Centre for Philosophy of Memory

PhilMemBib:
A comprehensive philosophy of memory bibliography

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The Centre for Philosophy of Memory is pleased to offer PhilMemBib, a comprehensive database of philosophical research on memory, as a service to the philosophy of memory community.

The database currently contains approximately 2400 entries. Entries are sorted by year, then by author, then by title. No date is given for forthcoming work, which appears first. Abstracts and DOIs are included where available, and URLs are included for online-only publications. BibTeX entries are provided for all items.

PhilMemBib was produced and is maintained by Kourken Michaelian with occasional support from research assistants. An initial list of entries was generated from Michaelian's personal files. Systematic searches were then performed using the Philosophers' Index, PhilPapers, Google Scholar, the archives of roughly a hundred journals, bibliographies of key works, and websites of researchers working in the area. The bibliography was first published in April 2019 and is updated on an ongoing basis. The html for this page is generated from a BibTeX file by JabRef using a modified version of a custom export filter.

Ideally, the database would include all and only philosophical work on memory. In practice, certain restrictions are necessary. One important restriction is temporal: PhilMemBib contains only work published since (roughly) the beginning of the twentieth century. Another is linguistic: PhilMemBib contains only English-language work. There are two reasons for the latter restriction. First, the overwhelming majority of contemporary research in the area is published in English. Second, it was practically infeasible to include work in all languages, and no other nonarbitrary set of languages could be defined. (Translations have, however, been included.) Several additional qualifications should be noted. Nonphilosophical work by philosophers (e.g., interdisciplinary collaborations of a primarily empirical character) has been excluded, and philosophical work by nonphilosophers has (where it engages with work by philosophers) been included. The emphasis of the database is on analytic philosophy; coverage of other approaches (e.g., phenomenology, nonwestern philosophy) may be relatively incomplete. Works primarily on topics other than memory but including significant discussions of memory have been included; nevertheless, coverage of certain debates in which memory has played important roles (e.g., content externalism, extended cognition, personal identity) may be limited. Dissertations and theses have been excluded, as have book reviews (though longer critical reviews or discussion notes have been included). Coverage is certainly better for more recent years than for earlier years and is most likely better for articles and books than for chapters in edited books. Very recent publications may not be included, and information about forthcoming publications may be incomplete or require updating. Please send any corrections or additions to Kourken Michaelian.

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author(s)	year	title	journal or book info	abstract	DOI/URL	BibTeX	file
Andonovski, N.		Engrams as mental files	Synthese	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Engrams—physical memory traces resulting from specific experiences—are the central posits of modern memory science. In this paper, I examine engrams through the lens of the theory of mental files. Integrating evidence from a variety of research programs, I argue that engrams exhibit the core functional properties of mental files. I characterize them as discrete informational structures, formed upon individual experiences of events and causally involved in their subsequent recall. Engrams are plausibly structurally complex in a file-like way, consisting of a stable hippocampal index, which may function as an atomic pointer-like component, and a distributed cortical representation of an event's properties. As such, they afford transmission of content and referential stability during potential content change. Their deployment is constitutive of the capacity for singular reference in episodically remembering particular previously experienced events. This emerging picture of engrams should engender reasonable optimism about the prospects of causal-representational theories of memory.
BibTeX: @article{AndonovskiForthcomingEngrams, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Engrams as mental files}, journal = {Synthese} }
Andonovski, N. and Michaelian, K.		Naturalism and simulationism in the philosophy of memory	Naturalism and Its Challenges	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this chapter, we examine the naturalist approach in the philosophy of memory through the lens of the simulation theory of memory. On the theory, episodic memory is a kind of constructive simulation performed by a functionally specialized neurocognitive system. Taking naturalism to be a kind of methodological stance characterized by a cluster of epistemic guidelines, we illustrate the roles these guidelines have played in the development of the theory. We show how scientific evidence has guided both the selection of the research question and the initial elaboration of the theory. We demonstrate how such evidence has led the simulationist to reject a familiar, commonsense picture of memory. We also trace the recent radicalization of the theory, highlighting the simulationist's continual reflection on their concepts and assumptions. In the spirit of such reflection, we end by outlining some outstanding challenges for the theory
BibTeX: @article{AndonovskiForthcomingNaturalism, author = {Andonovski, Nikola and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Naturalism and simulationism in the philosophy of memory}, journal = {Naturalism and Its Challenges}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003430568-15} }
Aronowitz, S.		Semanticization challenges the episodic/semantic distinction	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic and semantic memory are often taken to be fundamentally diierent mental systems, and contemporary philosophers often pursue research questions about episodic memory, in particular, in isolation from semantic memory. This paper challenges that assumption , and puts pressure on philosophical approaches to memory that break oo episodic memory as its own standalone topic. I present and systematize psychological and neuro-scientiic theories of semanticization, the thesis that memory content tends to drift from episodic to semantic in structure over time and exposure to an environment. Semanticiza-tion, I argue, is a long-term interconnection between episodic and semantic systems that requires approaching both the content and function of these two memory systems as a whole. Thus we have a reason to reject projects by Michael Martin, which aims to carve out a uniquely episodic memory content, and Kourken Michaelian, which pairs episodic memory to its own unique function. Instead, seeing declarative memory as a single system with two facets or even a continuum of features allows for deeper insight into both content and function.
BibTeX: @article{AronowitzForthcomingSemanticization, author = {Aronowitz, Sara}, title = {Semanticization challenges the episodic/semantic distinction}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/721760} }
Barnett, D.J.		Internalism, stored beliefs, and forgotten evidence	Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{BarnettForthcomingInternalism, author = {Barnett, David James}, title = {Internalism, stored beliefs, and forgotten evidence}, booktitle = {Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology}, editor = {Goldberg, Sanford and Wright, Stephen}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Bassford, A.D.		PTSD and Rilkean memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This is a paper on the philosophical clinical psychology of PTSD. How best to improve our treatment plans for the disorder is the primary imperative in the clinical literature. Our failure to properly treat those suffering from PTSD up until now could be either the result of merely a problem in practice or, more seriously, a problem in principle. In this essay, I explore three possible accounts consistent with the supposition that what we have here is a problem in principle. I call the first the “Somatic” hypothesis; the second, the “Memorial”; and the third, a “Rilkean” hypothesis of PTSD, which is inspired by the recent work of M. Rowlands (2015, 2017). The first two have been more-or-less articulated previously; the third is introduced here for the first time. The primary argument of this essay is abductive: I argue in favor of a Rilkean Memory hypothesis of PTSD by comparing it to the other two accounts and showing that it possesses greater theoretical virtue than they do. I then conclude the essay by noting certain limitations with the account here sketched, nonetheless suggesting that this hypothesis can open up new avenues of clinical research and treatment options for the disorder.
BibTeX: @article{BassfordForthcomingPTSD, author = {Bassford, Andrew Dennis}, title = {PTSD and Rilkean memory}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00750-z} }
Bielecka, K.		Confabulations in Korsakoff's syndrome: Defending an error-based account	Erkenntnis	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper investigates confabulations in Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) from the per- spective of error-based teleosemantics, a framework that emphasizes the role of error detection in mental representation. I introduce a distributed and communica- tive model of memory, framing it as a network of information transfer encompass- ing both internal cognitive processes and external social interactions. This model, grounded in teleosemantics, allows for an understanding of how confabulations arise not solely from internal memory deficits, but also from disruptions in the feedback loops between individuals and their social environments. By analyzing cases of pro- voked and spontaneous confabulations in KS patients, I demonstrate how this frame- work illuminates the crucial role of external consumers (e.g., caregivers) in either reinforcing or correcting erroneous memory reports. This approach, emphasizing error detection mechanisms, offers a new lens for examining the interplay between individual cognitive processes and social scaffolding in shaping memory and its pathologies.
BibTeX: @article{BieleckaForthcomingConfabulations, author = {Bielecka, Krystyna}, title = {Confabulations in Korsakoff's syndrome: Defending an error-based account}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00857-w} }
Bigg, A., Latham, A., Miller, K. and Yechimovitz, S.		Episodic imagining, temporal experiences, and beliefs about time	Phillosophy and Phenomenological Research	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to increase the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to decrease the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports.
BibTeX: @article{BiggForthcomingEpisodic, author = {Bigg, Anthony and Latham, Andrew and Miller, Kristie and Yechimovitz, Shira}, title = {Episodic imagining, temporal experiences, and beliefs about time}, journal = {Phillosophy and Phenomenological Research}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13054} }
Blomkvist, A.		Imagination, creativity, and aphantasia	Oxford Handbook of Imagination and Creativity Oxford University Press	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter focuses on the role of the imagination in creativity, using aphantasia as a case study. It first distinguishes between imagination and mental imagery, before giving an overview of what we know about aphantasia to date, focusing in particular on findings pertaining to creativity, imagination, and memory. It then turns to the role of the imagination in creativity, agreeing with philosophers that the imagination plays an essential role in creativity, which allows individuals to imagine a multitude of possibilities. This view is then supplemented with a theory of the neuro-cognitive underpinnings of the imagination, whereby both the imagination and memory are supported by the same neural network – the default mode network. Finally, the chapter argues that this fuller picture allows us to understand the creative abilities of people with aphantasia, thoroughly resisting the thought that they might generally be unimaginative or uncreative.
BibTeX: @incollection{BlomkvistForthcomingImagination, author = {Blomkvist, Andrea}, title = {Imagination, creativity, and aphantasia}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Imagination and Creativity}, editor = {Langkau, Julia and Kind, Amy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Boyle, A. and Brown, S.A.B.		Why might animals remember? A functional framework for episodic memory research in comparative psychology	Learning & Behavior	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of Clayton’s major contributions to our understanding of animal minds has been her work on episodic-like memory. A central reason for the success of this work was its focus on ecological validity: rather than looking for episodic memory for arbitrary stimuli in artificial contexts, focussing on contexts in which episodic memory would serve a biological function such as food caching. This review aims to deepen this insight by surveying the numerous functions that have been proposed for episodic memory, articulating a philosophically grounded framework for understanding what exactly functions are, and drawing on these to make suggestions for future directions in the comparative cognitive psychology of episodic memory. Our review suggests four key insights. First, episodic memory may have more than one function and may have different functions in different species. Second, cross-disciplinary work is key to developing a functional account of episodic memory. Third, there is scope for further theoretical elaboration of proposals relating episodic memory to food caching and, in particular, future-oriented cognition. Finally, learning-related functions suggested by AI (artificial intelligence)-based models are a fruitful avenue for future behavioural research.
BibTeX: @article{BoyleForthcomingWhy, author = {Boyle, Alexandria and Brown, Simon A. B.}, title = {Why might animals remember? A functional framework for episodic memory research in comparative psychology}, journal = {Learning & Behavior}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3758/s13420-024-00645-0} }
Byrne, E.A.		Narrative deference	Topoi	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent work on distributed cognition and self-narrative has emphasised how autobiographical memories and their narra- tion are, rather than being stored and created by an individual, distributed across embodied organisms and their environ- ment. This paper postulates a stronger form of distributed narration than has been accommodated in the literature so far, which I call narrative deference. This describes the phenomena whereby a person is significantly dependent upon another person for the narration of some significant aspect of their own autobiographical self-narrative. I suggest that a person is more likely to narratively defer where they suffer a mnemonic impairment regarding some significant adverse life experi- ence like trauma, illness or injury. Following a recent turn in the literature towards investigating the harmful aspects of distributed cognition as well as its many advantageous features, this paper explores how the benefits of autobiographical self-narrative deference within close personal relationships are complexly related to its harms.
BibTeX: @article{ByrneForthcomingNarrative, author = {Byrne, Eleanor A.}, title = {Narrative deference}, journal = {Topoi}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10105-z} }
Caravà, M.		Norm-induced forgetting:When social norms induce us to forget	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Sometimes subjects have sufficient internal and external resources to retrieve information stored in memory, in particular information that carries socially charged content. Yet, they fail to do so: they forget it. These cases pose an explanatory challenge to common explanations of forgetting in cognitive science. In this paper, I take this challenge and develop a new explanation of these cases. According to this explanation, these cases are best explained as cases of norm- induced forgetting: cases in which forgetting is caused by social norms in a relevant sense. These cases draw attention to the normative aspects of the mechanisms of forgetting. This is an important but neglected aspect of cases of everyday forgetting, in particular of those characterized by a social dimension. By investigating some ways in which the psychology of social norms is causally relevant in the mechanisms of retrieval failure, I begin to fill this gap.
BibTeX: @article{CaravaForthcomingNorm, author = {Caravà, Marta}, title = {Norm-induced forgetting:When social norms induce us to forget}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2352549} }
Cochrane, T.		Imagination, endogenous attention, and mental agency	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper develops a mechanistic account of basic mental agency by identifying similarities between two of its major exemplars: endogenous attention and imagination. Five key similarities are identified: (i) that both capacities are driven by currently prioritised goals that are either person-level or apt to become person-level. (ii) that both deliver their outputs to the working memory (iii) that both range across all and only conceptual contents; (iv) that both proceed under the guidance of norms and/or habits; and (v) that both directly activate rather than inhibit content. These five features are consolidated by proposing that basic mental agency is essentially the power to call for conceptual content and hold it within our working memories.
BibTeX: @article{CochraneForthcomingImagination, author = {Cochrane, Tom}, title = {Imagination, endogenous attention, and mental agency}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09909-y} }
Coliva, A. and Palmira, M.		Immunity to error through misidentification: Some trends	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to a prominent strand of thought in analytic philosophy of mind, certain judgments of the form “a is F” are such that, although one can be mistaken about what property it is that a has, one cannot be mistaken that it is a that has the relevant property. Judgments of this kind are said to be immune to error through misidentification (IEM). This article has two main aims. On the one hand, it responds to a need for a systematization of the debate about immunity to error through misidentification, which consists of multiple contributions in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics that have accumulated throughout the last 80 years – since the publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Blue Book – and which no one – to the best of our knowledge – has drawn together in an exhaustive and accessible way. On the other hand, the article will take a stand on matters concerning the nature, scope, explanation, and significance of immunity to error through misidentification.
BibTeX: @article{ColivaForthcomingImmunity, author = {Coliva, Annalisa and Palmira, Michele}, title = {Immunity to error through misidentification: Some trends}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2024.2371423} }
Colombetti, G. and Bogota, J.D.		The tacitly situated self: From narration to sedimentation and projection	Topoi	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent analytic-philosophical works in the field of situated cognition have proposed to conceptualize the self as deeply entwined with the environment, and even as constituted by it. A common move has been to characterize the self in narrative terms, and then to argue that the narrative self is partly constituted by narratives about the past that are scaffolded (shaped and maintained) by, or distributed over, a variety of objects that can rekindle episodic memories. While we are sympathetic to these approaches, here we propose a different strategy to situate the self—one which can be seen as complementing the narrative one, and which draws from concepts and ideas central to the phenomenological-existentialist tradition. We suggest, first, that the self has a sense of its past not just via narratives and episodic memories, but in virtue of being embodied and thus, importantly, sedimented (in other words, it has, or rather is, a body memory). Embodiment and sedimentation, in turn, always necessarily imply an environment or a situation, entailing that the self is also inherently situated. Second, we discuss the future-oriented dimension of selfhood, and argue that we understand ourselves as projected into the future, again not necessarily only narratively and reflectively, but also tacitly, in a bodily and inherently situated way.
BibTeX: @article{ColombettiForthcomingTacitly, author = {Colombetti, Giovanna and Bogota, Juan Diego}, title = {The tacitly situated self: From narration to sedimentation and projection}, journal = {Topoi}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10044-9} }
De Brigard, F.		'Repressed memory' makes no sense	Topics in Cognitive Science	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The expression ''repressed memory'' was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud's seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked---yet the term ''repressed memory'' seems to remain. In this paper I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have either survived scientific change---such as ''atom'' or ''gene''---or that have perished, such as ''black bile''. Ultimately, I argue that ''repressed memory'' is more like ''black bile'' than ''atom'' or ''gene'' and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigardForthcomingRepressed, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {'Repressed memory' makes no sense}, journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12677} }
Dorsch, J.		Are noetic feelings embodied? The case for embodied metacognition	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One routinely undergoes a noetic feeling (also called ''metacognitive feeling'' or ''epistemic feeling''), the so-called ''feeling of knowing'', whenever trying to recall a person's name. One feels the name is known despite being unable to recall it. Other experiences also fall under this category, e.g., the tip-of-the-tongue experience, the feeling of confidence. A distinguishing characteristic of noetic feelings is how they are crucially related to the facts we know, so much so that the activation of semantic memory can easily result in the production of noetic feelings -- a regularity that memory research has often exploited. And yet little is known about the mechanism that produces noetic feelings. Is it solely brain-based or does it depend upon the extracerebral body for its production of feelings? To arrive at an answer, various studies in metamemory research will be analyzed to determine what ought to be made of the mechanism responsible for noetic feelings. I argue that evidence suggests that it relies upon extracerebral processes, in particular cardiovascular processes, the result being support for an embodied view of metacognition.
BibTeX: @article{DorschForthcomingAre, author = {Dorsch, John}, title = {Are noetic feelings embodied? The case for embodied metacognition}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2197937} }
Dranseika, V.		Memory as evidence of personal identity: A study on reincarnation beliefs	Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DranseikaForthcomingMemory, author = {Dranseika, Vilius}, title = {Memory as evidence of personal identity: A study on reincarnation beliefs}, booktitle = {Experimental Philosophy of Identity and the Self}, editor = {Tobia, Kevin}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
Fabry, R.E.		Distributed autobiographical memories, distributed self-narratives	Mind & Language	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Richard Heersmink argues that self-narratives are distributed across embodied organisms and their environment, given that their building blocks, autobiographical memories, are distributed. This argument faces two problems. First, it commits a fallacy of composition. Second, it relies on Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view, which is incompatible with the distributed cognition framework. To solve these problems, this article develops an alternative account of self-narratives. On this account, we actively connect distributed autobiographical memories through distributed conversational and textual self-narrative practices. This account enhances our understanding of the memory--narrative nexus and has implications for philosophical conceptions of self.
BibTeX: @article{FabryForthcomingDistributed, author = {Fabry, Regina E.}, title = {Distributed autobiographical memories, distributed self-narratives}, journal = {Mind & Language}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12453} }
Fernandez-Velasco, P., Nijman, J. and Casati, R.		The cognitive advantages of the notebook	Cognitive Semiotics	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Notebooks are widely used in a large number of professional and everyday life contexts. The notebook has been widely mentioned in the context of distributed cognition, the extended mind hypothesis and the study of cognitive artefacts. Despite its ubiquity and almost paradigmatic status, to date, there is no dedicated analysis of the notebook qua cognitive artefact, to explain its success and its resilience. Our aim is to fill this gap in the literature by studying a set of cognitive advantages of the notebook. For our analysis, we employ the methodological framework of distributed cognition. Using this framework, we find a series of cognitive advantages at both an individual and at a group level. At an individual level, these include external non-biological memory, the consolidation of long-term biological memory encoding, effects on attention modulation, an enhancement in metacognition and the graphication of thought. At the group level, the cognitive advantages include collaboration, the transference of content from one user to another, group-level metacognition, coordination, and the transformation of the overall epistemological setting in which notebook use takes place.
BibTeX: @article{FernandezVelascoForthcomingCognitive, author = {Fernandez-Velasco, Pablo and Nijman, Jade and Casati, Roberto}, title = {The cognitive advantages of the notebook}, journal = {Cognitive Semiotics}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2023-2003} }
Goldwasser, S.		Remembering is an imaginative project	Philosophical Studies			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{GoldwasserForthcomingRemembering, author = {Goldwasser, Seth}, title = {Remembering is an imaginative project}, journal = {Philosophical Studies} }
Golwasser, S. and Springle, A.		Trauma, trust, & competent testimony	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Public discourse implicitly appeals to what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” (TUA). To motivate, articulate, and assess the TUA, we appeal to Hawley’s (2019) commitment account of trust and trustworthiness. On Hawley’s account, being trustworthy consists in the successful avoidance of unfulfilled commitments and involves three components: the actual avoidance of unfulfilled commitments, sincerity in one’s taking on elective commitments, and competence in fulfilling commitments one has incurred. In contexts of testimony, what’s at issue is the speaker’s competence and sincere intention to speak truthfully. The TUA targets trauma victims’ competence rather than their sincerity. According to the TUA, empirical evidence shows that trauma undermines victims’ trustworthiness with regard to speaking truthfully about their trauma by undermining their competence to remember the relevant event. We argue that what the evidence shows is rather that remembering traumatic events involves a distinct “mode of manifesting” the competence to remember particular events from the personal past. Trauma victims are competent to speak truthfully about their trauma and ought to be trusted at least with regard to the central details of the event. By suggesting otherwise, the TUA threatens an insidious form of epistemic injustice which Hawley’s account helps us locate.
BibTeX: @article{GoldwasserForthcomingTrauma, author = {Golwasser, Seth and Springle, Alison}, title = {Trauma, trust, & competent testimony}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2247011} }
Gomez-Lavin, J.		Working memory is as working memory does: A pluralist take on the center of the mind	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Working memory is thought to be the psychological capacity that enables us to maintain or manipulate information no longer in our environment for goal-directed action. Recent work argues that working memory is not a so-called natural kind and in turn cannot explain the cognitive processes attributed to it. This paper first clarifies the scope of this earlier critique and argues for a pluralist account of working memory. Under this account, working memory is variously realized by many mechanisms that con- tribute to the maintenance and manipulation of information across tasks. This view in effect updates one of the earliest pluralist formulations of working memory. Juxtaposing this view against deflationary descriptions allows us to delineate two gradients that help us chart various accounts of working memory and identify their respective theoretical commitments. In turn, we can isolate those accounts that fail to accord with the evidence supporting a pluralist view, and we can begin to rehabilitate working memory as a pluralist, and ultimately more informative, construct.
BibTeX: @article{GomezLavinForthcomingWorking, author = {Gomez-Lavin, Javier}, title = {Working memory is as working memory does: A pluralist take on the center of the mind}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1696} }
Gregory, D.		Dreams	The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies Palgrave	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Three questions arise about the relationship between dreams and memory. First, how reliably can we remember and report dreams? The privacy of dreams means that it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that we can recall and report our dreams reliably, but there are some empirical reasons to have some confidence in dream reports. Second, can we have memories during dreams? It is rare to have a dream experience which would be considered an episodic memory, if we apply strict criteria, but many dreams incorporate aspects of waking experiences. Third, do dreams play a role in memory consolidation? The evidence on this question is mixed and no confident statement is possible, although the notion that sleep is important for memory consolidation is well supported.
BibTeX: @incollection{GregoryForthcomingDreams, author = {Gregory, Daniel}, title = {Dreams}, booktitle = {The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies}, editor = {Bietti, L. and Pogačar, M.}, publisher = {Palgrave}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_40-1} }
Gyollai, D.		Collaborative inhibition: A phenomenological perspective	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The tendency for people to remember less as members of a group than they would be capable of were they to remember alone is a phenomenon known as collabora- tive inhibition. The article offers a phenomenological account of this highly coun- terintuitive effect of group remembering. It argues that the mutual failure to live up to one’s potential does not warrant the standard, strongly negative views about the role of others in recall. Rather, the phenomenon may imply that sharedness itself becomes constitutive of the process in the sense that interaction partners co- determine what and how to remember. Drawing on phenomenological approaches to remembering and second-person engagement, the article argues that individuals participating in shared remembering co-construct their memories by reciprocally and dynamically incorporating each other’s perspectives, attitudes, and emotions about their shared past.
BibTeX: @article{GyollaiForthcomingCollaborative, author = {Gyollai, Daniel}, title = {Collaborative inhibition: A phenomenological perspective}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00748-7} }
Han, W.		Can memory color effects be explained by cognitive penetration?	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Orange heart shapes are commonly perceived as slightly reddish, which is an example of the memory color effect (MCE). Given that the MCE is a modulation of visual memories of typical colors of familiar objects, it can be considered to be a top-down effect. Whether cognitive penetration can explain MCEs has been actively debated since Macpherson argued that the belief that hearts are red alters orange perception. This paper aims to provide a credible explanation of the MCE that is consistent with scientific studies. I first prove that Macpherson's theory is not properly supported by the psychological evidence that she provides. I also show that her model contradicts a report on the neural correlate of the MCE. Next, I examine color constancy, which enables the perception of colors as constant under various illuminations, as a possible noncognitive principle for the MCE. The relationship between them, however, is not well established. Using statistical analyses of scenes around us, Purves suggests that perception is determined by the most frequent percepts. I argue that Purves' view better explains the noncognitive aspects of visual memory and is consistent with the finding of the neural correlate of the MCE.
BibTeX: @article{HanForthcomingCan, author = {Han, Woojin}, title = {Can memory color effects be explained by cognitive penetration?}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2201265} }
Heersmink, R.		History of memory artifacts	Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies Palgrave	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Human biological memory systems have adapted to use technological artifacts to overcome some of the limitations of these systems. For example, when performing a difficult calculation, we use pen and paper to create and store external number symbols; when remembering our appointments, we use a calendar; when remembering what to buy, we use a shopping list. This chapter looks at the history of memory artifacts, describing the evolution from cave paintings to virtual reality. It first characterizes memory artifacts, memory systems, and the two main functions such artifacts have, which are to aid individual users in completing memory tasks and as a cultural inheritance channel (section 2). It then outlines some of our first symbolic practices such as making cave paintings and figurines, and then moves on to outline several key developments in external representational systems and the artifacts that support these such as written language, numeral systems and counting devices, diagrams and maps, measuring devices, libraries and archives, photographs, analogue and digital computational artifacts, the World Wide Web, virtual reality, and smartphones (section 3). After that, it makes some brief points about the cumulative nature of the cultural evolution of memory artifacts and speculates about the possible future of memory artifacts, arguing that it is very difficult to look beyond an epistemological horizon of more than five years (section 4).
BibTeX: @incollection{HeersminkForthcomingHistory, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {History of memory artifacts}, booktitle = {Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies}, editor = {Bietti, L., and Pogačar, M.}, publisher = {Palgrave}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_82-1} }
Hinchmann, E.		The role of assurance in judgment and memory	Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{HinchmannForthcomingRole, author = {Hinchmann, Edward}, title = {The role of assurance in judgment and memory}, booktitle = {Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology}, editor = {Goldberg, Sanford C. and Wright, Stephen}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Jahangiri, M. and Faruque, M.U.		Toward a neuro-ethics in Islamic philosophy: Trauma, memory, and personal identity	Sophia	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This study deals specifically with one of the most relevant issues in neuro-ethics, namely the philosophical classification of so-called memory dampening, which refers to the attenuation of traumatic memories with the help of medication. Numerous neuroethical questions emerge from this issue. For example, how is a person’s identity affected by using such drugs? Does one still remain the same person? Would propranolol, for example, as a memory-dampening agent lead to a fundamental change in one’s identity? Are not a person’s negative memories also part of their identity and present personality? These questions are examined from the perspective of the seventeenth-century Islamic philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā. The goal is to shed light on the neuroethical foundations of memory dampening and personal identity from an Islamic philosophical perspective.
BibTeX: @article{JahangiriForthcomingToward, author = {Jahangiri, Mona and Faruque, Muhammed U.}, title = {Toward a neuro-ethics in Islamic philosophy: Trauma, memory, and personal identity}, journal = {Sophia}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-023-00997-6} }
Klein, S.B.		Consider the source: An examination of the effects of externally and internally generated content on memory	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Drawing on ideas from philosophy (in particular, epistemology), I argue that one of memory's most important functions is to provide its owner with knowledge of the physical world. This knowledge helps satisfy the organism's need to confer stability on an ever-changing reality so the objects in which it consists can be identified and reidentified. I then draw a distinction between sources of knowledge (i.e., from physical vs. subjective reality) and argue---based on evolutionary principles---that because memory was designed by natural selection to interface with the physical world, knowledge acquired via sensory/perceptual experiences should be better remembered than internally generated knowledge made available by introspection. A study conducted to test this hypothesis provides support. I conclude that a serious interdisciplinary approach to issues typically considered the purview of psychology best enables researchers to craft well-specified, theoretically based hypotheses that directly target functions of the mind.
BibTeX: @article{KleinForthcomingConsider, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Consider the source: An examination of the effects of externally and internally generated content on memory}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000339} }
Lai, C.		Is 'remembering' a normative concept?	International Journal of Philosophical Studies	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is a substantial disagreement in the literature over whether ‘remember- ing’ is a normative concept. Some philosophers have attempted to defend the normativity of ‘remembering’ by highlighting its normative importance or its conceptual affinities with ‘knowing’ or ‘duties’. This paper will first reveal defects of these existing normativist arguments. After that, I will propose and defend a new normativist argument, according to which the concept ‘remembering’ is partly constituted by a paradigmatically normative concept, namely ‘rational’. To be more specific, I argue that full possession of the concept of ‘remembering’ requires having an inclination to believe that ‘if S remembers that p, then S would be (at least defeasibly) rational in holding a memory-based belief that p’. This, according to a persuasive constitutive account of normative con- cepts, suffices to demonstrate the normative nature of remembering.
BibTeX: @article{LaiForthcomingIs, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Is 'remembering' a normative concept?}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2024.2390832} }
Liefke, K.		Just simulating? Linguistic support for continuism about remembering and imagining	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Much recent work in philosophy of memory discusses the question whether episodic remembering is continuous with imagining. This paper contributes to the debate between continuists and discontinuists by considering a previously neglected source of evidence for continuism: the linguistic properties of overt memory and imagina- tion reports (e.g. sentences of the form ‘x remembers/imagines p’). I argue that the distribution and truth-conditional contribution of episodic uses of the English verb remember is surprisingly similar to that of the verb imagine – even when compared to the distribution of other experiential attitude verbs like see, hallucinate, or dream. This holds despite the presence of some remarkable truth-conditional differences between remember and imagine. I show how these differences can be explained by a con- tinuist account of remembering, on which remembering is past-directed, referential, and accurate experiential imagining.
BibTeX: @article{LiefkeForthcomingJust, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Just simulating? Linguistic support for continuism about remembering and imagining}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-024-00751-y} }
Liefke, K. and Werning, M.		Diachronicity matters! How semantics supports discontinuism about remembering and imagining	Topoi	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Much work in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience has argued for continuism about remembering and imagining (see, e.g., Addis J R Soc N Z 48(2–3):64–88, 2018). This view claims that episodic remembering is just a form of imagining, such that memory does not have a privileged status over other forms of episodic simulation (esp. imagination). Large parts of contemporary philosophy of memory support continuism. This even holds for work in semantics and the philosophy of language, which has pointed out substantial similarities in the distribution of the verbs remember and imagine. Our paper argues against the continuist claim, by focusing on a previously neglected source of evidence for discontinuism: the semantics of episodic memory and imagination reports. We argue that, in contrast to imagination reports, episodic memory reports are essentially diachronic, in the sense that their truth requires a foregoing reference-fixing experience. In this respect, they differ from reports of experiential imagination, which is paradigmatically synchronic. To defend our claim about this difference in diachronicity, we study the truth-conditions of episodic memory and imagination reports. We develop a semantics for episodic uses of remember and imagine that captures this difference.
BibTeX: @article{LiefkeForthcomingDiachronicity, author = {Liefke, Kristina and Werning, Markus}, title = {Diachronicity matters! How semantics supports discontinuism about remembering and imagining}, journal = {Topoi}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10068-1} }
Masny, M.		Junk, numerosity, and the demands of epistemic consequentialism	Erkenntnis	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Epistemic consequentialism has been challenged on the grounds that it is overly demanding. According to the Epistemic Junk Problem, this view implies that we are often required to believe junk propositions such as ‘the Great Bear Lake is the largest lake entirely in Canada’ and long disjunctions of things we already believe. According to the Numerosity Problem, this view implies that we are frequently required to have an enormous number of beliefs. This paper puts forward a novel version of epistemic consequentialism that avoids these twin demandingness problems. The key is to recognise, first, that the final epistemic value of a true belief depends at least partially on the duration for which it is retained by the agent and, second, that our cognitive make-up places important constraints on which beliefs are retained and for how long.
BibTeX: @article{MasnyForthcomingJunk, author = {Masny, Michal}, title = {Junk, numerosity, and the demands of epistemic consequentialism}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00741-z} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Andonovski, N.		Episodic memory as a mindshaped capacity	The Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarrollForthcomingEpisodic, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Episodic memory as a mindshaped capacity}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping}, editor = {Zawidski, Tadeusz}, publisher = {Routledge} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Sutton, J.		Perspective	Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies Palgrave	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The imagery we adopt when recalling the personal past may involve different perspectives. In many cases, we remember the past event from our original point of view. In some cases, however, we remember the past event from an external ‘observer’ perspective and view ourselves in the remembered scene. Are such observer perspective images genuine memories? Are they accurate representations of the personal past? This chapter focuses on such observer perspectives in memory, and outlines and examines proposals about the nature of such imagery.
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarrollForthcomingPerspective, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sutton, John}, title = {Perspective}, booktitle = {Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies}, editor = {Bietti, L. and Pogačar, M.}, publisher = {Palgrave} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Yan, K.		Mourning a death foretold: Memory and mental time travel in anticipatory grief	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Grief is a complex emotional experience or process, which is typically felt in response to the death of a loved one, most typically a family member, child, or partner. Yet the way in which grief manifests is much more complex than this. The things we grieve over are multiple and diverse. We may grieve for a former partner after the breakup of a relationship; parents sometimes report experiencing grief when their grown-up children leave the family home. We can also experience grief for people we have never met. Indeed, it is not just persons that we may grieve for. People report feeling grief over the death of their pets, or about the destruction the natural environment. In all these cases one factor that seems to stand out is loss. Despite being about very different things, these various forms of grief all involve a loss of some sort. Yet there is a further aspect of grief, which, on the face of it, does not quite follow this pattern. Grief can also be experienced before a loss has occurred. Grief can be experienced while the person that one is grieving for is still living and before one has (fully) suffered the loss. This phenomenon is known as anticipatory grief. The experience of anticipatory grief is a complex phenomenon, which resists easy classification. Nonetheless, we suggest that mental time travel, our ability to mentally project ourselves into the personal past (episodic memory) and personal future (episodic prospection), is a key mechanism that underpins experiences of anticipatory grief. Anticipatory grief can still be understood in terms of loss, but it is a loss that is brought to mind through memory and imagination.
BibTeX: @article{McCarrollForthcomingMourning, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Yan, Karen}, title = {Mourning a death foretold: Memory and mental time travel in anticipatory grief}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09956-z} }
Michaelian, K. and Wall, C.		When misremembering goes online: The "Mandela Effect" as collective confabulation	Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology Oxford University Press	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent years, popular fora have seen lively discussion of the "Mandela Effect". So called in reference to the paradigm case of a widely-shared apparent memory of Nelson Mandela's death in prison in the 1980s, the effect occurs, roughly speaking, when individuals who have never met develop highly similar memories of events that never took place. Popular explanations of this phenomenon-e.g., that the seemingly inaccurate memories in question are in fact accurate memories of events that took place in parallel universes-are, to put it mildly, fanciful, and the academic literature so far contains little discussion of the effect or of the mechanisms that might be responsible for its occurrence. The goal of this chapter is to make a case for the existence of the Mandela Effect as a novel collective memory error worthy of serious scholarly scrutiny and to sketch a general account of the mechanisms that give rise to it. We argue, in particular, that the effect is an instance of collective confabulation, maintaining that this error occurs when individual misremembering goes online: whereas, in typical offline environments, subjects who give voice to mismemories about publicly-accessible events of the sort at issue in the Mandela Effect will usually encounter contradictory testimony, subjects who do so in the unusual environments constituted by certain online discussion fora may instead encounter confirmatory testimony, resulting in the reinforcement and stabilization of their mismemories and leading to convergence on shared but inaccurate representations of the past.
BibTeX: @incollection{MichaelianForthcomingWhen, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Wall, Chloe}, title = {When misremembering goes online: The "Mandela Effect" as collective confabulation}, booktitle = {Memory and Testimony: New Essays in Epistemology}, editor = {Goldberg, Sanford C. and Wright, Stephen}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Millière, R.		Constitutive self-consciousness	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness has a long philosophical history, and has received renewed support in recent years. My aim in this paper is to argue that this surprisingly enduring idea is misleading at best, and insufficiently supported at worst. I start by offering an elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish two notions of self- consciousness: consciousness of oneself and consciousness of one’s experience. While ‘self- consciousness’ is often taken to refer to the former notion, the most common variant of the constitutive claim, on which I focus here, targets the latter. This claim can be further interpreted in two ways: on a deflationary reading, it falls within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on an inflationary reading, it points to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary reading of the constitutive claim is plausible, but should be formulated without using a term as polysemous and suggestive as ‘self- consciousness’; by contrast, the inflationary reading is not adequately supported, and ultimately rests on contentious intuitions about phenomenology. I conclude that we should abandon the idea that self-consciousness is constitutive of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{MilliereForthcomingConstitutive, author = {Millière, Raphaël}, title = {Constitutive self-consciousness}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy} }
Myers, J.		The epistemic role of vividness	Analysis	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The vividness of mental imagery is epistemically relevant. Intuitively, vivid and intense memories are epistemically better than weak and hazy memories, and using a clear and precise mental image in the service of spatial reasoning is epistemically better than using a blurry and imprecise mental image. But how is vividness epistemically relevant? I argue that vividness is higher-order evidence about one’s epistemic state, rather than first-order evidence about the world. More specifically, the vividness of a mental image is higher- order evidence about the amount of first-order information one has about its subject matter. When vividness is sufficiently low, it can give one reason to doubt the epistemic basis of the mental image and thereby act as a defeater. This account has important implications for theorizing about the epistemic roles of memory, imagination, mental imagery, and phenomenal consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{MyersForthcomingEpistemic, author = {Myers, Joshua}, title = {The epistemic role of vividness}, journal = {Analysis} }
Najenson, J.		Encoding without perceiving: Can memories be implanted?	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The origin of memories is thought to be found in sensory perception. This conception is central to how the memory sciences characterize encoding. This paper considers how novel memory traces can be formed independently of external sensory inputs. I present a case study in which memory traces are created without sensory perception using a technique I call optogenetic memory implantation. Comparing this artificial process with normal memory encoding, I consider its implications for rethinking the causal chain that leads to remembering.
BibTeX: @article{NajensonForthcomingEncoding, author = {Najenson, Jonathan}, title = {Encoding without perceiving: Can memories be implanted?}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2295927} }
Najenson, J.		LTP revisited: Reconsidering the explanatory power of synaptic efficacy	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Changes in synaptic strength are described as a unifying hypothesis for memory formation and storage, leading philosophers to consider the ‘synaptic efficacy hypothesis’ as a paradigmatic explanation in neuroscience. Craver’s mosaic view has been influential in understanding synaptic efficacy by presenting long-term potentiation as a multi-level mechanism nested within a multi-level structure. This paper argues that the mosaic view fails to fully capture the explanatory power of the synaptic efficacy hypothesis due to assumptions about multi-level mechanisms. I present an alternative approach that emphasizes the explanatory function of unification, accounting for the widespread consensus in neuroscience regarding synaptic efficacy by highlighting the stability of synaptic causal variables across different multi-level mechanisms.
BibTeX: @article{NajensonForthcomingLTP, author = {Najenson, Jonathan}, title = {LTP revisited: Reconsidering the explanatory power of synaptic efficacy}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-023-00694-w} }
Najenson, J.		Memory systems and the mnemic character of procedural memory	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to a standard view in psychology and neuroscience, there are multiple memory systems in the brain. Philosophers and scientists of memory rely on the idea that there are multiple memory systems in the brain to infer that procedural memory is not a cognitive form of memory. As a result, memory is considered to be a disunified capacity. In this paper, I evaluate two criteria used by Michaelian to demarcate between cognitive and non-cognitive memory systems: appeal to stored content and retrieval flexibility. By considering several empirical cases I argue that the criteria offered ultimately fail to distinguish between memory systems. The procedural memory system is neither contentless nor inflexible.
BibTeX: @article{NajensonForthcomingMemory, author = {Najenson, Jonathan}, title = {Memory systems and the mnemic character of procedural memory}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science} }
Parker Haratine, T.		Augustine on memory, the mind and the human flourishing	British Journal for the History of Philosophy		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{ParkerHaratineForthcomingAugustine, author = {Parker Haratine, T.}, title = {Augustine on memory, the mind and the human flourishing}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2024.2315083} }
Perrin, D., Moulin, C.J.A. and Sant'Anna, A.		Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view	Philosophical Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience.
BibTeX: @article{PerrinForthcomingDeja, author = {Perrin, Denis and Moulin, Chris J. A. and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2161357} }
Puddifoot, K. and Trakas, M.		Fear generalization and mnemonic injustice	Episteme	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper focuses on how experiences of trauma can lead to generalized fear of people, objects and places that are similar or contextually or conceptually related to those that produced the initial fear, causing epistemic, affective and practical harms to those who are unduly feared and those who are intimates of the victim of trauma. We argue that cases of fear generalization that bring harm to other people constitute examples of injust- ice closely akin to testimonial injustice, specifically, mnemonic injustice. Mnemonic injustice is a label that has been introduced to capture how injustice can occur via the operation of human memory systems when stereotypes shape what is remembered. Here we argue that injustices can also occur via memory systems when trauma leads to a generalized fear. We also argue that this calls for a reformulation of the notion of mnemonic injustice.
BibTeX: @article{PuddifootForthcomingFear, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Trakas, Marina}, title = {Fear generalization and mnemonic injustice}, journal = {Episteme}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2023.60} }
Quilty-Dunn, J.		Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of working memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Border Between Seeing and Thinking is an extraordinary achievement, the result of careful attention (and contribution) to both the science and philosophy of perception. The book offers some bold hypotheses. While the hypotheses themselves are worth the price of entry, Block’s sustained defense of them grants the reader insight into countless fascinating experimental results and philosophical concepts. His unpretentious and accommodating exposition of the science—explaining rather than asserting, digging into specific results in detail rather than making summary judgments and demanding that readers take him at his word—is a model of how philosophers ought to engage with empirical evidence. It is simply not possible to read this book without learning something. It will surely play a foundational role in theoretical work on perception for many years to come.
BibTeX: @article{QuiltyDunnForthcomingRemnants, author = {Quilty-Dunn, Jake}, title = {Remnants of perception: Comments on Block and the function of working memory}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} }
Righetti, F.		Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: Reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper investigates the embodied dimensions of episodic memory through a phenomenological analysis. Contemporary philosophical theories understand epi- sodic memory as a mental representation of a past event ‘happening in the head’. A philosophical account that seemingly supports an embodied understanding of episodic memory comes from phenomenology. Phenomenology has traditionally understood episodic memory in terms of presentification, which implies a repro- duction of the elapsed portion of the consciousness lived during the foreground experience, replicating the previous perceptual activity. However, this appears to be incoherent with the constructive theories of episodic memory, which highlight how subjects shift perspectives in memory or include information not present in the foregoing experience. Thus, according to these contemporary theories, episodic memory is unlikely to imply a replay of the past conscious experience. I argue that if we investigate the embodied dimensions, then it is possible to reconcile the phenomenological approach and the constructive theories. More precisely, I ground the investigation on the analysis of operative intentionality and its role in comparing procedural and episodic memory. I argue that two embodied features qualify the reproductive modification of consciousness: the flexible re-enactment of the previ- ous operative intentionality and the pre-reflective mode of embodied resonance with an agent I am no longer.
BibTeX: @article{RighettiForthcomingReenactment, author = {Righetti, Francesca}, title = {Re-enactment and embodied resonance in episodic memory: Reconciling phenomenological approaches and constructive theories}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-10026-7} }
Sant'Anna, A.		Deweyan experiences and the aesthetics of remembering	International Journal of Philosophical Studies	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: My goal in this paper is to argue that some cases of autobiographical remembering can be, and sometimes are, experienced aesthetically. Building on a Deweyan approach to the nature of aesthetic experiences, I show how Dewey conceived of aesthetic experiences as having a cumulative and progressive structure—I call experiences with such structure Deweyan experiences—and how that structure is replicated in some cases of autobiographical remembering in virtue of their having narrative structure. I also discuss the relationship between remembering and other forms of narrative thinking and argue that not only it is easier for remembering to be experienced aesthetically, but also that only remembering can have the cumulative and progressive structure that characterizes Deweyan experiences. I conclude by showing how the Deweyan approach allows us to conceive of the aesthetic value of remembering in terms of the pleasurable or hedonic character of Deweyan experiences.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnnaForthcomingDeweyan, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Deweyan experiences and the aesthetics of remembering}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies} }
Shardlow, J.		Temporal perspectives and the phenomenology of grief	Review of Philosophy and Psychology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In first personal accounts of the experience of grief, it is often described as disrupting the experience of time. This aspect of the experience has gained more attention in recent discussions, but it may nonetheless strike some as puzzling. Grieving subjects do, after all, still perceptually experience motion, change, and succession, and they are typically capable of orienting themselves in time and accurately estimating durations. As such, it is not immediately obvious how we ought understand the claim that grief disrupts the experience of time. In the present discussion I suggest that we can shed light on this aspect of the experience of grief by distinguishing between three temporal perspectives that experiencing (human) subjects typically occupy: the perceptual, the agential, and the narrative. Appeal to these three temporal perspectives helps to clarify the phenomenology of grief; it reveals a way in which grief can disrupt the experience of time; and it can also help us to analyse pre-existing issues in the literature on grief.
BibTeX: @article{ShardlowForthcomingTemporal, author = {Shardlow, Jack}, title = {Temporal perspectives and the phenomenology of grief}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00659-5} }
Stuart, M.T.		Experimental philosophy of imagination and creativity	Oxford Handbook of Imagination and Creativity Oxford University Press	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter presents and contextualizes empirical work done by philosophers on imagination and creativity. It also suggests new directions for future empirical research. It is argued that empirical work on these (and other topics) is not just beneficial but necessary for philosophy of imagination and creativity. Further, it is argued that this work must sometimes be done by philosophers, and it is also often best done by philosophers. Topics discussed include imaginative resistance, counterfactual imagination, scientific imagination, distinguishing imagination from other mental states (e.g., supposition, memory), vividness of imagination, AI imagination, creativity and praiseworthiness, creativity as a virtue, and AI and creativity.
BibTeX: @incollection{StuartForthcomingExperimental, author = {Stuart, Michael T.}, title = {Experimental philosophy of imagination and creativity}, booktitle = {Oxford Handbook of Imagination and Creativity}, editor = {Kind, Amy and Langkau, Julia}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Sutton, J.		Situated affects and place memory	Topoi	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Traces of many past events are often layered or superposed, in brain, body, and world alike. This often poses challenges for individuals and groups, both in accessing specific past events and in regulating or managing coexisting emotions or attitudes. We sometimes struggle, for example, to find appropriate modes of engagement with places with complex and difficult pasts. More generally, there can appear to be a tension between what we know about the highly constructive nature of remembering, whether it is drawing on neural or worldly resources or both, and the ways that we need and use memory to make claims on the past, and to maintain some appropriate causal connections to past events. I assess the current state of work on situated affect and distributed memory, and the recent criticisms of the ‘dogma of harmony’ in these fields. I then deploy these frameworks to examine some affective dimensions of place memory, sketching a strongly distributed conception of places as sometimes partly constituting the processes and activities of feeling and remembering. These approaches also offer useful perspectives on the problems of how to engage – politically and aesthetically – with difficult pasts and historically burdened heritage. In assessing artistic interventions in troubled places, we can seek respon- sibly to do justice to the past while fully embracing the dynamic and contested constructedness of our present emotions, memories, and activities.
BibTeX: @article{SuttonForthcomingSituated, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Situated affects and place memory}, journal = {Topoi}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10053-8} }
Teng, L.		The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an inte- gral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best.
BibTeX: @article{TengForthcomingEpistemic, author = {Teng, Lu}, title = {The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.13020} }
Walsh, E.		The phenomenology of living in the past post-traumatic stress disorder & oppression	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article explores the idea that there is a spectrum of individuals who feel compelled to dwell in the past, either due to psychological or social conditions. I analyze both conditions respectively by critically examining two cases: post-traumatic stress disorder and racialized oppression. I propose that individuals with PTSD can feel psychologically compelled to dwell in the past in a dually negative sense: the individual lives in the past but also broods on it, causing them to feel “stuck” in the past. This kind of “dwelling” can cause individuals to suffer disruptions to their sense of self and intersubjectivity. After exploring the psychological case of dwelling in the past, I explore the social sense in which individuals can dwell in the past due to oppressive social structures by examining the case of racialized oppression. The case of racialization is philosophically stimulating because of its intersubjective dimensions—it subverts the idea that dwelling in the past is simply a psychological phenomenon by capturing that others can help or hinder us with maintaining a sense of self and future-directed intentionality. By putting the phenomenological work of Al-Saji into conversation with recent phenomenological research on incarceration, I propose that racialization can be similarly disruptive to one’s sense of self and intersubjectivity. The proposed account is suggestive that traumatic and oppressive experiences may amplify and compound each other in ways not yet well elucidated in the literature. If this account is taken to be persuasive, it is indicative that both psychological and social conditions mediate one’s temporality and well-being.
BibTeX: @article{WalshForthcomingPhenomenology, author = {Walsh, Emily}, title = {The phenomenology of living in the past post-traumatic stress disorder & oppression}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-024-09990-x} }
Westfall, M.		Mindshaping and constructing kinds	The Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping Routledge	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this chapter, I juxtapose the mindshaping research program with the literature on the metaphysics of social construction. I suggest that these research programs are re- markably congenial. The practices of interest to mindshaping theorists are more or less straightforward instances of the processes that are taken to be essential to social construction. As such, a constructionist metaphysics of psychological kinds is readily available. I discuss some recent constructionist treatments of particular psychologi- cal kinds against this backdrop, before considering how the constructionist outlook interacts with more orthodox viewpoints in the metaphysics of mind.
BibTeX: @incollection{WestfallForthcomingMindshaping, author = {Westfall, Mason}, title = {Mindshaping and constructing kinds}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Mindshaping}, editor = {Zawidzki, T. and Tison, R.}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Yang, J.		Ethical issues in memory modification technology: A scoping review	Bioethical Inquiry	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory modification technology (MMT) refers to the use of neurotechnologies to intervene in memories. Many scholars have reflected on the ethi- cal issues in MMT, but a comprehensive review of this topic has not been seen. This article presents the first scoping review study of ethical issues in MMT using a bibliometric and systematic approach. After thorough examination, 133 records of key literature are included in this scoping review. Six core ethical themes are extracted: (1) self, identity, and authentic- ity; (2) autonomy and informed consent; (3) welfare and happiness; (4) safety and risks; (5) responsibil- ity and obligation; (6) social and legal justice. More detailed analyses are conducted on the moral stances and reasons held by different scholars concerning these ethical themes. As can be seen, current debates exhibit certain shortcomings, including ambiguous ethical concepts and a restricted scope of analysis. Therefore, we call for deeper reflections on the philo- sophical foundations, more precise definitions of ethi- cal terms, and more comprehensive examinations of neurotechnological applications, in order to better address the ethical challenges in the future.
BibTeX: @article{YangForthcomingEthical, author = {Yang, Junjie}, title = {Ethical issues in memory modification technology: A scoping review}, journal = {Bioethical Inquiry}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-024-10371-x} }
Trigg, D.	2025	A melancholic joy: On the role habits play in nostalgia	Phenomenology of Broken Habits: Philospohical and Psychological Perspectives on Habitual Action Routledge 206--222		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Trigg2025Melancholic, author = {Trigg, Dylan}, title = {A melancholic joy: On the role habits play in nostalgia}, year = {2025}, booktitle = {Phenomenology of Broken Habits: Philospohical and Psychological Perspectives on Habitual Action}, editor = {Ryberg Ingerslev, Line and Mertens, Karl}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {206---222}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003332466-14} }
Winokur, B.	2025	Transparency and memory	New perspectives on transparency and self-knowledge Routledge 192-212		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Winokur2025Transparency, author = {Winokur, Benjamin}, title = {Transparency and memory}, year = {2025}, booktitle = {New perspectives on transparency and self-knowledge}, editor = {Andreotta, Adam and Winokur, Benjamin}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {192-212}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032710334-9} }
Altanian, M.	2024	The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism	Taylor & Francis group			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Altanian2024Epistemic, author = {Altanian, Melanie}, title = {The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism}, year = {2024}, editor = {Routledge studies in epistemology}, publisher = {Taylor & Francis group} }
Andén, L.	2024	Between memory and history: Retracing historical knowledge through a phenomenology of afterlife	Jan Patočka andthe Phenomenology of Life After Death Springer 139-15		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Anden2024Between, author = {Andén, Lovisa}, title = {Between memory and history: Retracing historical knowledge through a phenomenology of afterlife}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Jan Patočka andthe Phenomenology of Life After Death}, editor = {Strandberg, Gustav and Strandberg, Hugo}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {139-15}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49548-9_10} }
Andonovski, N., Sutton, J. and McCarroll, C.J.	2024	Eliminating episodic memory?	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230413	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Tulving’s initial characterization, episodic memory was one of multiple memory systems. It was postulated, in pursuit of explanatory depth, as displaying proprietary operations, representations and substrates such as to explain a range of cognitive, behavioural and experiential phenomena. Yet the subsequent development of this research programme has, paradoxically, introduced surprising doubts about the nature, and indeed existence, of episodic memory. On dominant versions of the ‘common system’ view, on which a single simulation system underlies both remembering and imagining, there are no processes unique to memory to support robust generalizations with inductive potential. Eliminativism about episodic memory seems to follow from the claim that it has no dedicated neurocognitive system of its own. After identifying this under- noticed threat, we push back against modern eliminativists by surveying recent evidence that still indicates specialized mechanisms, computations and representations that are distinctly mnemic in character. We argue that contemporary realists about episodic memory can retain lessons of the common system approach while resisting the further move to eliminativism.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2024Eliminating, author = {Andonovski, Nikola and Sutton, John and McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Eliminating episodic memory?}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230413}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0413} }
Arcangeli, M. and Dokic, J.	2024	Two levels of confusion between imagination and memory	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is it possible to confuse one’s own memories with imaginings? And what about confusing one’s own imaginings with memories? The extensive literature in psychology on memory errors and confabulation suggests positive answers to these questions. However, things are more complicated, and the notion of confusion deserves a more detailed analysis. In this paper, we will do so and provide several scenarios showing that these two types of confusion can occur on two different levels: reflective (the level of self-ascription) and phenomenological (the level of what it is like to be in a certain mental state). To strengthen our case, we will relate at least some of our hypothetical scenarios to known conditions affecting memory or imagination. The genuine possibility of these conditions opens the door to a systematic exploration of the implications of the falsity of the impossibility claims for the adequate account of the relationship between memory and imagination.
BibTeX: @article{Arcangeli2024Two, author = {Arcangeli, Margherita and Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Two levels of confusion between imagination and memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10362} }
Bacharach, J.	2024	Agent-regret, finitude,and the irrevocability of the past	Topoi 43 447-458	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In ‘Moral Luck,’ Bernard Williams famously argued that “there is a particularly important species of regret, which I shall call ‘agent-regret,’ which a person can feel only towards his past actions.” Much subsequent commentary has focused on Williams’s claim that agent-regret is not necessarily restricted to voluntary actions, and questioned whether such an attitude could be rationally justified. This focus, however, obscures a more fundamental set of questions raised by Williams’s discussion: what is the role in our moral psychology of evaluative attitudes that relate essentially to past exercises of our agency—occurrences which, by their very nature, cannot be repeated? On a standard conception, regret is directed principally towards actions that resulted from suboptimal deliberation. On this view, the main point of regret is to guide us away from similar poor decisions in the future. But Williams’s key insight in ‘Moral Luck,’ I argue, is that there is a mode of evaluation of one’s past actions and decisions that does not track considerations one could and should have been responsive to at the time, and is for this reason essentially retrospective. From this perspective, the full significance of regret cannot be captured in terms of a disposition to deliberate better in the future. Rather, the particular kind of painful of consciousness of the past embodied in regret amounts to a reflective, and essentially backward-looking, insight into the contingency and finitude of our own agency—that I am a particular person leading a particular life, and that the possibility of leading a different life is now gone forever. I end by making some speculative comments about the intractable question whether it is ultimately good or desirable to be disposed to regret one’s past mistakes.
BibTeX: @article{Bacharach2024Agent, author = {Bacharach, Julian}, title = {Agent-regret, finitude,and the irrevocability of the past}, year = {2024}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {43}, pages = {447--458}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09986-3} }
Bacharach, J.	2024	Transient particulars	Ergo 11 24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We spend much of our adult lives thinking and reminiscing about particular events of the past, which, by their very nature, can never be repeated. What is involved in a capacity to think thoughts of this kind? In this paper, I propose that such thoughts are essentially connected with a capacity to communicate about past events, and specifically in the special way in which events of the past are valued and shared in our relationships with one another. I motivate this proposal by way of the claim that such thoughts are practically useless: there are no practical, forward-looking tasks that require information which is specific to particular past events. Thus I suggest that thoughts of this specific kind have a home only in the cognitive economy of a creature who finds past events to be of interest for their own sake, and that this interest in the past is a peculiar feature of human social life.
BibTeX: @article{Bacharach2024Transient, author = {Bacharach, Julian}, title = {Transient particulars}, year = {2024}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {11}, pages = {24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.6164} }
Barkasi, M.	2024	Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces	Synthese 203 86	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What fixes the referents of episodic memories? While developed theories are lack- ing, it is generally assumed that the causal production of a memory, via memory traces, determines its referent. Recently, it has been pointed out that the “promiscuity” of memory traces poses a problem for this approach. Proposed solutions focus on finding some nonpromiscuous causal link. In this paper, I refine the problem posed by promiscuous memory traces and show that these solutions fail. By developing the question of mnemonic episodic reference within the framework of informational signs, I argue that no pure “producer-side” theory of reference will work. The only solution, I argue, is to abandon pure producer-side theories for theories which appeal to consumer-side factors, i.e., factors concerning how referring signs are used. Once it is admitted that mnemonic episodic reference depends on consumer-side factors, the natural question is whether producer-side factors (i.e., causal production) play any role at all in mnemonic episodic reference. I conclude by outlining two possible pure consumer-side theories for mnemonic episodic reference, one based on the work of Imogen Dickie and one based on the work of Ruth Millikan. Both theories explain how the referents of episodic memories are fixed without any appeal to a causal link, and, hence, are compatible with “post-causal” theories of memory, like simulationism.
BibTeX: @article{Barkasi2024Consumer, author = {Barkasi, Michael}, title = {Consumer-side reference through promiscuous memory traces}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {86}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04509-y} }
Barkasi, M.	2024	When is now? How temporally shifting dreams illuminate the feeling of pastness	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 279-301	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It’scommonlysaidthereisafeelingofpastnesswhenrememberingpast- perceived events. Still, there’s little agreement on how to construe this feeling. Some deny there’s any feeling of pastness at all, some hold that it’s an affective nonlocalized sensation akin to déjà vu, while still others say it’s literal experience of time. What’s missed in this debate is that the feeling of pastness isn’t unique to episodic recall. It occurs in some temporally shifting dreams too. By comparing the feeling of pastness across episodic recall and temporally shifting dreams, I argue for a new account of the feeling of pastness, the two-sided temporal approach. According to my approach, the feeling of pastness results from the interaction between our experience of time and the temporal structure of experience itself. I end by comparing the two-sided temporal approach to the three existing proposals.
BibTeX: @incollection{Barkasi2024When, author = {Barkasi, Michael}, title = {When is now? How temporally shifting dreams illuminate the feeling of pastness}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {279--301}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_13} }
Berger, M.	2024	Memoria, contuitus et expectatio: Revisiting Augustine of hippo	Philosophy of Music Education Review 32(1) 34-45	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Since the Middle Ages, Augustine and the wealth of his writings have had an enormous impact on Western philosophical thinking. His approach to time and memory, which he sets out in his eleventh book of the Confessions, is one of the most important sources for research about the philosophy of time. Augustine describes time as a permanent movement in which the future passes unceasingly through an unrelated present into the past. Only the very present moment exists, but this present moment is infinitely short. If the past is no more, the future is not yet, and the present is indivisibly brief, memoria becomes the determining factor of human consciousness. Augustine’s theory of memory and time reveals an epistemological connection with the functioning of human consciousness. Since his understanding of time and memory is already of great relevance in many interdisciplinary approaches, it can also become important to the philosophy of music education. Revisiting Augustine’s concept of memoria can give us new impetus on questions about aesthetic education, cancel culture, and utopian thinking.
BibTeX: @article{Berger2024Memoria, author = {Berger, Martin}, title = {Memoria, contuitus et expectatio: Revisiting Augustine of hippo}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy of Music Education Review}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, pages = {34--45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2979/pme.00005} }
Bernecker, S.	2024	Dreaming, imagining, and remembering	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 241-259	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thepaperputsforwardacriterionfordistinguishingrememberingfrom imagining and dreaming. The idea is that a state of imagining qualifies as remem- bering, not dreaming, if it is underwritten by a cognitive mechanism whose proper function it is to track the truth. The hallmark of states of dreaming is that they aim at something other than truth, such as verisimilitude or interestingness.
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2024Dreaming, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Dreaming, imagining, and remembering}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {241--259}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_11} }
Boyle, A. and Blomkvist, A.	2024	Elements of episodic memory: insights from artificial agents	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230416	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these ‘episodic-inspired’ AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory while differing in important respects and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory’s operations and function. However, further work is needed to validate them as models of episodic memory and isolate the contributions of their memory systems to their behaviour. More immediately, we propose that these systems have a role to play in directing episodic memory research by highlighting novel or neglected hypotheses as pursuit-worthy. In this vein, we propose that the evidence reviewed here highlights two pursuit-worthy hypotheses about episodic memory’s function: that it plays a role in planning that is independent of future- oriented simulation, and that it is adaptive in virtue of its contributions to fast learning in novel, sparse-reward environments.
BibTeX: @article{Boyle2024Elements, author = {Boyle, Alexandria and Blomkvist, Andrea}, title = {Elements of episodic memory: insights from artificial agents}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230416}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0416} }
Bradley, D.	2024	How to lose your memory without losing your money: Shifty epistemiology and Dutch strategies	Synthese 203 n126	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An objection to shifty epistemologies such as subject-sensitive invariantism is that it predicts that agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses. Bob Beddor (Analysis, 81, 193–198, 2021) argues that these guaranteed losses are not a symptom of irrationality, on the grounds that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being irrational. I agree that forgetful agents are susceptible to guaranteed losses without being irrational but when we investigate why, the analogy with shifty epistemology breaks down. I argue that agents with shifty epistemologies are susceptible to guaranteed losses in a way which is a symptom of irrationality. Along the way I make a suggestion about what it takes for an agent to be coherent over time. I close by offering a taxonomy of shifty epistemologies.
BibTeX: @article{Bradley2024How, author = {Bradley, Darren}, title = {How to lose your memory without losing your money: Shifty epistemiology and Dutch strategies}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {n126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04516-z} }
Brogaard, B. and Sørensen, T.A.	2024	Template tuning and graded consciousness	Conscious and Unconscious Mentality: Examining Their Nature, Similarities and Differences Routledge 251-273		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brogaard2024Template, author = {Brogaard, Berit and Sørensen, Thomas Alrik}, title = {Template tuning and graded consciousness}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Conscious and Unconscious Mentality: Examining Their Nature, Similarities and Differences}, editor = {Hvorecký, Juraj and Marvan, Tomáš and Polák, Michal}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {251-273}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-18} }
Brower Toland, S.	2024	Ockham on memory and the metaphysics of human persons	The Philosophical Quarterly 74(2) 453-473	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores William Ockham’s account of memory with a view to understanding its impli- cations for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim statenamely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham’s own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham’s account of interim memory with his account of human beings.
BibTeX: @article{BrowerToland2024Ockham, author = {Brower Toland, Susan}, title = {Ockham on memory and the metaphysics of human persons}, year = {2024}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {74}, number = {2}, pages = {453--473}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad079} }
Brown, S.	2024	Episodic memory and unrestricted learning	Philosophy of Science 91(2) 90-110	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our thinking often uses rich memories of particular past events. Yet frequently we would do better to use other forms of memory. I show that existing accounts of the function of episodic memory cannot account for such cases, then develop an account which can. Roughly: rich representations of particular past events are required for Unrestricted Learning, learning which is not limited in how much of the world’s complexity it can capture; and episodic memory’s selection for Unrestricted Learning could explain its ubiquitous (and often inappropriate) use for other tasks. This proposal suggests many avenues for further empirical and computational research.
BibTeX: @article{Brown2024Episodic, author = {Brown, Simon}, title = {Episodic memory and unrestricted learning}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {91}, number = {2}, pages = {90--110}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.16} }
Buckner, C.	2024	From Deep Learning to Rational Machines	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Buckner2024From, author = {Buckner, Cameron}, title = {From Deep Learning to Rational Machines}, year = {2024}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Cath, Y.	2024	Knowing what it is like and the three "Rs"	Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Cath2024Knowing, author = {Cath, Yuri}, title = {Knowing what it is like and the three "Rs"}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations}, editor = {Werner, Christiana and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Christoff, C.	2024	Performative trauma narratives: Imperfect memories and epistemic harms	Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 26 27-50	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I suggest that individuals who suffer trauma are often forced to reproduce that for material gain. After noting the key features of what I define as ‘performing trauma narratives’, I argue that the environments in which these narratives are told place undue epistemic burdens on the victims and fail to account for the differential understanding of listeners and the difficulties in conveying the descriptive and normative features with accuracy and integrity. I argue that this results in two specific forms of epistemic injustice: structurally precarious testimonial injustice’ and binary hermeneutical injustice’. I go on to suggest that these epistemic burdens prevent the healing from the traumatic experience in virtue of causing victims to normatively dissociate from their traumatic experience causing victim’s to not appropriately integrate their memories into their conception of self.
BibTeX: @article{Christoff2024Performative, author = {Christoff, Caroline}, title = {Performative trauma narratives: Imperfect memories and epistemic harms}, year = {2024}, journal = {Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso}, volume = {26}, pages = {27--50}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp27-50} }
Colaço, D. and Najenson, J.	2024	Where memory resides: Is there a rivalry between molecular and synaptic models of memory?	Philosophy of Science 91(2) 1-11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent proposals that the substrate of memory is molecular raise questions about where this molecular model stands in relation to the dominant synaptic model of memory. In this article, we address the perceived rivalry between these models and ask whether they can be integrated. We argue that addressing rivalry or integration requires delineating the explananda of synaptic and molecular models, as well as revisiting assumptions about how these models account for their explananda. The perceived rivalry between these models exemplifies epistemic costs that arise when we try to pit explanatory models as rivals or integrate them.
BibTeX: @article{Colaco2024Where, author = {Colaço, David and Najenson, Jonathan}, title = {Where memory resides: Is there a rivalry between molecular and synaptic models of memory?}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {91}, number = {2}, pages = {1--11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.126} }
Connor, M.	2024	Toward a formal-pragmatic theory of communicative memory: Rethinking Habermas' isolated speech situation	Res Philosophica 101(2) 271-297	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: This article argues that Habermas’s formal-pragmatics are better understood as a set of weak-universal dispositions susceptible to erosion over the course of a lifetime, if exposed to continual “disappointing” communicative experiences. Habermas’s rational-reconstructive project to explicate the intuitive rule-consciousness held by competent speakers retains immense theoretical value for analyzing both partisan and mass political discourse, if his emphasis on isolated speech situations is supplemented with a logic of communicative memory better accounting for how disagreement antecedes discourse on the formal-pragmatic register. I argue that Habermas’s concept of the “lifeworld” contains untapped theoretical resources for thinking about the formal-pragmatic consequences of accumulated partisan experiences; namely, how such experiences lead inter-partisan actors to jettison mutual imputations of communicative accountability. I conclude by offering revisions to Habermas’s discourse ethics. Rapport-building intended to alleviate the negative effects of prior accumulated partisan experiences is first necessary if a norm is to enjoy real justification.
BibTeX: @article{Connor2024Toward, author = {Connor, Moran}, title = {Toward a formal-pragmatic theory of communicative memory: Rethinking Habermas' isolated speech situation}, year = {2024}, journal = {Res Philosophica}, volume = {101}, number = {2}, pages = {271--297}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/resphilosophica20241012119} }
Copenhaver, R.	2024	Dreams, remembering, and remembering dreams: An intentionalist, direct realist, acquaintance account	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 11-37	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ipresentagenericversionofintentionalismtoshowthatintentionalism is motivated by and consistent with direct realism. I also present a theoretically neutral account of acquaintance as direct awareness. I apply intentionalism and an acquaintance view of memory to two questions. First, do dreams acquaint us with the objects, properties, persons, and events they represent? I argue that they don’t. When dreams represent events from your past, they don’t acquaint you with events, even if the events happened. Second, do memory experiences of dreams of events that really happened acquaint us with those events? I argue that they don’t. The memory experience of an event that you dreamed about can’t renew acquaintance, even if the event happened, because dreams don’t acquaint us with events. When you have a memory experience of having dreamed of an event that happened, it is a memory experience, but not a memory: it is a veridical confabulation.
BibTeX: @incollection{Copenhaver2024Dreams, author = {Copenhaver, Rebecca}, title = {Dreams, remembering, and remembering dreams: An intentionalist, direct realist, acquaintance account}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {11--37}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_2} }
De Brigard, F.	2024	Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230410	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ever since Tulving’s influential 1985 article ‘Memory and consciousness’, it has become traditional to think of autonoetic consciousness as necessary for episodic memory. This paper questions this claim. Specifically, it argues that the construct of autonoetic consciousness lacks validity and that, even if it was valid, it would still not be necessary for episodic memory. The paper ends with a proposal to go back to a functional/computational characterization of episodic memory in which its characteristic phenomenology is a contingent feature of the retrieval process and, as a result, open to empirical scrutiny. The proposal also dovetails with recent taxonomies of memory that are independent of conscious awareness and suggests strategies to evaluate within- and between-individual variability in the conscious experience of episodic memories in human and non-human agents.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2024Episodic, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Episodic memory without autonoetic consciousness}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230410}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0410} }
Demšar, E. and Windt, J.	2024	Studying dream experience through dream reports: Points of contact between dream research and first-person methods in consciousness science	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 85-117	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Inthischapter,wefocusontheproblemofdreamreportsattheintersec- tion of dream research, the philosophy of dreaming, and first-person methods in consciousness science. We advance three proposals: (1) that the variability of meth- ods and measures used in dream research influences research results; (2) that best- practice guidelines for the report-based study of experience in sleep (as well as in waking) can nonetheless be identified; and (3) that certain areas of dream research could benefit from more explicitly focusing on phenomenal (vs content or formal) features of dreaming. Drawing from the shared conceptual and methodological ground of dream research and consciousness science, we suggest that investigating the phenomenal features of dreaming could profit from the application of elements of first-person methods in consciousness research. We consider two specific inter- view methods: descriptive research sampling and micro-phenomenological inter- views, discuss their applicability in dream research, and outline promising directions for future research.
BibTeX: @incollection{Demsar2024Studying, author = {Demšar, Ema and Windt, Jennifer}, title = {Studying dream experience through dream reports: Points of contact between dream research and first-person methods in consciousness science}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {85--117}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_5} }
Do Valle Miranda, L.	2024	Memory traces, phenomenology and the simulationist vs causal theory dispute	Artykuly 65 21-34	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophy of memory is a hot topic in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. This work examines the dispute between simulations and causal theories of memory by means of an examination of the feeling of familiarity and its relation to memory traces, more specifically how they increase the fluency of reconstruction of past episodes. Understanding the relationship between familiarity and memory traces and, furthermore, the relation between a fully-fledged phenomenology of memory and a sense of subjective certainty of the episode has occurred in the past, lead to a different interpretation of the rivalry between the CTM and the simulationist account.
BibTeX: @article{DoValleMiranda2024Memory, author = {Do Valle Miranda, Luiz}, title = {Memory traces, phenomenology and the simulationist vs causal theory dispute}, year = {2024}, journal = {Artykuly}, volume = {65}, pages = {21--34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2024.65-02} }
Donahue, S.	2024	Collective procedural memory	Philosophical Studies 181 397-417	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Collective procedural memory is a group’s memory of how to do things, as opposed to a group’s memory of facts. It enables groups to mount effective responses to periodic events (e.g., natural hazards) and to sustain collective projects (e.g., combatting climate change). This article presents an account of collective procedural memory called the Ability Conception. The Ability Conception has various advantages over other accounts of collective procedural memory, such as those appealing to collective know-how and collective identity. It also demonstrates new applications for collective procedural memory. I develop three in this article: to social epistemology, to the ethics of memorialization, and to a pattern of group vulnerability to recurring hazardous events that I call the saeculum effect.
BibTeX: @article{Donahue2024Collective, author = {Donahue, Sean}, title = {Collective procedural memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {181}, pages = {397--417}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02091-6} }
Dranseika, V.	2024	Folk beliefs about phenomenological differences and similarities between kinds of mental states	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 325-352	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thetopicofthischapterispre-theoreticalbeliefsaboutphenomenologi- cal similarities and differences between mental states. I report the results of a set of exploratory studies on folk beliefs about phenomenological differences and simi- larities between dreaming, remembering, perceiving, imagining, and hallucinating. Study participants were inclined to treat some pairs of mental states as phenomeno- logically relatively similar (dreaming and imagining; hallucinating and dreaming) and other pairs as phenomenologically relatively different (hallucinating and remembering; dreaming and seeing). Similarity judgments, however, were often sensitive to the order of comparison. For instance, study participants were much more inclined to agree that hallucinating feels like seeing than that seeing feels like hallucinating, and much more inclined to agree that dreaming feels like seeing than the other way around. Furthermore, beliefs about phenomenological similarity were associated with beliefs about how likely various metacognitive mistakes are.
BibTeX: @incollection{Dranseika2024Folk, author = {Dranseika, Vilius}, title = {Folk beliefs about phenomenological differences and similarities between kinds of mental states}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {325--352}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_15} }
Eldridge, P.	2024	Objective time and the transcendental functions of memory in Husserl	Husserl Studies 40 241-262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from 1917 to 1926. These three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2024Objective, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {Objective time and the transcendental functions of memory in Husserl}, year = {2024}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {40}, pages = {241-262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-024-09347-x} }
Fernández, J.	2024	Memory and self-reference	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32(1) 59-77	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2024Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory and self-reference}, year = {2024}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, pages = {59--77}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2024.2334461} }
Fernández, J.	2024	Memory in two dimensions	Synthese 203 41	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memories can be accurate or inaccurate. They have, then, accuracy conditions. A reasonable picture of the accuracy conditions of a memory is that a memory is ac- curate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory. But how are the references of our memories determined exactly? And what are the accuracy conditions of memories, given their references? In this paper, I argue that the notion of accuracy conditions for memories is ambiguous. There are two types of conditions which can be plausibly construed as accuracy conditions for memories. I motivate this idea by using some resources from two-dimensional semantics. The outcome of applying two-dimensionalism to memory is that memo- ries have two kinds of accuracy conditions. In both cases, causal relations play an important role in the framing of those conditions. But the role is quite different in each case. For one type of accuracy conditions, the causal relations which produce a memory play the role of fixing the reference of that memory. For the other type of accuracy conditions, the causal relations which produce a memory become part of the information which needs to be satisfied by the reference of the memory for it to be accurate. However, in both cases, the picture according to which a memory is ac- curate just in case the reference of a memory satisfies the information provided by the memory reemerges as being correct, though for interestingly different reasons.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2024Memoryb, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory in two dimensions}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04462-2} }
Frise, M.	2024	Remembering trauma in epistemology	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 23	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores some surprising effects of psychological trauma on memory and develops the puzzle of observer memory for trauma. Memory for trauma tends to have a third-person perspec- tive, or observer perspective. But it appears observer memory, by having a novel visual point of view, tends to misrepresent the past. And many find it plausible that if a memory type tends to misrepresent, it cannot yield knowledge of, or justification for believing, details of past events. But it is also plausible that, with respect to details of past trauma, observer memory can yield knowl- edge or justification. I argue for a novel set of views that offers a way out of the puzzle: observer memory does tend to misrepresent, but it still has epistemic power regarding details of the past, although with special limits; but observer memory for trauma has other epistemic powers too, in that it allows for a kind of self-awareness.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2024Remembering, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Remembering trauma in epistemology}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10220} }
García-Carpintero, M.	2024	Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification	Synthese 204 70	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Wittgenstein distinguished between two uses of ‘I’, one “as object” and the other “as subject”, a distinction that Shoemaker elucidated in terms of a notion of immunity to error through misidentification (‘IEM’); in their use “as subject”, first-personal claims are IEM, but not in their use “as object”. Shoemaker argued that memory judgments based on “personal”, episodic memory are only de facto IEM, not strictly speaking IEM, while Gareth Evans disputed it. In the past two decades research on memory has produced very significant results, which have changed the philosophical landscape. As part of it, several new arguments have been made for and against the IEM of personal memories. The paper aims to defend the Shoemaker line by critically engaging with some compelling recent contributions.
BibTeX: @article{GarciaCarpintero2024Memory, author = {García-Carpintero, Manuel}, title = {Memory-based reference and immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {70}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04664-2} }
Gentry, H. and Buckner, C.	2024	Transitional gradation and the distinction between episodic and semantic memory	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230407	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, we explore various arguments against the traditional distinction between episodic and semantic memory based on the metaphysical phenomenon of transitional gradation. Transitional gradation occurs when two candidate kinds A and B grade into one another along a continuum according to their characteristic properties. We review two kinds of arguments—from the gradual semanticization of episodic memories as they are consolidated, and from the composition of episodic memories during storage and recall from semantic memories—that predict the proliferation of such transitional forms. We further explain why the distinction cannot be saved from the challenges of transitional gradation by appealing to distinct underlying memory structures and applying our perspective to the impasse over research into ‘episodic-like’ memory in non-human animals. On the whole, we recommend replacing the distinction with a dynamic life cycle of memory in which a variety of transitional forms will proliferate, and illustrate the utility of this perspective by tying together recent trends in animal episodic memory research and recommending productive future directions.
BibTeX: @article{Gentry2024Transitional, author = {Gentry, Hunter and Buckner, Cameron}, title = {Transitional gradation and the distinction between episodic and semantic memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230407}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0407} }
Goodman, R. and Gray, A.	2024	Mental filing, continued	Synthese 204 12	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to traditional versions of the mental file theory, we should posit mental files—that is, mental representations with containment structure—to explain both rational relations between the attitudes, and the persistence of the attitudes across time. However, Goodman and Gray (2022) offer a revisionary interpretation of the file framework, according to which its explanatory commitments are better present- ed by positing mental filing, as a process, but not mental files, as mental representa- tions with file structure. Goodman and Gray focus on a certain class of synchronic explanations, but files have also been thought to play an essential diachronic role in the maintenance and update of object-directed thought. This paper has two aims. First, we clarify the aims and commitments of Goodman and Gray (2022). Second, we extend their mental filing view to show how it can account for continued belief, change of mind and persistence of the attitudes in general.
BibTeX: @article{Goodman2024Mental, author = {Goodman, Rachel and Gray, Aidan}, title = {Mental filing, continued}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04670-4} }
Gregory, D.	2024	Is it possible to have episodic memories during non-lucid dreams?	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 221-237	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is not to show that the answer to the question in the title is ‘no’, but to show that it is ‘probably not’, at least on one particular theory of memory. Assuming that an experience will only be an episodic memory if we are ‘disposed to take the relevant experience into account when judging about the past’ (Debus, Accounting for epistemic relevance: A new problem for the causal theory of memory. American Philosophical Quarterly, 47:17–29, 2010, p. 25), there are many obstacles to answering the question in the affirmative. If one holds that it is possible to have episodic memories during dreams, they will have to accept more implications than may be palatable. Specifically, they will have to believe, contra Sosa (A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. I). Clarendon Press, 2007), that we can actually make judgments during dreams and not just imag- ine doing so; that we retain a fairly high degree of rationality during dreams; and that there is a respectable sense in which we can refer to the past at all when we dream.
BibTeX: @incollection{Gregory2024Possible, author = {Gregory, Daniel}, title = {Is it possible to have episodic memories during non-lucid dreams?}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {221--237}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_10} }
Gregory, D. and Michaelian, K.	2024	Dreaming and memory: Editors' introduction	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 1-7	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This book explores what we can learn about two fascinating mental states, dreaming and memory, by investigating them in tandem. This brings to the surface several issues about the phenomena which are not apparent when we think about each in isolation. The 15 contributions are arranged into three parts: Part I: Remembering Dreams; Part II: Remembering Within Dreams; and Part III: Remembering and Dreaming Compared. The authors apply a range of methodolo- gies: philosophical, exegetic, experimental, and formal.
BibTeX: @incollection{Gregory2024Dreaming, author = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Dreaming and memory: Editors' introduction}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {1-7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_1} }
Grünbaum, T.	2024	Responsibility for forgetting to do	Erkenntnis 89(1) 755-776	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Assuming that an agent can be morally responsible for her forgetting to do something, we can use recent psychological research on prospective memory to assess the psychological assumptions made by normative accounts of the moral responsibility for forgetting. Two accounts of moral responsibility (control accounts and valuative accounts) have been prominent in recent debates about the degree to which agents are blameworthy for their unwitting omissions. This paper highlights the psychological assumptions concerning remembering and forgetting that characterise the accounts. The paper then introduces and reviews recent empirical literature on prospective memory. Finally, it uses the literature to assess the various assumptions. One important implication is that a direct capacitarian control account implies implausible assumptions about the psychological capacity for remembering. A second important implication is that an indirect capacitarian control account and a valuative account highlight different but complementary aspects of remembering and forgetting.
BibTeX: @article{Grunbaum2024Responsibility, author = {Grünbaum, Thor}, title = {Responsibility for forgetting to do}, year = {2024}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {89}, number = {1}, pages = {755--776}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00554-6} }
Hoerl, C.	2024	Singular thought without temporal representation ?	Synthese 203 150	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What is required for an individual to entertain a singular thought about an object they have encountered before but that is currently no longer within their perceptual range? More specifically, does the individual have to think about the object as having been encountered in the past? I consider this question against the background of the assumption that non-human animals are cognitively ‘stuck in the present’. Does this mean that, for them, ‘out of sight is out of mind’, as, e.g., Schopenhauer seems to have thought? I suggest an alternative answer, also drawing on some empirical work on animal cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2024Singular, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Singular thought without temporal representation ?}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {150}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04562-7} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2024	The history of episodic memory	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230396	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Over the course of his research, Endel Tulving offered a number of somewhat different characterizations of episodic memory. Do they indicate that he changed his mind over time as to what episodic memory is, or did his core understanding of the nature of episodic memory stay the same? In this article, we offer some support for the latter claim, and in particular for thinking that, throughout his life, Tulving took as a defining feature of episodic memory the distinctive awareness of the self in time it involves. We argue that it is easier to see the continuities rather than the discontinuities in Tulving’s writings once their historical context is taken into account, where this involves both the authors who influenced his thinking, as well as the intellectual climate at the different times he was writing. We also discuss two recent bodies of work on episodic memory that take aspects of Tulving’s writings as their point of departure, but try to factor out into separate ingredients what he arguably saw as a unitary phenomenon. Considering aspects of the dialectic between them and Tulving’s view might shed further light on some of the motivations behind the latter.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2024History, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {The history of episodic memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230396}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0396} }
Hopkins, R.	2024	The Profile of Imagining	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hopkins2024Profile, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {The Profile of Imagining}, year = {2024}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
James, S.	2024	Dreams of particulars: Dreams, memory, and distinguishing objectual knowledge	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 203-219	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: At least some dreams relate us to external-world particulars, e.g. dreams of one’s parent. What is the nature of this relation? It depends on memory for sure, but this chapter argues that the relation is a specific one: in such dreams, one remem- bers the relevant particular. It then sketches an account according to which such remembering involves ‘distinguishing objectual knowledge’ and shows that the account enables us to make sense of a range of dream cases and provides a partial framework for understanding why dreams have some of the social roles they are thought to have.
BibTeX: @incollection{James2024Dreams, author = {James, Steven}, title = {Dreams of particulars: Dreams, memory, and distinguishing objectual knowledge}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {203--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_9} }
Keven, N.	2024	Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?	Synthese 203 132	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory gives us the ability to mentally travel back in time to revisit and relive past experiences. In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the function of episodic memory. According to the orthodox view, episodic memory should be considered a part of a constructive system that simulates the future for sophisticated foresight and flexible planning. In this paper, I offer a novel alterna- tive view. I argue that episodic memory provides invaluable information about the past behavior of others, allowing us to identify reliable and trustworthy partners while avoiding dealing with cheaters. Theoretical models demonstrate that coop- eration in groups can be maintained if potential partners use information about an individual’s past behavior to guide their behavior toward that individual. In these reputation-based models of human cooperation, individuals with a history of cheat- ing are ostracized, whereas those with a history of cooperative behavior flourish. Against this theoretical background, it is possible to see a function of episodic memory in facilitating information exchange about others, helping group members make effective partner choices, and avoiding the risk of interacting with cheaters. If correct, episodic memory may have played a significant role in the evolution of human cooperation.
BibTeX: @article{Keven2024Can, author = {Keven, Nazım}, title = {Can episodic memory deter cheating and promote altruism?}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04560-9} }
Khalidi, M.A.	2024	Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins	Mind and Language 39(1) 129-140	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: In this response to three critiques of my book, Cognitive ontology, I expand on some of its main themes. First, I demarcate the domain of cognition to support my claim that it is properly investigated from Marr's computational level. Then, I defend the claim that cognitive kinds ought to be individuated externalistically, by contrast with neural kinds, which are often individuated internalistically. This implies that the relationship between the cognitive sciences is one of delivering mutual constraints, which is a more productive research strategy than the search for “neural correlates” of cognitive constructs.
BibTeX: @article{Khalidi2024Kinds, author = {Khalidi, Muhammad Ali}, title = {Kinds in the cognitive sciences: Reply to Weiskopf, Sullivan, and Robins}, year = {2024}, journal = {Mind and Language}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {129--140}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12477} }
Lai, C.	2024	Relearning and remembering: A gradualist account	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Relearning and remembering are usually seen as two distinct cognitive processes in contemporary philosophy of memory. In particular, relearning is sometimes regarded as a kind of memory error. This paper aims to address two questions. First, is relearning a kind of memory error? Second, how to draw a distinction (if any) properly between relearning and remembering? My answer to the first question is a conditional ‘yes’—it depends on whether relearning can be falsidical and whether metacognitive monitoring counts as a part of memory process. My answer to the second question appeals to a gradualist account, according to which the distinction between relearning and remembering is not an absolute yes-or-no affair, but a matter of degrees.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2024Relearning, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Relearning and remembering: A gradualist account}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10251} }
Lai, C.	2024	Remembering requires no reliability	Philosophical Studies 181 43-63	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from occasionally resulting in successful remembering. Potential responses available for mnemic reliabilism are also evaluated. I show that those responses are susceptible to a challenge akin to the generality problem for process reliabilism.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2024Remembering, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Remembering requires no reliability}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {181}, pages = {43--63}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02073-8} }
Lai, T.H.	2024	Objectionable commemorations, historial value, and repudiatory honouring	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(1) 37-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2024Objectionable, author = {Lai, Teng Herng}, title = {Objectionable commemorations, historial value, and repudiatory honouring}, year = {2024}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {102}, number = {1}, pages = {37--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2022.2106499} }
Langland Hassan, P.	2024	Imagining what you intend	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If we are free to imagine what we choose, this is likely because our intentions determine what we are imagining. However, in a recent article, Munro and Strohminger (2021) argue that, in some cases of imagistic imagining, our intentions do not determine what we are imagining. They offer examples where, intuitively, a person intends to imagine one thing but, due to the causal source of the image used, imagine another. This paper acknowledges the challenge posed by these cases while arguing on several grounds that, when present, intentions nevertheless always suffice to determine the object of one’s imaginings. I conclude by explaining how intentions could fix the objects of episodic rememberings in much the same way as they do for imaginings, thereby bolstering the case that remembering is a kind of imagining.
