Abstract: Unfortunately, despite explicit advertisements to the contrary, current science tends to conflate different notions of consciousness. While theories claim to target subjective experiences, they also count evidence concerning general wakefulness, cognition, and perception, as critical support. This means that most current theories are driven by severe experimental confounds. Putting theories aside, if we think about what subjective experiences really involve, I suggest that the relevant sensory representations need to be Assertoric, Relative (to each other), and thereby, Metacognitive (ARM). This kind of ARM content comes about because the brain has mechanisms that track the statistical properties of its own activities. Exercising these mechanisms is akin to applying a skill, which involves familiarity with one's own brain. Therefore, it is an implicit mnemonic process.

Abstract: Recollections of our personal past are often impressionistic, not so much for lack of detail but for a certain generality of subject matter. If you've made a journey many times, you may ‘relive’ it through memory without reliving a particular occasion. I offer an account of (what I will call) generalised remembering that treats it as a semantic phenomenon. In particular, it is the construction of an event representation that is temporally imprecise in virtue of referential indeterminacy. I recommend a plurivaluationist account of such indeterminacy that can fold into our broader theory of memory accuracy. Though distinct from the framework itself, I urge theorists to see generalised and specific recollections of events as psychologically continuous. As such, even resolutely systems-oriented projects ought not shelve generalised remembering as a separate kind or afterthought. And this also motivates the semantic account of generalised remembering over accounts which would suggest a qualitative difference in content or kind. I conclude that generalised remembering, though differentiated only by its semantic profile, warrants the attention it is slowly beginning to receive.

Abstract: What is the function of memory? Many in the recent literature have rejected the traditional view that memory merely functions to preserve previously acquired information, such as information acquired through perception (Burge, 1997; Goldman, 2009). Some of these recent views instead argue that memory generates new epistemic justifications (Bernecker & Grundmann, 2019; Miyazono & Tooming, 2023). This paper proceeds in the same spirit as the generativist views in the literature, but identifies understanding instead of epistemic justification as the kind of epistemic value that memory functions to generate. I argue that one of the functions of memory is to improve our understanding of subjects and systems represented in the contents that we previously acquired. This is possible thanks to the fact that the memory system further processes previously acquired information, especially during the memory consolidation process. Drawing on empirical research, I argue that the consolidation process systematically generates the specific type of representations that contribute to understanding: they make accessible underlying relationships between different components of the represented subject or system, and do so in a way that is adaptive to the agent’s goals. The consolidation process therefore significantly enhances our performance in generating representations that provide understanding.

Abstract: Human imagination is a complex, rich and highly developed cognitive ability, constituting an important part of human experience. Approaching human imagination from an evolutionary perspective raises questions such as: how has this complex ability evolved? What were the circumstances that led to the elaboration of this ability and what precursors needed to be in place? Finally, is imagination uniquely human, or is this ability more widespread across the animal kingdom? While the subjective qualities of imagination are difficult—if not impossible—to probe in non-linguistic animals, behavioural studies offer insights into whether non-human animals exhibit imaginative processes. In this talk, I propose that episodic-like memory is a foundational component of imagination, an evolutionarily necessary yet insufficient step toward its full development. This view relies on the link between episodic memory and imagination in humans, as suggested by proponents of constructive episodic simulation theory (and others). I examine the phylogenetic distribution of episodic-like memory and planning abilities across vertebrates, and conclude with a comparative framework that integrates both behavioural and neurophysiological data.

Abstract: This talk returns to the fundamental issues of habit, memory and time. Against the background of nineteenth-century French philosophy, the talk will first argue that habit, in its multiple forms, cannot be explained physiologically or materially. This will lead to the claim that the power of habit involves a primitive form of memory according to a non-linear, non-spatialising conception of time.

Abstract: TBA.

Abstract: TBA.