Abstract: Dreaming is a strangely neglected topic in philosophy, despite the use to which Cartesian sceptics have put it. This paper compares dream-narratives with memory-reports, arguing against the Analytic and popular consensus that the former are not memory-reports – there are vital differences as well as similarities. As Wittgenstein recognised, dream-narratives have authority – memory-reports, in contrast, are merely reliable. As in his account of pain, Wittgenstein rejects both Cartesianism and behaviourism: "Does this mean that it is nonsense ever to raise the question whether dreams really take place during sleep, or are a memory phenomenon of the awakened? It will turn on the use of the question." In this discussion, I am indebted to the work of Roger Squires (1940-2021).

Abstract: If episodic memory is an adaptation, what is its evolutionary function? A number of apparently conflicting answers have recently been offered to this question. It is not clear, however, how to adjudicate between these accounts: what should an adequate account of episodic memory's function do? Drawing on critical responses to existing accounts, I consider three prima-facie plausible desiderata on accounts of episodic memory's function. First, functional accounts of episodic memory should specify a selection-relevant benefit that outweighs the costs of episodic memory. Second, functional accounts should explain central, characteristic features of episodic memory, such as autonoetic consciousness. Third, functional accounts should explain the existence of episodic memory and not related but distinct phenomena. Whilst these desiderata all appear reasonable, I argue that they are difficult to justify once we grant the possibility that episodic memory may have developed gradually over a long period of evolutionary time – a possibility we should acknowledge, particularly given the emerging picture of animals' memory capacities. In light of this argument, I attempt to motivate some alternative desiderata for accounts of episodic memory's evolution.

Abstract: Many of our beliefs were originally acquired based on some evidential grounds, while we often do not remember their original grounds. In this talk, I examine how memory beliefs are justified after their original grounds were lost. In my view, acquiring a new belief and retaining it in memory require maintaining a variety of relevant dispositions, and acceptable theories of justification for memory beliefs have to take the epistemic roles of relevant dispositions into account. In light of the epistemic roles of relevant dispositions, I claim that retaining a once well-grounded belief without having sufficient grounds for it is rather exceptional.

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