BibTeX: @article{LanglandHassan2024Imagining, author = {Langland Hassan, Peter}, title = {Imagining what you intend}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10258} }
Latham, A., Miller, K. and Pedersen, R.	2024	Mental time travel in animals: The "when" of mental time travel	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230398	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an organism. Second, it provides the conceptual resources to foster a discussion about which of these representations is necessary for an organism to count as having the capacity to mentally time travel. Third, it enables us to distinguish stricter from more liberal views of mental time travel that differ regarding which kind(s) of temporal representation is taken to be necessary for mental time travel. Fourth, it allows us to determine the benefits of taking a stricter or more liberal view of mental time travel. Finally, it ensures that disagreement about whether some species can mentally time travel is not merely the product of unrecognized disagreement about which temporal representation is necessary for mental time travel. We argue for a more liberal view, on the grounds that it allows us to view mental time travel as an evolutionarily continuous phenomenon and to recognize that differences in the ways that organisms mentally time travel might reflect different temporal representations, or combinations thereof, that they employ. Our ultimate aim, however, is to create a conceptual framework for further discussion regarding what sorts of temporal representations are required for mental time travel.
BibTeX: @article{Latham2024Mental, author = {Latham, Andrew and Miller, Kristie and Pedersen, Rasmus}, title = {Mental time travel in animals: The "when" of mental time travel}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230398}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0398} }
Liefke, K.	2024	Experiential attitudes are propositional	Erkenntnis 39(1) 293-317	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Attitudinal propositionalism is the view that all mental attitude content is truth-evaluable. While attitudinal propositionalism is still silently assumed in large parts of analytic philosophy, recent work on objectual attitudes (i.e. attitudes like ‘fearing Moriarty’ and ‘imagining a unicorn’ that are reported through intensional transitive verbs with a direct object) has put attitudinal propositionalism under explanatory pressure. This paper defends propositionalism for a special subclass of objectual attitudes, viz. experiential attitudes. The latter are attitudes like seeing, remembering, and imagining whose grammatical objects intuitively denote (events or) scenes. I provide a propositional analysis of experiential attitudes that preserves the merits of propositionalism. This analysis uses the possibility of representing the target-scenes of experiential attitudes by the intersection of all propositions that are true in these scenes. I show that this analysis makes available the usual (Russellian) account of intensionality and the common (Boolean) logic for entailments.
BibTeX: @article{Liefke2024Experiential, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Experiential attitudes are propositional}, year = {2024}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {293--317}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00534-w} }
Liefke, K.	2024	Perspective and the self in experiential attitude reports	Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics Springer 1-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is often assumed that self-directedness (i.e. de se-ness) and first-person perspective (1pp) can be jointly captured through individual centers (s.t. 1pp- and de se-contents both take the form of centered propositions, or properties). This assumption is challenged by instances of ‘outside’ (i.e. objective, or observer) remembering and imagining, which intuitively combine de se with a third-person [= non-actual/non-original, possibly unoccupied] perspective. My paper answers this challenge: It argues that perspective can be captured through a classical propositional account of attitudes that identifies experiential attitude content with a set of situations. Individual centers are only required to account for the de se-status of these attitudes. The separation of modelling mechanisms for perspectivity and de se-ness also enables an account of an inverse phenomenon to outside imagining, viz. first-person perspectival non-de se imagining.
BibTeX: @incollection{Liefke2024Perspective, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Perspective and the self in experiential attitude reports}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics}, editor = {Bekki, Daisuke and Mineshima, Koji and McCready, Elin}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {1--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-60878-0_2} }
Lin, Y.-T., McCarroll, C.J., Michaelian, K. and Stuart, M.	2024	Successful and unsuccessful remembering and imagining: Editorial introduction	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lin2024Successful, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken and Stuart, Mike}, title = {Successful and unsuccessful remembering and imagining: Editorial introduction}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.11736} }
López Ríos, M.B., McCarroll, C.J. and Muñoz Gómez, P.	2024	Memory, mourning, and the Chilean constitution: An account of grief in response to the 2022 constitutional election	Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 26 159-177	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The present paper investigates and provides an account of the feeling of grief evidenced in certain sectors of the Chilean population after the electoral defeat following the constitutional plebiscite of September 2022 in Chile. How can one experience grief at the rejection of a political referendum? We suggest that the experience of grief is importantly related to a loss of life possibilities and disruptions in one’s practical identity. The outpouring of grief experienced by many Chileans at this political loss can be traced to the importance of the constitutional plebiscite for their identities. The grieving process involves a renegotiation, through memory and future oriented imagination, of past, present, and future aspects of one’s practical identity.
BibTeX: @article{LopezRios2024Memory, author = {López Ríos, María Berta and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Muñoz Gómez, Paloma}, title = {Memory, mourning, and the Chilean constitution: An account of grief in response to the 2022 constitutional election}, year = {2024}, journal = {Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso}, volume = {26}, pages = {159--177}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp159-177} }
Macpherson, F.	2024	Perception in dreams: A guide for dream engineers, a reflection on the role of memory in sensory states, and a new counterexample to Hume's account of the imagination	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 353-381	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Iarguethatdreamscancontainperceptualelementsinmultifarious,hereto- fore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain per- ceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of perception in dreams. Second, I consider the consequences of the view for the role of memory in dreaming and imagination. I argue that not every element of dreams or sensory imaginations must rely on memory. The resultant view of sensory imagination provides a counterex- ample to Hume’s account of sensory imagination, according to which sensory imagina- tion must be built up from faint copies of sensory impressions stored in memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Macpherson2024Perception, author = {Macpherson, Fiona}, title = {Perception in dreams: A guide for dream engineers, a reflection on the role of memory in sensory states, and a new counterexample to Hume's account of the imagination}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {353--381}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_16} }
Mahr, J. and Schacter, D.L.	2024	Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 379 20230409	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for ‘representational continuism’: the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2024Episodic, author = {Mahr, Johannes and Schacter, Daniel L.}, title = {Episodic recombination and the role of time in mental travel}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {379}, pages = {20230409}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2023.0409} }
Mahr, J.B.	2024	How to become a memory: The individual and collective aspects of mnemicity	Topics in Cognitive Science 16(2) 225-440	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Human adults distinguish their mental event simulations along various dimensions—most prominently according to their “mnemicity”: we track whether these simulations are outcomes of past personal experiences or not (i.e., whether we are “remembering” or “imagining”). This distinction between memory and imagination is commonly thought to reflect a deep architectural distinction in the mind. Against this idea, I argue that mnemicity is not based on a fundamentalstructural difference between memories and imaginations but is instead the result of metacognitive attribution and social construction. On this attributional view, mnemicity is likely a uniquely human capacity that both serves collective functions and has been shaped by collective norms. First, on the individual level, mnemicity attribution is an outcome of metacognitive learning: it relies on acquired interpretations of the phenomenal features of mental event simulations. Such interpretations are in part acquired through interactive reminiscing with other community members. Further, how the distinction between memory and imagination is drawn is likely sensitive to cultural norms about what remembering is, when it is appropriate to claim to remember, what can be remembered, and what remembering entails. As a result, how individuals determine whether they remember or imagine is bound to be deeply enculturated. Second, mnemicity attribution solves an important collective challenge: who to grant epistemic authority about the past. Solving this challenge is important because -for humans- the past represents not just an opportunity to learn about the future but to coordinate present social realities. How a community determines such social realities both draws on individuals’ remembering and in turn shapes when, what, and how individuals remember.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2024How, author = {Mahr, Johannes B.}, title = {How to become a memory: The individual and collective aspects of mnemicity}, year = {2024}, journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, pages = {225--440}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12646} }
Maiese, M.	2024	Trauma, dissociation, and relational authenticity	Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 26 3-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Relational trauma can be understood as a psychological injury that occurs in the context of abusive interpersonal relationships and appears to be correlated with a wide array of mental illnesses. However, one potential harm of trauma that has not received much attention from philosophers is the threat it poses to authenticity. To understand why relational trauma potentially creates impediments to authentic agency, we need to consider two other phenomena that are commonly associated with it: (i) dissociation, and (ii) diminished habitual trust. Whereas trauma-related dissociation commonly involves bodily alienation and detachment from the self, diminished habitual trust often leads to alienation from others. I maintain that dissociative detachment and diminished habitual trust often are mutually reinforcing and that, together, they can cause agents to become disconnected from themselves, others, and the reality of what has happened to them. What implications does this have for authentic agency among traumatized individuals? After outlining existing conceptions, I emphasize the important sense in which authenticity is relational and scaffolded by social connections. I also discuss several competencies that undergird authenticity and argue that the interplay between dissociative detachment and attenuated habitual trust can make it difficult for traumatized individuals to develop and sustain these competencies. Thus, the trauma they have experienced impedes their ability to conduct their lives in accordance with their genuine cares and desires.
BibTeX: @article{Maiese2024Trauma, author = {Maiese, Michelle}, title = {Trauma, dissociation, and relational authenticity}, year = {2024}, journal = {Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso}, volume = {26}, pages = {3--25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp3-25} }
Marrafa, M. and Meini, C.	2024	The developmental psychology of personal identity: A philosophical perspective	Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Marrafa2024Developmental, author = {Marrafa, Massimo. and Meini, Cristina}, title = {The developmental psychology of personal identity: A philosophical perspective}, year = {2024}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Lin, Y.-T.	2024	Feeling episodic: Dimensions of phenomenology in observer memory	Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 13(1) 20-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One interesting aspect of the imagery of episodic memory is the distinct visual perspectives that can be adopted when remembering the personal past. As Peggy St. Jacques (2024) notes, these distinct perspectives are typically associated with differences in phenomenological profile in episodic recall. We pick up on St. Jacques’ description of phenomenological differences between field and observer perspectives and outline new ways to think about how such differences might arise. Drawing on existing work in philosophy to highlight some of the different components that might contribute to the phenomenology of a mental state or process, we apply this to the case of observer memory. This approach may identify novel avenues of empirical research, which would help shed light on the differences in phenomenology reported in observer memory.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2024Feeling, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {Feeling episodic: Dimensions of phenomenology in observer memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {20-25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/mac0000163} }
McCarroll, C.J., Michaelian, K. and Nanay, B.	2024	Explanatory contextualism about episodic memory: Towards a diagnosis of the causalist‑simulationist debate	Erkenntnis 89 2273-2301	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We argue that the causal theory of memory and the simulation theory of memory are not as straightforwardly incompatible as they are usually taken to be. Following a brief review of the theories, we describe alternative normative and descriptive perspectives on memory, arguing that the causal theory aligns better with the normative perspective and the simulation theory with the descriptive perspective. Taking explanatory contextualism about perception as our starting point, we then develop a form of explanatory contextualism about memory, arguing that, depending on the context in which we find ourselves, either the normative perspective or the descriptive perspective may be appropriate. It follows that, while the causal theory and the simulation theory cannot both be right with respect to a given perspective, and while it is necessary to choose one perspective or the other in a given context, there an important sense in which we need not choose between causalism and simulationism. We conclude by differentiating our position from and critiquing a related position developed by Craver (2020) and defending our position against objections.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2024Explanatory, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken and Nanay, Bence}, title = {Explanatory contextualism about episodic memory: Towards a diagnosis of the causalist‑simulationist debate}, year = {2024}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {89}, pages = {2273--2301}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00629-4} }
McCarroll, C.J., Wang, I.-J. and Lin, Y.-T.	2024	Attitudinal pluralism in dream experiences and dream memories	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 177-200	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Dream experiences are heterogenous and involve a complex and varied phenomenology. While mental states like belief and desire can be easily character- ised by their attitudes and contents, dreaming seems to involve a variety of attitudes, including beliefs, desires, and more. How do we make sense of dreaming itself as well as its relationship to the attitudes involved? We outline an attitudinal pluralism about dreaming. Attitudinal pluralism is the view that the dream self can adopt a variety of attitudes—beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.—towards the content of the dreamscape. On this view, there are multiple attitudes that the dream self can adopt within the simulated dream world. The best way to understand this pluralism is not by narrowly taking dreaming to just involve thinking itself, but rather by taking dreaming to involve a dream self experiencing thoughts within the dream. The atti- tudes belong to the dream self (the character one identifies with in the dream) not the dreamer per se (the sleeping subject). This attitudinal pluralism has conse- quences for thinking about the nature of dream experiences and the content of dream memories. First, the attitudes we experience as part of the dream world seem to go beyond mere phenomenology and may be part of the ontological structure of dream experiences. Second, accuracy in dream memories will involve recalling the various attitudes that one adopted while dreaming. Understood in this way, accuracy in dream memory requires a condition of authenticity, such that the dream memory represents not just the content of the dreamscape, but the way in which the dream subject experienced the dream world. Accurate dream memories will be authentic dream memories.
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarroll2024Attitudinal, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Wang, I-Jan and Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {Attitudinal pluralism in dream experiences and dream memories}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {177--200}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_8} }
Michaelian, K.	2024	Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past	Philosophical Psychology 37(5) 1170-1196	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: On the simulation theory of memory, to remember is to imagine an event from the personal past. McCarroll has recently argued that, because it implies not only that a genuine memory need not be caused by the rememberer's experience of the remembered event but also that the rememberer need not even have experienced that event, simulationism is unable, first, to explain infantile amnesia (the inability to remember events that occurred in one's early childhood) and, second, to rule out certain ''impossible'' memories (namely, memories of events that occurred before one was born). Responding to McCarroll, this paper argues that simulationism is in fact able to explain infantile amnesia but concedes that it is unable to rule out pre-birth memories. It goes on to argue, however, that, rather than leading us to reject the theory, this should lead us to endorse a radicalized simulationism on which to remember is simply to imagine an event from the past, regardless of whether that event belongs to the personal past.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2024Radicalizing, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Radicalizing simulationism: Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {37}, number = {5}, pages = {1170--1196}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2082934} }
Michaelian, K.	2024	True, authentic, faithful: Accuracy in memory for dreams	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 155-176	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What is it to remember a dream accurately? This paper argues that nei- ther of the two available concepts of mnemic accuracy, namely, truth and authentic- ity, enables us to answer this question and that a new understanding of accuracy is therefore needed: a dream memory is accurate not when it is true or authentic but rather when it is “faithful” to the remembered dream. In addition to memory for dreams, the paper applies the notion of faithfulness to memory for perceptual expe- riences, memory for imaginations, and memory for hallucinations and briefly con- siders the broader implications of adopting an understanding of mnemic accuracy as faithfulness.
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2024True, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {True, authentic, faithful: Accuracy in memory for dreams}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {155-176}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_7} }
Michaelian, K., Sakuragi, S., Openshaw, J. and Perrin, D.	2024	Mental time travel	Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies Palgrave	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory has often been viewed as being fundamentally of the past, as being dependent on the transmission of content from the past, and, insofar as it preserves a certain kind of knowledge, as being for the past. The mental time travel paradigm in psychology, which provides an influential model of the relationships between capacities including episodic memory, episodic future thought, and episodic counterfactual thought, has encouraged researchers in multiple disciplines to reconsider these views. Driven by evidence concerning the overlapping brain regions that they engage, the mental time travel paradigm treats these capacities as expressions of a single underlying system, suggesting that memory may have as much to do with the future as it does with the past.
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2024Mental, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sakuragi, Shin and Openshaw, James and Perrin, Dennis}, title = {Mental time travel}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies}, editor = {Bietti, Lucas and Pogačar, Martin}, publisher = {Palgrave}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_12-1} }
Millière, R. and Newen, A.	2024	Selfless memories	Erkenntnis 89 897-918	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-con- scious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of ‘selfless’ episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problem- atic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysteri- ous how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counter-examples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Milliere2024Selfless, author = {Millière, Raphaël and Newen, Albert}, title = {Selfless memories}, year = {2024}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {89}, pages = {897-918}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00562-6} }
Miyamoto, O.	2024	From mind to memory: Bridging Charles Peirce and Endel Tulving through phenomenology of time	Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis Springer 169-188		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Miyamoto2024Mind, author = {Miyamoto, Oscar}, title = {From mind to memory: Bridging Charles Peirce and Endel Tulving through phenomenology of time}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Explorations in Dynamic Semiosis}, editor = {Tragel, E. M.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {169-188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47001-1_6} }
Miyazono, K. and Tooming, U.	2024	Imagination as a generative source of justification	Noûs 58(2) 289-561	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagi- nation in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically con- tributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a preservative source, of justification. In other words, imagination generates new justification above and beyond prior justification provided by other sources. After clarifying the generation/preservation distinction (Section 2), we present an argument for generationism about imagination, which can be divided into two parts; the philosophical part and the empirical part. In the philosophical part of our argument (Section 3), we claim that generationism about imagination follows from what we call “INACCESSIBILITY”. According to INACCESSIBILITY, imagination is properly constrained by the imaginative constrainers (i.e., the prior represen- tations that constrain the development of a scenario in imagination) to which non-imaginative belief-forming processes do not have access. In the empirical part of our argument (Section 4), we claim that INACCESSIBILITY is plausible in light of relevant studies and theories inthe empirical literature, especially the literature on men- tal simulation (Section 4.1), core cognition (Section 4.2), and intuitive physics (Section 4.3).
BibTeX: @article{Miyazono2024Imagination, author = {Miyazono, Kengo and Tooming, Uku}, title = {Imagination as a generative source of justification}, year = {2024}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {58}, number = {2}, pages = {289--561}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12458} }
Miyazono, K. and Tooming, U.	2024	Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A source of epistemic justification can be either preservative or generative, in that it can either just preserve justification that was provided by some other source or generate justification on its own. This paper asks what is required for generationism about memory to be true and argues that there are rather demanding conditions that a case of memory justification needs to satisfy in order to count as epistemically generative in a substantive sense. By considering a parallel argument for epistemically generative cases of imagination and drawing from empirical data on event completion, we argue that there are such cases of memory justification because the way in which memory processes fill in the content of event memories suggests that memory is fit to provide justification about past events that is not due to a source other than memory.
BibTeX: @article{Miyazono2024Prospects, author = {Miyazono, Kengo and Tooming, Uku}, title = {Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10248} }
Moravec, M.	2024	Henri Bergson and the Philosophy of Religion: God, freedom, and duration	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Moravec2024Henri, author = {Moravec, Matyáš}, title = {Henri Bergson and the Philosophy of Religion: God, freedom, and duration}, year = {2024}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Munro, D.	2024	Remembering religious experience: Reconstruction, reflection, and reliability	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 17	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between religious belief and religious experience, bringing out a role for episodic memory that has been overlooked in the epistemology of religion. I do so by considering two questions. The first, the “Psychological Question,” asks what psychological role religious experiences play in causally bringing about religious beliefs. The second, the “Reliability Question,” asks: for a given answer to the Psychological Question about how religious beliefs are formed, are those beliefs formed using generally truth-conducive cognitive mechanisms or patterns of reasoning? I argue that the standard way of answering the Psychological Question overlooks the fact that religious beliefs are often formed via reflection on episodic memories of past religious experiences. Furthermore, recognizing this opens up room to make more meaningful progress on answering the Reliability Question.
BibTeX: @article{Munro2024Remembering, author = {Munro, Daniel}, title = {Remembering religious experience: Reconstruction, reflection, and reliability}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {17}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10205} }
Murez, M. and Strickland, B.	2024	Event completion: A test case for theories of reference in memory	Synthese 204 78	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although we encounter objects from a particular perspective, what we perceive and remember are typically whole objects. In ‘amodal completion’ our mind automatically fills in objects’ spatially occluded parts, and our memory then often discards infor- mation about the orientation from which the objects were perceived. An analogous phenomenon of ‘event completion’ has been demonstrated, which may be understood as the mind automatically filling in temporally occluded parts of events. Exemplifying typical experiments in this paradigm, Strickland and Keil (Strickland and Keil, Cog- nition 121:409–415, 2011) showed participants videos depicting a causal event (e.g., someone kicking a ball), which was edited so that a crucial part was missing (e.g., the moment of contact between foot and ball). Subjects were more likely to falsely remember having seen the moment of contact if (and only if) it was strongly implied by subsequent footage. We use this phenomenon of event completion as a test case for comparing different theories of reference in memory. We argue that event com- pletion puts pressure on both pure causal and pure descriptive theories of reference, and favors more nuanced hybrids of causal and descriptive theories, which integrate insights from cognitive and epistemic approaches.
BibTeX: @article{Murez2024Event, author = {Murez, Michael and Strickland, Brent}, title = {Event completion: A test case for theories of reference in memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {78}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04722-9} }
Nawar, T.	2024	Temporalism and eternalism reconsidered: Perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge	Synthese 203 176	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Traditional debates between semantic temporalists and eternalists appeal to the efficacy of temporal operators and the intuitive (in)validity of instances of temporal reasoning. In this paper, I argue that such debates are inconclusive at best and that under-explored arguments concerning perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge offer more pro- ductive means of advancing debates between temporalists and eternalists and rendering salient several significant potential costs and benefits of these views.
BibTeX: @article{Nawar2024Temporalism, author = {Nawar, Tamer}, title = {Temporalism and eternalism reconsidered: Perceptual experience, memory, and knowledge}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {176}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04535-w} }
Openshaw, J. and Michaelian, K.	2024	Reference in remembering: Towards a simulationist account	Synthese 203 90	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent theories of remembering and of reference (or singular thought) have de- emphasised the role causation was thought to play in mid- to late-twentieth century theorising. According to postcausal theories of remembering, such as simulationism, instances of the psychofunctional kind remembering are not, in principle, dependent on appropriate causal chains running from some event(s) remembered to the occurrence of remembering. Instead they depend only on the reliability, or proper functioning, of the cognitive system responsible for their production. According to broadly reliabilist accounts of singular thought, such thought is not, in principle, dependent on causal chains running from the object(s) of thought to the occurrence of thinking. Despite this common trend, accounts of the two phenomena have been pursued separately. In this paper, we argue that the two lines of research can profitably converge to address a neglected question: what enables occurrences of remembering to refer to particular events, and what determines which event a given occurrence of remembering refers to? We motivate and present a reliabilist account of reference-fixing for postcausal theories of remembering, focusing in particular on simulationism. We then show that this account draws attention to the possibility of referential mnemic confabulation: cases where the reliability requirement for reference is met despite the improper func- tioning of the episodic construction system. We suggest that this makes sense of some underdiscussed phenomena described in the empirical literature on confabulation and argue that our reliabilist account of mnemic reference-fixing accommodates these more naturally than could causal theories of remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Openshaw2024Reference, author = {Openshaw, James and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Reference in remembering: Towards a simulationist account}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04508-z} }
Perrin, D. and Barkasi, M.	2024	Immersing oneself into one's past: Subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 27	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteris- tic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a sub- jective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in remembering, we argue that subjective locative presence – the feeling of be- ing immersed in a certain scene – can be so. Our argument for this claim starts by determining independently the underpinning mechanisms of subjective locative presence in quasi-perceptual imagination. These mechanisms are self-projection, imaginative pretence, and attentional focus. We then proceed to establish that they have been found to underpin conscious states of episodic remembering too. We conclude that episodic remembering can bring us to relive the subjective locative presence characteristic of a perceptual experience, and that the common view is mistaken. Our view – ‘mnemonic immersivism’ – has important consequences regarding the relationships between memory and imagination and the phenomenology of episodic remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2024Immersing, author = {Perrin, Denis and Barkasi, Michael}, title = {Immersing oneself into one's past: Subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10392} }
Pressly, L.	2024	The right to be forgotten and the value of an open future	Ethics 135(1) 65-87	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article seeks to shed light on debates about the right to be forgotten by of- fering a new account of the right as grounded in the confidence that the direc- tion of one’s life is up to one and worth the trouble that it takes to direct it. I show how this confidence is supported by what the right actually provides: the possibility of new social interactions unconditioned by information about one’s past. This view avoids pitfalls facing other accounts of the right’s moral basis, clar- ifies its relation to rights of privacy, and resolves several puzzles thought to face its practical application.
BibTeX: @article{Pressly2024Right, author = {Pressly, Lowry}, title = {The right to be forgotten and the value of an open future}, year = {2024}, journal = {Ethics}, volume = {135}, number = {1}, pages = {65--87}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/731431} }
Puddifoot, K. and Sandelind, C.	2024	Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice	Journal of Social Philosophy 55(1)		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Puddifoot2024Knowing, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Sandelind, Clara}, title = {Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice}, year = {2024}, journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy}, volume = {55}, number = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12557} }
Recanati, F.	2024	Memory-based modes of presentation	Synthese 203 116	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: To deal with memory-based modes of presentation I propose a couple of revisions to the standard criterion of difference for modes of presentation attributed to Frege. First, we need to broaden the scope of the criterion so that not merely the thoughts of a given subject at a given time may or may not involve the same way of thinking of some object, but also the thoughts of a subject at different times. Second, we need to ‘relativize’ the criterion of difference to particular subjects in particular situations. Thanks to these revisions, we can make sense of Evans’ notion of a dynamic mode of presentation that persists through time despite lower-level changes. A dynamic mode of presentation is a complex mode of presentation involving several epistemically rewarding relations to the reference successively (in contrast to composite modes of presentation, which involve several epistemically rewarding relations simultaneously). I show how this idea can be cashed out in the mental file framework, and how, in that framework, we can provide a straightforward answer to the question: when is a mode of presentation based on a memory M the same as the mode of presentation based on the perception P from which the memory derives? The answer appeals to the distinction between anchored and unanchored memories.
BibTeX: @article{Recanati2024Memory, author = {Recanati, François}, title = {Memory-based modes of presentation}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {116}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04531-0} }
Rivadulla-Duró, A.	2024	The simulation theory of memory and the phenomenology of remembering	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 925-945	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Simulation Theory of Memory states that to remember an episode is to simulate it in the imagination (Michaelian, 2016a, b), making memory thus reducible to the act of imagining. This paper examines Simulation Theory's resources to account for our ability to distinguish episodic memory from free imagination. The theory suggests that we can reliably do so because of the distinctive phenomenology episodic memory comes with (i.e., a feeling of remembering), which other episodic imaginings lack. I will raise two objections to how the feeling of remembering is engineered in the theory, followed by an exhaustive exploration of the theory's resources to ground the mechanism underlying the elicitation of such feeling. I will conclude that the Simulation Theory cannot simultaneously defend the simulational character of episodic memory and ground our ability to discriminate between memories and imaginings.
BibTeX: @article{RivadullaDuro2024Simulation, author = {Rivadulla-Duró, Andrea}, title = {The simulation theory of memory and the phenomenology of remembering}, year = {2024}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {23}, pages = {925-945}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09881-z} }
Robins, S.K. and De Brigard, F.	2024	Introduction to the topical collection 'locating representations in the brain: Interdisciplinary persepctives'	Synthese 203 151		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Robins2024Introduction, author = {Robins, Sarah K. and De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Introduction to the topical collection 'locating representations in the brain: Interdisciplinary persepctives'}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {203}, pages = {151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04565-4} }
Rosen, M.G.	2024	Retroactive consciousness of dreams: What do we remember when we wake up?	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 39-61	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How skeptical should we be of dream memory? It’s hard to deny that some form of conscious experience occurs while we sleep that leaves memory traces which are reported on waking. However, a form of weak skepticism towards dream reports is warranted: many of the reports we make on waking are not of con- scious episodes that occurred during sleep. Instead, we become conscious of most ‘dreams’ only upon waking. This is because both memory and other cognitive capacities in dreams can be severely degraded. The conditions under which mental events occur in sleep might prevent such processes from making it to the ‘global workspace’ or, alternatively, they may lack ‘access consciousness’. This makes it possible that when a subject is woken up during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, they become retroactively conscious of dreams, an updated version of Dennett’s cassette theory of dreaming. According to this weak skeptical view, most dream reports are of, in some sense, false memories.
BibTeX: @incollection{Rosen2024Retroactive, author = {Rosen, Melanie G.}, title = {Retroactive consciousness of dreams: What do we remember when we wake up?}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {39--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_3} }
Sakuragi, S.	2024	Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The problem of forgotten evidence consists of a pair of scenarios originally proposed by Alvin Gold- man. In the ‘’forgotten good evidence” and ‘’forgotten bad evidence” scenarios, subjects hold the same memory belief while irreversibly forgetting its original, though different, pieces of evidence. The two scenarios pose a series of challenges to current time slice (CTS) theories, which posit that memory beliefs are justified solely by contemporaneous states. Goldman’s two scenarios pose an apparent dilemma to CTS theories given a naïve picture of how a memory belief is successfully retained while its evidence is irreversibly forgotten. In my view, however, CTS theories may find a solution to the apparent problem by carefully examining the conditions under which a memory belief is successfully retained while its evidence is completely forgotten. Namely, the two scenarios overlook an important difference between forgetting good evidence and forgetting bad evidence.
BibTeX: @article{Sakuragi2024Successfully, author = {Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {Successfully remembering a belief and the problem of forgotten evidence}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10244} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2024	Dream memories, metacognition, and the nature of dream experiences	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 63-83	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Onekeyfeatureofmanyphilosophicalaccountsofdreamexperiencesis the attempt to explain their nature by drawing analogies to other wakeful experi- ences, most notably perceptual and imaginative experiences. Because we do not have direct access to dream experiences themselves, reports produced on the basis of dream memories have become central for those attempts. The reliance on analo- gies to wakeful experiences and dream reports does, however, generate what I call the asymmetry problem. This is the problem according to which there is an asym- metry in the way that reports of wakeful experiences and reports of dream experi- ences are produced, which is potentially misleading when drawing parallels between those experiences. Against this backdrop, my goal in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue that the asymmetry problem can be overcome by investigating how meta- cognition allows us to distinguish between memories of wakeful experiences and memories of dream experiences. Second, I build on this discussion to tentatively suggest a view of the nature of dream experiences according to which they are nei- ther perceptual experiences nor imaginative experiences, but rather intensified forms of mind-wandering. The focus on metacognition and dream memories thus points to novel and interesting ways in which we can move forward central discus- sions in the philosophy of dreams.
BibTeX: @incollection{SantAnna2024Dream, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Dream memories, metacognition, and the nature of dream experiences}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {63--83}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_4} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2024	Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 18	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and- authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness— if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2024Metacognition, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.9880} }
Sant'Anna, A., Michaelian, K. and Andonovski, N.	2024	Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 15(1) e1665	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to epis- odicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2024Autonoesis, author = {Sant'Anna, Andre and Michaelian, Kourken and Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {e1665}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1665} }
Schechtman, M.	2024	Personal identity and mental time travel	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper examines the role of episodic memory, and the broader notion of “mental time travel” (MTT), in constituting personal identity. After arguing that the construal of memory’s role in personal identity found in traditional psychological continuity theories of personal identity is both unrealistic and unsatisfying, the paper endeavors to provide a better account. This begins with recent work in the science and philosophy of memory that sees episodic memory as part of a broader faculty for MTT (which also involves imagination and counterfactual thought). Some of the basic ideas expressed in this work are developed into an account of the connection between MTT with “strong identification” and personal identity. According to this alternative approach, we regularly “borrow affect” from our pasts and futures through forms of remembering, imagining, and counterfactual thinking that involve a particular form of identification with our past and future selves. This activity generates a strong diachronic experience of self, which contributes in important ways to diachronic personal identity. The sense of self generated through MTT is, however, only one piece of a more comprehensive account of personal identity. The paper concludes by describing its place in the larger picture.
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2024Personal, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Personal identity and mental time travel}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10639} }
Schechtman, M.	2024	Self-narrative, litterary narrative, and self-understanding	Philosophia 52 11-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the innovative and engaging Philosophy, Literature and Understanding, Jukka Mikkonen investigates a range of developments in multiple disciplines that have complicated traditional debates between cognitivists and non-cognitivists about litterature. To avoid the extremes this debate has fallen into, Mikkonen develops a middle course that grounds the cognitive value of literature in its contributions to cultural and self-understanding. As part of this argument, Mikkonen offers an account of how literature can contribute to self-understanding via its narrative form despite what he sees as deep differences between real-life and literary narratives. He concludes that literature can (obliquely) aid our understanding of emotions like grief due to their shared processual nature, and self-understanding generally through its artificiality, the awareness of which allows us to recognize and correct fictionalizing narrative tendencies in our life-narratives. While I agree with Mikkonen’s conclusions, I believe they are too modest and that he provides the resources to claim even greater cognitive benefits from literature. Focusing on what it means to ‘have a self-narrative’ and describing narrative work as it occurs both unreflectively and through self-conscious reflection, this paper argues that that the selectivity, interpretation, and revision said to fictionalize life-narratives are in fact critical to self- understanding, which requires imaginative engagement of the sort Mikkonen sees as characteristic of the practice of literature. This suggests additional and more direct potential cognitive benefits of literature for self-understanding than Mikkonen describes, strengthening and supporting his broader position.
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2024Self, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Self-narrative, litterary narrative, and self-understanding}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {52}, pages = {11--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00687-0} }
Semeijn, M.	2024	Matraversian skepticism and models of memory	Synthese 204 143	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper introduces Matraversian skepticism from aesthetics (i.e., there is no cognitively interesting difference between our engagement with fiction versus our engagement with non-fiction) to debates in psychology and cognitive science on mem- ory processing. I argue that the concept of ‘fiction’ has no place in our cognitive models of memory, neither in a specific category of memory, nor as a fact/fiction dimension. I propose a two-stage model of memory processing and explore the skeptical challenge that it poses to existing accounts of the role of the concept of ‘fiction’ in models of mem- ory. An important element of this challenge is the realization that remembering agents typically recognize a range of different kinds of non-fictional, non-believed memories, e.g., memories originating in lies, trickery, dreams, hallucinations, illusions, etc.
BibTeX: @article{Semeijn2024Matraversian, author = {Semeijn, Merel}, title = {Matraversian skepticism and models of memory}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {143}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04776-9} }
Soteriou, M.	2024	Perspectives in imagination, memory, and dreams	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 261-278	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Whenweareawake,weoccupyaspatiotemporalperspective,andwhile occupying that spatiotemporal perspective we can simultaneously exercise a capac- ity to represent a distinct spatiotemporal perspective that we do not occupy—for example, when we imagine or recollect events. The first half of the paper compares and contrasts the ways in which this capacity is exercised in imagination and epi- sodic recollection. The second half of the paper draws on the above accounts in order to frame hypotheses about the ways in which perspectives can feature in dreams. The paper argues that some unusual and distinctive features of dreams can be explained by making intelligible the idea that it is possible to represent a spatio- temporal perspective while failing to meet the conditions required for occupying a such perspective. In such circumstances, one fails to occupy a conscious perspective that makes possible even the minimal orienting knowledge ‘I am here now’.
BibTeX: @incollection{Soteriou2024Perspectives, author = {Soteriou, Matthew}, title = {Perspectives in imagination, memory, and dreams}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {261--278}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_12} }
Sutton, J.	2024	Affective, cognitive and ecological components of joint expertise in collaborative embodied skills	Expertise: Philosophical perspectives Oxford University Press 85-104			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2024Affective, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Affective, cognitive and ecological components of joint expertise in collaborative embodied skills}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Expertise: Philosophical perspectives}, editor = {Farina, Mirko and Lavazza, Andrea and Pritchard, Duncan}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {85--104} }
Sutton, J.	2024	Maurice Halwachs on dreams and memory	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 303-323	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In his 1925 book Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire (The Social Frameworks of Memory), the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) developed a sustained comparison between remembering and dreaming. Drawing on a new first full English translation of this material, this chapter assesses Halbwachs’ critique of individualism about memory, his scientifically-informed analysis of dream experience, and his ambitious program for a sociological psychol- ogy. In work relevant both to contemporary dream science and to approaches to memory inspired by distributed and 4E cognitive theory, Halbwachs argues that dreaming is a natural experiment that tests the cognitive powers of the isolated brain, and that its fragmentary nature confirms that social frameworks are necessary for rich memory experience. Remembering is an activity that involves significant cognitive work in context. Having rejected individualism, Halbwachs offers a more subtle account of dreams as retaining some minimal orientation to society, space, and time. In sharp contrast to prevailing assumptions that Halbwachs ignored indi- vidual psychology, his intriguing account of dreams and his social ontology of memory offer rich materials for contemporary integrative approaches to dreaming and remembering across the social and the cognitive sciences.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2024Maurice, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Maurice Halwachs on dreams and memory}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {303--323}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_14} }
Teng, L.	2024	The justificatory power of memory experience	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 31	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Psychological research has discovered that episodic memories are constructive in nature. This pa- per examines how, despite being constructive, episodic memories can provide us with justification for beliefs about the past. In current literature, two major approaches to memorial justification are internalist foundationalism and reliabilism. I first demonstrate that an influential version of internalist foundationalism, dogmatism, encounters problems when we compare certain types of memory construction with cognitive penetration in perception. On the other hand, various versions of reliabilism all face skeptical challenges. I propose an alternative, two-factor theory that recognizes an epistemic distinction typically overlooked by dogmatism and reliabilism. Although our account leaves certain aspects unspecified, it is an important step forward.
BibTeX: @article{Teng2024Justificatory, author = {Teng, Lu}, title = {The justificatory power of memory experience}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {31}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10238} }
Teroni, F.	2024	Memory identification and its failures	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 28	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When we remember, we often know that we do. How does this memory identification proceed? After having articulated some constraints on an attractive account of memory identification, this paper explores three types of accounts that respectively appeal to features of memory content, of memory as an activity, and of memory as an attitude. It offers reasons to favour an attitudinal ac- count giving pride of place to the feeling of familiarity.
BibTeX: @article{Teroni2024Memory, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {Memory identification and its failures}, year = {2024}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {5}, pages = {28}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2024.10386} }
Trakas, M., de Ávila, N. and Walsh, E.	2024	Introduction to the monographic section: Memory and trauma: Philosophical perspectives	Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 26 1-2		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2024Introduction, author = {Trakas, Marina and de Ávila, Nathália and Walsh, Em}, title = {Introduction to the monographic section: Memory and trauma: Philosophical perspectives}, year = {2024}, journal = {Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso}, volume = {26}, pages = {1--2}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22370/rhv2024iss26pp1-2} }
Vanello, D.	2024	Autobiographical memory and moral identity development	Journal of Consciousness Studies 31(7-8) 86-108	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Moral identity theory is one of the most popular theories of moral development. A central concept of moral identity theory is moral integration. Moral identity theorists refer to moral integration as the process by which moral values become central to a person's identity, thus developing one's moral identity. The problem is that there is still very little understanding of the psychological processes that constitute the process of moral integration. The aim of this paper is to offer an account of the role of autobiographical memory in moral identity development. Autobiographical memory refers to the ability to recollect events in one's past as part of one's personal history. I motivate the claim that the role of the development of autobiographical memory in moral integration should be conceived in relation to the emergence of psychological abilities that both develop and are exercised on a personal, conscious, and deliberative level.
BibTeX: @article{Vanello2024Autobiographical, author = {Vanello, Daniel}, title = {Autobiographical memory and moral identity development}, year = {2024}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {7-8}, pages = {86--108}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.7.086} }
Verano, L.E.	2024	Home movies as reliquaries of memory: A phenomenological perspective	Film-Philosophy 28(2) 350-372	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If film immortalises the ephemeral and presentifies the past, this is especially true of home movies, whose content is not the result of a narrative composition or an invention of fiction, but the product of fragments of reality. These three categories – fiction, documentary, and the home movie – have been analysed by Jean-Pierre Meunier and Vivian Sobchack, with an emphasis on the effect that each film mode can have on the spectator, eliciting a particular emotional and cognitive response. But these authors’ models depend entirely on the spectator’s experience to identify each mode, with the home movie being limited to footage in which we can recognise our own families. Nevertheless, a stranger’s home movie can elicit an act of recognition through an intersubjectivity that arises from the footage. On this basis, this article proposes a reading of the home movie as a reliquary of memory, where content and medium intersect to give rise to the particular experience associated with this film mode.
BibTeX: @article{Verano2024Home, author = {Verano, Lourdes Esqueda}, title = {Home movies as reliquaries of memory: A phenomenological perspective}, year = {2024}, journal = {Film-Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {2}, pages = {350--372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/film.2024.0272} }
Verdejo, V.M.	2024	Remembering as the same	Synthese 204 104	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One may not only represent the same objects of one’s past, but also represent them as the same objects across time. I call this phenomenon “Remembering as the Same” (RaS). In this article, I aim to bring out the connection between the simula- tionist model of cognitive memory and this underexplored aspect of memory expe- rience. I shall suggest that, unlike the causalist contender, the simulationist is in an advantageous position to properly capture RaS, especially when subjects represent past objects as the same in cross-temporal trains of thought that are also future- oriented. In the course of defending this claim, I will highlight the significance of RaS in the study of memory and cross-temporal reference, critically examine the resources available to causalist approaches, and reject too simplistic incorporations of RaS within the simulationist framework.
BibTeX: @article{Verdejo2024Remembering, author = {Verdejo, Victor M.}, title = {Remembering as the same}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04720-x} }
Watts, M.	2024	Semantic memory, mnemonic effort and mnemonic habit	Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2023 Collocated Workshops Springer 90-98	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Semantic memory is often conceptualized as a storage space for an extensive assortment of explicit knowledge structures, formed as the result of a chronic, unconscious mechanism of abstraction and generalization. Against that, I argue that it is not the product of a dedicated system in which content is abstracted from experiences and stored, rather it's best understood as split between what can be called mnemonic efforts and mnemonic habits. Mnemonic efforts are the effortful expression of semantic knowledge and often take the form of the determination of similarities among multiple episodic memory traces activated in parallel. Mnemonic habits on the other hand form as a result of fluency of constructive memory processes that can be broadly understood as embodied, or enacted.
BibTeX: @incollection{Watts2024Semantic, author = {Watts, Matthew}, title = {Semantic memory, mnemonic effort and mnemonic habit}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Software Engineering and Formal Methods. SEFM 2023 Collocated Workshops}, editor = {Aldini, Alessandro}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {90--98}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66021-4_6} }
Werning, M. and Liefke, K.	2024	Remembering dreams: Parasitic reference by minimal traces in memories from non-veridical experiences	Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues Springer 119-154	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memories are widely regarded as factive: Linguistic reports of a memory make the presupposition that the memory refers to an actually existent object and that the properties remembered of the object actually apply to it. Focusing on memories from perceptions—where factivity can indeed be assumed—the two main historical strands in the philosophy of memory, intentionalism and relational- ism, disagree, amongst others, over (i) whether memory reports should be analyzed as de re or de dicto, (ii) to what type of entity agents are related when they episodi- cally remember, and (iii) how the time gap between experience and remembering is bridged. However, what about memories from dreams or hallucinations, where fac- tivity is violated? Here, we can still distinguish remembering from misremembering and confabulation. We show that the intentionalist as well as the relationalist faces insurmountable problems in those cases. We develop a new account according to which reference in episodic memory is parasitic on the reference relation in the primary experience—the host attitude. Accordingly, we replace de re and de dicto analyses of memory reports with a de hospite analysis. Referential parasitism over- comes the problems of intentionalism and relationalism. We argue that referential parasitism obviates the need to transmit representational content from experience to remembering, as postulated by the Causal Theory of Memory. Minimal traces with- out representational content suffice. Trace minimalism (Werning 2020) paired with referential parasitism provides a uniform, non-disjunctivist explanation of remem- bering and misremembering from veridical and non-veridical experiences.
BibTeX: @incollection{Werning2024Remembering, author = {Werning, Markus and Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Remembering dreams: Parasitic reference by minimal traces in memories from non-veridical experiences}, year = {2024}, booktitle = {Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues}, editor = {Gregory, Daniel and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {119--154}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-68204-9_6} }
Winokur, B.	2024	Extended mentality and ascriptive authority	Synthese 204 18	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Self-ascriptions of one’s current mental states often enjoy a distinctively strong presumption of truth. Some philosophers claim that this ascriptive authority is non- transferable in the sense that it cannot be matched or surpassed by anyone else. In this paper I examine this non-transferability claim in the light of potential extended mental- ity cases. These cases threaten to show that popular accounts of ascriptive authority do not vindicate its alleged non-transferability. However, I also argue that a less popular account of ascriptive authority can do so.
BibTeX: @article{Winokur2024Extended, author = {Winokur, Benjamin}, title = {Extended mentality and ascriptive authority}, year = {2024}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {204}, pages = {18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04637-5} }
Wolpert, D.H. and Kipper, J.	2024	Memory systems, the epistemic arrow of time, and the second law	Entropy 26(2) 126	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The epistemic arrow of time is the fact that our knowledge of the past seems to be both of a different kind and more detailed than our knowledge of the future. Just like with the other arrows of time, it has often been speculated that the epistemic arrow arises due to the second law of thermodynamics. In this paper, we investigate the epistemic arrow of time using a fully formal framework. We begin by defining a memory system as any physical system whose present state can provide information about the state of the external world at some time other than the present. We then identify two types of memory systems in our universe, along with an important special case of the first type, which we distinguish as a third type of memory system. We show that two of these types of memory systems are time-symmetric, able to provide knowledge about both the past and the future. However, the third type of memory systems exploits the second law of thermodynamics, at least in all of its instances in our universe that we are aware of. The result is that in our universe, this type of memory system only ever provides information about the past. We also argue that human memory is of this third type, completing the argument. We end by scrutinizing the basis of the second law itself. This uncovers a previously unappreciated formal problem for common arguments that try to derive the second law from the “Past Hypothesis”, i.e., from the claim that the very early universe was in a state of extremely low entropy. Our analysis is indebted to prior work by one of us but expands and improves upon this work in several respects
BibTeX: @article{Wolpert2024Memory, author = {Wolpert, David. H. and Kipper, Jens}, title = {Memory systems, the epistemic arrow of time, and the second law}, year = {2024}, journal = {Entropy}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, pages = {126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/e26020170} }
Allen, B.	2023	Living in Time: The Philosophy of Henri Bergson	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Allen2023Living, author = {Allen, Barry}, title = {Living in Time: The Philosophy of Henri Bergson}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Amaya, S., Abitbol, P. and Allais, L.	2023	Forgiveness and memory: Opportunities for reconciliation. An introduction	Revista de Estudios Sociales 86 3-12	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this introduction, we argue for a basic idea. Community-based spaces for promoting forgiveness and memory-making bear the promise of promoting some of the cultural transformations needed for thick, structural reconciliation. As we show by discussing some recent examples taken from the Colombian context of the past decade, these spaces do not compete, but actually complement a pragmatic, thin institutional design for reconciliation. This idea, as we discuss here, serves as the common thread connecting the articles in this special issue. The texts reflect on the practice of forgive- ness and some of its specific contours in the context of the Colombian conflict.
BibTeX: @article{Amaya2023Forgiveness, author = {Amaya, Santiago and Abitbol, Pablo and Allais, Lucy}, title = {Forgiveness and memory: Opportunities for reconciliation. An introduction}, year = {2023}, journal = {Revista de Estudios Sociales}, volume = {86}, pages = {3-12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7440/res86.2023.01} }
Andonovski, N.	2023	Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory: Explanation, idealization, and the role of crucial data	European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 42	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Galilean explanatory style is characterized by the search for the underlying structure of phenomena, the positing of "deep" explanatory principles, and a view of the relation between theory and data, on which the search for "crucial data" is of primary importance. In this paper, I trace the dynamics of adopting the Galilean style, focusing on the science of episodic memory. I argue that memory systems, such as episodic and semantic memory, were posited as underlying competences producing the observable phenomena of memory. Considered in idealized isolation from other systems, episodic memory was taken to underlay the ability of individuals to remember events from their personal past. Yet, in reality, memory systems regularly interact, standing in many-to-many relations to actual memory tasks and experiences. Upon this backdrop, I explore a puzzle about the increasing prominence of the notion of autonoetic consciousness in Tulving's theory of episodic memory. I argue that, contrary to widespread belief, the prominence is not best explained by the purported essential link between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory. Rather, it is explained by the fact that autonoetic consciousness, hypothesized to uniquely accompany episodic retrieval, was considered a source of crucial data, predictable only from theories positing a functionally distinct episodic memory system. However, with the emergence of a new generation of theories, positing wider memory systems for remembering and imagination, the question of the relation between episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness has been reopened. This creates a pressing need for de-idealization, triggering a new search for crucial data.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2023Autonoesis, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory: Explanation, idealization, and the role of crucial data}, year = {2023}, journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science}, volume = {13}, pages = {42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-023-00548-3} }
Andonovski, N. and Michaelian, K.	2023	Accounting for the strangeness, infrequency, and suddenness of déjà vu.	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e358	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Barzykowski and Moulin argue that déjà vu is natural product of autobiographical memory retrieval. Their proposal fails to account for three salient properties of déjà vu experiences: their strangeness, their infrequency, and their characteristically sudden onset. Accounting for these properties is necessary for proper integration of déjà vu into autobiographical memory research.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2023Accounting, author = {Andonovski, Nikola and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Accounting for the strangeness, infrequency, and suddenness of déjà vu.}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e358}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23000237} }
Arcangeli, M.	2023	Imagining in remembering from the outside	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 146-164		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Arcangeli2023Imagining, author = {Arcangeli, Margherita}, title = {Imagining in remembering from the outside}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {146--164}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-10} }
Aronowitz, S.	2023	Representational structures only make their mark over time: A case from memory.	The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e263	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Memory structures range across the dimensions that distinguish language-like thought. Recent work suggests agent- or situation-specific information is embedded in these structures. Understanding why this is, and pulling these structures apart, requires observing what happens under major changes. The evidence presented for the language-of-thought (LoT) does not look broadly enough across time to capture the function of representational structure.
BibTeX: @article{Aronowitz2023Representational, author = {Aronowitz, Sara}, title = {Representational structures only make their mark over time: A case from memory.}, year = {2023}, journal = {The Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e263}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x23001905} }
Bailey, O.	2023	What must be lost: On retrospection, authenticity, and some neglected costs of transformation	Synthese 201 189	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A sensibility is, on a rough first pass, an emotional orientation to the world. It shapes how things appear to us, evaluatively speaking. By transfiguring things’ evaluative appearances, a change in sensibility can profoundly alter one’s overall experience of the world. I argue that some forms of sensibility change entail (1) risking one’s knowledge of what experiences imbued with one’s prior sensibility were like, and (2) surrendering one’s grasp on the intelligibility of one’s prior emotional apprehen- sions. These costs have consequences for Laurie Paul’s ‘problem of transformative experience.’ Paul has argued that when we are poised to become someone new, our inexperience generates problems for authentic choice about our own futures. By reck- oning with the epistemic losses involved in sensibility change, I show that this problem must not be confined to novel transformations. Prior experience does not guarantee the knowledge or understanding necessary for choosing authentically (in Paul’s sense). If the problem Paul highlights is indeed a problem at all, then, it is a still more pervasive and intractable one than it has been taken to be.
BibTeX: @article{Bailey2023What, author = {Bailey, Olivia}, title = {What must be lost: On retrospection, authenticity, and some neglected costs of transformation}, year = {2023}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {201}, pages = {189}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04179-2} }
Barash, J.A.	2023	Historical time, collective memory, and the finitude of historical understanding	Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History: A Cross-Cultural Approach Bloomsbury Academic 225-238		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Barash2023Historical, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Historical time, collective memory, and the finitude of historical understanding}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History: A Cross-Cultural Approach}, editor = {Elgabsi, Natan and Gilbert, Bennett}, publisher = {Bloomsbury Academic}, pages = {225--238}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.48487/pdh.2016.n2.23296} }
Barkasi, M.	2023	Memory as sensory modality, perception as experience of the past	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 791-809	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Perceptual experience strikes us as a presentation of the here and now. I argue that it also involves experience of the past. This claim is often made based on cases, like seeing stars, involving significant signal-transmission lag, or based on how working memory allows us to experience extended events. I argue that the past is injected into perceptual experience via a third way: long-term memory traces in sensory circuits. Memory, like the receptor-based senses, is an integrated and constituent modality through which we experience the environment. Because of this modality, we expe- rience the sensed properties of stimuli partly as they are now, but also partly as we encountered them in the past.
BibTeX: @article{Barkasi2023Memory, author = {Barkasi, Michael}, title = {Memory as sensory modality, perception as experience of the past}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, pages = {791-809}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00598-7} }
Barner, A.K.	2023	Imagining the actual vs. possible future	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 54-75		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Barner2023Imagining, author = {Barner, Alma K.}, title = {Imagining the actual vs. possible future}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {54--75}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-5} }
Bernecker, S.	2023	An explanationist model of (false) memory	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 109-126	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Chapter 5 argues that the current debate about the nature of mnemonic confabulation has reached an impasse and proposes an explanationist account of false memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2023Explanationist, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {An explanationist model of (false) memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {109--126} }
Berninger, A.	2023	A family-resemblance approach to nostalgia	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 272-288		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Berninger2023Family, author = {Berninger, Anja}, title = {A family-resemblance approach to nostalgia}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {272--288}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-18} }
Block, N.	2023	Let's get rid of the concept of an object file	Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind Wiley 494-516		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Block2023Lets, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {Let's get rid of the concept of an object file}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {McLaughlin, Brian and Cohen, Jonathan}, publisher = {Wiley}, pages = {494--516}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781394259847.ch27} }
Block, N.	2023	The Border Between Seeing and Thinking	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Block2023Border, author = {Block, Ned}, title = {The Border Between Seeing and Thinking}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Blomkvist, A.	2023	Aphantasia: In search of theory	Mind & Language 38(3) 866-888	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Though researchers working on congenital aphantasia (henceforth “aphantasia”) agree that this condition involves an impairment in the ability to voluntarily generate visual imagery, disagreement looms large as to which other impairments are exhibited by aphantasic subjects. This article offers the first extensive review of studies on aphantasia, and proposes that aphantasic subjects exhibit a cluster of impairments. It puts forward a novel cognitive theory of aphantasia, building on the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis of memory and imagination. It argues that aphantasia is best explained as a malfunction of processes in the episodic system, and is therefore an episodic system condition.
BibTeX: @article{Blomkvist2023Aphantasia, author = {Blomkvist, Andrea}, title = {Aphantasia: In search of theory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {38}, number = {3}, pages = {866--888}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12432} }
Boyle, A.	2023	Episodic memory in animals	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 189-205			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Boyle2023Episodic, author = {Boyle, Alexandria}, title = {Episodic memory in animals}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {189--205} }
Caravà, M.	2023	Enactive memory	Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies Palgrave Macmillan	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter describes the concept of enactive memory, which is quite new but increasingly discussed in contemporary philosophy of memory. Although the enactive approach has been used to investigate several memory systems, e.g., procedural memory, episodic memory, and autobiographical memory, this chapter focuses only on the enactive approach to episodic memory because most of the current debate on enactive memory is about this memory system. Section “Introduction” specifies what type of enactive memory is discussed in this chapter. Section “The Concept of Enactive Memory” introduces the concept of enactive memory, clarifies its central theoretical commitments and goals, and describes how enactivists have explained episodic remembering. Section “The Philosophical Context of Enactive Memory” provides a brief contextualization of the enactive approach to memory with respect to approaches and theories with which, for one reason or another, it shares some theoretical insights, like the embodied, the extended, and the distributed approach, and the simulation theory. Section “Forgetting as a Challenge for Enactive Memory” explains why forgetting poses an important explanatory challenge to the enactive approach to memory and describes one philosophical proposal that has been developed to address this challenge. Section “Summary” provides a summary of the chapter, mentions some ongoing projects on enactive memory, and identifies some topics that advocates of the enactive approach to memory may want to investigate in the future.
BibTeX: @incollection{Carava2023Enactive, author = {Caravà, Marta}, title = {Enactive memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies}, editor = {Bietti, Lucas and Pogacar, Martin}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93789-8_53-1} }
Caravà, M. and Robins, S.K.	2023	From phenomenology to traces: Inferring memory mechanisms	Constructivist Foundations 19(1) 70-71	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Open peer commentary on the article “Deconstructing Accurate and Inaccurate Recall in the DRM Paradigm: A Phenomenological and Behavioral Exploration” by Jaša Černe & Urban Kordeš. Abstract: By providing a detailed account of the phenomenology of accurate and inaccurate recall, Černe and Kordeš offer a rich and much-needed account of memory’s constructive nature. Their results amplify growing concerns about the nature and significance of the remember-know distinction, but also suggest that there is more differentiation in the underlying mechanism than either they or traditional constructivist accounts have acknowledged.
BibTeX: @article{Carava2023Inferring, author = {Caravà, Marta and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {From phenomenology to traces: Inferring memory mechanisms}, year = {2023}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {70-71} }
Carnegy-Arbuthnott, H.	2023	Privacy, publicity, and the right to be forgotten	Journal of Political Philosophy 31 494-516		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{CarnegyArbuthnott2023Privacy, author = {Carnegy-Arbuthnott, Hannah}, title = {Privacy, publicity, and the right to be forgotten}, year = {2023}, journal = {Journal of Political Philosophy}, volume = {31}, pages = {494-516}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12308} }
Chadha, M.	2023	Selfless Minds: A Contemporary Perspective on Vasubandhu's Metaphysics	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Chadha2023Selfless, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {Selfless Minds: A Contemporary Perspective on Vasubandhu's Metaphysics}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Colaço, D. and Robins, S.K.	2023	Why have "revolutionary" tools found purchase in memory science?	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4 30	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The study of the neural basis of memory has advanced over the past decade. A key contributor to this memory “renaissance” has been new tools. On its face, this matches what might be described as a neuroscientific revolution stemming from the development of tools, where this revolution is largely independent of theory. In this paper, we challenge this tool revolution account by focusing on a problem that arises in applying it to this “renaissance”: it is centered around memory, but the tools were not developed for solving problems in memory science. To resolve this problem, we introduce an account that distinguishes tool development and tool uptake, and we argue that while theoretical considerations may not inform development, they do inform uptake. Acknowledging the distance between these stages of tool use draws our attention to the questions of why and how tool uptake occurs in the domains that it does.
BibTeX: @article{Colaco2023Why, author = {Colaço, David and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Why have "revolutionary" tools found purchase in memory science?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {4}, pages = {30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.10499} }
Craig, C.	2023	Memory and the Political Art in Plato's Statesman	Lexington Books			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @book{Craig2023Memory, author = {Craig, Catherine}, title = {Memory and the Political Art in Plato's Statesman}, year = {2023}, editor = {Rowman and Littlefield}, publisher = {Lexington Books} }
Dantas, D.F.	2023	Epistemic sanity or why you shouldn't be opinionated or skeptical	Episteme 20 647-666	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the ‘alethic potential’ of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve, given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs, which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence, opinionated agents are often forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but suspension dominates indifference in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her entire agenda, but then ‘flipping’ beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an ‘impure’ veritism, which can deal with some limitations of veritism (e.g., explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs).
BibTeX: @article{Dantas2023Epistemic, author = {Dantas, Danilo Fraga}, title = {Epistemic sanity or why you shouldn't be opinionated or skeptical}, year = {2023}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {20}, pages = {647--666}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.43} }
De Brigard, F.	2023	Memory and Remembering	Cambridge University Press		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{DeBrigard2023Memory, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Memory and Remembering}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108955447} }
Decaix, V.	2023	Is memory a matter of complexion ? On memory disorders in the latin commentaries on de memoria	Early Science and Medecine 28(3) 452-471	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: This article focuses on the use of the theory of complexions made by medieval commentators to explain the pathologies or dysfunctions of memory as outlined by Aristotle in his treatise on Memory and Reminiscence. More particularly, it focuses on the Aristotelian issues of the young and the old, the slow- and quick-witted, condensed in the Latin commentaries into an aporia that we will call the “aporia of the opposites” and into the aporia of the melancholics, questioning the influence that complexions can exert on memory. We examine three contrasting solutions, as given by Albert the Great (1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), and Radulphus Brito (d. 1320/21), to shed light on their use and interpretation of theories of complexion within their accounts on memory. The main question that arises in the midst of these interpretations is about which complexion is the most appropriate to memory.
BibTeX: @article{Decaix2023Memory, author = {Decaix, Veronique}, title = {Is memory a matter of complexion ? On memory disorders in the latin commentaries on de memoria}, year = {2023}, journal = {Early Science and Medecine}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, pages = {452--471}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15733823-20230082} }
Dings, R., McCarroll, C.J. and Newen, A.	2023	Situated authenticity in episodic memory	Synthese 202 86	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the ‘bounds of authenticity’. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of ‘Situated Authenticity’ which highlights that the norms of authenticity are context- dependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our account, which is currently elaborated targeting a phenomenological level, may also be elaborated on a processing level using the concept of representational format.
BibTeX: @article{Dings2023Situated, author = {Dings, Roy and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Newen, Albert}, title = {Situated authenticity in episodic memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {202}, pages = {86}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04309-w} }
Dings, R. and Newen, A.	2023	Constructing the past: The relevance of the narrative self in modulating episodic memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14(1) 87-112	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memories can no longer be seen as the re-activation of stored experiences but are the product of an intense construction process based on a memory trace. Episodic recall is a result of a process of scenario construction. If one accepts this generative framework of episodic memory, there is still a be big gap in understanding the role of the narrative self in shaping scenario construction. Some philosophers are in principle sceptic by claiming that a narrative self cannot be more than a causally inefficacious attributed entity anyway. Thus, we first characterize a narrative self in detail and second we clarify its influential causal role in shaping our episodic memories by influencing the process of scenario construction. This happens at three stages, namely at the level of the input, the output and the process of scenario construction.
BibTeX: @article{Dings2023Constructing, author = {Dings, Roy and Newen, Albert}, title = {Constructing the past: The relevance of the narrative self in modulating episodic memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {87--112}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00581-2} }
Eldridge, P.	2023	Memory as a theme in phenomenology	Encyclopedia of Phenomenology Springer		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Eldridge2023Memory, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {Memory as a theme in phenomenology}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Phenomenology}, editor = {de Warren, N. and Toadvine, T.}, publisher = {Springer}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47253-5_277-1} }
Ferdinand, J.	2023	Experience versus recollection: Reinhart Koselleck and Aleida Assmann on collective memory	Journal of the Philosophy of History 17(3) 430-451	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Since the 1990s, Reinhart Koselleck has been one of the critics of the concept of collective memory. This includes contributions to practical debates on the one hand and reflections on a more theoretical level on the other. In contrast, with her concept of cultural memory, Aleida Assmann has taken a more positive view of the concept of collective memory. She defends this concept against Koselleck’s critical remarks, referring to him as an implicit addressee of her reflections. This essay takes this disagreement as an opportunity to look more closely at the ‘dialogue’ between them by addressing three overlapping aspects, primarily on a theoretical level: the distinction between experience and recollection, the collective conditions of recollection, and the opposition between history of memory and memory of history.
BibTeX: @article{Ferdinand2023Experience, author = {Ferdinand, Jan}, title = {Experience versus recollection: Reinhart Koselleck and Aleida Assmann on collective memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Journal of the Philosophy of History}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {430--451}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341511} }
Fernández, J.	2023	The ownership of memories	Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness Oxford University Press 343-362	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is there such a thing as experiencing a memory as one's own? I argue that the phenomenon of disowned memory gives us a reason to believe that memories carry a sense of mineness. I challenge the view that the sense of mineness for a memory is the feeling of being identical with the witness of the remembered scene, and I put forward an alternative proposal. According to it, the sense of mineness for a memory is the experience of the memory as matching the past. I argue that the alternative proposal makes better sense of the available reports of disowned memory. I conclude by offering some considerations on how the proposed account could accommodate other cases of disowned conscious states.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2023Ownership, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {The ownership of memories}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness}, editor = {Garcia-Carpintero, M. and Guillot, M.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {343--362}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805397.003.0015} }
Frise, M.	2023	Epistemological problems of memory	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Frise2023Epistemological, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Epistemological problems of memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, Edward N. and Nodelman, Uri}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory-episprob/} }
Frise, M.	2023	You don't know what happened	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 244-258	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I develop two reasons for thinking that, in most cases, not all conditions for knowing the past by way of episodic memory are met. First, the typical subject who accurately and justifiedly believes what episodic memory delivers is Gettiered, as her justification essentially depends on the falsehood that episodic memory functions like a storehouse. Second, episodic memory misrepresents often. If the subject has evidence of this she typically does not satisfy the justification condition for knowledge of the past from episodic memory. If instead the subject lacks evidence of this misrepresentation, she typically does not satisfy the Gettier condition for knowledge of the past from episodic memory. Either way, episodic memory does not provide the typical subject with knowledge of the past.
BibTeX: @incollection{Frise2023You, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {You don't know what happened}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {244--258} }
Galvany, A.	2023	The oblivious against the doctor: Pathologies of remembering and virtues of forgetting in the Liezi	The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China SUNY Press 215-244			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Galvany2023Oblivious, author = {Galvany, Albert}, title = {The oblivious against the doctor: Pathologies of remembering and virtues of forgetting in the Liezi}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China}, editor = {Galvany, Albert}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {215--244} }
Gentry, H.	2023	Special attention to the self: A mechanistic model of patient RB's lost feeling of ownership	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14(1) 57-85	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Patient RB has a peculiar memory impairment wherein he experiences his memories in rich contextual detail, but claims to not own them. His memories do not feel as if they happened to him. In this paper, I provide an explanatory model of RB's phenomenology, the self-attentional model. I draw upon recent work in neuroscience on self-attentional processing and global workspace models of conscious recollection to show that RB has a self-attentional deficit that inhibits self-bias processes in broadcasting the contents of episodic memories to the global workspace. Typically, self-related contents enjoy a higher salience level than other-related contents. Elimination of bias toward self-related contents diminishes the salience of those contents to the level of other-related contents. Because the typical high salience of self-related content is necessary for the feeling of ownership, RB lacks the feeling of ownership. I also discuss potential applications of the self-attentional model to other psychopathological cases.
BibTeX: @article{Gentry2023Special, author = {Gentry, Hunter}, title = {Special attention to the self: A mechanistic model of patient RB's lost feeling of ownership}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {57--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00574-1} }
Goda, M.	2023	Memory and history: Rereading Bergson from Ricoeur	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 53-62		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Goda2023Memory, author = {Goda, Masato}, title = {Memory and history: Rereading Bergson from Ricoeur}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {53--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-002} }
Goldwasser, S.	2023	Memory as skill	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 833-856	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The temporal structure for motivating, monitoring, and making sense of agency depends on encoding, maintaining, and accessing the right contents at the right times. These functions are facilitated by memory. Moreover, in informing action, memory is itself often active. That remembering is essential to and an expression of agency and is often active suggests that it is a type of action. Despite this, Galen Strawson (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103, 227--257, 2003) and Alfred Mele (2009) deny that remembering is an action. They claim that memory fails to admit of control. Remembering is automatic---once remembering starts, the pro- cess can neither be stopped nor intervened on. Moreover, the agent does not initi- ate remembering. An agent has control over an event or process if and only if she has the capacity and opportunity to initiate and intervene on that event or process. Actions are events over which an agent has control. Since it is automatic, we fail to have control over remembering. Thus, remembering is not an action. In this paper, I draw out an assumption of Strawson's and Mele's accounts: an event-type whose tokens exhibit automaticity cannot, for that reason, be an action (§2). Against this assumption, I draw parallels between skilled bodily action and memory. I show that memory exhibits two defining features of skill: it can be learned with practice and it admits of attributions of excellence (§3). These features reveal how intelligent control is exerted in the exercise of skill despite apparent automaticity---control is gained over time (§4). Since exercises of skill are by definition actions and since memory exemplifies the defining features of skill, memory is a skill and instances of remembering are actions too.
BibTeX: @article{Goldwasser2023Memory, author = {Goldwasser, Seth}, title = {Memory as skill}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, pages = {833-856}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00605-x} }
Golwasser, S. and Springle, A.	2023	Trauma, trust, & competent testimony	Philosophical Psychology 37(1) 167-195	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Public discourse implicitly appeals to what we call the “Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument” (TUA). To motivate, articulate, and assess the TUA, we appeal to Hawley’s (2019) commitment account of trust and trustworthiness. On Hawley’s account, being trustworthy consists in the success- ful avoidance of unfulfilled commitments and involves three components: the actual avoidance of unfulfilled commit- ments, sincerity in one’s taking on elective commitments, and competence in fulfilling commitments one has incurred. In contexts of testimony, what’s at issue is the speaker’s competence and sincere intention to speak truthfully. The TUA targets trauma victims’ competence rather than their sincerity. According to the TUA, empirical evidence shows that trauma undermines victims’ trustworthiness with regard to speaking truthfully about their trauma by undermining their competence to remember the relevant event. We argue that what the evidence shows is rather that remembering traumatic events involves a distinct “mode of manifesting” the competence to remember particular events from the personal past. Trauma victims are competent to speak truth- fully about their trauma and ought to be trusted at least with regard to the central details of the event. By suggesting otherwise, the TUA threatens an insidious form of epistemic injustice which Hawley’s account helps us locate
BibTeX: @article{Goldwasser2023Trauma, author = {Golwasser, Seth and Springle, Alison}, title = {Trauma, trust, & competent testimony}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {167--195}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2247011} }
Gunji, P.-Y.	2023	Connection and disconnection of perception and memory: Déjà vu, Bayesian and inverse Bayesian inference	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 195-212		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Gunji2023Connection, author = {Gunji, Pegio-Yukio}, title = {Connection and disconnection of perception and memory: Déjà vu, Bayesian and inverse Bayesian inference}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {195--212}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-014} }
Heersmink, R.	2023	Materialised identities: Cultural identity, collective memory, and artifacts	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14(1) 249-265	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay outlines one way to conceptualise the relation between cultural identity, collective memory, and artifacts. It starts by characterising the notion of cultural identity as our membership to cultural groups and briefly explores the relation between cultural and narrative identity (section 2). Next, it presents how human memory is conceptualised on an individual and collective level (section 3) and then distinguishes between small-scale and large-scale collective memory (section 4). Having described cultural identity and collective memory, it argues that cultural identity is materialised in the environment when we retrieve and construct collective memories by integrating information from our biological memory with information in artifacts or in other people's embodied brains (section 5). This essay ends with analysing how materialised cultural identities are constructed by using a niche construction approach from evolutionary biology (section 6).
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2023Materialised, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Materialised identities: Cultural identity, collective memory, and artifacts}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {249--265}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00570-5} }
Helleman, W.E.	2023	Prayer, magic and memory in Plotinus' treaties on the soul	International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 17(2) 208-231	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In an environment where astrology was widely respected, Plotinus accepted the role of heavenly bodies in answering prayer. Considering them divine, he denied them the use of memory (iv 4, 6-8); how then could he explain response to prayer received after an interval of time? Plotinus was also concerned to deny attributing intentionality in any response given, for good or evil, since that would make the astral deities responsible also for morally dubious answers. In his treatment of the issue in this passage, Plotinus draws on a lengthy earlier discussion of the role of memory in the soul’s thinking and knowing (iv 3, 25-iv 4, 12), as associated primarily with that which exists in time and is characterized by αἴσθησις, i.e., the lower soul belonging to the composite living being (iv 3, 25.12-14; iv 4, 16-17). If astral deities have bodies, these are of a highly refined fiery nature, and can be affected only inasmuch as they participate in the cosmic circuit. What suppliants may regard as intentional response must therefore be understood as the effect of a type of ‘linking’ of the universe as a living organism in which all parts are coordinated in an interrelationship characterized by sympathy. This is why answers to prayer represent no more than the unintended reaction of natural forces in the universe, the very same forces also responsible for effective use of magic. If Plotinus does not assign much value to prayer, he does recognize that, as with magic, such incantations may have a harmful effect, if only for the lower soul. He therefore warns the wise person to guard against such outcomes by focusing the soul in its contemplation of what is higher, i.e., its inner life.
BibTeX: @article{Helleman2023Prayer, author = {Helleman, Wendy E.}, title = {Prayer, magic and memory in Plotinus' treaties on the soul}, year = {2023}, journal = {International Journal of the Platonic Tradition}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {208--231}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-bja10021} }
Hirai, Y.	2023	What is the 'thickness' of the present? Bergson's dual perception system and the ontology of time	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 117-132		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirai2023What, author = {Hirai, Yasushi}, title = {What is the 'thickness' of the present? Bergson's dual perception system and the ontology of time}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {117--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-009} }
Hopkins, R.	2023	Architecture and cultural memory	Heritage and War: Ethical Issues Oxford University Press 153-173			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hopkins2023Architecture, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {Architecture and cultural memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Heritage and War: Ethical Issues}, editor = {Bülow, William and Frowe, Helen and Matravers, Derek and Thomas, Joshua Lewis}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {153--173} }
Hopkins, R.	2023	Remembering and imagining as agential powers	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 212-229		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hopkins2023Remembering, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {Remembering and imagining as agential powers}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {212--229}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-14} }
Horváth, L.	2023	The topography of memory: The constitutive relation between body memory and place memory	Papers in Arts and Humanities 3(1) 66-80	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The current work aims to examine the relation between body memory and place memory. The paper will rely on a phenomenological standpoint, but it will also utilize literary and clinical studies which are closely connected to the problem of body memory. First, the paper will define body memory and place memory with the help of Edward S. Casey’s and Thomas Fuchs’ work. Second, the paper will discuss the connection between these two types of memory. Third, the paper will shed light to the processes through which body memory and place memory alters the structure of the lived space. Finally, the paper will consider the question whether there is a constitutive relation between body memory and place memory.
BibTeX: @article{Horvath2023Topography, author = {Horváth, Lajos}, title = {The topography of memory: The constitutive relation between body memory and place memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Papers in Arts and Humanities}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {66-80}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.52885/pah.v3i1.123} }
Hutto, D.D.	2023	Remembering without a trace?	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 61-81			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hutto2023Remembering, author = {Hutto, Daniel D.}, title = {Remembering without a trace?}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {61--81} }
Isashiki, T.	2023	What arranges memories in a line?	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 161-174		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Isashiki2023What, author = {Isashiki, Takahiro}, title = {What arranges memories in a line?}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {161--174}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-009} }
Jalsevac, J.	2023	Mitigating the magic - the role of memory, the vis cognitiva , and the experience in Aquina's abstractionist epistemology	American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 97(3) 267-292	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Aquinas famously argues that there exists a purely active intellective power—i.e., the agent intellect—in each human agent that is capable of “abstracting” universals, including natures, from sensible phantasms. Robert Pasnau has worried, however, that Aquinas’s thin account of how the agent intellect performs abstraction makes abstraction appear to be little short of “magic.” In this paper I reply to Pasnau’s objection by arguing for the necessity of expanding the standard account of Aquinas’s theory to include the oft-neglected role of the so-called “interior sense powers,” in particular memory and the cogitative power, in his epistemology. I argue that for Aquinas memory and the cogitative power, operating in close cooperation with intellect, are responsible for bridging the ontological and epistemological divide between sensation of the singular and intellection of the universal by producing the pre-intellective, quasi-knowledge of experience (experimentum), which is propaedeutic to abstraction
BibTeX: @article{Jalsevac2023Mitigating, author = {Jalsevac, John}, title = {Mitigating the magic - the role of memory, the vis cognitiva , and the experience in Aquina's abstractionist epistemology}, year = {2023}, journal = {American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {97}, number = {3}, pages = {267--292}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq2023822276} }
Jalsevac, J.	2023	The intentio of pastness in Aquinas's theory of memory	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 62 475-489	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that the “aspect of pastness” involved in memory is a certain kind of cognitive object — i.e., an intention — apprehended by the “estimative power.” All told, however, Aquinas mentions this idea precisely once. In this article, I construct an account of the idea that pastness is an estimative intention by drawing upon texts in which I argue that Aquinas develops this idea, albeit without invoking the terminology of the estimative intention. I conclude that, by identifying the aspect of pastness as an estimative intention, Aquinas neatly synthesizes the Aristotelian and Arabic traditions on memory.
BibTeX: @article{Jalsevac2023Intentio, author = {Jalsevac, John}, title = {The intentio of pastness in Aquinas's theory of memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {62}, pages = {475-489}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217323000252} }
Jones, L. and Tierney, H.	2023	Forgetting to un-forgive	Revista de Estudios Sociales 86 45-61	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Much of the literature on forgiveness is dedicated to understanding the reasons to forgive and what changes in attitude are required to do so. But philosophers have been much less attentive to what happens after agents forgive. This is a serious oversight, since the reasons to forgive do not always retain their force and it is not always possible, or advisable, to maintain the changes in attitudes that forgiveness requires. Fortunately, Monique Wonderly has begun to fill this lacuna in the literature with her recent work on un-forgiveness. According to the author, un-forgiveness involves altering our attitudes, by either reinhabiting an adversarial stance towards an agent for their wrongdoing and/or returning one’s relationship with them to the state it was in prior to forgiveness taking place. While Wonderly’s account of un-forgiveness is both novel and illuminating, it is incomplete. In this paper, we argue that one can also un-forgive by forgetting that the wrong in question occurred and/or that the previously forgiven agent was the perpetrator of the wrong. We contend that not only is it possible to un-forgive by forgetting, but doing so can be both justified and morally important. We defend our view by considering the objection that un-forgiveness by forgetting can negatively impact victims’ relationships with wrongdoers as well as addressing the concern that agents cannot exercise their agency over their memories in order to un-forgive by forgetting.
BibTeX: @article{Jones2023Forgetting, author = {Jones, Lel and Tierney, Hannah}, title = {Forgetting to un-forgive}, year = {2023}, journal = {Revista de Estudios Sociales}, volume = {86}, pages = {45-61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7440/res86.2023.04} }
Jonkus, D.	2023	Writing as a model of cultural sedimentation and memory: Ferraris, Derrida and Husserl	Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Despite their creativity, cultural actions are not established out of nothing. They are based on previous actions, their passive or active memory, and extension. Sedimentation is the depositing of sediments that occurs during certain processes. They testify to the processes that have taken place and themselves become significant links or traces. Different layers of sediment are formed, which testify to past events, which have structures in the present. The best-known phenomenological concept of sedimentation was formulated in Husserl’s text The Origin of Geometry. Husserl uses the specific geological term of sedimentation to describe the science of geometry as a linguistically (written) mediated genesis of conceptual knowledge. The human practice of knowledge can be transmitted to other generations only by expressing it linguistically and recording it in writing. Derrida used the phenomenological concept of sedimentation and created Grammatology. The main idea of documentality is that a particular kind of social objects, namely documents (records of social acts) are the ground of social reality. For all three philosophers, writing or recording becomes a model for reflecting on cultural-social reality. The purpose of this article is to discuss the writing as a model for cultural sedimentation and memory. Husserl understood writing as a sedimentation that must be reactivated. However, Derrida and Ferraris identify the written objects only with materialized writing and the repetition of what is written. They do not distinguish between imitative and comprehensive reading.
BibTeX: @article{Jonkus2023Writing, author = {Jonkus, Dalius}, title = {Writing as a model of cultural sedimentation and memory: Ferraris, Derrida and Husserl}, year = {2023}, journal = {Horizon: Studies in Phenomenology}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2023-12-1-103-114} }
Keven, N.	2023	What does it take to remember episodically?	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 206-222			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Keven2023What, author = {Keven, Nazım}, title = {What does it take to remember episodically?}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {206--222} }
Khalidi, M.A.	2023	Cognitive Ontology: Taxonomic Practices in the Mind-Brain Sciences	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Khalidi2023Cognitive, author = {Khalidi, Muhammad Ali}, title = {Cognitive Ontology: Taxonomic Practices in the Mind-Brain Sciences}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Kind, A.	2023	Memory, imagination, and skill	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 193-211		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kind2023Memory, author = {Kind, Amy}, title = {Memory, imagination, and skill}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {193--211}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-13} }
Klein, E. and Goering, K.	2023	Can I hold that thought for you? Dementia and shared relational agency	Hastings Center Report 53(5) 17-29	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Agency is talked about by many as something that people living with dementia lose, but what if it were recognized as something they share? People with dementia share and can enjoy aspects of their agency by sharing capacities for memory, language, and decision-making with their loved ones. That sharing agency is a central feature of living with dementia has implications for treatment, caregiver support, and building dementia-friendly environments.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2023Can, author = {Klein, Eran and Goering, Kara}, title = {Can I hold that thought for you? Dementia and shared relational agency}, year = {2023}, journal = {Hastings Center Report}, volume = {53}, number = {5}, pages = {17-29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.1485} }
Kono, T.	2023	Bergson and ecological psychology: Memory of the body and of the universe	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 97-106		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kono2023Bergson, author = {Kono, Tetsuya}, title = {Bergson and ecological psychology: Memory of the body and of the universe}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {97--106}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-007} }
Kwok, C.H., Ryan, S. and Mi, C.	2023	An epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge	Episteme 20(3) 584-597	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one.
BibTeX: @article{Kwok2023Epistemological, author = {Kwok, Chung Him and Ryan, Shane and Mi, Chienko}, title = {An epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge}, year = {2023}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {20}, number = {3}, pages = {584--597}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.30} }
Lai, C.	2023	Memory belief is weak	Ratio 36(3) 204-214	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2023Memoryb, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Memory belief is weak}, year = {2023}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, pages = {204--214}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12381} }
Lai, C.	2023	Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution	Asian Journal of Philosophy 2(15)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A large portion of our knowledge seems to rest on our memories, while memory scepticism poses challenges to our memory knowledge. This paper will delve into different forms of memory scepticism. The goal of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on Moon (2017) and Frise (2022), I compare and criticize various forms of sceptical arguments provided by them. Meanwhile, the two most threatening arguments are picked out: the Russellian argument and the argument from doubtful reliability. Second, I demonstrate that the two arguments are essentially based on the closure principle and the underdetermination principle, respectively, and hence, Pritchard's biscopic anti-sceptical proposal is applicable. A Pritchardean solution to the problem of memory scepticism will then be sketched out.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2023Memory, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution}, year = {2023}, journal = {Asian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {2}, number = {15}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00070-6} }
Laikhuram, P.	2023	Collective memory: Metaphor or real?	Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 57(1) 189-204	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Collective memory researchers predominantly in the cultural and social sciences have commonly understood the concept of collective memory as a mere metaphor, as something not existing in itself as memory but useful only as a tool for referring to the way groups construct shared representations of their past. Few have however addressed the question of whether it is a metaphor or literal in its own right. This paper looks at the plausibility of the claim that collective memory is a mere metaphor by probing its presuppositions, where the representationalist theory of mind emerges as the ground for such a claim. Then appealing to the externalist model of the mind championed in recent studies of mind in disciplines as varied as philosophy, cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and collective intentionality studies, we try to expose the presuppositions of that claim, opening up possibilities for conceiving collective memory as not merely metaphorical but literal and naturally existing as memory.
BibTeX: @article{Laikhuram2023Collective, author = {Laikhuram, Premjit}, title = {Collective memory: Metaphor or real?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science}, volume = {57}, number = {1}, pages = {189--204}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-022-09683-7} }
Langland-Hassan, P.	2023	Remembering and imagining	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 11-34			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Langland2023Remembering, author = {Langland-Hassan, Peter}, title = {Remembering and imagining}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {11--34} }
Langland-Hassan, P.	2023	Remembering, imagining, and memory traces: Toward a continuist causal theory	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 19-37			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Langland2023Rememberingb, author = {Langland-Hassan, Peter}, title = {Remembering, imagining, and memory traces: Toward a continuist causal theory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {19--37} }
Latham, S. and Pinder, M.	2023	Is it good to conceive of one's life narratively?	Philosophia 51 2005-2014	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Grace Hibshman has developed a new explanation for why narrative self-concep- tions might contribute to one’s flourishing: conceiving of one’s life narratively, she argues, can facilitate an improved self-understanding. In this short paper, we argue that, pace Hibshman, life narratives tend to misrepresent and mislead. So while they may give the impression of an improved self-understanding, that impression is typically mistaken. In this respect, conceiving of one’s life narratively hinders flourishing.
BibTeX: @article{Latham2023Good, author = {Latham, Sally and Pinder, Mark}, title = {Is it good to conceive of one's life narratively?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {51}, pages = {2005-2014}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00659-4} }
Liefke, K.	2023	Experiential attitude reports	Philosophy Compass 18 e12913	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One can remember events and one can remember facts: to remember an event (e.g. the barista's pouring my coffee this morning), one needs to have personally witnessed this event. To remember a fact (e.g. that the barista was trained in Italy), it suffices to have learned this fact from some other source. The distinction between event-directed (i.e. experiential) and fact-directed (or propositional) attitudes is an established distinction in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that is also exemplified by other attitudes (incl. seeing, imagining, and dreaming). Until recently, semantics and the philosophy of language have assumed that experiential attitudes can be more or less straightforwardly reduced to propositional attitudes. However, new work has identified some key properties of experiential attitudes that cast doubt on this reducibility. The present paper discusses the most notable of these properties, focusing on experiential attitude reports. It links these properties to recent developments in formal and philosophical semantics in an effort to foster the development of a rigorous, empirically adequate account of experiential attitudes.
BibTeX: @article{Liefke2023Experiential, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Experiential attitude reports}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {18}, pages = {e12913}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12913} }
Liefke, K.	2023	Remembering individuals and remembering scenes	New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI-isAI 2021 Springer 97-109	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the object position of certain intensional transitive verbs (paradigmatically: remember), DPs are semantically ambiguous between individuals and scenes [= scenes that saliently feature these individuals]. This ambiguity cuts across the familiar intensionality-related distinctions (esp. specific/non-specific, referentially transparent/referentially opaque) and cannot be explained at the level of Logical Form. As a result, it poses a challenge for existing semantics for intensional transitive verbs, esp. for Zimmermann’s property-based account, for Stephenson’s situation-theoretic account, and for Moltmann’s truthmaker-semantic account. My paper provides a uniform compositional semantics for ‘individual’- and for ‘scene’-interpretations of remember DP-reports that explains this ambiguity. To do this, it investigates the situations that feature in the proposition-type complement of remember. It finds that, if the referent of the object DP has different properties in these situations, the report receives an individual-interpretation. If the referent has the same properties in all situations, the report can receive an individual-interpretation (next to its scene-interpretation). The resulting semantics captures the intensionality and entailment properties of remember DP-reports and predicts the preferred individual-interpretation of strongly quantificational object DPs.
BibTeX: @incollection{Liefke2023Remembering, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {Remembering individuals and remembering scenes}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI-isAI 2021}, editor = {Yada, Katsutoshi and Takama, Yasufumi and Mineshima, Koji and Satoh, Ken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {97--109}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36190-6_7} }
Liefke, K. and Werning, M.	2023	Facitivity variation in episodic memory reports	New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI-isAI 2021 Springer 110-127	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent work in experimental semantics has found that some memory reports fail to give rise to theoretically predicted factivity-inferences (see, e.g., White and Rawlins; de Marneffe et al.). Our paper accounts for one domain of such failures, viz. factivity variation in episodic memory reports. The latter are reports like John remembers a woman dancing that require the agent’s personal experience of a past event or scene. We argue that, in episodic memory reports, the factivity inference is not triggered by the presupposition of the verb remember or its complement, but by the veridicality of the underlying experience: if the experience is veridical (as is often the case in perception), the factivity inference arises. If the experience is counterfactual (as is the case in hallucination and dreaming), the inference does not arise. We give a compositional semantics for episodic memory reports that captures this dependence.
BibTeX: @incollection{Liefke2023Factivity, author = {Liefke, Kristina and Werning, Markus}, title = {Facitivity variation in episodic memory reports}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI-isAI 2021}, editor = {Yada, Katsutoshi and Takama, Yasufumi and Mineshima, Koji and Satoh, Ken}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {110--127}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36190-6_8} }
Lyon, A.	2023	Psychedelic Experience: Revealing the Mind	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Lyon2023Psychedelic, author = {Lyon, Aidan}, title = {Psychedelic Experience: Revealing the Mind}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Mahr, J.B.	2023	Episodic memory: And what is it for?	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 149-165			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Mahr2023Episodic, author = {Mahr, Johannes B.}, title = {Episodic memory: And what is it for? }, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {149--165} }
Mahr, J.B. and Schacter, D.	2023	A language of episodic thought?	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e283	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We propose that episodic thought (i.e., episodic memory and imagination) is a domain where the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) could be fruitfully applied. On the one hand, LoTH could explain the structure of what is encoded into and retrieved from long-term memory. On the other, LoTH can help make sense of how episodic contents come to play such a large variety of different cognitive roles after they have been retrieved.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2023Language, author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Schacter, Daniel}, title = {A language of episodic thought?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e283}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X2300198X} }
Mahr, J.B., Van Bergen, P., Sutton, J., Schacter, D. and Heyes, C.	2023	Mnemicity: A cognitive gadget?	Perspectives on Psychological Science 18 1160-1177	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic representations can be entertained either as “remembered” or “imagined”—as outcomes of experience or as simulations of such experience. Here, we argue that this feature is the product of a dedicated cognitive function: the metacognitive capacity to determine the mnemicity of mental event simulations. We argue that mnemicity attribution should be distinguished from other metacognitive operations (such as reality monitoring) and propose that this attribution is a “cognitive gadget”—a distinctively human ability made possible by cultural learning. Cultural learning is a type of social learning in which traits are inherited through social interaction. In the case of mnemicity, one culturally learns to discriminate metacognitive “feelings of remembering” from other perceptual, emotional, action-related, and metacognitive feelings; to interpret feelings of remembering as indicators of memory rather than imagination; and to broadcast the interpreted feelings in culture- and context-specific ways, such as “I was there” or “I witnessed it myself.” We review evidence from the literature on memory development and scaffolding, metacognitive learning and teaching, as well as cross-cultural psychology in support of this view before pointing out various open questions about the nature and development of mnemicity highlighted by our account.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2023Mnemicity, author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Van Bergen, Penny and Sutton, John and Schacter, Daniel and Heyes, Cecilia}, title = {Mnemicity: A cognitive gadget?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, volume = {18}, pages = {1160--1177}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221141352} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2023	Memory and imagination, minds and worlds	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 35-53		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarroll2023Memory, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Memory and imagination, minds and worlds}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {35--53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-4} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Dings, R.	2023	Putting the past into perspective: Remembering, reappraising, and forgiving	Revista de Estudios Sociales 86 13-28	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The process of forgiving seems to require that a person can remember a specific moment in their personal past in which they were harmed in some way. Forgiving, then, often requires episodic memory, which may be understood as memory of events or experiences in one’s personal past. What is it that grounds acts of forgiveness? One of the most prominent ideas is that, fundamentally, forgiveness involves a change in emotion; it requires that negative emotions associated with the event are abandoned, withdrawn or overcome. In this paper, we outline one way in which the emotion and meaning of past events may be modulated. In particular, we suggest that by thinking more abstractly about an event we can shift our emotional response to it. We outline one way in which this form of more abstract thinking, which can help us distance ourselves from the negative emotion associated with a past wrongdoing, can show up in memory. We propose that emotionally distant memories, or memories in which the emotional content has undergone some change, may often be recalled from an observer perspective, in which the individual recalls the event from an external or detached point of view. Recalling a past wrongdoing from an observer memory may help put it into perspective and afford the emotional distancing required to facilitate forgiveness.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2023Putting, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Dings, Roy}, title = {Putting the past into perspective: Remembering, reappraising, and forgiving}, year = {2023}, journal = {Revista de Estudios Sociales}, volume = {86}, pages = {13-28}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7440/res86.2023.02} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Kirby, A.	2023	The repair shop of memory	Memory, Mind & Media 2 e1	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the BBC show, The Repair Shop, members of the public bring their cherished but crumbling possessions into a workshop populated by expert craftspeople, who carry out restorations. These objects arrive as treasured possessions, which, despite their dilapidated state, still hold memories and meaning for their owners, albeit memories that may have faded as the object itself has aged. Something magical seems to take place after the objects are restored, however. The restored objects seem to reanimate and revive the memories that their owners have invested in them. How is it possible that this restoration can bring memories held by the objects back to life? What is special about The Repair Shop restoring objects to their former glory? We outline two ways in which objects can be evocative and embody emotion, memory, and meaning. We then outline the ways in which the restoration of these objects to something like their original form can improve scaffolded recall and bring memories back to life. For one class of evocative objects, the restoration enhances recall by reinstating details from the context in which the memories were encoded. For the second class of evocative objects, their restoration affords an imaginative connection to the past, which enables them to become powerful focal points of memory and shared narratives. In effect, The Repair Shop seems to work not only as a repair shop of objects but as a repair shop of memory too.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2023Repair, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Kirby, Alun}, title = {The repair shop of memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Memory, Mind & Media}, volume = {2}, pages = {e1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/mem.2023.1} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Michaelian, K.	2023	Deconstructing accuracy in episodic memory	Constructivist Foundations 19(1) 65-67	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The topic of accuracy in memory is the core issue that Jaša Cerne and Urban Kordeš tackle in the target article. In this commentary, we focus on a theoretically important issue that they raise and explore how their view of accuracy relates to existing views in the phi- losophy and sciences of memory.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2023Deconstructing, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Deconstructing accuracy in episodic memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {65-67} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Sant'Anna, A.	2023	Cryptomnesia: A three-factor account	Synthese 201 23	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Understood as a psychological phenomenon, there has been very little discussion of cryptomnesia in the philosophical literature. Cryptomnesia presents us with a strange phenomenon in which we take ourselves to be imagining, but the thought or idea that we entertain actually involves remembered content. In this paper, we argue for a three-factor account of cryptomnesia, according to which it is a mnemonic phenomenon that involves imagination. We provide an account of both the 'mnemonic' and 'imaginative' aspects of cryptomnesia in terms of the attitude, the content, and the metacognitive processes involved in those states. In addition, we show how our three-factor account is better suited to account for cryptomnesia than competing philosophical theories of episodic memory. We conclude by discussing how the three-factor account sheds light on a range of other mnemonic and imaginative phenomena.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2023Cryptomnesia, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Cryptomnesia: A three-factor account}, year = {2023}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {201}, pages = {23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04002-4} }
Meier, L.J.	2023	Memories without survival: Personal identity and the ascending reticular activating system	The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 48(5) 478-491	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a structure originating in the brainstem—the ascending reticular activating system—be functional. Hence, there can be situations in which even small brainstem lesions render individuals irreversibly comatose and thus forever preclude access to their mental states, while the neural correlates of the states themselves are retained. In these situations, Lockeans are forced to regard as fulfilled their criterion of diachronic persistence since psychological continuity, as they construe it, is not disrupted. Deeming an entity that is never again going to have any mental experiences to be a person, however, is an untenable position for a psychological account to adopt. In their current form, Lockean views of personal identity are therefore incompatible with human neurophysiology.
BibTeX: @article{Meier2023Memories, author = {Meier, Lukas J.}, title = {Memories without survival: Personal identity and the ascending reticular activating system}, year = {2023}, journal = {The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine}, volume = {48}, number = {5}, pages = {478--491}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhad028} }
Michaelian, K.	2023	If remembering is imagining, then what is forgetting?	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 76-93		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2023Remembering, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {If remembering is imagining, then what is forgetting?}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {76--93}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-6} }
Michaelian, K.	2023	Towards a virtue-theoretic account of confabulation	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 127-146			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2023Towards, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Towards a virtue-theoretic account of confabulation}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {127--146} }
Michaelian, K. and Sakuragi, S.	2023	Shared metamemory and (the feeling of) shared memory	Current Anthropology 64(6) 723	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This commentary on Joël Candau’s “Modalities and criteria of shared memory” focusses on his treatment of shared metamemory. His description of the role of shared metamemory in generating shared memory itself is plausible, but his description of its role in generating the feeling of shared memory faces two issues. First, it is unclear how the feeling of shared memory is to be defined. Second, it is unclear what theoretical work the feeling of shared memory is meant to do.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2023Shared, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {Shared metamemory and (the feeling of) shared memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Current Anthropology}, volume = {64}, number = {6}, pages = {723}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/727893} }
Miyake, T.	2023	Bergson and the rise of 'the sciences of memory'	Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today Bloomsbury 25-42		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Miyake2023Bergson, author = {Miyake, Takeshi}, title = {Bergson and the rise of 'the sciences of memory'}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Bergson's Scientific Metaphysics: Matter and Memory Today}, editor = {Hirai, Yasushi}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {25--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350342002.ch-002} }
Miyazono, K. and Tooming, U.	2023	On the putative epistemic generativity of memory and imagination	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 127-145		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Miyazono2023Putative, author = {Miyazono, Kengo and Tooming, Uku}, title = {On the putative epistemic generativity of memory and imagination}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {127--145}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-9} }
Moravec, M.	2023	Taking time seriously: the Bergsonism of Karin Costelloe-Stephen, Hilda Oakeley, and May Sinckair	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31(2) 331-354	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the influence of Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) philosophy of time on three early twentieth-century British philosophers: Karin Costelloe-Stephen (1889–1953), Hilda Oakeley (1867–1950), and May Sinclair (1863–1946). I demonstrate that three central claims of Bergson’s account of temporal experience (novelty, memory, and indivisibility) were creatively incorporated into their accounts of time. All these philosophers place time at the centre of their philosophical systems, so this study of their views on time and temporality can deepen our understanding of their systems more broadly. Further, this study helps us appreciate the reception of Bergson’s thought in British philosophy after it was ferociously attacked by Bertrand Russell in 1912, and can provide more detailed contours on the joint fortunes of temporal experience and Bergson's thought in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. I conclude by emphasizing reasons why contemporary philosophers should pay particular attention to the three figures’ treatment of Bergson.
BibTeX: @article{Moravec2023Taking, author = {Moravec, Matyas}, title = {Taking time seriously: the Bergsonism of Karin Costelloe-Stephen, Hilda Oakeley, and May Sinckair}, year = {2023}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {31}, number = {2}, pages = {331--354}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2022.2030670} }
Munro, D.	2023	Capturing the conspiracist's imagination	Philosophical Studies 180 3353-3381	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the role of the imagination in conspiracist belief formation. I argue that conspiracists first become imaginatively absorbed in conspiracist narratives, where this helps to explain how they process their evidence. From there, we can better understand why they find this evidence so compelling, as well as the psychological role it plays in their belief forming processes. This account also has practical implications for com- batting the spread of online conspiracy theories.
BibTeX: @article{Munro2023Capturing, author = {Munro, Daniel}, title = {Capturing the conspiracist's imagination}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {180}, pages = {3353--3381}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02038-x} }
Nanay, B.	2023	Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Nanay2023Mental, author = {Nanay, Bence}, title = {Mental Imagery: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Neumann, S.J.	2023	Empirical inconsistencies defying simulationism	Organon F 30(4) 350-371	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: In our common understanding, remembering and imagining are two different entities. Yet, with brain research progressing, this common understanding of remembering and imagining changes significantly. Simulationists go as far as to claim that remembering and imagining only differ in their temporal orientation but are part of the same system. In what follows, I want to defend our common understanding of how to distinguish between remembering and imagining. With the help of empirical studies, I will defend the view that remembering and imagining are significantly different and not only different in their temporal orientation. I will base my argumentation on empirical studies which are suggestive of simulationism having gotten it wrong. In this paper, I will firstly introduce the two opposing views of simulationism and the causal theory of memory. With the help of empirical studies, I will secondly show that simulationism faces significant evidence of being wrong and thirdly, will suggest that a slightly changed version of the causal theory of memory does a better job in explaining the introduced research results.
BibTeX: @article{Neumann2023Empirical, author = {Neumann, Saskia Janina}, title = {Empirical inconsistencies defying simulationism}, year = {2023}, journal = {Organon F}, volume = {30}, number = {4}, pages = {350--371}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30404} }
Noordhof, P.	2023	Relationism about memory?	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 94-123		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Noordhof2023Relationism, author = {Noordhof, Paul}, title = {Relationism about memory?}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {94--123}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-7} }
Nourbakshi, H.	2023	The role of imagination and recollection in the method of phenomenal contrast	Theoria 89(5) 710-733	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The method of phenomenal contrast (in perception) invokes the phenomenal character of perceptual experience as a means to discover its contents. The method implicitly takes for granted that ‘what it is like’ to have a perceptual experience e is the same as ‘what it is like’ to imagine or recall it; accordingly, in its various proposed implementations, the method treats imaginations and/or recollections as interchangeable with real experiences. The method thus always contrasts a pair of experiences, at least one of which is imagined or remembered rather than occurrent. Surveying all eighteen forms of implementing the method, I argue that in all of the proposed pairings, the substitution of imagination or recollection for perceptual experience in the method, is either inconceivable or impermissible. I identify four reasons why I think imagination cannot be substituted for real experience, and three reasons why recollection cannot be substituted for real experience. If my argument works, there is no form of implementing the method that is useful for discovering the contents of experience, and thus the method is not a well-functioning tool to study the contents of perception.
BibTeX: @article{Nourbakshi2023Role, author = {Nourbakshi, Hamid}, title = {The role of imagination and recollection in the method of phenomenal contrast}, year = {2023}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {89}, number = {5}, pages = {710--733}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12489} }
Openshaw, J.	2023	(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?	Philosophical Perspectives 37(1) 290-307	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I suggest that the theories of remembering one finds in the philosophy of memory literature are best charac- terised as theories principally operating at three different levels of inquiry. Simulationist views are theories of the psychofunctional process type remembering. Causalist views are theories of referential remembering. Epistemic views are theories of successful remembering. Insofar as there is conflict between these theories, it is a conflict of integration rather than—as widely presented—head- on disagreement. Viewed in this way, we can see the previous awareness condition and preservationism as principles applying at only some of the correspond- ing levels of inquiry. Where either principle has been rejected, it is, I claim, due to arguments which slip between these different levels. While the view of the landscape I offer does not dissolve ongoing disputes about the nature of remembering, it clarifies the dialec- tical rules of engagement, helping to clear the path for future, collaborative progress to be made. The view enables us to see less conflict in the recent philosophy of memory literature than there seems at face value to be.
BibTeX: @article{Openshaw2023Defence, author = {Openshaw, James}, title = {(In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {290--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12191} }
Pan, S. and Carruthers, P.	2023	Déjà vu may be illusory gist identification	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e371		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pan2023Deja, author = {Pan, Shen and Carruthers, Peter}, title = {Déjà vu may be illusory gist identification}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e371}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23000195} }
Pasqualoni, A.	2023	Thought, memory and being in Plato's sophist	Archai 33	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thinking as described in Plato’s Sophist undergoes two basic changes: it progresses by shifting from one to many and it regresses by shifting from many to one. The change from one to many is generative; the change from many to one is reductive. These opposing changes provide a tension for thinking, and like Heraclitus’ bow string, this tension gives thinking its efficacy. Thinking would wander and accumulate endlessly unless it regresses from many to one. Yet, thinking would stagnate if it could not progress from one to many. Both changes are essential characteristics of thinking, and bothrest on memory. Memory constitutes the foundation of thought.
BibTeX: @article{Pasqualoni2023Thought, author = {Pasqualoni, Anthony}, title = {Thought, memory and being in Plato's sophist}, year = {2023}, journal = {Archai}, volume = {33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.14195/1984-249X_33_23} }
Peeters, A., Cosentino, E. and Werning, M.	2023	Constructing a wider view on memory	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 165-190		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Peeters2023Constructing, author = {Peeters, Anco and Cosentino, Erica and Werning, Markus}, title = {Constructing a wider view on memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {165--190}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-11} }
Perkins, F.	2023	So comfortable you'll forget you have them on: Attention and forgetting in the Zhuangzi and Huainanzi	The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China SUNY Press 153-179			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perkins2023Comfortable, author = {Perkins, Franklin}, title = {So comfortable you'll forget you have them on: Attention and forgetting in the Zhuangzi and Huainanzi}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China}, editor = {Galvany, Albert}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {153--179} }
Perrin, D.	2023	Accommodating the continuum hypothesis with the déjà vu/déjà vécu distinction.	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e372	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: On Barzykowski and Moulin’s continuum hypothesis, déjà vu and involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) share their underpinning neurocognitive processes. A discontinuity issue for them is that familiarity and episodic recollection exhibit dif- ferent neurocognitive signatures. This issue can be overcome, I say, provided the authors are ready to distinguish a déjà vécu/ episodic IAM continuity and a déjà vu/semantic IAM continuity.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2023Accommodating, author = {Perrin, Denis}, title = {Accommodating the continuum hypothesis with the déjà vu/déjà vécu distinction.}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23000225} }
Perrin, D. and McCarroll, C.J.	2023	Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106(2) 299-323	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically-grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2023Immunity, author = {Perrin, Denis and McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {106}, number = {2}, pages = {299--323}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12850} }
Piñeiro, J.M.	2023	Rikean memory, epistemic injustice and epistemic violence	Southwest Philosophy Review 39(2) 109-111	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Mark Rowlands develops a novel account of remembering in which episodic memories survive in a mutated form after their content has been long forgotten. He dubs this account “Rilkean memories.” I draw from this account to argue that episodic memories of past epistemic harms resulting from Miranda Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice, can persist as embodied behavioral or bodily dispositions that have negative epistemic and practical consequences long after these episodic memories have been forgotten. The way that others judge us as epistemic agents—as people with the capacity to know or the ability to contribute to the pool of knowledge—and following this judgment, treat or fail to treat us as epistemic agents can cause us to adopt attitudes or behaviors with consequences to our epistemic agency. When embodied as Rilkean memories, these attitudes or behaviors raise new difficulties and become quite difficult to eradicate.
BibTeX: @article{Pineiro2023Rikea, author = {Piñeiro, Josué M.}, title = {Rikean memory, epistemic injustice and epistemic violence}, year = {2023}, journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review}, volume = {39}, number = {2}, pages = {109--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202339129} }
Potter, N.	2023	Memory and the instituting social imaginary	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 29(4) 241-242		[DOI]	[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @article{Potter2023Memory, author = {Potter, Nancy}, title = {Memory and the instituting social imaginary}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {241--242}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0041} }
Prezioso, E. and Alessandroni, N.	2023	Enacting memories through and with things: Remembering as material engagement	Memory Studies 16(4) 663-1032	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: For mainstream theories, memory is a skull-bound activity consisting of encoding, storing and retrieving representations. Conversely, unorthodox perspectives proposed that memory is an extended process that includes material resources. This article explains why neither representationalist nor classical extended stances do justice to the active and constitutive role of material culture for cognition. From Material Engagement Theory, we propose an alternative enactive, ecological, extended and semiotic viewpoint for which remembering is a way of materially engaging with and through things. Specifically, we suggest that one remembers when one updates their interactions with the world, a form of engagement previously acquired through sociomaterial practices. Moreover, we argue that things are full-fledged memories, since they accumulate and bring forth how we have materially engaged with them over different timescales. Last, we highlight the need for studies considering the cognitive ecologies where remembering takes place in its full complexity.
BibTeX: @article{Prezioso2023Enacting, author = {Prezioso, Emanuele and Alessandroni, Nicolás}, title = {Enacting memories through and with things: Remembering as material engagement}, year = {2023}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {16}, number = {4}, pages = {663--1032}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980221108475} }
Ratcliffe, M.	2023	Grief Worlds	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ratcliffe2023Grief, author = {Ratcliffe, Matthew}, title = {Grief Worlds}, year = {2023}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Righetti, F.	2023	The pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory: a phenomenological perspective	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 22 479-499	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper investigates the madeleine-memory (so-called from Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time) as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of ''epistemological inadequacy of perception'' and ''background experiences''. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections.
BibTeX: @article{Righetti2023Pre, author = {Righetti, Francesca}, title = {The pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory: a phenomenological perspective}, year = {2023}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {22}, pages = {479--499}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09774-7} }
Ritter, E.	2023	Toward collective memory reconstruction as epistemic activism	Philosophy Today 67(1) 189-206	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: The United States, alongside other Western democracies, is in search of a usable past. Collective memory in the United States has persistently distorted or whitewashed its past, resulting in a distinct kind of (socially sanctioned) ignorance of the present. Collective memory reconstruction can thus be understood as “epistemic activism,” targeting an “epistemology of ignorance,” borrowing and expanding key concepts from the work of Charles Mills and José Medina. In this article I begin to defend an ethical practice of collective memory reconstruction as epistemic activism. I first outline a qualified understanding of “collective memory” that survives philosophical skepticism. I then draw on Paul Ricœur’s critical phenomenology of abuses of memory and analyze collective memory distortions of the US Civil War and the US struggle for civil rights. I suggest that a reconstructed democratic collective memory will be a set of plural and dynamic collective memories, rather than a homogeneous and static memory. I end by outlining some consequences that follow from this conclusion.
BibTeX: @article{Ritter2023Toward, author = {Ritter, Eric}, title = {Toward collective memory reconstruction as epistemic activism}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {67}, number = {1}, pages = {189--206}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday202328475} }
Robins, S.K.	2023	Episodic memory is not for the future	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 166-184			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2023Episodic, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Episodic memory is not for the future}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {166--184} }
Robins, S.K.	2023	The 21st century engram	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 14(5) e1653	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The search for the engram—the neural mechanism of memory—has been a guiding research project for neuroscience since its emergence as a distinct scientific field. Recent developments in the tools and techniques available for investigating the mechanisms of memory have allowed researchers to proclaimed the search is over. While there is ongoing debate about the justification for that claim, renewed interest in the engram is clear. This attention highlights the impoverished status of the engram concept. As research accelerates, the simple characterization of the engram as an enduring physical change is stretched thin. Now that the engram commitment has been made more explicit, it must also be made more precise. If the project of 20th century neurobiology was finding the engram, the project of the 21st must be supplying a richer account of what's been found. This paper sketches a history of the engram, and a way forward.
BibTeX: @article{Robins202321st, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {The 21st century engram}, year = {2023}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {14}, number = {5}, pages = {e1653}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1653} }
Robins, S.K.	2023	The method of loci and the role of constructive imagination in remembering	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 230-247		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2023Method, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {The method of loci and the role of constructive imagination in remembering}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {230--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-15} }
Robins, S.K. and Afifi, M.	2023	Cueing involuntary memory	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e374	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We raise two points about cues, which complicate Barzykowski and Moulin’s attempt at a unified model of memory retrieval. First, cues operate differently in voluntary and involuntary con- texts. Second, voluntary and involuntary memory can be inter- connected, as in cases of chaining.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2023Cueing, author = {Robins, Sarah K. and Afifi, Maziya}, title = {Cueing involuntary memory}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e374}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23000122} }
Robins, S.K. and Schulz, A.	2023	Episodic memory, simulated future planning, and their evolution	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 811-832	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The pressures that led to the evolution of episodic memory have recently seen much discussion, but a fully satisfactory account of them is still lacking. We seek to make progress in this debate by taking a step backward, identifying four possible ways that episodic memory could evolve in relation to simulationist future planning—a similar and seemingly related ability. After distinguishing each of these possibilities, the paper critically discusses existing accounts of the evolution of episodic memory. It then presents a novel argument in favor of the view that episodic memory is a by-product of the evolution of simulationist future planning. The paper ends by showing that this position allows for the maintenance of the traditional view that episodic memory operates on stored memory traces, as well as explaining a number of key features of episodic memory: its being subject to frequent and systematic errors, its neural co-location with the capacity for simulationist future planning, and the potential existence of non-human episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2023Episodicb, author = {Robins, Sarah K. and Schulz, Armin}, title = {Episodic memory, simulated future planning, and their evolution}, year = {2023}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {14}, pages = {811--832}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00601-1} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2023	Current controversies in philosophy of memory: Editors' introduction	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 1-16			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{SantAnna2023Current, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Current controversies in philosophy of memory: Editors' introduction }, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {1--16} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2023	Is remembering constructive imagining?	Synthese 202 141	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2023Remembering, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Is remembering constructive imagining?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {202}, pages = {141}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04338-5} }
Sant'Anna, A. and Perrin, D.	2023	Fluency and the inaccuray of recall	Constructivist Foundations 19(1) 72-74	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We focus on a couple of issues that are prompted by Černe & Kordeš’s discussion of flow of recall as a phenomenological indicator of the inaccuracy of recall and on how they see the relationship between this result and existing work on fluency. We make two theoretical distinctions concerning the role played by fluency in recall that are needed to better assess that relationship. We argue that once these distinctions are in place, it is no longer clear whether there are any major tensions between existing work on fluency and the idea that flow of recall is associated with the inaccuracy of recall.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2023Fluency, author = {Sant'Anna, André and Perrin, Denis}, title = {Fluency and the inaccuray of recall}, year = {2023}, journal = {Constructivist Foundations}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {72-74} }
Schirmer Dos Santos, C., McCarroll, C.J. and Sant'Anna, A.	2023	The relation between memory and imagination: A debate about the right concepts	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 38-56			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DosSantos2023Relation, author = {Schirmer Dos Santos, César and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {The relation between memory and imagination: A debate about the right concepts}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {38--56} }
Senor, T.D.	2023	The epistemology of episodic memory	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 227-243			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Senor2023Epistemology, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {The epistemology of episodic memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {227--243} }
Springle, A., Dreier, R. and Goldwasser, S.	2023	Trusting traumatic memory: Considerations from memory science	Philosophy of Science 90(5) 1060-1068	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Court cases involving sexual assault and police violence rely heavily on victim testimony. We consider what we call the Traumatic Untrustworthiness Argument (TUA) according to which we should be skeptical about victim testimony because people are particularly liable to misremember traumatic events. The TUA is not obviously based in mere distrust of women, people of color, disabled people, poor people, and so forth. Rather, it seeks to justify skepticism on epistemic and empirical grounds. We consider how the TUA might appeal to the psychology and neuroscience of memory for empirical support. However, we argue that neither support the TUA.
BibTeX: @article{Springle2023Trusting, author = {Springle, Alison and Dreier, Rebecca and Goldwasser, Seth}, title = {Trusting traumatic memory: Considerations from memory science}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {90}, number = {5}, pages = {1060--1068}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.31} }
Sutton, J. and O'Brien, G.	2023	Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memory	Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory Routledge 82-104	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Chapter 4 argues that an account of memory traces as distributed but contentful is compatible with the causal theory of constructive memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2023Distributed, author = {Sutton, John and O'Brien, Gerard}, title = {Distributed traces and the causal theory of constructive memory}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Current Controversies in Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Sant'Anna, André and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {82--104} }
Tavares da Silva, R.	2023	Neuroscience of memory and philosophy of knowledge: Challenges to immediacy	Fairness in Criminal Appeal. A Critical and Interdisciplinary Analysis of the ECtHR Case-Law Springer 163-176	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Are there any special reasons, in terms of epistemic reliability, that support the demand, advocated by the ECtHR, that personal evidence be provided again in Criminal Appeal, having the appeal court to hear the witnesses and the defendant directly? Namely, are there epistemic considerations to prefer direct contact with witnesses over accessing visual and audio recordings of their intervention in first instance? Can testimony and, with it, memory bring out information in a cognitive agent with complete security? Or are they fallible? Or, even less, do they never give rise to information about reality? If they are fallible, in what extent do they fail? These are some---perhaps the most relevant---of the questions to be answered when one intends to discuss the value (the epistemic validity) of testimonial evidence in Criminal Procedure, having in mind the principle of immediacy. In this chapter, I will analyse, specifically, research in the Neurosciences of Memory, according to which the retrieval of stored information occurs with distortions (with addition, subtraction, or modification of information), and its implications to Criminal Appeal, as well as the main obstacles brought by the Philosophy of Knowledge to testimony reliability.
BibTeX: @incollection{Tavares2023Neuroscience, author = {Tavares da Silva, Ricardo}, title = {Neuroscience of memory and philosophy of knowledge: Challenges to immediacy}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Fairness in Criminal Appeal. A Critical and Interdisciplinary Analysis of the ECtHR Case-Law}, editor = {Morão, Helena and da Silva, Ricardo, Tavares}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {163--176}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13001-4_8} }
Teroni, F.	2023	Affective selves, streams of consciousness, and mental time travels	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 289-307		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Teroni2023Affective, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {Affective selves, streams of consciousness, and mental time travels}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {289--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-19} }
Todd, C.	2023	Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery	Synthese 202 152	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper examines two phenomena that are usually treated separately but which resemble each other insofar as they both raise questions concerning the difference, if there is one, between so-called ‘real’ and ‘as if’ emotions: affective memory and imagined emotion. The existence of both states has been explicitly denied, and there are very few positive accounts of either. I will argue that there are no good grounds for scepticism about the existence of ‘as if’ emotions, but also that the existing positive accounts of them are all explanatorily inadequate. Comparing the two phenomena directly, I contend, allows us to defend the existence of both by showing how they essentially involve the same ‘affective bodily imagery’. The final part of the paper offers an original, empirically informed account of the nature of this imagery, the role it plays in ‘as if’ emotions, and how it may help illuminate some important connections between memory, imagination, and emotion.
BibTeX: @article{Todd2023Affective, author = {Todd, Cain}, title = {Affective memory, imagined emotion, and bodily imagery}, year = {2023}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {202}, pages = {152}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04372-3} }
Trakas, M.	2023	Journeying to the past: Time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?	Frontiers in Psychology 14 1260458	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Spatial models dominated memory research throughout much of the twentieth century, but in recent decades, the concept of memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) to the past has gained prominence. Initially introduced as a metaphor, the MTT perspective shifted the focus from internal memory processes to the subjective conscious experience of remembering. Despite its significant impact on empirical and theoretical memory research, there has been limited discussion regarding the meaning and adequacy of the MTT metaphor in accounting for memory. While in previous work I have addressed the general limitations of the MTT metaphor in explaining memory, the objective of this article is more focused and modest: to gain a better understanding of what constitutes MTT to the past. To achieve this objective, a detailed analysis of the characteristics of MTT to the past is presented through a comparison with time travel (TT) to the past. Although acknowledging that TT does not refer to an existing physical phenomenon, it is an older concept extensively discussed in the philosophical literature and provides commonly accepted grounds, particularly within orthodox theories of time, that can offer insights into the nature of MTT. Six specific characteristics serve as points of comparison: (1) a destination distinct from the present, (2) the distinction between subjective time and objective time, (3) the subjective experience of the time traveler, (4) their differentiation from the past self, (5) the existence of the past, and (6) its unchangeability. Through this research, a detailed exploration of the phenomenal and metaphysical aspects of MTT to the past is undertaken, shedding light on the distinct features that mental time travel to the past acquires when it occurs within the realm of the mind rather than as a physical phenomenon. By examining these characteristics, a deeper understanding of the nature of mental time travel is achieved, offering insights into how it operates in relation to memory and the past.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2023Journeying, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {Journeying to the past: Time travel and mental time travel, how far apart?}, year = {2023}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {14}, pages = {1260458}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1260458} }
Valmisa, M.	2023	Wang Bi and the hermeneutics of actualization	The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China SUNY Press 245-267			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Valmisa2023Wang, author = {Valmisa, Mercedes}, title = {Wang Bi and the hermeneutics of actualization}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {The Craft of Oblivion: Forgetting and Memory in Ancient China}, editor = {Galvany, Albert}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {245--267} }
Veit, W. and Browning, H.	2023	Evolutionary mismatch and anomalies in the memory system	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46 e381	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In order to understand involuntary autobiographical memories and déjà vu experiences, we argue that it is important to take an evolutionary medicine perspective. Here, we propose that these memory anomalies can be understood as the outcomes of an inevitable design trade-off between type I and type II errors in memory processing.
BibTeX: @article{Veit2023Evolutionary, author = {Veit, Walter and Browning, Heather}, title = {Evolutionary mismatch and anomalies in the memory system}, year = {2023}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {46}, pages = {e381}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X23000183} }
Vendrell-Ferran, Í.	2023	Imagine what it feels like	Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination Routledge 251-271		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ferran2023Imagine, author = {Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, title = {Imagine what it feels like}, year = {2023}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination}, editor = {Berninger, Anja and Vendrell-Ferran, Íngrid}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {251--271}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003153429-17} }
Viola, T.	2023	Memory, folk narratives, and social critique: Notes on Jane Addams and the “devil Baby” legend	Journal of the Philosophy of History 17 328-348	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article focuses on the link between memory, folk narratives, and critical thinking. I suggest in particular that there are instances in which the transmission of a folk- loric story, such as a legend or a tale, can intersect with a person’s life experiences and facilitate the articulation of critical perspectives on society that might otherwise go unexpressed. The opportunity for discussing this idea is offered by the work of early twentieth-century Chicago sociologist Jane Addams. In her book The Long Road of Woman’s Memory (1916) Addams dealt with the modern revival of an ancient legend and investigated its interplay with the recollections, grievances, and aspirations of working-class women.
BibTeX: @article{Viola2023Memory, author = {Viola, Tullio}, title = {Memory, folk narratives, and social critique: Notes on Jane Addams and the “devil Baby” legend}, year = {2023}, journal = {Journal of the Philosophy of History}, volume = {17}, pages = {328--348}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341503} }
Walsh, E.	2023	Memory, colonialism, and psychiatry: How collective memories underwrite madness	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 29(4) 223-239	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article defends the idea that colonialism still has a grasp on a valuable tool in the construction of our reality: memory. Developments in cognitive neuroscience and interdisciplinary memory studies propose that memory is far more creative and tied to one's imaginal capacities than we used to believe, suggesting that remembering is not simply a reproductive process, but a complex reconstructive process. Drawing on the psychiatric works of Frantz Fanon, in Alienation & Freedom; Black Skin, White Masks; and Wretched of the Earth, this article seeks to illustrate the ways in which colonialism continues to be involved in this reconstructive memory process. Colonialism has affected both episodic memories, the kind we have as individuals regarding our own past, and collective memories, the intersubjective shared narratives we possess in our societies. I argue that dominant collective memories ought to be rejected as a means of self-preservation for racialized individuals because these memories do not do justice to the violence of colonialism. Nevertheless, rejection of dominant collective memories comes at a significant personal cost in our societies, as it creates a traumatic loop for racialized individuals. I propose that psychiatry itself plays an instrumental role in the alienation experienced by racialized individuals because psychiatry has not yet appreciated the ways in which colonialism continues to have a hold on memory. Piecing together a theory of remembering in Fanon's texts, this article suggests that this cycle of alienation can be broken, if psychiatrists incorporate Fanon's insights regarding memory into their practice.
BibTeX: @article{Walsh2023Memory, author = {Walsh, Emily}, title = {Memory, colonialism, and psychiatry: How collective memories underwrite madness}, year = {2023}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {223--239}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0040} }
Watts, F.	2023	Rowan Williams on attention and memory in the spiritual life	Zygon 58(4) 1117-1127	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a series of recent articles, including his Boyle Lecture, Rowan Williams has developed a theology of the role of intelligence and attention in spiritual life. There is a sense in which all intelligence is spiritual activity. Current approaches to intelligence are often mechanistic, but intelligence in spiritual life needs to be understood in a more embodied and organic way. Attention is often thought of as a matter of choosing which already-formed objects to focus on. That overlooks the fact that sensory information is often confusing and ambiguous, and neglects how habits of attention make the world appear more atomized than it really is. If we can learn restraint in how we impose order upon the world around us in attending to it, there is an opportunity to encounter the divine Spirit which is the source of all that we experience. That leads to a more participatory, less objectifying, way of engaging with the world.
BibTeX: @article{Watts2023Rowan, author = {Watts, Frazer}, title = {Rowan Williams on attention and memory in the spiritual life}, year = {2023}, journal = {Zygon}, volume = {58}, number = {4}, pages = {1117--1127} }
West, J.	2023	Mnemonics as signs of memory: Semiotics and agency	Cognitive Semiotics 16(1) 45-67	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper engages the question of the extended mind hypothesis, specifically in terms of memory and mnemonics. I use the case of an external object which is set to trigger a memory internally, but is not the memory, to explore the idea of extension versus distribution. I use the example of tzitzit, which is a garment worn by observant Jewish men, where is states in scripture that seeing the tassels attached to the garment are supposed to trigger a specific memory. The point of the essay is that extension is merely a metaphysical commitment, and that this commitment leads to some ethical issues.
BibTeX: @article{West2023Mnemonics, author = {West, Joel}, title = {Mnemonics as signs of memory: Semiotics and agency}, year = {2023}, journal = {Cognitive Semiotics}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {45--67}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2023-2002} }
Wu, W.	2023	Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Wu2023Movements, author = {Wu, Wayne}, title = {Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action}, year = {2023}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Andonovski, N.	2022	Episodic representation: A mental models account	Frontiers in Psychology 13	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Abstract: This paper offers a modeling account of episodic representation. I argue that the episodic system constructs mental models: representations that preserve the spatiotemporal structure of represented domains. In prototypical cases, these domains are events: occurrences taken by subjects to have characteristic structures, dynamics and relatively determinate beginnings and ends. Due to their simplicity and manipulability, mental event models can be used in a variety of cognitive contexts: in remembering the personal past, but also in future-oriented and counterfactual imagination. As structural representations, they allow surrogative reasoning, supporting inferences about their constituents which can be used in reasoning about the represented events.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2022Episodic, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Episodic representation: A mental models account}, year = {2022}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {13}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.899371} }
Antonijevic, S. and Ubois, J.	2022	Representing the absent: The limits and possibilities of digital memory and preservation	Filozofija i drustvo 33(2) 311-325	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Digital preservation has significantly expanded over the past few decades, renewing old and creating new challenges related to provenance, integrity, completeness, and context in memory and preservation practices. In this paper we explore how, perhaps counterintuitively, a more extensive digital historical record offers greater opportunities to misrepresent reality. We first review a set of concepts and socio-cultural approaches to memory and preservation. We then focus on the multiplicity of digital memory and preservation practices today, examining their limits, possibilities, and tensions; specifically, we explore the challenges of decontextualized data, personal versus institutional preservation, and ''outsider'' digital collections that are willingly and/or forcibly excluded from official accounts. Through these discussions, we review examples of what we consider good digital memory and preservation practices that take new approaches to context and collaboration. Lastly, we explore the optimism inherent in seeking to preserve human knowledge over the long term and to make it accessible to all.
BibTeX: @article{Antonijevic2022Representing, author = {Antonijevic, Smiljana and Ubois, Jeff}, title = {Representing the absent: The limits and possibilities of digital memory and preservation}, year = {2022}, journal = {Filozofija i drustvo}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {311--325}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2202311A} }
Balcerak Jackson, B., DiDomenico, D. and Lota, K.	2022	In defense of clutter	Ergo 9(1)		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Balcerak2022Defense, author = {Balcerak Jackson, Brendan and DiDomenico, David and Lota, Kenji}, title = {In defense of clutter}, year = {2022}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2257} }
Barkasi Michael and Sant'Anna, A.	2022	Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3(14)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The viability of a na\ive realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, na\ive realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of na\ive realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In this paper, we identify three reasons why philosophers of memory have felt compelled to outright reject na\ive realism. We argue that none of those reasons are successful. Thus, far from being a non-starter, we argue that na\ive realism is a theoretical perspective that needs to be given serious consideration in current philosophy of memory debates.
BibTeX: @article{Barkasi2022Reviving, author = {Barkasi, Michael, and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {3}, number = {14}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2022.9192} }
Basu, R.	2022	The importance of forgetting	Episteme 19(4) 471-490	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there's a harder challenge that can't. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world.
BibTeX: @article{Basu2022Importance, author = {Basu, Rima}, title = {The importance of forgetting}, year = {2022}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {19}, number = {4}, pages = {471--490}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.36} }
Bickle, J.	2022	When two levels collide	From Electrons to Elephants and Elections: Saga of Content and Context Springer 653-672		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bickle2022When, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {When two levels collide}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {From Electrons to Elephants and Elections: Saga of Content and Context}, editor = {Wuppuluri, Shyam and Stewart, Ian}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {653--672}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92192-7_35} }
Bickle, J. and Barwich, A.-S.	2022	Introduction to molecular and cellular cognition	Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience Routledge 32-50	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Since the 1990s, molecular and cellular cognition (MCC) has elucidated critical causal mechanisms behind higher level processes of perception and cognition. New intervention techniques, including genetic tracers and fluorescent visualization, have facilitated targeted access and manipulation of molecular pathways to investigate their precise roles in cognition and links to behavior. Insights from MCC have trans- formed central ideas of cognition, especially memory. This chapter introduces key developments in late 20th-century neuroscience that explain how the discovery of the molecular mechanisms modified theoretical understanding of memory as a cogni- tive function. It also looks at contemporary innovations in optical imaging microscopy that further exemplify the central argument that technological innovations in the study of cellular processes constitute fundamental also of high-level cognitive theories.
BibTeX: @incollection{Bickle2022Introduction, author = {Bickle, John and Barwich, Ann-Sophie}, title = {Introduction to molecular and cellular cognition}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience}, editor = {Young, Benjamin D. and Jennings, Carolyn Dicey}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {32--50}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-4} }
Blomkvist, A.	2022	Imagination as a skill: A Bayesian proposal	Synthese 200 119	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent works, Kind (2020a, b) has argued that imagination is a skill, since it possesses the two hallmarks of skill: (i) improvability by practice , and (ii) control . I agree with Kind that (i) and (ii) are indeed hallmarks of skill, and I also endorse her claim that imagination is a skill in virtue of possessing these two features. However, in this paper, I argue that Kind's case for imagination's being a skill is unsatisfactory, since it lacks robust empirical evidence. Here, I will provide evidence for (i) by considering data from mental rotation experiments and for (ii) by considering data from developmental experiments. I conclude that imagination is a skill, but there is a further pressing question of how the cognitive architecture of imagination has to be structured to make this possible. I begin by considering how (ii) can be implemented sub-personally. I argue that this can be accounted for by positing a selection mechanism which selects content from memory representations to be recombined into imaginings, using Bayesian generation. I then show that such an account can also explain (i). On this basis, I hold that not only is imagination a skill, but that it is also plausibly implemented sub-personally by a Bayesian selection mechanism.
BibTeX: @article{Blomkvist2022Imagination, author = {Blomkvist, Andrea}, title = {Imagination as a skill: A Bayesian proposal}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, pages = {119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03550-z} }
Blustein, J.	2022	Bridging the gap between the social science and the social ontology of collective memory	Memory Studies 15(4)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz's analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies---one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Blustein2022Bridging, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {Bridging the gap between the social science and the social ontology of collective memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {15}, number = {4}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019876081} }
Boddapati, K.	2022	Introduction	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 223-228		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Boddapati2022Introduction, author = {Boddapati, Krishna}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {223--228}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243213} }
Bordini, D. and Torrengo, G.	2022	Fear of the past	Ergo 9	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Abstract The search for the engram---the neural mechanism of memory---has been a guiding research project for neuroscience since its emergence as a distinct scientific field. Recent developments in the tools and techniques available for investigating the mechanisms of memory have allowed researchers to proclaimed the search is over. While there is ongoing debate about the justification for that claim, renewed interest in the engram is clear. This attention highlights the impoverished status of the engram concept. As research accelerates, the simple characterization of the engram as an enduring physical change is stretched thin. Now that the engram commitment has been made more explicit, it must also be made more precise. If the project of 20th century neurobiology was finding the engram, the project of the 21st must be supplying a richer account of what's been found. This paper sketches a history of the engram, and a way forward. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science
BibTeX: @article{Bordini2022Fear, author = {Bordini, Davide and Torrengo, Giuliano}, title = {Fear of the past}, year = {2022}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {9}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2269} }
Boyle, A.	2022	The mnemonic functions of episodic memory	Philosophical Psychology 35(3) 327-349	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory is the form of memory involved in remembering personally experienced past events. Here, I address two questions about episodic memory's function: what does episodic memory do for us, and why do we have it? Recent work addressing these questions has emphasized episodic memory's role in imaginative simulation, criticizing the mnemonic view on which episodic memory is ''for'' remembering. In this paper, I offer a defense of the mnemonic view by highlighting an underexplored mnemonic function of episodic memory -- namely, its role in the encoding, storage and retrieval of the type of information more standardly associated with semantic memory. I argue that in healthy individuals, episodic memory plays a central role in the encoding, storage and retrieval of prototypically semantic information, analogous to the role played by mind palaces in the method of loci, and may have been selected on for this reason. This suggests new directions for studying episodic memory, particularly in nonhuman animals.
BibTeX: @article{Boyle2022Mnemonic, author = {Boyle, Alexandria}, title = {The mnemonic functions of episodic memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {35}, number = {3}, pages = {327--349}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1980520} }
Brumberg-Chaumont, J. and Poirel, D.	2022	Adam of Bockenfield and His Circle on Aristotle's de Memoria et Reminiscentia	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{BrumbergChaumont2022Adam, author = {Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie and Poirel, Dominique}, title = {Adam of Bockenfield and His Circle on Aristotle's de Memoria et Reminiscentia}, year = {2022}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Colaço, D.	2022	What counts as a memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and 'kinding in progress'	Philosophy of Science 89(1) 89-106	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper accounts for broad definitions of memory, which extend to paradigmatic memory phenomena, like episodic memory in humans, and phenomena in worms and sea snails. These definitions may seem too broad, suggesting that they extend to phenomena that don't count as memory or illustrate that memory is not a natural kind. However, these responses fail to consider a definition as a hypothesis. As opposed to construing definitions as expressing memory's properties, a definition as a hypothesis is the basis to test inferences about phenomena. A definition as a hypothesis is valuable when the ''kinding'' of phenomena is ongoing.
BibTeX: @article{Colaco2022What, author = {Colaço, David}, title = {What counts as a memory? Definitions, hypotheses, and 'kinding in progress'}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {89}, number = {1}, pages = {89--106}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2021.14} }
Cosentino, E., McCarroll, C.J. and Michaelian, K.	2022	Resisting temptation and overcoming procrastination: The roles of mental time travel and metacognition	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21(4) 791-811	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We tend to seek immediate gratification at the expense of long-term reward. In fact, the more distant a reward is from the present moment---the more we tend to discount it. This phenomenon is known as temporal discounting. Engaging in mental time travel plausibly enables subjects to overcome temporal discounting, but it is unclear how, exactly, it does so. In this paper, we develop a framework designed to explain the effects of mental time travel on temporal discounting by showing how the subject’s temporally extended self enables mental time travel to generate appropriate emotions that, in turn, via metacognitive monitoring and control, generate appropriate behaviours. Building on existing approaches we outline an initial framework, involving the concepts of emotion and the temporally extended self, to explain the effects of mental time travel on resisting temptation. We then show that this initial framework has difficulty explaining the effects of mental time travel on a closely related phenomenon, namely, overcoming procrastination. We next argue that, in order to explain these effects, the concept of emotion needs to be refined, and the concept of metacognition needs to be added to the framework: emotions involve an action-readiness component, which, through metacognitive monitoring and control, can enable the subject to resist temptation and overcome procrastination. Finally, we respond to an objection to our account---based on the somatic marker hypothesis---such that metacognition is not necessary to account for the role of emotions in decision-making.
BibTeX: @article{Cosentino2022Resisting, author = {Cosentino, Erica and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Resisting temptation and overcoming procrastination: The roles of mental time travel and metacognition}, year = {2022}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {21}, number = {4}, pages = {791--811}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-022-09836-4} }
De Brigard, F. and Robins, S.K.	2022	Memory	Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction Routledge	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter provides a discussion of memory in philosophy and neuroscience, with each section organized around three questions: 1) What is memory? 2) What is remembering? and 3) What are memories? Each section begins by exploring ways that memory has been taxonomized, both by scientists and philosophers of memory, emphasizing the kinds that have been particularly relevant for discussions at the intersection of these disciplines. The focus moves next to the mental act of remembering---the processes that are involved in our capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information---and the mechanisms that make remembering unique but also similar to other cognitive operations. Finally, each section draws attention to the individual mental states we call ''memories,'' whether or not they involve memory traces or representations, and what the nature of such entities may be. Throughout, we make note of the ways that philosophical and neuroscientific work on memory have been pursued independently and discuss the current trend toward interdisciplinary, collaborative work on these basic questions.
BibTeX: @incollection{DeBrigard2022Memory, author = {De Brigard, Felipe and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Memory}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction}, editor = {Young, B. and Jennings, C. D.}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003241898-24} }
Debus, D. and Richardson, L.	2022	'Rather than succour, my memories bring eloquent stabs of pain' on the ambiguous role of memory in grief	Journal of Consciousness Studies 29(9-10) 36-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory can play two quite different roles in grief. Memories involving a deceased loved one can make them feel either enjoyably present, or especially and painfully absent. In this paper, we consider what makes it possible for memory to play these two different roles, both in grief and more generally. We answer this question by appeal to the phenomenological nature of vivid remembering, and the context in which such memories occur. We argue that different contexts can make salient different aspects of memory's phenomenological nature, thus making what is remembered sometimes feel pleasantly 'present' again, and sometimes painfully absent.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2022Rather, author = {Debus, Dorothea and Richardson, Louise}, title = {'Rather than succour, my memories bring eloquent stabs of pain' on the ambiguous role of memory in grief}, year = {2022}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {29}, number = {9-10}, pages = {36--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.9.036} }
Dings, R. and McCarroll, C.J.	2022	The complex phenomenology of episodic memory: Felt connections, multimodal perspectivity, and multifaceted selves	Journal of Consciousness Studies 29(11-12) 29-55	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is thought to be a rich connection between the self and the phenomenology of episodic memory. Despite the emphasis on this link, the precise relation between the two has been underexplored. In fact, even though it is increasingly acknowledged that there are various facets of the self, this notion of the multifaceted self has played very little role in theorizing about the phenomenology of episodic memory. Getting clear about the complex phenomenology of episodic memory involves getting clear about various components that contribute to the sense of self. Inspired by work on 4E cognition, and focusing on the phenomenological feature of felt connections, we show that the phenomenology of episodic memory can be modulated by focusing on different facets --- embodied, extended, embedded, and ecological --- of the self.
BibTeX: @article{Dings2022Complex, author = {Dings, Roy and McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {The complex phenomenology of episodic memory: Felt connections, multimodal perspectivity, and multifaceted selves}, year = {2022}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {29}, number = {11-12}, pages = {29--55}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.11.029} }
Dodd, J.	2022	The art of memory	Phenomenological Studies 6 97-123	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is Augustine's famous architectural descriptions of memory in the Confessions as a 'storehouse' or a 'palace' more than the use of a suggestive metaphor? Tracking the origin of Augustine's descriptions to the ancient art of memory and its role in the rhetorical traditions of Greece and Rome, this essay suggests that entertaining the idea that there may have been a literal 'architecture of memory' finds significant support in these ancient practices. The essay then draws on the analyses of memory, image-consciousness, and imagination in Edmund Husserl's writings, in order to provide a phenomenological account of the cogency of the idea.
BibTeX: @article{Dodd2022Art, author = {Dodd, James}, title = {The art of memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Phenomenological Studies}, volume = {6}, pages = {97--123}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2143/EPH.6.0.3289794} }
Droege, P.	2022	The Evolution of Consciousness: Representing the Present Moment	Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Droege2022Evolution, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {The Evolution of Consciousness: Representing the Present Moment}, year = {2022}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
Elkins, K.	2022	Memory, technology and wisdom	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 297-321	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: Drawing from classical philosophical discourse, including Plato's reflections on knowledge and memory, this essay navigates the transition from traditional memory repositories to modern insights from Proust and Wordsworth to digital platforms. With the rise of AI, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), new generative technologies challenge our traditional notions of memory and knowledge. Integrating Ong's concept of "secondary orality," the essay explores how technology, especially AI, might be ushering in a new era reminiscent of oral traditions, yet distinct in its digital nature. How do these AI models, which mimic human cognition, influence our understanding of knowledge and wisdom? And as these technologies become more integrated into our daily lives, what does it mean for the future of human knowledge?
BibTeX: @article{Elkins2022Memory, author = {Elkins, Katherine}, title = {Memory, technology and wisdom}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {297--321}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243217} }
Farina, M. and Lavazza, A.	2022	Memory modulation via non-invasive brain stimulation: Status, perspectives, and ethical issues	Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16 826862	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While research to improve memory or counter decay caused by neurodegenerative diseases has a fairly long history, scientific attempts to erase memories are very recent. The use of non-invasive brain stimulation for memory modulation represents a new and promising application for the treatment of certain disorders [such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)]. However, numerous ethical issues are related to memory intervention. In particular, the possibility of using forms of non-invasive brain stimulation requires to distinguish treatment interventions from the enhancement of the healthy. Furthermore, a range of important societal and legal concerns arise when manipulating memories. In this short contribution, we address some of the most significant ethical, social, and legal implications surrounding the application of memory-modulation techniques and offer a series of reflections and considerations, which we hope can be of use to guide -and perhaps regulate- their potential, future implementation in society.
BibTeX: @article{Farina2022Memory, author = {Farina, Mirko and Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {Memory modulation via non-invasive brain stimulation: Status, perspectives, and ethical issues}, year = {2022}, journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience}, volume = {16}, pages = {826862}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2022.826862} }
Faulkner, P.	2022	Collective and extended knowledge	Philosophical Issues 32(1) 200-213		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Faulkner2022Collective, author = {Faulkner, Paul}, title = {Collective and extended knowledge}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, pages = {200--213}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12231} }
Fortney, M.	2022	Evans on intellectual attention and memory demonstratives	Analytic Philosophy 63(2) 118-130	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Intellectual attention, like perceptual attention, is a special mode of mental engagement with the world. When we attend intellectually, rather than making use of sensory information we make use of the kind of information that shows up in occurent thought, memory, and the imagination (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011). In this paper, I argue that reflecting on what it is like to comprehend memory demonstratives speaks in favour of the view that intellectual attention is required to understand memory demonstratives. Moreover, I argue that this is a line of thought endorsed by Gareth Evans in his Varieties of Reference (1982). In so doing, I improve on interpretations of Evans that have been offered by Christopher Peacocke (1984), and Christoph Hoerl & Theresa McCormack (a coauthored piece, 2005). In so doing I also improve on McDowell's (1990) criticism of Peacocke's interpretation of Evans. Like McDowell, I believe that Peacocke might overemphasize the role that ''memory-images'' play in Evans' account of comprehending memory demonstratives. But unlike McDowell, I provide a positive characterization of how Evans described the phenomenology of comprehending memory demonstratives.
BibTeX: @article{Fortney2022Evans, author = {Fortney, Mark}, title = {Evans on intellectual attention and memory demonstratives}, year = {2022}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {63}, number = {2}, pages = {118--130}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12222} }
Fritzman, J.M. and Rottshaefer, W.A.	2022	What memory is---Not!	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 13(1) e1584	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Rejecting the received account, which includes procedural and semantic memory, Stanley B. Klein claims that only episodic memory is genuine memory. This is so, he asserts, because only episodic memory is partly constituted by a quale, a Nagelian “what it is like” feeling of the past. How- ever, his actual position reveals a very different set of claims about memory, one that involves a distinctive feel, distinct from Nagelian qualia and other versions of what qualia are. We argue that Klein's actual position signifi- cantly differs from what he claims memory is. And we try to describe what Kleinian qualia should feel like. We suspect that they might not feel like anything at all.
BibTeX: @article{Fritzman2022What, author = {Fritzman, J. M. and Rottshaefer, William A.}, title = {What memory is---Not!}, year = {2022}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {e1584}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1584} }
Geniusas, S.	2022	Modes of self-awareness: Perception, dreams, memory	Husserl Studies 38 151-170	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I contend that the well-established phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness needs to be further supplemented with more refined distinctions between different modes of pre-reflective self-awareness. Here I distinguish between five modes, which we come across in perception, lucid dreams, non-lucid dreams, daydreams, and episodic memory. Building on the basis of a phenomenological description, I argue that perception entails the pre-reflective self-awareness of the perceiving ego; non-lucid dreams implicate the pre-reflective self-awareness of the dreamed (and not the dreaming) ego; in the case of lucid dreams and daydreams, we are faced with a split pre-reflective self-awareness, which entails the self-awareness of the (day)dreaming and the (day)dreamed ego. Lastly, in the case of episodic recollection, we are confronted with a threefold pre-reflective self-awareness: the self-awareness of the remembered ego, the remembering ego, and of the temporal unity of experience. The phenomenological analysis here offered leads to the conclusion that pre-reflective self-awareness need not be spoken of in the singular, but in the plural, and that while some modes of pre-reflective self-awareness constitute the foundations of selfhood, others enable the subject of experience to flee its facticity and become someone other than it is.
BibTeX: @article{Geniusas2022Modes, author = {Geniusas, Saulius}, title = {Modes of self-awareness: Perception, dreams, memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {38}, pages = {151--170}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-022-09301-9} }
Giustina, A.	2022	A defense of inner awareness: The memory argument revisited	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13(2) 341-363	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally been a central element of philosophy of consciousness, from Aristotle, to Descartes, Brentano, the phenomenological tradition, and early and contemporary analytic philosophy. Its existence, however, has recently been called into question, especially by defenders of so-called transparency of experience and first-order representationalists about phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I put forward a defense of inner awareness based on an argument from memory. Roughly, the idea is that since we can only recall something if we were aware of it at the time of its occurrence, and since we can recall our own experiences, we must be aware of our own experiences at the time of their occurrence. The argument is far from new: it goes back to the Buddhist tradition and has been revived more recently in Buddhist Scholarship but also in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, in particular by Uriah Kriegel. However, I believe that, since it is the best extant argument for inner awareness, it deserves more extensive treatment. My goal is to strengthen the memory argument by making some conceptual distinctions as to the exact thesis about inner awareness that the argument is supposed to support, considering different ways the argument may be reconstructed depending on the exact thesis to be supported, and defending the argument from a new objection, raised very recently by Daniel Stoljar.
BibTeX: @article{Giustina2022Defense, author = {Giustina, Anna}, title = {A defense of inner awareness: The memory argument revisited}, year = {2022}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {341--363}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00602-0} }
Gomez-Lavin, J. and Humphreys, J.	2022	Striking at the heart of cognition: Aristotelian phantasia, working memory, and psychological explanation	Medicina Nei Secoli: Journal of History of Medicine and Medical Humanities 34(2) 13-38	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper examines a parallel between Aristotle's account of phantasia and contemporary psychological models of working memory, a capacity that enables the temporary maintenance and manipulation of information used in many behaviors. These two capacities, though developed within two distinct scientific paradigms, share a common strategy of psychological explanation, Aristotelian Faculty Psychology. This strategy individuates psychological components by their target-domains and functional roles. Working memory and phantasia result from an attempt to individuate the psychological components responsible for flexible thought and are thus implicated in most of our robust cognitive processes, from reading comprehension to problem solving. We then present two novel objections which suggest that these capacities cannot explain our ability to engage in flexible thought. To escape the resultant impasse, we survey alternatives and argue that most promising strategies depend on identifying the behaviors attributed to intelligent thought and action.
BibTeX: @article{Gomez2022Striking, author = {Gomez-Lavin, Javier and Humphreys, Justin}, title = {Striking at the heart of cognition: Aristotelian phantasia, working memory, and psychological explanation}, year = {2022}, journal = {Medicina Nei Secoli: Journal of History of Medicine and Medical Humanities}, volume = {34}, number = {2}, pages = {13--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.13133/2531-7288/2647} }
Grundmann, T.	2022	Dependent reliability: Why and how conditional reliability should be replaced by it	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105(1) 144-159	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between unconditionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Goldman's account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows dependently reliable processes to operate not only on doxastic but also on non-doxastic input. Thinking this way advances the explanatory power of reliabilism significantly.
BibTeX: @article{Grundmann2022Dependent, author = {Grundmann, Thomas}, title = {Dependent reliability: Why and how conditional reliability should be replaced by it}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {105}, number = {1}, pages = {144--159}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12811} }
Heersmink, R.	2022	Preserving narrative identity for dementia patients: Embodiment, active environments, and distributed memory	Neuroethics 15(1) 8	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One goal of this paper is to argue that autobiographical memories are extended and distributed across embodied brains and environmental resources. This is important because such distributed memories play a constitutive role in our narrative identity. So, some of the building blocks of our narrative identity are not brain-bound but extended and distributed. Recognising the distributed nature of memory and narrative identity, invites us to find treatments and strategies focusing on the environment in which dementia patients are situated. A second goal of this paper is to suggest various of such strategies, including lifelogging technologies such as SenseCams, life story books, multimedia biographies, memory boxes, ambient intelligence systems, and virtual reality applications. Such technologies allow dementia patients to remember their personal past in a way that wouldn't be possible by merely relying on their biological memory, in that way aiding in preserving their narrative identity and positively contributing to their sense of well-being.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2022Preserving, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Preserving narrative identity for dementia patients: Embodiment, active environments, and distributed memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {8}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-022-09479-x} }
Hoerl, C.	2022	A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory	Synthese 200(5) 376	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper aims to outline, and argue for, an approach to episodic memory broadly in the spirit of knowledge-first epistemology. I discuss a group of influential views of epsiodic memory that I characterize as 'two-factor accounts', which have both proved popular historically (e.g., in the work of Hume, 1739-40; Locke 1690; and Russell 1921) and have also seen a resurgence in recent work on the philosophy of memory (see, e.g., Dokic 2014; Michaelian, 2016; Owens, 1996). What is common to them is that they try to give an account of the nature of episodic memory in which the concept of knowledge plays no explanatory role. I highlight some parallels between these two-factor accounts and attempts to give a reductive definition of knowledge itself. I then discuss some problems two-factor accounts of episodic memory face in explaining the distinctive sense in which episodic recollection involves remembering personally experienced past events, before sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which takes as basic the idea that episodic memory involves the retention of knowledge. I argue that we can give an exhaustive constitutive account of what episodic memory is, and how it differs from other types of mental states, by considering what particular type of knowledge is retained in episodic memory, and what exactly having that knowledge consists in.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2022Knowledge, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, number = {5}, pages = {376}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03702-1} }
Høffding, S., Martiny, K. and Roepstorff, A.	2022	Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 33-51	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper defends the position that phenomenological interviews can provide a rich source of knowledge and that they are in no principled way less reliable or less valid than quantitative or experimental methods in general. It responds to several skeptic objections such as those raised against introspection, those targeting the unreliability of episodic memory, and those claiming that interviews cannot address the psychological, cognitive and biological correlates of experience. It argues that the skeptic must either heed the methodological and epistemological justification of the phenomenological interview provided, or embrace a more fundamental skepticism, a ''deep mistrust'', in which scientific discourse can have no recourse to conscious processes as explananda, with ensuing dire consequences for our conception of science.
BibTeX: @article{Hoeffding2022Can, author = {Høffding, Simon and Martiny, Kristian and Roepstorff, Andreas}, title = {Can we trust the phenomenological interview? Metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological objections}, year = {2022}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {21}, pages = {33--51}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09744-z} }
Inan, D.	2022	A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons	Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 45(2) 161-216	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does memory constitue diachronic identity? Or does it presuppose it? Butler has claimed that it is the latter, and, in this paper, I will side with him. My argumentation, however, will take a different route. My claim is not that memory presupposes transtemporal identity because I can only remember episodes that have happened to me. Rather, I will probe the idea that some properties of episodic remembering may be such that accounting for them requires us to posit a subject the transtemporal identity of which can't be reduced to continuity. These properties are the pastness of the recollected episode coupled with its first-personal accessibility. The argument will make heavy use of the experience of temporality.
BibTeX: @article{Inan2022memory, author = {Inan, Daniel}, title = {A memory-based argument for non-reductionism about the transtemporal identity of persons}, year = {2022}, journal = {Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {45}, number = {2}, pages = {161--216}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2022.v45n2.di} }
Johnsson, M.	2022	Perception, imagery, memory and consciousness	Filozofia i Nauka 10 229-244	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I propose and discuss some principles that I believe are substantial for percep- tion, various kinds of memory, expectations and the capacity for imagination in the mammal brain, as well as for the design of a biologically inspired artificial cognitive architecture. I also suggest why these same principles could explain our ability to represent novel concepts and imagine non-existing and perhaps impossible objects, while there are still limits to what we can imagine and think about. Some ideas re- garding how these principles could be relevant for an autonomous agent to become functionally conscious are discussed as well.
BibTeX: @article{Johnsson2022Perception, author = {Johnsson, Magnus}, title = {Perception, imagery, memory and consciousness}, year = {2022}, journal = {Filozofia i Nauka}, volume = {10}, pages = {229--244}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2022081132} }
Kirmayer, L.	2022	Decolonozing memory	Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 29(4) 243-248	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this far reaching essay, Emily Walsh explores the significance of memory for coming to grips with the enduring legacy of colonialism in psychiatry. She argues that "for reasons of self-preservation, racialized individuals should reject collective memories underwritten by colonialism." Psychiatry can enable this process or collude with the structures of domination to silence and disable those who bear the brunt of the colonialist history of violence and its current global incarnations. In this brief commentary, I want to underscore the importance of Walsh's argument, link it to contemporary work in cognitive and social science on the dynamics of memory, and point to some resources for implementing these insights in health services and clinical practice.
BibTeX: @article{Kirmayer2022Decolonizing, author = {Kirmayer, Lawrence}, title = {Decolonozing memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {243--248}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2022.0042} }
Kwak, C., Lee, J. and Lee, H.	2022	Could you ever forget me? Why people want to be forgotten online	Journal of Business Ethics 179 25-42	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The concept of people's memory maintains the finiteness of time and capacity. However, with the advancement in technology, the amount of storage memory a person can use has increased dramatically. Given that digital traces can hardly be erased or forgotten, individuals have begun to express their desire to be forgotten in the digital world, and governments and academia are considering methods to fulfill such wishes. Capturing the difficulties in terms of a cultural lag between technological advancements and regulations on individuals' data privacy needs, we identify six motives for individuals wishing to be forgotten online and investigate its expected effects on online content generation through a qualitative content analysis of 222 responses from open-ended surveys in Korea. Our findings provide implications for the literature on individual privacy and the right to be forgotten employing the cultural lag, as well as, elaborate further on the relationship between being forgotten online and the legitimacy of such requests of individuals. Additionally, implications for data providers, data controllers/processors, and governments to address this lag and build a balanced system of personal information are provided.
BibTeX: @article{Kwak2022Could, author = {Kwak, Chanhee and Lee, Junyeong and Lee, Heeseok}, title = {Could you ever forget me? Why people want to be forgotten online}, year = {2022}, journal = {Journal of Business Ethics}, volume = {179}, pages = {25--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04747-x} }
Lai, C.	2022	Memory, knowledge, and epistemic luck	The Philosophical Quarterly 72(4) 896-917	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does 'remembering that p' entail 'knowing that p'? The widely-accepted epistemic theory of memory (hereafter, ETM) answers affirmatively. This paper purports to reveal the tension between ETM and the prevailing anti-luck epistemology. Central to my argument is the fact that we often 'vaguely remember' a fact, of which one plausible interpretation is that our true memory-based beliefs formed in this way could easily have been false. Drawing on prominent theories of misremembering in philosophy of psychology (e.g. fuzzy-trace theory and simulationism), I will construct cases where the subject vaguely remembers that p while fails to meet the safety condition, which imply either that ETM is false or that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The conclusion reached in this paper will be a conditional: if veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with knowledge, then 'remembering that p' does not entail 'knowing that p'.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2022Memory, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Memory, knowledge, and epistemic luck}, year = {2022}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {72}, number = {4}, pages = {896--917}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab064} }
Lai, C.	2022	Remembering is not a kind of knowing	Synthese 200 333	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper purports to disprove an orthodox view in contemporary epistemology that I call 'the epistemic conception of memory', which sees remembering as a kind of epistemic success, in particular, a kind of knowing. This conception is embodied in a cluster of platitudes in epistemology, including 'remembering entails knowing', 'remembering is a way of knowing', and 'remembering is sufficiently analogous to knowing'. I will argue that this epistemic conception of memory, as a whole, should be rejected insofar as we take into account some putative necessary conditions for knowledge. It will be illustrated that while many maintain that knowing must be (1) anti-luck and (2) an achievement, the two conditions do not apply to remembering. I will provide cases where the subject successfully remembers that p but lacks knowledge that p for failing to meet the two putative conditions for knowledge. Therefore, remembering is not a kind of knowing but a sui generis cognitive activity.
BibTeX: @article{Lai2022Remembering, author = {Lai, Changsheng}, title = {Remembering is not a kind of knowing}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, pages = {333}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03814-8} }
Langland-Hassan, P.	2022	Propping up the causal theory	Synthese 200(2) 95	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Martin and Deutscher's (1966) causal theory of remembering holds that a memory trace serves as a necessary causal link between any genuine episode of remembering and the event it enables one to recall. In recent years, the causal theory has come under fire from researchers across philosophy and cognitive science, who argue that results from the scientific study of memory are incompatible with the kinds of memory traces that Martin and Deutscher hold essential to remembering. Of special note, these critics observe, is that a single memory trace can be shaped by multiple past experiences. This appears to prevent traces from underwriting Martin and Deutscher's distinction between remembering an event and merely forming an accurate representation of it. This paper accepts such criticisms of the standard causal theory and, through considering the phenomenon forgetting through repetition, raises several others. A substantially revised causal theory is then developed, compatible with the thesis that individual memory traces are shaped by multiple past experiences. The key strategy is to conceive of episodic remembering not as the simple retrieval and projection of a static memory trace, but as a complex quasi-inferential process that makes use of multiple forms of information and cues---''prop-like'' memory traces included---in generating the experience known as episodic remembering. When remembering is understood as a multi-componential process, there are a variety of ways in which a representation of the past may be appropriately causally dependent upon a prior experience of the event remembered.
BibTeX: @article{Langland2022Propping, author = {Langland-Hassan, Peter}, title = {Propping up the causal theory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, number = {2}, pages = {95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03635-9} }
Leshinskaya, A. and Lambert, E.	2022	Implications from the philosophy of concepts for the neuroscience of memory systems	Neuroscience and Philosophy MIT Press 353-387	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers and neuroscientists address central issues in both fields, including morality, action, mental illness, consciousness, perception, and memory. Philosophers and neuroscientists grapple with the same profound questions involving consciousness, perception, behavior, and moral judgment, but only recently have the two disciplines begun to work together. This volume offers fourteen original chapters that address these issues, each written by a team that includes at least one philosopher and one neuroscientist, who integrate disciplinary perspectives and reflect the latest research in both fields. Topics include morality, empathy, agency, the self, mental illness, neuroprediction, optogenetics, pain, vision, consciousness, memory, concepts, mind wandering, and the neural basis of psychological categories. The chapters first address basic issues about our social and moral lives: how we decide to act and ought to act toward each other, how we understand each other's mental states and selves, and how we deal with pressing social problems regarding crime and mental or brain health. The following chapters consider basic issues about our mental lives: how we classify and recall what we experience, how we see and feel objects in the world, how we ponder plans and alternatives, and how our brains make us conscious and create specific mental states.
BibTeX: @incollection{Leshinskaya2022Implications, author = {Leshinskaya, Anna and Lambert, Enoch}, title = {Implications from the philosophy of concepts for the neuroscience of memory systems}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Neuroscience and Philosophy}, editor = {De Brigard, Felipe and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {353--387}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0017} }
Leuenberger, M.	2022	Memory modification and authenticity: A narrative approach	Neuroethics 15(1) 10	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The potential of memory modification techniques (MMTs) has raised concerns and sparked a debate in neuroethics, particularly in the context of identity and authenticity. This paper addresses the question whether and how MMTs influence authenticity. I proceed by drawing two distinctions within the received views on authenticity. From this, I conclude that an analysis of MMTs based on a dual-basis, process view of authenticity is warranted, which implies that the influence of MMTs on authenticity crucially depends on the specifics of how memory modification would eventually work. Therefore, I continue with a systematic analysis of possible properties of MMTs in which I distinguish between the dimensions of memories and the kinds of experiences that can be modified as well as the properties of the process of memory modification. The impact of MMTs on authenticity is analyzed regarding the possible properties of MMTs and based on a narrative approach to authenticity which fulfills the requirements of a dual-basis, process view of authenticity. Lastly, I explore the potential of MMTs to shift the balance between self-discovery and self-creation within authenticity and thereby alter the concept itself as well as the value of authenticity.
BibTeX: @article{Leuenberger2022Memory, author = {Leuenberger, Muriel}, title = {Memory modification and authenticity: A narrative approach}, year = {2022}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {10}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-022-09489-9} }
Levy, L.	2022	Remembering women: Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir on women and memory	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 341-370		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Levy2022Remembering, author = {Levy, Lior}, title = {Remembering women: Hegel, Irigaray, and Beauvoir on women and memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {341--370}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243219} }
Liefke, K.	2022	The filmic representation of relived experiences	Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 59(2) 56-65	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This comment discusses Emar Maier's argument against the characterization of unreliable filmic narration as personal narration. My comment focuses on two assumptions of Maier's argument, viz. that the narrating character's mental states can be described independently of other mental states/experiences and that personal filmic narration can only proceed from a de se perspective. I contend that the majority of movies with unreliable narration represents an experientially parasitic mental state. Since these states are well-known to involve perspective-shifting and various kinds of semantic enrichment, unreliable filmic representation is perfectly compatible with the presence of a personal narrator.
BibTeX: @article{Liefke2022Filmic, author = {Liefke, Kristina}, title = {The filmic representation of relived experiences}, year = {2022}, journal = {Epistemology and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {59}, number = {2}, pages = {56--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259221} }
Lingis, A.	2022	The need, the duty	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 393-407		[DOI]	[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @article{Lingis2022Need, author = {Lingis, Alphonso}, title = {The need, the duty}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {393--407}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243221} }
Machura, P.	2022	Moral topography of memory, time control and accumulation of identity	Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 17(1) 27-44	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan's critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent's recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community.
BibTeX: @article{Machura2022Moral, author = {Machura, Piotr}, title = {Moral topography of memory, time control and accumulation of identity}, year = {2022}, journal = {Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {27--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.1.2} }
Ménager, D.H., Choi, D. and Robins, S.K.	2022	A hybrid theory of event memory	Minds and Machines 32 365-394	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Amongst philosophers, there is ongoing debate about what successful event remembering requires. Causal theorists argue that it requires a causal connection to the past event. Simulation theorists argue, in contrast, that successful remembering requires only production by a reliable memory system. Both views must contend with the fact that people can remember past events they have experienced with varying degrees of accuracy. The debate between them thus concerns not only the account of successful remembering, but how each account explains the various forms of memory error as well. Advancing the debate therefore must include exploration of the cognitive architecture implicated by each view and whether that architecture is capable of producing the range of event representations seen in human remembering. Our paper begins by exploring these architectures, framing casual theories as best suited to the storage of event instances and simulation theories as best suited to store schemas. While each approach has its advantages, neither can account for the full range of our event remembering abilities. We then propose a novel hybrid theory that combines both instance and schematic elements in the event memory. In addition, we provide an implementation of our theory in the context of a cognitive architecture. We also discuss an agent we developed using this system and its ability to remember events in the blocks world domain.
BibTeX: @article{Menager2022Hybrid, author = {Ménager, David H. and Choi, D. and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {A hybrid theory of event memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {32}, pages = {365--394}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-021-09578-3} }
Merrick, A.	2022	On seeing what there is to see: Nietzsche on forgetting and aspectival captivity	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 373-391	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: How are we to understand Nietzsche’s championing of forgetting? Does Nietzsche consider unreconstructed forgetting an ethical and political ideal? If so, does Nietzsche’s counsel on forgetting thereby support and work at the behest of the dominant system of evaluation? Is, to frame it another way, Nietzschean forgetting but a mechanism by which the dominant evaluative framework repeats, reinscribes, retrenches, or otherwise reaffirms itself? By offering a close reading his remarks, most notably those that appear in On the Genealogy of Morality, I aim in this paper to contest the view that Nietzsche’s account of forgetting seeks to silence historical hurts and is, thereby, as ethically problematic as it is politically objectionable. By attending to and reconstructing key passages where Nietzsche’s view comes out most clearly, I demonstrate, contra the dominant account, that Nietzschean forgetting offers us important conceptual resources that can be used to combat any dominant moral evaluative framework.
BibTeX: @article{Merrick2022On, author = {Merrick, Allison}, title = {On seeing what there is to see: Nietzsche on forgetting and aspectival captivity}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {373--391}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243220} }
Mi, C. and Tang, M.-T.	2022	The problem of forgetting	Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy, Palgrave 91-110	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter demonstrates why the commonsensical idea of forgetting as simply a vice is problematic. It presents some philosophical arguments for the positive role of forgetting. Forgetting can be understood in many ways, for example forgetting as a cause of memory-seeming, forgetting as a reliable process of justification, forgetting as an intellectual virtue, and forgetting as a way of liberation (忘 in Chinese). The polysemy of forgetting can be traced back to Plato's conceptual distinction between ἐπιλήθομαι and λήθη. It echoes with the many facets of forgetting by showing how the opposite of memory relates to different domains such as knowing and perception. Key to classifying the polysemy of forgetting is a taxonomy of forgetting according to the computational model of memory. It brings out how the tripartite stages of memory correspond to the different types of forgetting.
BibTeX: @incollection{Mi2022problem, author = {Mi, Chienkuo and Tang, Man-To}, title = {The problem of forgetting}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy,}, editor = {Lai, K. L.}, publisher = {Palgrave}, pages = {91--110}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79349-4_5} }
Michaelian, K.	2022	Against Perrin's embodied causalism: Still no evidence for the necessity of appropriate causation	Intellectica 76 175-190	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Perrin (2021) has two main goals. First, to attack the simulation theory of memory on its empirical home turf. Second, to defend a novel embodied causal theory of memory designed to avoid the empirical difficulties that beset both the classical causal theory of memory and---if Perrin is right---the simulation theory of memory. In pursuit of his first goal, Perrin argues that the empirical evidence to which simulationists appeal does not in fact support simulationism. In pursuit of his second goal, he argues that that very evidence supports causalism in general and, moreover, that additional empirical evidence supports an embodied form of causalism in particular. This paper likewise has two goals. First, to critique Perrin's attempt to show that the evidence to which simulationists appeal supports causalism rather than simulationism. Second, to show that, regardless of whether Perrin is successful with respect to his first purpose, he is unsuccessful with respect to his second---to show, that is, that the additional evidence that he adduces fails to provide any support for the necessity of the sort of embodied appropriate causation that figures in the embodied causal theory. If the paper achieves its two goals, embodied causalism is in the same empirically-leaky boat as more traditional forms of causalism, and the empirical evidence continues to favour simulationism over causalism.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2022Against, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Against Perrin's embodied causalism: Still no evidence for the necessity of appropriate causation}, year = {2022}, journal = {Intellectica}, volume = {76}, pages = {175-190} }
Michaelian, K., Perrin, D., Sant'Anna, A. and Schirmer Dos Santos, C.	2022	Mental time travel	Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible Palgrave Macmillan	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel research has given rise to an ongoing debate between causal and simulation theories of memory, which has, in turn, triggered a debate between continuist and discontinuist views of the relationship between remembering experienced past events and imagining possible future events. Section ''Introduction'' of this entry describes the concept of mental time travel and reviews both debates, distinguishing between processual and attitudinal forms of continuism. Section ''Processual (Dis) Continuism'' reviews empirical evidence and metaphysical and epistemological arguments for processual continuism and discontinuism. Section ''Attitudinal (Dis) Continuism'' reviews the emergence of attitudinal continuism and discusses its relationship to processual continuism and discontinuism and to causalism and simulationism. Section ''Summary'' provides a brief summary of the entry.
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2022Mental, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, André and Schirmer Dos Santos, César}, title = {Mental time travel}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible}, editor = {Gl˘ aveanu, V. P.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_222-1} }
Michaelian, K. and Sant'Anna, A.	2022	From authenticism to alethism: Against McCarroll on observer memory.	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 835-856	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In opposition to the natural view that observer perspective memory is bound to be inauthentic, McCarroll (2018) argues for the surprising conclusion that memories in which the subject sees himself in the remembered scene are, in many cases, true to the subject's original experience of the scene. By means of a careful reconstruction of his argument, this paper shows that McCarroll does not succeed in establishing his conclusion. It shows, in fact, that we ought to come to the opposed conclusion that, while it may be possible in principle for observer perspective memory to be authentic, this is unlikely ever to happen in practice. The natural view, in short, is more or less right.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2022From, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {From authenticism to alethism: Against McCarroll on observer memory.}, year = {2022}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {21}, pages = {835--856}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-021-09772-9} }
Mihai, M.	2022	Political Memory and the Aesthetics of Care: The Art of Complicity and Resistance	Stanford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Mihai2022Political, author = {Mihai, Mihaela}, title = {Political Memory and the Aesthetics of Care: The Art of Complicity and Resistance}, year = {2022}, publisher = {Stanford University Press} }
Moran, A.	2022	Memory disjunctivism: A Causal Theory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13(4) 1097-1117	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Relationalists about episodic memory must endorse a disjunctivist theory of memory-experience according to which cases of genuine memory and cases of total confabulation involve distinct kinds of mental event with different natures. This paper is concerned with a pair of arguments against this view, which are analogues of the 'causal argument'and the 'screening off argument'that have been pressed in recent literature against relationalist (and hence disjunctivist) theories of perception. The central claim to be advanced is that to deal with these two arguments, memory disjunctivists both can and should draw on resources that are standardly appealed to by rival common factor theories of episodic memory, and, in particular, to the idea that genuine memories and merely apparent ones are to be distinguished, at least in part, in terms of the distinctive ways in which they are caused. On the proposed view, there are substantive causal constraints associated both with cases of genuine memory and with cases of mere confabulation. The resulting theory thus tells us something important about the nature both of genuine memories and of mere confabulations, namely, that such experiences must be caused in certain distinctive ways and cannot occur except as the result of a distinctive sort of causal process. In addition, the theory enables the disjunctivist to offer a unified response to an important pair of arguments against her view.
BibTeX: @article{Moran2022Memory, author = {Moran, Alex}, title = {Memory disjunctivism: A Causal Theory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {13}, number = {4}, pages = {1097--1117}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00569-y} }
Mounce, H.O.	2022	Malcolm on memory	Philosophical Investigations 45(1) 53-57	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Malcolm argues that memory takes a variety of forms and that philosophers go astray because they attempt to reduce this variety to a single form. We may grant that memory takes a variety of forms. It does not follow that these forms are of equal philosophical significance. In telling you my name, I do not have to recall it. I have repeated it innumerable times. If asked again, I simply repeat it once again. This is what Bergson called ''habit memory''. But Proust, in tasting a madeleine cake, did recall the past. His childhood returned vividly to his mind. But since his experience was in the present and his childhood was in the past, how could the one be an experience of the other? Here, it seems, we do have a philosophical problem.
BibTeX: @article{Mounce2022Malcolm, author = {Mounce, H. O.}, title = {Malcolm on memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, pages = {53--57}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12331} }
Munro, D.	2022	Mental imagery and the epistemology of testimony	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52(4) 428-449	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental imagery often occurs during testimonial belief transmission: a testifier often episodically remembers or imagines a scene while describing it, while a listener often imagines that scene as it's described to her. I argue that getting clear on imagery's psychological roles in testimonial belief transmission has implications for some fundamental issues in the epistemology of testimony. I first appeal to imagery cases to argue against a widespread 'internalist' approach to the epistemology of testimony. I then appeal to the same sort of case to argue for an alternative, externalist view.
BibTeX: @article{Munro2022Mental, author = {Munro, Daniel}, title = {Mental imagery and the epistemology of testimony}, year = {2022}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {52}, number = {4}, pages = {428--449}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.42} }
Murphy-Hollies, K. and Bortolotti, L.	2022	Stories as evidence	Memory, Mind & Media 1(e3) 1-12	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: People often use personal stories to support and defend their views. But can a personal story be evidence? A story tells us that a certain event can happen and has already happened to someone, but it may not always help us understand what caused the event or predict how likely that event is to happen again in the future. Moreover, people confabulate. That is, when they tell stories about their past, they are likely to distort reality in some way. When people who lack access to what motivated past behaviour are asked why they made a choice, they tend to offer plausible considerations in support of that choice, even if those considerations could not have played a motivating role in bringing about their behaviour. When people experience impairments in autobiographical memory, they tend to fill the gaps in their own story by reconstructing significant events to match their interests, values, and conception of themselves. This means that people often offer a curated version of the events they describe. In this paper, we argue that the pervasiveness of confabulation does not rule out that personal stories can be used as evidence but invites us to reflect carefully about what they are evidence of. And this is especially important in the context of digital storytelling, because stories shared on online platforms can exert even greater influence on what people think and do.
BibTeX: @article{MurphyHollies2022Stories, author = {Murphy-Hollies, Kathleen and Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {Stories as evidence}, year = {2022}, journal = {Memory, Mind & Media}, volume = {1}, number = {e3}, pages = {1--12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/mem.2021.5} }
Myin, E. and van Dijk, L.	2022	The is and oughts of remembering	Topoi 41 275-285	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One can be reproached for not remembering. Remembering and forgetting shows who and what one values. Indeed, memory is constitutively normative. Theoretical approaches to memory should be sensitive to this normative character. We will argue that traditional views that consider memory as the storing and retrieval of mental content, fail to consider the practices we need for telling the truth about our past. We introduce the Radically Enactive view of Cognition, or REC, as well-placed to recognize the central role of norms in remembering. Crucially, REC construes all remembering as ''something we do'', and the most sophisticated forms of remembering as things we collectively do, answerable to socioculturally established practices. On this view our mnemonic performances cannot avoid re-shaping our collective ways of doing and seeing going forward. By REC's lights therefore, the ''is'' of memory is ''oughty'' through and through.
BibTeX: @article{Myin2022is, author = {Myin, Erik and van Dijk, Ludger}, title = {The is and oughts of remembering}, year = {2022}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {41}, pages = {275--285}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09784-9} }
Nanay, B.	2022	Boundary extension as mental imagery	Analysis 81(4) 647-656		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Nanay2022Boundary, author = {Nanay, Bence}, title = {Boundary extension as mental imagery}, year = {2022}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {81}, number = {4}, pages = {647--656}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab023} }
Openshaw, J.	2022	Remembering objects	Philosophers' Imprint 22(11)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Conscious recollection, of the kind characterised by sensory mental imagery, is often thought to involve 'episodically' recalling experienced events in one's personal past. One might wonder whether this overlooks distinctive ways in which we sometimes recall ordinary, persisting objects. Of course, one can recall an object by remembering an event in which one encountered it. But are there acts of recall which are distinctively objectual in that they are not about objects in this mediated way (i.e., by way of being about events in which they featured)? This question has broad implications, not least for understanding the nature and role of imagery in remembering, the requirements of memory-based singular thought about objects, and the sense in which remembering involves 'mental time travel' through which one 'relives' past events. In this paper, I argue that we sometimes do recall objects from our past without remembering events in which they featured. The positive view of such cases I go on to propose draws on a wide body of empirical work in its support and accommodates a more nuanced picture of the role of imagery in remembering. Succinctly, remembering might essentially involve a kind of 're-experiencing', but it need not involve 'reliving'.
BibTeX: @article{Openshaw2022Remembering, author = {Openshaw, James}, title = {Remembering objects}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophers' Imprint}, volume = {22}, number = {11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.699} }
Palermos, S.O.	2022	Epistemic collaborations: Distributed cognition and virtue reliabilism	Erkenntnis 87 1481--1500	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Strong epistemic anti-individualism---i.e., the claim that knowledge can be irreducibly social---is increasingly debated within mainstream and social epistemology. Most existing approaches attempt to argue for the view on the basis of aggregative analyses, which focus on the way certain groups aggregate the epistemic attitudes of their members. Such approaches are well motivated, given that many groups to which we often ascribe group knowledge---such as juries and committees---operate in this way. Yet another way that group knowledge can be generated is on the basis of epistemic collaborations, such as scientific research teams and Transactive Memory Systems. To produce knowledge, epistemic collaborations rely heavily on the mutual interactions of their group members. This is a distinctive feature of epistemic collaborations that renders them resistant to aggregative analyses. To accommodate this kind of group knowledge, the paper combines virtue reliabilism with the hypothesis of distributed cognition in order to introduce the hybrid approach of distributed virtue reliabilism. On this view, (1) beliefs produced by epistemic collaborations entertain positive epistemic standing (i.e., they are both reliable and epistemically responsible) in virtue of the mutual interactions of their group members; (2) this positive epistemic standing is a collective property; (3) epistemic collaborations qualify as epistemic group agents; (4) collaborative knowledge is a special kind of group knowledge, motivating strong epistemic anti-individualism in a distinctive way.
BibTeX: @article{Palermos2022Epistemic, author = {Palermos, Spyridon Orestis}, title = {Epistemic collaborations: Distributed cognition and virtue reliabilism}, year = {2022}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {87}, pages = {1481---1500}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00258-9} }
Pan, S.	2022	What is so special about episodic memory: Lessons from the system-experience distinction	Synthese 200 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Compared to other forms of memory, episodic memory is commonly viewed as special for being distinctively metarepresentational and, relatedly, uniquely human. There is an inherent ambiguity in these conceptions, however, because ''episodic memory'' has two closely connected yet subtly distinct uses, one designating the recollective experience and the other designating the underlying neurocognitive system. Since experience and system sit at different levels of theorizing, their disentanglement is not only necessary but also fruitful for generating novel theoretical hypotheses. To show this, I first argue that accepting the phenomenally conscious contents of episodic remembering as metarepresentational does not necessitate a metarepresentational conception of the episodic memory system. In its stead, I sketch an alternative account on which the metarepresentational character of episodic remembering is generated through the interaction of first-order outputs of the episodic memory system with other neurocognitive components of the brain. Complemented with a first-order account of the memory system, the system-experience distinction further supplies a novel understanding of the human uniqueness of episodic recollection, one that is compatible with there being an evolutionarily conserved episodic memory system. Overall, by distinguishing the two equivocal senses of ''episodic memory'' in our theorizing, we unearth an opportunity to understand how the distinctive phenomenology of our episodic recollection is related to and implemented in the cognitive architecture.
BibTeX: @article{Pan2022What, author = {Pan, Shen}, title = {What is so special about episodic memory: Lessons from the system-experience distinction}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, pages = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03500-9} }
Patton, L.	2022	Organic memory and the perils of Perigenesis: The Helmholtz-Hering debate	Mechanism, Life and Mind in Modern Natural Philosophy Springer 345-362	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper will focus on a famous nineteenth century debate over the physiology of perception between Ewald Hering and Hermann von Helmholtz. This debate is often explained as a contest between empiricism (Helmholtz) and nativism (Hering) about perception. I will argue that this is only part of the picture. Hering was a pioneer of Lamarckian explanations, arguing for an early version of the biogenetic law. Hering explains physical processes, including perception, in terms of 'organic memory' that is supported by 'vital forces' located throughout the body. Helmholtz, on the other hand, argues that vital forces are in direct conflict with the results he and others proved in the 1840s and 50s on the conservation of force. The battleground of the debate was the interpretation of Johannes Müller's 'law of specific nerve energies', which Hering interpreted in terms of vital forces, and Helmholtz interpreted using a naturalized neo-Kantian approach. In the end, the debate revealed deep fissures in nineteenth century accounts of scientific explanation, as well as in the conception of how physiology, psychology, physics, and philosophy are related.
BibTeX: @incollection{Patton2022Organic, author = {Patton, Lydia}, title = {Organic memory and the perils of Perigenesis: The Helmholtz-Hering debate}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Mechanism, Life and Mind in Modern Natural Philosophy}, editor = {Wolfe, Charles T. and Pecere, Paolo and Clericuzio, Antonio}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {345--362}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07036-5_18} }
Perler, D.	2022	Ockham on memory and double intentionality	Topoi 41 133-142	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ockham developed two theories to explain the intentionality of memory: one theory that takes previously perceived things to be the objects of memory, and another that takes one's own earlier acts of perceiving to be the objects of memory. This paper examines both theories, paying particular attention to the reasons that motivated Ockham to give up the first theory in favor of the second. It argues that the second theory is to be understood as a theory of double intentionality. At the core of this theory is the thesis that one directly remembers one's own acts, and indirectly also the objects of these acts. The paper analyzes the cognitive mechanism that makes this double intentionality possible and examines the causal account that Ockham gave for explaining the emergence of acts of remembering. It emphasizes that he accepted nothing more than a causal chain of acts and habits, thereby offering an ontologically parsimonious theory of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Perler2022Ockham, author = {Perler, Dominik}, title = {Ockham on memory and double intentionality}, year = {2022}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {41}, pages = {133--142}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09728-9} }
Perrin, D. and Sant'Anna, A.	2022	Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: From intentionalism to metacognition	Synthese 200 109	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández (2019) has argued that it can be explained in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in (Perrin et al., 2020), the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández' causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2022Episodic, author = {Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: From intentionalism to metacognition}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, pages = {109}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03567-4} }
Retkoceri, U.	2022	Remembering emotions	Biology & Philosophy 37(1) 5	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memories and emotions are both vital parts of everyday life, yet crucial interactions between the two have scarcely been explored. While there has been considerable research into how emotions can influence how well things are remembered, whether or not emotions themselves can be remembered is still a largely uncharted area of research. Philosophers and scientists alike have diverging views on this question, which seems to stem, at least in part, from different accounts of the nature of emotions. Here, I try to answer this question in a way that takes an intuitive notion of emotion and includes both scientific as well as philosophical aspects of both emotions and memory. To do this, I first distinguish between two different ways emotions can be expressed: as certain physiological responses, or as certain conscious experiences. Next, I show how each of these expressions of emotions can be remembered. Finally, I bring these two ways of expressing emotions, and the ways of remembering each of them, together into an explanation that also includes aspects often ascribed to emotions such as cognition. This interdisciplinary endeavor aims to serve as a starting point on what it could mean to remember emotions, and in doing so tries to build a bridge between scientific research and philosophical investigation of the memory of emotions.
BibTeX: @article{Retkoceri2022Remembering, author = {Retkoceri, Urim}, title = {Remembering emotions}, year = {2022}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-022-09834-5} }
Robins, S.K.	2022	Implicit memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition Routledge 353-361	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Implicit memory is the use of memory without awareness of the activity of remembering. Both psychologists and philosophers appeal to a distinction between explicit and implicit memory, although they do so in distinct ways. Psychologists focus on implicit recollection, distinguishing it from explicit recall. Making this distinction precise requires a more elaborate account of how awareness of remembering works -- a task made more difficult by deep disagreements on what and whether explicit memory has any such kind of distinctive awareness. Philosophers, in contrast, focus on a distinction implicit and explicit memory storage. This distinction is clear, but compromised by the current trend to view explicit memory storage in a way that eschews memory traces in favor of a more diffuse form of information storage. This has been viewed as advantageous for characterizing explicit memory, but complicates our ability to understand what implicit storage could be in contrast. The chapter concludes by considering a range of alternative ways philosophers have conceived of implicit memory, which involve looser and more dynamic connections to explicit memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2022Implicit, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Implicit memory}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition}, editor = {Thompson, J. Robert}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {353--361}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003014584-35} }
Robins, S.K.	2022	The role of memory science in the philosophy of memory	Philosophy Compass 17(10) e12880		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Robins2022Role, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {The role of memory science in the philosophy of memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {17}, number = {10}, pages = {e12880}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12880} }
Robins, S.K., Aronowitz, S. and Stolk, A.	2022	Memory structure and cognitive maps	Neuroscience and Philosophy MIT Press 325-351		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2022Memory, author = {Robins, Sarah K. and Aronowitz, Sara and Stolk, Arjen}, title = {Memory structure and cognitive maps}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Neuroscience and Philosophy}, editor = {Brigard, Felipe De and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {325--351}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12611.003.0016} }
Ruin, H.	2022	The remembered self	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 229-258	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: The emergence of Memory studies as a growing trans-disciplinary field within the human and social sciences is part of a larger orientation in the last four decades toward the exploration of how the past is experienced and enacted by individuals and groups. However, approaching this general theme through the specific term of “memory” is not obvious. In order to bring out the often neglected philosophical dimension of contemporary memory studies, the article seeks to situate the phenomenon of memory within a larger theoretical context. Through the lens of Husserlian phenomenology and its hermeneutic and deconstructive legacy, and also of Bergson’s life-philosophy, it focuses on three fundamental aspects of memory: as the privileged sense of time, as the site of the experience of embodied selfhood, and as a locus for the interior/exterior distinction. Warning against the reification of memory in the service of disciplinary consistency, it argues for its place at the heart of a hermeneutic-deconstructive philosophy of temporality and historicity.
BibTeX: @article{Ruin2022Remembered, author = {Ruin, Hans}, title = {The remembered self}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {229--258}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243214} }
Russon, J.	2022	Being present: The existential challenges of remembering and forgetting	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 323-339		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Russon2022Being, author = {Russon, John}, title = {Being present: The existential challenges of remembering and forgetting}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {323--339}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243218} }
Sa Cavalcante Schuback, M.	2022	The implex of oblivion	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 43(2) 282-296	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: This essay is a reflection on oblivion, taking its cue from trauma as the experience of how the unforgettable acts upon existence. It presents oblivion not as the negative counterpart of memory, or as a repressive force generating complexes, but as the intricate knot of feelings and sensations that are the sources for the possible. By bringing together the experience of blindness and Paul Valéry’s concept of "implex" as guiding thoughts for understanding oblivion as a source of sensibility for the gerund of existence, for the is-being, this article seeks to show how oblivion is capacity of its own.
BibTeX: @article{SaCavalcanteSchuback2022Implex, author = {Sa Cavalcante Schuback, Marcia}, title = {The implex of oblivion}, year = {2022}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {282--296}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gfpj202243216} }
Saha, S.	2022	Memory and the writing of (un)time: Being, presence and the possible	Critical Horizons 23(3) 247-264	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Focusing on the philosophical puzzle of time and its relation with being and presence the paper explores the volatile relationalities un/tying them in shaping our conceptualisation of memory as re-turning. With such an approach the paper analyses the paradoxes that always haunt any attempt at thinking time, being and presence in their specificity as well as within their general embrace. It is through such play of the specific and general, the paper submits, that the thinking of memory and its acts of re-turning comes to be conceptualised in terms of linear, teleological, homogenous understanding of continuity. Turning towards Bergson and Heidegger's approaches to the question of time, presence and being the paper attempts to open-up the layered paradoxes that not only shape any act of turning but also the thinking of possible itself as a general category for conceptualising memory as re-turning. Bringing in the question of language and its ontological and temporal concerns, the paper thus brings in the concept of ''poetics'' to hint at the continuous negotiation that thinking of such interstices in language demands. It is towards such contingencies of the (un)timely, the paper submits, that any attempt at thinking memory as re-turning gestures.
BibTeX: @article{Saha2022Memory, author = {Saha, Subro}, title = {Memory and the writing of (un)time: Being, presence and the possible}, year = {2022}, journal = {Critical Horizons}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, pages = {247--264}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2021.1957360} }
Salis, M. and Brenna, C.T.A.	2022	Ethics of amnestics and analgesics: The role of memory in mediating pain and harm	Canadian Journal of Bioethics 5(4) 60-67	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Analgesia and amnesia represent two complimentary pillars of anesthesia directed, respectively, at mitigating the experience of pain and the processes of encoding that experience into memory. These elements are typically combined in modern anesthetic techniques, but some circumstances exist -- such as conscious sedation -- in which the conditions of amnesia are satisfied while analgesia plays an auxiliary and often incomplete role. These activities reflect a widely held yet underrecognized belief in clinical practice that although pain experiences may be short-lived, their representation in memory and its subsequent effects on thought and emotion can have enduring consequences for patients. In this exploratory article, we delineate phenomenal and abstract ontological categories of pain experience; advance a claim that they are treated by analgesic and amnestic agents, respectively; and describe how each class of experience is uniquely able to bring about individual harm. Beginning with the question of how it can be permissible to allow any preventable experiences or memories of pain, we identify that both phenomenal and abstract pain manifest on a spectrum of severity, each with an enigmatic threshold -- unique to circumstance and individual -- that determines whether or not pain will translate into harm, and what permissions therefore surround its treatment. Ultimately, we find that there are compelling physiological reasons for the concurrent use of analgesics and amnestics when pain experience exceeds these thresholds, while the treatment of ''sub-threshold'' experience in either class is a purely ethical imperative to be balanced with considerations of the potential harms posed by the treatments themselves.
BibTeX: @article{Salis2022Ethics, author = {Salis, Marina and Brenna, Connor T. A.}, title = {Ethics of amnestics and analgesics: The role of memory in mediating pain and harm}, year = {2022}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {60--67}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7202/1094698ar} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2022	Unsuccessful remembering: A challenge for the relational view of memory	Erkenntnis 87 1539--1562	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between a prominent version of the relational view of memory and recent work on forms of unsuccessful remembering or memory errors. I argue that unsuccessful remembering poses an important challenge for the relational view. Unsuccessful remembering can be divided into two kinds: misremembering and confabulating. I discuss each of these cases in light of a recent relational account, according to which remembering is characterized by an experiential relation to past events, and I argue that experiential relations do not adequately distinguish between remembering and unsuccessful remembering. This is because there are, on the one hand, cases of remembering that do not instantiate the relevant experiential relations, and, on the other hand, cases of confabulation and misremembering that do instantiate the relevant experiential relations. I conclude by suggesting that any successful relationalist attempt to explain remembering needs to come to grips with unsuccessful remembering.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2022Unsuccessful, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Unsuccessful remembering: A challenge for the relational view of memory}, year = {2022}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {87}, pages = {1539---1562}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00261-0} }
Satne, P.	2022	Remembrance beyond forgiveness	Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment Springer 301-327	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that political forgiveness is sometimes, but not always, compatible with public commemoration of politically motivated wrongdoing. I start by endorsing the claim that commemorating serious past wrongdoing has moral value and imposes moral demands on key actors within post-conflict societies. I am concerned with active commemoration, that is, the deliberate acts of bringing victims and the wrong done to them to public attention. The main issue is whether political forgiveness requires forgetting and conversely whether remembrance can be an impediment to political forgiveness. The notion of political forgiveness, its definition, very possibility and desirability are contentious issues in the contemporary literature. I develop a multidimensional account of political forgiveness with a core element. The core element of political forgiveness involves taking a non-adversarial stance towards perpetrators in the sense of committing to stop holding their wrong doing against them. The core element of forgiveness is usually combined with other attitudes and practices, which are appropriate depending on the circumstances. This is due to the fact that there are different ways of holding a wrong against an offender. I argue that forgiving perpetrators is not compatible with continue to punishing them, refusing to reconcile with them, and/or reminding them of their misdeed if perpetrators refuse to accept punishment, deny the importance of commemorating the past or wish to reconcile against the victim's desires. I show that some forms of political forgiveness are not morally legitimate because they conflict with moral demands to punish perpetrators, commemorate atrocities and respect victims. This conclusion is less alarming than it might initially seem because the refusal to forgive politically motivated wrongdoing does not necessarily lead to the perpetuation of violence and conflict. I briefly draw on the example of Argentina in order to show how some forms of political un-forgiveness can be morally legitimate and effective ways for victims to uphold these demands.
BibTeX: @incollection{Satne2022Remembrance, author = {Satne, Paula}, title = {Remembrance beyond forgiveness}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {Conflict and Resolution: The Ethics of Forgiveness, Revenge, and Punishment}, editor = {Satne, P and Scheiter, K M}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {301--327}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77807-1_16} }
Schwartz, A.	2022	Simple remembering	Synthese 200 190	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Dretske has provided very influential arguments that there is a difference between our sensory awareness of objects and our awareness of facts about these objects---that there is a difference, for example, between seeing x and seeing that x is F . This distinction between simple and epistemic seeing is a staple of the philosophy of perception. Memory is often usefully compared to perception, and in this spirit I argue for the conditional claim that if Dretske's arguments succeed in motivating the posit of simple seeing, then parallel arguments should equally motivate a posit I call simple remembering. Simple remembering would be a conscious form of memory about an object or event which is prior to and independent of any beliefs the subject may or may not form about the object or event simply remembered.
BibTeX: @article{Schwartz2022Simple, author = {Schwartz, Arieh}, title = {Simple remembering}, year = {2022}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {200}, pages = {190}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03663-5} }
Sims, M. and Kiverstein, J.	2022	Externalized memory in slime mould and the extended (non-neuronal) mind	Cognitive Systems Research 73 26-35	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) claims that the cognitive processes that materially realise thinking are sometimes partially constituted by entities that are located external to an agent's body in its local environment. We show how proponents of HEC need not claim that an agent must have a central nervous system, or physically instantiate processes organised in such a way as to play a causal role equivalent to that of the brain if that agent is to be capable of cognition. Focusing on the case of spatial memory, we make our argument by taking a close look at the striking example of Physarum Polycephalum plasmodium (i.e., slime mould) which uses self- produced non-living extracellular slime trails to navigate its environment. We will argue that the use of externalized spatial memory by basal organisms like Physarum is an example of extended cognition. Moreover, it is a possible evolutionary precursor to the use of internal spatial memory and recall in animals thus demonstrating how extended cognition may have emerged early in evolutionary history.
BibTeX: @article{Sims2022Externalized, author = {Sims, Matthew and Kiverstein, Julian}, title = {Externalized memory in slime mould and the extended (non-neuronal) mind}, year = {2022}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {73}, pages = {26--35}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2021.12.001} }
Sisto, D.	2022	Remember Me: Memory and Forgetting in the Digital Age	Polity Press			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @book{Sisto2022Remember, author = {Sisto, Davide}, title = {Remember Me: Memory and Forgetting in the Digital Age}, year = {2022}, publisher = {Polity Press} }
Smith, T.	2022	A refutation of memory circularity	Erkenntnis 87 2067--2080	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is widely, if not universally, assumed by philosophers that it is impossible to justify the reliability of memory without recourse to the use of memory. This so-called ''epistemic circularity'' is supposed to infect all attempts to justify memory as a source of knowledge in a noncircular way. In this paper, we argue that advances in cognitive science radically upheave the traditional, folk-psychological conception of memory which epistemologists have hitherto been subjecting to analysis. With an updated view of the nature of the diverse systems typically falling under the umbrella term ''memory'', it can be shown that the epistemic circularity associated with the justification of memory no longer rears its ugly head. We show that it is possible to give a noncircular justification of memory. In so doing, we believe that we have solved a perennial problem in epistemology.
BibTeX: @article{Smith2022Refutation, author = {Smith, Tiddy}, title = {A refutation of memory circularity}, year = {2022}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {87}, pages = {2067---2080}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00289-2} }
Sutton, J.	2022	Preserving without conserving: Memoryscopes and historically burdened heritage	Adaptive Behavior 30(6)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Rather than conserving or ignoring historically burdened heritage, RAAAF intervene. Their responses are striking, sometimes dramatic or destructive. Prompted by Rietveld's discussion of the Luftschloss project, I compare some other places with difficult pasts which engage our embodied and sensory responses, without such active redirection or disruption. Ross Gibson's concept of a 'memoryscope' helps us identify distinct but complementary ways of focussing the forces of the past. Emotions and imaginings are transmitted over time in many forms. The past is not easily washed, blasted or sliced away. By considering other settings and modes of encounter, we can recognise and applaud the novelty of RAAAF's interventions while urging further attention to the variable dynamics and rhythms of remembering and of sociomaterial residues.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2022Preserving, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Preserving without conserving: Memoryscopes and historically burdened heritage}, year = {2022}, journal = {Adaptive Behavior}, volume = {30}, number = {6}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211000833} }
Tanesini, A.	2022	Scaffolding knowledge	Philosophical Issues 32(1) 367-381	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article I argue that often propositional knowledge is acquired and retained by extensive reliance on physical and social scaffolds that create an environment or niche conducive to knowledge. It is incumbent on epistemologists to subject these aids to epistemic assessments. I show that several of the activities involved in the creation of niches within which inquiry can thrive are carried out by whole cultures. New generations benefit from inheriting these niches whilst being able to improve upon them to the advantage of their descendants. Finally, I highlight that the growth of human epistemic achievements is often due to increased outsourcing of cognitive effort and epistemic powers onto impersonal physical and social structures so that human beings can succeed more by contributing less to the solution of problems.
BibTeX: @article{Tanesini2022Scaffolding, author = {Tanesini, Alessandra}, title = {Scaffolding knowledge}, year = {2022}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, pages = {367--381}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12234} }
Trakas, M.	2022	Different ways of being emotional about the past	Filosofia Unisinos 23(3)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to Dorothea Debus (2007), all emotional aspects related to an act of remembering are present and new emotional responses to the remembered past event. This is a common conception of the nature of the emotional aspect of personal memories, if not explicitly defended then at least implicitly accepted in the literature. In this article, I first criticize Debus' arguments and demonstrate that she does not give us valid reasons to believe that all the emotional aspects related to a memory are present and new emotional responses to that past event. I then criticize Debus' thesis tout court for being a direct consequence of assuming a particular conceptualization of the nature of emotions: emotions as physiological changes. Finally, based on a different conceptualization of emotions that focuses on their relational nature, I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the different possible emotional aspects of our personal memories. This leads me to conclude, contrary to Debus, that some emotional aspects of our memories are not occurrent emotions but are better conceived as a sort of quasi-emotions
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2022Different, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {Different ways of being emotional about the past}, year = {2022}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2022.233.08} }
Violi, P.	2022	Looking into death: Trauma, memory and human face	Topoi 41 809-819	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article analyses the relationship of human faces with trauma and death, in particular focalizing on the use of snap shot and ID kinds of photos in site of memory, memorials an public art.
BibTeX: @article{Violi2022Looking, author = {Violi, Patrizia}, title = {Looking into death: Trauma, memory and human face}, year = {2022}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {41}, pages = {809--819}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09818-w} }
Vrahimis, A.	2022	Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy	Palgrave Macmillan		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Vrahimis2022Bergsonism, author = {Vrahimis, Andreas}, title = {Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy}, year = {2022}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80755-9} }
Vukov, J.	2022	Rationally navigating subjective preferences in memory modification	Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 47(3) 424-442	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, MMTs do a particularly poor job at promoting the autonomy of their users. If this conclusion is true, moreover, it provides a fresh perspective on debates about the permissibility of MMTs. On the one hand, for those who would limit the use of MMTs to a narrow range of circumstances, the conclusion that MMTs are rarely preferable gives them further reason to eye MMTs with suspicion. On the other hand, for those who view MMTs as permissible in a wide range of circumstances, the conclusion may deflate their endorsement.
BibTeX: @article{Vukov2022Rationally, author = {Vukov, Joseph}, title = {Rationally navigating subjective preferences in memory modification}, year = {2022}, journal = {Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine}, volume = {47}, number = {3}, pages = {424--442}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhac006} }
Woods, D.B.	2022	Proust and Schopenhauer	The Proustian Mind Routledge		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Woods2022Proust, author = {Woods, David Bather}, title = {Proust and Schopenhauer}, year = {2022}, booktitle = {The Proustian Mind}, editor = {Elsner, Anna and Stern, Thomas}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429341472-33} }
Zacks, O., Ginsburg, S. and Jablonka, E.	2022	The futures of the past: The evolution of imaginative animals	Journal of Consciousness Studies 29(3-4) 29-61	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We discuss the evolution of imagination in vertebrate animals within the framework of an evolutionary-transition approach. We define imaginative consciousness and the cognitive architecture that constitutes it and argue that the evolution of full-fledged imaginative consciousness that enables planning can be regarded as a major transition in the evolution of cognition. We explore the distribution and scope of a core capacity of imaginative cognition in non-human vertebrates --- episodic-like memory (ELM) --- by examining its behavioural manifestations as well as the organization and connectivity of the hippocampus, a central hub of episodic memory processes in vertebrates. Although the data are limited, we conclude that ELM evolved in parallel several times through the enrichment of minimal consciousness capacities, that there is a general correspondence between enhanced behavioural capacities and the size and complexity of the hippocampus during vertebrate evolution, and that the evolution of prospective, planning-enabling imagination is a major transition in cognition and consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Zacks2022Futures, author = {Zacks, Oryan and Ginsburg, Simona and Jablonka, Eva}, title = {The futures of the past: The evolution of imaginative animals}, year = {2022}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {29}, number = {3-4}, pages = {29--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.3.029} }
Zawadzki, P.	2022	The ethics of memory modification: Personal narratives, relational selves and autonomy	Neuroethics 16(1)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: For nearly two decades, ethicists have expressed concerns that the further development and use of memory modification technologies (MMTs)---techniques allowing to intentionally and selectively alter memories---may threaten the very foundations of who we are, our personal identity, and thus pose a threat to our well-being, or even undermine our ''humaneness.'' This paper examines the potential ramifications of memory-modifying interventions such as changing the valence of targeted memories and selective deactivation of a particular memory as these interventions appear to be at the same time potentially both most promising clinically as well as menacing to identity. However, unlike previous works discussing the potential consequences of MMTs, this article analyzes them in the context of the narrative relational approach to personal identity and potential issues related to autonomy. I argue that such a perspective brings to light the ethical aspects and moral issues arising from the use of MMTs that have been hidden from previously adopted approaches. In particular, this perspective demonstrates how important the social context in which an individual lives is for the ethical evaluation of a given memory-modifying intervention. I conclude by suggesting that undertaking memory modifications without taking into account the social dimension of a person's life creates the risk that she will not be able to meet one of the basic human needs---the autonomous construction and maintenance of personal identity. Based on this conclusion, I offer some reflections on the permissibility and advisability of MMTs and what these considerations suggest for the future.
BibTeX: @article{Zawadzki2022Ethics, author = {Zawadzki, Przemysław}, title = {The ethics of memory modification: Personal narratives, relational selves and autonomy}, year = {2022}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-022-09512-z} }
Alpina, T.	2021	Retaining, remembering, recollecting: Avicenna's account of memory and its sources	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 67-92		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Alpina2021Retaining, author = {Alpina, Tommaso}, title = {Retaining, remembering, recollecting: Avicenna's account of memory and its sources}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {67--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126085} }
Altanian, M.	2021	Remembrance and denial of genocide: On the interrelations of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29(4) 595-612	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and social-historical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell's relational, reconstructive account of remembering, I argue that genocide denialism involves disrespectful challenges to memory, which systematically misrecognize rememberers. Adopting the case of Turkey's denialism of the Armenian genocide, I discuss two interrelated mechanisms through which this can happen: i) through the systematic portrayal of survivors and descendants as vicious rememberers, and ii) through distortions of the very concept of 'genocide'. Based on this, I show how hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are crucially interrelated when it comes to 'contested' memories of historical injustice and the biographical testimony it gives rise to.
BibTeX: @article{Altanian2021Remembrance, author = {Altanian, Melanie}, title = {Remembrance and denial of genocide: On the interrelations of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice}, year = {2021}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {595--612}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2021.1997397} }
Andonovski, N.	2021	Causation and mnemonic roles: On Fernández's functionalism	Estudios de Filosofía 64 139-153	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Debates about causation have dominated recent philosophy of memory. While causal theorists have argued that an appropriate causal connection to a past experience is necessary for remembering, their opponents have argued that this necessity condition needs to be relaxed. Recently, Jordi Fernández (2018; 2019) has attempted to provide such a relaxation. On his functionalist theory of remembering, a given state need not be caused by a past experience to qualify as a memory; it only has to realize the relevant functional role in the subject's mental economy. In this comment, I argue that Fernández's theory doesn't advance the debate about memory causation. I propose that this debate is best understood as being about the existence of systems, which support kinds of interactions that map onto the relations dictated by (causal) theories. Since Fernández's functionalism tells us very little about this empirical question, the theoretical gains from endorsing it are minimal.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2021Causationb, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Causation and mnemonic roles: On Fernández's functionalism}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {139--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a07} }
Andonovski, N.	2021	Causation in memory: Necessity, reliability and probability	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61493	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that causal theories of memory are typically committed to two independent, non-mutually entailing theses. The first thesis pertains to the necessity of appropriate causation in memory, specifying a condition token memories need to satisfy. The second pertains to the explanation of memory reliability in causal terms, and it concerns memory as a type of mental state. Post-causal theories of memory can reject only the first (weak post-causalism) or both (strong post-causalism) theses. Upon this backdrop, I examine Werning's (2020) causalist argument from probabilistic correlation. I argue that it doesn't establish the necessity of appropriate causation, and thus it can only target strong post-causalist theories. I end up by presenting some general considerations, suggesting that memories may not always be causally linked to past experiences.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2021Causation, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Causation in memory: Necessity, reliability and probability}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61493}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61493} }
Andonovski, N.	2021	Memory as triage: Facing up to the hard question of memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(2) 227-256	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Hard Question of memory is the following: how are memory representations stored and organized so as to be made available for retrieval in the appropriate circumstances and format? In this essay, I argue that philosophical theories of memory should engage with the Hard Question directly and seriously. I propose that declarative memory is a faculty performing a kind of cognitive triage: management of information for a variety of uses under significant computational constraints. In such triage, memory representations are preferentially selected and stabilized, but also systematically modified and integrated into generalized, model-like representational structures. Further, I propose a hybrid theory of remembering, which takes into account both the nature of the cognitive processes underlying remembering and the norms that govern representational success in relevant cognitive/epistemic contexts.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2021Memory, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Memory as triage: Facing up to the hard question of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {227--256}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00514-5} }
Ang, J.M.S.	2021	Remembering as necessary for forgiving	Human Studies 44(4) 655-673	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As Japan marks the 75th anniversary of World War II in 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not offer a fresh apology and maintained that future generations should not have to keep apologizing for past mistakes. This paper uses the unresolved war issue of the military comfort women system as a context to discuss what it means for political apologies to be more than mere political gestures founded on political interests and discusses what it takes to facilitate forgiveness. It will examine the features of a repentant wrongdoer who deserves forgiveness based on how one relates to one's past wrongdoing in order to distinguish political apologies that are genuine from those that are mere gestures aimed at hasty reconciliation. This will be discussed through the works of Jacques Derrida and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Next, through Jankélévitch's and Paul Ricoeur's ideas of forgiveness, it will be discussed how matters of justice and forgiveness should be understood as well as how the history of past wrongs and injustice is necessary for a genuine apology and makes forgiveness possible. It is also a moral responsibility for both perpetrators and victims to remember history in order to achieve personal forgiveness as well as begin social and political reconciliation.
BibTeX: @article{Ang2021Remembering, author = {Ang, Jennifer Mei Sze}, title = {Remembering as necessary for forgiving}, year = {2021}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {44}, number = {4}, pages = {655--673}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09608-0} }
Aranyosi, I.	2021	Preteriception: Memory as past-perception	Synthese 198(11) 10765-10792	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper explicates and defends a direct realist view of episodic memory as pastperception, on the model of the more prominent direct realism about perception. First, a number of extant allegedly direct realist accounts are critically assessed, then the slogan that memory is past-perception is explained, defended against objections, and compared to extant rival views. Consequently, it is argued that direct realism about memory is a coherent and defensible view, and an attractive alternative to both the mainstream causal theories and the post-causal and constructivist views.
BibTeX: @article{Aranyosi2021Preteriception, author = {Aranyosi, István}, title = {Preteriception: Memory as past-perception}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {11}, pages = {10765--10792}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02751-8} }
Araujo, A.	2021	Memory from a pragmatic point of view: Intersections of Merleau-Ponty and Francisco Varela	Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia 21(2) 203-230	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Based on a pragmatic conception of memory as doing without representing, this paper looks into the intersection between Merleau-Ponty and Varela in which the notion of bodily condition assumes a distinctive function. The idea is that memory depends on the bodily condition as a whole and, therefore, has nothing to do with representation. The purpose of the paper can be summarized in the following terms: for an organism, pragmatically, it is vital to know how to do things with its memories more than to take them to be internal representations of the world. Keywords:
BibTeX: @article{Araujo2021Memory, author = {Araujo, Arthur}, title = {Memory from a pragmatic point of view: Intersections of Merleau-Ponty and Francisco Varela}, year = {2021}, journal = {Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, pages = {203--230}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2020v21i2p203-230} }
Argyri, D.	2021	The byzantine reception of Aristotle's De memoria	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 203-230		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Argyri2021Byzantine, author = {Argyri, Dafni}, title = {The byzantine reception of Aristotle's De memoria}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {203--230}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.128620} }
Asavei, M.A.	2021	On tradition and cultural memory in contemporary art: Theoretical considerations	Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 5(1) 126-139	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper starts with a detailed analysis of Jan Assmann's qualitative distinction between cultural memory and communicative memory. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight both the strengths and the limitations of this seminal distinction, and to also reflect on what cultural theorists and contemporary artists could learn through Assmann's distinction since artistic production also employs cultural memory formats that do not exclude cultural traditions in their materializations. In line with these considerations, this paper aims to disentangle what ''tradition'' means to contemporary artists. Following Edward Shils and Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophy of ''tradition,'' the paper argues that cultural tradition does not necessarily have an oppressive character and the rebellion and suspicion against it is at the heart of tradition itself. Thus, the traditional/contemporary binary can be precluded by reconsidering how ''tradition'' and ''traditional'' are conceptualized considering philosophy of tradition and artistic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Asavei2021tradition, author = {Asavei, Maria Alina}, title = {On tradition and cultural memory in contemporary art: Theoretical considerations}, year = {2021}, journal = {Eidos: A Journal for Philosophy of Culture}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {126--139}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.14394/eidos.jpc.2021.0008} }
Axtell, G.	2021	Starting from the muses: Engaging moral imagination through memory's many gifts	The Moral Psychology of Amusements Rowman {\&} Littlefield 211-230	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Abstract: In Greek mythology the Muses-patron goddesses of fine arts, history, humanities, and sciences-are tellingly portrayed as the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, the goddess Memory, who is of the race of Titans, older still than Zeus and other Olympian deities. The relationship between memory and such fields as epic poetry, history, music and dance is easily recognizable to moderns. But bards/poets like Homer and Hesiod, who began oral storytelling by "invoking the Muses" with their audience, knew well that remembering, forgetting, and imagining are each to be esteemed as, in Hesiod's words, "gifts of the goddesses." The economy of memory is an important concern for moral psychology, philosophy of emotions, and philosophy of imagination. This chapter examines ways that amusements, both classically and today, can function to educate moral emotions in and though their multi-faceted engagements with the economy of memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Axtell2021Starting, author = {Axtell, Guy}, title = {Starting from the muses: Engaging moral imagination through memory's many gifts}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Moral Psychology of Amusements}, editor = {Robinson, Brian}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield}, pages = {211--230} }
Barash, J.A.	2021	Collective memory and the transformations of political myth in the era of the mass media	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61020	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If myths have been narrated since time immemorial, this study argues that a novel kind of political myth has emerged over the past decades that has been adapted to a specifically modern significance and function. To account for the appearance of this novel form of political myth, I investigate the role of the mass media. In this perspective, the development and technological advance of the mass media has brought about a transformation in the modes of public experience and remembrance and a corresponding metamorphosis in the specific character of public space that lends to contemporary political myth its unique significance and function.
BibTeX: @article{Barash2021Collective, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Collective memory and the transformations of political myth in the era of the mass media}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61020}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61020} }
Basile, G.	2021	Categorization, memory and linguistic uses: What happens in the case of polysemy	Inquiries in philosophical pragmatics. Theoretical developments Springer 95-109	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Polysemy is a pervasive phenomenon in historical-natural languages and thus central to any description of their functioning. An ideal language would have a unique and univocal designation for every event, fact, class or cultural category, but historical-natural languages simply cannot have a one-to-one correspondence between signs and referents because of the principle of economy and its key role in languages, and also because human experiences are extremely rich and complex. As a result, words are characterised by polysemy. In this paper we will deal with polysemy, how it is interwoven with categorization and memory and how the disambiguation of the possible senses of a polysemic word necessarily depends on the context. The aim of this paper is to show that polysemy is not merely a linguistic issue but a phenomenon of great theoretical interest from a ''global'' point of view that holds together semantic and pragmatic aspects. Polysemy not only allows us to make progress in consideration of how human cognition and memory function, but also -- considering the major role played by the context -- it is a central theme when exploring the interface between semantics and pragmatics.
BibTeX: @incollection{Basile2021Categorization, author = {Basile, Grazia}, title = {Categorization, memory and linguistic uses: What happens in the case of polysemy}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Inquiries in philosophical pragmatics. Theoretical developments}, editor = {Macagno, Fabrizio and Capone, Alessandro}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {95--109}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56437-7_8} }
Bendaña, J. and Mandelbaum, E.	2021	The fragmentation of belief	The Fragmented Mind Oxford University Press	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Belief storage is often modeled as having the structure of a single, unified web. This model of belief storage is attractive and widely assumed because it appears to provide an explanation of the flexibility of cognition and the complicated dynamics of belief revision. However, when one scrutinizes human cognition, one finds strong evidence against a unified web of belief and for a fragmented model of belief storage. This chapter uses the best available evidence from cognitive science to develop this fragmented model into a nascent theory of the cognitive architecture of belief storage.
BibTeX: @incollection{Bendana2021fragmentation, author = {Bendaña, Joseph and Mandelbaum, Eric}, title = {The fragmentation of belief}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Fragmented Mind}, editor = {Borgoni, Cristina and Kindermann, Dirk and Onofri, Andrea}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850670.003.0004} }
Bergmann, M.	2021	Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bergmann2021Radical, author = {Bergmann, Michael}, title = {Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition}, year = {2021}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Bickle, J.	2021	The first two decades of CREB-memory research: Data for philosophy of neuroscience	AIMS Neuroscience 8(3) 322-339	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I recount some landmark discoveries that initially confirmed the cyclic AMP response element-binding (CREB) protein-memory consolidation and allocation linkages. This work constitutes one of the successes of the field of Molecular and Cellular Cognition (MCC) but is also of interest to philosophers of neuroscience. Two approaches, ''mechanism'' and ''ruthless reductionism'', claim to account for this case, yet these accounts differ in one crucial way. I explain this difference and argue that both the experiment designs and discussions of these discoveries by MCC scientists better fit the ruthless reductionist's account. This conclusion leads to further philosophical discussion about how discoveries in cellular/molecular neurobiology integrate with systems neuroscience findings.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2021first, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {The first two decades of CREB-memory research: Data for philosophy of neuroscience}, year = {2021}, journal = {AIMS Neuroscience}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, pages = {322--339}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3934/Neuroscience.2021017} }
Bondarevych, I.M.	2021	Anthropological dimension of commemorative practices: The phenomenon of bodily memory	Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research (19) 41-51	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Purpose. The article is aimed to analyse the phenomenon of bodily memory in the context of commemorative practices. The commemorative practices are a social instrument known since archaic times, which had different ways of use in different epochs. In totalitarian societies, officially organized commemorative practices are frequently used for propaganda and manipulation. For most people, their mechanism remains unconscious, as bodily memory plays a leading role there. The density of a modern social world actualises the ability to observe own changes and regulate the processes of their flow. This updates an exploration of the bodily memory phenomenon. Theoretical basis. The classification of forms of bodily memory is carried out in the article: genetic (cellular memory, heredity), psychophysical (memory for different types of sensations, skills, muscle tone, etc.), psychoenergetic (emotions, mental states, mood, unconscious action, etc.), mental (knowledge of the rules of social games, attitudes, stereotypes, thoughts, memories, ways of our detection, behaviour, etc.). It has been revealed that the systemic openness of bodily memory is the fundamental basis of commemorative practices. Originality. The term "conscious commemoration" is proposed to denote the anthropological process associated with self-knowledge, self-construction and co-creation, which requires a distinction between forms of bodily memory, understanding of its structural features and functional capabilities. Conclusions. The phenomenon of bodily memory reveals the anthropological potential of commemorative practices. It can manifest itself as an independently organized body-spiritual practice of self-construction (harmonization of the architecture of one's own body and individuality) on the basis of self-knowledge and self-observation (directing attention to one's movements, reactions, behaviour, honest recognition of one's attitudes). The latter is the foundation of conscious co-creation. The phenomenon of bodily memory reveals the secret of spiritualization in the process of approaching a person to his body.
BibTeX: @article{Bondarevych2021Anthropological, author = {Bondarevych, I. M.}, title = {Anthropological dimension of commemorative practices: The phenomenon of bodily memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research}, number = {19}, pages = {41--51}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.15802/ampr.v0i19.235987} }
Boyle, A.	2021	Remembering events and representing time	Synthese 199(1-2) 2505-2524	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory---memory for personally experienced past events---seems to afford a distinctive kind of cognitive contact with the past. This makes it natural to think that episodic memory is centrally involved in our understanding of what it is for something to be in the past, or to be located in time---that it is either necessary or sufficient for such understanding. If this were the case, it would suggest certain straightforward evidential connections between temporal cognition and episodic memory in nonhuman animals. In this paper, I argue that matters are more complicated than this. Episodic memory is memory for events and not for the times they occupy. As such, it is dissociable from temporal understanding. This is not to say that episodic memory and temporal cognition are unrelated, but that the relationship between them cannot be straightforwardly captured by claims about necessity and sufficiency. This should inform our theoretical predictions about the manifestations of episodic memory in nonhuman behaviour.
BibTeX: @article{Boyle2021Remembering, author = {Boyle, Alexandria}, title = {Remembering events and representing time}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {1-2}, pages = {2505--2524}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02896-6} }
Bradley, D.	2021	Bayesianism and self-doubt	Synthese 199(1-2) 2225-2243	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How should we respond to evidence when our evidence indicates that we are rationally impaired? I will defend a novel answer based on the analogy between self-doubt and memory loss. To believe that one is now impaired and previously was not is to believe that one's epistemic position has deteriorated. Memory loss is also a form of epistemic deterioration. I argue that agents who suffer from epistemic deterioration should return to the priors they had at an earlier time. I develop this argument regarding memory loss then extend it to cases of self-doubt.
BibTeX: @article{Bradley2021Bayesianism, author = {Bradley, Darren}, title = {Bayesianism and self-doubt}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {1-2}, pages = {2225--2243}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02879-7} }
Breyer, T.	2021	Phantom sensations: A neurophenomenological exploration of body memory	Neuroethics 14(1) 73-81	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper brings neuroscientific experiments into relation with concepts from phenomenological philosophy to investigate phantom sensations from the perspective of embodied subjectivity. Using a mirror device to create intersensory effects in subjects experiencing phantom sensations, one can create illusions aiming at alleviating phantom pain. Neuroplasticity as a general property of the brain and cortical remapping as a specific mechanism underlying the success of this procedure are interpreted with the phenomenological notions of body image, body schema, and body memory. It is argued that a phantom can be understood as an ambiguous unity of body-imagistic neglect and body-schematic remembering. This neurophenomenological approach highlights the significance of the polarity of subjective-objective embodied experience one the one hand, and the spatial and temporal horizons of the emergence of phantoms on the other. Thereby, implicit and explicit forms of remembering, habitual and reflective modes of behavioural and cognitive self-representation and -understanding can be compared according to how the body integrates its various sensations.
BibTeX: @article{Breyer2021Phantom, author = {Breyer, Thiemo}, title = {Phantom sensations: A neurophenomenological exploration of body memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {73--81}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9356-9} }
Brumberg-Chaumont, J.	2021	The first latin reception of the De memoria et reminiscentia: Memory and recollection as apprehensive faculties or as moving faculties?	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 123-153		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brumberg2021First, author = {Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie}, title = {The first latin reception of the De memoria et reminiscentia: Memory and recollection as apprehensive faculties or as moving faculties?}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {123--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126088} }
Bublitz, J.C. and Repantis, D.	2021	Memory, authenticity, and optogenethics	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 30-32		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bublitz2021Memory, author = {Bublitz, Jan Christoph and Repantis, Dimitris}, title = {Memory, authenticity, and optogenethics}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {30--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866102} }
Caravà, M.	2021	An exploration into enactive forms of forgetting	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20(4) 703-722	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Remembering and forgetting are the two poles of the memory system. Consequently, any approach to memory should be able to explain both remembering and forgetting in order to gain a comprehensive and insightful understanding of the memory system. Can an enactive approach to memory processes do so? In this article I propose a possible way to provide a positive answer to this question. In line with some current enactive approaches to memory, I suggest that forgetting --similarly to remembering-- might be constituted within an embodied and active process. Within this process, some simulation and re-enactment paths would acquire more relevance than others. This acquired relevance would make the activation of other paths of recall less likely, thus preventing the memory system from engaging in some episodic simulations. These changes in the likelihood of activation of some paths of recall --the forgotten ones-- can be accounted for in an enactive fashion by studying both ''internal'' and ''external'' re-enactment and simulation paths. With regard to the latter, I propose to examine the process of forgetting by considering the engagement and affective relation of an embodied agent with her field of affordances. I suggest that, in the case of emotion-laden memories, the agent's decoupling from some affordances of the environment might contribute to the process of forgetting, in that it would reduce the agent's opportunities for situated episodic simulations.
BibTeX: @article{Carava2021exploration, author = {Caravà, Marta}, title = {An exploration into enactive forms of forgetting}, year = {2021}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {703--722}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-020-09670-6} }
Caravà, M.	2021	Are forgotten memories literal experiences of absences? Episodic forgetting and metacognitive feelings	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61021	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Are occurrent states of forgetting literal experiences of absences? I situate this question within the debate on mental time travel (MTT) to understand whether these states can be explained as literal experiences of absent episodic memories. To frame my argument, I combine Barkasi and Rosen's literal approach to MTT with Farennikova's literal approach to the perception of absences, showing that both are built on the idea that for an experience to be literal it must afford an unmediated contact with the object that constitutes it. I test the idea that forgetting affords literal experiences of mnemonic absences by considering different views of absence perception and I evaluate whether the objections raised against Farennikova's approach also apply to my exploratory idea. I show that, while the idea resists the objections that an advocate of a cognitive approach to mnemonic absences may raise, the same does not apply to those elaborated by advocates of a metacognitive approach. Even if conceiving of occurrent states of forgetting as literal experiences of mnemonic absences sounds appealing, this idea is misleading. Therefore, I suggest conceiving of occurrent states of forgetting as states with metacognitive features, which track the absence of episodic memories from awareness in an affectively mediated way.
BibTeX: @article{Carava2021Are, author = {Caravà, Marta}, title = {Are forgotten memories literal experiences of absences? Episodic forgetting and metacognitive feelings}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61021}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61021} }
Carmona, C.	2021	Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: Evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory	Synthese 199(1-2) 3611-3643	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper provides evidence for a radically enactive, embodied account of remembering. By looking closely at highly context-dependent instances of memorizing and recalling dance material, I aim at shedding light on the workings of memory. Challenging the view that cognition fundamentally entails contentful mental representation, the examples I discuss attest the existence of non-representational instances of memory, accommodating episodic memory. That being so, this paper also makes room for content-involving forms of remembering. As a result, it supports the duplex vision of mentality advanced by the REC framework. Building on research on the enactive imagination, I suggest that contentless forms of remembering act below content-involving forms. In addition, contentless and contentful forms of remembering a movement are revealed as the product of culturally scaffolded engagements with others and the environment, in which direct perception and mirroring play a fundamental role. It is argued that many of the practices of remembering a movement are best explained as enactments or re-enactments of such direct ecological perceptions. In the process, the dance studio proves to be a paradigm of the extensive mind. This paper is also intended as an invitation to the REC framework to extend the family and explicitly embrace research on sociocultural practices as an equal partner, including dance studies. Given the fundamental role that sociocultural practices play in REC's understanding of cognition, it is only natural that further radicalization goes along those lines.
BibTeX: @article{Carmona2021Practices, author = {Carmona, Carla}, title = {Practices of remembering a movement in the dance studio: Evidence for (a radicalized version of) the REC framework in the domain of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {1-2}, pages = {3611--3643}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02949-w} }
Chadha, M. and Nichols, S.	2021	Experiential unity without a self: The case of synchronic synthesis	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99(4) 631-647	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The manifest fact of experiential unity---namely, that a single experience often seems to be composed of multiple features and multiple objects---was lodged as a key objection to the Buddhist no-self view by Nyāya philosophers in the classical Indian tradition. We revisit the Nyāya-Buddhist debate on this issue. The early Nyāya experiential unity arguments depend on diachronic unification of experiences in memory, but later Nyāya philosophers explicitly widened the scope to incorporate new unity arguments that invoke synchronic unification in experiences. We argue that classical responses to this objection in the Buddhist traditions are not satisfactory. We offer a new solution on behalf of the Buddhists, with some help from cognitive sciences. We argue that there are different kinds of experiential unity and that, once we distinguish between these kinds, the Nyāya argument becomes difficult to sustain.
BibTeX: @article{Chadha2021Experiential, author = {Chadha, Monima and Nichols, Shaun}, title = {Experiential unity without a self: The case of synchronic synthesis}, year = {2021}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {99}, number = {4}, pages = {631--647}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1836007} }
Chandelier, J.	2021	Memory, Avicenna and the western medical tradition	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 107-122		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chandelier2021Memory, author = {Chandelier, Joël}, title = {Memory, Avicenna and the western medical tradition}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {107--122}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126087} }
Christensen, W.	2021	The skill of translating thought into action: Framing the problem	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(3) 547-573	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The nature of the cognition-motor interface has been brought to prominence by Butterfill & Sinigaglia (2014), who argue that the representations employed by the cognitive and motor systems should not be able to interact with each other. Here I argue that recent empirical evidence concerning the interface contradicts several of the assumptions incorporated in Butterfill & Sinigaglia's account, and I seek to develop a theoretical picture that will allow us to explain the structure of the interface presented by this evidence. The central idea is that neural plasticity incorporates metarepresentational rules for constructing representational systems and linking them. The structure of the cognition-motor interface is constructed flexibly during development and skill learning based on information processing demands.
BibTeX: @article{Christensen2021skill, author = {Christensen, Wayne}, title = {The skill of translating thought into action: Framing the problem}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, pages = {547--573}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00517-2} }
Cockayne, J. and Salter, G.	2021	Feasts of memory: Collective remembering, liturgical time travel and the actualisation of the past	Modern Theology 37(2) 275-295	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How does religious liturgy connect participants to each other and to those that went before them thereby creating a living tradition that can span millennia? By drawing together insights from theology, psychology, and the philosophy of mind, we seek to explore the nature of communal remembering in religious rites. We begin by showing that the sense of memory used in Jewish and Christian Scriptures is much richer than mere fact recollection; to remember is to participate in the events of the past, to experience them as part of the narrative of a community's present, and to fuel the community's imagination about its future. Crucial to this corporate religious sense of memory is the concept of actualisation, in which some ritual or narrative allows the community to relive events of the past. We then argue that contemporary work on the psychology and philosophy of memory can help us to think about the application of these biblical senses of memory to contemporary practice.
BibTeX: @article{Cockayne2021Feasts, author = {Cockayne, Joshua and Salter, Gideon}, title = {Feasts of memory: Collective remembering, liturgical time travel and the actualisation of the past}, year = {2021}, journal = {Modern Theology}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, pages = {275--295}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/moth.12683} }
Coren, D.	2021	Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs	Synthese 198(1) 743-756	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine's alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls's reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic context. Taking a stylistic cue from Peter Strawson, I argue that, though it does not seem to be self-contradictory to suppose that someone has a bare belief, and so it is not absolutely inconceivable that bare beliefs exist, it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable that bare beliefs exist. It does not seem practically feasible, then, to evaluate EC on its own terms.
BibTeX: @article{Coren2021Epistemic, author = {Coren, Daniel}, title = {Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {1}, pages = {743--756}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02059-8} }
Decaix, V.	2021	Introduction	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 11-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Decaix2021Introduction, author = {Decaix, Veronique}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {11--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.129409} }
Decaix, V.	2021	What is memory of? Albert the Great on the proper object of memory	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 154-169		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Decaix2021What, author = {Decaix, Veronique}, title = {What is memory of? Albert the Great on the proper object of memory}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {154--169}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126089} }
Deroche, M.H.	2021	Mindful wisdom: The path integrating memory, judgment, and attention	Asian Philosophy 31(1) 19-32	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses the Buddhist threefold model of wisdom which, on the basis of ethics, progresses from 'study,' to 'reflection,' to 'cultivation,' and argues that mindfulness plays a critical role at each of these steps, forming the common thread joining them together. Beyond opposing statically the mnemonic, conceptual, and attentional dimensions of mindfulness, this threefold paradigm of 'mindful wisdom' can serve to articulate them dynamically within the context of the path. The model is first examined with special consideration of Mahāyāna sources and its relation to the epistemic foundations of tradition, reason, and direct experience. Then, in reference to living Tibetan and Himalayan traditions, each step of wisdom is shown to rely upon a distinct aspect of mindfulness or presence: keeping in mind the teachings present, forming adequate re-present-ations, and cultivating a presence of mind. Ultimately, the paper inquires into the emergence of self-knowledge and the integration of personality.
BibTeX: @article{Deroche2021Mindful, author = {Deroche, Marc Henri}, title = {Mindful wisdom: The path integrating memory, judgment, and attention}, year = {2021}, journal = {Asian Philosophy}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {19--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2021.1875610} }
Dokic, J.	2021	Episodic remembering and affective metacognition	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61022	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify, in the light of philosophical and psychological research on affective metacognition, the nature of the episodic feeling, which determines what it is like to remember or relive in one's mind an episode from one's own past. The hypothesis defended is that the episodic feeling is a metacognitive experience, which rests on mechanisms that monitor the source of the relevant information. Although there is presently no direct psychological evidence for the existence of the episodic feeling, studies on a specific kind of feelings of knowing, which are especially tied to episodic memory, can help cast light on the nature of the episodic feeling. Overall, the hypothesis that the episodic feeling is a metacognitive experience squares well with a general theory of metacognition. It leads to a two-tiered account of episodic remembering. On this account, the phenomenology characteristic of episodic remembering is extrinsic to the memory state itself. When we have a memory, it feels episodic only if it is properly monitored at the metacognitive level. However, an episodic memory can be attributed to a subject in the absence of an episodic feeling. The memory itself can be a mere unconscious mental condition, as in some cases of tip-of-the-tongue experiences, or its content can be transparent to the subject via a conscious imagining.
BibTeX: @article{Dokic2021Episodic, author = {Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Episodic remembering and affective metacognition}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61022}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61022} }
Dolbeault, J.	2021	Laws, dispositions, memory: Three hypotheses on the order of the world	Metaphysica 22(1) 101-121	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The more science progresses, the more it is evident that the physical world presents regularities. This raises a metaphysical problem: why is the world so ordered? In the first part of the article, I attempt to clarify this problem and justify its relevance. In the following three parts, I analyze three hypotheses already formulated in philosophy in response to this problem: the hypothesis that the order of the world is explained 1) by laws of nature, 2) by dispositions of the fundamental physical entities, 3) or by a memory immanent to matter (a hypothesis developed by Peirce, Bergson and James). The third hypothesis may seem surprising. However, it can be shown that the three hypotheses have a psychomorphic dimension in the sense that they give to nature properties analogous to those of mind. In addition, this third hypothesis presents several interesting arguments.
BibTeX: @article{Dolbeault2021Laws, author = {Dolbeault, Jöel}, title = {Laws, dispositions, memory: Three hypotheses on the order of the world}, year = {2021}, journal = {Metaphysica}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, pages = {101--121}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0010} }
Dranseika, V.	2021	Authenticity, self-defining memories, and the direction of change	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 48-49		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dranseika2021Authenticity, author = {Dranseika, Vilius}, title = {Authenticity, self-defining memories, and the direction of change}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {48--49}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866112} }
Dranseika, V., McCarroll, C.J. and Michaelian, K.	2021	Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy	Consciousness and Cognition 96 103240	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one's original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.
BibTeX: @article{Dranseika2021Are, author = {Dranseika, Vilius and McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy}, year = {2021}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {96}, pages = {103240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103240} }
Durcan, S.	2021	Memory and Intermediality in Artists' Moving Image	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Durcan2021Memory, author = {Durcan, Sarah}, title = {Memory and Intermediality in Artists' Moving Image}, year = {2021}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Ebbesen, S.	2021	Memory is of the past	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 169-184		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ebbesen2021Memory, author = {Ebbesen, Sten}, title = {Memory is of the past}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {169--184}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126090} }
Egeland, J.	2021	Against overconfidence: Arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification	Synthese 198(9) 8851-8871	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, I argue that access internalism should replace preservationism, which has been called ''a received view'' in the epistemology of memory, as the standard position about memorial justification. My strategy for doing so is two-pronged. First, I argue that the considerations which motivate preservationism also support access internalism. Preservationism is mainly motivated by its ability to answer the explanatory challenges posed by the problem of stored belief and the problem of forgotten evidence. However, as I will demonstrate, access internalism also has the resources to provide plausible solutions to those problems. Second, I argue that preservationism faces a couple of problems which access internalism avoids. Doing so, I present a new scenario which, on the one hand, functions as a counterexample to preservationism, and, on the other hand, provides intuitive support for access internalism. Moreover, I also demonstrate how preservationism, in light of recent research in cognitive psychology, is vulnerable to skepticism about memorial justification, whereas access internalism remains unthreatened.
BibTeX: @article{Egeland2021overconfidence, author = {Egeland, Jonathan}, title = {Against overconfidence: Arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {9}, pages = {8851--8871}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02604-4} }
Eldridge, P.	2021	False remembrance: Husserl's account of the distortions of memory	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 52(1) 1-15	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article demonstrates why Husserl struggled to understand the conditions of possibility of false memory, and how only the genetic dimension of his phenomenology enabled him to conceive of a specifically mnemic form of falsehood. For a false memory to deceive us, we must trust that it is true, but in order to have a phenomenology of its falsehood, the memory must appear as false. Husserl's theory of false memory responds to both of these demands by showing how distorting syntheses (repression, filling-in, re-touching) conceal themselves, without making it impossible to discover their distorting effects. Key to meeting these two demands is Husserl's account of how the unconscious functions as the ''untrue'' basis of memory, and how all recollections (both true and false) require affective, associative syntheses between present conscious experience and past unconscious experience, syntheses that are subject to many vicissitudes.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2021False, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {False remembrance: Husserl's account of the distortions of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {52}, number = {1}, pages = {1--15}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2020.1741782} }
Elsey, J.W.B.	2021	Optogenetic manipulation of maladaptive memory -- new challenges or new solutions for personal authenticity?	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 27-29		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Elsey2021Optogenetic, author = {Elsey, James William Benjamin}, title = {Optogenetic manipulation of maladaptive memory -- new challenges or new solutions for personal authenticity?}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {27--29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866101} }
Erler, A.	2021	Optogenetic memory modification and the many facets of authenticity	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 40-42		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Erler2021Optogenetic, author = {Erler, Alexandre}, title = {Optogenetic memory modification and the many facets of authenticity}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {40--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866108} }
Fan, Z.	2021	A critical discussion of the "memory-challenge" to interpretations of the private language argument	Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9(4) 46-58	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a recent paper, Francis Y. Lin proposes a ''memory-challenge'' to two main interpretations of Wittgenstein's private language argument: the ''no-criterion-of-correctness'' interpretation and the ''no-stage-setting'' interpretation. According to Lin, both camps of interpretation fail to explain why a private language is impossible within a short time period. To answer the ''memory- challenge'', Lin motivates a grammatical interpretation of the private language argument. In this paper, I provide a critical discussion of Lin's objection to these interpretations and argue that Lin's objection fails. In the case of the ''no-stage-setting'' interpretation, Lin suggests that the private language user can establish a stage within a short time period. However, I show that this stage is insufficient for a private language to be used correctly. In the case of the ''no-criterion-of-correctness'' interpretation, Lin believes that since memory is reliable within a short period, no criterion is needed for the correct use of a private language. However, I argue that his objection attacks a strawman, since the interpretation concerns the structure of justification, rather than the weakness of memory itself. I conclude with a critical discussion on memory and primitive expressions, the latter of which are crucial to Wittgenstein's approach to public language. This discussion will help to draw a sharp line between private language and public language, and cast some doubt on Lin's grammatical interpretation.
BibTeX: @article{Fan2021critical, author = {Fan, Zhao}, title = {A critical discussion of the "memory-challenge" to interpretations of the private language argument}, year = {2021}, journal = {Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {46--58}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v9i4.4688} }
Fernández, J.	2021	Defending functionalism and self-reference in memory	Estudios de Filosofía 64 223-236	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent work, Sarah Robins, Gerardo Viera and Steven James have provided some insightful objections to the ideas offered in my book, Memory: A Self-Referential Account. In this paper, I put forward some responses to those objections. Robins challenges the idea that being a memory could be a matter of having a particular functional role within the subject's cognitive economy. Viera challenges the idea that the content of a memory could explain some of its phenomenological properties. And James challenges the idea that our memories could be immune to error through misidentification. All three commentators are targeting, not tangential aspects of, but fundamental assumptions in the account of memory proposed in the book. For that reason, modifying some of those assumptions would amount to proposing a whole different account of memory. I hope to show, however, that such a radical move is not necessary. For there are possible responses to the objections from all three commentators which are available within the constraints of the account proposed in the book.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2021Defending, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Defending functionalism and self-reference in memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {223--236}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a12} }
Fernández, J.	2021	Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification	Synthese 198(1) 641-660	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2021Observer, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {1}, pages = {641--660}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02050-3} }
Fish, W.	2021	Naïve realism and the phenomenology of perception and memory	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61023	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I begin to explore what a naïve realist might say about the phenomenology of episodic memory. I start by arguing that, when it comes to accounting for the phenomenology of memory experiences, there are two primary options available to the naïve realist: to treat memory phenomenology along the same lines as perceptual phenomenology -- as involving phenomenal character that is grounded in acquaintance with the external environment -- or to treat memory as lacking such acquaintance-based phenomenal character, and then attempting to account for there being something it is like to remember as being somehow inherited from cases that do have phenomenal character. I then explore the prospects of providing an account of the phenomenology of episodic memory in both ways, before tentatively coming down in favour of the latter approach.
BibTeX: @article{Fish2021Naive, author = {Fish, William}, title = {Naïve realism and the phenomenology of perception and memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61023}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61023} }
Frise, M.	2021	Reliabilism's memory loss	The Philosophical Quarterly 71(3) 565-585	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a long-standing argument for reliabilism.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2021Reliabilisms, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Reliabilism's memory loss}, year = {2021}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {71}, number = {3}, pages = {565--585}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa057} }
Frise, M. and McCain, K.	2021	Forgetting memory skepticism	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103(2) 253-263	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory's epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If it does not threaten memory in this way, then the challenge leaves a foundation for an inference to the best explanation response, one we articulate and support.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2021Forgetting, author = {Frise, Matthew and McCain, Kevin}, title = {Forgetting memory skepticism}, year = {2021}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {103}, number = {2}, pages = {253--263}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12715} }
Gärdenfors, P. and Quinon, P.	2021	Situated counting	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(4) 721-744	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We present a model of how counting is learned based on the ability to perform a series of specific steps. The steps require conceptual knowledge of three components: numerosity as a property of collections; numerals; and one-to-one mappings between numerals and collections. We argue that establishing one-to-one mappings is the central feature of counting. In the literature, the so-called cardinality principle has been in focus when studying the development of counting. We submit that identifying the procedural ability to count with the cardinality principle is not sufficient, but only one of the several steps in the counting process. Moreover, we suggest that some of these steps may be facilitated by the external organization of the counting situation. Using the methods of situated cognition, we analyze how the balance between external and internal representations will imply different loads on the working memory and attention of the counting individual. This analysis will show that even if the counter can competently use the cardinality principle, counting will vary in difficulty depending on the physical properties of the elements of collection and on their special arrangement. The upshot is that situated factors will influence counting performance.
BibTeX: @article{Gaerdenfors2021Situated, author = {Gärdenfors, Peter and Quinon, Paula}, title = {Situated counting}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {721--744}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00508-3} }
George, D.R. and Whitehouse, P.J.	2021	(Un)ethical early interventions in the Alzheimer's "marketplace of memory"	AJOB Neuroscience 12(4) 245-247		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{George2021Unethical, author = {George, Daniel R. and Whitehouse, Peter J.}, title = {(Un)ethical early interventions in the Alzheimer's "marketplace of memory"}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {245--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2021.1941402} }
Gilbert, F., Harris, A.R. and Kidd, M.	2021	Burnt in your memory or burnt memory? Ethical issues with optogenetics for memory modification	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 22-24		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gilbert2021Burnt, author = {Gilbert, Frederic and Harris, Alexander R. and Kidd, Michael}, title = {Burnt in your memory or burnt memory? Ethical issues with optogenetics for memory modification}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {22--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866104} }
Gomez-Lavin, J.	2021	Working memory is not a natural kind and cannot explain central cognition	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(2) 199-225	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Working memory is a foundational construct of cognitive psychology, where it is thought to be a capacity that enables us to keep information in mind and to use that information to support goal directed behavior. Philosophers have recently employed working memory to explain central cognitive processes, from consciousness to reasoning. In this paper, I show that working memory cannot meet even a minimal account of natural kindhood, as the functions of maintenance and manipulation of information that tie working memory models and theories together do not have a coherent or univocal realizer in the brain. As such, working memory cannot explain central cognition. Rather, I argue that working memory merely redescribes its target phenomenon, and in doing so it obfuscates relevant distinctions amongst the many ways that brains like ours retain and transform information in the service of cognition. While this project ultimately erodes the explanatory role that working memory has played in our understanding of cognition, it simultaneously prompts us to evaluate the function of natural kinds within cognitive science, and signals the need for a productive pessimism to frame our future study of cognitive categories.
BibTeX: @article{GomezLavin2021Working, author = {Gomez-Lavin, Javier}, title = {Working memory is not a natural kind and cannot explain central cognition}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {199--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00507-4} }
Gray, J.	2021	Saving Elizabeth: Radical control & the puzzle of authenticity	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 24-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gray2021Saving, author = {Gray, Jesse}, title = {Saving Elizabeth: Radical control & the puzzle of authenticity}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {24--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866100} }
Greely, N.	2021	Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem	Synthese 199(3-4) 6803-6825	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Epistemic feelings like tip-of-the-tongue experiences, feelings of knowing, and feelings of confidence tell us when a memory can be recalled and when a judgment was correct. Thus, they appear to be a form of metacognition, but a curious one: they tell us about content we cannot access, and the information is supplied by a feeling. Evaluativism is the claim that epistemic feelings are components of a distinct, primitive metacognitive mechanism that operates on its own set of inputs. These inputs are heuristics that correlate with the presence of mental content that can't be accessed directly. I will argue that evaluativism is unmotivated, unsupported, and ill-conceived. I will critique the philosophical and empirical arguments for evaluativism and conclude that there is no reason to posit a distinct mechanism to explain epistemic feelings. I will conclude, however, that epistemic feelings may constitute a nonconceptual form of metacognition, which if true is a significant claim.
BibTeX: @article{Greely2021Epistemic, author = {Greely, Nathaniel}, title = {Epistemic feelings, metacognition, and the Lima problem}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {3-4}, pages = {6803--6825}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03094-8} }
Green, E.J. and Quilty-Dunn, J.	2021	What is an object file?	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72(3) 665-699	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The notion of an object file figures prominently in recent work in philosophy and cognitive science. Object files play a role in theories of singular reference, object individuation, percep- tual memory, and the development of cognitive capacities. However, the philosophical liter- ature lacks a detailed, empirically informed theory of object files. In this article, we articulate and defend the multiple-slots view, which specifies both the format and architecture of object files. We argue that object files represent in a non-iconic, propositional format that incorpo- rates discrete symbols for separate features. Moreover, we argue that features of separate cat- egories (such as colour, shape, and orientation) are stored in separate memory slots within an object file. We supplement this view with a computational framework that characterizes how information about objects is stored and retrieved.
BibTeX: @article{Green2021What, author = {Green, E. J. and Quilty-Dunn, Jake}, title = {What is an object file?}, year = {2021}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, pages = {665-699}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx055} }
Grünbaum, T., Oren, F. and Kyllingsbæk, S.	2021	A new cognitive model of long-term memory for intentions	Cognition 215 104817	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we propose a new mathematical model of retrieval of intentions from long-term memory. We model retrieval as a stochastic race between a plurality of potentially relevant intentions stored in long-term memory. Psychological theories are dominated by two opposing conceptions of the role of memory in temporally extended agency -- as when a person has to remember to make a phone call in the afternoon because, in the morning, she promised she would do so. According to the Working Memory conception, remembering to make the phone call is explained in terms of the construction and maintenance of intentions in working-memory. According to the Long-Term Memory conception, we should explain the episode in terms of an ability to store intentions in long-term memory. The two conceptions predict different processing profiles. The aim of this paper is to present a new mathematical model of the type of memory mechanism that could realise the long-term memory representations of intentions necessary for the Long-Term Memory conception. We present and illustrate the formal model and propose a new type of experimental paradigm that could allow us to test which of the two conceptions provides the best explanation of the role of memory in temporally extended agency.
BibTeX: @article{Gruenbaum2021new, author = {Grünbaum, Thor and Oren, Franziska and Kyllingsbæk, Søren}, title = {A new cognitive model of long-term memory for intentions}, year = {2021}, journal = {Cognition}, volume = {215}, pages = {104817}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104817} }
Hasan, A.	2021	The reliability of memory: An argument from the armchair	Episteme 18(2) 142-159	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The problem of memory in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, or at least justification, for trusting our apparent memories. I defend an inductive solution - more precisely, an abductive solution - to the problem. A natural worry is that any such solution would be circular, for it would have to depend on memory. I argue that belief in the reliability of memory can be justified from the armchair, without relying on memory. The justification is, roughly, that my having the sort of experience that my apparent memory should lead me to expect is best explained by the hypothesis that my memories are reliable. My solution is inspired by Harrod's (1942) inductive solution. Coburn (1960) argued that Harrod's solution contains a fatal flaw. I show that my solution is not vulnerable to Coburn's objection, and respond to a number of other, recent and likely objections.
BibTeX: @article{Hasan2021reliability, author = {Hasan, Ali}, title = {The reliability of memory: An argument from the armchair}, year = {2021}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, pages = {142--159}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2019.8} }
Hayse, C.G.W. and Roskies, A.L.	2021	Memory deletion threatens authenticity by destabilizing values	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 52-54		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hayse2021Memory, author = {Hayse, Colton G. W. and Roskies, Adina L.}, title = {Memory deletion threatens authenticity by destabilizing values}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {52--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866117} }
Heersmink, R.	2021	Varieties of artifacts: Embodied, perceptual, cognitive, and affective	Topics in Cognitive Science 13(4) 573-596	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The primary goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the various relations between material artifacts and the embodied mind. A secondary goal of this essay is to identify some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts. First, based on their functional properties, I identify four categories of artifacts co-opted by the embodied mind, namely (a) embodied artifacts, (b) perceptual artifacts, (c) cognitive artifacts, and (d) affective artifacts. These categories can overlap and so some artifacts are members of more than one category. I also identify some of the techniques (or skills) we use when interacting with artifacts. Identifying these categories of artifacts and techniques allows us to map the landscape of relations between embodied minds and the artifactual world. Second, having identified categories of artifacts and techniques, this essay then outlines some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts, focusing on neuroprosthetics, brain-computer interfaces, and personalization algorithms nudging their users toward particular epistemic paths of information consumption.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2021Varieties, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Varieties of artifacts: Embodied, perceptual, cognitive, and affective}, year = {2021}, journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, volume = {13}, number = {4}, pages = {573--596}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12549} }
Hösle, V.	2021	Antiochus' and Cicero's different theories of memory in the Lucullus	Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 24(1) 1-17	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: The essay deals with an important epistemological debate in the Lucullus: Can there be remembrance of false beliefs, as Cicero argues against his interlocutor, who defends Antiochus' position? It is shown that Antiochus, like Aristoteles, considers 'remember' to be a double achievement verb: Remembrance occurs only if a correct past perception is faithfully transmitted to the present. Cicero, on the other hand, insists that faithful transmission can also occur with false beliefs. The distinction seems to be analogous to that between valid and sound inference in contemporary Stoic logic. Finally, I discuss differences between ancient and modern forms of skepticism, address the issue of why misremembering plays no role in the Lucullus, and find an answer in Cicero's doctrine of the orator.
BibTeX: @article{Hosle2021Antiochus, author = {Hösle, Vittorio}, title = {Antiochus' and Cicero's different theories of memory in the Lucullus}, year = {2021}, journal = {Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {1-17}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/bpjam.00070.hos} }
Isay, G.C.	2021	Non-forgetfulness and forgetfulness 忘 (wang) in ancient Chinese philosophical texts.	Memory Studies 15(2)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this study, I examine conceptualizations of memory in classical Chinese philosophical texts with the purpose of encouraging the inclusion of ideas of non-Western cultures in memory studies. The texts selected for this study are Kongzi's Analects, Mengzi, the Xici commentary on the Book of Changes, the Zhuangzi, and the Xunzi. Methodologically, I differentiate between the mnemic process and its goal. My point of departure is the complementary relation that marks the non-forgetfulness and forgetfulness sequence. This study proposes the paradigm of an axis and margins to represent the yin--yang reasoning implied by the complementary relation in conjunction with the narrativity of the mnemic process. Two major consequences of this model are the understanding of non-forgetfulness and forgetfulness in terms of attentive and suspended awareness, and the supportive role of forgetfulness or suspended awareness in enhancing the function of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Isay2021Non, author = {Isay, Gad C.}, title = {Non-forgetfulness and forgetfulness 忘 (wang) in ancient Chinese philosophical texts.}, year = {2021}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211044704} }
James, S.	2021	Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory	Estudios de Filosofía 64 189-200	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Fernández (2019) offers an account of the nature of episodic memory that marries two core ideas: (i) role-functionalism about episodic memory, and (ii) self-reflexive mnemonic content. One payoff of this view is that episodic memory judgments are immune to error through misidentification. Fernández takes this to reveal something important about the nature of one's self-awareness in memory and our first-person conception of ourselves. However, once one sees why such judgments are immune in this way, according to the proposed account, the fact that they are immune becomes moot. While technically immune to error through misidentification, episodic memory judgments are not grounded in a way such that they have any interesting epistemological import for the subject (in contrast to other paradigms of such judgments), and any insights about our self-awareness and self-conception are directly derivable from the metaphysics of memory content alone.
BibTeX: @article{James2021Immunity, author = {James, Steven}, title = {Immunity to error through misidentification and the functionalist, self-reflexive account of episodic memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {189--200}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a10} }
Johnson, J.R.	2021	Félix Guattari and the highways of memory	Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 26(6) 128-143	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the last major works of ''French Theory,'' Félix Guattari's notoriously dense 1989 Schizoanalytic Cartographies (SC) has only recently been made available to English-speaking audiences by Andrew Goffey's 2013 translation. This sudden displacement of Guattari's treatise into the present day provides the ideal opportunity for its place within Guattari's thought, and also within the wider field of post-humanist critical discourse that has developed since its publication, to be reconsidered. I contend that the thread of memory--the storing, recalling, and forgetting of memory-data--serves as both a privileged means of navigating this text's hyper-complexity and of articulating its critical utility. SC offers itself as a framework for thinking through the subject-in-production's complex imbrication in the ''age of planetary computerization,'' one in which there is always a revolving door between the ''data'' of subjectivity and the ''memory'' of technical machines.
BibTeX: @article{Johnson2021Felix, author = {Johnson, Joseph R.}, title = {Félix Guattari and the highways of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities}, volume = {26}, number = {6}, pages = {128--143}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2021.1988400} }
Juchniewicz, N.	2021	Extended memory: On delegation of memory to smartphones	Techn'e: Research in Philosophy and Technology 25(2) 308-331	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article raises the problem of extended memory in the context of using a smartphone. Taking into account the extended mind hypothesis and the everyday practices of smartphone users, the article analyses four fields of memory: pictures, chats, maps and, geolocating games. Each of these fields can be used in a number of ways to reinforce memory or to participate in the memory practices of an individual or a collectivity, and this is analysed in the article using numerous examples. The problem of extended memory is considered in the article on a theoretical level by referring to new media studies (on mobile phones and iPhones). The practical dimension of this problem is presented by the results of empirical, qualitative research conducted among smartphone users.
BibTeX: @article{Juchniewicz2021Extended, author = {Juchniewicz, Natalia}, title = {Extended memory: On delegation of memory to smartphones}, year = {2021}, journal = {Techn'e: Research in Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {25}, number = {2}, pages = {308--331}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/techne202168143} }
Kabasenche, W.P.	2021	Forgetting myself: Self-regarding ethical responsibilities in the use of memory modifying technologies	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 55-56		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kabasenche2021Forgetting, author = {Kabasenche, William Paul}, title = {Forgetting myself: Self-regarding ethical responsibilities in the use of memory modifying technologies}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {55--56}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866118} }
Khalidi, M.A.	2021	Etiological kinds	Philosophy of Science 88 1-21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Kinds that share historical properties are dubbed ''historical kinds'' or ''etiological kinds,'' and they have some distinctive features. I will try to characterize etiological kinds in gen- eral terms and briefly survey some previous philosophical discussions of these kinds. Then I will take a closer look at a few case studies involving different types ofetiological kinds. Finally, I will try to understand the rationale for classifying on the basis ofetiology, putting forward reasons for classifying phenomena on the basis of diachronic features, thereby making a provisional case for considering at least some etiological kinds to be natural kinds.
BibTeX: @article{Khalidi2021Etiological, author = {Khalidi, Muhammad Ali}, title = {Etiological kinds}, year = {2021}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {88}, pages = {1--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/710020} }
Kilov, D.	2021	The brittleness of expertise and why it matters	Synthese 199(1-2) 3431-3455	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Expertise has become a topic of increased interest to philosophers. Fascinating in its own right, expertise also plays a crucial role in several philosophical debates. My aim in this paper is to draw attention to an important, and hitherto unappreciated feature of expertise: its brittleness. Experts are often unable to transfer their proficiency in one domain to other, even intuitively similar domains. Experts are often unable to flexibly respond to changes within their domains. And, even more surprisingly, experts will occasionally be outperformed by novices when confronted with novel circumstances within their domains of expertise. In section 1, I marshal the evidence in favour of brittleness. In section 2, I argue that appeals to brittleness can advance the dialectic in debates on skilled action and provide reasons to reject a powerful recent argument offered by Christensen et al. (Philos Psychol 32(5): 693--719, 2019). In section 3, I appeal to brittleness to argue against a common conception of philosophical expertise, according to which philosophers possess a domain-general set of reasoning skills. Although my argument in this section is largely negative, there is a twist. Recalibrating our understanding of philosophical expertise opens new avenues of research for defenders of the so-called 'expertise defence' against the findings of experimental philosophy.
BibTeX: @article{Kilov2021brittleness, author = {Kilov, Daniel}, title = {The brittleness of expertise and why it matters}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {1-2}, pages = {3431--3455}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02940-5} }
Kind, A.	2021	The feeling of familiarity	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61024	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The relationship between the phenomenology of imagination and the phenomenology of memory is an interestingly complicated one. On the one hand, there seem to be important similarities between the two, and there are even occasions in which we mistake an imagining for a memory or vice versa. On the other hand, there seem to be important differences between the two, and we can typically tell them apart. This paper explores various attempts to delineate a phenomenological marker differentiating imagination and memory, with a special focus on two proposed markers that have generated considerable philosophical discussion: the feeling of pastness and the feeling of familiarity. As we will find, neither of them proves to be up to the task at hand. However, by way of a deeper exploration of the feeling of familiarity, we are able to tease out some important morals for efforts to differentiate imagination and memory on phenomenological grounds and, more generally, for efforts to engage in a descriptive phenomenological enterprise.
BibTeX: @article{Kind2021feeling, author = {Kind, Amy}, title = {The feeling of familiarity}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61024}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61024} }
Kirby, A.	2021	No maps for these territories: Exploring philosophy of memory through photography	Estudios de Filosofía 64 47-71	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I begin by examining perception of photographs from two directions: what we think photographs are, and the aspects of mind involved when viewing photographs. Traditional photographs are shown to be mnemonic tools, and memory identified as a key part of the process by which photographs are fully perceived. Second, I describe the metamorphogram; a non-traditional photograph which fits specific, author-defined criteria for being memory. The metamorphogram is shown to be analogous to a composite of all an individual's episodic memories. Finally, using the metamorphogram in artistic works suggests a bi-directional relationship between individual autobiographical memory and shared cultural memory. A model of this relationship fails to align with existing definitions of cultural memory, and may represent a new form: sociobiographical memory. I propose that the experiences documented here make the case for promoting a mutually beneficial relationship between philosophy and other creative disciplines, including photography.
BibTeX: @article{Kirby2021No, author = {Kirby, Alun}, title = {No maps for these territories: Exploring philosophy of memory through photography}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {47--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a03} }
Kostick, K.M. and Lázaro-Muñoz, G.	2021	Neural safeguards against global impacts of memory modification on identity: Ethical and practical considerations	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 45-48		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kostick2021Neural, author = {Kostick, Kristin Marie and Lázaro-Muñoz, Gabriel}, title = {Neural safeguards against global impacts of memory modification on identity: Ethical and practical considerations}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {45--48}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866111} }
Krakauer, J.W.	2021	Automatizing knowledge: Confusion over what cognitive neuroscience tells us about intellectualism	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise Routledge 219-225		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Krakauer2021Automatizing, author = {Krakauer, John W.}, title = {Automatizing knowledge: Confusion over what cognitive neuroscience tells us about intellectualism}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise}, editor = {Fridland, Ellen and Pavese, Carlotta}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {219--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315180809-22} }
Kriegel, U.	2021	The structure of phenomenal justification	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101(2) 282-297	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An increasing number of epistemologists defend the notion that some perceptual experiences can immediately justify some beliefs and do so in virtue of (some of) their phenomenal properties. But this view, which we may call phenomenal dogmatism, is also the target of various objections. Here I want to consider an objection that may be put as follows: what is so special about perceptual phenomenology that only it can immediately justify beliefs, while other kinds of phenomenology—including quite similar ones—remain ‘epistemically inert’? I will argue that, to overcome this objection, the phenomenal dogmatist should incorporate into her view a general principle—I call it the ‘experiential attitude/ doxastic content link’ principle—that essentially extends the view from the perceptual case to other phenomenal states.
BibTeX: @article{Kriegel2021Structure, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {The structure of phenomenal justification}, year = {2021}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {101}, number = {2}, pages = {282-297}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1978513} }
Lähteenmäki, V.	2021	Locke on memory	The Lockean Mind Routledge 138-148.		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Laehteenmaeki2021Locke, author = {Lähteenmäki, Vili}, title = {Locke on memory}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Lockean Mind}, editor = {Gordon-Roth, Jessica and Weinberg, Shelley}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {138--148.}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315099675-22} }
Landeweerd, L.	2021	Time, Life & Memory: Bergson and Contemporary Science	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Landeweerd2021Time, author = {Landeweerd, Laurens}, title = {Time, Life & Memory: Bergson and Contemporary Science}, year = {2021}, publisher = {Springer} }
Langland-Hassan, P.	2021	What sort of imagining might remembering be?	Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7(2) 231-251	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend a factive (or causalist) view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary.
BibTeX: @article{Langland2021What, author = {Langland-Hassan, Peter}, title = {What sort of imagining might remembering be?}, year = {2021}, journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, pages = {231--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.28} }
Lavazza, A.	2021	Can memory make a difference? Reasons for changing or not our autobiographical memory	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 38-40		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lavazza2021Can, author = {Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {Can memory make a difference? Reasons for changing or not our autobiographical memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {38--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866106} }
Leuenberger, M.	2021	Why authenticity hinges on narrative identity	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 43-45		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Leuenberger2021Why, author = {Leuenberger, Muriel}, title = {Why authenticity hinges on narrative identity}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {43--45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866109} }
Liao, S.Y.	2021	Bittersweet food	Critica-Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia 53(157) 71-93	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Nostalgia and food are intertwined universals in human experience. All of us have experienced nostalgia centered on food, and all of us have experienced food infused with nostalgia. To explore the links between nostalgia and food, I start with a rough taxonomy of nostalgic foods, and illustrate it with examples. I argue that there is a psychological commonality to experiencing nostalgic foods: imagination. On my account, imagination is the key to understanding the cognitive, conative, affective, and perceptual aspects of experiencing nostalgic foods. In turn, the recognition of imagination's centrality in experiencing nostalgic foods reveals how food can produce aesthetic experiences comparable to those produced by literature and painting.
BibTeX: @article{Liao2021Bittersweet, author = {Liao, Shen Yi}, title = {Bittersweet food}, year = {2021}, journal = {Critica-Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia}, volume = {53}, number = {157}, pages = {71--93}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.22201/IIFS.18704905E.2021.1246} }
Liefke, K. and Werning, M.	2021	Experiential imagination and the inside/outside-distinction	JSAI-isAI 2020 Workshops, LNAI 12758 Springer 96-112	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Gerundive imagination reports with an embedded reflexive subject (e.g. Zeno imagines himself swimming) are ambiguous between an 'inside' and an 'outside' reading: the inside reading captures the imaginer's directly making the described experience (here: swimming); the outside reading captures the imaginer's having an experience of an event, involving his own counterpart, from an out-of-body point of view (watching one's counterpart swim). Our paper explains the inside/outside-ambiguity through the observation (i) that imagining can referentially target different phenomenal experiences -- esp. proprioception (i.e. bodily feeling) and visual perception (seeing, watching) -- and (ii) that imagining and its associated experience can both be de se. Inside/outside readings then arise from intuitive constraints in the lexical semantics of verbs like feel, see.
BibTeX: @incollection{Liefke2021Experiential, author = {Liefke, Kristina and Werning, Markus}, title = {Experiential imagination and the inside/outside-distinction}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {JSAI-isAI 2020 Workshops, LNAI 12758}, editor = {Okazaki, N.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {96--112}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79942-7_7} }
Lin, Y.-T.	2021	Memory and retrospective reports of totally selfless states of consciousness	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e60942	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The debate about the necessary involvement of any form of self-consciousness in conscious experience has recently shifted its focus to the question of whether there are totally selfless states of consciousness (TSSC). The primary source of evidence for the existence of TSSC is the subjective reports from subjects who either are currently undergoing or have undergone altered experiences such as drug-induced ego dissolution. While the subjective reports are made largely after the occurrence of the experience, such reports have been challenged on the basis that one cannot coherently report about TSSC from one's own, autobiographical memory. This paper addresses this issue regarding TSSC from the perspective of memory study. The aim is to examine whether and how it is possible for a subject to report a past TSSC based on her own memory without being considered as confabulating or misremembering. Such an examination can provide potential explanations for how a person reports a past experience of TSSC.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2021Memory, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {Memory and retrospective reports of totally selfless states of consciousness}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e60942}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.60942} }
Lin, Y.-T. and Dranseika, V.	2021	The variety and limits of self-experience and identification in imagination	Synthese 199(3-4) 9897-9926	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Imagination and other forms of mental simulation allow us to live beyond the current immediate environment. Imagination that involves an experience of self further enables one to incorporate or utilize the contents of episodic simulation in a way that is of importance to oneself. However, the simulated self can be found in a variety of forms. The present study provides some empirical data to explore the various ways in which the self could be represented in observer-perspective imagination as well as the potential limits on such representations. In observer-perspective imagination, the point of view or perspective is dissociated from the location of one's simulated body. We have found that while there are different ways to identify with oneself in an observer-perspective imagination, the identification is rarely dissociated from first-person perspective in imagination. Such variety and limits pave the way for understanding how we identify with ourselves in imagination. Our results suggest that the first-person perspective is a strong attractor for identification. The empirical studies and analysis in this paper demonstrate how observer-perspective episodic simulation serves as a special case for research on identification in mental simulation, and similar methods can be applied in the studies of memory and future thinking.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2021variety, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung and Dranseika, Vilius}, title = {The variety and limits of self-experience and identification in imagination}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {3-4}, pages = {9897--9926}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03230-4} }
Lunstroth, J.	2021	Yoga/sād mkhya, memory modifying technologies, and authenticity	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 32-35		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lunstroth2021Yogasamkhya, author = {Lunstroth, John}, title = {Yoga/sād mkhya, memory modifying technologies, and authenticity}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {32--35}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866099} }
Magrì, E.	2021	Sedimentation, memory, and self in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty	The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology Palgrave Macmillan 361-383		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Magri2021Sedimentation, author = {Magrì, Elisa}, title = {Sedimentation, memory, and self in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology}, editor = {Coe, Cynthia D.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {361--383}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66857-0_17} }
Mannette, R.	2021	Memory, authenticity, and alienation	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 50-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mannette2021Memory, author = {Mannette, Ruel}, title = {Memory, authenticity, and alienation}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {50--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866113} }
Marinescu, P.	2021	The duty of memory revisited: Ricoeur's contribution to a crisis in French historiography	Human Studies 44(3) 453-471	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The relationship between memory and history, which has preoccupied historiography and the philosophy of history since the middle of the nineteenth century, took a particular course in France at the end of the millennium. The forms this relationship took in this particular context have been the subject of heated debate around whether the reconstruction of the past should bear the sign of a moral imperative or, on the contrary, it should be kept away from any moral conditioning. To address this question and underline its particular relevance to the present, I will revisit a significant debate, based around Paul Ricoeur's interpretation of the duty of memory developed in his book Memory, History, Forgetting. I will do this by means of a three-step approach. First, a short introduction will provide several guidelines for understanding the issues at stake in the debate in which Ricoeur was caught and explanations regarding the significance of the main notions around which the discussions took place, i.e., the duty and work of memory. Second, I will identify how historical debates, political decisions and civic concerns about the past gradually coagulated into two different ''camps'' in France during the 1980s and 1990s, i.e., the advocates of memory against those of history, foreshadowing the emergence of a historiographical crisis, the stakes of which I will analyse in detail. Finally, I will show how Ricoeur's solution to this debate, i.e., an incomplete dialectic between the duty and the work of memory, developed on the horizon of justice, continues to have relevance for the present, being an innovative form of ''defatalizing'' the past.
BibTeX: @article{Marinescu2021duty, author = {Marinescu, Paul}, title = {The duty of memory revisited: Ricoeur's contribution to a crisis in French historiography}, year = {2021}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {44}, number = {3}, pages = {453--471}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09587-2} }
McCarroll, C.J., Michaelian, K. and Arango-Muñoz, S.	2021	Memory and perception, insights at the interface: Editors' introduction	Estudios de Filosofía 64 5-19	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The recent development of specialized research fields in philosophy of memory and philosophy of perception invites a dialogue about the relationship between these mental capacities. Following a brief review of some of the key issues that can be raised at the interface of memory and perception, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, and outlines possible directions for further research.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2021Memory, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Michaelian, Kourken and Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {Memory and perception, insights at the interface: Editors' introduction}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {5--19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a01} }
Meloni, M. and Reynolds, J.	2021	Thinking embodiment with genetics: Epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism	Synthese 198(11) 10685-10708	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment---e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and '4e' cognition---interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.
BibTeX: @article{Meloni2021Thinking, author = {Meloni, Maurizio and Reynolds, Jack}, title = {Thinking embodiment with genetics: Epigenetics and postgenomic biology in embodied cognition and enactivism}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {11}, pages = {10685--10708}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02748-3} }
Mi, C.	2021	Memory and reflection	Trans/Form/Ação 44 151-168	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I have argued that the Analects of Confucius presents us with a conception of reflection with two components, a retrospective component and a perspective component. The former component involves hindsight or careful examination of the past and as such draws on previous learning or memory and previously formed beliefs to avoid error. The latter component is foresight, or forward looking, and as such looks to existing beliefs and factors in order to achieve knowledge. In this paper, I raise the problem of forgetting and argue that most of contemporary theories of knowledge have to face the problem and deal with the challenge seriously. In order to solve the problem, I suggest a bi-level virtue epistemology which can provide us with the best outlook for the problem-solving. I will correlate two different cognitive capacities or processes of "memory" (and "forgetting") with the conception of reflection, and evaluate them under two different frameworks, a strict deontic framework (one that presupposes free and intentional determination) and a more loosely deontic framework (one that highlights functional and mechanical faculties). The purpose is to show that reflection as meta-cognition plays an important and active role and enjoys a better epistemic (normative) status in our human endeavors (cognitive or epistemic) than those of first-order (or animal) cognition, such as memory, can play.
BibTeX: @article{Mi2021Memory, author = {Mi, Chienkuo}, title = {Memory and reflection}, year = {2021}, journal = {Trans/Form/Ação}, volume = {44}, pages = {151--168}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-3173.2021.v44dossier2.10.p151} }
Michaelian, K.	2021	Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: Against Fernández	Synthese 198(10) 9525-9543	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The claim that episodic memory is immune to error through misidentification enjoys continuing popularity in philosophy. Psychological research on observer memory---usually defined as occurring when one remembers an event from a point of view other than that that from which he originally experienced it---would seem, on the face of it, to undermine the IEM claim. Relying on a certain view of memory content, Fernández (Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02050-3, forthcoming), however, has provided an ingenious argument for the view that it does not. This paper reconstructs Fernández' argument and shows that there is reason to reject the definition of observer memory and the view of memory content on which it relies. Once these are rejected, it turns out that observer memory does indeed imply that the IEM claim is false.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2021Episodic, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Episodic memory is not immune to error through misidentification: Against Fernández}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {10}, pages = {9525--9543}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02652-w} }
Michaelian, K.	2021	Imagining the past reliably and unreliably: Towards a virtue theory of memory	Synthese 199(3-4) 7477-7507	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers of memory have approached the relationship between memory and imagination from two very different perspectives. Advocates of the causal theory of memory, on the one hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to the intuitive contrast between successfully remembering an event and merely imagining it. Advocates of the simulation theory, on the other hand, have motivated their preferred theory by appealing to empirical evidence for important similarities between remembering the past and imagining the future. Recently, causalists have argued that simulationism is unable to accommodate the difference between successful remembering and forms of unsuccessful remembering or mere imagining such as confabulating. This paper argues that, while these arguments fail, simulationism, in its current form, is indeed unable to provide a fully adequate account of unsuccessful remembering. Rather than suggesting a return to causalism, the paper proposes a new form of simulationism, a virtue theory of memory modelled not on the process reliabilist epistemology that has so far served as the inspiration for the simulation theory but instead on virtue reliabilist epistemology, and shows that this new theory grounds a more adequate account of unsuccessful remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2021Imagining, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Imagining the past reliably and unreliably: Towards a virtue theory of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {3-4}, pages = {7477--7507}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03125-4} }
Michaelian, K., Dranseika, V. and Álvarez, J.	2021	Experimental philosophy of memory	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e60875	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Experimental philosophy is now some twenty years old and has a large body of work to its credit. Little of this work focusses directly on memory, but it has, as the philosophy of memory has come into its own over the last several years, become increasingly clear that there are numerous questions about the concept of memory to which the tools developed by experimental philosophers might profitably be applied. By describing a sample of these questions, explaining how and why they might be approached using experimental methods, and providing a snapshot of published and in-progress experimental work, this article makes a case for experimental philosophy of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2021Experimental, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Dranseika, Vilius and Álvarez, Juan}, title = {Experimental philosophy of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e60875}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.60875} }
Michaelian, K. and Sant'Anna, A.	2021	Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory	Synthese 198(Suppl 1) S307-S335	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters (in: Michaelian and Debus (eds) New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as contentless, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters' argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a contentless conception of memory traces.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2021Memory, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {Suppl 1}, pages = {S307--S335}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02119-7} }
Michalewski, A.	2021	Writing in the soul: On some aspects of recollection in Plotinus	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 45-66		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michalewski2021Writing, author = {Michalewski, Alexandra}, title = {Writing in the soul: On some aspects of recollection in Plotinus}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {45--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126084} }
Mihailov, E., Zorila, A. and Iftode, C.	2021	Taking relational authenticity seriously: Neurotechnologies, narrative identity, and co-authorship of the self	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 35-37		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mihailov2021Taking, author = {Mihailov, Emilian and Zorila, Alexandra and Iftode, Cristian}, title = {Taking relational authenticity seriously: Neurotechnologies, narrative identity, and co-authorship of the self}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {35--37}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866105} }
Miyamoto Gómez, O.S.	2021	Four epistemological gaps in alloanimal episodic memory studies	Biosemiotics 14 839-857	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Experimental studies show that some corvids, apes, and rodents possess a common long-term memory system that allows them to take goal-directed actions on the basis of absent spatiotemporal contexts. In other words, evidence supports the hypothesis that Episodic Memory ---far from being uniquely human--- has evolved as a cross-species meaning making system. However, within this zoosemiotic breakthrough, neurocognitive studies now struggle characterizing the relations between teleological factors (e.g. interpretant-based choice-making) and phenomenological factors (e.g. representamen-centered experiences) that would account for the episodic behavior displayed by these living beings (e.g. object-oriented actions). Within such field, this paper identifies four epistemological gaps ---the 'Nagelian', 'de Waalian', 'Chomskyan', and 'semiotic' gaps---, making a case for the need of a future biosemiotic model of Alloanimal Episodic Memory (AEM) to come into the equation. As a whole, I conclude that experimental developments in AEM research, and philosophical advancements in biosemiotics could converge through the concept of semiosis. Introducing the latter would account for animal episodic agency as a causal influence and continuity between the above relations, outclassing the reductionist and Cartesian separation between 'external' bodily behavior and 'internal' computational operations.
BibTeX: @article{Miyamoto2021Four, author = {Miyamoto Gómez, Oscar S.}, title = {Four epistemological gaps in alloanimal episodic memory studies}, year = {2021}, journal = {Biosemiotics}, volume = {14}, pages = {839--857}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-021-09437-9} }
Molodkina, L.	2021	Memory and monuments: A philosophical vision of architectural and natural memorials	Agathos 12(2) 47-58	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article attempts to philosophically analyze a very important and always topical problem of the relationship between memory and monuments as guardians of the centers of human culture in its past and present. The phenomenon of memory is viewed through the prism of the modern recipient's perception of the "dialogical" relationship between "bygone times" and the current socio-cultural situation. Memory, quantitatively consisting of memories of specific things, events, images, etc., takes on the character of a holy substance, transforming various attributes into monuments. It is emphasized that the memorial functionality of a monument consists in the preservation and identification of the spiritual quintessence of some historical or individual-personal phenomenon, not really repeated, but able to be phenomenologically reproduced in consciousness as an intentional object. Containing a memorial meaning, the monument reflects the culture and history of a particular era. It becomes an object of a value relationship, serves as a mediator and bearer of continuity in the dynamic dialogue of cultural cycles. Referring to historical examples of the development of architectural and natural works, we outline the philosophical and phenomenological contours in the aesthetic interpretation of memorial objects.
BibTeX: @article{Molodkina2021Memory, author = {Molodkina, Lyudmila}, title = {Memory and monuments: A philosophical vision of architectural and natural memorials}, year = {2021}, journal = {Agathos}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {47--58} }
Montero, B.G.	2021	Consciousness and skill	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise Routledge 181-193		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Montero2021Consciousness, author = {Montero, Barbara Gail}, title = {Consciousness and skill}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise}, editor = {Fridland, Ellen and Pavese, Carlotta}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {181--193}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315180809-19} }
Moss-Wellington, W.	2021	Picturing the autobiographical imagination: Emotion, memory and metacognition in Inside Out	Film-Philosophy 25(2) 187-206	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Inside Out (Pete Docter & Ronnie Del Carmen, 2015) develops novel cinematic means for representing memory, emotion and imagination, their interior relationships and their social expression. Its unique animated language both playfully represents pre-teenage metacognition, and is itself a manner of metacognitive interrogation. Inside Out motivates this language to ask two questions: an explicit question regarding the social function of sadness, and a more implicit question regarding how one can identify agency, and thereby a sense of developing selfhood, between one's memories, emotions, facets of personality, and future-thinking imagination. Both the complexity of the language Inside Out develops to ask these questions, and the complicated answers the film provides, ultimately serve as a manner of recognition of the effortfulness of finding one's place in the world. This article talks sequentially through the complex representative systems Inside Out advances in order to pay homage to the ways in which metacognitive cinema -- as well as discussions and hermeneutic readings around that cinema -- can make viewers feel recognised for invisible, internal labour that is existentially difficult to share due to its very interiority; an interiority that is reconstructed in imaginative processes such as autobiographical reminiscence, and filmic animation.
BibTeX: @article{MossWellington2021Picturing, author = {Moss-Wellington, Wyatt}, title = {Picturing the autobiographical imagination: Emotion, memory and metacognition in Inside Out}, year = {2021}, journal = {Film-Philosophy}, volume = {25}, number = {2}, pages = {187--206}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/film.2021.0168} }
Munro, D.	2021	Imagining the actual	Philosophers' Imprint 21(17)			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Munro2021Imagining, author = {Munro, Daniel}, title = {Imagining the actual}, year = {2021}, journal = {Philosophers' Imprint}, volume = {21}, number = {17} }
Munro, D.	2021	Remembering the past and imagining the actual	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(2) 175-197	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recently, a view I refer to as ''hypothetical continuism'' has garnered some favour among philosophers, based largely on empirical research showing substantial neurocognitive overlaps between episodic memory and imagination. According to this view, episodically remembering past events is the same kind of cognitive process as sensorily imagining future and counterfactual events. In this paper, I first argue that hypothetical continuism is false, on the basis of substantive epistemic asymmetries between episodic memory and the relevant kinds of imagination. However, I then propose and defend an alternative form of continuism, according to which episodic memory is continuous with a capacity I call ''actuality-oriented imagination.'' Because of the deep epistemic affinities between episodic memory and actuality-oriented imagination, it makes sense to think of them as cognitive processes of the same kind.
BibTeX: @article{Munro2021Remembering, author = {Munro, Daniel}, title = {Remembering the past and imagining the actual}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {175--197}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00499-1} }
Murray, S. and Finocchiaro, P.	2021	These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation	Synthese 198(11) 10313-10339	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon's potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational.
BibTeX: @article{Murray2021These, author = {Murray, Samuel and Finocchiaro, Peter}, title = {These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {11}, pages = {10313--10339}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02721-0} }
Najenson, J.	2021	What have we learned about the engram?	Synthese 199(3-4) 9581-9601	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The discovery of the engram, the physical substrate of memory, is a central challenge for the sciences of memory. Following the application of optogenetics to the neurobiological study of memory, scientists and philosophers claim that the engram has been found. In this paper, I evaluate the implications of applying optogenetic tools to the localization of the engram. I argue that conceptions of engram localization need to be revised to be made consistent with optogenetic studies of the engram. I distinguish between challenges to vehicle and content localization. First, I consider the silent engram hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, optogenetic studies indicate that synaptic efficacy, the traditional engram-bearing vehicle, is important merely for retrieval. I argue that this interpretation rests upon a misunderstanding of accessibility. Second, I argue that optogenetic-based strategies and findings conflict with preservationist and constructivist views on memory storage. There is an enduring trace, but stored content may change over time and experience, resulting in doubt about what constitutes a single engram.
BibTeX: @article{Najenson2021What, author = {Najenson, Jonathan}, title = {What have we learned about the engram?}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {3-4}, pages = {9581--9601}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03216-2} }
Parvizian, S.	2021	Scientia, diachronic certainty, and virtue	Synthese 198(10) 9165-9192	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the Fifth Meditation Descartes considers the problem of knowledge preservation (PKP): the challenge of accounting for the diachronic certainty of perfect knowledge [scientia]. There are two general solutions to PKP in the literature: the regeneration solution and the infallible memory solution. While both readings pick up on features of Descartes' considered view, I argue that they ultimately fall short. Salvaging pieces from both readings and drawing from Descartes' virtue theory, I argue on textual and systematic grounds for a dispositionalist solution. On this view, the diachronic certainty of scientia is achieved through virtuous habits of belief.
BibTeX: @article{Parvizian2021Scientia, author = {Parvizian, Saja}, title = {Scientia, diachronic certainty, and virtue}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {10}, pages = {9165--9192}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02626-y} }
Perälä, M.	2021	Aristotle's three questions about memory	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 27-44		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perala2021Aristotle, author = {Perälä, Mika}, title = {Aristotle's three questions about memory}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {27--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126083} }
Perrin, D.	2021	Embodied episodic memory: A new case for causalism?	Intellectica 74 229-252	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2021Embodied, author = {Perrin, Denis}, title = {Embodied episodic memory: A new case for causalism?}, year = {2021}, journal = {Intellectica}, volume = {74}, pages = {229--252} }
Protopapadakis, E.D.	2021	Messing with autobiographical memory: Identity, and moral status	Сборники По Теории Поэтического Языка 4 175-181	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The role of autobiographical memory is not just to relate us to our past self, but also to shape the future self of ours by helping us navigate the complex world we encounter in our every-day lives on a stable basis: some more or less vivid idea of who we really are as persons, as individual beings with distinct selves and unique identities. In this sense memory has also to do with being and becoming, and not just with having been. The advances in the field of memory neuroscience have resulted in what is called memory reconsolidation, that is, techniques to suppress, modify, or enhance certain memories that have to do with our moral identity and moral status. In this presentation I will discuss certain potential implications of memory reconsolidation that are in my view of key importance for neuroethics, and especially for the debate concerning moral identity, agency and status in the brand-new landscape that has been shaped by the novel capabilities neuroscience has made available.
BibTeX: @article{Protopapadakis2021Messing, author = {Protopapadakis, Evangelos D.}, title = {Messing with autobiographical memory: Identity, and moral status}, year = {2021}, journal = {Сборники По Теории Поэтического Языка}, volume = {4}, pages = {175-181} }
Retkoceri, U.	2021	False procedural memory	Philosophical Psychology 34(3) 397-423	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Lately, it seems a number of philosophical memory theories are incorporating false memory phenomena into their conceptual frameworks. At the same time, scientific research is extending its analysis of false memories to nondeclarative forms of memory. However, both sides have paid little attention to the notion of false procedural memory. Yet, from everyday experience as well as from psychological investigation, we are aware of different ways procedural memory goes wrong. Here, I characterize the conceptual foundation of false procedural memory. First, I distinguish remembering-how from knowing-how by proposing that remembering-how requires the performance of an act. Accordingly, genuine remembering-how is characterized as the performance of an act for which a respective ability has been acquired that is instrumental in the execution of said act. False remembering-how is identified as a kind of error where a subject acquires the ability to perform a certain act, which is then correctly executed, but is not what the subject tried to perform. This framework of false procedural memory is delineated from notions of interference and crosstalk. A comparison with current philosophical theories of false memory and analysis showing the relevance for current psychological research and everyday life concludes the paper.
BibTeX: @article{Retkoceri2021False, author = {Retkoceri, Urim}, title = {False procedural memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {34}, number = {3}, pages = {397--423}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2020.1828572} }
Robbins, S.E.	2021	Is experience stored in the brain? A current model of memory and the temporal metaphysic of Bergson	Axiomathes 31(1) 15-43	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In discussion on consciousness and the hard problem, there is an unquestioned background assumption, namely, our experience is stored in the brain. Yet Bergson (in: Matter and memory. Zone Books, New York, 1896/1991) argued that this very question, ''Is experience stored in the brain?'' is the critical issue in the problem of consciousness. His examination of then-current memory research led him, save for motor or procedural memory, to a ''no'' answer. Others, for example Sheldrake (in: Science set free. Random House, New York, 2012), have continued this negative assessment of the research findings. So, has this assumption actually been proven since Bergson? Do we know how experience is stored? Or that it is stored? Here, a recent review and model of memory is examined to see where this assumption actually stands. Again, the assessment will be that nothing has changed. The core of the problem, it will be argued, lies in two things: Firstly, the search for how/where experience is stored is motivated---rephrasing Bergson---in the classic metaphysic, a framework on space and time whose logic cannot be coherently, logically adhered to in attempting to explain how experience is stored. Secondly, the search generally assumes an inadequate theory of perception that is implicitly based in this classic metaphysic. If framed within Bergson's model of perception and his temporal metaphysic, conjoined with J. J. Gibson's model, the storage-search appears misguided from the start.
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2021Is, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {Is experience stored in the brain? A current model of memory and the temporal metaphysic of Bergson}, year = {2021}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {15--43}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09483-x} }
Robins, S.K.	2021	The failures of functionalism (for memory)	Estudios de Filosofía 64 201-222	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Memory: A Self-Referential Account, Fernández offers a functionalist account of the metaphysics of memory, which is portrayed as presenting significant advantages over causal and narrative theories of memory. In this paper, I present a series of challenges for Fernández's functionalism. There are issues with both the particulars of the account and the use of functionalism more generally. First, in characterizing the mnemonic role of episodic remembering, Fernández fails to make clear how the mental image type that plays this role should be identified. Second, I argue that a functionalist approach, which appeals to the overall structure of the memory system and tendencies of mental state types, is ill-suited to the metaphysical question about episodic remembering that is of interest to the causal and narrative theorists with which Fernandez engages. Fernández's self-referential account of memory has many other virtues, but functionalism is a poor fit for episodic remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2021failures, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {The failures of functionalism (for memory)}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {201--222}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a11} }
Rosen, M. and Barkasi, M.	2021	What makes a mental state feel like a memory: Feelings of pastness and presence	Estudios de Filosofía 64 95-122	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The intuitive view that memories are characterized by a feeling of pastness, perceptions by a feeling of presence, while imagination lacks either faces challenges from two sides. Some researchers complain that the ''feeling of pastness'' is either unclear, irrelevant or isn't a real feature. Others point out that there are cases of memory without the feeling of pastness, perception without presence, and other cross-cutting cases. Here we argue that the feeling of pastness is indeed a real, useful feature, and although this feeling does not define memory ontologically, it is a characteristic marker which helps us easily categorise a mental state first-personally. We outline several cognitive features that underlie this experience, including the feeling of past accessibility, ergonomic significance, immersion, objectivity and mental strength. Our account is distinctly phenomenal, rather than doxastic, although our web of beliefs may contribute to this experience.
BibTeX: @article{Rosen2021What, author = {Rosen, Melanie and Barkasi, Michael}, title = {What makes a mental state feel like a memory: Feelings of pastness and presence}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {95--122}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a05} }
Rozemberg, A.	2021	Memories of Venice: Analysis of two thought experiments by Derek Parfit	Human Affairs 31(1) 125-135	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is commonly believed that our episodic memory teaches us about the reality of personal identity over time. Derek Parfitt's notion of quasi-memory challenges this belief. According to Parfit, q-memories provide us with knowledge of past experiences in the same way that memory does, without presupposing that the rememberer and the experiencer are the same person. Various aspects of Parfit's theory have met with criticism from scholars such as D. Wiggins, J. McDowell, M. Schechtman, and others. In this paper, I will focus primarily on the holistic argument that q-memories cannot be squared with the complex nature of mental life. This is a well-known argument and, when understood as criticism of memory-trace copying, is accepted by some q-memory proponents. In this paper, I will try to show why it is impossible to defend quasi-memory, even when wholesale psychological continuity applies, and why post-fission persons are not genuine cases of q-memories.
BibTeX: @article{Rozemberg2021Memories, author = {Rozemberg, Andrej}, title = {Memories of Venice: Analysis of two thought experiments by Derek Parfit}, year = {2021}, journal = {Human Affairs}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {125--135}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2021-0011} }
Russell, J.L.	2021	Stuck on repeat: Why do we continue to ruminate?	Synthese 199 13143-13162	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An oft misattributed piece of folk-wisdom goes: ''Insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results.'' In many cases, we don't just do things repeatedly but think over the same topics repeatedly. People who ruminate are not often diagnosed as insane---most of us ruminate at some point in our lives---but it is a common behaviour underlying both depression and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema in J Abnorm Psychol 109(3):504, 2000). If rumination is something we all do at some time, what is it about ruminative thought that makes it 'sticky' and difficult to stop for the worst sufferers? In order to answer this question, I will present a plausible account of how ruminative behaviour becomes entrenched to the point where sufferers of anxiety and depression simply cannot make meaning from the world except in terms of the kinds of behaviours, actions and thoughts they have become reliant on. I develop my account from Barrett's theory of constructed emotion (2006, 2011, 2014) using the work of Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of perception, Taylor and Francis Group. (Online), ProQuest Ebook Central, 2012. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ed/detail.action?docID=1433878. Accessed 29 Dec 2020) in order to bridge the gap between the explicit thought we experience---an important part of the lived experience of rumination. To conclude, I will apply my account to Wu and Dunning's (Rev General Psychol 22(1):25--35, 2018; Hypocognitive mind: How lack of conceptual knowledge confines what people see and remember, 2019. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/29ryz) theory of hypocognition to further illuminate the particular cognitive qualities that can be experienced by ruminators, i.e. a prohibited access to particular emotion concepts.
BibTeX: @article{Russell2021Stuck, author = {Russell, Jodie Louise}, title = {Stuck on repeat: Why do we continue to ruminate?}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, pages = {13143--13162}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03370-7} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2021	Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination	Estudios de Filosofía 64 73-93	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian (2017) have suggested that the dispute over the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead be viewed as a dispute about the nature of the attitudes involved in remembering and imagining. The focus on attitudes, rather than on causal connections, suggests a new way of conceiving of the relationship between memory and imagination that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of memory.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2021Attitudes, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {73--93}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a04} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2021	Introduction: Philosophy of memory	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61814		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2021Introduction, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Introduction: Philosophy of memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61814}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61814} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2021	Mnemonic causation, construction, and the particularity of episodic memory	Aufklärung: Journal of Philosophy 8 57-70	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The idea that episodic memory is memory of particulars is prominent in philosophy. The particularity of remembering, as I will call it, has been taken for granted in most recent theorizing on the subject. This is because the classical causal theory of memory, which has been extremely influential in philosophy, is said to provide a straightforward account of particularity. But the causal theory has been criticized recently, in particular due to its inability to make sense of the constructive character of remembering. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to account for the constructive character of remembering have failed to account for its particularity. This is either because they depart in important senses from the classical causal theory's account of mnemonic causation or because they give up on mnemonic causation altogether. I then proceed to consider the question of whether we should go back to the classical causal theory of memory to account for particularity. I argue that, despite the widespread idea that the classical causal theory offers a straightforward account of particularity, there are good reasons to reject it. The upshot is that philosophers of memory should consider alternative accounts of particularity that do not revolve around mnemonic causation.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2021Mnemonic, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Mnemonic causation, construction, and the particularity of episodic memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {Aufklärung: Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {8}, pages = {57--70}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v8iesp.60017} }
Schack, T. and Frank, C.	2021	Mental representation and the cognitive architecture of skilled action	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12(3) 527-546	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to understand the functional role of mental representations and intentionality in skilled actions from a systems related perspective. Therefore, we will evaluate the function of representation and then discuss the cognitive architecture of skilled actions in more depth. We are going to describe the building blocks and levels of the action system that enable us to control movements such as striking the tennis ball at the right time, or grasping tools in manual action. Based on this theoretical understanding the measurement of mental representations and related research results concerning mental representation in skilled action are presented in an overview. This leads to the question how mental representations develop and change during learning. Finally, to consolidate the functional understanding of mental representation in skilled action and interaction, we provide examples how to use the measurement of mental representation in humans to inform technical systems.
BibTeX: @article{Schack2021Mental, author = {Schack, Thomas and Frank, Cornelia}, title = {Mental representation and the cognitive architecture of skilled action}, year = {2021}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, pages = {527--546}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00485-7} }
Schechtman, M.	2021	In a sentimental mood: Memories as treasured objects	Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences 43(3) e61025	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is common for people to view memories as 'treasured objects' or 'cherished possessions'. Great care is taken to preserve such memories via scrapbooks, photo albums, or mementos. Despite the widespread nature of this phenomenon in human life, it has received little attention in recent philosophical discussions of personal identity. In this essay I consider the nature of these memories, asking what kinds of memories hold this status and why they are so highly treasured. I argue that at least one version of this phenomenon involves memories of autobiographically significant events that are experientially rich and evoke complex, multi-valanced affect. I then investigate the way in which such memories can be connected to a sense of personal identity and continuity, which explains their value. The conclusions reached are preliminary, and directions for further development are discussed.
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2021sentimental, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {In a sentimental mood: Memories as treasured objects}, year = {2021}, journal = {Acta Scientiarum. Human and Social Sciences}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {e61025}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4025/actascihumansoc.v43i3.61025} }
Schechtman, M.	2021	Locke and the current debate on personal identity	The Lockean Mind Routledge	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Present day psychological continuity theorists of personal identity start with a reading of Locke as a memory theorist and amend his view to avoid standard objections to this view. While these updated theories do avoid some serious worries that apply to a simple memory account, psychological continuity theorists remain vulnerable to the complaint that their views do not account for the practical significance of personal identity. I argue that this is because these theories employ an outdated and oversimplified picture of how memory connections work. Focusing on two recent developments in the psychological study of memory, I propose an updated memory theory that has the potential to avoid this serious objection. This account does not do the same philosophical work that psychological continuity theories seek to do and requires that we reframe the question we are asking. By describing an intimate relation between memory, consciousness, and personal identity, however, it captures some of the crucial insights of Locke's account, and shows why it remains relevant and influential.
BibTeX: @incollection{Schechtman2021Locke, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Locke and the current debate on personal identity}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {The Lockean Mind}, editor = {Gordon-Roth, Jessica and Weinberg, Shelley}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Singer, D.J., Bramson, A., Grim, P., Holman, B., Kovaka, K., Jung, J. and Berger, W.J.	2021	Don't forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget	Synthese 198(6) 5373-5394	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn't typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and find it lacking. We conclude that understanding how agents forget should be as central to social epistemology as understanding how agents form beliefs and share information with others.
BibTeX: @article{Singer2021Dont, author = {Singer, Daniel J. and Bramson, Aaron and Grim, Patrick and Holman, Bennett and Kovaka, Karen and Jung, Jiin and Berger, William J.}, title = {Don't forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {198}, number = {6}, pages = {5373--5394}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02409-0} }
Soueltzis, N.	2021	Protention in Husserl's Phenomenology	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Soueltzis2021Protention, author = {Soueltzis, Nikos}, title = {Protention in Husserl's Phenomenology}, year = {2021}, publisher = {Springer} }
St. Amant, G.	2021	"Memory" revisited: What sāmavedic technical literature tells us about smrti's early meaning	Journal of Indian Philosophy 49(4) 699-724	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I build on recent scholarship concerning the early semantic history of the word ''smr. ti,'' which has been shown to denote ''tradition'' in the early dharmasűtra material. I seek to add nuance to this work by examining the meaning of smr. ti in the early Sa¯mavedic technical literature. This corpus helps elucidate one of the processes whereby smr. ti came to refer to something textual. This paper argues that smr. ti's earliest textualized referent may have been fixed or semi-fixed individual statements rather than definite texts.
BibTeX: @article{St.Amant2021Memory, author = {St. Amant, Guy}, title = {"Memory" revisited: What sāmavedic technical literature tells us about smrti's early meaning}, year = {2021}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {49}, number = {4}, pages = {699--724}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09481-2} }
Thörnqvist, C.T.	2021	Aristotle and his early latin commentators on memory and motion in sleep	Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia Brepols 185-202		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Thornqvist2021Aristotle, author = {Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, title = {Aristotle and his early latin commentators on memory and motion in sleep}, year = {2021}, booktitle = {Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia}, editor = {Decaix, Veronique and Thörnqvist, Christina T.}, publisher = {Brepols}, pages = {185--202}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1484/M.SA-EB.5.126091} }
Thorpe, L.	2021	Thomas Reid on the role of conception and belief in perception and memory	History of Philosophy Quarterly 38(4) 357-374	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thomas Reid argues that both perception and memory involve a conception of an object and usually cause a corresponding belief. According to defenders of the constitutive interpretation, such as Rebecca Copenhaver, the belief is constitutive of acts of perception and memory. I instead argue for a causal interpretation: although in normal circumstances perceiving and remembering cause a corresponding belief, the belief is not constitutive of perception or memory. Copenhaver's strongest argument for the constitutive interpretation is that perception essentially represents objects as present, while memory essentially represents objects as past; since such tense markers can only occur within the beliefs, the beliefs must be an essential aspect of perception and memory. I argue, in contrast, that temporal markers are contained in our conceptions of objects, so beliefs do not play an essential role in distinguishing between perception and memory. Such a reading presupposes a ''thick'' interpretation of what Reid means by a conception, according to which a Reidian conception is a mode of presentation of the object apprehended.
BibTeX: @article{Thorpe2021Thomas, author = {Thorpe, Lucas}, title = {Thomas Reid on the role of conception and belief in perception and memory}, year = {2021}, journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly}, volume = {38}, number = {4}, pages = {357--374}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.38.4.04} }
Tooming, U. and Miyazono, K.	2021	Vividness as a natural kind	Synthese 199(1-2) 3023-3043	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts that treat vividness as an explanatory primitive and with those that attempt to provide a definition. We apply the natural kind methodology to make several substantive (but also provisional) claims about the vividness of mental imagery. First, we will argue that it forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity. In arguing for this claim, we also show how the cluster can be modified in the light of empirical research by complementing it with a correlation between vividness and familiarity. Second, we will argue that these correlations can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image.
BibTeX: @article{Tooming2021Vividness, author = {Tooming, Uku and Miyazono, Kengo}, title = {Vividness as a natural kind}, year = {2021}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, number = {1-2}, pages = {3023--3043}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02920-9} }
Trakas, M.	2021	Kinetic memories: An embodied form of remembering the personal past	Journal of Mind and Behavior 42(2) 139-174	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Despite the popularity that the embodied cognition thesis has gained in recent years, memories of events personally experienced are still conceived as disembodied mental representations. It seems that we can consciously remember our personal past through sensory imagery, through concepts, propositions and language, but not through the body. In this article, I defend the idea that the body constitutes a genuine means of representing past personal experiences. For this purpose, I focus on the analysis of bodily movements associated with the retrieval of a personal memory, which have certain features that make them different from procedural memories, pragmatic actions and common gestures, as well as other forms of embodied memories found in recent literature. I refer to these as ''kinetic memories'' and analyse their representative nature as well as their adaptive functions. Kinetic memories are bodily movements in which some event or action that took place in the past can be seen, because they are an externalisation of the subject's inner intention of representing a past personal experience. Kinetic memories represent a past experience sometimes by imitation of a past movement, and other times through embodied symbols and metaphors. Furthermore, although sometimes they present direct pragmatic benefits, such as communicative benefits, they seem to enhance the whole reexperience of the past event and memory recall, which I argue is one important adaptive value.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2021Kinetic, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {Kinetic memories: An embodied form of remembering the personal past}, year = {2021}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {42}, number = {2}, pages = {139--174}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.14184.19206} }
Trakas, M.	2021	No trace beyond their name? Affective memories, a forgotten concept	L'année psychologique/Topics in Cognitive Psychology 121(2) 129-173	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It seems natural to think that emotional experiences associated with a memory of a past event are new and present emotional states triggered by the remembered event. This common conception has nonetheless been challenged at the beginning of the 20th century by intellectuals who considered that emotions can be encoded and retrieved, and that emotional aspects linked to memories of the personal past need not necessarily be new emotional responses caused by the act of recollection. They called these specific kinds of memories "affective memories" and defended their existence. My aim here is to expound both the historical background of this debate, as well as the characterization and development of the notion of affective memory since its first inception. I aim to show that although the debate was left unresolved and the term disappeared from the academic landscape around 1930, many of the characterizations of the nature of emotions and memory advanced by the advocates of affective memory have implicitly reappeared in the scientific agenda and been further developed during the last decades.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2021No, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {No trace beyond their name? Affective memories, a forgotten concept}, year = {2021}, journal = {L'année psychologique/Topics in Cognitive Psychology}, volume = {121}, number = {2}, pages = {129--173}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3917/anpsy1.212.0129} }
Trakas, M.	2021	The sense of mineness in personal memory: Problems for the endorsement model	Estudios de Filosofía 64 155-172	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What does it take for a subject to experience a personal memory as being her own? According to Fernández' (2019) model of endorsement, this particular phenomenal quality of our memories, their ''sense of mineness'', can be explained in terms of the experience of the mnemonic content as veridical. In this article, I criticize this model for two reasons: (a) the evidence that is used by Fernández to ground his theoretical proposal is dubious; and more importantly, (b) the endorsement model does not accommodate many non-pathological everyday memories that preserve their sense of mineness, but whose veridicality is explicitly denied, suspected, not automatically endorsed, or neither denied nor endorsed. Finally, I sketch two alternative explanations: one also problematic, the other one more promising, and present some normative advantages of the latter. This also displays the undesirability of the endorsement model from a normative perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2021sense, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {The sense of mineness in personal memory: Problems for the endorsement model}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {155--172}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a08} }
Van Woerkum, B.	2021	The evolution of episodic-like memory: The importance of biological and ecological constraints	Biology & Philosophy 36(2) 11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A persisting question in the philosophy of animal minds is which nonhuman animals share our capacity for episodic memory (EM). Many authors address this question by primarily defining EM, trying to capture its seemingly unconstrained flexibility and independence from environmental and bodily constraints. EM is therefore often opposed to clearly context-bound capacities like tracking environmental regularities and forming associations. The problem is that conceptualizing EM in humans first, and then reconstructing how humans evolved this capacity, provides little constraints for understanding the evolution of memory abilities in other species: it defines ''genuine'' EM as independent from animals' evolved sensorimotor setup and learning abilities. In this paper, I define memory in terms of perceptual learning: remembering means ''knowing (better) what to do in later situations because of past experience in similar earlier situations''. After that, I explain how episodic memory can likewise be explained in terms of perceptual learning. For this, we should consider that the information in animals' ecological niches is much richer than has hitherto been presumed. Accordingly, instead of asking ''given that environmental stimuli provide insufficient information about the cache, what kind of representation does the jay need?'' we ask ''given that the animal performs in this way, what kind of information is available in the environment?'' My aim is not to give a complete alternative explanation of EM; rather, it is to provide conceptual and methodological tools for more zoocentric comparative EM-research.
BibTeX: @article{Woerkum2021evolution, author = {Van Woerkum, Bas}, title = {The evolution of episodic-like memory: The importance of biological and ecological constraints}, year = {2021}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {36}, number = {2}, pages = {11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-021-09785-3} }
Viera, G.	2021	Feeling the past: Beyond causal content	Estudios de Filosofía 64 173-188	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memories often come with a feeling of pastness. The events we remember strike us as having occurred in our past. What accounts for this feeling of pastness? In his recent book, Memory: A self-referential account, Jordi Fernández argues that the feeling of pastness cannot be grounded in an explicit representation of the pastness of the remembered event. Instead, he argues that the feeling of pastness is grounded in the self-referential causal content of memory. In this paper, I argue that this account falls short. The representation of causal origin does not by itself ground a feeling of pastness. Instead, I argue that we can salvage the temporal localization account of the feeling of pastness by describing a form of egocentric temporal representation that avoids Fernández's criticisms.
BibTeX: @article{Viera2021Feeling, author = {Viera, Gerardo}, title = {Feeling the past: Beyond causal content}, year = {2021}, journal = {Estudios de Filosofía}, volume = {64}, pages = {173--188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n64a09} }
Wolf, Y.	2021	''A memory within change Itself.'' Bergson and the memory theory of temporal experience	Bergsoniana 1		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wolf2021, author = {Wolf, Yaron}, title = {''A memory within change Itself.'' Bergson and the memory theory of temporal experience}, year = {2021}, journal = {Bergsoniana}, volume = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4000/bergsoniana.286} }
Zawadzki, P. and Adamczyk, A.K.	2021	Personality and authenticity in light of the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics	AJOB Neuroscience 12(1) 3-21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There has been a growing interest in research concerning memory modification technologies (MMTs) in recent years. Neuroscientists and psychologists are beginning to explore the prospect of controllable and intentional modification of human memory. One of the technologies with the greatest potential to this end is optogenetics---an invasive neuromodulation technique involving the use of light to control the activity of individual brain cells. It has recently shown the potential to modify specific long-term memories in animal models in ways not yet possible with other MMTs. As the therapeutic potential of optogenetics has already prompted approval of the first human trials, it is especially important and timely to consider the opportunities and dangers this technology may entail. In this article, we focus on possible consequences of optogenetics as an MMT by analyzing fundamental threats potentially associated with memory modifications: the potential disruption of personality and authenticity.
BibTeX: @article{Zawadzki2021Personality, author = {Zawadzki, Przemysław and Adamczyk, Agnieszka K.}, title = {Personality and authenticity in light of the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics}, year = {2021}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {3--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1866097} }
Zawadzki, P. and Adamczyk, A.K.	2021	To remember, or not to remember? Potential impact of memory modification on narrative identity, personal agency, mental health, and well-being	Bioethics 35(9) 891-899	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory modification technologies (MMTs)---interventions within the memory affecting its functions and contents in specific ways---raise great therapeutic hopes but also great fears. Ethicists have expressed concerns that developing and using MMTs may endanger the very fabric of who we are---our personal identity. This threat has been mainly considered in relation to two interrelated concerns: truthfulness and narrative self-constitution. In this article, we propose that although this perspective brings up important matters concerning the potential aftermaths of MMT utilization, it fails to tell the whole story. We suggest that capturing more tangible potential consequences of MMT use, namely, its psychological ramifications is crucial both in ethical considerations and in making decisions regarding the permissibility of such interventions. To this end, we first examine what current MMTs are capable of and what are the prospects of emerging MMTs. Subsequently, we outline the relationship between memory and personal identity; specifically, we indicate that concepts of self-defining memories and narrative identity are crucial to considering how MMTs may influence one's psychological functioning. On this basis, we analyze potential consequences of narrative disruption that may be the result of the use of MMTs; more precisely, we consider its potential effects on mental health, well-being, and personal agency, and outline the ethical dilemmas that decision-makers face in this context. We conclude by considering the broader cultural context that may have influence on policymaking regarding permissibility of memory modification interventions.
BibTeX: @article{Zawadzki2021remember, author = {Zawadzki, Przemysław and Adamczyk, Agnieszka K.}, title = {To remember, or not to remember? Potential impact of memory modification on narrative identity, personal agency, mental health, and well-being}, year = {2021}, journal = {Bioethics}, volume = {35}, number = {9}, pages = {891--899}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12926} }
Zhang, Z.	2021	The imparity of the parity principle	Philosophia 49(5) 2265-2273	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Some recent authors suggest that the extended view fails because it does not follow from functionalism. For although functionalism can tell us whether a system is cognitive, it does not show whether such a newly identified cognitive system can be attributed to the very same subject. I argue that Clark and Chalmers can dodge this attack by claiming that the Parity Principle is essentially an analogy. In their crucial thought experiment, it can be argued that Otto's notebook is similar to Inga's biological memory in that they are functionally equivalent, and it seems that the only relevant difference between them is concerned with their being located inside/outside the skull/skin. Provided that Inga's biological memory is part of Inga's cognition, analogously, Otto's notebook should also be regarded as part of Otto's cognition. However, I argue that this alleged analogy does not hold because the location is not the only difference that matters. Otto's notebook and Inga's biological memory are taken as part of a whole for different reasons, and because of this, they actually belong to different kinds of wholes. Otto's notebook is part of a whole because such a whole functions as a cognitive system, but Inga's biological memory is part of a whole because it is within a ''proper whole'' whose boundary is determined by reproduction. As a result, the analogy does not really work.
BibTeX: @article{Zhang2021imparity, author = {Zhang, Zixia}, title = {The imparity of the parity principle}, year = {2021}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {49}, number = {5}, pages = {2265--2273}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00334-6} }
Adamczyk, A.K. and Zawadzki, P.	2020	The memory-modifying potential of optogenetics and the need for neuroethics	NanoEthics 14(3) 207-225	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation technology involving the use of light to control the activity of individual neurons. Even though optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool whose various implications have not yet been scrutinized, it has already been approved for its first clinical trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively investigated in animal models with the aim of developing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neurological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to consider both the opportunities and dangers such therapies may offer. In this review, we focus on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies (MMTs). We then outline the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans. Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology.
BibTeX: @article{Adamczyk2020memory, author = {Adamczyk, Agnieszka K. and Zawadzki, Przemysław}, title = {The memory-modifying potential of optogenetics and the need for neuroethics}, year = {2020}, journal = {NanoEthics}, volume = {14}, number = {3}, pages = {207--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-020-00377-1} }
Addis, D.R.	2020	Mental time travel? A neurocognitive model of event simulation	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 233-259	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process -- constructive episodic simulation -- and demonstrate that the 'simulation system' meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of 'MTT', suggesting that 'time' and 'travel' may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the 'mental' rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this domain-general simulation system enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.
BibTeX: @article{Addis2020Mental, author = {Addis, Donna Rose}, title = {Mental time travel? A neurocognitive model of event simulation}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {233--259}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00470-0} }
Andonovski, N.	2020	Singularism about episodic memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 335-365	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the philosophy of memory, singularism is the view that episodic memories are singular mental states about unique personally experienced past events. In this paper, I present an empirical challenge to singularism. I examine three distinct lines of evidence from the psychology of memory, concerning general event memories, the transformation of memory traces and the minimized role temporal information plays in major psychological theories of episodic memory. I argue that singularist views will have a hard time accommodating this evidence, facing a problem of transitional gradation. I then look at some potential consequences for the larger debate, highlighting the way in which singularism has featured in three important recent arguments in the philosophy of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2020Singularism, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Singularism about episodic memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {335--365}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00464-y} }
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Michaelian, K.	2020	From collective memory … to collective metamemory?	Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency Springer 195-217	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our aim in this chapter is to delineate the form of shared agency that we take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capacities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition.
BibTeX: @incollection{ArangoMunoz2020collective, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {From collective memory … to collective metamemory?}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency}, editor = {Fiebich, Anika}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {195--217}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29783-1_12} }
Aranyosi, I.	2020	Mental time travel and disjunctivism	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 367-384	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper discusses radical constructivism about episodic memory as developed by Kourken Michaelian under the name of ''simulationism'', a view that equates episodic memory with mental time travel. An alternative, direct realist view is defended, which implies disjunctivism about the appearance of remembering. While admitting the importance of mental time travel as an underlying cognitive mechanism in episodic memory, as well as the prima facie reasonableness of the simulationist's critique of disjunctivism, I formulate three arguments in defense of disjunctivism, which thus appears to be a feasible alternative to radical constructivism.
BibTeX: @article{Aranyosi2020Mental, author = {Aranyosi, István}, title = {Mental time travel and disjunctivism}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {367--384}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00467-9} }
Barkasi, M.	2020	Some hallucinations are experiences of the past	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101(3) 454-488	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past-perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading cues (e.g. 'seeing' Kanizsa triangles), hallucinations of Charles Bonnet Syndrome patients, and dreams are experiences of past-perceived objects.
BibTeX: @article{Barkasi2020Some, author = {Barkasi, Michael}, title = {Some hallucinations are experiences of the past}, year = {2020}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {101}, number = {3}, pages = {454--488}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12320} }
Barkasi, M. and Rosen, M.	2020	Is mental time travel real time travel?	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(1) 1-27	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory (memories of the personal past) and prospecting the future (anticipating events) are often described as mental time travel (MTT). While most use this description metaphorically, we argue that episodic memory may allow for MTT in at least some robust sense. While episodic memory experiences may not allow us to literally travel through time, they do afford genuine awareness of past-perceived events. This is in contrast to an alternative view on which episodic memory experiences present past-perceived events as mere intentional contents. Hence, episodic memory is a way of coming into experiential contact with, or being again aware of, what happened in the past. We argue that episodic memory experiences depend on a causal-informational link with the past events being remembered, and that, assuming direct realism about episodic memory experiences, this link suffices for genuine awareness. Since there is no such link in future prospection, a similar argument cannot be used to show that it also affords genuine awareness of future events. Constructivist views of memory might challenge the idea of memory as genuine awareness of remembered events. We explain how our view is consistent with both constructivist and anti-causalist conceptions of memory. There is still room for an interpretation of episodic memory as enabling genuine awareness of past events, even if it involves reconstruction.
BibTeX: @article{Barkasi2020Is, author = {Barkasi, Michael and Rosen, Melanie}, title = {Is mental time travel real time travel?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {1--27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.1.28} }
Barwich, A.-S.	2020	Smellosophy: What the Nose Tells the Mind	Harvard University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Barwich2020Smellosophy, author = {Barwich, Ann-Sophie}, title = {Smellosophy: What the Nose Tells the Mind}, year = {2020}, publisher = {Harvard University Press} }
Benziman, Y.	2020	Old times' sake as a moral category	Diametros 17 2-9	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the notion of old times' sake, one which is hardly discussed by moral philosophers, and claim that it serves as a moral reason for us to act on behalf of the people we used to cherish: former friends, colleagues, neighbors, or spouses. While our relationship with them has ended, the building-blocks of our identity will continue to bear their fingerprints, and they will ever be an important part of our biography. Acting for old times' sake reflects both our caring about them, and our caring about our own past, biography, and accumulated identity. Why the relationship has ceased will of course affect our attitude towards them. Although old times' sake might not always be a decisive factor, it still serves as a moral reason for action.
BibTeX: @article{Benziman2020Old, author = {Benziman, Yotam}, title = {Old times' sake as a moral category}, year = {2020}, journal = {Diametros}, volume = {17}, pages = {2--9}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1462} }
Berninger, A.	2020	Commemorating public figures ? In favour of a fictionalist position	Journal of Applied Philosophy (5) 793-806	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, I discuss the commemoration of public figures such as Nelson Mandela and Yitzhak Rabin. In many cases, our commemoration of such figures is based on the admiration we feel for them. However, closer inspection reveals that most (if not all) of those we currently honour do not qualify as fitting objects of admiration. Yet, we may still have the strong intuition that we ought to continue commemorating them in this way. I highlight two problems that arise here: the problem that the expressed admiration does not seem appropriate with respect to the object and the problem that continued commemorative practices lead to rationality issues. In response to these issues, I suggest taking a fictionalist position with respect to commemoration. This crucially involves sharply distinguishing between commemorative and other discourses, as well as understanding the objects of our commemorative practices as fictional objects.
BibTeX: @article{Berninger2020Commemorating, author = {Berninger, Anja}, title = {Commemorating public figures ? In favour of a fictionalist position}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy}, number = {5}, pages = {793--806}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12474} }
Bickle, J.	2020	Laser lights and designer drugs: New techniques for descending levels of mechanisms "in a single bound"?	Topics in Cognitive Science 12(4) 1241-1256	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Optogenetics and DREADDs (Designer Receptors Exclusively Activated by Designer Drugs) are important research tools in recent neurobiology. These tools allow unprecedented control over activity in specifically targeted neurons in behaving animals. Two approaches in philosophy of neuroscience, mechanism and ruthless reductionism, provide explicit accounts of experiments and results using tools like these, but each offers a different picture about how levels of mechanisms relate. I argue here that the ruthless reductionist's direct mind-to-cellular/molecular activities linkages ''in a single bound'' better fits with both the experimental designs using these tools and some of the scientists' own judgments about their results than does the mechanist's ''nested hierarchies of mechanisms-within-mechanisms.'' So at least some important work in current neuroscience appears to be ruthlessly reductive. Mechanism may not correctly characterize all current work in neuroscience, despite its recent popularity.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2020Laser, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Laser lights and designer drugs: New techniques for descending levels of mechanisms "in a single bound"?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {1241--1256}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12452} }
Bortolotti, L.	2020	The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bortolotti2020Epistemic, author = {Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs}, year = {2020}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Boyle, A.	2020	The impure phenomenology of episodic memory	Mind & Language 35(5) 641-660	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves ''mentally reliving'' a past event. It has been suggested that characterising episodic memory in terms of this phenomenology makes it impossible to test for in animals, because ''purely phenomenological features'' cannot be detected in animal behaviour. Against this, I argue that episodic memory's phenomenological features are impure, having both subjective and objective aspects, and so can be behaviourally detected. Insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory consequently does nothing to damage the prospects for detecting it in nonhuman animals.
BibTeX: @article{Boyle2020impure, author = {Boyle, Alexandria}, title = {The impure phenomenology of episodic memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {35}, number = {5}, pages = {641--660}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12261} }
Brown, O.	2020	Habit as resistance: Bergson's philosophy of second nature	European Journal of Philosophy 28(2) 394-409	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Henri Bergson is one of the few philosophers who both explicitly and extensively discusses the phenomenon of habit. In view of his engagement with habit, does Bergson develop a philosophically robust account of the phenomenon? Most commentary on his account of habit refers to his early work, Matter and Memory. In this paper, I begin by arguing that Bergson's treatment of habit in Matter and Memory is problematic because it does not adequately differentiate between habit and material nature. Despite its neglect in secondary literature, Bergson also discusses habit in the first part of his final book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. With respect to this book, I subsequently show how Bergson deploys Ravaisson's distinction between instinct and habit to reconceptualize habit as the second of our two natures, our social nature. Lastly, I reconstruct Bergson's late contribution to the philosophy of habit: rather than a tendency that is hard to resist, habit is a resistance to which we tend to submit. By shedding light on the effort that we expend to adhere to them, Bergson's resistance account of habit advances an original and productive perspective on our social habits.
BibTeX: @article{Brown2020Habit, author = {Brown, Olivia}, title = {Habit as resistance: Bergson's philosophy of second nature}, year = {2020}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {28}, number = {2}, pages = {394--409}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12454} }
Candiotto, L.	2020	The divine feeling: The epistemic function of erotic desire in Plato's theory of recollection	Philosophia 48(2) 445-462	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the so-called ''erotic dialogues'', especially the Symposium and the Phaedrus, Plato explained why erotic desire can play an epistemic function, establishing a strong connection between erotic desire and beauty, ''the most clearly visible and the most loved'' (Phaedr. 250e1) among the Ideas. Taking the erotic dialogues as a background, in this paper I elucidate Plato's explanation in another context, the one of the Phaedo (72e3-77a5), for discussing the epistemic function of erotic desire in relation to the deficiency argument and the affinity argument. My claim is that the erotic desire of the philosopher is activated by the recognition of traces of the Ideas as something that the material world lacks and that, nevertheless, his soul is familiar with. This desire for the Ideas triggers the process of recollection, and thus erotic desire acquires a decisive role in the acquisition of knowledge in the Phaedo. In the final section of the paper, I highlight the contemporary relevance of Plato's epistemology of erotic desire.
BibTeX: @article{Candiotto2020divine, author = {Candiotto, Laura}, title = {The divine feeling: The epistemic function of erotic desire in Plato's theory of recollection}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {48}, number = {2}, pages = {445--462}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00108-1} }
Carter, J.A. and Kallestrup, J.	2020	Varieties of cognitive integration	Noûs 54(4) 867-890	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration---cluster-model functionalism---which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.
BibTeX: @article{Carter2020Varieties, author = {Carter, J. Adam and Kallestrup, Jesper}, title = {Varieties of cognitive integration}, year = {2020}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {54}, number = {4}, pages = {867--890}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12288} }
Clowes, R.W.	2020	The internet extended person: Exoself or doppelganger?	Límite \| Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología 15(22) 1-23	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As the Internet becomes the pervasive background to so many of our cognitive activities, it moves beyond simply being a tool and becomes a new sort of cognitive ecology. Our deepening reliance upon it, reshapes many of our cognitive activities and this provokes profound changes in our sense of self and agency, even in who and what at we are as persons In the process we may be becoming Internet Extended Persons. This article uses some of the theoretical resources of 4E cognitive science to explore a central dilemma: What is the philosophical significance of these changes for us as persons? Should we view at least some Internet systems and applications as potential extensions of ourselves, both as persons and agents: as genuine extended selves, or, Exoselves? Or is it better to see the profiles and personalized systems as, merely appearing to contribute to our cognitive profile, but really undermining our sense of ourselves, our coherence, our agency, and perhaps ultimately our identity as persons? Might our interactions with the Internet really be creating dopplegangers rather than exoselves? This paper discusses the possibilities and constraints of the existence of exoselves and whether the Internet (or the Cloud) serves as a good substrate for extending persons.
BibTeX: @article{Clowes2020internet, author = {Clowes, Robert W.}, title = {The internet extended person: Exoself or doppelganger?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Límite \| Revista Interdisciplinaria de Filosofía y Psicología}, volume = {15}, number = {22}, pages = {1--23} }
Coninx, S.	2020	Pain, amnesia, and qualitative memory: Conceptual and empirical challenges	Journal of Consciousness Studies 27(11-12) 126-133	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Barbara Montero considers whether or not we are able to remember what pain feels like. In order to properly answer this question, she introduces a new type of memory called 'qualitative memory', which seems common to exteroceptive sensations. Having concluded that there is arguably no qualitative memory for pain and other bodily sensations, Montero considers possible philosophical implications for areas including rational choice-making and empathy. In addressing the relationship between pain and memory, the paper raises an issue that has not received much attention and indicates various interesting fields of research for which the apparent inability to remember pain might prove relevant. My comment primarily focuses on the core concepts of pain and qualitative memory which are foundational for the paper. I argue that a deeper engagement with some key aspects of these concepts is necessary. A more fine-grained discussion could have made Montero's argument more convincing.
BibTeX: @article{Coninx2020Pain, author = {Coninx, Sabrina}, title = {Pain, amnesia, and qualitative memory: Conceptual and empirical challenges}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {27}, number = {11-12}, pages = {126--133} }
Cosentino, E.	2020	Self-control, mental time travel, and the temporally extended self	Surrounding Self-Control Oxford University Press 434-451		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Cosentino2020Self, author = {Cosentino, Erica}, title = {Self-control, mental time travel, and the temporally extended self}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Surrounding Self-Control}, editor = {Mele, A.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {434--451}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500941.003.0023} }
Cowan, R.	2020	The puzzle of moral memory	Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 202-228	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: Apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: Consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja's (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn't superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.
BibTeX: @article{Cowan2020puzzle, author = {Cowan, Robert}, title = {The puzzle of moral memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Moral Philosophy}, volume = {17}, pages = {202--228}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20192914} }
Craver, C.F.	2020	Remembering: Epistemic and empirical	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 261-281	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The construct ''remembering'' is equivocal between an epistemic sense, denoting a distinctive ground for knowledge, and empirical sense, denoting the typical behavior of a neurocognitive mechanism. Because the same kind of equivocation arises for other psychologistic terms (such as believe, decide, know, judge, decide, infer and reason), the effort to spot and remedy the confusion in the case of remembering might prove generally instructive. The failure to allow these two senses of remembering equal play in their respective domains leads, I argue, to unnecessary confusion about memory externalism, the possibility of episodic memory in non-human species, and the thesis of memory continuism. By distinguishing these equivocal senses of remembering, we thus gain leverage on understanding how the distinctive epistemic norms that define many of our psychologic terms are more plausibly related to the capacities studied by empirical science, given that neither identity nor elimination are possible.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2020Remembering, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Remembering: Epistemic and empirical}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {261--281}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00469-7} }
Crone, K.	2020	The self-understanding of persons beyond narrativity	Philosophical Explorations 23(1) 65-77	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Some narrative approaches assume a tight relation between narrative and selfhood. They hold that the self-understanding of persons as individuals possessing a set of particular character traits is above all narratively structured for it is constituted by stories persons tell or can tell about their lives. Against this view, it is argued that self-understanding is also characterized by certain non-narrative and invariant mental features. In order to show this, a non-narrative awareness of self-identity over time will be analyzed. It will be argued that this basic form of awareness plays a fundamental role for the possibility of a richer form of self-understanding.
BibTeX: @article{Crone2020self, author = {Crone, Katja}, title = {The self-understanding of persons beyond narrativity}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {65--77}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2020.1711961} }
Dantas, D.F.	2020	Two informational theories of memory: A case from memory-conjunction errors	Disputatio 12(59) 395-431	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The causal and simulation theories are often presented as very distinct views about declarative memory, their major difference lying on the causal condition. The causal theory states that remembering involves an accurate representation causally connected to an earlier experience (the causal condition). In the simulation theory, remembering involves an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process (no causal condition). I investigate how to construe detailed versions of these theories that correctly classify memory errors (DRM, ''lost in the mall'', and memory-conjunction errors) as misremembering or confabulation. Neither causalists nor simulationists have paid attention to memory-conjunction errors, which is unfortunate because both theories have problems with these cases. The source of the difficulty is the background assumption that an act of remembering has one (and only one) target. I fix these theories for those cases. The resulting versions are closely related when implemented using tools of information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides us with insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors have a privileged position.
BibTeX: @article{Dantas2020Two, author = {Dantas, Danilo Fraga}, title = {Two informational theories of memory: A case from memory-conjunction errors}, year = {2020}, journal = {Disputatio}, volume = {12}, number = {59}, pages = {395--431}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2020-0019} }
De Brigard, F.	2020	Do we need another kind of memory?	Journal of Consciousness Studies 27(11-12) 134-178			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2020Do, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Do we need another kind of memory?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {27}, number = {11-12}, pages = {134--178} }
De Brigard, F.	2020	The explanatory indispensability of memory traces	The Harvard Review of Philosophy 27 7-21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: During the first half of the twentieth century, many philosophers of memory opposed the postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued that even if one were to buy Martin and Deutscher's argument for causal claims, we still don't need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between realists and an- ti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists' arguments amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm's anti-realist strategy consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as good as those that do. But then, contra Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I of- fer a causal model based on an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the neuroscience of memory.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2020explanatory, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {The explanatory indispensability of memory traces}, year = {2020}, journal = {The Harvard Review of Philosophy}, volume = {27}, pages = {7--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview2019261} }
Dinges, A.	2020	Relativism and conservatism	Erkenntnis 85(4) 757-772	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Relativism and contextualism have been suggested as candidate semantics for ''knowledge'' sentences. I argue that relativism faces a problem concerning the preservation of beliefs in memory. Contextualism has been argued to face a similar problem. I argue that contextualists, unlike relativists, can respond to the concern. The overall upshot is that contextualism is superior to relativism in at least one important respect.
BibTeX: @article{Dinges2020Relativism, author = {Dinges, Alexander}, title = {Relativism and conservatism}, year = {2020}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {85}, number = {4}, pages = {757--772}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0047-z} }
Dorato, M. and Wittmann, M.	2020	The phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience of experienced temporality	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19(4) 747-771	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We discuss the three dominant models of the phenomenological literature pertaining to temporal consciousness, namely the cinematic, the retentional, and the extensional model. This is first done by presenting the distinction between acts and contents of consciousness and the assumptions underlying the different models concerning both the extendedness and duration of these two components. Secondly, we elaborate on the consequences related to whether a perspective of direct or indirect realism about temporal perceptions is assumed. Finally, we review some relevant findings from the psychology and neuroscience of temporality in order to decide which of the three models of time consciousness is better confirmed from an empirical viewpoint. Depending on the time scale, all three models of temporal consciousness might apply. We specifically argue in favor of an extensional model of time consciousness for the experienced present where the acts and contents of consciousness are both extended. The retentional model might apply to longer time intervals covered by working memory. In addition, a predictive component is highlighted as decisive for an understanding of temporality.
BibTeX: @article{Dorato2020phenomenology, author = {Dorato, Mauro and Wittmann, Marc}, title = {The phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience of experienced temporality}, year = {2020}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {19}, number = {4}, pages = {747--771}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09651-4} }
Doyle, C.	2020	Remembering what is right	Philosophical Explorations 23(1) 49-64	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle's on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.
BibTeX: @article{Doyle2020Remembering, author = {Doyle, Casey}, title = {Remembering what is right}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {49--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2020.1711959} }
Dranseika, V.	2020	False memories and quasi-memories are memories	Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (Volume 3) Oxford University Press 175-188		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dranseika2020False, author = {Dranseika, Vilius}, title = {False memories and quasi-memories are memories}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy (Volume 3)}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {175--188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852407.003.0008} }
Eldridge, P.	2020	The act of forgetting: Husserl on the constitution of the absent past	Springer, 53 401-417	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I advance a phenomenology of forgetting based on Husserl’s accounts of time-consciousness and passive synthesis. This theory of forgetting is crucial for understand- ing the transcendental constitution of the past. I argue that without forgetting, neither memory nor retention suffice for a consciousness of the past as past, since both are irreducibly connected to the Living Present. After an initial survey of the challenges that confront a phenomenology of forgetting (i.e. the “forgotten” is defined by its lack of phenomenality), I provide a descriptive analysis of forgetting as a complex process that integrates an accomplishment of retention that Husserl called “temporal contraction” with an accomplishment of passive synthesis that Husserl called “affective fusion.” Temporal contraction is the accomplishment that creates a qualitative (not quantitative) distinction between near-retentions and far-retentions. Affective fusion enables us to provide a positive (not privative) phenomenological description of the withdrawal of egoic investment in intentional experiences. Taken together, these two syntheses generate a double concealment in which consciousness both forgets its object and forgets that it has forgotten it, thereby constituting it as part of the truly absent past.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2020Act, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {The act of forgetting: Husserl on the constitution of the absent past}, year = {2020}, journal = {Springer,}, volume = {53}, pages = {401--417}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-020-09501-0} }
Fernández, J.	2020	Self-referential memory and mental time travel	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 283-300	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can shed some light on the experience of mental time travel. This is the view that, when a subject remembers some fact episodically, their memory represents itself as coming from a perception of that fact. I propose that the experience of mental time travel in memory is the experience of representing one of the elements in this complex content, namely, the past perceptual experience of the remembered fact. In defence of this proposal, I offer two considerations. Firstly, the proposal is consistent with the idea that memories enjoy a temporal phenomenology (specifically, a feeling of pastness). Secondly, the proposal is consistent with the possibility that some of our other cognitive capacities might yield an experience of mental time travel which can be oriented towards the future. I argue that the received conception of mental time travel is in tension with those two ideas.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2020Self, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Self-referential memory and mental time travel}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {283--300}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-019-00453-w} }
Ferrández-Formoso, R.	2020	'I have regained memory' (smd rtir labdhā): The Bhagavad Gītā as a parrhesiastic journey against forgetfulness	Comparative Philosophy 11(2) 36-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper proposes an interdisciplinary reading of the Bhagavad G\itā, presenting it as a parrhesiastic dialogue between Kd rd sd na and Arjuna, and focusing on the importance attached to memory. Foucault's studies on the exercise of parrhesia ("true speech") in the Greco-Roman context, but also Heidegger's views on the original memory, and Abhinavagupta's commentary to the Bhagavad G\itā have been used as important tools of interpretation. Devotion is described as the constant memory of Kd rd sd na, through which the practitioner succeeds in substituting some subconscious dispositions (sad mskāras) for others, building a psychic memory that allows for liberation at the time of death. On the one hand, Kd rd sd na's goal is to awaken transcendental memory in Arjuna, on the other, at the end of the G\itā we are invited to remember and study this sacred conversation. This leads us to establish a comparison between the use of memory promoted in the Bhagavad G\itā and in the Epicurean school, highlighting important similarities and differences between the two pedagogies.
BibTeX: @article{FerrandezFormoso2020I, author = {Ferrández-Formoso, Raquel}, title = {'I have regained memory' (smd rtir labdhā): The Bhagavad Gītā as a parrhesiastic journey against forgetfulness}, year = {2020}, journal = {Comparative Philosophy}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {36--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2020).110205} }
Fuchs, T.	2020	Time, the body, and the other in phenomenology and psychopathology	Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches Cambridge University Press 12-40		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fuchs2020Time, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Time, the body, and the other in phenomenology and psychopathology}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches}, editor = {Tewes, C. and Stanghellini, G.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {12--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108776660} }
Garrocho, D.S.	2020	Mythological sources of oblivion and memory	Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 35(1) 105-120	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this work, I present a selection of mythological and cultural insights from Ancient Greece that make our ambiguous relationship with memory and oblivion explicit. From Plato to Dante, or from Orphism to Nietzsche, and even today, the experiences of memory and forgetting appear as two sides of one essential nucleus in our cultural tradition in general and in the history of philosophy in particular. I intend to present a panoramic view of the main mythological sources that mention these two experiences as well as their unequal consideration. I will thus stress the personifications of both figures, taking up their features and the moral, gnoseological, and even political implications that historically have been associated with them. This is especially apparent in the strong Platonic legacy latent in the history of philosophy, where every time it insists on defining knowledge as a form of memory, the peculiar attributes of forgetting unexpectedly surface, not as a mistake or cognitive error, but as an experience which is truly saving and therapeutic.
BibTeX: @article{Garrocho2020Mythological, author = {Garrocho, Diego S.}, title = {Mythological sources of oblivion and memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy}, volume = {35}, number = {1}, pages = {105--120}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134417-00351p11} }
Genot, E.J. and Jacot, J.	2020	The brain attics: The strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry	Synthese 197 1203-1224	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: M. B. Hintikka (1939--1987) and J. Hintikka (1929--2016) claimed that their reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can ''serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory'' (1983, p. 159). The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strate- gies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the 'Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' allows to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a contin- uum of behavioral strategies.
BibTeX: @article{Genot2020brain, author = {Genot, Emmanuel J. and Jacot, Justine}, title = {The brain attics: The strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry}, year = {2020}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {197}, pages = {1203--1224}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1743-6} }
Griakalov, A.	2020	Philosophy of the event and hermeneutics of memory: Evidence of assertion	Russian Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century: An Anthology Brill 136-151		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Griakalov2020Philosophy, author = {Griakalov, Aleksei}, title = {Philosophy of the event and hermeneutics of memory: Evidence of assertion}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Russian Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century: An Anthology}, editor = {Sergeev, Mikhail and Chumakov, Alexander and Theis, Mary}, publisher = {Brill}, pages = {136--151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004432543_015} }
Grünbaum, T. and Kyllingsbæk, S.	2020	Is remembering to do a special kind of memory?	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 385-404	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When a person decides to do something in the future, she forms an intention and her intention persists. Philosophers have thought about the rational requirement that an agent's intention persists until its execution. But philosophers have neglected to think about the causal memory mechanisms that could enable this kind of persistence and its role in rational long-term agency. Our aim of this paper is to fill this gap by arguing that memory for intention is a specific kind of memory. We do this by evaluating and rejecting standard declarative accounts of memory for intention and arguing for the plausibility of an alternative model of memory for intention. We argue for the alternative by spelling out a number of computational principles that could enable retaining and retrieving intentions from long-term memory. These principles could explain a number of core features of intentions.
BibTeX: @article{Gruenbaum2020Is, author = {Grünbaum, Thor and Kyllingsbæk, Søren}, title = {Is remembering to do a special kind of memory?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {385--404}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00479-5} }
Heersmink, R.	2020	Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory	Mind & Language 37(4) 659-673	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2020Extended, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Extended mind and artifactual autobiographical memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {37}, number = {4}, pages = {659--673}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12353} }
Heersmink, R.	2020	Narrative niche construction: Memory ecologies and distributed narrative identities	Biology & Philosophy 35(5) 53	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memories of our personal past are the building blocks of our narrative identity. So, when we depend on objects and other people to remember and construct our per- sonal past, our narrative identity is distributed across our embodied brains and an ecology of environmental resources. This paper uses a cognitive niche construction approach to conceptualise how we engineer our memory ecology and construct our distributed narrative identities. It does so by identifying three types of niche con- struction processes that govern how we interact with our memory ecology, namely creating, editing, and using resources in our memory ecology. It also conceptualises how identity-relevant information in objects and (family) stories is transmitted ver- tically, i.e., across generations of people. Identifying these processes allows us to better understand the cultural information trajectories that constitute our memory ecologies. In short, what I'll argue is that our memory ecology scaffolds our narra- tive identity and that engineering our memory ecology is a form of narrative niche construction. Keywords
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2020Narrative, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Narrative niche construction: Memory ecologies and distributed narrative identities}, year = {2020}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {35}, number = {5}, pages = {53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-020-09770-2} }
Heersmink, R.	2020	Varieties of the extended self	Consciousness and Cognition 85 103001	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article provides an overview and analysis of recent work on the extended self, demonstrating that the boundaries of selves are fluid, shifting across biological, artifactual, and sociocultural structures. First, it distinguishes the notions of minimal self, person, and narrative self. Second, it surveys how philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists argue that embodiment, cognition, emotion, consciousness, and moral character traits can be extended and what that implies for the boundaries of selves. It also reviews and responds to various criticisms and counterarguments against the extended self. The main focus is on the link between the extended mind and extended self, which has received the most attention in recent literature. But accounts of the extended self developed independently of the extended mind are also briefly discussed. This article ends by drawing out some of the conceptual, methodological, and normative implications of the extended self and suggesting some directions for future research.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2020Varieties, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Varieties of the extended self}, year = {2020}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {85}, pages = {103001}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103001} }
Heersmink, R. and Carter, J.A.	2020	The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values	Memory Studies 13(4) 416-433	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory technologies are cultural artifacts that scaffold, transform, and are interwoven with human biological memory systems. The goal of this article is to provide a systematic and integrative survey of their philosophical dimensions, including their metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical dimensions, drawing together debates across the humanities, cognitive sciences, and social sciences. Metaphysical dimensions of memory technologies include their function, the nature of their informational properties, ways of classifying them, and their ontological status. Epistemological dimensions include the truth-conduciveness of external memory, the conditions under which external memory counts as knowledge, and the metacognitive monitoring of external memory processes. Finally, ethical and normative dimensions include the desirability of the effects memory technologies have on biological memory, their effects on self and culture, and their moral status. While the focus in the article is largely philosophical and conceptual, empirical issues such as the way we interact with memory technologies in various contexts are also discussed. We thus take a naturalistic approach in which philosophical and empirical concepts and approaches are seen as continuous.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2020philosophy, author = {Heersmink, Richard and Carter, J. Adam}, title = {The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values}, year = {2020}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {13}, number = {4}, pages = {416--433}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017703810} }
Heersmink, R. and Sutton, J.	2020	Cognition and the web: Extended, transactive, or scaffolded?	Erkenntnis 85(1) 139-164	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cognitive analysis.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2020Cognition, author = {Heersmink, Richard and Sutton, John}, title = {Cognition and the web: Extended, transactive, or scaffolded?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {139--164}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0022-8} }
Hill, C.S.	2020	Consciousness and memory	The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness Oxford University Press 520-537	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter is concerned with relationships between three forms of consciousness and three types of memory. The three forms of consciousness are introspective consciousnessaccess consciousnessand phenomenal consciousness.There are three types of memory that are arguably connected, either directly or indirectly, with one or more of the aforementioned forms of consciousness—long-term memory, working memory, and iconic memory. The chapter will consider the relationship between each type of consciousness and each type of memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Hill2020Consciousness, author = {Hill, Christopher S.}, title = {Consciousness and memory}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness}, editor = {Kriegel, Uriah}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {520-537}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.24} }
Holden, T.	2020	Normative reconstruction and social memory: Honneth and Ricoeur	Continental Philosophy Review 53(2) 157-181	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Normative reconstruction is a form of immanent critique which judges society in terms of values which are already institutionalized and implicitly expressed across everyday forms of interaction. Honneth, for his part, reads the value of social freedom into the normative grammar of modern institutions and anticipates further advances towards its institutionalization. Many have voiced doubts over the extent to which the model of normative reconstruction which Honneth proposes is solidly anchored in social reality: at worst, it is argued, this reality is resistant to reconstruction in terms of the value of social freedom; at best, it is too susceptible to multiple readings to allow for such a reconstruction. I seek to respond to these charges, while also testing the reach of Ricoeur's understanding of the philosophical anthropological idea of indebtedness to the past, by following up on Honneth's appeal to a horizon of social memory in response to his own uncertainties over the viability of normative reconstruction. More generally, I seek to arrive at a better understanding of the capacity of memory to orientate social critique within a shifting historical landscape.
BibTeX: @article{Holden2020Normative, author = {Holden, Terence}, title = {Normative reconstruction and social memory: Honneth and Ricoeur}, year = {2020}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {53}, number = {2}, pages = {157--181}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-020-09486-w} }
Høffding, S. and Montero, B.G.	2020	Not being there: An analysis of expertise-induced amnesia	Mind & Language 35(5) 621-640	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It has been hypothesized that postperformance memory gaps occur in highly skilled individuals because experts generally perform their skills without conscious attention. In contrast, we hypothesize that such memory gaps may occur when performers focus so intently on their unfolding actions that their ongoing attention interferes with long-term memory formation of what was previously attended to, or when performers are highly focused on aspects of their bodily skills that are not readily put into words. In neither case, we argue, does performance proceed automatically yet both situations, we suggest, may lead to an inability to recollect performance.
BibTeX: @article{Hoeffding2020Not, author = {Høffding, Simon and Montero, Barbara Gail}, title = {Not being there: An analysis of expertise-induced amnesia}, year = {2020}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {35}, number = {5}, pages = {621--640}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12260} }
Ingerslev, L.R.	2020	On the role of habit for self-understanding	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19(3) 481-497	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An action is typically carried out over time, unified by an intention that is known to the agent under some description. In some of our habitual doings, however, we are often not aware of what or why we do as we do. Not knowing this, we must ask what kind of agency is at stake in these habitual doings, if any. This paper aims to show how habitual doings can still be considered actions of a subject even while they involve a sense of involuntariness and there is a temporal displacement in the self-understanding they afford. It turns out that in some forms of habitual agency, we do not have the relevant intentional description at hand when we are engaged in the process of doing what we so typically do; on the contrary, such a description can only be appropriated with effort and subsequent to the time of the action. I will focus on two approaches to habits, broadly construed; a phenomenological and an action theoretic one, and I will suggest that both approaches focus too narrowly on a synchronic relation between habitual action and self-understanding. I will suggest that we need a diachronic account of the potential for self-understanding required for agency that allows us to explain the experience of diminished control and alienation involved in certain of our habitual actions. The suggested perspective enables us to explain how some habits can be experienced as both momentarily involuntary and unconscious while at the same time they play a significant role for self-understanding.
BibTeX: @article{Ingerslev2020role, author = {Ingerslev, Line Ryberg}, title = {On the role of habit for self-understanding}, year = {2020}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {481--497}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9605-8} }
Jennings, C.D.	2020	The Attending Mind	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Jennings2020Attending, author = {Jennings, Carolyn Dicey}, title = {The Attending Mind}, year = {2020}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Kobyliŉski, A.	2020	Just and unjust memory? The moral obligation to remember all victims of wars and totalitarian regimes	Journal of Military Ethics 19(2) 151-162	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to analyze the philosophical problem of just and unjust memory. There is a general consensus about commemorating fallen soldiers and killed civilians. But, unfortunately, our human memory of such victims is often incomplete. Some victims are remembered, others are not--maybe very few even want to remember the latter. It turns out that in our world, not only wars may be just or unjust, but also the memory of their victims. In this context, a serious problem is the unequal memory of crimes perpetrated by Nazism and Communism in the last century, denying several dozen million victims of the latter totalitarian system their due place in the collective awareness of mankind. Therefore, one of the most important aspects of the ethical analysis of wars and totalitarian regimes should be the moral obligation to commemorate all victims in a just way.
BibTeX: @article{Kobylinski2020Just, author = {Kobyliŉski, Andrzej}, title = {Just and unjust memory? The moral obligation to remember all victims of wars and totalitarian regimes}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Military Ethics}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {151--162}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2020.1797987} }
Kraft, T.	2020	Brains in a vat and memory: How (not) to respond to Putnam's argument	Belgrade Philosophical Annual 33 39-53	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Putnam's argument that we are not brains in a vat has recently seen a resurgence in interest. Although objections to it are legion, an emerging consensus seems to be that even if it successfully refutes one version of the brain in a vat scenario, lifelong envatment, it is powerless against a different one, recent envatment. Although initially appealing, I argue in this paper that this response -- merely replacing lifelong envatment by recent envatment -- is a bad response to Putnam's argument. Yet there's a different version of the brain in a vat scenario, recent memory-altering envatment, that Putnam's argument doesn't refute and is also sufficiently radical. The crucial issue turns out to be which epistemic sources sceptical scenarios may attack. I argue that there's no convincing reason for exempting memory from the sceptical attack: Sceptical scenarios must target memory to be sufficiently radical and they can do so without violating any constraint on sceptical scenarios. In the end Putnam's argument doesn't fail because of some 'deep' philosophical mistake, but because it overlooks how flexible and adjustable sceptical scenarios are.
BibTeX: @article{Kraft2020Brains, author = {Kraft, Tim}, title = {Brains in a vat and memory: How (not) to respond to Putnam's argument}, year = {2020}, journal = {Belgrade Philosophical Annual}, volume = {33}, pages = {39--53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5937/bpa2033039k} }
Leyva, A.	2020	A phenomenological and physiological approach to embodied Rilkean sport-specific perception	Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 14(1) 62-75	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a recent paper, I developed and introduced embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge into the current sports knowledge philosophical debate. The existence of embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge was proven using neuroscience. Specifically, I used plasticity, or the body's precise and individualized neuromuscular adaptations to sport-specific movements, to show that the Rilkean embodiment process takes place. In this paper, I will draw on the recent work, using the plasticity concept to prove the existence of embodied Rilkean sport-specific perception. I use the phenomenological tradition to provide a description of how some of an athlete's mental processes are embodied (brain and peripheral neuromuscular structures) and extended to what she does in and to her environment. Finally, this paper addresses the current perceptual learning philosophical debate. It shows that embodied Rilkean sport-specific perception plays a generative and preservative epistemic role and that it supports cognitive penetrability, or the idea that knowledge affects how we see the world.
BibTeX: @article{Leyva2020phenomenological, author = {Leyva, Arturo}, title = {A phenomenological and physiological approach to embodied Rilkean sport-specific perception}, year = {2020}, journal = {Sport, Ethics and Philosophy}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {62--75}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2018.1535522} }
Liivoja, R. and Kroes, M.C.W.	2020	Memory modification as treatment for PTSD: Neuroscientific reality and ethical concerns	Ethics of Medical Innovation, Experimentation, and Enhancement in Military and Humanitarian Contexts Springer 211-234		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Liivoja2020Memory, author = {Liivoja, Rain and Kroes, Marijn C. W.}, title = {Memory modification as treatment for PTSD: Neuroscientific reality and ethical concerns}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Ethics of Medical Innovation, Experimentation, and Enhancement in Military and Humanitarian Contexts}, editor = {Messelken, D. and Winkler, D.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {211--234}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36319-2_13} }
Lin, Y.-T.	2020	The experience of being oneself in memory: Exploring sense of identity via observer memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 405-422	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain a sense of identity---the experience of our recollection structurally resembles our perception of the original event. However, given the phenomenon of observer memory, in which our visual perspective is decoupled from our embodied dimension, it is unclear whether it is the observing or the embodied one that is identified. This phenomenon is important not only in illustrating the complexity of identification but also in assessing how best to address it. In this paper, the issue is analyzed through concepts introduced from the literature on bodily self-consciousness. The potential approaches to addressing the issue of identification are examined, including the inheritance view, according to which the identification relies on the inheritance of mnemonic content from the original experience. I propose and argue for the self-simulation view, which suggests that what results in the experience of ''I am this'' in memory is the observing and the embodied dimensions as well as the relation between them, which enable different ways of projecting oneself into an episodic simulation.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2020experience, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {The experience of being oneself in memory: Exploring sense of identity via observer memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {405--422}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00468-8} }
Liv, N. and Greenbaum, D.	2020	Deep fakes and memory malleability: False memories in the service of fake news	AJOB Neuroscience 11(2) 96-104	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Deep fakes have rapidly emerged as one of the most ominous concerns within modern society. The ability to easily and cheaply generate convincing images, audio, and video via artificial intelligence will have repercussions within politics, privacy, law, security, and broadly across all of society. In light of the widespread apprehension, numerous technological efforts aim to develop tools to distinguish between reliable audio/video and the fakes. These tools and strategies will be particularly effective for consumers when their guard is naturally up, for example during election cycles. However, recent research suggests that not only can deep fakes create credible representations of reality, but they can also be employed to create false memories. Memory malleability research has been around for some time, but it relied on doctored photographs or text to generate fraudulent recollections. These recollected but fake memories take advantage of our cognitive miserliness that favors selecting those recalled memories that evoke our preferred weltanschauung. Even responsible consumers can be duped when false but belief-consistent memories, implanted when we are least vigilant can, like a Trojan horse, be later elicited at crucial dates to confirm our pre-determined biases and influence us to accomplish nefarious goals. This paper seeks to understand the process of how such memories are created, and, based on that, proposing ethical and legal guidelines for the legitimate use of fake technologies.
BibTeX: @article{Liv2020Deep, author = {Liv, Nadine and Greenbaum, Dov}, title = {Deep fakes and memory malleability: False memories in the service of fake news}, year = {2020}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {96--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1740351} }
Lowney, C.W., Levy, S.D., Meroney, W. and Gayler, R.W.	2020	Connecting twenty-first century connectionism and Wittgenstein	Philosophia 48(2) 643-671	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: By pointing to deep philosophical confusions endemic to cognitive science, Wittgenstein might seem an enemy of computational approaches. We agree (with Mills 1993) that while Wittgenstein would reject the classicist's symbols and rules approach, his observations align well with connectionist or neural network approaches. While many connectionisms that dominated the later twentieth century could fall prey to criticisms of biological, pedagogical, and linguistic implausibility, current connectionist approaches can resolve those problems in a Wittgenstein-friendly manner. We (a) present the basics of a Vector Symbolic Architecture formalism, inspired by Smolensky (1990), and indicate how high-dimensional vectors can operate in a context-sensitive and object-independent manner in biologically plausible time scales, reflecting Wittgenstein's notions of language-games and family resemblance; we (b) show how ''soft'' symbols for such a formalism can be formed with plausible learning cycles using Sparse Distributed Memory, resolving disputes surrounding Wittgenstein's private language argument; and (c) show how connectionist networks can extrapolate meaningful patterns to solve problems, providing ''ways to go on'' without explicit rules, which indicates linguistic plausibility. Connectionism thus provides a systematicity and productivity that is more than a mere implementation of a classical approach, and provides Wittgenstein-friendly and Wittgenstein-illuminating models of Mind & Language for cognitive science.
BibTeX: @article{Lowney2020Connecting, author = {Lowney, Charles W. and Levy, Simon D. and Meroney, William and Gayler, Ross W.}, title = {Connecting twenty-first century connectionism and Wittgenstein}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {48}, number = {2}, pages = {643--671}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00154-9} }
Mac Cumhaill, C.	2020	Still life, a mirror: Phasic memory and re-encounters with artworks	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 423-446	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Re-encountering certain kinds of artworks in the present (re-listening to music, re-reading novels) can often occasion a kind of recollection akin to episodic recollection, but which may be better cast as 'phasic', at least insofar as one can be said to remember 'what it was like' to be oneself at some earlier stage or phase in one's personal history. The kinds of works that prompt such recollection, I call 'still lives' - they are limited wholes whose formal properties are stable over time. In the first part of the paper, I spell out a way of making sense of the peculiar power that certain artworks have to occasion such recollection -- it is, as I explain, a power or ductus that derives from the form of the artwork, though possession of such a power is not limited to art. I then detail three dimensions along which episodic recollection and phasic recollection as occasioned by re-encountering 'still lives' differ: metaphysical, phenomenological, and descriptive. In the second half, I explore a challenge for my account of phasic recollection, which in turn helps make more vivid my proposal as well as the spectral analogy at the heart of it: Just as one can see regions behind one by looking in the direction of a mirror located in the same space in which one is, sometimes by re-encountering certain kinds of artworks now, past intervals or phases 'behind one' can be 'made present' in a way that the paper aims to make plain. I also explain to what extent phasic recollection might be understood as a form of mental time travel, and what the attendant phenomenology of 'transportation' involves.
BibTeX: @article{MacCumhaill2020Still, author = {Mac Cumhaill, Clare}, title = {Still life, a mirror: Phasic memory and re-encounters with artworks}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {423--446}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00472-y} }
Mahr, J.B.	2020	The dimensions of episodic simulation	Cognition 196 104085	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Human adults possess the extraordinary ability to produce mental imagery about a wide variety of non-occurrent events. We can, for example, simulate the perception of different places, different times, different possibilities, or others' perspectives. Findings from cognitive psychology, neuropsychology, and cognitive neuroscience suggest that all of these capacities rely on the same neuro-cognitive mechanism: episodic simulation. This ability produces mental imagery by constructively recombining elements of past experiences to simulate event representations. However, if episodic simulation indeed produces mental imagery, it remains unclear how the non-imagistic aspects of its outputs become cognitively determined. In this article, I argue that there are (at least) four such nonimagistic 'dimensions' of episodic simulation: specificity, temporal orientation, subjectivity, and factuality. Further, I propose an account of the mechanisms which might be responsible for determining where a given output of episodic simulation falls within this dimensional space. According to this view, episodic simu- lation relies on propositional 'scope-operators' either deployed as inputs to the simulation process itself or produced by post-hoc monitoring processes operating over its outputs. This view has consequences for how we should view the operation, development, and evolution of episodic simulation.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2020dimensions, author = {Mahr, Johannes B.}, title = {The dimensions of episodic simulation}, year = {2020}, journal = {Cognition}, volume = {196}, pages = {104085}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104085} }
Mahr, J.B. and Csibra, G.	2020	Witnessing, remembering, and testifying: Why the past Is special for human beings	Perspectives on Psychological Science 15(2) 428-443	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The past is undeniably special for human beings. To a large extent, both individuals and collectives define themselves through history. Moreover, humans seem to have a special way of cognitively representing the past: episodic memory. As opposed to other ways of representing knowledge, remembering the past in episodic memory brings with it the ability to become a witness. Episodic memory allows us to determine what of our knowledge about the past comes from our own experience and thereby what parts of the past we can give testimony about. In this article, we aim to give an account of the special status of the past by asking why humans have developed the ability to give testimony about it. We argue that the past is special for human beings because it is regularly, and often principally, the only thing that can determine present social realities such as commitments, entitlements, and obligations. Because the social effects of the past often do not leave physical traces behind, remembering the past and the ability to bear testimony it brings is necessary for coordinating social realities with other individuals.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2020Witnessing, author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Csibra, Gergely}, title = {Witnessing, remembering, and testifying: Why the past Is special for human beings}, year = {2020}, journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, pages = {428--443}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619879167} }
Marvin, M.A.	2020	Memory altering technologies and the capacity to forgive: Westworld and Volf in dialogue	Zygon 55(3) 713-732	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I explore the impact of memory altering technologies in the science fiction drama (2016-2020) in order to show that un-reconciled altered traumatic memory may lead to a dystopian breakdown of society. I bring Miroslav Volf's theological perspectives on memory into conversation with the plot of Westworld in order to reveal connections between memory altering technologies and hu-manity's responsibility to remember rightly. Using Volf's theology of remembering as an interpretive lens, I analyze characters' inability to remember rightly while recalling partial memories of their trauma. In virtue of this examination, I contend that memory altering technologies may inhibit individuals from relational processes of healing, such as forgiveness. Consequently, I argue that this study leads to a richer understanding of the potential that memory altering technologies have for undermining humanity's ability to interact in a relational capacity, specifically in terms of forgiveness.
BibTeX: @article{Marvin2020Memory, author = {Marvin, Michelle A.}, title = {Memory altering technologies and the capacity to forgive: Westworld and Volf in dialogue}, year = {2020}, journal = {Zygon}, volume = {55}, number = {3}, pages = {713--732}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/zygo.12633} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2020	Construction, preservation, and the presence of self in observer memory: A reply to Trakas	Análisis Filosófico 40(2) 287-303	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Observer memories involve a representation of the self in the memory image, which is presented from a detached or external point of view. That such an image is an obvious departure from how one initially experienced the event seems relatively straightforward. However, in my book on this type of imagery, I suggested that such memories can in fact, at least in some cases, accurately represent one's past experience of an event. During these past events there is a sense in which we adopt an external perspective on ourselves. In the present paper, I respond to a critical notice of my book by Marina Trakas. Trakas argues that my account of observer memory unfolded against the background of a problematic preservationist account of episodic memory, and that I failed to adequately account for the presence of self in observer memory. I respond to these worries here, and I try to clarify key points that were underdeveloped in the book.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2020Construction, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Construction, preservation, and the presence of self in observer memory: A reply to Trakas}, year = {2020}, journal = {Análisis Filosófico}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, pages = {287--303}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.371} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2020	Remembering the personal past: Beyond the boundaries of imagination	Frontiers in Psychology 11 585352	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What is the relation between episodic memory and episodic (or experiential) imagination? According to the causal theory of memory, memory differs from imagination because remembering entails the existence of a continuous causal connection between one's original experience of an event and one's subsequent memory, a connection that is maintained by a memory trace. The simulation theory rejects this conception of memory, arguing against the necessity of a memory trace for successful remembering. I show that the simulation theory faces two serious problems, which are better explained by appealing to a causal connection maintained by a memory trace. Remembering the personal past is not the same as imagining.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2020Remembering, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Remembering the personal past: Beyond the boundaries of imagination}, year = {2020}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {11}, pages = {585352}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.585352} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Cosentino, E.	2020	Rewarding one's future self: Psychological connectedness, episodic prospection, and a puzzle about perspective	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 449-467	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When faced with intertemporal choices, which have consequences that unfold over time, we often discount the future, preferring smaller immediate rewards often at the expense of long-term benefits. How psychologically connected one feels to one's future self-influences such temporal discounting. Psychological connectedness consists in sharing psychological properties with past or future selves, but connectedness comes in degrees. If one feels that one is not psychologically connected to one's future self, one views that self like a different person and is less likely to wait for the future reward. Increasing perceived psychological connectedness to one's future self may lead to more far-sighted decisions. Episodic prospection may help in this regard. Episodic prospection is our ability to 'pre-experience' the future by mentally simulating it, drawing on information from episodic memory and other sources. Episodic memory and prospection are thought to involve a special form of consciousness, which underpins the capacity to appreciate the connection between one's past, present, and future selves. Simulating the future self through prospection may increase felt psychological connectedness and support future-oriented decision-making. Yet this is where a puzzle arises. The imagery of episodic memory and prospection is perspectival: often one views the visualised scenario from a detached perspective, seeing oneself from-the-outside as if viewing another person. The aim of this paper is to characterise how the perspectival imagery of prospection relates to psychological connectedness, and to show that even though such imagery involves a detached perspective it can still be used to help reward one's future self.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2020Rewarding, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Cosentino, Erica}, title = {Rewarding one's future self: Psychological connectedness, episodic prospection, and a puzzle about perspective}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {449--467}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00460-2} }
Michaelian, K.	2020	Confabulating as unreliable imagining: In defence of the simulationist account of unsuccessful remembering	Topoi 39(1) 133-148	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper responds to Bernecker's (Front Psychol 8:1207, 2017) attack on Michaelian's (Front Psychol 7:1857, 2016a) simulationist account of confabulation, as well as his defence of the causalist account of confabulation (Robins, Philos Psychol 29(3):432--447, 2016a) against Michaelian's attack on it. The paper first argues that the simulationist account survives Bernecker's attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of unjustified memory and justified confabulation, unscathed. It then concedes that Bernecker's defence of the causalist account against Michaelian's attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning, is partly successful. This concession points the way, however, to a revised simulationist account that highlights the role played by failures of metacognitive monitoring in confabulation and that provides a means of distinguishing between ''epistemically innocent'' (Bortolotti, Conscious Cogn 33:490--499, 2015) and ''epistemically culpable'' memory errors. Finally, the paper responds to discussions by Robins (Synthese 1--17, 2018) and Bernecker (Front Psychol 8:1207, 2017) of the role played by the concept of reliability in Michaelian's approach, offering further considerations in support of simulationism.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2020Confabulating, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Confabulating as unreliable imagining: In defence of the simulationist account of unsuccessful remembering}, year = {2020}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {133--148}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9591-z} }
Michaelian, K., Perrin, D. and Sant'Anna, A.	2020	Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy	The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination Cambridge University Press 293-310		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2020Continuities, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination}, editor = {Abraham, Anna}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {293--310}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108580298.019} }
Milliere, R.	2020	The varieties of selflessness	Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1(I) 8	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Milliere2020varieties, author = {Milliere, Raphael}, title = {The varieties of selflessness}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophy and the Mind Sciences}, volume = {1}, number = {I}, pages = {8}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2020.I.48} }
Montero, B.G.	2020	Qualitative memory: A response to commentators	Journal of Consciousness Studies 27(11-12) 154-165			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Montero2020Qualitative, author = {Montero, Barbara Gail}, title = {Qualitative memory: A response to commentators}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {27}, number = {11-12}, pages = {154--165} }
Montero, B.G.	2020	What experience doesn't teach : Pain amnesia and a new paradigm for memory research	Journal of Consciousness Studies 27(11-12) 102-127	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Do we remember what pain feels like? Investigations into this question have sometimes led to ambiguous or apparently contradictory results. Building on research on pain memory by Rohini Terry and colleagues, I argue that this lack of agreement may be due in part to the difficulty researchers face when trying to convey to their study's participants the type of memory they are being tasked with recalling. To address this difficulty, I introduce the concept of 'qualitative memory', which, arguably, is the sort of memory we have of what red looks like yet lack with respect to pain. I also briefly address a number of consequences the acknowledgment of qualitative memory would potentially have for philosophy, arguing that if we fail to have qualitative memories of certain sensations, such as pain, the standard philosophical accounts of experience, rational choice, and the sources of moral action may all need revision. The noting of the similarities and differences of things and events is the first step in organizing knowledge about nature.-Arthur Melton (1964) You aren't supposed to talk about it. Not really. And certainly not in front of the kids. But that isn't why you don't remember it. You don't remember it because it doesn't leave a memory trace to begin with.
BibTeX: @article{Montero2020What, author = {Montero, Barbara Gail}, title = {What experience doesn't teach : Pain amnesia and a new paradigm for memory research}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {27}, number = {11-12}, pages = {102--127} }
Ostovich, S.T.	2020	Dangerous memories: Nostalgia and the historical sublime	Nostalgia Now: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on the Past in the Present Routledge		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ostovich2020Dangerous, author = {Ostovich, Steven T}, title = {Dangerous memories: Nostalgia and the historical sublime}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Nostalgia Now: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on the Past in the Present}, editor = {Jacobsen, Michael Hviid}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429287602-5} }
Pacheco Acosta, H.L.	2020	Kant on empirical and transcendental functions of memory	Eidos 32 103-134	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ?is paper analyses the features of Kant's view of memory, which Kant himself described explicitly in his lectures on anthropology and implicitly in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall offer a review of literature on Kant's view of memory up to this day. I suggest that memory is a cognitive faculty that has the power to store and reproduce representations. Kant distinguishes among three different kinds of memorization which are relevant for human cognition. I offer reasons to hold that imagination and memory must be differentiated by their functioning, although the first one grounds the second one. Finally, I hold that certain functions of memory need to be presupposed at a transcendental level, in which memory would play a fundamental function with regard to the possibility of experience.
BibTeX: @article{PachecoAcosta2020Kant, author = {Pacheco Acosta, Hector Luis}, title = {Kant on empirical and transcendental functions of memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Eidos}, volume = {32}, pages = {103--134}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.14482/eidos.32.193} }
Paul, L.	2020	The first time as tragedy, the second as farce	Journal of Consciousness Studies 27(11-12) 145-53			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Paul2020first, author = {Paul, L.A.}, title = {The first time as tragedy, the second as farce}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {27}, number = {11-12}, pages = {145--53} }
Perrin, D., Michaelian, K. and Sant'Anna, A.	2020	The phenomenology of remembering is an epistemic feeling	Frontiers in Psychology 11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article aims to provide a psychologically informed philosophical account of the phenomenology of episodic remembering. The literature on epistemic or metacognitive feelings has grown considerably in recent years, and there are persuasive reasons, both conceptual and empirical, in favor of the view that the phenomenology of remembering---autonoetic consciousness, as Tulving influentially referred to it, or the feeling of pastness, as we will refer to it here---is an epistemic feeling, but few philosophical treatments of this phenomenology as an epistemic feeling have so far been proposed. Building on insights from the psychological literature, we argue that a form of feeling-based metacognition is involved in episodic remembering and develop an integrated metacognitive feeling-based view that addresses several key aspects of the feeling of pastness, namely, its status as a feeling, its content, and its relationship to the first-order memories the phenomenology of which it provides.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2020phenomenology, author = {Perrin, Denis and Michaelian, Kourken and Sant'Anna, André}, title = {The phenomenology of remembering is an epistemic feeling}, year = {2020}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01531} }
Protevi, J.	2020	Phenomenology of blackout rage: The inhibition of episodic memory in extreme berserker episodes	Perception and the Inhuman Gaze: Perspectives from Philosophy, Phenomenology, and the Sciences Routledge		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Protevi2020Phenomenology, author = {Protevi, John}, title = {Phenomenology of blackout rage: The inhibition of episodic memory in extreme berserker episodes}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Perception and the Inhuman Gaze: Perspectives from Philosophy, Phenomenology, and the Sciences}, editor = {Daly, Anya and Cummins, Fred and Jardine, James and Moran, Dermot}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367815707-18} }
Puddifoot, K.	2020	Credibility deficits, memory errors and the criminal trial	The social epistemology of legal trials Routledge 9-29		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Puddifoot2020Credibility, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine}, title = {Credibility deficits, memory errors and the criminal trial}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {The social epistemology of legal trials}, editor = {Hoskins, Zachary and Robson, Jon}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {9--29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429283123-1} }
Puddifoot, K.	2020	Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: The misinformation effect and the overcritical juror	Episteme 17(2) 255-279	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyewitness testimony compelling and persuasive, it is argued that jurors are likely to give inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony, judging it to be reliable when it is not. It is argued that jurors should be informed about psychological findings on the misinformation effect, to ensure that they lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony to reflect the unreliability of human memory that is demonstrated by the effect. Here I present a new argument, the overcritical juror argument, to support the conclusion that eyewitnesses are likely to make inappropriate credence assignments to eyewitness testimony. Whereas previously authors have argued that jurors will tend to give too much credence to eyewitness testimony, I identify circumstances in which jurors will give too little credence to some pieces of testimony. In my view jurors should be informed by psychological findings relating to the misinformation effect to ensure that they do not lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony when they should not.
BibTeX: @article{Puddifoot2020Re, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine}, title = {Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: The misinformation effect and the overcritical juror}, year = {2020}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {255--279}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.42} }
Quilty-Dunn, J.	2020	Is iconic memory iconic?	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101(3) 660-682	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Short-term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high-capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity-limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image-like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception--cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by arguing against the idea of capacity limits in favor of a flexible resource-based model of short-term memory. I argue that, while VWM capacity is probably governed by flexible resources rather than a sharp limit, the two memory stores should still be distinguished by their representational formats. Iconic memory stores icons, while VWM stores discursive (i.e., language-like) representations. I conclude by arguing that this format-based distinction between memory stores entails that prominent views about consciousness and the perception--cognition border will likely have to be revised.
BibTeX: @article{QuiltyDunn2020Is, author = {Quilty-Dunn, Jake}, title = {Is iconic memory iconic?}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {101}, number = {3}, pages = {660--682}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12625} }
Robins, S.K.	2020	Defending discontinuism, naturally	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 469-486	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The more interest philosophers take in memory, the less agreement there is that memory exists---or more precisely, that remembering is a distinct psychological kind or mental state. Concerns about memory's distinctiveness are triggered by observations of its similarity to imagination. The ensuing debate is cast as one between discontinuism and continuism (Perrin, D in Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives of Future Oriented Mental Time Travel, 39--61, 2016). The landscape of debate is set such that any extensive engagement with empirical research into episodic memory places one on the side of continuism. Discontinuists concerns are portrayed as almost exclusively conceptual and a priori. As philosophers of memory become increasingly interested in memory science, this pushes continuism into an apparent lead. The aim of this paper is to challenge this characterization of the (dis)continuism debate---namely, that a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of mind and memory favors continuism. My response has two components. First, I argue for weakening the alignment between naturalism and continuism. Second, I defend a naturalistically oriented, empirically-informed discontinuism between memory and imagination. I do so by introducing seeming to remember, which I argue is distinct from other mental attitudes---most importantly, from imagining.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2020Defending, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Defending discontinuism, naturally}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {469--486}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00462-0} }
Robins, S.K.	2020	Mnemonic confabulation	Topoi 39(1) 121-132	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Clinical use of the term ''confabulation'' began as a reference to false memories in dementia patients. The term has remained in circulation since, which belies shifts in its definition and scope over time. ''Confabulation'' now describes a range of disorders, deficits, and anomalous behaviors. The increasingly wide and varied use of this term has prompted many to ask: what is confabulation? In recent years, many have offered answers to this question. As a general rule, recent accounts are accounts of broad confabulation: attempts to unify the seemingly disparate features of all or most confabulatory phenomena under a shared set of characteristics or mechanisms. In this paper, I approach the question differently. I focus on a particular form of confabulation---mnemonic confabulation---so as to understand its distinctive features and the ways in which it does (or does not) fit into accounts of broad confabulation. Understanding mnemonic confabulation is a project in the philosophy of memory; it plays an important role in guiding theories of remembering, as a form of error that must be distinguished from genuine remembering. Mnemonic confabulation, as I define it in Sect. 2, occurs when there is no relation between a person's seeming to remember a particular event or experience and any event or experience from their past---either because there is no such event in their past or because any similarity to such an event is entirely coincidental. This account draws on my own theory of remembering, but shares many important points of consensus with other accounts of mnemonic confabulation, which I highlight in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, I turn to accounts of broad confabulation---identifying three features such accounts have in common---and, for each, I argue that mnemonic confabulation lacks the requisite feature. As an error, mnemonic confabulation has more in common with perceptual hallucination than with the confabulatory phenomena included in standard accounts of broad confabulation. Recognizing that, despite the shared use of the term ''confabulation'' mnemonic confabulation and broad forms of confabulation are unrelated, is important for continued progress in debates about each.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2020Mnemonic, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Mnemonic confabulation}, year = {2020}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {121--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9613-x} }
Robins, S.K.	2020	Stable engrams and neural dynamics	Philosophy of Science 87 1130-1139	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The idea that remembering involves an engram, becoming stable and permanent via consolidation, has guided the neuroscience of memory since its inception. The shift to thinking of memory as continuous and dynamic, as part of a trend toward neural dynamics, has challenged this commitment, with some, such as Lynn Nadel, calling for ''the demise of the fixed trace'' and others, such as Alcino J. Silva, urging rejection of the ''consolidation dogma.'' Does consideration of neural dynamics offer reasons to reject engram theory? No. I argue that they are compatible. At most, shifting to a dynamic view of neural processes compels revision of the implementational details.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2020Stable, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Stable engrams and neural dynamics}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {87}, pages = {1130--1139}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/710624} }
Ross, N.	2020	Walter Benjamin's first philosophy: Towards a constellational definition of experience	Open Philosophy 3(1) 81-101	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay argues for the philosophical standing of Walter Benjamin's early work and posits a deeper continuity between this early work as a philosopher and the subsequent development of his work as a writer. When these fragments are read in proper relation to each other, they reveal for the first time many of the key innovations of Benjamin as a philosopher, as well as his points of influence on Horkheimer and Adorno. His early 'Program' critiques the Enlightenment conception of experience as a means for gaining empirical knowledge, and announces the need for a new concept of experience. Benjamin follows through on this program with a method of philosophical enquiry that is by turns fragmentary and constellational, developing a series of provisional notions of experience, which form a constellation with one another: perception, mimesis, language as a medium of experience, observation and memory.
BibTeX: @article{Ross2020Walter, author = {Ross, Nathan}, title = {Walter Benjamin's first philosophy: Towards a constellational definition of experience}, year = {2020}, journal = {Open Philosophy}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {81--101}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0006} }
Ruin, H.	2020	Memory, history and the paternal shadow: Nietzsche's autobiographical survival	Niezstche on Memory and History University of Wisconsin Press 74-92			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ruin2020Memory, author = {Ruin, Hans}, title = {Memory, history and the paternal shadow: Nietzsche's autobiographical survival}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Niezstche on Memory and History}, editor = {Neumann, Klaus and Thompson, Janna}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, pages = {74--92} }
Samira Paiella, G.	2020	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Memory erasure, and the problem of personal identity	Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 3 1-16	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Michel Gondry and Charlie Kaufman's 2004 Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, which celebrated its fifteenth anniversary in 2019, is an extended thought experiment on the nature of memory, minds, and persons. The memory erasure thought experiment presented in the film-and its implications for personal identity-raises poignant questions for the ethicist, epistemologist, neuroscientist, metaphysician, and cognitive scientist. In this paper, I explore the rich insights the film has to offer interdisciplinary studies of memory, providing a case study in how narrative can uniquely contribute to memory research, while also maintaining philosophical rigor and fidelity to scientific discoveries about memory. Turning to the philosophical implications of memory erasure, I consider memory erasure in the context of several leading views of personal identity and proposed answers to the persistence question of personal identity, assessing the challenges and complications that the memory erasure thought experiment brought to life by Eternal Sunshine poses to these theories. I argue that the psychological continuity view of personal identity-in its various iterations-does not allow an individual to truly survive the memory erasure procedure. The memory erasure thought experiment presented in Eternal Sunshine-and its metaphysical and epistemological consequences-reveal how we establish the relationship between memories and selfhood, how to define personhood in the presence of both hypothetical and real-world memory loss, and what experiences we value in human life.
BibTeX: @article{SamiraPaiella2020Eternal, author = {Samira Paiella, Giorgina}, title = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Memory erasure, and the problem of personal identity}, year = {2020}, journal = {Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy}, volume = {3}, pages = {1--16} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2020	The hybrid contents of memory	Synthese 197 1263-1290	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2020hybrid, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {The hybrid contents of memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {197}, pages = {1263--1290}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1753-4} }
Sant'Anna, A., Michaelian, K. and Perrin, D.	2020	Editorial: Memory as mental time travel	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 223-232	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Originally understood as memory for the ''what'', the ''when'', and the ''where'' of experienced past events, episodic memory has, in recent years, been redefined as a form of past-oriented mental time travel. Following a brief review of empirical research on memory as mental time travel, this introduction provides an overview of the contributions to the special issue, which explore the theoretical implications of that research.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2020Editorial, author = {Sant'Anna, André and Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis}, title = {Editorial: Memory as mental time travel}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, pages = {223--232}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00484-8} }
Schwartz, A.	2020	Simulationism and the function(s) of episodic memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 487-505	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to simulationism, the function of episodic memory is not to remember the past, but to help construct representations of possible future episodes, by drawing together features from different experiential sources. This article suggests that the relationship between the traditional storehouse view, on which the function of memory is remembering, and the simulationist approach is more complicated than has been typically acknowledged. This is attributed, in part, to incorrect interpretations of what remembering on the storehouse view requires. Further, by appeal to function pluralism, the article questions both the assumption that the traditional view and simulationism are inconsistent, and the simulationist's inference to the best explanation strategy that is based upon this assumption. The article then provides an evaluation of the simulationist argument against the traditional view, and finds it in need of further support.
BibTeX: @article{Schwartz2020Simulationism, author = {Schwartz, Arieh}, title = {Simulationism and the function(s) of episodic memory}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {487--505}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00461-1} }
Slors, M.	2020	From notebooks to institutions: The case for symbiotic cognition	Frontiers in Psychology 11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognition is claimed to be extended by a wide array of items, ranging from notebooks to social institutions. Although the connection between individuals and these items is usually referred to as ''coupling,'' the difference between notebooks and social institutions is so vast that the meaning of ''coupling'' is bound to be different in each of these cases. In this paper I argue that the radical difference between ''artifact- extended cognition'' and ''socially extended cognition'' is not sufficiently highlighted in the literature. I argue that there are two different senses of ''cognitive extension'' at play, that I shall label, respectively, ''implementation extension'' and ''impact extension.'' Whereas implementation extension is a causal-functional notion, impact-extension hinges on social normativity that is connected with organization and action coordination. I will argue that the two kinds of cognitive extension are different enough to warrant separate labels. Because the most salient form of social extension of cognition involves the reciprocal co-constitution of cognitive capacities, I will propose to set it apart from other types of extended cognition by using the label ''symbiotic cognition.''
BibTeX: @article{Slors2020notebooks, author = {Slors, Marc}, title = {From notebooks to institutions: The case for symbiotic cognition}, year = {2020}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00674} }
Smortchkova, J. and Murez, M.	2020	Representational kinds	What are Mental Representations? Oxford University Press	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting type of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In this chapter we outline a proposal for a theory of representational kinds in cognitive science. We argue that the explanatory role of representational kinds in scientific theories, in conjunction with a mainstream approach to explanation in cognitive science, suggest that representational kinds are multi-level. This is to say that representational kinds' properties cluster at different levels of explanation and allow for intra- and inter-level projections.
BibTeX: @incollection{Smortchkova2020Representational, author = {Smortchkova, Joulia and Murez, Michael}, title = {Representational kinds}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {What are Mental Representations?}, editor = {Smortchkova, Joulia and Dołega, Krzysztof and Schlicht, Tobias}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190686673.003.0008} }
Soon, V.	2020	Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach	Philosophical Studies 177(7) 1857-1877	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: To what extent should we focus on implicit bias in order to eradicate persistent social injustice? Structural prioritizers argue that we should focus less on individual minds than on unjust social structures, while equal prioritizers think that both are equally important. This article introduces the framework of transactive memory into the debate to defend the equal priority view. The transactive memory framework helps us see how structure can emerge from individual interactions as an irreducibly social product. If this is right, then debiasing interventions are structural interventions. One upshot is that the utility of the individual versus structural distinction is not apparent for the purposes of intervention.
BibTeX: @article{Soon2020Implicit, author = {Soon, Valerie}, title = {Implicit bias and social schema: a transactive memory approach}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {177}, number = {7}, pages = {1857--1877}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01288-y} }
Sorgiovanni, B.	2020	The role of memory in agential self-knowledge	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(3) 413-425	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Agentialism about self-knowledge (hereafter simply ''agentialism'') is the view that key to understanding our capacity for self-knowledge is appreciating the connection between that capacity and our identities as rational agents---as creatures for whom believing, intending, desiring, and so on are manifestations of a capacity to be responsive to reasons. This connection, agentialists maintain, consists in the fact that coming to know our own minds involves an exercise of our rational capacities in the service of answering the relevant first-order question. Agentialists face the task of accounting for the connection between our identities as rational agents and our capacity to know our stored beliefs. It's plausible that one comes to know that one believes that p by exercising one's rational capacities in those cases where the belief that p is formed on the basis of present consideration of the reasons for and against p. But what exactly is the relevance of our rational capacities in the case where one has already formed the belief in question? In this paper I provide an answer to this question. That answer involves an appeal to a particular model of memory. According to the model I favor, memory preserves, in addition to the content of one's beliefs, one's commitment to their truth.
BibTeX: @article{Sorgiovanni2020role, author = {Sorgiovanni, Ben}, title = {The role of memory in agential self-knowledge}, year = {2020}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, pages = {413--425}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.51} }
Stammers, S. and Bortolotti, L.	2020	Introduction: Philosophical perspectives on confabulation	Topoi 39(1) 115-119		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Stammers2020Introduction, author = {Stammers, Sophie and Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {Introduction: Philosophical perspectives on confabulation}, year = {2020}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {115--119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-019-09668-z} }
Suojanen, M.	2020	On perceiving continuity: The role of memory in the perception of the continuity of the same things	Philosophia (United States) 48(5) 1979-1995	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Theories of philosophy of perception are too simplifying. Direct realism and representationalism, for example, are philosophical theories of perception about the nature of the perceived object and its location. It is common sense to say that we directly perceive, through our senses, physical objects together with their properties. However, if perceptual experience is representational, it only appears that we directly perceive the represented physical objects. Despite psychological studies concerning the role of memory in perception, what these two philosophical theories do not explicate are the continuity of the external describable object and the role of memory in perceiving the continuity, difference, break or ending. Using empirical evidence of particular cases and the hypothetico-deductive model, this research article analyses how one is able to perceive the continuity of same things. The early stages of perceptual process are not sufficient for the perception of continuity. Empirical evidence of memory disorders shows that persons with a memory disorder do not perceive the same thing or the familiar place they previously saw and now experience or remember what they are thinking about, even if the object, the place or the person has remained the same. I will argue that the perception of continuity requires memory. In fact, observation indicates how the memory runs at the same time, when the object is seen over time. This fact implies the memory system's essential role for perceiving the continuity of the same things.
BibTeX: @article{Suojanen2020perceiving, author = {Suojanen, Mika}, title = {On perceiving continuity: The role of memory in the perception of the continuity of the same things}, year = {2020}, journal = {Philosophia (United States)}, volume = {48}, number = {5}, pages = {1979--1995}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00187-5} }
Sutton, J.	2020	Movements, memory, and mixture: Aristotle, confusion, and the historicity of memory	The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition Springer 137-155	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Aristotle frequently discusses specific material constraints on memory and recollection. This essay reinterprets his fluid physiological psychology of memory, which depends on the stability of bodily movements or traces, in light of his general theory of mixture. It proposes newways to link memory and metaphysics in the Aristotelian tradition; counters a popular historical narrative which sets Aristotle at the origin of a static Western 'archival model' of memory; and suggests the relevance for contemporary philosophy and science of Aristotle's view of the potential existence of movements in memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2020Movements, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Movements, memory, and mixture: Aristotle, confusion, and the historicity of memory}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition}, editor = {Mousavian, S. N. and Fink, J. L.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {137--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33408-6_8} }
Sutton, J.	2020	Personal memory, the scaffolded mind, and cognitive change in the neolithic	Consciousness, Creativity, and Self at the Dawn of Settled Life Cambridge University Press 209-229		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2020Personal, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Personal memory, the scaffolded mind, and cognitive change in the neolithic}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Consciousness, Creativity, and Self at the Dawn of Settled Life}, editor = {Hodder, Ian}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {209--229}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108753616.014} }
Sutton, J.	2020	Place and memory: History, cognition, phenomenology	Geographies of Embodiment in Early Modern England Oxford University Press 113-133		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2020Place, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Place and memory: History, cognition, phenomenology}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Geographies of Embodiment in Early Modern England}, editor = {Floyd-Wilson, Mary and Sullivan, Garrett}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {113--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198852742.003.0005} }
Sutton, J., McIlwain, D., Christensen, W. and Geeves, A.	2020	Embodying thought in skilful action	Thinking in the World: A Reader Bloomsbury 79-114			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2020Embodying, author = {Sutton, John and McIlwain, Doris and Christensen, Wayne and Geeves, Andrew}, title = {Embodying thought in skilful action}, year = {2020}, booktitle = {Thinking in the World: A Reader}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {79--114} }
Sweeney, P.	2020	Nostalgia reconsidered	Ratio 33(3) 184-190	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Nostalgia is standardly assumed to be directed towards the past, to involve some salient feeling of the irretrievability of the past, and to be directed towards the memory of an event. In this paper I argue that none of these standard assumptions hold. I use a time-traveller example to demonstrate that nostalgia is not essentially past-directed. Once nostalgia is prised from the objective past, we can examine the other purported conditions, making space for the conclusion that the felt irretrievability of the past is not the necessary feature of nostalgia that we assumed it to be. I then argue that the notion that nostalgia is directed towards the memory of an event is misguided. Finally, I distinguish two routes to nostalgia and, with this distinction in place, argue that nostalgia is neither essentially time nor place directed. Nostalgia is simply change-directed.
BibTeX: @article{Sweeney2020Nostalgia, author = {Sweeney, Paula}, title = {Nostalgia reconsidered}, year = {2020}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {33}, number = {3}, pages = {184--190}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12272} }
Tan, S.Z.K. and Lim, L.W.	2020	A practical approach to the ethical use of memory modulating technologies	BMC Medical Ethics 21 89	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Background: Recent advancements in neuroscientific techniques have allowed us to make huge progress in our understanding of memories, and in turn has paved the way for new memory modification technologies (MMTs) that can modulate memories with a degree of precision, which was not previously possible. With advancements in such techniques, new and critical ethical questions have emerged. Understanding and framing these ethical questions within the current philosophical theories is crucial in order to systematically examine them as we translate these techniques to the clinic. Main body: In this paper, we discuss the ethical implications of modern neuroscience techniques that aim to disrupt or enhance memories. We attempt to frame the MMTs in the context of existing ethical philosophical theories to provide a cohesive analysis of the myriad of ethical quagmires that might emerge from such technologies. We argue the application of Aristotle's Golden Mean and multiple accounts of authenticity are useful in approaching the ethical questions surrounding MMTs. We then propose a framework in which ethical considerations can be systematically examined. Lastly, we provide caveats and considerations for the use of this framework. Overall, we provide a practical approach for the ethical use of MMTs depending on the situation. Conclusion: While at face value, our model appears to put severe limitations on the application of MMTs, we are not completely opposed to their use, but rather our framework guides the agent to consider the implications before making any decisions. Most importantly, we argue that the use of MMTs does not reduce the responsibility of the initial decision, and the agent must accept the post-MMT self as the new ''true self'' regardless of the outcome. As the developmental trajectory of MMTs suggests we are getting closer to practical clinical applications, ethical concerns across a wide range of disciplines need to be addressed to develop best strategies and policies when dealing with MMTs. If this can be achieved, we believe the ethical use of MMTs is not only possible but would also be of tremendous benefit to many people suffering from memory-related mental disorders.
BibTeX: @article{Tan2020practical, author = {Tan, Shawn Zheng Kai and Lim, Lee Wei}, title = {A practical approach to the ethical use of memory modulating technologies}, year = {2020}, journal = {BMC Medical Ethics}, volume = {21}, pages = {89}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-020-00532-z} }
Trakas, M.	2020	Observer memories and the perspectival mind: On Remembering from the Outside by Christopher McCarroll	Análisis Filosófico 40(1) 123-138	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory experiences. On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation. Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems. In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll's account. I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2020Observer, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {Observer memories and the perspectival mind: On Remembering from the Outside by Christopher McCarroll}, year = {2020}, journal = {Análisis Filosófico}, volume = {40}, number = {1}, pages = {123--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.335} }
Trakas, M.	2020	On epistemic responsibility while remembering the past: The case of individual and historical memories	Les ateliers de l'éthique 14(2) 240	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The notion of epistemic responsibility applied to memory has been in general examined in the framework of the responsibilities that a collective holds for past injustices, but it has never been the object of an analysis of its own. In this article, I propose to isolate and explore it in detail. For this purpose, I start by conceptualizing the epistemic responsibility applied to individual memories. I conclude that an epistemic responsible individual rememberer is a vigilant agent who knows when to engage in different kinds of mental and non-mental actions in order to monitor and update her memories, and who develops and nurture different kinds of virtuous attitudes that guide those actions. These (epistemic) virtuous attitudes are oriented not only towards herself but also towards others. Whereas this conception of epistemic responsibility does not pose a problem to understand shared memories of family members and friends, it may seem suspicious when applied to large-scale collective memories. These memories, which I name historical memories, are memories of events that have a traumatic impact for the community, are permeated by unequal relations of power, keep a complex relationship with historical science, and present other characteristics that distinguish them from individual memories. But despite these differences, the analysis undertaken in this work shows that the general principles that govern the epistemic responsibility of individual and (large-scale) collective rememberers are similar, and are based on similar grounds: pragmatic considerations about the consequences of misremembering or forgetting and a feeling of care. The similarities at the individual and collective scale of the epistemic vigilant attitude that is and should be taken toward our significant past may partially justify the use of the same epithet---''memory''---to refer to these different kinds of representations.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2020epistemic, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {On epistemic responsibility while remembering the past: The case of individual and historical memories}, year = {2020}, journal = {Les ateliers de l'éthique}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7202/1071139ar} }
Tsuruta, N.	2020	Why did Rachael need implanted memories?	倫理学論究 6(1) 33-47			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tsuruta2020Why, author = {Tsuruta, Naomi}, title = {Why did Rachael need implanted memories?}, year = {2020}, journal = {倫理学論究}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {33--47} }
Werning, M.	2020	Predicting the past from minimal traces: Episodic memory and its distinction from imagination and preservation	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11(2) 301-333	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper develops an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploits an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present on the basis of sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a ''prediction of the past'' on the basis of a minimal trace, i.e., an informationally sparse, merely causal link to a previous experience. The resulting notion of episodic memory will be validated as a natural kind distinct from imagination. This trace minimalist view contrasts with two theory camps dominating the philosophical debate on memory. On one side, we face versions of the Causal Theory that hold on to the idea that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. The Causal Theory, however, fails to account for the epistemic generativity of episodic memory and is psychologically and information-theoretically implausible. On the other side, a new camp of simulationists is currently forming up. Motivated by empirical and conceptual deficits of the Causal Theory, they reject not only the necessity of preserving representational content, but also the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory. They argue that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination, peculiar only in that it has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one's personal past. Albeit sharing their criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, rejecting its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, the paper argues that a causal connection to experience is still necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability.
BibTeX: @article{Werning2020Predicting, author = {Werning, Markus}, title = {Predicting the past from minimal traces: Episodic memory and its distinction from imagination and preservation}, year = {2020}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {301--333}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00471-z} }
Adams, S.	2019	A note on Ricœur's early notion of cultural memory	Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 10(1) 112-124	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay considers Paul Ricœur's early notion of cultural memory from 1956-1960. He discusses it in two texts: ''What does Humanism Mean?'' and the slightly later The Symbolism of Evil. In the former, cultural memory appears as an ongoing and dynamic process of retroaction focussed on questioning and rethinking the meaning of classical antiquity for contemporary worlds, on the one hand, that is linked to an important critical aspect as a counterweight to the flattening effects of modernity, on the other. In the latter, cultural memory expands the reach of the classical heritage, and, in addition to retroaction, further modes of orientation, such as relations of depth and breadth, are delineated. At first glance, cultural memory, in Ricœur's sense, appears to be embodied in the singular, albeit generalized self. Yet, in reconstructing its meaning, the essay argues that Ricœur's articulation of cultural memory relies on an implicit collective dimension. The present essay's hermeneutic reconstruction of Ricœur's notion of cultural memory comprises a preliminary step of a broader project that aims to rearticulate Jan and Aleida Assmann's cultural memory framework along social imaginary lines. In this vein, the essay concludes with an overview of the Assmannian approach to cultural memory and considers possible bridges between Ricœur and the Assmanns.
BibTeX: @article{Adams2019note, author = {Adams, Suzi}, title = {A note on Ricœur's early notion of cultural memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {112--124}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2019.465} }
Agócs, P.	2019	Speaking in the wax tablets of memory	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 68-90			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Agocs2019Speaking, author = {Agócs, Peter}, title = {Speaking in the wax tablets of memory}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {68--90} }
Aktunc, M.E.	2019	Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI	Synthese	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Several developments for diverse scientific goals, mostly in physics and physiology, had to take place, which eventually gave us fMRI as one of the central research paradigms of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This technique stands on solid foundations established by the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of hemodynamics and is complimented by computational and statistical techniques. I argue, and support using concrete examples, that these foundations give rise to a productive theory-ladenness in fMRI, which enables researchers to identify and control for the types of methodological and inferential errors. Consequently, this makes it possible for researchers to represent and investigate cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data and for experimental knowledge to grow independently of large scale theories of cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Aktunc2019Productive, author = {Aktunc, M. Emrah}, title = {Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI}, year = {2019}, journal = {Synthese}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02125-9} }
Andonovski, N.	2019	Is the simulation theory of memory about simulation?	Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10(3) 37-52	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay investigates the notion of simulation and the role it plays in Kourken Michaelian's simulation theory of memory. I argue that the notion is importantly ambiguous and that this ambiguity may threaten some of the central commitments of the theory. To illustrate that, I examine two different conceptions of simulation: a narrow one (simulation as replication) and a broad one (simulation as computational modeling), arguing that the preferred narrow conception is incompatible with the claim that remembering involves the simulation of past episodes. InvesStigating possible solutions, I suggest that, despite some relatively serious consequences, the theory may be better off subscribing to the broad notion of simulation.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2019Is, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Is the simulation theory of memory about simulation?}, year = {2019}, journal = {Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {37--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378640399} }
Arango-Muñoz, S.	2019	Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings	Mind & Language 34(2) 247-262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that ''there is something it is like'' to have cognitive states such as believing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of nonsensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology.
BibTeX: @article{ArangoMunoz2019Cognitive, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings}, year = {2019}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {34}, number = {2}, pages = {247--262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12215} }
Aronowitz, S.	2019	Memory is a modeling system	Mind & Language 34(4) 483-502	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper aims to reconfigure the place of memory in epistemology. I start by rethinking the problem that memory systems solve; rather than merely functioning to store information, I argue that the core function of any memory system is to support accurate and relevant retrieval. This way of specifying the function of memory has consequences for which structures and mechanisms make up a memory system. In brief, memory systems are modeling systems. This means that they generate, update and manage a series of overlapping, simplified, relational representations that map out features of the world. Succeeding at building and maintaining models requires the kind of active knowledge generation traditionally associated only with deliberative reasoning.
BibTeX: @article{Aronowitz2019Memory, author = {Aronowitz, Sara}, title = {Memory is a modeling system}, year = {2019}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {34}, number = {4}, pages = {483--502}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12220} }
Bamford, R.	2019	Experimentation, curiosity, and forgetting	The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 50(1) 11-32	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I examine how curiosity is grounded in Nietzsche's critique of customary morality. I argue that Nietzsche's positive account of active forgetting is compatible with his treatment of curiosity as a key virtue, and that it can be shown to actively support curiosity. To support the latter claim, I suggest that Nietzschean memorial courtesy can be defined as the application of politeness about memory toward ourselves, toward others, or with regard to specific matters of inquiry.
BibTeX: @article{Bamford2019Experimentation, author = {Bamford, Rebecca}, title = {Experimentation, curiosity, and forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Nietzsche Studies}, volume = {50}, number = {1}, pages = {11--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jnietstud.50.1.0011} }
Barash, J.A.	2019	Introduction	Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 10(1) 6-9		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barash2019Introduction, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2019}, journal = {Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {6--9}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2019.475} }
Barash, J.A.	2019	The time of collective memory: Social cohesion and historical discontinuity in Paul Ricœur's Memory, History, Forgetting	Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 10(1) 102-111	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of principal tasks of Paul Ricoeur's Memory, History, Forgetting is to analyze the phenomenon of social cohesion, understood not as a uniform bond, but in terms of human plurality that arises from a diversity of perspectives of remembering groups rooted in complex stratifications and concatenations. This paper focuses on the role of remembrance and of its historical inscription as a source of social cohesion, which is subject to rupture and dissolution over time. It first identifies the way in which, according to Ricœur, memory and history function as essential preconditions of social cohesion; following this, it examines the significance and scope of temporal rupture and discontinuity to which this cohesion is subject. In examining Ricœur's reflection on social cohesion and on the discontinuity to which it is subject over time, I aim to place his thought in a critical light in order to set in relief what I take to be an important aporia it encounters.
BibTeX: @article{Barash2019time, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {The time of collective memory: Social cohesion and historical discontinuity in Paul Ricœur's Memory, History, Forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {102--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/errs.2019.471} }
Bernecker, S. and Grundmann, T.	2019	Knowledge from forgetting	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98(3) 525-540	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2019Knowledge, author = {Bernecker, Sven and Grundmann, Thomas}, title = {Knowledge from forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {98}, number = {3}, pages = {525--540}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12469} }
Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.	2019	Editor's response: Book review symposium: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory	Memory Studies 12(6) 746-750	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cognitive analysis.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2019Editors, author = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Editor's response: Book review symposium: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {12}, number = {6}, pages = {746--750}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019883205} }
Bickle, J.	2019	Linking mind to molecular pathways: The role of experiment tools	Axiomathes 29(6) 577-597	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neurobiologists talk of linking mind to molecular dynamics in and between neurons. Such talk is dismissed by cognitive scientists, including many cognitive neuroscientists, due to the number of ''levels'' that separate behaviors from these molecular events. In this paper I explain what neurobiologists mean by such claims by describing the kinds of experiment tools that have forged these linkages, directly on lab benches. I here focus on one of these tools, gene targeting techniques, brought into behavioral neuroscience from developmental biology more than a quarter-century ago. Discussion of this tool does more than illuminate these claims by neurobiologists, however. An account of its development shows the doubly dependent role that theory plays in neurobiology. Our best current theories about ''how the brain works'' depend entirely on the experiment tools neuroscientists have available. And these tools get developed via the solution of engineering problems, not the application of theory. Theory is thus of tertiary importance in neuroscience, not of the primary importance that many cognitive scientists assume it to occupy.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2019Linking, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Linking mind to molecular pathways: The role of experiment tools}, year = {2019}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {29}, number = {6}, pages = {577--597}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-019-09442-1} }
Boyle, A.	2019	Learning from the past: Epistemic generativity and the function of episodic memory	Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(5-6) 242-251	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that the function of episodic memory is to store information about the past, against the orthodox view that it is to support imagining the future. I show that episodic memory is epistemically generative, allowing organisms to learn from past events retroactively. This confers adaptive benefits in three domains: reasoning about the world, skill, and social interaction. Given the role of evolutionary perspectives in comparative research, this argument necessitates a radical shift in the study of episodic memory in nonhumans.
BibTeX: @article{Boyle2019Learning, author = {Boyle, Alexandria}, title = {Learning from the past: Epistemic generativity and the function of episodic memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {26}, number = {5-6}, pages = {242--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.35867} }
Breuer, I.	2019	Phenomenological reflections on the intertwining of violence, place and memory: The memorials of the ungraspable	Studia Phaenomenologica 19 153-174	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Acts of violence develop in relation to place and involve the violation of its very limits. Every significant place is a scene of history, its limits embrace presence and sense. As such, it is the life-worldly home of memory. In this article, I will retrieve the bodily affective dimension of the phenomenon of place memory in instances of public commemoration. Drawing on different philosophical horizons like those of mainly Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Adorno, Ricïur and Bataille, IÕll contrast their different perspectives on the question of the intertwining of violence, place and memory and refer them to the narrative work of memorials (e.g. LibeskindÕs and EisenmanÕs for Berlin). Insofar violence has been traditionally represented and thereby obliterated by architecture, we may ask how should genocide, as the unspeakable and ungraspable be expressed? IÕll suggest that it can only be attained by the suspension of meaning and presence: A narrative of bodily affections, of pathos, suffering and excess that accounts for what in itself remains beyond expression.
BibTeX: @article{Breuer2019Phenomenological, author = {Breuer, Irene}, title = {Phenomenological reflections on the intertwining of violence, place and memory: The memorials of the ungraspable}, year = {2019}, journal = {Studia Phaenomenologica}, volume = {19}, pages = {153--174}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/studphaen2019198} }
Brons, L.	2019	Aphantasia, SDAM, and episodic memory	Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 28 9-32	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules.
BibTeX: @article{Brons2019Aphantasia, author = {Brons, Lajos}, title = {Aphantasia, SDAM, and episodic memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, pages = {9--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos.28.0_9} }
Capra, A.	2019	Lyric oblivion: When Sappho taught Socrates how to forget	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 179-194			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Capra2019Lyric, author = {Capra, Andrea}, title = {Lyric oblivion: When Sappho taught Socrates how to forget}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {179--194} }
Castagnoli, L.	2019	Is memory of the past? Aristotle on the objects of memory	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 236-255			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Castagnoli2019Is, author = {Castagnoli, Luca}, title = {Is memory of the past? Aristotle on the objects of memory}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {236--255} }
Castagnoli, L. and Ceccarelli, P.	2019	Introduction	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 1-49			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Castagnoli2019Introduction, author = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {1--49} }
Chadha, M.	2019	Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self	Mind & Language 34(1) 121-138	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper evaluates a well-known argument for a self from episodic memories---that remembering that I did something or thought something involves experiencing the identity of my present self with the past doer or thinker. Shaun Nichols argues that although it phenomenologically appears to be the case that we are identical with the past self, no metaphysical conclusion can be drawn from the phenomenology. I draw on literature from contemporary psychology and Buddhist resources to arrive at a more radical conclusion: that there is no phenomenological sense of identity with a past self; the sense of self in episodic memory depends on narrative construction of the self.
BibTeX: @article{Chadha2019Reconstructing, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self}, year = {2019}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {34}, number = {1}, pages = {121--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12204} }
Chella, A.	2019	Rilkean memories and the self of a robot	Philosophies 4(2) 20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses the concept of Rilkean memories, recently introduced by Mark Rowlands, to analyze the complex intermix of hardware and software related to the self of a robot. The Rilkean memory of an event is related to the trace of that episode left in the body of the individual. It transforms the act of remembering into behavioral and bodily dispositions, thus generating the peculiar behavioral style of the individual, which is at the basis of her autobiographical self. In the case of long-life operating robots, a similar process occurs: the software of the robot has to cope with the changes that happened in the body of the robot because of damaging events in its operational life. Thus, the robot, in compensating the damages of its body, acquires a particular behavioral style. The concept of Rilkean memory is essential in self-adapting robotics technologies where human intervention on a robot is not possible, and the robot must cope with its faults, and also in applications concerning green robotics.
BibTeX: @article{Chella2019Rilkean, author = {Chella, Antonio}, title = {Rilkean memories and the self of a robot}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophies}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020020} }
Chiaradonna, R.	2019	Plotinus on memory, recollection and discursive thought	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 310-324			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chiaradonna2019Plotinus, author = {Chiaradonna, Riccardo}, title = {Plotinus on memory, recollection and discursive thought}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {310--324} }
Christensen, W., Sutton, J. and Bicknell, K.	2019	Memory systems and the control of skilled action	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 693-719	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In keeping with the dominant view that skills are largely auto- matic, the standard view of memory systems distinguishes between a representational declarative system associated with cognitive processes and a performance-based procedural system. The procedural system is thought to be largely respon- sible for the performance of well-learned skilled actions. Here we argue that most skills do not fully automate, which entails that the declarative system should make a substantial contri- bution to skilled performance. To support this view, we review evidence showing that the declarative system does indeed play a number of roles in skilled action.
BibTeX: @article{Christensen2019Memory, author = {Christensen, Wayne and Sutton, John and Bicknell, Kath}, title = {Memory systems and the control of skilled action}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {693--719}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607279} }
Clark, S.R.L.	2019	Plotinus: Remembering and forgetting	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 325-339			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Clark2019Plotinus, author = {Clark, Stephen R. L.}, title = {Plotinus: Remembering and forgetting}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {325--339} }
Clorinda, V.M.C.	2019	Paul Ricoeur on collective memory: The cohesion of social life	Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10(3) 87-107	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this article is to present a critical reconstruction of Ricoeur's analysis of the complex phenomenon of memory as a collective act of recollection. By focusing the attention on memory as a collective practice, through the use of resources drawn from phenomenology, sociology, and history, I will seek to outline the construction of the collective memorial discourse and its foundations, looking particularly at the eighth chapter of the third volume of Time and Narrative and at the work Memory, History, Forgetting. I will show that our identification and location with others in social collectivities imply to negotiate a gap between subjective and cosmic time. Temporality comes, then, in the plural: our being in time is not merely personal, but rather we are originally involved in a shared social and historical framework.
BibTeX: @article{Clorinda2019Paul, author = {Clorinda, Vendra Maria Cristina}, title = {Paul Ricoeur on collective memory: The cohesion of social life}, year = {2019}, journal = {Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {87--107}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378639936} }
Colonnello, P.	2019	Phenomenology and Pathography of Memory	Mimesis International			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Colonnello2019Phenomenology, author = {Colonnello, Pio}, title = {Phenomenology and Pathography of Memory}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Mimesis International} }
Coppenger, B.	2019	Internalism, memory, and skepticism	The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations Brill 161-175		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Coppenger2019Internalism, author = {Coppenger, Brett}, title = {Internalism, memory, and skepticism}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations}, editor = {McCain, Kevin and Poston, Ted}, publisher = {Brill}, pages = {161--175}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004393530_010} }
Cruz, M.	2019	Hume's dual criteria for memory	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(2) 336-358	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas' phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume's account of memory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts of his philosophical system. This paper defends Hume's criteria by showing that they achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of 'memory.' In particular, I argue that Hume's definition of 'memory' is cogent in light of Putnamian considerations about definitions.
BibTeX: @article{Cruz2019Humes, author = {Cruz, Maité}, title = {Hume's dual criteria for memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {100}, number = {2}, pages = {336--358}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12272} }
De Brigard, F.	2019	Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 720-759	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between knowthatand know-how. This traditional "anti-intellectualist" view is soentrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in supportof an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicitmemory, derived from the so-called "standard model of memory."In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has beenchallenged by an "intellectualist" view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the anti-intellec-tualist view have turned to the cognitivescience of memory, and to the standard model in particular, todefend their view. Here, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitivepsychology and neuroscience of memory does not support theanti-intel-lectualist approach, mainly because the standard modelof memory is likely wrong. However, this need not be interprete-das good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that theempirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I arguethat, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms thatdo not correspond to categories in psychological science. As aresult, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabularythat is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settledempirically.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2019Know, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Know-how, intellectualism, and memory systems}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {720--759}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607280} }
De Brigard, F. and O'Neill, K.	2019	Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal cognition	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e247	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a two-system account of temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic pro- posals where cognitive systems are putatively independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a minimum, involve (1) a difference in the nature of the representations upon which each system operates, and (2) a difference in the compu- tations they carry out. In this comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's proposal does not meet the min- imal requirements (1) and (2).
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2019Two, author = {De Brigard, Felipe and O'Neill, Kevin}, title = {Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal cognition}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000645} }
Fatić, A.	2019	Can memory erasure contribute to a virtuous tempering of emotions?	Philosophy and Society 30(2) 257-269	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper deals with a perspective of Christian philosophy on artificial memory erasuse for psychotherapeutic purposes. Its central question is whether a safe and reliable technology of memory erasure, once it is available, would be acceptable from a Christian ethics point of view. The main facet of this question is related to the Christian ethics requirement of contrition for the past wrongs, which in the case of memory erasure of particulary troubling experiences and personal choices would not be possible. The paper argues that there are limits to the ethical significance of contrition in the writings of the leading Christian fathers on the theme (e.g. St. Thomas Aquinas), where excessive suffering and inability to forgive oneself for one's actions is an impediment to the achivement of tranquility of mind and spiritual redemption, rather than a prerequisite for it. The paper thus concludes that there is no hindrance in principle from the Christian ethics point of view to pursuing a voluntary and selective memory erasure as a psychotherapeutic technique once a fully adequate technology is available.
BibTeX: @article{Fatic2019Can, author = {Fatić, Aleksandar}, title = {Can memory erasure contribute to a virtuous tempering of emotions?}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophy and Society}, volume = {30}, number = {2}, pages = {257--269}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1902257F} }
Fernández, J.	2019	Memory: A Self-Referential Account	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Fernandez2019Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory: A Self-Referential Account}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Ferrara, I.	2019	Kant on memory	Lo Sguardo 28 91-115	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory, in New Elucidation, is criticized as a method of the ars combinatoria; in Dreams memory is connected to the concept of inner sense and in, the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not offer a treatment of memory in a transcendental sense, since the building up of cognitive principles is fixed on the synthetic judgments of experience. In Transcendental Analytics, Kant considers the activity of memory within those transitional operations of the reproductive imagination in the inner sense, which produce unified representations through the stabilizing activity of schematism. Kant also focuses on the theme of memory in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and, maintaining the traditional de-qualification of the faculty with respect to the transcendental foundation, he manages to link the theme to a cosmopolitan interest. The contemporary approach to memory, in reference to the conception of space, is connected to cognitive neuroscience but maintains the presuppositions of Kantian philosophy.
BibTeX: @article{Ferrara2019Kant, author = {Ferrara, Ilaria}, title = {Kant on memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Lo Sguardo}, volume = {28}, pages = {91--115}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3721301} }
Ferraris, M. and Terrone, E.	2019	Like giants immersed in time. Ontology, phenomenology, and Marcel Proust	Rivista di estetica 59 92-106	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time, raises an interesting philosophical issue, namely, how can one be in touch with past things if they no longer exist? It provides us with a way to address this issue by outlining an ontological view according to which past things still exist within a four-dimensional world. Although one cannot be in touch with past things by means of ordinary perception, one can do so by combining perception and memory. In this sense, In Search of Lost Time helps us to reconcile a four-dimensionalist ontology according to which things have both spatial and temporal parts with a realist phenomenology according to which experience gives us access to things as they are. In so doing, Proust's masterpiece allows us to shed some light on what it means for a subject of experience to exist in a four-dimensional world.
BibTeX: @article{Ferraris2019giants, author = {Ferraris, Maurizio and Terrone, Enrico}, title = {Like giants immersed in time. Ontology, phenomenology, and Marcel Proust}, year = {2019}, journal = {Rivista di estetica}, volume = {59}, pages = {92--106}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.5146} }
Fileva, I. and Tresan, J.	2019	Metaethics and mental time travel: A reply to Gerrans and Kennett	Philosophia 47(5) 1457-1474	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In ''Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency'' (Mind 2010), Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett argue that prominent versions of metaethical sentimentalism and moral realism ignore the importance, for moral agency and moral judgment, of the capacity to experientially project oneself into the past and possible futures -- to engage in 'mental time travel' (MTT). They contend that such views are committed to taking subjects with impaired capacities for MTT to be moral judgers, and thus confront a dilemma: either allow that these subjects are moral agents, or deny that moral agency is required for moral judgment. In reply, we argue for two main claims. First, it is implausible that moral agency is required for moral judgment, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason for thinking it is. Second, at least some of the subjects in question seem able to make moral judgments, and Gerrans and Kennett give us no good reason to doubt that they can. We conclude that they have not shown a problem for any of the metaethical views in question.
BibTeX: @article{Fileva2019Metaethics, author = {Fileva, Iskra and Tresan, Jonathan}, title = {Metaethics and mental time travel: A reply to Gerrans and Kennett}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {47}, number = {5}, pages = {1457--1474}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00066-8} }
Follesa, L.	2019	"Paradise of childhood": Herder's theory of memory between Plato and Leibniz	Lo Sguardo 28 77-90	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article examines J. G. Herder's original doctrine of memory, as expressed in Über die Seelenwandrung (1782), where the author questioned the link between the theory of transmigration of souls and mnemonic processes. The first part of the paper focuses on the premises underlying Herder's reflection on memory by means of an analysis of his early writings (such as the manuscript, written around 1767, known as Plato sagte) concerning Plato's theory of recollection as interpreted by modern philosophers including Leibniz and Mendelssohn. These latter thinkers reappraise Plato's theory of recollection, and 'correct' certain errors, such as the theory of a previous life in the hyperuranion as a premise of true knowledge. Herder reconsiders both Plato's and Leibniz's doctrines of recollection, attempting to eliminate their metaphysical implications and explain memory from a more anthropological and psychological perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Follesa2019Paradise, author = {Follesa, Laura}, title = {"Paradise of childhood": Herder's theory of memory between Plato and Leibniz}, year = {2019}, journal = {Lo Sguardo}, volume = {28}, pages = {77--90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3721229} }
Fridland, E.	2019	Longer, smaller, faster, stronger: On skills and intelligence	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 760-784	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How does practice change our behaviors such that they go from being awkward, unskilled actions to elegant, skilled performances? This is the question that I wish to explore in this paper. In the first section of the paper, I will defend the tight connection between practice and skill and then go on to make precise how we ought to construe the concept of practice. In the second section, I will suggest that practice contributes to skill by structuring and automatizing the motor routines constitutive of skilled actions. I will cite how this fact about skilled action has misled many philosophers to conclude that skills are mindless or bodily. In the third section of the paper, I will challenge this common misconception about automaticity by appealing to empirical evidence of motor chunking. This evidence reveals that there are two opposing processes involved in the automaticity of skilled action: one process that is largely associative, which I will call ''concatenation,'' and a second which is a controlled cognitive process, which I will call ''segmentation.'' As a result of this evidence, we will be in a position to see clearly why skills are minded and intelligent not merely during their acquisition and not simply in virtue of their connection to intentional states but, rather, in their very nature. I will end by reflecting on some theoretical reasons for why this is exactly what we should expect to be the case when it comes to skilled action.
BibTeX: @article{Fridland2019Longer, author = {Fridland, Ellen}, title = {Longer, smaller, faster, stronger: On skills and intelligence}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {760--784}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607275} }
Friedman, J.	2019	Checking again	Philosophical Issues 29(1) 84-96		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Friedman2019Checking, author = {Friedman, Jane}, title = {Checking again}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {29}, number = {1}, pages = {84--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12141} }
Fuchs, T.	2019	Body memory and the unconscious	The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis Oxford University Press	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In traditional psychoanalysis the unconscious was conceived as a separate intra-psychic reality, hidden 'below consciousness' and only accessible to a 'depth psychology' based on metapsychological premises and concepts. In contrast to this vertical conception, this chapter presents a phenomenological approach to the unconscious as a horizontal dimension of the lived body, lived space, and intercorporeality. This approach is based (a) on a phenomenology of body memory, defined as the totality of implicit dispositions of perception and behaviour mediated by the body and sedimented in the course of earlier experiences. It is also based on (b) a phenomenology of the life space as a spatial mode of existence which is centred in the lived body and in which unconscious conflicts are played out as field forces.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fuchs2019Body, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Body memory and the unconscious}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis}, editor = {Gipps, Richard G. T. and Lacewing, Michael}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198789703.013.22} }
Gatzia, D.E.	2019	Cognitive penetration and memory colour effects	Erkenntnis 84(1) 121-143	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognition can influence action. Your belief that it is raining outside, for example, may cause you to reach for the umbrella. Perception can also influence cognition. Seeing that no raindrops are falling, for example, may cause you to think that you don't need to reach for an umbrella. The question that has fascinated philosophers and cognitive scientists for the past few decades, however, is whether cognition can influence perception. Can, for example, your desire for a rainy day cause you to see, hear, or feel raindrops when you walk outside? More generally, can our cognitive states (such as beliefs, desires or intentions) influence the way we see the external world? In this paper, I discuss three experiments on memory colour effects. In these experiments, subjects systematically made different colour matches or adjustments for object-patches representing objects that have prototypical colours and neutral object-patches. I argue that these differences are not merely differences in judgments but are best explained in terms of phenomenology. However, I show that these differences in phenomenology can be explained without reference to cognitive states such as colour concepts or beliefs.
BibTeX: @article{Gatzia2019Cognitive, author = {Gatzia, Dimitria Electra}, title = {Cognitive penetration and memory colour effects}, year = {2019}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {84}, number = {1}, pages = {121--143}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9951-x} }
Gillett, A.J. and Heersmink, R.	2019	How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions	Cognitive Systems Research 56 36-49	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.
BibTeX: @article{Gillett2019How, author = {Gillett, Alexander James and Heersmink, Richard}, title = {How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions}, year = {2019}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {56}, pages = {36--49}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2019.03.004} }
Glannon, W.	2019	The Neuroethics of Memory: From Total Recall to Oblivion	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Glannon2019Neuroethics, author = {Glannon, Walter}, title = {The Neuroethics of Memory: From Total Recall to Oblivion}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Granados, Z.O.	2019	Hegel: Metacritics, philosophical language, and memory	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 58(3) 439-463	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Hegel has a metacritical standpoint that can be related to but not reduced to the Herderian metacritique. Hegel's philosophical language must not be understood in terms of the opposition between an 'absolute' and a 'finite' language; rather, it must be understood in terms of the opposition between abstract and concrete language. At a theoretical level, concrete language cannot be understood without assuming an organic function of memory. At the practical level, the difference between abstract and concrete language will be understood as the difference between everyday language and a philosophical one. Hegel justifies this last difference by following Humboldtian standpoints.
BibTeX: @article{Granados2019Hegel, author = {Granados, Zaida Olvera}, title = {Hegel: Metacritics, philosophical language, and memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {58}, number = {3}, pages = {439--463}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000501} }
Guidi, S. and James, S.	2019	Philosophers and memory: Introductory remarks	Lo Sguardo 28 5-11		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Guidi2019Philosophers, author = {Guidi, Simone and James, Steven}, title = {Philosophers and memory: Introductory remarks}, year = {2019}, journal = {Lo Sguardo}, volume = {28}, pages = {5--11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3721002} }
Hara, K.-I.	2019	The origins of presentism: On Bergson's concept of "my present" in chapter 3 of Matter and Memory	An Anthology of Philosophical Studies 13 17-34	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I shall focus on Bergson's concept of "my present." This is Bergson's concept of temporal experience as introduced in Matter and memory. The aim of this paper is to find out the reason why Bergson introduced the concept of "my present." One of the aims of chapter 3 of Matter and memory is to refute Presentism and to justify the existence of past memories. Insofar as this is the case, in order to explain the reason why Bergson introduced "my present," we have to consider the relation between the concept of "my present" and the claim that past memories exist. With that said, however, we should note in advance that the claim that the present in temporal experience is successive and contains the past does not entail the statement that the past itself has an objective reality. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that we can necessarily find a relation between these two claims. If this is the case, then what is the contribution of the concept of "my present" to an affirmation of the objective reality of the past? This will be our question in this paper.
BibTeX: @article{Hara2019origins, author = {Hara, Ken-Ichi}, title = {The origins of presentism: On Bergson's concept of "my present" in chapter 3 of Matter and Memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {An Anthology of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {13}, pages = {17--34} }
Hayes, S.	2019	Merleau-Ponty's melancholy	Epoché 24(1) 201-219	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]
Abstract: I offer a re-evaluation of Freudian melancholy by reading it in-conjunction with Merleau-Ponty's analysis of phantom limbs and Marcel Proust's involuntary memories. As an affective response to loss, melancholy bears a strange, belated temporality (Nachträglichkeit). Through Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the phantom limb, I emphasize that the melancholic subject remains affectively bound to a past world. While this can be read as problematic insofar as the subject is attuned to both the possibilities that belong to the present and the impossibilities that belong to the past world, I turn to Proust whose writings on involuntary memory indicate a way of taking up these futural (im)possibilities. I focus the discussion on the narrator's involuntary memory of his grandmother after her death to highlight the creative transformation of his melancholy.
BibTeX: @article{Hayes2019Merleau, author = {Hayes, Shannon}, title = {Merleau-Ponty's melancholy}, year = {2019}, journal = {Epoché}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {201--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche20191115151} }
Heersmink, R. and McCarroll, C.J.	2019	The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects	Blade Runner 2049 (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 87-107		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Heersmink2019best, author = {Heersmink, Richard and McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Blade Runner 2049 (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Smart, Paul and Shanahan, Timothy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {87--107}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429460036-6} }
Hirai, Y.	2019	Event and mind: An expanded Bergsonian perspective	Understanding Digital Events: Bergson, Whitehead, and the Experience of the Digital Routledge		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirai2019Event, author = {Hirai, Yasushi}, title = {Event and mind: An expanded Bergsonian perspective}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Understanding Digital Events: Bergson, Whitehead, and the Experience of the Digital}, editor = {Kreps, David}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429032066-4} }
Hirst, W., Aronowitz, S., Bortolotti, L. and Rocha L Santos, F.	2019	Book review symposium: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory	Memory Studies 12(6) 736-746		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hirst2019Book, author = {Hirst, William and Aronowitz, Sara and Bortolotti, Lisa and Rocha L Santos, Felipe}, title = {Book review symposium: The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {12}, number = {6}, pages = {736--746}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019883205} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2019	Temporal updating, temporal reasoning, and the domain of time	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e278	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We focus on three main sets of topics emerging from the commentaries on our target article. First, we discuss several types of animal behavior that commentators cite as evidence against our claim that animals are restricted to temporal updating and cannot engage in temporal reasoning. In doing so, we illustrate further how explanations of behavior in terms of temporal updating work. Second, we respond to commentators' queries about the developmental process through which children acquire a capacity for temporal reasoning and about the relation between our account and accounts drawing similar distinctions in other domains of cognition. Finally, we address some broader theoretical issues arising from the commentaries, concerning in particular the question as to how our account relates to the phenomenology of experience in time, and the question as to whether our dichotomy between temporal reasoning and temporal updating is exhaustive, or whether there might be other forms of cognition or representation related to time not captured by it.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2019Temporal, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Temporal updating, temporal reasoning, and the domain of time}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e278}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19001195} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2019	Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e244	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time - a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system - of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of our everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterising two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2019Thinking, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e244}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002157} }
Hołda, M.	2019	Can forgetting be constructive? The hermeneutics of memory, forgiveness and reconciliation	Studia Philosophiae Christianae 55(1) 5-26	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In his hermeneutics of memory, Ricoeur points to the dialectic character of the interrelation between remembering and forgetting. He abandons an understanding of forgetting as limited only to oblivion, or to deletion in the Bergsonian use of the term. He supplants the negativity of forgetting by the productivity of disremembering, and stretches forgetting to its reserve, to the dynamic unveiling of the details of past events, with varied degrees of truthfulness and accuracy. This article attempts to demonstrate that the positivity of forgetting in the context of reconciliation is a tangible possibility. Forgetting is viewed here as a positive, constructive faculty, which influences the future, makes it possible to create and shape it, and is opposed to a slavish adherence to memory anchored wholly in the past. The totality of the anchorage in the past results in an exclusive focus on remembering, and causes the impasse of being entrapped in a disconsolate past. We ascertain that forgetting is not a failure but rather a productive possibility, either self-creative or purgative, to educate oneself and the Other towards a more promising future.
BibTeX: @article{Holda2019Can, author = {Hołda, Małgorzata}, title = {Can forgetting be constructive? The hermeneutics of memory, forgiveness and reconciliation}, year = {2019}, journal = {Studia Philosophiae Christianae}, volume = {55}, number = {1}, pages = {5--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.21697/2019.55.1.01} }
Iida, T.	2019	Time, brain and language	Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 28 33-54	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Kitazawa (2017) has proposed an interesting hypothesis about the processing of A-series time concepts-past, present, future-in the brain. The experiments on which it is based can be interpreted in two different ways; they are concerned with either our ability of processing linguistic expressions with different tenses or ability of imagining situations with different temporal specifications. Time awareness has evolved from that involved in the primitive perception through the representation of immediate past and future to the highly detailed mental time travel performed by human beings. Language seems to be essential to human mental time travel, because mental time travel is an "episodic constructive process" that requires a developed form of imagination, which seems to be impossible without a language. By considering the two different interpretations of the experiments, this paper tries to find out how our understanding of time expressions and imagining time in specific situations are related to each other.
BibTeX: @article{Iida2019Time, author = {Iida, Takashi}, title = {Time, brain and language}, year = {2019}, journal = {Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science}, volume = {28}, pages = {33--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4288/jafpos.28.0_33} }
Innis, R.E.	2019	Locating one's life: Memory, mood, and self-reflection	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(2) 162-177	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article aims to analyze some contours of the existential practice of attempting to ''locate one's life'' through self-reflection. I will focus primarily, but not exclusively, on two exemplifications of self-reflection that are not ''philosophical'' in any technical or academic sense: Cory Taylor's Dying: A Memoir and Yi-Fu Tuan's Who Am I? An Autobiography of Emotion, Mind, and Spirit. Taylor, a novelist, is writing hurriedly facing imminent death, while Tuan, a distinguished cultural geographer, writes facing not death but the prospect of continuing to live without any real will to do so. Their reflections are carried out in two different rhetorical registers, with quite different motivational contexts and expectations. They throw clear light, with rich philosophical import, on the complex relations between memory and mood, such as regret and nostalgia, the languages of self-description, and the permanent tensions between hope and action in coming to terms with what or who one is, or has become, or with what, if anything, lies ahead.
BibTeX: @article{Innis2019Locating, author = {Innis, Robert E.}, title = {Locating one's life: Memory, mood, and self-reflection}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {162--177}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.2.0162} }
Jacobsen, R.	2019	Making epistemologists nervous: Relational memory and psychological individualism	Hypatia 34(3) 405-423	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We cannot rethink the ethical and political dimensions of memory---especially its role in constituting persons and identities---without rethinking the nature of memory itself. I first describe a traditional epistemological view of memory, according to which memory is a faculty for preserving knowledge of the past, and then juxtapose a relational theory of memory developed by Sue Campbell. The relational theory is represented in terms of a distinction between actions and achievements; this distinction enables us to both clarify and defend the shift from an epistemological to a political conception of memory. On the resulting view, accuracy, not truth, is the appropriate norm for evaluating memory, and remembering is no longer conceived as an interior process. In the penultimate section I confront an objection to a relational theory of memory---and to relational theories of cognition generally---and suggest a strategy of response.
BibTeX: @article{Jacobsen2019Making, author = {Jacobsen, Rockney}, title = {Making epistemologists nervous: Relational memory and psychological individualism}, year = {2019}, journal = {Hypatia}, volume = {34}, number = {3}, pages = {405--423}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12473} }
Jani, A.	2019	Guilt, confession, and forgiveness: From methodology to religious experiencing in Paul Ricoeur's phenomenology	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(1) 8-21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: My approach to religious experience in Paul Ricœur's phenomenology of religion consists in the primordial hypothesis that the basic question of phenomenology can be formulated by virtue of the reality of the experienced thing. The aim of the essay is to show the way Ricœur connected the phenomenological and hermeneutic problematics of Being to the fundamental ethical dimension of phenomenological ontology, that is, the way the fundamental ontology of phenomenology essentially belongs to individual religious questioning. Based on the two poles of the investigation, I will focus on the questions of (1) how religious experiences reflect on reality and (2) how the methodology of phenomenology leads to the wider ontology of theology. According to my hypothesis, the two divergent approaches to religious experiences find their source in the phenomenological reflection on reality, and this reality, in view of the substantially nonreal experience of religiosity, urges the creation of a new ontology in the gift of revelation.
BibTeX: @article{Jani2019Guilt, author = {Jani, Anna}, title = {Guilt, confession, and forgiveness: From methodology to religious experiencing in Paul Ricoeur's phenomenology}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {8--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.1.0008} }
Kebede, M.	2019	Bergson's Philosophy of Self-Overcoming: Thinking without Negativity or Time as Striving	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Kebede2019Bergsons, author = {Kebede, Messay}, title = {Bergson's Philosophy of Self-Overcoming: Thinking without Negativity or Time as Striving}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Kelly, M.R.	2019	Time, memory and creativity: Bergson	A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy John Wiley & Sons 480-505		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kelly2019Time, author = {Kelly, Michael R.}, title = {Time, memory and creativity: Bergson}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy}, editor = {Shand, John}, publisher = {John Wiley & Sons}, pages = {480--505}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119210054.ch18} }
Keven, N.	2019	Let's call a memory a memory, but what kind?	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e260	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Hoerl & McCormack argue that animals cannot represent past situations and subsume animals' memory-like representations within a model of the world. I suggest calling these memory-like representations as what they are without beating around the bush. I refer to them as event memories and explain how they are different from episodic memory and how they can guide action in animal cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Keven2019Lets, author = {Keven, Nazım}, title = {Let's call a memory a memory, but what kind?}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000360} }
King, R.A.H.	2019	Memory and recollection in Plato's Philebus: Use and definitions	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 216-235			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{King2019Memory, author = {King, R. A. H.}, title = {Memory and recollection in Plato's Philebus: Use and definitions}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {216--235} }
Klein, S.B.	2019	An essay on the ontological foundations and psychological realization of forgetting	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 6(3) 292-305	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that appreciation of the phenomenon of forgetting requires serious attention to its origins and place in nature. This, in turn, necessitates metaphysical inquiry as well as empirical backing---a combination likely to be eschewed by psychological ortho- doxy. But, if we hope to avoid the conceptual vacuity that characterizes too much of contemporary psychological inquiry (e.g., Klein, 2012, 2014a, 2015a, 2016a), a ''big picture'' approach to phenomena of interest is essential. Adopting this investigative posture turns the ''received view'' of the relation between remembering and forgetting on its head: Rather than treated as the result of breakdowns and responses to the limitations of biologically engineered systems of remembering, forgetting is accorded elevated status as the driving force behind the evolution of organic systems of information retention.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2019essay, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {An essay on the ontological foundations and psychological realization of forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, pages = {292--305}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000197} }
Klein, S.B.	2019	The phenomenology of REM-sleep dreaming: The contributions of personal and perspectival ownership, subjective temporality, and episodic memory	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 6(1) 55-66	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although the dream narrative, of (bio)logical necessity, originates with the dreamer, he or she typically is not aware of this. For the dreamer, the dream world is the real world. In this article, I argue that this nightly misattribution is best explained in terms of the concept of mental ownership (e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012). Specifically, the exogenous nature of the dream narrative is the result of an individual assuming perspectival, but not personal, ownership of the content she or he authored (i.e., "The content in my head is not mine. Therefore it must be peripherally perceived"). Situating explanation within a theoretical space designed to address questions pertaining to the experienced origins of conscious content has a number of salutary consequences. For example, it promotes predictive fecundity by bringing to light empirical generalizations whose presence otherwise might have gone unnoticed (e.g., the severely limited role of mental time travel within the dream narrative).
BibTeX: @article{Klein2019phenomenology, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {The phenomenology of REM-sleep dreaming: The contributions of personal and perspectival ownership, subjective temporality, and episodic memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {55--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000174} }
Kriegel, U.	2019	Dignāga's argument for the awareness principle: An analytic refinement	Philosophy East and West 69(1) 143-155		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kriegel2019Dignagas, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {Dignāga's argument for the awareness principle: An analytic refinement}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {69}, number = {1}, pages = {143--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0003} }
Lavazza, A.	2019	Moral bioenhancement through memory-editing: A risk for identity and authenticity?	Topoi 38(1) 15-27	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Moral bioenhancement is the attempt to improve human behavioral dispositions, especially in relation to the great ethical challenges of our age. To this end, scientists have hypothesised new molecules or even permanent changes in the genetic makeup to achieve such moral bioenhancement. The philosophical debate has focused on the permissibility and desirability of that enhancement and the possibility of making it mandatory, given the positive result that would follow. However, there might be another way to enhance the overall moral behavior of us humans, namely that of targeting people with lower propensity to trust and altruism. Based on the theory of attachment, people who have a pattern of insecure attachment are less inclined to prosocial behavior. We know that these people are influenced by negative childhood memories: this negative emotional component may be erased or reduced by the administration of propranolol when the bad memory is reactivated, thereby improving prosocial skills. It could be objected that memory-editing might be a threat for the person's identity and authenticity. However, if the notion of rigid identity is replaced by that of extended identity, this objection loses validity. If identity is understood as something that changes over time, moral bioenhancement through memory-editing seems indeed legitimate and even desirable.
BibTeX: @article{Lavazza2019Moral, author = {Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {Moral bioenhancement through memory-editing: A risk for identity and authenticity?}, year = {2019}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, pages = {15--27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9465-9} }
Lazzarato, M.	2019	Videophilosophy: The Perception of Time in Post-Fordism	Columbia University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Lazzarato2019Videophilosophy, author = {Lazzarato, Maurizio}, title = {Videophilosophy: The Perception of Time in Post-Fordism}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Columbia University Press} }
Liao, S.Y. and Gendler, T.	2019	Imagination	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Liao2019Imagination, author = {Liao, Shen Yi and Gendler, Tamar}, title = {Imagination}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, E. N.}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/imagination/} }
Luzzi, F.	2019	Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Luzzi2019Knowledge, author = {Luzzi, Federico}, title = {Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Luzzi, F.	2019	Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge	Knowledge from Non-Knowledge Cambridge University Press 167-183	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this chapter I present the received view in the epistemology of memory, according to which one only knows p via memory if one knew p at an earlier time. I discuss Jennifer Lackey's counterexamples to this view and address Thomas Señor's criticisms to Lackey's cases. I explain why factual-defeater-based cases of mnemonic knowledge from non-knowledge should not be expected.
BibTeX: @incollection{Luzzi2019Memory, author = {Luzzi, Federico}, title = {Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Knowledge from Non-Knowledge}, editor = {Luzzi, Federico}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {167--183}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108649278.006} }
Magada-Ward, M.	2019	Immediate family: On the consolation, embellishment, and distortion of memory	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(2) 311-323	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I advance two claims about memory. The first is that memory itself is best conceived as consisting of scenes (or images), which thus provide the raw material for the stories that we can tell about the past. The second is that these narratives can be revised in the light of new possibilities for redescription. In support of these claims, I examine the photographer Sally Mann's stunning (and controversial) 1992 series entitled ''Immediate Family.'' By appealing to Ian Hacking's account of how, in the latter part of the twentieth century, multiple personality became ''a culturally sanctioned way of expressing distress,'' I argue that both the condemnation of Mann's work and the explosion in diagnoses of multiple personality were ultimately rooted in the then-popular belief that memories of childhood abuse determined adult character.
BibTeX: @article{MagadaWard2019Immediate, author = {Magada-Ward, Mary}, title = {Immediate family: On the consolation, embellishment, and distortion of memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {311--323}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.2.0311} }
Mahr, J.B.	2019	Thinking about the past as the past for the past's sake: Why did temporal reasoning evolve?	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Hoerl & McCormack discuss the benefits of temporal reasoning mainly with respect to future planning and decision making. I point out that, for humans, the ability to represent particular past times has distinct benefits, which are independent from contributing to future-directed cognition. Hence, the evolution of the temporal reasoning system was not necessarily driven primarily by its benefits for future-directed cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2019Thinking, author = {Mahr, Johannes B.}, title = {Thinking about the past as the past for the past's sake: Why did temporal reasoning evolve?}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000402} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2019	Looking at the self: Perspectival memory and personal identity	Philosophical Explorations 22(3) 259-279	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Both Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson appeal to autobiographical memory in developing their accounts of personal identity. Although both scholars share a similar conception of autobiographical memory, they use it to develop theories of personal identity that are radically distinct. Memories that are relevant for personal identity are generally considered to be personal (autobiographical) memories of those events in one's lifetime to which one can gain first-personal access: memories from-the-inside. Both Schechtman and Strawson base their discussion of personal identity on exactly this type of memory. Empirical evidence shows, however, that personal memory imagery is not only visualised from-the-inside, from a ''field'' perspective. Personal memories may also involve ''observer'' perspectives, in which one sees oneself from-the-outside in the remembered scene. Both Schechtman and Strawson appeal to the notion of remembering from-the-inside, but they remain silent on the phenomenon of observer perspectives in personal memory. I suggest that accounts of personal identity that appeal to memory should consider observer perspectives as one aspect of personal memory. I explore the implications that the acknowledgment and inclusion of observer perspectives would have for both Schechtman's and Strawson's accounts. Even though autobiographical memory is not their theoretical target, both Schechtman and Strawson base their accounts of personal identity on their understanding of autobiographical memory. Therefore, their depictions of the nature of personal identity are founded upon an incomplete picture of autobiographical memory.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2019Looking, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Looking at the self: Perspectival memory and personal identity}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {22}, number = {3}, pages = {259--279}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2018.1562087} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2019	Navigating intertemporal choices: Mental time travel, perspectival imagery, and prudent decision-making.	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 6(2) 200-213	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We have the capacity to mentally project ourselves into the personal past and future. We typically see and feel these past and future events unfold before our mind's eye, ''reexpe- riencing'' or ''preexperiencing'' them. This capacity is known as mental time travel (MTT). We can predict, plan, and prepare for the future based, in part, on our knowledge of the past. Often, however, we fail to give sufficient weight to future outcomes. We discount the future, seeking immediate gratification at the expense of long-term reward. It has been proposed that MTT is crucial to overcoming this tendency to discount future rewards. MTT enables us to preexperience the emotional impact of a future reward and this supports future-oriented decision-making. Yet the imagery of MTT involves distinct visual perspec- tives. Sometimes we visualize the event from a field perspective, seeing the scene from our own eyes. But often, the imagery ofMTT involves an external observer perspective, and we see ourselves in the past or future scenario. Observer perspectives are often thought to be phenomenally and affectively dry. This creates a puzzle. If much of the imagery of MTT involves observer perspectives, then using such imagery to think about a future reward may not provide the emotional force necessary for supporting future-oriented decision-making. I examine the role that observer perspectives play in simulating the future and supporting prudent decision-making. I show that observer perspectives can involve emotional imagery and that they can therefore help us to navigate intertemporal choices.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2019Navigating, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Navigating intertemporal choices: Mental time travel, perspectival imagery, and prudent decision-making.}, year = {2019}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, volume = {6}, number = {2}, pages = {200--213}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000177} }
McDonald, M.	2019	Merleau-Ponty and a Phenomenology of PTSD: Hidden Ghosts of Traumatic Memory	Lexington Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{McDonald2019Merleau, author = {McDonald, Marycatherine}, title = {Merleau-Ponty and a Phenomenology of PTSD: Hidden Ghosts of Traumatic Memory}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Lexington Books} }
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J.	2019	Collective mental time travel: Remembering the past and imagining the future together	Synthese 196(12) 4933-4960	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar (Mem Stud 9(4):376--389, 2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective mental time travel is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, the concept of collective mental time travel nevertheless provides a useful means of organizing existing findings, while also suggesting promising directions for future research.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2019Collective, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John}, title = {Collective mental time travel: Remembering the past and imagining the future together}, year = {2019}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {196}, number = {12}, pages = {4933--4960}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1449-1} }
Mihai, M.	2019	Understanding complicity: Memory, hope and the imagination	Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22(5) 504-522	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper addresses the thorny issue of complicity with wrongdoing under conditions of systemic political violence, such as authoritarianism, totalitarianism or military occupation. The challenge of dealing with collaborators--those who colluded with the apparatus of repression or who benefitted from its existence--is central to subsequent processes of justice and memory-making. This paper proposes several arguments. Firstly, it claims we need to think about complicity and resistance not dichotomically, but as a continuum of locations individuals can occupy. Secondly, these locations are influenced by the agents' positionality within the social world, each agent being situated at the intersection of several axes of distinction: class, gender, racialisation, and religion, among others. Thirdly, to understand complicity we also need to draw a connection between individual's experience of time and their actions: temporality is experienced from within a social position, through the interplay between memory, imagination and hope. Positionality thus affects one's memories and self-understanding, the scope of one's imagination, as well as the type and intensity of one's hopes. Therefore, individuals' capacity to build on the past to imagine a future, to invest emotionally in the future and act accordingly are interrelated aspects of their experience, which will influence how they navigate the muddy waters of systemic wrongdoing, more or less complicitly. To give concreteness to these three theoretical arguments, the paper discusses several forms of complicity with violence during the Vichy Regime in France.
BibTeX: @article{Mihai2019Understanding, author = {Mihai, Mihaela}, title = {Understanding complicity: Memory, hope and the imagination}, year = {2019}, journal = {Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy}, volume = {22}, number = {5}, pages = {504--522}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2019.1565692} }
Milburn, J. and Moon, A.	2019	Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism	New Essays in Epistemological Disjunctivism 281-297		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Milburn2019Two, author = {Milburn, Joe and Moon, Andrew}, title = {Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {New Essays in Epistemological Disjunctivism}, editor = {Doyle, Casey and Milburn, Joe and Pritchard, Duncan}, pages = {281--297}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315106243-14} }
Miracchi, L.	2019	A competence framework for artificial intelligence research	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 589-634	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While over the last few decades AI research has largely focused on building tools and applications, recent techno- logical developments have prompted a resurgence of inter- est in building a genuinely intelligent artificial agent -- one that has a mind in the same sense that humans and animals do. In this paper, I offer a theoretical and methodological framework for this project of investigating ''artificial minded intelligence'' (AMI) that can help to unify existing approaches and provide new avenues for research. I first outline three desiderata that a framework for AMI research should satisfy. In Section 1, I further motivate the desiderata as well as the need for a new framework. Section 2 develops a general methodological approach, the ''generative meth- odology,'' and Section 3 develops a version of this metho- dology, the ''Competence Framework for AI research'' (CFAI).
BibTeX: @article{Miracchi2019competence, author = {Miracchi, Lisa}, title = {A competence framework for artificial intelligence research}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {589--634}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607692} }
Montemayor, C.	2019	On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 e266	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A central claim by Hoerl & McCormack is that the temporal reasoning system is uniquely human. But why exactly? This commentary evaluates two possible options to justify the thesis that temporal reasoning is uniquely human, one based on considerations regarding agency and the other based on language. The commentary raises problems for both of these options.
BibTeX: @article{Montemayor2019human, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e266}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000335} }
Montero, B.G.	2019	The paradox of post-performance amnesia	Midwest Studies in Philosophy 44(1) 38-47		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Montero2019paradox, author = {Montero, Barbara Gail}, title = {The paradox of post-performance amnesia}, year = {2019}, journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {38--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12118} }
Morgan, D.	2019	Thinking about the body as subject	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(4) 435-457	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself 'as subject'. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments (e.g. 'My legs are crossed') can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM.
BibTeX: @article{Morgan2019Thinking, author = {Morgan, Daniel}, title = {Thinking about the body as subject}, year = {2019}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {49}, number = {4}, pages = {435--457}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432} }
Murray, S., Murray, E.D., Stewart, G., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. and De Brigard, F.	2019	Responsibility for forgetting	Philosophical Studies 176(5) 1177-1201	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has important implications for a long-running debate about the nature of responsible agency.
BibTeX: @article{Murray2019Responsibility, author = {Murray, Samuel and Murray, Elise D. and Stewart, Gregory and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Responsibility for forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {176}, number = {5}, pages = {1177--1201}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3} }
Nikulin, D.	2019	Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Nikulin2019Neoplatonism, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Neoplatonism in Late Antiquity}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
O'Shea, A.	2019	Memory, origins, and the searching quest in Girard's mimetic cycle: An Arendtian perspective	Forum Philosophicum 24(1) 43	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper offers an interpretation of René Girard's mimetic theory in light of Hannah Arendt's account of St Augustine's philosophy of love. Girard's mimetic theory crosses many disciplines and has been the main inspiration in his oeuvre over decades. However, its later application and how it purports to demystify culture and point to the truth of the Christian revelation, sits uneasily with his early confessional position. This paper is an attempt to make sense of Girard the Christian thinker, who seeks to explain Christianity without a continuous search- ing quest for God and ethical orientation in the world. I examine his early theory of desire and how it claims to lead to the conversion of the hero and author of the novel, and how Girard compares the hero's journey in literary space to the Saint's journey in spiritual space. In explicating Hannah Arendt's work entitled Love and Saint Augustine I set out some of the key concepts of Augustine's philosophy of ''love as desire'' and highlight a number of contexts in Augustine's thinking that refocus his philosophy in the direction of memory in response to the com- mandment to love God, neighbour and self. I go on to examine whether Arendt's analysis of Augustine might also apply to Girard's journey with mimetic theory. Finally, I attempt to articulate a context for reading Girard in light of Augustine's own searching quest for God, one that tries to bring his personal and confessional stance back into his account of mimesis and human origins.
BibTeX: @article{OShea2019Memory, author = {O'Shea, Andrew}, title = {Memory, origins, and the searching quest in Girard's mimetic cycle: An Arendtian perspective}, year = {2019}, journal = {Forum Philosophicum}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {43}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2019.2401.03} }
Pacheco Acosta, H.L.	2019	Kant's anthropological study of memory	Con-Textos Kantianos 9(1) 72-96	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this article is to shed light on Kant's anthropological theory of memory. I shall contrast physiological studies of memory against Kant's own study. I suggest some ideas about the relation between memory and time, as long as memory has the power to store and reproduce the temporal configuration of our representations. Moreover, I deal with the problem of personal identity and I suggest that memory contributes to the possibility of this identity from a pragmatic point of view. Finally, I hold that Kant's pragmatic anthropology does not only provide a description of memory for the human being's self-knowledge but also for the human being's self-perfection. Thus, such description discloses not only what the human being is but also what this can become, insofar as it is capable of perfecting itself.
BibTeX: @article{Acosta2019Kants, author = {Pacheco Acosta, Hector Luis}, title = {Kant's anthropological study of memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Con-Textos Kantianos}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, pages = {72--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3251077} }
Pavese, C.	2019	The psychological reality of practical representation	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 785-822	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We represent the world in a variety of ways: through per- cepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation (e.g., vision, auditory, tactile) and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation -- proce- dural representation -- represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural representations represent differently from both purely conceptual representations and purely perceptual representations. Although procedural representations, just like conceptual and perceptual repre- sentations, involve modes of presentation, their modes of presentation are distinctively practical, in a sense which I will clarify. It is argued that an understanding of this sort of practical representation has important consequences for the debate on the nature of know-how.
BibTeX: @article{Pavese2019psychological, author = {Pavese, Carlotta}, title = {The psychological reality of practical representation}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {785--822}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1612214} }
Pavese, C. and De Brigard, F.	2019	Editor's introduction	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 585-588		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pavese2019Editors, author = {Pavese, Carlotta and De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Editor's introduction}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {585--588}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607964} }
Peeters, A. and Segundo-Ortin, M.	2019	Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace	Consciousness and Cognition 76 102834	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its efficacy. Second, the technique faces significant practical challenges to its users. Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that promise. We address both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied, enactive approach to memory can better help us understand the effectiveness of the memory palace. Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual memory palace. Our theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute to solving both problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive account over an information-processing treatment of the memory palace.
BibTeX: @article{Peeters2019Misplacing, author = {Peeters, Anco and Segundo-Ortin, Miguel}, title = {Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual memory palace}, year = {2019}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {76}, pages = {102834}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102834} }
Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L.	2019	Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs	Philosophical Studies 176(3) 755-780	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating that a person is less reliable than others or their former self. Evidence of memory errors can undermine a per- son's view of themselves as a competent epistemic agent, but we show that false memory beliefs can be the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms found across the species, which bring substantial epistemic benefits. This challenge to the folk conception is not adequately captured by existing epistemological theories. However, it can be captured by the notion of epistemic innocence, which has previously been deployed to highlight how beliefs which have epistemic costs can also bring significant epistemic benefits. We therefore argue that the notion of epistemic innocence should be expanded so that it applies not just to beliefs but also to cognitive mechanisms.
BibTeX: @article{Puddifoot2019Epistemic, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {176}, number = {3}, pages = {755--780}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1038-2} }
Robins, S.K.	2019	Confabulation and constructive memory	Synthese 196(6) 2135-2151	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Confabulation is a symptom central to many psychiatric diagnoses and can be severely debilitating to those who exhibit the symptom. Theorists, scientists, and clinicians have an understandable interest in the nature of confabulation---pursuing ways to define, identify, treat, and perhaps even prevent this memory disorder. Appeals to confabulation as a clinical symptom rely on an account of memory's function from which cases like the above can be contrasted. Accounting for confabulation is thus an important desideratum for any candidate theory of memory. Many contemporary memory theorists now endorse Constructivism, where memory is understood as a capacity for constructing plausible representations of past events (e.g., De Brigard in Synthese 191:155--185, 2014; Michaelian in Philos Psychol 24:323--342, 2012, 2016). Constructivism's aim is to account for and normalize the prevalence of memory errors in everyday life. Errors are plausible constructions that, on a particular occasion have led to error. They are not, however, evidence of malfunction in the memory system. While Constructivism offers an uplifting repackaging of the memory errors to which we are all susceptible, it has troubling implications for appeals to confabulation in psychiatric diagnosis. By accommodating memory errors within our understanding of memory's function, Constructivism runs the risk of being unable to explain how confabulation errors are evidence of malfunction. After reviewing the literature on confabulation and Constructivism, respectively, I identify the tension between them and explore how different versions of Constructivism may respond. The paper concludes with a proposal for distinguishing between kinds of false memory---specifically, between misremembering and confabulation---that may provide a route to their reconciliation.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2019Confabulation, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Confabulation and constructive memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {196}, number = {6}, pages = {2135--2151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1315-1} }
Sakuragi, S.	2019	On philosophical concepts of memory	Lo Sguardo 28 259-273	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ''Remember'' is one of the most frequently used English verbs to express our mnemonic phenomena. In the traditional taxonomy of memory in philosophy, called the tripartite concepts, two concepts of declarative memory -- propositional and experiential memories -- are distinguished. Recently, the traditional classification has been drawing criticism. Markus Werning and Sen Cheng reject the classification because it is based upon English grammar. Sven Bernecker argues that the distinction between the two concepts is «not sharp». In this paper, I defend the two philosophical concepts of memory. The argument in this paper is twofold. Despite Werning and Cheng's observation, I argue that the two memory concepts are not characterized by English grammar. Against Bernecker, I also defend the alleged ambiguity between the two memory concepts. In my view, the two types of memories appear to be «not sharp» not due to conceptual ambiguity, but rather different ways of memory attribution.
BibTeX: @article{Sakuragi2019philosophical, author = {Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {On philosophical concepts of memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {Lo Sguardo}, volume = {28}, pages = {259--273}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3721911} }
Salvaggio, M.	2019	A capacity account of memory	American Philosophical Quarterly 56(4) 371-384	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I argue for a capacity account of memory, according to which memory is a neurocogni-tive capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information. Phenomenal accounts classify memory as having a certain phenomenal character. However, the mental processes generating that phenomenal character are separate from the processes that generate content. Causal accounts require a causal connection between the subject's current representation and their original representation. However, when memory is constructed, this connection does not exist. Unlike its major competitors, the capacity account picks out an epistemically interesting class of memory beliefs while accommodating the constructive nature of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Salvaggio2019capacity, author = {Salvaggio, Mary}, title = {A capacity account of memory}, year = {2019}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {56}, number = {4}, pages = {371--384}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/48563050} }
Sant'Anna, A. and Michaelian, K.	2019	Thinking about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10(1) 187-217	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representa-tionalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2019Thinking, author = {Sant'Anna, André and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Thinking about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought}, year = {2019}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {187--217}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0391-6} }
Sassi, M.M.	2019	The Greek philosophers on how to memorise -- and learn	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 343-361			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sassi2019Greek, author = {Sassi, Maria Michela}, title = {The Greek philosophers on how to memorise -- and learn}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {343--361} }
Sauchelli, A.	2019	Personal identity and trivial survival	Theoria 85(5) 402-411	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Your replica is created on Mars and you, on Earth, are destroyed. Parfit claims that your replica may still have what prudentially matters for you -- provided that you are psychologically connected and continuous with your replica. If someone accidently destroys the tapes containing your psychological profile used in the production of your replica and this same action fortuitously produces a functionally equivalent tape, Ehring claims that Parfit should maintain that the resulting new individual may still have what matters. Nihilism about what matters follows, or so Ehring claims. I argue that Ehring is wrong and that the difference between the two ways of creating a replica is not trivial -- there is no trivial survival.
BibTeX: @article{Sauchelli2019Personal, author = {Sauchelli, Andrea}, title = {Personal identity and trivial survival}, year = {2019}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {85}, number = {5}, pages = {402--411}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12205} }
Schermer, M.H.N. and Richard, E.	2019	On the reconceptualization of Alzheimer's disease	Bioethics 33(1) 138-145	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the hope of future treatments to prevent or slow down the disease, there is a strong movement towards an ever-earlier detection of Alzheimer's disease (AD). In conjunction with scientific developments, this has prompted a reconceptualization of AD, as a slowly progressive pathological process with a long asymptomatic phase. New concepts such as 'preclinical' and 'prodromal' AD have been introduced, raising a number of conceptual and ethical questions. We evaluate whether these new concepts are theoretically defensible, in light of theories of health and disease, and whether they should be understood as disease or as an at-risk state. We introduce a pragmatic view on disease concepts and argue that an evaluation of the reconceptualization of AD should also take its aims and effects into account, and assess their ethical acceptability. The reconceptualization of AD is useful to coordinate research into preventive strategies, and may potentially benefit future patients. However, in the short term, early detection and labelling of 'preclinical AD' can potentially harm people. Since there is no treatment available and the predictive value is unclear, it may only create a group of 'patients-in-waiting' who may suffer from anxiety, uncertainty and stigmatization, but will never actually develop dementia. We conclude that only if the promise of preventive medication materializes, will the reconceptualization of AD turn out unequivocally to be for the better. Otherwise, the reconceptualization may do more harm than good.
BibTeX: @article{Schermer2019reconceptualization, author = {Schermer, Maartje H. N. and Richard, Edo}, title = {On the reconceptualization of Alzheimer's disease}, year = {2019}, journal = {Bioethics}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {138--145}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12516} }
Schirmer Dos Santos, C. and Vieira Rodrigues, T.	2019	Foreword: The philosophy of memory today	Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10(3) 3-7		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{DosSantos2019Foreword, author = {Schirmer Dos Santos, César and Vieira Rodrigues, Tiegue}, title = {Foreword: The philosophy of memory today}, year = {2019}, journal = {Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {3--7}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378641576} }
Schwartz, A. and Drayson, Z.	2019	Intellectualism and the argument from cognitive science	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 662-692	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or 'know- how' is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evi- dence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the rela- tionship between intellectualist arguments based on truth- conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions and anti-intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: Its proponents assume that findings from cognitive science provide evidence about the nature of mental states. We demonstrate that this fact has been overlooked in the ensuing debate, resulting in inconsistency and confusion. Defenders of the semantic approach to intellectualism engage with the argument from cognitive science in a way that implicitly endorses this natur- alistic metaphysics, and they even rely on it to claim that cognitive science supports intellectualism. In the course of their arguments, however, they also reject that scientific find- ings can have metaphysical import. We argue that this situa- tion is preventing productive debate about intellectualism, which would benefitfromboth sides being more transparent about their metaphilosophical assumptions.
BibTeX: @article{Schwartz2019Intellectualism, author = {Schwartz, Arieh and Drayson, Zoe}, title = {Intellectualism and the argument from cognitive science}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {662--692}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607278} }
Seemann, A.	2019	Reminiscing together: Joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self	Synthese 196(12) 4813-4828	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this essay, I consider a kind of social group that I call 'epistemic'. It is constituted by its members' possession of perceptually grounded common knowledge, which endows them with a particular kind of epistemic authority. This authority, I argue, is invoked in the activity of 'joint reminiscing'---of remembering together a past jointly experienced event. Joint reminiscing, in turn, plays an important role in the constitution of social and personal identity. The notion of an epistemic group, then, is a concept that helps explain an important aspect of a subject's understanding of who she is.
BibTeX: @article{Seemann2019Reminiscing, author = {Seemann, Axel}, title = {Reminiscing together: Joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self}, year = {2019}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {196}, number = {12}, pages = {4813--4828}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1156-3} }
Senor, T.D.	2019	A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory	Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Senor2019Critical, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
Sinclair, M.	2019	Bergson	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sinclair2019Bergson, author = {Sinclair, Mark}, title = {Bergson}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Smithies, D.	2019	On the global ambitions of phenomenal conservatism	Analytic Philosophy 60(3) 206-244		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Smithies2019global, author = {Smithies, Declan}, title = {On the global ambitions of phenomenal conservatism}, year = {2019}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {60}, number = {3}, pages = {206--244}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12167} }
Softić, T.	2019	Circle back: Immigrant memories and fungal networks	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(2) 300-310	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article is about three bodies of visual work that raise questions of cultural belonging, hybridity, and memory. I use languages of printmaking, drawing, photography, and poetry to creatively trace processes of memory of place and meanings we make with it. In Migrant Universe, drawings function as rearrangeable continua of maps, landscapes, and portraits of memory and identity. Catalogue of Silence, an installation of photographs, an essay, and poems about the state of cultural institutions in my native city of Sarajevo, is an elegy for what has been irretrievably lost as well as a testament of hope that the city will rebound and be, as it was in the past, a fertile ground for new ways of cultural thriving. In Beginnings and Endings, a series of etchings, images culled from science, explosion traces, and comic book speech bubbles are placed on liquid and unsteady ground, invaded by fungi, functioning as icons of precarity: the loss and the promise of it. In this precipitous moment in human history, in American history, what can we learn about our survival as a species, and a global civilization, from the stories of migrants, seeds, and mushrooms?
BibTeX: @article{Softic2019Circle, author = {Softić, Tanja}, title = {Circle back: Immigrant memories and fungal networks}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {300--310}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.2.0300} }
Sorgiovanni, B.	2019	The agential point of view	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(2) 549-572	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Agentialist accounts of self-knowledge seek to do justice to the connection between our identities as rational agents and our capacity to know our own minds. There are two strategies that agentialists have employed in developing their position: substantive and non-substantive. My aim is to explicate and defend one particular example of the non-substantive strategy, namely, that proposed by Tyler Burge. In particular, my concern is to defend Burge's claim that critical reasoning requires a relation of normative directness between reviewing and reviewed perspectives. My defence will involve supplementing Burge's view with a substantive agentialist account of self-knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Sorgiovanni2019agential, author = {Sorgiovanni, Ben}, title = {The agential point of view}, year = {2019}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {100}, number = {2}, pages = {549--572}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12263} }
Sorrentino Marques, B.	2019	Psychogenic amnesia: Implications for the diachronic sense of selfhood	Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10(3) 129-149	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Traditionally, the issue of personal identity has been considered as the question about what makes one the same across time. Recently though, attention to one's own phenomenal experience has brought a new perspective to the debate. In light of this change of perspective, Klein suggests that individuals with retrograde episodic amnesia retain a notion of who they are, as well as a sense of continuity. He, therefore, argues that episodic memory is not necessary for a diachronic sense of selfhood. I challenge Klein's conclusion by pointing out that there are more extreme kinds of amnesia---e.g. psychogenic amnesia---that seem problematic to his proposal---according to which a sense of continuity is enough for a diachronic sense of self. This is the case because some instances of psychogenic amnesia are cases of dissociative amnesia, which show that having continuous conscious experience does not solve the issue.
BibTeX: @article{SorrentinoMarques2019Psychogenic, author = {Sorrentino Marques, Beatriz}, title = {Psychogenic amnesia: Implications for the diachronic sense of selfhood}, year = {2019}, journal = {Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {129--149}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378640389} }
Spinelli, E.	2019	Physiologia medicans: The Epicurean road to happiness	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 278-291			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Spinelli2019Physiologia, author = {Spinelli, Emidio}, title = {Physiologia medicans: The Epicurean road to happiness}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {278--291} }
Springle, A.	2019	Methods, minds, memory, and kinds	Philosophical Psychology 32(5) 635-661	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and pro-positional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists con-flate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds.
BibTeX: @article{Springle2019Methods, author = {Springle, Alison}, title = {Methods, minds, memory, and kinds}, year = {2019}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {32}, number = {5}, pages = {635--661}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1607277} }
Steup, M.	2019	Benign infinity	404 Themes from Klein 235-257	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to infinitism, all justification comes from an infinite series of reasons. Peter Klein defends infinitism as the correct solution to the regress problem by rejecting two alternative solutions: foundationalism and coherentism. I focus on Klein's argument against foundationalism, which relies on the premise that there is no justification without meta-justification. This premise is incompatible with dogmatic foundationalism as defended by Michael Huemer and Jim Pryor. It does not, however, conflict with non-dogmatic foundationalism. Whereas dogmatic foundationalism rejects the need for any form of meta-justification, non-dogmatic foundationalism merely rejects Laurence BonJour's claim that meta-justification must come from beliefs. Unlike its dogmatic counterpart, non-dogmatic foundationalism can allow for basic beliefs to receive meta-justification from non-doxastic sources such as experiences and memories. Construed thus, non-dogmatic foundationalism is compatible with Klein's principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. I conclude that Klein's rejection of foundationalism fails. Nevertheless, I agree with Klein that when in response to a skeptical challenge we engage in the activity of defending our beliefs, the number of reasons we can give is at least in principle infinite. I argue that this type of infinity is benign because, when we continue to give reasons, we will eventually merely repeat previously stated reasons. Consequently, I reject Klein's claim that the more reasons we give the more we increase the justification for our beliefs.
BibTeX: @incollection{Steup2019Benign, author = {Steup, Matthias}, title = {Benign infinity}, year = {2019}, volume = {404}, booktitle = {Themes from Klein}, editor = {Fitelson, Branden and Borges, Rodrigo and Braden, Cherie}, pages = {235--257}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04522-7_15} }
Stokes, D.	2019	Memory, imagery, and self-knowledge	Avant 10(2) 1-18	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One distinct interest in self-knowledge is an interest in whether one can know about one's own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one's beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one's veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given the robust psychological and phenomenal similarities be-tween episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: "Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?" After critical analysis of the application of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne [2010], following Evans [1982]) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive sensory-access account of Carruthers [2011]). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind.
BibTeX: @article{Stokes2019Memory, author = {Stokes, Dustin}, title = {Memory, imagery, and self-knowledge}, year = {2019}, journal = {Avant}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, pages = {1--18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.26913/avant.2019.02.03} }
Stroud, S.R. and Henson, J.A.	2019	Memory, reconstruction, and ethics in memorialization	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(2) 282-299	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article examines the ethical choices that are implicit in acts of memorialization. By engaging literature on the rhetoric of memorials and pragmatist aesthetics, we argue that memorialization involves a range of important ethical choices in who is remembered, how they are remembered, and the experience the act of memorialization evokes in viewers. By using John Dewey's nascent account of memorial aesthetics, we construct an exploratory typology of the ways that memorials can use and evoke the experience of viewers. The means of experiential reconstruction are also found to involve important ethical decisions. We explore the usefulness of this typology in reference to two different memorials: Ambedkar Memorial Park in Lucknow, India, and the Memorial for the Unknown War Deserters and for the Victims of the National Socialist Military Justice System in Erfurt, Germany.
BibTeX: @article{Stroud2019Memory, author = {Stroud, Scott R. and Henson, Jonathan A.}, title = {Memory, reconstruction, and ethics in memorialization}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {282--299}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.2.0282} }
Symons, S.	2019	The Work of Forgetting, or, How Can We Make the Future Possible	Rowman & Littlefield			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Symons2019Work, author = {Symons, Stéphane}, title = {The Work of Forgetting, or, How Can We Make the Future Possible}, year = {2019}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield} }
Talay Turner, Z.	2019	Nietzsche on memory and active forgetting	The European Legacy 24(1) 46-58	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article explores Nietzsche's approach to the fundamental ques- tion of ''how to live one'slife'', and more specifically his view of the role of the past in seeking an answer to this question. By discussing Nietzsche's views of how different nations and cultures relate to their history, I suggest some comparisons with how individuals might do so. Common to both is the relationship between the past as a resource and as a burden: the burden of single events or periods and the burden of the abundance of facts. Key to Nietzsche'sthinking on these questions is his account of the relationship between remembering, promising, and forgetting. He considers ''active forget- ting'' paradoxically as both a form of forgetting and a way of taking full responsibility for the past.
BibTeX: @article{TalayTurner2019Nietzsche, author = {Talay Turner, Zeynep}, title = {Nietzsche on memory and active forgetting}, year = {2019}, journal = {The European Legacy}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {46--58}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2018.1538091} }
Tarver, E.C.	2019	Bigger than football: Fan anxiety and memory in the racial present	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 33(2) 220-237	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Understanding many white football fans' responses to football players' protests against police brutality requires recognizing the historical and contemporary role of football fandom in managing racial and gendered anxieties. In this article, I analyze three distinct uses of memory by white football fans as they work through the anxiety that results when the sport fails to work in the way they expect. My analysis draws on the opposing views of football taken by the American philosophers Josiah Royce and George Santayana and on contemporary social science research on the behavior of sports fans. I show that contemporary fan hostility to protesting players is consistent with the social ills that have surrounded football since the era of Royce's critique.
BibTeX: @article{Tarver2019Bigger, author = {Tarver, Erin C.}, title = {Bigger than football: Fan anxiety and memory in the racial present}, year = {2019}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {220--237}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.33.2.0220} }
Trakas, M.	2019	How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey	Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 10(3) 53-86	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is not a unitary phenomenon. Even among the group of long-term individual memory representations (known in the literature as declarative memory) there seems to be a distinction between two kinds of memory: memory of personally experienced events (episodic memory) and memory of facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory). Although this distinction seems very intuitive, it is not so clear in which characteristic or set of interrelated characteristics lies the difference. In this article, I present the different criteria proposed in the philosophical and scientific literature in order to account for this distinction: (1) the vehicle of representation; (2) the grammar of the verb ''to remember''; (3) the cause of the memory; (4) the memory content; and (5) the phenomenology of memory representations. Whereas some criteria seem more plausible than others, I show that all of them are problematic and none of them really fulfill their aim. I then briefly outline a different criterion, the affective criterion, which seems a promising line of research to try to understand the grounds of this distinction.
BibTeX: @article{Trakas2019How, author = {Trakas, Marina}, title = {How to distinguish memory representations? A historical and critical journey}, year = {2019}, journal = {Voluntas: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {53--86}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5902/2179378639849} }
Vieira Rodrigues, T.	2019	Memory compatibilism: Preserving and generating positive epistemic status	Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 143 457-481	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The contemporary epistemological debate regarding the epistemic role of memory is dominated by the dispute between two different views: memory preservationism and memory generativism. While the former holds that memory only preserves the epistemic status already acquired through another source, the latter advocates that there are situations where memory can function as a generative epistemic source. Both views are problematic and have to deal with important objections. In this paper, I suggest a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge that overcomes objections raised for both preservationism and generativism. I shall call this view Memory Compatibilism. I argue that the proposed view better explains the generative epistemic character of memory.
BibTeX: @article{VieiraRodrigues2019Memory, author = {Vieira Rodrigues, Tiegue}, title = {Memory compatibilism: Preserving and generating positive epistemic status}, year = {2019}, journal = {Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia}, volume = {143}, pages = {457--481}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-512X2019n14312tvr} }
Viera, G. and Margolis, E.	2019	Animals are not cognitively stuck in time	Behavioral and Brain sciences 42 e277	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We argue that animals are not cognitively stuck in time. Evidence pertaining to multisensory temporal order perception strongly suggests that animals can represent at least some temporal relations of perceived events.
BibTeX: @article{Viera2019Animals, author = {Viera, Gerardo and Margolis, Eric}, title = {Animals are not cognitively stuck in time}, year = {2019}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain sciences}, volume = {42}, pages = {e277}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000396} }
Wiskus, J.	2019	On memory, nostalgia, and the temporal expression of Josquin's Ave Maria… virgo serena	Continental Philosophy Review 52(4) 397-413	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I draw upon Edmund Husserl's classic text, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893--1917), in order to reframe some of his insight regarding the structures of inner time-consciousness and lay the groundwork for a few claims of my own. First, I show how musical expression is constituted in relation to the flowing movement of absolute subjectivity. Moreover, by carefully distinguishing between retention and recollection, I clarify, on the one hand, music's ability to support access to memory proper (i.e. memory as a representation of the past) and, on the other hand, its ability to keep the past ''in play,'' so to speak (i.e. as an experience of nostalgia---as a perception of the past in terms of protentions that pertain to the present). In this way, we come to understand how music offers a unique memorial capacity---it makes possible the life of the past, as the vital movement of absolute subjectivity. Throughout the essay, I refer to Josquin's motet Ave Maria…virgo serena in order to clarify the specific temporal structures that are at issue.
BibTeX: @article{Wiskus2019memory, author = {Wiskus, Jessica}, title = {On memory, nostalgia, and the temporal expression of Josquin's Ave Maria… virgo serena}, year = {2019}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {52}, number = {4}, pages = {397--413}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-019-09470-z} }
Wygoda, Y.	2019	Socratic forgetfulness and Platonic irony	Greek Memories: Theories and Practices Cambridge University Press 195-215			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wygoda2019Socratic, author = {Wygoda, Ynon}, title = {Socratic forgetfulness and Platonic irony}, year = {2019}, booktitle = {Greek Memories: Theories and Practices}, editor = {Castagnoli, Luca and Ceccarelli, Paola}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {195--215} }
Yatczak, J.	2019	Everyday material engagement: supporting self and personhood in people with Alzheimer's disease	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18(1) 223-240	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Threats to the self and personhood of people with ADRD include the disturbing images of Alzheimer's disease as the death before death, culturally based assumption that status as a full human being is dependent upon cognition and memory, and a decrease in personal possessions with a move to a 24-h care setting. This paper presents the findings of an ethnographic study of self and personhood in Alzheimer's disease in an American long-term care facility. It argues that the lifeworld in which the self and personhood of individuals with ADRD is actualized is mediated and negotiated through engagement with everyday objects. Using a framework that integrates Material Engagement Theory with Bourdieu's Practice Theory, it is argued that the study of the material engagement of individuals with ADRD can lead to a better understanding of the lives of individuals with ADRD by focusing on the material and non-discursive aspects of objects. Findings contribute to the understanding of current practice issues in dementia care while shifting the focus away from exclusively biomedical understanding. Paradoxically, people with ADRD, due to their cognitive impairment, may provide us with a more fundamental way to understand the importance of objects in the lives of humans in general.
BibTeX: @article{Yatczak2019Everyday, author = {Yatczak, Jayne}, title = {Everyday material engagement: supporting self and personhood in people with Alzheimer's disease}, year = {2019}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {223--240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9566-y} }
Andonovski, N.	2018	Is episodic memory a natural kind? A Comment on Cheng and Werning's "What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?" (2016)	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1609	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a recent paper, Sen Cheng and Markus Werning argue that the class of episodic memories constitutes a natural kind. Endorsing the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds, they suggest that episodic memories can be characterized by a cluster of properties unified by an underlying neural mechanism for coding sequences of events. Here, I argue that Cheng and Werning's proposal faces some significant, and potentially insurmountable, difficulties. Two are described as most prominent. First, the proposal fails to satisfy an important normative constraint on natural kind theorizing, not providing the requisite theoretical resources for arbitration between rival taxonomies of memory. Second, the proposal is in direct tension with a foundational principle of the HPC view: the rejection of essentialism. This has far-reaching consequences, which threaten to undermine the coherence of the proposal.
BibTeX: @article{Andonovski2018Is, author = {Andonovski, Nikola}, title = {Is episodic memory a natural kind? A Comment on Cheng and Werning's "What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?" (2016)}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1609} }
Ansell-Pearson, K.	2018	Bergson: Thinking Beyond the Human Condition	Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{AnsellPearson2018Bergson, author = {Ansell-Pearson, Keith}, title = {Bergson: Thinking Beyond the Human Condition}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Bermúdez, J.P.	2018	Remembering as a mental action	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 75-96		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{ArangoMunoz2018Remembering, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Bermúdez, Juan Pablo}, title = {Remembering as a mental action}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {75--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-5} }
Arcangeli, M. and Dokic, J.	2018	Affective memory: A little help from our imagination	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 13-32			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Arcangeli2018Affective, author = {Arcangeli, Margherita and Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Affective memory: A little help from our imagination}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {13--32} }
Arese, L.	2018	Doing justice to the past: Memory and criticism in Herbert Marcuse	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1615	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt (1933), Horkheimer points out the need for a new understanding of history that avoids the contemporary versions of the Hegelian Verklärung. He synthesizes this challenge with an imperative: to do justice to past suffering. The result of this appeal can be found in the works of the members of the Frankfurt School in the form of multiple, even divergent, trains of thought that reach with unlike intensities the current debates on memory and its link with history. This paper focuses on three of these trains, which can be traced back to different periods of the work of Herbert Marcuse. It intends to systematize and present what can be considered alternative---although not necessarily contradictory---approaches aroused from the same concern over the critical power of nonreconciliatory memory: first, a genealogy inquiry that deconstructs the reified character of the given; second, a recollection of past images of happiness; and finally, a memory of the limits of all attainable freedom. Exploring these three moments, their shortcomings and tensions, may shed light on the complexity and present importance of the challenge they intend to face.
BibTeX: @article{Arese2018Doing, author = {Arese, Laura}, title = {Doing justice to the past: Memory and criticism in Herbert Marcuse}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1615}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1615} }
Armary, P., Dokic, J. and Sander, E.	2018	The problem of context for similarity: An insight from analogical cognition	Philosophies 3(4) 39	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Similarity is central for the definition of concepts in several theories in cognitive psychology. However, similarity encounters several problems which were emphasized by Goodman in 1972. At the end of his article, Goodman banishes similarity from any serious philosophical or scientific investigations. If Goodman is right, theories of concepts based on similarity encounter a huge problem and should be revised entirely. In this paper, we would like to analyze the notion of similarity with some insight from psychological works on analogical cognition. Analogical cognition compares two situations or objects in order to find similarities between them. In doing so, the analogical process sorts the different features of the two situations or objects and determines the most important ones. The analogical process is also highly sensitive to context. Context-sensitivity is desirable at some level, but it is also problematic as it leads to a computational explosion. To answer this problem, we would like to consider salience as a possible heuristic in the analogical process. We will distinguish three forms of salience: Sensory, categorical, and operational. By taking salience into account, we can introduce a shortcut into the computation of similarity and circumvent computational explosion.
BibTeX: @article{Armary2018problem, author = {Armary, Pauline and Dokic, Jérôme and Sander, Emmanuel}, title = {The problem of context for similarity: An insight from analogical cognition}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophies}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, pages = {39}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies3040039} }
Aronowitz, S.	2018	Retrieval is central to the distinctive function of episodic memory	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e2	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic retrieval is heavily and asymmetrically dependent on the temporal order of the remembered events. This effect, or rather the underlying structure which it reflects, is a distinctive feature missing from the account in the target article. This structure explains significant successes and failures of episodic retrieval, and it has clear consequences for the fitness of the organism extending beyond communication.
BibTeX: @article{Aronowitz2018Retrieval, author = {Aronowitz, Sara}, title = {Retrieval is central to the distinctive function of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e2}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001248} }
Arvan, M.	2018	Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and A.I. ethics	AI & Society	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article argues that existing approaches to programming ethical AI fail to resolve a serious moral-semantic trilemma, generating interpretations of ethical requirements that are either too semantically strict, too semantically flexible, or overly unpredictable. This paper then illustrates the trilemma utilizing a recently proposed 'general ethical dilemma analyzer,' GenEth. Finally, it uses empirical evidence to argue that human beings resolve the semantic trilemma using general cognitive and motivational processes involving 'mental time-travel,' whereby we simulate different possible pasts and futures. I demonstrate how mental time-travel psychology leads us to resolve the semantic trilemma through a six-step process of interpersonal negotiation and renegotiation, and then conclude by showing how comparative advantages in processing power would plausibly cause AI to use similar processes to solve the semantic trilemma more reliably than we do, leading AI to make better moral-semantic choices than humans do by our very own lights.
BibTeX: @article{Arvan2018Mental, author = {Arvan, Marcus}, title = {Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and A.I. ethics}, year = {2018}, journal = {AI & Society}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0848-2} }
Baysan, U.	2018	Memory, confabulation, and epistemic failure	Logos & Episteme 9(4) 369-378	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mnemonic confabulation is an epistemic failure that involves memory error. In this paper, I examine an account of mnemonic confabulation offered by Sarah Robins in a number of works. In Robins' framework, mnemonic cognitive states in general (e.g., remembering, misremembering) are individuated by three conditions: existence of the target event, matching of the representation and the target event, and an appropriate causal connection between the target event and its representation. Robins argues that when these three conditions are not met, the cognitive state in question is an instance of mnemonic confabulation. Here, I argue that this is not true. There are mnemonic cognitive states which don't meet any of these conditions, and they are not cases of mnemonic confabulation. On a more positive note, I argue that mnemonic confabulation requires it to be a failing on behalf of either the subject or her mnemonic system that these conditions are not met.
BibTeX: @article{Baysan2018Memory, author = {Baysan, Umut}, title = {Memory, confabulation, and epistemic failure}, year = {2018}, journal = {Logos & Episteme}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {369--378}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20189430} }
Behnke, E.A.	2018	On the transformation of the time-drenched body: Kinaesthetic capability-consciousness and recalcitrant holding patterns	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 89-111	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Drawing upon Husserlian phenomenological methods and findings throughout, I begin by briefly considering the role of the body in explicit, presentificational memory and in recognizing familiar types of objects and situations, then I review and extend Husserl's account of the formation of bodily memory, focusing on kinaesthetic capability-consciousness (including such themes as 'making-a-body' and the bodily 'how-of-the-receivingness' standing in correlation to the 'how-of-the-givenness' of what we are experiencing) as well as addressing bodily 'amnesia'. Finally, I turn to the formation of 'recalcitrant holding patterns' (persisting patterns of bodily tension one cannot voluntarily release) and propose some practical, phenomenologically-inspired strategies that can shift such patterns. In this way the 'time-drenched' body-the body saturated, permeated by time-becomes a body that is not only suffused with and shaped by its past, but already bears the seeds of an open future where something other than the automatic reiteration of a sedimented past is possible.
BibTeX: @article{Behnke2018transformation, author = {Behnke, Elizabeth A.}, title = {On the transformation of the time-drenched body: Kinaesthetic capability-consciousness and recalcitrant holding patterns}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {89--111} }
Bernacer, J.	2018	An integrative understanding of habit to explore its neural correlates	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 112-146	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Scientific research leans on the theoretical assumptions that have been taken for granted through decades of research. Experimental psychology, mostly rooted in experiments with rodents, defines habits as rigid, unconscious, and non-teleological behaviours opposed to goal-directed actions. This definition has been transferred to human research as such, and habits are thus viewed as compulsions, obsessions, slips-of-action, and addictions. From an experiential point of view, however, humans possess habits that go beyond these behaviours. According to Aristotle, habits are dispositions of thought and performance, usually acquired by repetition, which predispose our future actions. This 'new' understanding of human habits would be associated with a brain configuration that goes beyond the rigid carving of motor routines in certain areas. An empirical application of this interpretation is explained. In conclusion, a novel perspective is proposed to study the neural correlates of habits and their impact on behaviour.
BibTeX: @article{Bernacer2018integrative, author = {Bernacer, Javier}, title = {An integrative understanding of habit to explore its neural correlates}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {112--146} }
Bernecker, S.	2018	On the blameworthiness of forgetting	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 241-258		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2018blameworthiness, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {On the blameworthiness of forgetting}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {241--258}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-13} }
Bickle, J.	2018	From microscopes to optogenetics: Ian Hacking vindicated	Philosophy of Science 85(5) 1065-1077	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I introduce two new tools in experimental neurobiology, optogenetics and DREADDs (de-signer receptors exclusively activated by designer drugs). These tools permit unprecedented control over activity in specific neurons in behaving animals. In addition to their inherent scientific interest, these tools make an important contribution to philosophy of science. They illustrate the very premises of Ian Hacking's ''microscope'' argument for the relative independence of experiment from theory. This new example is important for generalizing Hacking's argument because the background sciences (optics for microscopes, molecular biology for optogenetics, and DREADDs) and the fields of engineering producing these tools differ significantly.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2018microscopes, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {From microscopes to optogenetics: Ian Hacking vindicated}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {85}, number = {5}, pages = {1065--1077}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/699760} }
Bickle, J. and Kostko, A.	2018	Connection experiments in neurobiology	Synthese 195(12) 5271-5295	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Accounts of causal explanation are standard in philosophy of science. Less common are accounts of experimentation to investigate causal relations: detailed discussions of the specific kinds of experiments scientists design and run. Silva, Landreth, and Bickle's (SLB) (Engineering the next revolution in neuroscience: the new science of experiment planning, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014) account of ''connection experiments'' derives directly from landmark experiments in ''molecular and cellular cognition.'' We start with its key components, and then using a detailed case study from recent social neuroscience we emphasize and extend three features of SLB's account: (1) a division of distinct types of connection experiments, each providing a different type of evidence for a hypothesized causal relationship; (2) the typically downward-looking nature (in the sense of componentry) of the experimental search for mediating causes in mainstream neurobiology; and most importantly, (3) the centrality of multiple-experiment research programs, with each experiment designed such that if successful its results can be integrated with the others, toward the goal of confirming multiple-phenomena causal pathways. Our extension of SLB's account complements existing philosophical work on experimentation in neurobiology.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2018Connection, author = {Bickle, John and Kostko, Aaron}, title = {Connection experiments in neurobiology}, year = {2018}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {195}, number = {12}, pages = {5271--5295}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1838-0} }
Bilbrough, A.	2018	Memory and the true self: When moral knowledge can and cannot be forgotten	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1280	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal identity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths---especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to social relationships---cannot be forgotten because they're too tightly tied to one's true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent's identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten.
BibTeX: @article{Bilbrough2018Memory, author = {Bilbrough, André}, title = {Memory and the true self: When moral knowledge can and cannot be forgotten}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1280}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1614} }
Blustein, J.	2018	Conceptions of genocide and the ethics of memorialization	Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory Springer 21-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Conceptions of genocide can be broadly divided into individualistic and collectivistic. According to the former, genocide is essentially a crime against (many) individuals; according to the latter, it is a crime against a group, which is not reducible to an aggregate of the individuals who belong to it. This chapter argues for the latter on the grounds that it is necessary to capture the distinctive moral evil of genocide. It also argues for a non-consequentialist way of accounting for the ethical value of memorializing genocide. This is called an expressivist approach and three attitudes that memorials may express are highlighted and explored: respect, self-respect, and fidelity to the dead. Different accounts are then presented to explain how these attitudes can belong not only to individuals but also to groups and how, therefore, an expressivist ethic of remembrance for groups is possible. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the principle of warranted self-testifying, according to which those who suffer harm are in an ethically privileged position to testify to it. This principle is applied to group memorialization of genocidal harm, conceived as a group practice.
BibTeX: @incollection{Blustein2018Conceptions, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {Conceptions of genocide and the ethics of memorialization}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Genocide and Memory}, editor = {Lindert, J. and Marsoobian, A.T.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {21--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65513-0_3} }
Bortolotti, L.	2018	Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9(2) 227-249	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the costs and benefits of confabulation, focusing on the type of confabulation people engage in when they offer explanations for their attitudes and choices. What makes confabulation costly? In the philosophical literature confabulation is thought to undermine claims to self-knowledge. I argue that when people confabulate they do not necessarily fail at mental-state self-attributions, but offer ill-grounded explanations which often lead to the adoption of other ill-grounded beliefs. What, if anything, makes confabulation beneficial? As people are unaware of the information that would make their explanations accurate, they are not typically in a position to acknowledge their ignorance or provide better-grounded explanations for their attitudes and choices. In such cases, confabulating can have some advantages over offering no explanation because it makes a distinctive contribution to people's sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents. This role of ill-grounded explanations could not be as easily played by better-grounded explanations should these be available. In the end, I speculate about the implications of this conclusion for attempting to eliminate or reduce confabulation.
BibTeX: @article{Bortolotti2018Stranger, author = {Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation}, year = {2018}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {227--249}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0367-y} }
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E.	2018	The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions	Mind & Language 33(3) 263-279	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological well-being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.
BibTeX: @article{Bortolotti2018epistemic, author = {Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema}, title = {The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions}, year = {2018}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {33}, number = {3}, pages = {263--279}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12175} }
Brison, S.J.	2018	Outliving oneself: Trauma, memory, and personal identity	Feminists Rethink the Self Westview Press 12-39		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brison2018Outliving, author = {Brison, Susan J.}, title = {Outliving oneself: Trauma, memory, and personal identity}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Feminists Rethink the Self}, editor = {Meyers, D.}, publisher = {Westview Press}, pages = {12--39}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190867614.003.0018} }
Brogaard, B.	2018	Phenomenal dogmatism, seeming evidentialism and inferential justification	Believing in Accordance with the Evidence Springer 53-67	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Let 'strong normative evidentialism' be the view that a belief is doxastically justified just when (i) the belief is (properly) based on evidence in the agent's possession, and (ii) the evidence constitutes a good reason for the belief. Strong normative evidentialism faces two challenges. One is that of explaining which kinds of evidence can serve as a good reason for belief. The other is to explain how inferential justification is possible. If a belief p is based on a belief q that justifies p, then it would seem that the subject would need to be justified in believing that q makes p likely. The problem for the evidentialist is to explain what justifies this belief about likelihood. I will argue that the evidentialist can respond to both worries by construing basic evidence as seemings and then adopt a version of phenomenal dogmatism -- the view that seemings can confer immediate and full justification upon belief -- that takes seemings to be good reasons when they are evidence- insensitive in virtue of their phenomenology. This view meets the first challenge by explaining what kinds of evidence constitute a good reason. It meets the second challenge by taking beliefs that one phenomenon makes another phenomenon more likely to be immediately and fully justified by memory seemings.
BibTeX: @incollection{Brogaard2018Phenomenal, author = {Brogaard, Berit}, title = {Phenomenal dogmatism, seeming evidentialism and inferential justification}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Believing in Accordance with the Evidence}, editor = {McCain, Kevin}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {53--67}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_5} }
Brogan, W.	2018	In the wake of Socrates: Impossible memory	A Companion to Ancient Philosophy Northwestern University Press		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brogan2018wake, author = {Brogan, Walter}, title = {In the wake of Socrates: Impossible memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {A Companion to Ancient Philosophy}, editor = {Kirkland, Sean D. and Sanday, Eric}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv75d7w6.14} }
Byrne, A.	2018	Transparency and Self-Knowledge	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Byrne2018Transparency, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Transparency and Self-Knowledge}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Carruthers, P.	2018	Episodic memory isn't essentially autonoetic	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e6	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that the function attributed to episodic memory by Mahr & Csibra (M&C) -- that is, grounding one's claims to epistemic authority over past events -- fails to support the essentially autonoetic character of such memories. I suggest, in contrast, that episodic event memories are sometimes purely first order, sometimes autonoetic, depending on relevance in the context.
BibTeX: @article{Carruthers2018Episodic, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {Episodic memory isn't essentially autonoetic}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e6}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001285} }
Carvalho, F.M.	2018	Situating mental time travel in the broad context of temporal cognition: A neural systems approach	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 81-88	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability of remembering personal past events or thinking about possible personal future happenings. This mental property is possible due to our capacity to be aware of subjective time, which enables us to experience the flow of time, to conceive non-present times, and to process time as a dimension of real world phe- nomena. Temporal cognition encompasses the mental functions which rely on temporal information enabling the experience of the temporal flow and the processing of the temporal dimension of external phenomena. Given the broad range of our time experiences and, hence, the broad scope of our temporal cognition, it is expected that certain kinds of temporal information can be of particular importance when we mentally transport ourselves to events in the past or future, whereas others could be unrelated to this mental property. The present paper seeks to situate the process of MTT within human temporal cognition. This will be done by identifying the commonalities and differences in the neural correlates of MTT and those of the three main subjective time processing systems, namely metric timing, ordinal timing and autobiographical timing.
BibTeX: @article{Carvalho2018Situating, author = {Carvalho, Fabiana Mesquita}, title = {Situating mental time travel in the broad context of temporal cognition: A neural systems approach}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {81--88}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.09} }
Chudnoff, E.	2018	The epistemic significance of perceptual learning	Inquiry 61(5-6) 543-558	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
BibTeX: @article{Chudnoff2018epistemic, author = {Chudnoff, Elijah}, title = {The epistemic significance of perceptual learning}, year = {2018}, journal = {Inquiry}, volume = {61}, number = {5-6}, pages = {543--558}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1368172} }
Colaço, D.	2018	Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 72 32-40	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.
BibTeX: @article{Colaco2018Rip, author = {Colaço, David}, title = {Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon}, year = {2018}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {72}, pages = {32--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.04.003} }
Corsa, A.J. and Walker, W.R.	2018	Moral psychology of the fading affect bias	Philosophical Psychology 31(7) 1097-1113	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attributed to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the ''fading affect bias,'' namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emotions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. Secondarily, we note that if Julia Driver's moral theory is correct, then the disposition to display the fading affect bias is a moral virtue.
BibTeX: @article{Corsa2018Moral, author = {Corsa, Andrew J. and Walker, W. Richard}, title = {Moral psychology of the fading affect bias}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {31}, number = {7}, pages = {1097--1113}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1477126} }
Costelloe, T.M.	2018	The Imagination in Hume's Philosophy The Canvas of the Mind	Edinburgh University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Costelloe2018Imagination, author = {Costelloe, Timothy M.}, title = {The Imagination in Hume's Philosophy The Canvas of the Mind}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Edinburgh University Press} }
Craver, C.F. and Rosenbaum, R.S.	2018	Consent without memory	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 259-275		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Craver2018Consent, author = {Craver, Carl F. and Rosenbaum, R. Shayna}, title = {Consent without memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {259--275}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-14} }
Curry, D.S.	2018	Cartesian critters can't remember	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 69 72-85	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Descartes held the following view of declarative memory: to remember is to reconstruct an idea that you intellectually recognize as a reconstruction. Descartes countenanced two overarching varieties of declarative memory. To have an intellectual memory is to intellectually reconstruct a universal idea that you recognize as a reconstruction, and to have a sensory memory is to neurophysiologically reconstruct a particular idea that you recognize as a reconstruction. Sensory remembering is thus a capacity of neither ghosts nor machines, but only of human beings qua mind-body unions. This interpretation unifies Descartes's various remarks (and conspicuous silences) about remembering, from the 1628 Rules for the Direction of the Mind through the suppressed-in-1633 Treatise of Man to the 1649 Passions of the Soul. It also rebuts a prevailing thesis in the current secondary literature---that Cartesian critters can remember---while incorporating the textual evidence for that thesis---Descartes's detailed descriptions of the corporeal mechanisms that construct sensory memories.
BibTeX: @article{Curry2018Cartesian, author = {Curry, Devin Sanchez}, title = {Cartesian critters can't remember}, year = {2018}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A}, volume = {69}, pages = {72--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.03.001} }
Dace, T.	2018	Memory as a property of nature	Axiomathes 28(5) 507-519	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Prerequisite to memory is a past distinct from present. Because wave evolution is both continuous and time-reversible, the undisturbed quantum system lacks a distinct past and therefore the possibility of memory. With the quantum transition, a reversibly evolving superposition of values yields to an irreversible emergence of definite values in a distinct and transient moment of time. The succession of such moments generates an irretrievable past and thus the possibility of memory. Bohm's notion of implicate and explicate order provides a conceptual basis for memory as a general feature of nature akin to gravity and electromagnetism. I propose that natural memory is an outcome of the continuity of implicate time in the context of discontinuous explicate time. Among the ramifications of natural memory are that laws of nature can propagate through time much like habits and that personal memory does not require neural information storage.
BibTeX: @article{Dace2018Memory, author = {Dace, Ted}, title = {Memory as a property of nature}, year = {2018}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {28}, number = {5}, pages = {507--519}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9381-7} }
Das, N.	2018	Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention	Ratio 31(4) 402-414	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhad td ta (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists' challenge.
BibTeX: @article{Das2018Object, author = {Das, Nilanjan}, title = {Object reidentification and the epistemic role of attention}, year = {2018}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, pages = {402--414}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12214} }
De Brigard, F.	2018	Memory and the intentional stance	The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett Oxford University Press 62-91		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DeBrigard2018Memory, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Memory and the intentional stance}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett}, editor = {Huebner, Bryce}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {62--91}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199367511.003.0005} }
De Brigard, F.	2018	Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing	New DIrections in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 200-219		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DeBrigard2018Memoryb, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New DIrections in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {200--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-11} }
De Brigard, F. and Gessell, B.S.	2018	Why episodic memory may not be for communication	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e8	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories. Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more parsimonious evolutionary accounts.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2018Why, author = {De Brigard, Felipe and Gessell, Bryce S.}, title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e8}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001303} }
De Medeiros, E.V.	2018	Undoing one's past	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 97-102	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In contemporary research on memory, the idea of mental time travel (MTT) has been connected , at the functional level, with planning and imagining what might occur in one's future. Episodic memory impacts on our capacity to move imaginatively towards possible scenarios ahead. Consequently, Gerrans and Kennett (2010, 2016) urge us to agree that MTT is essential to moral agency. In this paper, we suggest that if we conceive the specific varieties of MTT as something more than remembering one's past and imagining one's future , then the capacity of undoing one's past both by episodic counterfactual thinking and the emotion of regret must be considered essential to moral agency on equal terms.
BibTeX: @article{DeMedeiros2018Undoing, author = {De Medeiros, Eduardo Vicentini}, title = {Undoing one's past}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {97--102}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.11} }
Debus, D.	2018	Handle with care: Activity, passivity, and the epistemological role of recollective memories	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 119-135		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Debus2018Handle, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Handle with care: Activity, passivity, and the epistemological role of recollective memories}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {119--135}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-7} }
Debus, D.	2018	Memory, imagination, and narrative	Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Oxford University Press 73-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Debus2018Memory, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Memory, imagination, and narrative}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory}, editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabian}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {73--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0005} }
Dennett, D.C.	2018	Reflections on Felipe De Brigard	The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett Oxford University Press 92-94			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dennett2018Reflections, author = {Dennett, Daniel C.}, title = {Reflections on Felipe De Brigard}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett}, editor = {Huebner, Bryce}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {92--94} }
DePergola, P.A.	2018	The neurostructure of morality and the hubris of memory manipulation	New Bioethics 24(3) 199-227	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neurotechnologies that promise to dampen (via pharmacologicals), disassociate (via electro-convulsive therapy), erase (via deep brain stimulation), and replace (via false memory creation) unsavory episodic memories are no longer the subject of science fiction. They have already arrived, and their funding suggests that they will not disappear anytime soon. In light of their emergence, this essay examines the neurostructure of normative morality to clarify that memory manipulation, which promises to take away that which is bad in human experience, also removes that which enables human beings to be good. Concepts such as free will, moral responsibility, and the neurobiological basis of moral reasoning are explored to underscore the fundamental hubris inherent to the memory manipulation enterprise.
BibTeX: @article{DePergola2018neurostructure, author = {DePergola, Peter A.}, title = {The neurostructure of morality and the hubris of memory manipulation}, year = {2018}, journal = {New Bioethics}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {199--227}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2018.1520535} }
Dutton, J.	2018	Dead write: Mourning Proust's signature	Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 23(6) 78-92	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article presents a reading of mourning in Marcel Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu from the philosophical perspective of Jacques Derrida to imagine a relationship between death and literature. When he writes mourning, Proust works over an irreconcilable abyss -- he writes the possibility of mourning, but never writes its completion. In fact, he dies before writing any completion; he dies in deferring it, opening up a mourning for his signature that he had already begun. This, I argue, underlines the aporia that Proust contends with in writing a subjectivity of mourning and death. Death in literature dissects the arresting spectral quality of literature itself -- the disability to irrevocably absent its transversal representations, or the interminable coming-back of its ghosts. In composing a literary mourning, Proust dies into a work in which the separation of signatories (Proust, any one of his narrators, us as readers, and any one of those) blurs into an indistinguishable synecdoche. As such, the article resolves upon the consideration that Proust seemingly left his novel -- when we create a fictive image of death, how can we imagine anything other than life? The literary dissemination of the signature, of every past self, presents, or imagines, absence as a dream of nothingness.
BibTeX: @article{Dutton2018Dead, author = {Dutton, James}, title = {Dead write: Mourning Proust's signature}, year = {2018}, journal = {Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities}, volume = {23}, number = {6}, pages = {78--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2018.1546993} }
Fernández, J.	2018	The functional character of memory	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 52-71		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2018functional, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {The functional character of memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {52--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-4} }
Figueiredo, N.M.	2018	On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as awareness of past events	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 63-71	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving's view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker's distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving's conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
BibTeX: @article{Figueiredo2018philosophical, author = {Figueiredo, Nara M.}, title = {On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as awareness of past events}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {63--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.07} }
Folescu, M.	2018	Remembering events: A Reidean account of (episodic) memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97(2) 304-321	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is essential to our functioning as fully developed, social individuals. Being in the world without remembering most of what we did would leave us unable to process and acquire any kind of knowledge about ourselves, the world we live in, and everyone else around us. Without memory to help us retain new information, our lives would be devoid of continuity, so that questions about our identity as persons and our place in the world would be impossible to answer. According to psychologists, there are several types of memory, and one type in particular, the so-called ''episodic memory'', is essential for keeping track of our relationships with things in our environment. One project here is to determine exactly what type of things we are related to via episodic memory. Intuitively, physical objects, broadly construed, and their properties should be on the list.In addition, events seem like good candidates. But it is difficult to understand how we can have direct access to past events, given their essentially ephemeral character.
BibTeX: @article{Folescu2018Remembering, author = {Folescu, Marina}, title = {Remembering events: A Reidean account of (episodic) memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {97}, number = {2}, pages = {304--321}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12333} }
Folescu, M.	2018	Thomas Reid's view of memorial conception	Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16(3) 211-226	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?
BibTeX: @article{Folescu2018Thomas, author = {Folescu, Marina}, title = {Thomas Reid's view of memorial conception}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Scottish Philosophy}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {211--226}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0204} }
Follesa, L.	2018	Learning and vision: Johann Gottfried Herder on memory	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1610	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A consistent thread throughout Johann Gottfried Herder's thought is his interest in human knowledge and in its origins. Although he never formulated a systematic theory of knowledge, elements of one are disseminated in his writings, from the early manuscript Plato sagte (1766--68) to one of his last works, the periodical Adrastea (1801--3). Herder assigned a very special function to memory and to the related idea of a recollection of ''images,'' as they play a pivotal role in the formation of personal identity. He provided an original description of the Platonic theory of recollection, trying to merge ancient and modern meta- physical views and to interpret them from a less metaphysical and more psychological point of view. I then analyze Herder's notion of memory via another research line, which is basically founded upon the analogy between the childhood of an individual and the infancy of the human race. Finally, I explore Herder's view that memory and imagination, as ''forces'' of the soul, can have negative effects on an individual when they are not equally balanced.
BibTeX: @article{Follesa2018Learning, author = {Follesa, Laura}, title = {Learning and vision: Johann Gottfried Herder on memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1610}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1610} }
Fortney, M.	2018	The centre and periphery of conscious thought	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(3-4) 112-136	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper is about whether shifts in attention can alter what it is like to think. I begin by taking up the hypothesis that attention structures consciousness into a centre and a periphery, following Watzl's (2014, 2017) understanding of the distinction between the centre and periphery of the field of consciousness. Then I show that introspection leads to divided results about whether attention structures conscious thought into a centre and a periphery-remarks by Martin (1997) and Phillips (2012) suggest a negative answer, whereas remarks by Maher (1923) and Chudnoff (2013) suggest a positive answer. Lastly, I argue that there is behavioral evidence that lends weight to the "yes" side of the introspective dispute. My argument makes use of Garavan's (1998) study of forming and maintaining two mental counts at once.
BibTeX: @article{Fortney2018centre, author = {Fortney, Mark}, title = {The centre and periphery of conscious thought}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {3-4}, pages = {112--136} }
Frise, M.	2018	Eliminating the problem of stored beliefs	American Philosophical Quarterly 55(1)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The problem of stored beliefs is that of explaining how non-occurrent, seemingly justified beliefs are indeed justified. Internalism about epistemic justification, the view that one's mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing, allegedly cannot solve this problem. This paper provides a solution. It asks: Does having a belief that p require having a special relation to a mental representation that p? If the answer is yes, then there are no stored beliefs, and so there is no problem. Drawing on extensive research in cognitive psychology, this paper argues that memory doesn't store the representations required for stored belief, and we don't bear the special relation to anything memory does store. on the leading ''no'' answer, a belief is roughly a set of dispositions. This paper argues that a justified belief is then best understood as a set of dispositions. Since these dispositions are mental, internalism can count the right stored beliefs as justified.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2018Eliminating, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Eliminating the problem of stored beliefs}, year = {2018}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {55}, number = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/45128599} }
Frise, M.	2018	Forgetting	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 223-240			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Frise2018Forgetting, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Forgetting}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, K. and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {223--240} }
Frise, M.	2018	Metacognition as evidence for evidentialism	Believing in Accordance with the Evidence Springer 91-107	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in 'ordinary retrieval cases', cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases better support evidentialism than process reliabilism. This conclusion challenges several common assumptions. One is that non-evidentialism alone allows for a naturalized epistemology, i.e., an epistemology that is fully in accordance with scientific research and methodology. Another is that process reliabilism fares much better than evidentialism in the epistemology of memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Frise2018Metacognition, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Metacognition as evidence for evidentialism}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Believing in Accordance with the Evidence}, editor = {McCain, Kevin}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {91--107}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_7} }
Froese, T. and Izquierdo, E.J.	2018	A dynamical approach to the phenomenology of body memory: Past interactions can shape present capacities without neuroplasticity	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 20-46	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Body memory comprises the acquired dispositions that constitute an individual's present capacities and experiences. Phenomenological accounts of body memory describe its effects using dynamical metaphors: it is conceived of as curvatures in an agent-environment relational field, leading to attracting and repelling forces that shape ongoing sensorimotor interaction. This relational perspective stands in tension with traditional cognitive science, which conceives of the underlying basis of memory in representational-internal terms: it is the encoding and storing of informational content via structural changes inside the brain. We propose that this tension can be resolved by replacing the traditional approach with the dynamical approach to cognitive science. Specifically, we present three of our simulation models of embodied cognition that can help us to rethink the basis of several types of body memory. The upshot is that, at least in principle, there is no need to explain their basis in terms of content or to restrict their basis to neuroplasticity alone. Instead these models support the perspective developed by phenomenology: body memory is a relational property of a whole brain-body-environment system that emerges out of its history of interactions.
BibTeX: @article{Froese2018dynamical, author = {Froese, Tom and Izquierdo, Eduardo J.}, title = {A dynamical approach to the phenomenology of body memory: Past interactions can shape present capacities without neuroplasticity}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {20--46} }
Fuchs, T.	2018	Presence in absence. The ambiguous phenomenology of grief	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17(1) 43-63	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Despite its complex experiential structure, the phenomenon of grief following bereavement has not been a major topic of phenomenological research. The paper investigates its basic structures, elaborating as its core characteristic a conflict between a presentifying and a 'de-presentifying' intention: In grief, the subject experiences a fundamental ambiguity between presence and absence of the deceased, between the present and the past, indeed between two worlds he lives in. This phenomenological structure will be analyzed under several aspects: (1) regarding bodily experience, as disruption of a shared intercorporeality; (2) as a loss of the shared world and shared habitualities, leaving the bereaved person with ubiquitous indications of absence and with a contraction of their own self; (3) regarding temporality, as a separation of two strands of time, namely a still ongoing past and an alienated present which become more and more desynchronized; (4) finally, as an ''as-if presence'' of the deceased which the bereaved continue to feel and sometimes to perceive, leading to a cognitive-affective conflict between two experienced realities. The transforming process of grief is then analyzed as a gradual adjustment to the loss, finally enabling a re-integration of the conflicting realities. This is achieved through an incorporation and identification with the deceased on the one hand, and through various forms of representation on the other hand, in particular by recollection and symbolization.
BibTeX: @article{Fuchs2018Presence, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Presence in absence. The ambiguous phenomenology of grief}, year = {2018}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {43--63}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9506-2} }
Fuchs, T.	2018	The cyclical time of the body and its relation to linear time	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 47-65	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While linear time results from the measurement of physical events, the temporality of life is characterized by cyclical processes, which also manifest themselves in subjective bodily experience. This applies for the periodicity of heartbeat, respiration, sleep-wake cycle, or circadian hormone secretion, among others. The central integration of rhythmic bodily signals in the brain forms the biological foundation of the phenomenal sense of temporal continuity. Cyclical repetitions are also found in the recurring phases of need, drive, and satisfaction. Finally, the cyclical structure of bodily time manifests itself at an extended level in the form of implicit or body memory. However, this cyclical structure of lived time comes into tension with the orders of linear time which have been increasingly established in Western societies since the modern age. This tension creates both individual as well as societal conflicts and may also result in psycho-pathological phenomena. As an example, depression and burnout syndromes will be discussed.
BibTeX: @article{Fuchs2018cyclical, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {The cyclical time of the body and its relation to linear time}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {47--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192898197.003.0011} }
Garfield, J., Nichols, S. and Strohminger, N.	2018	Episodic memory and oneness	The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self Columbia University Press 285-304		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Garfield2018Episodic, author = {Garfield, Jay and Nichols, Shaun and Strohminger, Nina}, title = {Episodic memory and oneness}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self}, editor = {Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Flanagan, Owen J. and Harrison, Victoria S. and Sarkissian, Hagop and Schwitzgebel, Eric}, publisher = {Columbia University Press}, pages = {285--304}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7312/ivan18298-016} }
Gerrans, P.	2018	Painful memories	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 158-177			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Gerrans2018Painful, author = {Gerrans, Philip}, title = {Painful memories}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, D.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {158--177} }
Gottlieb, J.	2018	Consciousness and the limits of memory	Synthese 195(12) 5217-5243	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: IIntermodal representationalism is a popular theory of consciousness. This paper argues that intermodal representationalism is false, or at least likely so. The argument turns on two forms of exceptional episodic memory: hyperthymesia and prodigious visual memory in savant syndrome. Emerging from this argument is a broader lesson about the relationship between memory and perception; that it may be possible to entertain in memory the very same content as in a corresponding perceptual experience, and that the 'overflow' interpretation of the classic Sperling paradigm experiments may not fully generalize.
BibTeX: @article{Gottlieb2018Consciousness, author = {Gottlieb, Joseph}, title = {Consciousness and the limits of memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {195}, number = {12}, pages = {5217--5243}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1793-9} }
Gregory, D.	2018	Sensory memories and recollective images	Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Oxford University Press 28-45		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Gregory2018Sensory, author = {Gregory, Dominic}, title = {Sensory memories and recollective images}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory}, editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {28--45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0003} }
Gross, S.	2018	Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access from the perspective of capacity-unlimited working memory	Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373(1755) 20170343	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Theories of consciousness divide over whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse in specific representational content and whether it requires cognitive access. These two issues are often treated in tandem because of a shared assumption that the representational capacity of cognitive access is fairly limited. Recent research on working memory challenges this shared assumption. This paper argues that abandoning the assumption undermines post-cue-based ''overflow'' arguments, according to which perceptual conscious is rich and does not require cognitive access. Abandoning it also dissociates the rich/sparse debate from the access question. The paper then explores attempts to reformulate overflow theses in ways that don't require the assumption of limited capacity. Finally, it discusses the problem of relating seemingly non-probabilistic perceptual consciousness to the probabilistic representations posited by the models that challenge conceptions of cognitive access as capacity-limited.
BibTeX: @article{Gross2018Perceptual, author = {Gross, Steven}, title = {Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access from the perspective of capacity-unlimited working memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences}, volume = {373}, number = {1755}, pages = {20170343}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0343} }
Hardt, R.	2018	Storytelling agents: Why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17(3) 535-554	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events (Velleman 2003). Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a 'recombinable system', that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these two characteristics: it involves an embodied sense of self and the ability to create novel scenarios. What is unique about mental time travel is that it is a story explicitly about our selves, and it involves metarepresentation. Agency is enabled by narrative understanding when we are able to put our current situation into a larger narrative context, whereby some possible actions, but not others, make sense. However, new features of agency are enabled when we understand stories that are explicitly about our selves: we gain the ability to plan and act on plans.
BibTeX: @article{Hardt2018Storytelling, author = {Hardt, Rosa}, title = {Storytelling agents: Why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental}, year = {2018}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {535--554}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9530-2} }
Heersmink, R.	2018	The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects	Philosophical Studies 175(8) 1829-1849	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct. Keywords
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2018narrative, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {175}, number = {8}, pages = {1829--1849}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0935-0} }
Henry, J. and Craver, C.F.	2018	Episodic memory and the witness trump card	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e16	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We accept Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) causal claim that episodic memory provides humans with the means for evaluating the veracity of reports about non-occurrent events. We reject their evolutionary argument that this is the proper function of episodic memory. We explore three intriguing implications of the causal claim, for cognitive neuropsychology, comparative psychology, and philosophy.
BibTeX: @article{Henry2018Episodic, author = {Henry, Jeremy and Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Episodic memory and the witness trump card}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e16}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001376} }
Hoerl, C.	2018	Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered	Mind & Language 33(2) 148-160	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A familiar claim in the literature on episodic memory in both psychology and philosophy is that engaging in episodic recollection requires grasp of a theory of mind. In this paper, I re-examine what connection, if any, there is between episodic memory and theory of mind. I first criticize the dominant way in which this connection has been construed theoretically, which has sought to link the pos- session of episodic memory with a grasp of the idea of representation, or the idea of informational access. I then argue for a novel, alternative, way of connecting episodic memory and theory of mind, which focuses on the role a grasp of the category of an experience might be seen to play in episodic recollection. In doing so, I also draw attention to a dimension of our understanding of the mental which is as yet underexplored in the literature on theory of mind.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2018Episodic, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered}, year = {2018}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {33}, number = {2}, pages = {148--160}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12170} }
Hoerl, C.	2018	Remembering past experiences: Episodic memory, semantic memory, and the epistemic asymmetry	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 313-328		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2018Remembering, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Remembering past experiences: Episodic memory, semantic memory, and the epistemic asymmetry}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaeliean, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {313--328}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-17} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2018	Animal minds in time: The question of episodic memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds Routledge 56-64		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2018Animal, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Animal minds in time: The question of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds}, editor = {Andrews, Kristin and Beck, Jacob}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {56--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742250-6} }
Homan, M.	2018	Memory aids and the Cartesian circle	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(6) 1064-1083	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In answering the circularity charge, Descartes consistently distinguished between truths whose demonstrations we currently perceive clearly and distinctly (call these 'C-truths') and truths whose demonstrations we merely remember having perceived clearly and distinctly (call these 'R-truths'). Descartes uses C-truths to prove God's existence, thus validating R-truths. While avoiding one form of circularity (using C-truths to validate C-truths), this introduces another circle, for Descartes believes that God's existence validates R-truths even when itself an R-truth. I consider Newman and Nelson's grounds enhancement strategy according to which this problem is solved when God's existence is rendered axiomatic. I argue that since it is still possible to doubt axioms when not directly apprehending them, this strategy cannot work; having to reproduce the argument for God's existence in face of sceptical doubt is unavoidable. Drawing both on Newman and Nelson's notion of grounds enhancement and on reproducibility interpretations, I argue that reproducibility can be enhanced via memory aids. Although discussion of memory and the Cartesian circle has been sidelined since Frankfurt's 1962 refutation of Doney's memory interpretation, I argue that memory is at the heart of the matter after all (though not in the same way Doney thought).
BibTeX: @article{Homan2018Memory, author = {Homan, Matthew}, title = {Memory aids and the Cartesian circle}, year = {2018}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {26}, number = {6}, pages = {1064--1083}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1450217} }
Hopkins, R.	2018	Imagining the past	Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Oxford University Press 46-71		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hopkins2018Imagining, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {Imagining the past}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory}, editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {46--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0004} }
Hutto, D.D. and Peeters, A.	2018	The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 97-118		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hutto2018roots, author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Peeters, Anco}, title = {The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {97--118}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-6} }
Keven, N.	2018	Carving event and episodic memory at their joints	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e19	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.
BibTeX: @article{Keven2018Carving, author = {Keven, Nazım}, title = {Carving event and episodic memory at their joints}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001406} }
Khalilov, S.	2018	Holographic memory of life situation	Analecta Husserliana CXXI: Eco-Phenomenology: Life, Human Life, Post-Human Life in the Harmony of the Cosmos Springer 553-559	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Every phenomenon is rich and meaningful against its background and environment. The lives of a human being are not limited to their thoughts. The background, life situation, and ontopoiesis accompanying these thoughts are more important. Indeed, Husserl rightly tries to reduce our emotions and subjective features. However, there is hazy and vague content (substance) in the fine structure of a phenomenon. The goal is not to get rid of it but rather to illuminate it more and discover the background and substructure of this structure. In my opinion, it is possible to find a hologram of the noumena in the phenomenon. Our goal is to discover the method by which to find it. This event cannot be expressed fully by the term ''intuition.'' Intuition is the acceptance of the truth of ''things-in-themselves'' not from their manifestation or phenomenon, but from an unknown cosmic source. Actually, the illuminated front part of consciousness or a phenomenon should not be isolated from the context but, rather, should be taken in with its background and context. A pure consciousness or phenomenon isolated from the world and bordered on all sides cannot allow any precise thinking. Extreme precise extraction from conditions, mathematical or logical modeling of the world, the construction of the world from pure phenomena -- all of these are idealization and, in fact, are a distortion of the reality. The mathematization of life is impossible. Life is unique and unrepeatable, having endless wealth. The desire to specify events on the level of mathematical figures is too idealistic. Hence, there is a need in phenomenology to go beyond formal and mathematical logic and to apply the idea of fuzzy logic.
BibTeX: @incollection{Khalilov2018Holographic, author = {Khalilov, Salahaddin}, title = {Holographic memory of life situation}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CXXI: Eco-Phenomenology: Life, Human Life, Post-Human Life in the Harmony of the Cosmos}, editor = {Smith, William S. and Smith, Jadwiga S. and Verducci, Daniela}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {553--559}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77516-6} }
King, R.A.H.	2018	Aristotle on distinguishing phantasia and memory	Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Oxford University Press 9-27		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{King2018Aristotle, author = {King, R. A. H.}, title = {Aristotle on distinguishing phantasia and memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory}, editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {9--27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0002} }
Kirsch, J.	2018	Interpreting things past	Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative Springer 99-113	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our memories of past experiences influence the way that we think about ourselves and our relationships with others. But, as a growing body of empirical research has demonstrated, these memories are often biased and distorted. We sometimes play an active role in this process though our attempts at interpreting the past and 'uncovering' its true meaning; friends, lovers, and therapists often encourage us to do just this. In what follows, I argue that our memories are not always free from moral evaluation; for how we remember the past can enhance or impair our ability to relate to others in morally appropriate ways. In showing that an ethics of memory is possible, I look at the various forms of indirect control that we can exercise over our memories. While we cannot remember at will, we can influence our memories by using external aids, guarding against biases, and revising the interpretations that we develop of our past experiences.
BibTeX: @incollection{Kirsch2018Interpreting, author = {Kirsch, Julie}, title = {Interpreting things past}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative}, editor = {Pedrini, Patrizia and Kirsch, Julie}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {99--113}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_6} }
Klein, M., Osorio-Kupferblum, N. and Tóth, O.I.	2018	Preface: Remembering consciousness	Society and Politics 12 5-7	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Research in ancient and mediaeval philosophy has made it increasingly clear that questions similar to modern concerns about consciousness were already considered before the early modern period, even if those debates took place in their particular contexts and in different conceptual frameworks. These philosophical and historical studies of pre-modern conceptions have, in turn, changed our perspective regarding the works of early modern philosophers. More and more, we come to see the historical-philosophical background of early modern thinkers and which aspects in their new philosophies built on, or responded to, tralatitious views. It seems to us that a better understanding of their (our) heritage furthers the understanding and appreciation of all the breaches and innovation they brought to European philosophy. This issue, therefore, aims to contribute to research in the history of medieval and early modern philosophy of mind by shedding new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four papers focus on consciousness and, more specifically, on one of its less frequently considered aspects: memory. Memory gave rise to explanatory problems related to consciousness already in medieval philosophy, even if these issues were not necessarily formulated in terms of what modern philosophy came to regard as the problem of consciousness. Nevertheless, aspects of consciousness were clearly addressed when the schoolmen debated questions such as how it is possible to recall one"s own past experiences; whether sensual memories are still in the mind when not entertained, and if so, how we can be unaware of them; how their non-physical counterparts, i.e. intellectual memories, are retained; and whether the objects of sensual and intellectual memory are experienced separately in the stream of consciousness or rather as one object. In the early modern period, starting with Descartes, a new concept of mind emerged, which was inspired by and compatible with the advances of a new natural science based on mechanical principles. Nevertheless, the debates concerning specific
BibTeX: @article{Klein2018Preface, author = {Klein, Martin and Osorio-Kupferblum, Naomi and Tóth, Olivér István}, title = {Preface: Remembering consciousness}, year = {2018}, journal = {Society and Politics}, volume = {12}, pages = {5--7} }
Klein, S.B.	2018	Remembering with and without memory: A theory of memory and aspects of mind that enable its experience.	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 5(2) 117-130	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article builds on ideas presented in Klein (2015c) concerning the importance of a more nuanced, conceptually rigorous approach to the scientific understanding and use of the construct Memory. I first summarize my model, taking care to situate discussion within the terminological practices of contemporary philosophy of mind. I then elucidate the implications of the model for a particular operation of mind---the manner in which content presented to consciousness realizes its particular phenomenological character (i.e., mode of presentation). Finally, I discuss how the model offers a reconceptualization of the technical language used by psychologists and neuroscientists to formulate and test ideas about memory.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2018Remembering, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Remembering with and without memory: A theory of memory and aspects of mind that enable its experience.}, year = {2018}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {117--130}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000142} }
Kozyreva, A.	2018	Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17(1) 199-224	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There are two main approaches in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious. The first explores the intentional theory of the unconscious, while the second develops a non-representational way of understanding consciousness and the unconscious. This paper aims to outline a general theoretical framework for the non-representational approach to the unconscious within the phenomenological tradition. In order to do so, I focus on three relevant theories: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception, Thomas Fuchs' phenomenology of body memory, and Edmund Husserl's phenomenology of affectivity. Both Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs understand the unconscious as a ''sedimented practical schema'' of subjective being in the world. This sedimented unconscious contributes to the way we implicitly interpret reality, fill in the gaps of uncertainty, and invest our social interactions with meaning. Husserl, however, approaches the unconscious in terms of affective non-vivacity, as a sphere of sedimentation and the horizon of the distant past which stays affectively connected to the living present. Drawing on these ideas, I argue that these two accounts can reinforce one another and provide the ground for a phenomenological understanding of the unconscious in terms of the horizontal dimension of subjective experience and a non-representational relation to the past.
BibTeX: @article{Kozyreva2018Non, author = {Kozyreva, Anastasia}, title = {Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2018}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {199--224}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9492-9} }
Krebs, C.B.	2018	'Greetings, Cicero!': Caesar and Plato on writing and memory	The Classical Quarterly 68(2) 517-522		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Krebs2018Greetings, author = {Krebs, Christopher B.}, title = {'Greetings, Cicero!': Caesar and Plato on writing and memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {The Classical Quarterly}, volume = {68}, number = {2}, pages = {517--522}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838818000484} }
Lavazza, A.	2018	Memory-modulation: Self-improvement or self-depletion?	Frontiers in Psychology 9 469	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Autobiographical memory is fundamental to the process of self-construction. Therefore, the possibility of modifying autobiographical memories, in particular with memory-modulation and memory-erasing, is a very important topic both from the theoretical and from the practical point of view. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the state of the art of some of the most promising areas of memory-modulation and memory-erasing, considering how they can affect the self and the overall balance of the "self and autobiographical memory" system. Indeed, different conceptualizations of the self and of personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory are what makes memory-modulation and memory-erasing more or less desirable. Because of the current limitations (both practical and ethical) to interventions on memory, I can only sketch some hypotheses. However, it can be argued that the choice to mitigate painful memories (or edit memories for other reasons) is somehow problematic, from an ethical point of view, according to some of the theories of the self and personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory, in particular for the so-called narrative theories of personal identity, chosen here as the main case of study. Other conceptualizations of the "self and autobiographical memory" system, namely the constructivist theories, do not have this sort of critical concerns. However, many theories rely on normative (and not empirical) conceptions of the self: for them, the actions aimed at mitigating or removing specific (negative) memories can be seen either as an improvement or as a depletion or impairment of the self.
BibTeX: @article{Lavazza2018Memory, author = {Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {Memory-modulation: Self-improvement or self-depletion?}, year = {2018}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {9}, pages = {469}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00469} }
Leyva, A.	2018	Embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge	Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45(2) 128-143	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper develops and introduces the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge into the current sports knowledge philosophical debate. This idea is based on my interpretation of Mark Rowlands' Rilkean memory theory. Broadly speaking, Rowlands proposed that an embodied Rilkean memory is memory content that is then 'woven into the body and its neural infrastructure' resulting in new bodily or behavioral dispositions. I propose that elite-level sports knowledge may become contentless bodily and/or behavioral dispositions and take the form of embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge. This version of sports knowledge enriches the current philosophy of sports debate that has centered on the analytical distinction between procedural knowledge (knowing how) and declarative knowledge (knowing that). After presenting the embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge concept and providing empirical evidence that supports its existence, I argue that the current distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' may not be exhaustive.
BibTeX: @article{Leyva2018Embodied, author = {Leyva, Arturo}, title = {Embodied Rilkean sport-specific knowledge}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of the Philosophy of Sport}, volume = {45}, number = {2}, pages = {128--143}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2018.1455148} }
Lin, Y.-T.	2018	Visual perspectives in episodic memory and the sense of self	Frontiers in Psychology 9 2196	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the "phenomenal presence of self." To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of "I am this." This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2018Visual, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {Visual perspectives in episodic memory and the sense of self}, year = {2018}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {9}, pages = {2196}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02196} }
Lo, K.C.	2018	On the argument of infinite regress in proving self-awareness	Journal of Indian Philosophy 46(3) 553-576	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In PV 3.440ab and 473cd--474ab, Dharmak\irti raises the argument of infinite regress (anavasthiti) twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramād nasamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called anid sd thā. In Pramād nasamuccayavd rtti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress (anavasthā) driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmak\irtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bhad td ta and Bhad td ta Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments---Pramād nasamuccayavd rtti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmak\irti and his commentators, to Ganeri's and Kellner's critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga's and Dharmak\irti's theory.
BibTeX: @article{Lo2018argument, author = {Lo, King Chung}, title = {On the argument of infinite regress in proving self-awareness}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {46}, number = {3}, pages = {553--576}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-018-9349-3} }
Macpherson, F.	2018	Perceptual imagination and perceptual memory: An overview	Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Oxford University Press 1-5		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Macpherson2018Perceptual, author = {Macpherson, Fiona}, title = {Perceptual imagination and perceptual memory: An overview}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory}, editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {1--5}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717881.003.0001} }
Mahr, J.B. and Csibra, G.	2018	What is it to remember?	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e35	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In response to the commentaries, we clarify and defend our characterization of both the nature and function of episodic memory. Regarding the nature of episodic memory, we extend the distinction between event and episodic memory and discuss the relational role of episodic memory. We also address arguments against our characterization of autonoesis and argue that, while self-referential, it needs to be distinguished from an agentive notion of self. Regarding the function of episodic memory, we review arguments about the relation between future mental time travel and memory veridicality; clarify the relation between autonoesis, veridicality, and confidence; and finally discuss the role of episodic memory in diachronic commitments.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2018What, author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Csibra, Gergely}, title = {What is it to remember?}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e35}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001959} }
Mahr, J.B. and Csibra, G.	2018	Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e1	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.
BibTeX: @article{Mahr2018Why, author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Csibra, Gergely}, title = {Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000012} }
Malafouris, L. and Koukouti, M.D.	2018	How the body remembers its skills: Memory and material engagement	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 158-80	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What are bodily memories made of? Where do body memories reside and what forms do they take? What is the relationship between embodied memory and material culture? This paper adopts a material engagement approach and sets out to explore body memory as a skilful engagement with the material world. We examine the nature of body memory from a distributed, enactive, and trans-actional perspective. We use the examples of bicycle riding and pottery making to examine more closely what is changing in the way we understand bodily memory when we approach it from such a distributed and enactive anthropological perspective. Overall, we wish to make a case for the primacy of material engagement over body memory and to propose that the way a body remembers its skills is by re-enacting them inside the world using available forms of material culture and not by representing them inside the brain.
BibTeX: @article{Malafouris2018How, author = {Malafouris, Lambros and Koukouti, Maria Danae}, title = {How the body remembers its skills: Memory and material engagement}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {158--80} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2018	Remembering from the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{McCarroll2018Remembering, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Remembering from the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind}, year = {2018}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Meurer, C.F.	2018	Mental time travel: Towards a computational account	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 72-80	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper aims to highlight similarities between computational routines of mentally traveling the present time, on the one hand, and routines of mentally traveling other times, on the other hand. The first and second sections, in which I lay out an eternalist view of the world and the massive modularity account of the architecture of the human mind, are intended to set the stage. Subsequently, I clarify the idea that we mentally travel the present. This explanation resorts to a cognitive mechanism I have proposed elsewhere. Finally, I submit that a similar computational routine takes place when we travel other times, be they earlier or later than the present moment.
BibTeX: @article{Meurer2018Mental, author = {Meurer, César Fernando}, title = {Mental time travel: Towards a computational account}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {72--80}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.08} }
Micali, S.	2018	The anticipation of the present: Phenomenology of déjà vu	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 49(2) 156-170	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper analyses the déjà-vu experience in order to deepen the understanding of the complex nature of time-consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on Bergson's research on déjà vu in order to assess the validity of his position; the second section describes a specific form of déjà-vu experience from a phenomenological perspective. This investigation will question the widespread assumption according to which déjà vu should be conceived as a disturbance of the memory of the past. On the contrary, the author shows that the disturbance primarily pertains to the dimension of the future. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to focus on the coherent deformation of the immediate expectation of the imminent future.
BibTeX: @article{Micali2018anticipation, author = {Micali, Stefano}, title = {The anticipation of the present: Phenomenology of déjà vu}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, pages = {156--170}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2017.1403748} }
Micali, S.	2018	The repetition of a singularity: Phenomenology of déjà vu	Philosophy Today 62(3) 987-1007	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Phenomenology aims at analyzing the constitutive moments of the different experiences by doing justice to their specific ways of appearing. By doing so, it can make visible (and therefore correct) the problematic assumptions taken as valid from the outset. These assumptions coherently distort and manipulate the phenomena in such a way that the phenomena are transformed into something radically different. The phenomenon of déjà vu is very interesting in this regard for two different reasons. Déjà vu is transformed into a different phenomenon in the field of cognitive sciences: déjà-vu is commonly understood as a simple memory error. Secondly, déjà vu implies a repetition of a unique, contingent experience. This logic of repetition is not easily compatible with the logos of empirical sciences that focus on the identification of invariant relations between general terms through experimental research and therefore requires a different approach.
BibTeX: @article{Micali2018repetition, author = {Micali, Stefano}, title = {The repetition of a singularity: Phenomenology of déjà vu}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {62}, number = {3}, pages = {987--1007}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday20181130243} }
Michael, J., Székely, M. and Christensen, W.	2018	Using episodic memory to gauge implicit and/or indeterminate social commitments	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In discussing Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) observations about the role of episodic memory in grounding social commitments, we propose that episodic memory is especially useful for gauging cases of implicit commitment and cases in which the content of a commitment is indeterminate. We conclude with some thoughts about how commitment may relate to the evolution of episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Michael2018Using, author = {Michael, John and Székely, Marcell and Christensen, Wayne}, title = {Using episodic memory to gauge implicit and/or indeterminate social commitments}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1700142X} }
Michaelian, K.	2018	Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering systematically misleading?	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e22	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) view autonoesis as being essential to episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us about the past.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2018Autonoesis, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering systematically misleading?}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001431} }
Michaelian, K.	2018	Episodic and semantic memory and imagination: The need for definitions	The American Journal of Psychology 131(1) 99-103		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2018Episodic, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Episodic and semantic memory and imagination: The need for definitions}, year = {2018}, journal = {The American Journal of Psychology}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, pages = {99--103}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjpsyc.131.1.0099} }
Michaelian, K.	2018	Naturalistic descriptions of knowledge	Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy Bloomsbury 69-88			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2018Naturalistic, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Naturalistic descriptions of knowledge}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy}, editor = {Hetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {69--88} }
Michaelian, K. and Arango-Muñoz, S.	2018	Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective	Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications Oxford University Press 231-247		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2018Collaborative, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications}, editor = {Meade, Michelle and Harris, Celia B. and Van Bergen, Penny and Sutton, John and Barnier, Amanda J.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {231--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198737865.003.0013} }
Michaelian, K., Debus, D. and Perrin, D.	2018	The philosophy of memory today and tomorrow: Editors' introduction	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 1-9			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2018philosophy, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, title = {The philosophy of memory today and tomorrow: Editors' introduction}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin. Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {1--9} }
Michaelian, K. and Robins, S.K.	2018	Beyond the causal theory? Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 13-32		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2018causal, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Beyond the causal theory? Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Dennis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {13--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-2} }
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J.	2018	Collective memory	The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality Routledge 140-151		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2018Collective, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John}, title = {Collective memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality}, editor = {Jankovic, Marija and Ludwig, Kirk}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {140--151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315768571-14} }
Moeller, H.-G.	2018	Necessity and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A reconstruction	Frontiers of Philosophy in China 13(4) 505-517	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses two core concepts in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: necessity (Notwendigkeit) and memory (Erinnerung). The analysis is based on an investigation of the connotations and linguistic components of the two terms as they are used in the German language. Occurrences of the terms in decisive passages in the Phenomenology of Spirit are investigated and seen as a key to an understanding of Hegel's overall project of constructing a "scientific" (wissenschaftlich) philosophy in the form of a conceptual system. The paper aims at showing that this project can in part be understood as an attempt to transform the contingency of all moments of the path of the self-cultivation, maturation, and growth (Bildung) of spirit (Geist)-understood both in terms of its personal dimension and as "world spirit"-into necessity. It is argued that memory plays a decisive role in this endeavor, not only in the sense of a recalling of the past, but also as a prerequisite for a future that opens up room for further cultivation, maturation, and growth.
BibTeX: @article{Moeller2018Necessity, author = {Moeller, Hans-Georg}, title = {Necessity and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A reconstruction}, year = {2018}, journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China}, volume = {13}, number = {4}, pages = {505--517}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0040-3} }
Montemayor, C.	2018	Consciousness and memory: A transactional approach	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1612	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The prevailing view about our memory skills is that they serve a complex epistemic function. I shall call this the ''monistic view.'' Instead of a monistic, exclusively epistemic approach, I propose a transactional view. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic functions of episodic memory because of its essentially moral and empathic character. I argue that this transactional view pro- vides a more plausible and integral account of memory capacities in humans, based on theoretical and empirical reasons. Memory, on this account, plays two distinctive roles. The episodic memory system satisfies epistemic needs and is valuable because it is a source of justification for beliefs about the past. Autobiographical memory satisfies moral and narrative-autonoetic needs, and is valuable because it is a source of personally meaningful and insightful experiences about our past. Unlike autobiographical memory, episodic memory is only weakly autonoetic. The relation between these two roles of memory is captured by the tension between a narrative and an accurate report. Essays
BibTeX: @article{Montemayor2018Consciousness, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {Consciousness and memory: A transactional approach}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1612}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1612} }
Montemayor, C.	2018	Reality monitoring and autobiographical memory: Negotiating the self	Archives of Psychology 2(10)	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The contemporary study of memory has greatly benefited from recent findings in neuroscience and psychology showing that memory is a highly flexible, contextualized and yet, reliable enough system, composed of different types of functions that contribute to the formation of a personal perspective that balances accuracy and personal relevance. How exactly is this balance achieved and what is the contribution of society, language and culture in its development? Although this paper discusses some of the recent findings on memory, its main focus is on evaluating them within a larger perspective. Memory has been a central issue in the humanities, literature, and the history of psychology. The dynamics of inner speech and narrative, analyzed from a theoretical and historical point of view, provide key insights for the interpretation of contemporary findings in the light of previous theories of memory, consciousness, and the influence of language on both. Collective memory, different forms of memory-monitoring, and the interaction between episodic and autobiographical memory are discussed. The main proposal of the paper is that episodic memory plays an intermediary role between collective and autobiographical memory. Previous views on memory suppression and intrusion are analyzed in the context of such intermediation.
BibTeX: @article{Montemayor2018Reality, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {Reality monitoring and autobiographical memory: Negotiating the self}, year = {2018}, journal = {Archives of Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {10} }
Müller, P.N.	2018	Locke and Descartes on mental transparency	Society and Politics 12 72-94	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The transparency thesis-i.e. the doctrine that every mental state is necessarily conscious-was a widespread view in early modern philosophy. In this paper, I inquire into the role of mental transparency in the philosophies of John Locke and René Descartes. I begin by sketching a shared Lockean-Cartesian picture of mind as it pertains to the psychological or structural aspects of consciousness. I then distinguish mental transparency from the closely related concept of epistemic transparency and argue that the thesis must allow for different degrees of conscious awareness, which is needed to address some of our uneasy intuitions. Afterwards, I examine Locke"s and Descartes"s reasons for adopting transparency in their respective philosophies. In the case of Descartes, I present consciousness as a necessary condition for knowledge of our own minds in the larger context of his epistemological goals in the Meditations. In the case of Locke, I examine three of his arguments in order to illustrate the indispensable role of transparency in his polemic against central Cartesian doctrines such as innatism and the thesis that the soul always thinks.
BibTeX: @article{Mueller2018Locke, author = {Müller, Philipp N.}, title = {Locke and Descartes on mental transparency}, year = {2018}, journal = {Society and Politics}, volume = {12}, pages = {72--94} }
Nagel, J.	2018	Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The distinctive feature of episodic memory is autonoesis, the feeling that one's awareness of particular past events is grounded in firsthand experience. Autonoesis guides us in sharing our experiences of past events, not by telling us when our credibility is at stake, but by telling us what others will find informative; it also supports the sense of an enduring self.
BibTeX: @article{Nagel2018Epistemic, author = {Nagel, Jennifer}, title = {Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001443} }
Nennig, P.R.	2018	Mechanical memory and the speculative sentence: The importance of language for Hegel in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia	Southwest Philosophy Review 34(1) 181-188	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper examine the relation between the account of mechanical memory in Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the speculative sentence in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Both accounts involve a transition to speculative thinking, a kind of thinking that is free from given images and representations. By discussing them together I hope to illuminate how speculative thinking functions for Hegel and why it is important. Specifically, I try to show how what Hegel calls mechanical memory can shed light on Hegel's more familiar notion of the speculative sentence. I also draw out implications of language and mechanical memory for what Hegel calls speculative thinking. First, I examine Hegel's account of language acquisition in the Encyclopedia, which involves an account of mechanical memory, to show how Hegel thinks the mind can produce a vehicle for thinking that it has produced both in form and content. Second, I show how this vehicle of language works in the speculative sentence in the Phenomenology.
BibTeX: @article{Nennig2018Mechanical, author = {Nennig, Peter R.}, title = {Mechanical memory and the speculative sentence: The importance of language for Hegel in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia}, year = {2018}, journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review}, volume = {34}, number = {1}, pages = {181--188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201834118} }
O'Loughlin, I. and Robins, S.K.	2018	The philosophy of memory: Introduction	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1608		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{OLoughlin2018philosophy, author = {O'Loughlin, Ian and Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {The philosophy of memory: Introduction}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1608}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1608} }
Onofri, A.	2018	The publicity of thought	The Philosophical Quarterly 68(272) 521-541	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many oftheir thoughts, and the same applies to a single subject at different times. This 'publicity principle' has recently come under attack. Arguments by Mark Crimmins, RichardHeck andBrian Loar seem to show that publicity is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle that someone who is ignorant or mistaken about certain identity facts will have distinct thoughts about the relevant object---for instance, the astronomer who does not know that Hesperus is Phosphorus will have two distinct thoughts Hesperus is bright and Phosphorus is bright. In this paper, I argue that publicity can be defended ifwe adopt a relational account on which thoughts are individuated by their mutual relations. Ithen go on to develop a specific relational theory---the 'linking account'---and contrast it with other relational views.
BibTeX: @article{Onofri2018publicity, author = {Onofri, Andrea}, title = {The publicity of thought}, year = {2018}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {68}, number = {272}, pages = {521--541}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx023} }
Pantani, M., Tagini, A. and Raffone, A.	2018	Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and self across waking and dreaming: Bridging phenomenology and neuroscience	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17(1) 175-197	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is central to debates about consciousness and its neural correlates. However, this distinction has often been limited to the domain of perceptual (visual) experiences. On the basis of dream phenomenology and neuroscientific findings this paper suggests a theoretical framework which extends this distinction to dreaming, also in terms of plausible neural correlates. In this framework, phenomenal consciousness is involved in both waking perception and dreaming, whereas access consciousness is weakened, but not fully eliminated, during dreaming. However, access consciousness is more active during lucid dreaming. The proposed framework accounts for different aspects of dream phenomenology, including levels of integration of perceptual, cognitive and affective features in dreams, bizarreness, dream amnesia and the occurrence of meta-awareness and accessibility in lucid dreaming. Self-related experiences and their neural substrates are suggested to be differently involved in waking cognition and dreaming. Further, phenomenal consciousness during both waking and dream experiences involve widespread recurrent interactions and convergence-divergence zones in the thalamo-cortico-limbic system, activated before conscious access in global workspace areas. Finally, we discuss the relationships of the proposed framework with other neurocognitive theories and models of consciousness and major theories of dreaming, and propose novel experimental predictions.
BibTeX: @article{Pantani2018Phenomenal, author = {Pantani, Martina and Tagini, Angela and Raffone, Antonino}, title = {Phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness and self across waking and dreaming: Bridging phenomenology and neuroscience}, year = {2018}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {175--197}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9491-x} }
Perrin, D.	2018	A case for procedural causality in episodic recollection	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 33-51		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perrin2018case, author = {Perrin, Denis}, title = {A case for procedural causality in episodic recollection}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {33--51}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-3} }
Phillips, I.B.	2018	Consciousness, time, and memory	The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness Routledge 286-297		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Phillips2018Consciousness, author = {Phillips, Ian B.}, title = {Consciousness, time, and memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness}, editor = {Gennaro, Rocco J.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {286--297}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315676982-22} }
Prinz, J.	2018	Attention, working memory, and animal consciousness	The Routledge Handbook of Animal Minds Routledge 185-195		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Prinz2018Attention, author = {Prinz, Jesse}, title = {Attention, working memory, and animal consciousness}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Animal Minds}, editor = {Andrews, Kristin and Beck, Jacob}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {185--195}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315742250-18} }
Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L.	2018	The bright side of memory errors	Philosophers' Magazine 82 41-47		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Puddifoot2018bright, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Bortolotti, Lisa}, title = {The bright side of memory errors}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophers' Magazine}, volume = {82}, pages = {41--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20188275} }
Puddifoot, K. and O'Donnell, C.	2018	Human memory and the limits of technology in education	Educational Theory 68(6) 643-655	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Human memory systems perform various functions beyond simple storage and retrieval of information. They link together information about events, build abstractions, and perform memory updating. In contrast, typical information storage and access technologies, such as note-taking applications and Wikipedia, tend to store information verbatim. In this article, Katherine Puddifoot and Cian O'Donnell use results from cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning to argue that the increased dependence on such technologies in education may come at a price: the missed opportunity for memory systems of student learners to form abstractions and insights from newly learned information. This conclusion has important implications for how technologies should be adopted in education.
BibTeX: @article{Puddifoot2018Human, author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and O'Donnell, Cian}, title = {Human memory and the limits of technology in education}, year = {2018}, journal = {Educational Theory}, volume = {68}, number = {6}, pages = {643--655}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12345} }
Rau, P. and Botterill, G.	2018	Enhanced action control as a prior function of episodic memory	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e27	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Improved control of agency is likely to be a prior and more important function of episodic memory than the epistemic-communicative role pinpointed by Mahr & Csibra (M&C). Taking the memory trace upon which scenario construction is based to be a stored internal model produced in past perceptual processing promises to provide a better account of autonoetic character than metarepresentational embedding.
BibTeX: @article{Rau2018Enhanced, author = {Rau, Philipp and Botterill, George}, title = {Enhanced action control as a prior function of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001479} }
Reiheld, A.	2018	Rightly or for ill: The ethics of individual memory	Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28(4) 377-410	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this investigation, I focus on individual memory behaviors for which we commonly blame and praise each other. Alas, we too often do so unreflectively. Blame and praise should not be undertaken lightly or without a good grasp on both what we are holding people responsible for, and the conditions under which they can be held responsible. I lay out the constructivist view of memory with consideration for both remembering and forgetting, and special attention to how we remember events
BibTeX: @article{Reiheld2018Rightly, author = {Reiheld, Alison}, title = {Rightly or for ill: The ethics of individual memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, pages = {377--410}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2018.0023} }
Robins, S.K.	2018	Confabulation and epistemic authority	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e29	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) claim that episodic remembering's autonoetic character serves as an indicator of epistemic authority. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with the existence of confabulation errors -- where participants fabricate memories of experiences that never happened to them. Making confabulation errors damages one's epistemic authority, but these false memories have an autonoetic character.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2018Confabulation, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Confabulation and epistemic authority}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001492} }
Robins, S.K.	2018	Memory and optogenetic intervention: Separating the engram from the ecphory	Philosophy of Science 85(5) 1078-1089	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this paper, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon's (1921) distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories of memory error. I focus on a series of experiments where optogenetics is used to study false memory and forgetting. Abstract Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this paper, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon's (1921) distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories of memory error. I focus on a series of experiments where optogenetics is used to study false memory and forgetting.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2018Memory, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Memory and optogenetic intervention: Separating the engram from the ecphory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {85}, number = {5}, pages = {1078--1089}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/699692} }
Rowlands, M.	2018	The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 279-293		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Rowlands2018remembered, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {279--293}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-15} }
Salvaggio, M.	2018	The justification of reconstructive and reproductive memory beliefs	Philosophical Studies 175(3) 649-663	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Preservationism is a dominant account of the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of memory. According to preservationism, a memory belief is justified only if that belief was justified when it was initially held. However, we now know that much (if not most) of what we remember is not explicitly stored, but instead reconstructed when we attempt to recall it. Since reconstructive memory beliefs may not have been continuously held by the agent, or never held before at all, a purely preservationist account of memory does not allow for justified reconstructed memory beliefs. In this essay, I show how a process reliabilist account can maintain preservationism about reproductive memory beliefs while accommodating the justification of reconstructive memory beliefs. I argue that reconstructive memory is an inferential process, and that therefore the beliefs it produces are justified in the same way that other inferential beliefs are justified. Accordingly, my process reliabilist account combines a preservationist account of reproductive memory with an inferential account of reconstructive memory. I end by defending this view against objections.
BibTeX: @article{Salvaggio2018justification, author = {Salvaggio, Mary}, title = {The justification of reconstructive and reproductive memory beliefs}, year = {2018}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {175}, number = {3}, pages = {649--663}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0886-5} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2018	Episodic memory as a propositional attitude: A critical perspective	Frontiers in Psychology 9 1220	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Jordi Fernández (2006) provides a positive answer to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Alex Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2018Episodic, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Episodic memory as a propositional attitude: A critical perspective}, year = {2018}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {9}, pages = {1220}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01220} }
Sant'Anna, A.	2018	Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 52-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.
BibTeX: @article{SantAnna2018Mental, author = {Sant'Anna, André}, title = {Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {52--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.06} }
Sattig, T.	2018	Memory-based personal identity without circularity	The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity over Time Editiones Scholasticae			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sattig2018Memory, author = {Sattig, Thomas}, title = {Memory-based personal identity without circularity}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity over Time}, editor = {Buonomo, Valerio}, publisher = {Editiones Scholasticae} }
Sattig, T.	2018	The sense and reality of personal identity	Erkenntnis 83(6) 1139-1155	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The vast majority of philosophers of personal identity since John Locke have been convinced that the persistence of persons is not grounded in bodily continuity. Why? As numerous 'textbooks' on personal identity attest, their conviction rests, to a large extent, on an objection to the bodily approach, which concerns episodic memory. The objection invites us to a thought experiment in which we meet a person who experientially remembers events from the past of a person with a different body. The nature of such first-personal memory-links is viewed as strongly suggesting that the rememberer is identical with the remembered, and hence, given the possibility of such a case, as suggesting that a person can transgress its bodily limits. The memory objection is as influential as it gets in the metaphysics of personal identity. Textbooks often portray it as the starting point of the contemporary debate about personal identity. And it has been widely perceived as a success. As everyone who has taught an introductory course on personal identity knows, the recognition of episodic-memory links in body-switching cases has the power to turn any group of novice students against bodily criteria of personal identity. In this essay, I shall specify and undermine the memory objection. I shall attempt to establish two theses. The first thesis (Sects. 1, 2) is that the memory objection is only viable if construed as resting on the view that episodic memory contains a sense of personal identity, which teaches us about the reality of personal identity. The second thesis (Sects. 3, 4) is that there is no such sense of personal identity, that episodic memory teaches us nothing at all about personal identity.
BibTeX: @article{Sattig2018sense, author = {Sattig, Thomas}, title = {The sense and reality of personal identity}, year = {2018}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {83}, number = {6}, pages = {1139--1155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9933-z} }
Schierbaum, S.	2018	Ockham on awareness of one's acts: A way out of the circle	Society and Politics 12 8-27	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I proceed from the assumption that Ockham"s account of self-awareness can be correctly described as a kind of higher-order approach, because just like modern higher-order theorists, Ockham accounts for a mental act being conscious in terms of a higher-order act that takes the act as its object. I aim to defend Ockham"s approach against the objection that it fails to provide an explanation of how self-awareness comes about because any such explanation would be circular. Part of the critique, in light of recent findings in Ockham scholarship, is that the ontological identity of the subject does not suffice to explain-in a non-circular way-the psychological identity and unity of the subject of awareness. Here, I argue that Ockham can respond to this objection by highlighting the power of will. Roughly speaking, the idea is that he can account for the limits of the psychological subject in terms of what the subject can want or will with respect to her own acts and these acts alone. It is along these lines that Ockham can account for the asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspective in a non-circular way, with reference to the exotic case of angelic mind-reading and the comparatively less exotic case of human memory.
BibTeX: @article{Schierbaum2018Ockham, author = {Schierbaum, Sonja}, title = {Ockham on awareness of one's acts: A way out of the circle}, year = {2018}, journal = {Society and Politics}, volume = {12}, pages = {8--27} }
Schirmer Dos Santos, C.	2018	Episodic memory, the cotemporality problem, and common sense	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1613	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Direct realists about episodic memory claim that a rememberer has direct contact with a past event. How- ever, how is it possible to be acquainted with an event that ceased to exist? That is the so-called cotemporal- ity problem. The standard solution, proposed by Sven Bernecker, is to distinguish between the occurrence of an event and the existence of an event: an event ceases to occur without ceasing to exist. That is the eternalist solution for the cotemporality problem. Nevertheless, some philosophers of memory claim that the adoption of an eternalist metaphysics of time would be too high a metaphysical price to pay to hold direct realist intuitions about memory. Although I agree with these critics, I will make two claims. First, that this kind of common sense argument is far from decisive. Second, that Bernecker's proposal remains the best solution to the cotemporality problem.
BibTeX: @article{DosSantos2018Episodic, author = {Schirmer Dos Santos, César}, title = {Episodic memory, the cotemporality problem, and common sense}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1613}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1613} }
Schmal, D.	2018	Intellectual memory and consciousness in Descartes' philosophy of mind	Society and Politics 12 28-49	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although Descartes"s ideas regarding consciousness and memory have been studied extensively, few attempts have been made to address their systemic relations. In order to redress this deficiency, I argue in favor of three interrelated theses. The first is that intellectual memory has a crucial role to play in Descartes"s concept of consciousness, especially when it comes to explaining higher forms of consciousness. Second, the connection between memory and consciousness has been obscured by the fact that intellectual memory, taken as a subject in its own right, was relatively neglected in Descartes"s philosophy: By and large, his views on the matter remained within the limits of late scholastic Scotism. Third, what makes the question of intellectual memory so fascinating in Descartes is not some groundbreaking insight into its nature; rather, it is his gradual recognition of the role that intellectual memory plays in the constitution of higher forms of consciousness. With these arguments, and relying on Descartes"s 1648 correspondence with Antoine Arnauld, where he progressed beyond the substance-based approach to the self, I try to show that he deserves to be credited with a more prominent status in the history of the self and personhood than has previously been the case.
BibTeX: @article{Schmal2018Intellectual, author = {Schmal, Dániel}, title = {Intellectual memory and consciousness in Descartes' philosophy of mind}, year = {2018}, journal = {Society and Politics}, volume = {12}, pages = {28--49} }
Schwartz, A.	2018	Memory and disjunctivism	Essays in Philosophy 19(2) eP1611	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent analyses of memory (Robins 2016; Cheng & Werning 2016; Michaelian 2016; Bernecker, 2017) propose necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a memory, which are meant to set memory apart from related mental states like illusory memory and confabulation. Each of the pro- posed taxonomies includes accuracy as one of the necessary conditions such that only accurate representations are memories. I argue that inclusion of an accuracy condition implies a sort of disjunctivism about seeming to remember. The paper distinguishes several types of disjunctivism that these taxonomies could be committed to. If these taxonomies are meant to be empirically informed, however, then plausibly they should be seen to endorse the principle of psychological internalism. The causal argument, a standard objection to disjunctivism (Robinson 1985; Burge 2005, 2011), is then used to show that the sort of disjunctivism that endorses psychological internalism is mistaken. The ultimate goal is to underscore a lack of clarity in the status of recent accounts of memory as either epistemic, nonreductively ontological, or reductively ontological in approach.
BibTeX: @article{Schwartz2018Memory, author = {Schwartz, Arieh}, title = {Memory and disjunctivism}, year = {2018}, journal = {Essays in Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {eP1611}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1611} }
Sinclair, M.	2018	Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26(1) 131-153	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper shows how reflection on habit leads in nineteenth-century French philosophy to Henri Bergson's idea of duration in 1888 as a non-quantifiable dimension irreducible to time as measured by clocks. Historically, I show how Albert Lemoine's 1875 L'habitude et l'instinct was crucial, since he holds -- in a way that is both Ravaissonian and Bergsonian avant la lettre -- that for the being capable of habit, the three elements of time are fused together. For that habituated being, Lemoine claims, it is not true to say that the past is no longer, nor even that the future is not yet. This historical link between Ravaisson and Bergson, however, only sharpens the philosophical question of how a dynamic conception of habit involves and requires a conception of real duration, of a temporality more original than clock-time, and, conversely, of how reflection on duration prior to clock-time involves a notion of habit. With reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze, the paper concludes by showing that there is an internal connection between these two grand philosophical themes of nineteenth- and then twentieth-century French thought: habit and time. ARTICLE
BibTeX: @article{Sinclair2018Habit, author = {Sinclair, Mark}, title = {Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson}, year = {2018}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {131--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1337562} }
Smart, P.	2018	Emerging digital technologies: Implications for extended conceptions of cognition and knowledge	Extended Epistemology Oxford University Press		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Smart2018Emerging, author = {Smart, Paul}, title = {Emerging digital technologies: Implications for extended conceptions of cognition and knowledge}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Extended Epistemology}, editor = {Carter, J. Adam and Clark, Andy and Kallestrup, Jesper and Palermos, S. Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198769811.003.0015} }
Sorrentino Marques, B.	2018	Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 89-96	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The debate about moral responsibility for one's actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, however, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent's action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility.
BibTeX: @article{SorrentinoMarques2018Does, author = {Sorrentino Marques, Beatriz}, title = {Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {89--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.10} }
Soteriou, M.	2018	The past made present: Mental time travel in episodic recollection	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 294-312		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Soteriou2018past, author = {Soteriou, Matthew}, title = {The past made present: Mental time travel in episodic recollection}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {294--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-16} }
Sutton, J.	2018	Shared remembering and distributed affect: Varieties of psychological interdependence	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 181-199		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2018Shared, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Shared remembering and distributed affect: Varieties of psychological interdependence}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {181--199}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591} }
Tanesini, A.	2018	Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice	Socially Extended Epistemology Oxford University Press 195-219	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness is harmful. Here, the focus is exclusively on the harms caused by its contribution to undermining the intellectual self-trust of some members of the community. Further, since some of these harms are also wrongs, collective amnesia contributes to causing epistemic injustices.
BibTeX: @incollection{Tanesini2018Collective, author = {Tanesini, Alessandra}, title = {Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Socially Extended Epistemology}, editor = {Carter, J. Adam and Clark, Andy and Kallestrup, Jesper and Palermos, S. Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {195--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0011} }
Teroni, F.	2018	On seeming to remember	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory Routledge 329-345		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Teroni2018seeming, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {On seeming to remember}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {329--345}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-9} }
Tewes, C.	2018	The habitual body and its role in collective memory formation	Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(7-8) 135-57	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent decades many facets of habitual body memory have been explored in ever greater depth in the field of phenomenol-ogical research. As a result, one can regard this type of memory as an important exemplification of the strong embodiment thesis, i.e. the thesis that the body plays not only a causal but also a constitutive role with regard to (at least some) cognitive processes. However, it is still an open research question how, in particular, to evaluate the significance of the habitual body for the creation of collective memories. Especially when it comes to externalized symbolically-mediated and distributed forms of memory, some theorists think that the habitual body no longer plays a decisive role in scaffolding collective memories. In the present paper, I assess this assumption in more detail. I argue that habitual body memory and skill-based behaviour fulfil indispensable functions in the creation and maintenance of symbolically-based cultural niches and collective memory systems.
BibTeX: @article{Tewes2018habitual, author = {Tewes, Christian}, title = {The habitual body and its role in collective memory formation}, year = {2018}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {7-8}, pages = {135--57} }
Tewes, C.	2018	The phenomenology of habits: Integrating first-person and neuropsychological studies of memory	Frontiers in Psychology 9 1176	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is an ongoing debate how one can integrate the subjective (first-person) dimension of experiences more thoroughly into neuropsychological research. In cognitive experimental memory research, for instance, cognitive psychology begins by separating the act of recollection from the context where recollections occur, so as to make memory research suitable for study in the experimental conditions of the laboratory. It is the claim of this article that the challenge for memory research consists not merely in the (possible) loss of meaning entailed by transforming embedded recollected experiences into operationalized cognitive functions. Rather, from the outset, the first-person experiential basis of the entire research procedure is often insufficiently elaborated and hence risks neglecting or misrepresenting significant dimensions of the phenomena it studies. I demonstrate this with regard to habits understood as procedural memories. Research based on the paradigm of embodied cognition and phenomenology has shown that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to sub-personal (unconscious) processing mechanisms. This paradigm states that some cognitive processes involves not only the brain but also the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body. The key idea is that we have experiential access to bodily processes that are not yet conceptualized or reflexively mediated. In the final part of my paper, I delineate how such experiences can be integrated into the neuropsychological study of habits via the method of 'front-loaded phenomenology'
BibTeX: @article{Tewes2018phenomenology, author = {Tewes, Christian}, title = {The phenomenology of habits: Integrating first-person and neuropsychological studies of memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {9}, pages = {1176}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01176} }
Theiner, G.	2018	Groups as distributed cognitive systems	The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality Routledge 233-248		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Theiner2018Groups, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {Groups as distributed cognitive systems}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality}, editor = {Jankovic, Marija and Ludwig, Kirk}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {233--248}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315768571-22} }
Tóth, O.I.	2018	Memory, recollection and consciousness in Spinoza's ethics	Society and Politics 12 50-71	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Spinoza's account of memory has not received enough attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent literature has studied the "pancreas problem." This paper argues that there is an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza's account of memory can be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes's account to show that Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation of memories by holding that they are brain states without corresponding mental states, and that the mind is able to interpret perception either as new experience or as memory. Spinoza has none of these conceptual resources because of his substance monism. Spinoza accounts for memories as the mind's ability to generate ideas according to the order of images. This ability consists in the connection of ideas, which is not an actual property, but only a dispositional one and thus not conscious. It is, however, grounded in the actual property of parts of the body, of which ideas are conscious.
BibTeX: @article{Toth2018Memory, author = {Tóth, Olivér István}, title = {Memory, recollection and consciousness in Spinoza's ethics}, year = {2018}, journal = {Society and Politics}, volume = {12}, pages = {50--71} }
Trigg, D.	2018	From anxiety to nostalgia: A Heideggerian analysis	Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness Rowman & Littlefield 43-57			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Trigg2018anxiety, author = {Trigg, Dylan}, title = {From anxiety to nostalgia: A Heideggerian analysis}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness}, editor = {Aho, Kevin}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield}, pages = {43--57} }
Tucker, A.	2018	Memory: Irreducible, basic, and primary source of knowledge	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9(1) 1-16	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue against preservationism, the epistemic claim that memories can at most preserve knowledge generated by other basic types of sources. I show how memories can and do generate knowledge that is irreducible to other basic sources of knowledge. In some epistemic contexts, memories are primary basic sources of knowledge; they can generate knowledge by themselves or with trivial assistance from other types of basic sources of knowledge. I outline an ontology of information transmission from events to memory as an alternative to causal theories of memory. I derive from information theory a concept of reliability of memories as the ratio of retrieved information to transmitted information. I distinguish the generation of knowledge from reliable memories from its generation from unreliable memories. Reliable memories can generate new knowledge by forming together narratives and via colligation. Coherent, even unreliable, memories can generate knowledge if they are epistemically independent of each other and the prior probability of the knowledge they generate is sufficiently low or high. Ascertaining the epistemic independence of memories and eliminating possible confounders may be achieved through the generation of knowledge from independent memories in different minds, when memories are primary basic sources of knowledge and the testimonies that report them are trivial.
BibTeX: @article{Tucker2018Memory, author = {Tucker, Aviezer}, title = {Memory: Irreducible, basic, and primary source of knowledge}, year = {2018}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, pages = {1--16}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0336-5} }
Tzinman, R.	2018	Memory, organisms and the circle of life	The Persistence of Persons: Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity Over Time Editiones Scholasticae 243-274			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Tzinman2018Memory, author = {Tzinman, Rina}, title = {Memory, organisms and the circle of life}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {The Persistence of Persons: Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity Over Time}, editor = {Buonomo, Valerio}, publisher = {Editiones Scholasticae}, pages = {243--274} }
Vicentini De Medeiros, E.	2018	The philosophy of episodic memory and moral agency	Filosofia Unisinos 19(1) 50-51			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{DeMedeiros2018philosophy, author = {Vicentini De Medeiros, Eduardo}, title = {The philosophy of episodic memory and moral agency}, year = {2018}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {50--51} }
Wang, Y.	2018	Wholesome remembrance and the critique of memory---From Indian Buddhist context to Chinese Chan appropriation	Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy Springer 69-100		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wang2018Wholesome, author = {Wang, Youru}, title = {Wholesome remembrance and the critique of memory---From Indian Buddhist context to Chinese Chan appropriation}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy}, editor = {Wang, Youru and Wawrytko, Sandra A.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {69--100}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2939-3_4} }
Weiss, S.	2018	Mnéme and hénosis. Dynamism of memory in the thought of Plotinus	Ars et Humanitas 12(2) 56-70		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Weiss2018Mneme, author = {Weiss, Sonja}, title = {Mnéme and hénosis. Dynamism of memory in the thought of Plotinus}, year = {2018}, journal = {Ars et Humanitas}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {56--70}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4312/ars.12.2.56-70} }
Werning, M. and Cheng, S.	2018	Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 e34	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memories are distinct from semantic memories in that they are epistemically generative and privileged. Whereas Mahr & Csibra (M&C) develop a metarepresentational account of epistemic vigilance, we propose an explanation that builds on our notion of scenario construction: The way an event of the past is presented in episodic memory recall explains the epistemic generativity and privilegedness of episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Werning2018Doing, author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen}, title = {Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {41}, pages = {e34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001534} }
Wilson, R.A.	2018	Group-level cognizing, collaborative remembering, and individuals	Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications Oxford University Press 248-260		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wilson2018Group, author = {Wilson, Robert A.}, title = {Group-level cognizing, collaborative remembering, and individuals}, year = {2018}, booktitle = {Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications}, editor = {Meade, Michelle and Harris, Celia B. and Van Bergen, Penny and Sutton, John and Barnier, Amanda J.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {248--260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198737865.003.0014} }
Wiskus, J.	2018	On music and memory through Μνήμη and Ἀνάμνησις	Research in Phenomenology 48(3) 346-364	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory plays an integral role in music listening and music performance. But what specific memory structures do we employ when we engage with music? Taking Aristotle's De memoria et reminiscentia as principle guide, I aim to press upon a matter of central interest to the phenomenologist of music, focusing on the relation between memory proper and recollection. Drawing upon Physics IV and De anima III, I clarify a two-fold temporal structure- A structure comprised of sensation and flowing continuity- A t work in the experience of remembering. Finally, I claim that music, through the ordered expression of its successive sensations, pertains directly to but supports access to as well.
BibTeX: @article{Wiskus2018music, author = {Wiskus, Jessica}, title = {On music and memory through Μνήμη and Ἀνάμνησις}, year = {2018}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {48}, number = {3}, pages = {346--364}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341401} }
Zaborowski, R.	2018	Affectivity in its relation to memory	Axiomathes 28(3) 253-267	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgotten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memorized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is interpreted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.
BibTeX: @article{Zaborowski2018Affectivity, author = {Zaborowski, Robert}, title = {Affectivity in its relation to memory}, year = {2018}, journal = {Axiomathes}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, pages = {253--267}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9368-4} }
Apostolova, I.	2017	Russell's two theories of memory	Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 37 307-340	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I examine Russell's account of memory in both the acquaintance and the neutral monist periods, more specifically, the years from 1910 until 1927, with emphasis on The Problems of Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, and The Analysis of Mind. I argue that memory is central for understanding how knowledge works, which is the main reason it remained in the focus of Russell's analysis even after the gradual shift to neutral monism. I propose that memory played a not insignificant role in that shift. While this paper aims to show that Russell's theory of memory in the acquaintance period faced serious difficulties---mainly related to the commitment to direct realism---I argue that there is a consistent similarity and continuity between the theory of memory in the acquaintance period and that in the neutral monist period. Russell considered a similar type of memory to be paradigmatic and epistemically primary in both periods---a consideration, dictated, no doubt, by his commitment to the principles of Occam's razor and psychological plausibility.
BibTeX: @article{Apostolova2017Russells, author = {Apostolova, Iva}, title = {Russell's two theories of memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies}, volume = {37}, pages = {307--340}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v37i2.3417} }
Baracchi, C.	2017	Exile in the flow of time. On memory and immortality in Plato's Republic	Research in Phenomenology 47(2) 204-219	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In its contents as well as discursive strategy, Plato's Republic occasions a few reflections on the phenomenon of memory. The essay situates the philosophical discourse, along with that of divination and poetry, in the context of the practices of memory and, more broadly, within the sphere of Mnemosune. The figure of the philosopher retains traces of archaic humanity, most notably of the Homeric hero. At the same time, in the Platonic Socrates we discern a transfiguration of heroic heritage, in the direction of a thorough ethical recalibration emphasizing the awareness of mortality, the art of finite life (βίος), and the visionary celebration of life (ζωή) in its excessive and indestructible movement. In this way, at the very heart of the Republic we may heed the cipher and resonance of Dionysus.
BibTeX: @article{Baracchi2017Exile, author = {Baracchi, Claudia}, title = {Exile in the flow of time. On memory and immortality in Plato's Republic}, year = {2017}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {204--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341366} }
Barash, J.A.	2017	Collective memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 255-267			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Barash2017Collective, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Collective memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {255--267} }
Bermúdez, J.L.	2017	Memory and self-consciousness	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 180-191			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bermudez2017Memory, author = {Bermúdez, José Luis}, title = {Memory and self-consciousness}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {180--191} }
Bernecker, S.	2017	A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation	Frontiers in Psychology 8 1207	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as ''false memory'' and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2017causal, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation}, year = {2017}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {8}, pages = {1207}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01207} }
Bernecker, S.	2017	Memory and truth	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 51-62		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2017Memory, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory and truth}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {51--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-5} }
Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K.	2017	Editors' introduction: The philosophy of memory today	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 1-3		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2017Editors, author = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Editors' introduction: The philosophy of memory today}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {1--3}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315159591-1} }
Bickle, J.	2017	Memory and levels of scientific explanation	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 34-47		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bickle2017Memory, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Memory and levels of scientific explanation}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {34--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-4} }
Black, D.L.	2017	Avicenna and Averroes	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 448-460		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Black2017Avicenna, author = {Black, Deborah L.}, title = {Avicenna and Averroes}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {448--460}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-37} }
Blaiklock, J.	2017	Husserl, protention, and the phenomenology of the unexpected	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25(4) 467-483	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although there has been a great deal said about Husserl's account of time-consciousness, little attention has been specifically paid to future-consciousness. This article gives an Husserlian account of future-consciousness. It begins by arguing that protention should be understood as a future-directed version of retention and so that future-consciousness should be understood as perception. This account is developed in two ways: (1) the future need not be determinately given in protention and so future-consciousness can be vague; (2) cases when the future turns out to be other than we perceived it to be (cases when the unexpected happens) can be understood as temporal illusions. This account of future-consciousness both illuminates some of Husserl's more obscure remarks on time-consciousness and (more importantly) provides a means of understanding an often neglected phenomenon of independent philosophical interest: our awareness of the future.
BibTeX: @article{Blaiklock2017Husserl, author = {Blaiklock, Jack}, title = {Husserl, protention, and the phenomenology of the unexpected}, year = {2017}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {4}, pages = {467--483}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1342270} }
Bluemink, M.	2017	Socrates, memory and the internet	Philosophy Now 122 9-11			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bluemink2017Socrates, author = {Bluemink, M}, title = {Socrates, memory and the internet}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophy Now}, volume = {122}, pages = {9--11} }
Blustein, J.	2017	A duty to remember	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 351-363			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Blustein2017duty, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {A duty to remember}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {351--363} }
Brogaard, B.	2017	Foundationalism	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 296-309		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brogaard2017Foundationalism, author = {Brogaard, Berit}, title = {Foundationalism}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {296--309}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-24} }
Carman, T.	2017	Martin Heidegger	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 557-562		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Carman2017Martin, author = {Carman, Taylor}, title = {Martin Heidegger}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {557--562}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-48} }
Carter, J.A. and Gordon, E.C.	2017	Googled assertion	Philosophical Psychology 30(4) 490-501	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can help to explain why certain kinds of assertionsmade on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memoryare properly criticizable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
BibTeX: @article{Carter2017Googled, author = {Carter, J. Adam and Gordon, Emma C.}, title = {Googled assertion}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {30}, number = {4}, pages = {490--501}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395} }
Chadha, M.	2017	Indian Buddhist philosophy	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 416-427		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chadha2017Indian, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {Indian Buddhist philosophy}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {416--427}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-34} }
Chadha, M.	2017	No-self and episodic memory	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 347-352		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Chadha2017No, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {No-self and episodic memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {347--352}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428878} }
Chappell, S.-G.	2017	Aristotle	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 396-407		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chappell2017Aristotle, author = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace}, title = {Aristotle}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {396--407}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-32} }
Chappell, S.-G.	2017	Plato	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 385-395		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chappell2017Plato, author = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace}, title = {Plato}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {385--395}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-31} }
Cheng, C.-Y.	2017	Chinese Buddhist philosophy	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 428-438		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Cheng2017Chinese, author = {Cheng, Chung-Ying}, title = {Chinese Buddhist philosophy}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {428--438}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-35} }
Cheng, T.	2017	Iconic memory and attention in the overflow debate	Cogent Psychology 4(1) 1304018	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The overflow debate concerns this following question: does conscious iconic memory have a higher capacity than attention does? In recent years, Ned Block has been invoking empirical works to support the positive answer to this ques- tion. The view is called the ''rich view'' or the ''Overflow view''. One central thread of this discussion concerns the nature of iconic memory: for example how rich they are and whether they are conscious. The first section discusses a potential misun- derstanding of ''visible persistence'' in this literature. The second section discusses varieties of attention relevant to this debate. The final section discusses the most prominent alternative interpretation of the Sperling paradigm---the postdiction interpretation---and explains how it can be made compatible with a weaker version of the rich or overflow view. Subjects:
BibTeX: @article{Cheng2017Iconic, author = {Cheng, Tony}, title = {Iconic memory and attention in the overflow debate}, year = {2017}, journal = {Cogent Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {1304018}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2017.1304018} }
Clowes, R.W.	2017	Extended memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 243-254		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Clowes2017Extended, author = {Clowes, Robert W.}, title = {Extended memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {243--254}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-20} }
Copenhaver, R.	2017	John Locke and Thomas Reid	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 470-479		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Copenhaver2017John, author = {Copenhaver, Rebecca}, title = {John Locke and Thomas Reid}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {470--479}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-39} }
De Brigard, F.	2017	Memory and imagination	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 127-140		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DeBrigard2017Memory, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Memory and imagination}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {127--140}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-11} }
De Sousa, R.	2017	Memory and emotion	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 154-165		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DeSousa2017Memory, author = {De Sousa, Ronald}, title = {Memory and emotion}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {154--165}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-13} }
Debus, D.	2017	Memory causation	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 63-75		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Debus2017Memory, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Memory causation}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {63--75}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-6} }
Dessingué, A.	2017	Paul Ricoeur	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 563-571		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dessingue2017Paul, author = {Dessingué, Alexandre}, title = {Paul Ricoeur}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {563--571}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-49} }
Deutscher, M.	2017	Memory	Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Routledge		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Deutscher2017Memory, author = {Deutscher, Max}, title = {Memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-V020-2} }
Droege, P.	2017	Memory and consciousness	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 103-112		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Droege2017Memory, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {Memory and consciousness}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {103--112}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-9} }
Eldridge, P.	2017	Regret and the consciousness of the past	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25(5) 646-663	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of (1) the relationship between regret and episodic memory, (2) the temporal structure of 'regretful memory', (3) the affective and evaluative dimension of regretful memory and (4) the counterfactual dimension of regretful memory. Based on Husserl's phenomenology, I offer an analysis of regret's complex structures of intentionality and time-consciousness. Husserl held that episodic memory requires two temporal orientations on one's own experience: the past now that one relives and the present now in which one does the reliving. If memory generally entails two temporal perspectives, regretful memory brings in a third point of temporal reference: that now that could have been. Drawing on Hoerl and McCormack, I give an account of regret as a mnemic and counterfactual form of intentional consciousness that confronts an alternative past and attempts to negotiate between two essential yet conflicting features of its actual past: its contingency and its irreversibility. On this basis, I then draw on Bagnoli to offer a phenomenological theory of regretful memory as an emotional mode of valuing possibilities that belong to the past.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2017Regret, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {Regret and the consciousness of the past}, year = {2017}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {25}, number = {5}, pages = {646--663}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1381413} }
Fan, W.	2017	On recognition and self: A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmād msā and Buddhism	Asian Philosophy 27(4) 292-308	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (ātman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmād msakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakd sita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
BibTeX: @article{Fan2017recognition, author = {Fan, Wenli}, title = {On recognition and self: A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmād msā and Buddhism}, year = {2017}, journal = {Asian Philosophy}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, pages = {292--308}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388} }
Faria, P.	2017	Bertrand Russell	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 519-527		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Faria2017Bertrand, author = {Faria, Paulo}, title = {Bertrand Russell}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {519--527}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-44} }
Fernández, J.	2017	The intentional objects of memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 88-99		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2017intentional, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {The intentional objects of memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {88--99}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-8} }
Ferretti, F., Adornetti, I., Chiera, A., Nicchiarelli, S., Magni, R., Valeri, G. and Marini, A.	2017	Mental time travel and language evolution: A narrative account of the origins of human communication	Language Sciences 63 105-118	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we propose a narrative account for the origin of language. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is conceptual and concerns the idea that the distinctive feature of human language (what sets it apart from other forms of animal communication) has to be traced to its inherently narrative character. The second assumption is methodological and connected to the idea that the study of language origin is closely related to the analysis of the cognitive systems at the base of narrative. Research on narrative abilities of subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorder has shown that storytelling requires the capability to link events causally connected to one another, and especially events which are remote from one another on the temporal axis of a story. Based on this research, we hypothesize that an important cognitive device involved in narrative is Mental Time Travel (MTT), that is, the system that allows humans to project themselves into the past and future. We show that such a system is present (to a greater or lesser extent) even in non-human animals. By virtue of this, we argue that MTT is independent of language and that it may be considered a cognitive precursor for the origin of language. Specifically, we propose that MTT allowed our ancestors to develop a form of pantomimic communication that might be considered as the foundation of the narrative origin of language.
BibTeX: @article{Ferretti2017Mental, author = {Ferretti, F. and Adornetti, I. and Chiera, A. and Nicchiarelli, S. and Magni, R. and Valeri, G. and Marini, A.}, title = {Mental time travel and language evolution: A narrative account of the origins of human communication}, year = {2017}, journal = {Language Sciences}, volume = {63}, pages = {105--118}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2017.01.002} }
Fivush, R. and Graci, M.	2017	Memory and social identity	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 268-280		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fivush2017Memory, author = {Fivush, Robyn and Graci, Matthew}, title = {Memory and social identity}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {268--280}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-22} }
Flage, D.E.	2017	David Hume	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 480-486		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Flage2017David, author = {Flage, Daniel E}, title = {David Hume}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {480--486}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-40} }
Fox, K.C.R., Fitz, N.S. and Reiner, P.B.	2017	The multiplicity of memory enhancement: Practical and ethical implications of the diverse neural substrates underlying human memory systems	Neuroethics 10(3) 375-388	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The neural basis of human memory is incredibly complex. We argue that the diversity of neural systems underlying various forms of memory suggests that any discussion of enhancing 'memory' per se is too broad, thus obfuscating the biopolitical debate about human enhancement. Memory can be differentiated into at least four major (and several minor) subsystems with largely dissociable (i.e., non-overlapping) neural substrates. We outline each subsystem, and discuss both the practical and the ethical implications of these diverse neural substrates. In practice, distinct neural bases imply the possibility, and likely the necessity, of specific approaches for the safe and effective enhancement of various memory subsystems. In the debate over the moral propriety of enhancement, this fine-grained perspective clarifies -- and may partially ameliorate -- certain concerns, including issues related to safety, fairness, coercion, and authenticity. While many researchers certainly appreciate the neurobiological complexity of memory, the political debate tends to revolve around a monolithic one-size-fits-all conception. The overall project -- exploring the societal implications of human enhancement technologies -- stands to benefit from a deeper appreciation of the neurobiological diversity of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Fox2017multiplicity, author = {Fox, Kieran C. R. and Fitz, Nicholas S. and Reiner, Peter B.}, title = {The multiplicity of memory enhancement: Practical and ethical implications of the diverse neural substrates underlying human memory systems}, year = {2017}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {375--388}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9282-7} }
Frise, M.	2017	Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs	Erkenntnis 82(2) 285-304	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject's mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one's mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2017Internalism, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs}, year = {2017}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {285--304}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7} }
Frise, M.	2017	No need to know	Philosophical Studies 174(2) 391-401	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2017No, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {No need to know}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {174}, number = {2}, pages = {391--401}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1} }
Frise, M.	2017	Preservationism in the epistemology of memory	The Philosophical Quarterly 67(268) 486-507	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t 1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t 2 , then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t 2 . Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in part by drawing on research in cognitive psychology. The dilemmas centre on preservationism's implications for certain cases involving either stored beliefs, forgotten evidence, or recollection failure. Each dilemma shows that preservationism either is false or lacks key support.
BibTeX: @article{Frise2017Preservationism, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Preservationism in the epistemology of memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {67}, number = {268}, pages = {486--507}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw074} }
Fuchs, T.	2017	Self across time: The diachronic unity of bodily existence	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(2) 291-315	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke's tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone's persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person's entire past in his present being and potentiality.
BibTeX: @article{Fuchs2017Self, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Self across time: The diachronic unity of bodily existence}, year = {2017}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {16}, number = {2}, pages = {291--315}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9449-4} }
Funk Deckard, M.	2017	Of the memory of the past: Philosophy of history in spiritual crisis in the early Patočka and Ricoeur	Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 9(2) 560-583	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that Jan Patočka and Paul Ricoeur endured their own cognitive-spiritual crisis, particularly during the development and outbreak of war in the 1930s. Their philosophies of history are thus, on the one hand, born of a rethinking of modern philosophy from the time of Galileo and Descartes, and on the other, a suffering of crisis that Europe itself was suffering. Stemming from the historical and philosophical context of Husserl's epistemology in the Krisis, both Ricoeur and Patočka had to confront history and the decadence of European sciences, as it concerns the difficulty of remembering the past and describing events in history. These responses to the problem of modern philosophy and science in Europe point to the symptom of spiritual crisis due to 'modern man' having no unified worldview. By means of care of the soul and the challenging of the state in action, a hermeneutics of peace emerges from their spiritual crises.
BibTeX: @article{FunkDeckard2017memory, author = {Funk Deckard, Michael}, title = {Of the memory of the past: Philosophy of history in spiritual crisis in the early Patočka and Ricoeur}, year = {2017}, journal = {Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {560--583} }
Ganeri, J.	2017	Attention, Not Self	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ganeri2017Attention, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Attention, Not Self}, year = {2017}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Ganeri, J.	2017	Classical Indian philosophy	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 408-415		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ganeri2017Classical, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Classical Indian philosophy}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {408--415}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-33} }
Ganeri, J.	2017	Mental time travel and attention	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 353-373	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory is the ability to revisit events in one's personal past, to relive them as if one travelled back in mental time. It has widely been assumed that such an ability imposes a metaphysical requirement on selves. Buddhist philosophers, however, deny the requirement and therefore seek to provide accounts of episodic memory that are metaphysically parsimonious. The idea that the memory perspective is a centred field of experience whose phenomenal constituents are simulacra of an earlier field of experience, yet attended to (organised, arranged) in a way that presents them as happening again, is, I suggest, a better one than that the memory perspective consists in taking as object-aspect the subject-aspect of the earlier experience, or the idea that it consists in labelling a representation of the earlier experience with an I-tag. ART
BibTeX: @article{Ganeri2017Mental, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Mental time travel and attention}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {353--373}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1429794} }
Ganeri, J.	2017	Mental time travel and attention: Replies to commentators	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 450-455		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ganeri2017Mentalb, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Mental time travel and attention: Replies to commentators}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {450--455}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428880} }
Gold, N. and Kyratsous, M.	2017	Self and identity in borderline personality disorder: Agency and mental time travel	Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 23(5) 1020-1028	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We consider how conceptions of the self and identity from the philosophical literature can help us to understand identity disturbance in borderline personality disorder (BPD). We present 3 philosophical approaches: connectedness, narrative, and agency. We show how these map on to 3 different ways in which the self can be temporally extended. The connectedness approach is dominant in philosophy, and the narrative approach has been used by psychiatry, but we argue that the lesser-known agency approach provides a promising way to theorize some aspects of identity disturbance in BPD. It relates the 2 diagnostic criteria of identity disturbance and disinhibition and is consistent with evidence of memory deficits and altered self-processing in BPD patients.
BibTeX: @article{Gold2017Self, author = {Gold, Natalie and Kyratsous, Michalis}, title = {Self and identity in borderline personality disorder: Agency and mental time travel}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice}, volume = {23}, number = {5}, pages = {1020--1028}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.12769} }
Goldstone, R.L. and Theiner, G.	2017	The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) perspective on group cognition	Philosophical Psychology 30(3) 338-372	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We lay out a multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) framework to account for the cognitive capacities of individuals and the groups to which they belong. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision-making, problem solving, judgment, and flexible behavior. Two such systems are considered in some detail---lateral inhibition within a network for selecting the most attractive option from a candidate set and a diffusion process for accumulating evidence to reach a rapid and accurate decision. These system descriptions are aptly applied at multiple levels, including within and across people. These systems provide accounts that unify cognitive processes across multiple levels, can be expressed in a common vocabulary provided by network science, are inductively powerful yet appropriately constrained, and are applicable to a large number of superficially diverse cognitive systems. Given group identification processes, cognitively resourceful people will frequently form groups that effectively employ cognitive systems at higher levels than the individual. The impressive cognitive capacities of individual people do not eliminate the need to talk about group cognition. Instead, smart people can provide the interacting parts for smart groups
BibTeX: @article{Goldstone2017multiple, author = {Goldstone, Robert L. and Theiner, Georg}, title = {The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) perspective on group cognition}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, pages = {338--372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1295635} }
Gross, S.	2017	Perception and the origins of temporal representation	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(S1) 275-292	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation.
BibTeX: @article{Gross2017Perception, author = {Gross, Steven}, title = {Perception and the origins of temporal representation}, year = {2017}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {98}, number = {S1}, pages = {275--292}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12171} }
Hamilton, A.	2017	Ludwig Wittgenstein	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 546-556		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hamilton2017Ludwig, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {Ludwig Wittgenstein}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {546--556}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-47} }
Heersmink, R.	2017	Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems	Synthese 194(8) 3135-3151	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one's autobiographical memory and thus also of one's diachronic self. To develop this claim, I draw on recent empirical work in human-computer interaction, looking at lifelogging technologies in both healthcare and everyday contexts. I argue that personal identity can neither be reduced to psychological structures instantiated by the brain nor by biological structures instantiated by the organism, but should be seen as an environmentally-distributed and relational construct. In other words, the complex web of cognitive relations we develop and maintain with other people and technological artifacts partly determines our self. This view has conceptual, methodological, and normative implications: we should broaden our concepts of the self as to include social and artifactual structures, focus on external memory systems in the (empirical) study of personal identity, and not interfere with people's distributed minds and selves. textcopyright 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2017Distributed, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems}, year = {2017}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {194}, number = {8}, pages = {3135--3151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1102-4} }
Heersmink, R.	2017	Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(1) 17-32	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2017Extended, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts}, year = {2017}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {17--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9448-5} }
Hoerl, C.	2017	Memory and the concept of time	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 207-218		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2017Memory, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Memory and the concept of time}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {207--218}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-17} }
Hoerl, C.	2017	On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke and Reid	Journal of Consciousness Studies 24(3-4) 88-102	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling how this can be so, given that its central claim-that we can never just perceive things moving or changing-clearly flies in the face of our common sense view of the phenomenology of experience. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of how it is possible that the deep conflict between the snapshot view and our phenomenological intuitions can sometimes go unnoticed. The materials for this diagnosis can, I think, be found in some passages in Thomas Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in which he criticises John Locke's account of the origins of the idea of succession, as presented in chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As I argue, a crucial aspect of Reid's criticisms can be seen to turn on the idea that Locke fails to distinguish between two quite different variants of the snapshot view, which I call the memory theory and the mirroring theory of temporal experience, respectively. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different variants of the snapshot view, I suggest, that can also make the snapshot view appear more compatible with our phenomenological intuitions than it in fact is.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2017view, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke and Reid}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {24}, number = {3-4}, pages = {88--102} }
Hutto, D.D.	2017	Memory and narrativity	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 192-204		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hutto2017Memory, author = {Hutto, Daniel D.}, title = {Memory and narrativity}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {192--204}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-16} }
Hutto, D.D. and Myin, E.	2017	Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hutto2017Evolving, author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Myin, Erik}, title = {Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content}, year = {2017}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Irvine, E.	2017	Memory images	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 141-153		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Irvine2017Memory, author = {Irvine, Elizabeth}, title = {Memory images}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {141--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-12} }
Ismael, J.	2017	Passage, flow, and the logic of temporal perspectives	Time of Nature and Nature of Time Springer 23-38	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, an attempt is made to inject a little formal precision into the discussion of passage. Instead of focusing on the quality of temporal experience, we talk about the content, and we argue that a good many of the issues can be resolved with an examination of the logic of temporal perspectives.
BibTeX: @incollection{Ismael2017Passage, author = {Ismael, Jenann}, title = {Passage, flow, and the logic of temporal perspectives}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {Time of Nature and Nature of Time}, editor = {Bouton, C. and Huneman, P.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {23--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53725-2_2} }
Jablonka, E.	2017	Collective narratives, false memories, and the origins of autobiographical memory	Biology & Philosophy 32(6) 839-853	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Building on Dor's theory of language as a social technology for the instruction of imagination, I suggest that autobiographical memory evolved cul-turally as a response to the problems of false memory and deliberate deceit that were introduced by that technology. I propose that sapiens' linguistic communication about past and future events initially occurred in small groups, and this helped to correct individual memory defects. However, when human groups grew in size and became more socially differentiated, and movement between groups prevented story-verification, misattributions of events became more common. In such condi-tions individuals with better autobiographical memory had an advantage because they could evaluate their own contents and sources of information, as well as that of others, more accurately; this not only benefitted them directly, but also improved their reliability as social partners. Autobiographical memory thus evolved in the context of human linguistic communication through selection for communicative reliability. However, the advantages of imagination, which enables forward-plan-ning and decision-Making, meant that memory distortions, although controlled and moderated by autobiographical memory, could not be totally eradicated. This may have driven the evolution of additional forms of memory control involving social and linguistic norms. I interpret the language and the social norms of the Pirahã as the outcome of the cultural-evolutionary control of memory distortions. Some ways of testing aspects of this proposal are outlined.
BibTeX: @article{Jablonka2017Collective, author = {Jablonka, Eva}, title = {Collective narratives, false memories, and the origins of autobiographical memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {6}, pages = {839--853}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9593-z} }
James, S.	2017	Epistemic and non-epistemic theories of remembering	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98(S1) 109-127	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.
BibTeX: @article{James2017Epistemic, author = {James, Steven}, title = {Epistemic and non-epistemic theories of remembering}, year = {2017}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {98}, number = {S1}, pages = {109--127}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12157} }
Jungert, M.	2017	Neurophilosophy or philosophy of neuroscience? What neuroscience and philosophy can and cannot do for each other	The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain Elsevier 3-13		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Jungert2017Neurophilosophy, author = {Jungert, M.}, title = {Neurophilosophy or philosophy of neuroscience? What neuroscience and philosophy can and cannot do for each other}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain}, publisher = {Elsevier}, pages = {3--13}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804205-2.00001-X} }
Khalidi, M.A.	2017	Crosscutting psycho-neural taxonomies: The case of episodic memory	Philosophical Explorations 20(2) 191-208	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I will begin by proposing a taxonomy oftaxonomic positions regarding the mind--brain: localism, globalism, revisionism, and contextualism, and will go on to focus on the last position. Although some versions of contextualism have been defended by various researchers, they largely limit themselves to a version of neural contextualism: different brain regions perform different functions in different neural contexts. I will defend what I call ''environmental-etiological contextualism,'' according to which the psychological functions carried out by various neural regions can only be identified and individuated against an environmental context or with reference to a causal history. While this idea may seem innocuous enough, it has important implications for a structure-to-function mapping in the mind and brain sciences. It entails that the same neural structures can subserve different psychological functions in different contexts, leading to crosscutting psycho-neural mappings. I will try to illustrate how this can occur with reference to recent research on episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Khalidi2017Crosscutting, author = {Khalidi, Muhammad Ali}, title = {Crosscutting psycho-neural taxonomies: The case of episodic memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {20}, number = {2}, pages = {191--208}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312501} }
Kuipers, R.A.	2017	Turning memory into prophecy: Roberto Unger and Paul Ricoeur on the human condition between past and future	The Heythrop Journal 58(5) 806-815		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kuipers2017Turning, author = {Kuipers, Ronald A.}, title = {Turning memory into prophecy: Roberto Unger and Paul Ricoeur on the human condition between past and future}, year = {2017}, journal = {The Heythrop Journal}, volume = {58}, number = {5}, pages = {806--815}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00640.x} }
Le Poidevin, R.	2017	Memory and the metaphysics of time	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 219-227		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{LePoidevin2017Memory, author = {Le Poidevin, Robin}, title = {Memory and the metaphysics of time}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {219--227}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-18} }
Le Poidevin, R.	2017	The arrow of mind	Journal of Consciousness Studies 24(3-4) 112-126	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory provides a peculiarly intimate kind of access to our experiential past. Does this tell us anything about the nature of time, and in particular the basis of time's direction? This paper will argue that the causal theory of temporal direction enables us to unify a number of the key features of episodic memory: its being about particular past experiences, its reliable representation of experiences as past, and the derivative nature of this kind of access to the past: that is, what the memory is about, and how reliable it is, depends on the content and reliability of the original experience on which the memory is based.
BibTeX: @article{LePoidevin2017arrow, author = {Le Poidevin, Robin}, title = {The arrow of mind}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {24}, number = {3-4}, pages = {112--126} }
León, F.	2017	Mental time travel and joint reminiscing	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 426-431	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In joint episodic memory-or joint reminiscing-two or more individuals retrieve together an experience that they had previously encoded while socially engaged with one another. In this commentary, I focus on the question of how Ganeri's [2018] analysis of individual episodic memory might be applicable to joint reminiscing. I explore three topics that are of relevance for answering this question: intersubjectivity, attention, and the phenomenology of reminiscing.
BibTeX: @article{Leon2017Mental, author = {León, Felipe}, title = {Mental time travel and joint reminiscing}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {426--431}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411145} }
Liao, S.M.	2017	The ethics of memory modification	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 373-382		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Liao2017ethics, author = {Liao, S. Matthew}, title = {The ethics of memory modification}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {373--382}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-30} }
Lin, F.Y.	2017	Wittgenstein's private language investigation	Philosophical Investigations 40(3) 257-281	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: (i) 'remembering the connection right' means 'reidentifying sensation-types'; (ii) the reason for 'no criterion of correctness' is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; and (iii) private names are not really names, private language is not really a language, therefore, private language is a grammatical illusion. My interpretation has the advantage of being able to reconcile Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, which is to dissolve philosophical problems by rearranging grammatical facts, with his actual philosophical practice, at least in the case of private language.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2017Wittgensteins, author = {Lin, Francis Y.}, title = {Wittgenstein's private language investigation}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, pages = {257--281}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phin.12148} }
Loveridge, J.	2017	Rhetorical deliberation, memory, and sensation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas	Philosophy and Rhetoric 50(2) 178-200	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article explores Thomas Aquinas's interrelated views of rhetoric and deliberation, particularly through his commentaries on Aristotle and his Summa theologiae. It argues that while articulating a largely Boethian understanding of rhetoric as consideration of uncertain matters, Aquinas also advances a theory of delibera- tion indebted to Aristotelian theories of sensation and phantasia. Building from previous work on phantasia in Aristotle's works, I argue that, in Aquinas's view, rhetorical deliberation is dependent on sensory information experienced through phantasia. Gathered through time and experience, sensory information serves as the foundational material for other forms of reasoning, such as deliberation and practi- cal wisdom. In articulating Aquinas's views of rhetoric and deliberation, I suggest that the relationship between rhetoric and logic within Aquinas's system of thought be reconsidered, with rhetoric playing a prominent role in the consideration of vari- able and human phenomena.
BibTeX: @article{Loveridge2017Rhetorical, author = {Loveridge, Jordan}, title = {Rhetorical deliberation, memory, and sensation in the thought of Thomas Aquinas}, year = {2017}, journal = {Philosophy and Rhetoric}, volume = {50}, number = {2}, pages = {178--200}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.50.2.0178} }
Madison, B.J.C.	2017	Internalism and externalism	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 283-295		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Madison2017Internalism, author = {Madison, Brent J. C.}, title = {Internalism and externalism}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {283--295}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-23} }
Magrì, E.	2017	The problem of habitual body and memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty	Hegel Bulletin 38(01) 24-44	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I shall focus on the relation between habitual body and memory in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception . Both Hegel and Merleau-Ponty defend a view of the self that is centred on the role of habituality as embodied activity situated in a context. However, both philosophers avoid committing to what Edward Casey has defined habitual body memory, i.e., an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting and regular manner. I shall explore the reasons why neither Hegel nor Merleau-Ponty develops an explicit account of habitual body memory. This will shed light not only on Hegel's account of lived experience, but also on Hegel and Merleau-Ponty's common concern with the habitual body.
BibTeX: @article{Magri2017problem, author = {Magrì, Elisa}, title = {The problem of habitual body and memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2017}, journal = {Hegel Bulletin}, volume = {38}, number = {01}, pages = {24--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.65} }
Manning, L.	2017	Augustine	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 439-447		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Manning2017Augustine, author = {Manning, Lilianne}, title = {Augustine}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {439--447}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-36} }
Matheson, D.	2017	An obligation to forget	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 364-372		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Matheson2017obligation, author = {Matheson, David}, title = {An obligation to forget}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {364--372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-29} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2017	Looking the past in the eye: Distortion in memory and the costs and benefits of recalling from an observer perspective	Consciousness and Cognition 49 322-332	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández's claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández's assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one's past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial.
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2017Looking, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Looking the past in the eye: Distortion in memory and the costs and benefits of recalling from an observer perspective}, year = {2017}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {49}, pages = {322--332}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.014} }
McCarroll, C.J.	2017	Over and beyond our episodic memories	Journal of Mind and Behavior 38(3/4) 231-247			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McCarroll2017Over, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude}, title = {Over and beyond our episodic memories}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {38}, number = {3/4}, pages = {231--247} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Sutton, J.	2017	Memory and perspective	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 113-126		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarroll2017Memory, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sutton, John}, title = {Memory and perspective}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {113--126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-10} }
McCormack, T. and Hoerl, C.	2017	The development of temporal concepts: Learning to locate events in time	Timing & Time Perception 5(3-4) 297-327	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged two to three years may categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is in the future or in the past is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around four to five years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system.
BibTeX: @article{McCormack2017development, author = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {The development of temporal concepts: Learning to locate events in time}, year = {2017}, journal = {Timing & Time Perception}, volume = {5}, number = {3-4}, pages = {297--327}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-00002094} }
Michaelian, K., Klein, S.B. and Szpunar, K.K.	2017	The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 1-18		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2017past, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, title = {The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {1--18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0001} }
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J.	2017	Memory	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2017Memory, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John}, title = {Memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, E. N.}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/} }
Miyazono, K.	2017	Does functionalism entail extended mind?	Synthese 194(9) 3523-3541	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer's disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto's beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it " the systems reply " to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the " the systems reply " to Searle's Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak's claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply.
BibTeX: @article{Miyazono2017Does, author = {Miyazono, Kengo}, title = {Does functionalism entail extended mind?}, year = {2017}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {194}, number = {9}, pages = {3523--3541}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0971-2} }
Mole, C.	2017	Are there special mechanisms of involuntary memory?	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8(3) 557-571	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Following the precedent set by Dorthe Berntsen's 2009 book, Involuntary Autobiographical Memory, this paper asks whether the mechanisms responsible for involuntarily recollected memories are distinct from those that are responsible for voluntarily recollected ones. Berntsen conjectures that these mechanisms are largely the same. Recent work has been thought to show that this is mistaken, but the argument from the recent results to the rejection of Berntsen's position is problematic, partly because it depends on a philosophically contentious view of voluntariness. Berntsen herself shares this contentious view, but the defenders of her position can easily give it up. This paper explains how and why they should.
BibTeX: @article{Mole2017Are, author = {Mole, Christopher}, title = {Are there special mechanisms of involuntary memory?}, year = {2017}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, pages = {557--571}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0326-z} }
Moon, A.	2017	Skepticism and memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 335-347		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Moon2017Skepticism, author = {Moon, Andrew}, title = {Skepticism and memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {335--347}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-27} }
Nichols, S.	2017	Memory and personal identity	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 169-179		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nichols2017Memory, author = {Nichols, Shaun}, title = {Memory and personal identity}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {169--179}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-14} }
Nikiforov, A.L.	2017	Historical memory: The construction of consciousness	Russian Studies in Philosophy 55(1) 49-61	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Historical (national) memory is considered in this article as one of the most important pillars of national identity. In addition to identifying some of the characteristic features of national, historical memory, the author shows that historical memory is influenced by two factorsthe direct experience of the witnesses and participants of past events and official propaganda. As the direct witnesses of events disappear, the possibility of reconstructing and distorting historical memory increases. The ideas put forth in this article are formulated based on the historical memory of World War II in the United States, Russia, Germany, and other European countries.
BibTeX: @article{Nikiforov2017Historical, author = {Nikiforov, Alexander L.}, title = {Historical memory: The construction of consciousness}, year = {2017}, journal = {Russian Studies in Philosophy}, volume = {55}, number = {1}, pages = {49--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2017.1296292} }
Nikulin, D.	2017	Maurice Halbwachs	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 528-536		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nikulin2017Maurice, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Maurice Halbwachs}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {528--536}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-45} }
Nikulin, D.	2017	The Concept of History	Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Nikulin2017Concept, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {The Concept of History}, year = {2017}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
O'Callaghan, J.	2017	Thomas Aquinas	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 461-469		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{OCallaghan2017Thomas, author = {O'Callaghan, John}, title = {Thomas Aquinas}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {461--469}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-38} }
O'Loughlin, I.	2017	Learning without storing: Wittgenstein's cognitive science of learning and memory	A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education Springer 601-614	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Education has recently been shaped by the cognitive science of memory. In turn, the science of memory has been infused by revolutionary ideas found in Wittgenstein's works. However, the memory science presently applied to education draws mainly on traditional models that are quickly becoming outmoded; Wittgenstein's insights have yet to be fruitfully applied, though they have helped to develop the science of memory. In this chapter, I examine three Wittgensteinian reforms in memory science as they pertain to education. First, Wittgenstein has inspired a particular strain of enactive models of memory and cognition, with important implications for theories of situated learning in education. Second, researchers have begun modeling memory as publicpractice, which deeply informs, inter alia, fraught theoretical discussions of assessment. Third, a number of memory researchers have rejected models based on a stored trace, a fundamental, Wittgensteinian revision with broad implications for characterizations of learning.
BibTeX: @incollection{OLoughlin2017Learning, author = {O'Loughlin, Ian}, title = {Learning without storing: Wittgenstein's cognitive science of learning and memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education}, editor = {Peters, Michael A. and Stickney, Jeff}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {601--614}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_39} }
Olsson, E.J.	2017	Coherentism	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory New York 310-322		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Olsson2017Coherentism, author = {Olsson, Erik J.}, title = {Coherentism}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {New York}, pages = {310--322}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-25} }
Perri, T.	2017	Henri Bergson	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 510-518		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perri2017Henri, author = {Perri, Trevor}, title = {Henri Bergson}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {510--518}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-43} }
Perrin, D. and Michaelian, K.	2017	Memory as mental time travel	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 228-239		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perrin2017Memory, author = {Perrin, Denis and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Memory as mental time travel}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {228--239}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-19} }
von Petersdorff, F.	2017	Aspects of mental time travel within historical research	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 444-449	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although the concept of mental time travel refers to autonoetic consciousness (that is, consciousness of one's own past), I argue that it should prove worthwhile to analyse the apparent similarities between mental time travel and historical operations undertaken by historians in their attempt to understand the autonoetic consciousness of historical agents. I, therefore, analyse arguments presented by R.G. Collingwood as well as by Paul Ricœur, and then reconsider the result hereof within the context of Jonardon Ganeri's [2018] analysis of mental time travel, thereby intending to further outline the scope and the limits of the concept of mental time travel. ART
BibTeX: @article{Petersdorff2017Aspects, author = {von Petersdorff, Friedrich}, title = {Aspects of mental time travel within historical research}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {444--449}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411146} }
Popa, E.	2017	Is future-oriented mental time travel inextricably linked to the self?	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) Elena Popa 420-425	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ganeri's [2018] discussion of mental time travel and the self focuses on remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of Ganeri's interpretation of three Buddhist views-by Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga. Is the scope of Ganeri's discussion confined to the past, or is there a stronger assumption that future thought always entails self-representation? I argue that if mental time travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both past and future thought should be possible independently of self-representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can be further contrasted on the basis of distinct ways of constructing past/future scenarios (field vs. observer perspective), modes of experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time travel (episodic vs. semantic memory). I further assess the compatibility of future-oriented thought with the three Buddhist views on the basis of these coordinates.
BibTeX: @article{Popa2017Is, author = {Popa, Elena}, title = {Is future-oriented mental time travel inextricably linked to the self?}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, publisher = {Elena Popa}, pages = {420--425}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411147} }
Ricci, V.	2017	G.W.F. Hegel	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 487-495		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ricci2017G.W.F., author = {Ricci, Valentina}, title = {G.W.F. Hegel}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {487--495}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-41} }
Robbins, S.E.	2017	Analogical reminding and the storage of experience: The paradox of Hofstadter-Sander	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16(3) 355-385	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In their exhaustive study of the cognitive operation of analogy (Surfaces and Essences, 2013), Hofstadter and Sander arrive at a paradox: the creative and inexhaustible production of analogies in our thought must derive from a ''reminding'' operation based upon the availability of the detailed totality of our experience. Yet the authors see no way that our experience can be stored in the brain in such detail nor do they see how such detail could be accessed or retrieved such that the innumerable analogical remindings we experience can occur. Analogy creation, then, should not be possible. The intent here is to sharpen and deepen our understanding of the paradox, emphasizing its criticality. It will be shown that the retrieval problem has its origins in the failure of memory theory to recognize the actual dynamic structure of events (experience). This structure is comprised of invariance laws as per J. J. Gibson, and this event ''invariance structure'' is exactly what supports Hofstadter and Sander's missing mechanism for analogical reminding. Yet these structures of invariants, existing only over optical flows, auditory flows, haptic flows, etc., are equally difficult to imagine being stored in a static memory, and thus only exacerbate the problem of the storage of experience in the brain. A possible route to the solution of this dilemma, based in the radical model of Bergson, is also sketched.
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2017Analogical, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {Analogical reminding and the storage of experience: The paradox of Hofstadter-Sander}, year = {2017}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {355--385}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9456-0} }
Robins, S.K.	2017	Contiguity and the causal theory of memory	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47(1) 1-19	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker's Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering's requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2017Contiguity, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Contiguity and the causal theory of memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {47}, number = {1}, pages = {1--19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1209964} }
Robins, S.K.	2017	In defense of Vasubandhu's approach to episodic phenomenology	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 416-419	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ganeri [2018] explores three Buddhist approaches to episodic memory and concludes in favor of Buddhaghosa's attentional account. When comparing it to Vasubandhu's, Ganeri argues that Buddhaghosa's is preferable because it does not over- intellectualize episodic memory. In my commentary, I argue that the intellectualism of Vasubandhu's approach (at least as presented by Ganeri) makes it both a more plausible account of episodic memory and a more successful strategy for addressing the precarious role of the self in this form of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2017defense, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {In defense of Vasubandhu's approach to episodic phenomenology}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {416--419}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411148} }
Robins, S.K.	2017	Memory traces	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 76-87		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2017Memory, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Memory traces}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {76--87}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-7} }
Rowlands, M.	2017	Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science, and Autobiography	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rowlands2017Memory, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science, and Autobiography}, year = {2017}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Sakuragi, S.	2017	On different concepts of experiential memory	Journal of Philosophical Ideas 65s 35-58	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The topic of this paper is two concepts of experiential memory. Experiential Memory is known to play an essential role in the Lockean memory theory of personal identity. I ague that we can distinguish two different forms of English expressions for experiential memory. The traditional circularity problem is due to its formulation by appeal to one of the two forms, 'remember V-ing.' In my view, this is a mere linguistic coincidence in English. I show that the theory cannot be formulated in the same way in Japanese because Japanese has no corresponding memory expression. Meanwhile, I argue that the theory formulated by appeal to the other form, 'remember the feeling,' is likely to remain insufficient, if not facing another circularity charge.
BibTeX: @article{Sakuragi2017different, author = {Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {On different concepts of experiential memory}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Philosophical Ideas}, volume = {65s}, pages = {35--58} }
Sallis, J.	2017	The span of memory: On Plato's Theaetetus	Epoché 21(2) 321-333	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This interpretation directed at certain passages in Plato's Theaetetus explicates the close relation that the dialogue establishes between memory, thought, and speech. It shows that all of these means contribute to the soul's capacity to stretch beyond mere perceptions. The interpretation also shows that comedic elements play a major role in the dialogue, most notably, in the well-known passage that purportedly explains knowledge and memory by means of the image of birds flying about in an aviary. Through close examination of the relevant passages, the interpretation shows that the Theaetetus is not aporetic but rather achieves a positive advance that prepares the way for the Sophist.
BibTeX: @article{Sallis2017span, author = {Sallis, John}, title = {The span of memory: On Plato's Theaetetus}, year = {2017}, journal = {Epoché}, volume = {21}, number = {2}, pages = {321--333}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche201722778} }
Schuback, M.S.C.	2017	Memory in exile	Research in Phenomenology 47(2) 175-189	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, a discussion about memory in exile is presented that takes up the thesis that exile is a condition of post-existence and afterness. The main claim is that exile is not only existence after a cut and separation but is an existing as afterness, in a ''present tension'' of being with the without and without a with. It reveals a sense of the present and of presence as multi-directed movements, as clusters of echoes and delayings. In exile, memories are not the continuous simultaneity of double images but are rather ''photisms,'' shimmering between images, the coming and going between languages, experiences, a longing back and forth. Exilic memory is the experience that bears wit- ness to the present as the movement of presencing, of appearing while sliding away.
BibTeX: @article{Schuback2017Memory, author = {Schuback, Marcia Sá Cavalcante}, title = {Memory in exile}, year = {2017}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {175--189}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341364} }
Schwab, M.	2017	Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 496-509		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Schwab2017Sigmund, author = {Schwab, Martin}, title = {Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {496--509}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-42} }
Senor, T.D.	2017	Preservation and generation	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 323-334		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Senor2017Preservation, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Preservation and generation}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {323--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-26} }
Shevlin, H.	2017	Conceptual short-term memory: A missing part of the mind?	Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 163-188	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In debates in philosophy and cognitive science concerning short-term memory mechanisms and perceptual experience, most discussion has focused on the working memory and the various forms of sensory memory such as iconic memory. In this paper, I present a summary of some evidence for a proposed further form of memory termed Conceptual Short-Term Memory. I go on to outline some of the ways in which this additional distinctive sort of short-term memory might be of relevance to ongoing philosophical debates, specifically in relation to questions about high-level perceptual phenomenology, the relationship between consciousness and reportability, and the boundary between cognition and perception. I conclude that Conceptual Short-Term Memory offers a promising new direction of research and philosophical investigation.
BibTeX: @article{Shevlin2017Conceptual, author = {Shevlin, H.}, title = {Conceptual short-term memory: A missing part of the mind?}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {24}, pages = {163--188} }
Siegel, S. and Silins, N.	2017	The structure of episodic memory: Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 374-394	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts a Buddhist denial of persisting or even momentary selves. Our paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's[2018] 'Mental Time Travel and Attention', and we focus on his exploration of Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. In particular, we distinguish between memory perspectives on the past and memory relations that may or may not be successfully borne to the past. We also critically examine 3 ways of trying to cash out what is distinctive about episodic memory: (1) episodic memory as mental time travel, (2) episodic memory as reliving of the past, and (3) episodic memory as reflective attention to the past.
BibTeX: @article{Siegel2017structure, author = {Siegel, Susanna and Silins, Nicholas}, title = {The structure of episodic memory: Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {374--394}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411153} }
Smart, P., Clowes, R.W. and Heersmink, R.	2017	Minds online: The interface between web science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind	Foundations and Trends in Web Science 6(1-2) 1-232	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Alongside existing research into the social, political and eco- nomic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particu- larly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive sig- nificance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent--world in- teractions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.
BibTeX: @article{Smart2017Minds, author = {Smart, Paul and Clowes, Robert W. and Heersmink, Richard}, title = {Minds online: The interface between web science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind}, year = {2017}, journal = {Foundations and Trends in Web Science}, volume = {6}, number = {1-2}, pages = {1--232}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1561/1800000026} }
Smart, P., Heersmink, R. and Clowes, R.W.	2017	The cognitive ecology of the internet	Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice Springer 251-282	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognitionCognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitiveCognitive ecology ecologyEcology , providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. After that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied interactionInteraction , extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive integrationIntegration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the Internet.
BibTeX: @incollection{Smart2017cognitive, author = {Smart, Paul and Heersmink, Richard and Clowes, Robert W.}, title = {The cognitive ecology of the internet}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice}, editor = {Cowley, S. J. and Vallée-Tourangeau, F.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {251--282}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49115-8_13} }
Spohn, W.	2017	The epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness	Ergo 4 359-418	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper deals with the epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness in probabilistic terms. after explicitly stating the underlying algebraic or propositional framework, it proposes two rules of probability change through our inner sense of time and generally describes how conditionaliza-tion works with respect to indexical information. It suggests a rule for rearranging beliefs after forgetting (and other unfavorable epistemic changes). after rehearsing standard auto-epistemology in terms of the reflection principle and its consequences , it moreover studies the auto-epistemology of those non-standard epistemological changes. thus, it generalizes the reflection principle to the indexical case and to an even more general version that is free from the informal restrictions that are commonly assumed. all these principles are illustrated with various examples: the prisoner , the new riddle of induction, Sleeping Beauty, and finally Shangri-La.
BibTeX: @article{Spohn2017epistemology, author = {Spohn, Wolfgang}, title = {The epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness}, year = {2017}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {4}, pages = {359--418}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.013} }
Stinson, C. and Sullivan, J.A.	2017	Mechanistic explanation in neuroscience	The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy Routledge 375-388		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Stinson2017Mechanistic, author = {Stinson, Catherine and Sullivan, Jacqueline Anne}, title = {Mechanistic explanation in neuroscience}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy}, editor = {Glennan, Stuart and Illari, Phyllis}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {375--388}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315731544-28} }
Taber, J.	2017	The self and what lies beyond the self: Remarks on Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 395-405	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I believe that Jonardon Ganeri, in his essay 'Mental Time Travel and Attention' together with his book The Self, develops a plausible and attractive account of the self as a mere 'sense of ownership' that accompanies our experiences or a 'discrete cognitive system whose function is to implicate the self in the content of memory,' but which needn't refer to anything. Objections that might be raised from a (Galen-) Strawsonian perspective are not, I believe, decisive. Nevertheless, even though Ganeri makes ingenious use of Indian sources in working out this proposal, he chooses not to discuss what I take to be the most intriguing idea of Indian philosophers about the self. Philosophers from various Indian traditions argue that the 'self' as ordinarily experienced, that is, the finite 'living' self consisting of the body and cognitive and emotional faculties, is not what one really is. Rather, there is a reality beyond this self, which emerges when one steps away from or 'abandons' it. I suggest that an experience of this higher or 'true' Self or (according to those who reject that there is a self in any sense) reality that lies beyond the self (which, however, replaces the finite living self when it is abandoned) could still be accommodated within a naturalistic framework. ART
BibTeX: @article{Taber2017self, author = {Taber, John}, title = {The self and what lies beyond the self: Remarks on Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {395--405}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411149} }
Tang, M.-T.	2017	ἐπιλήθομαι (epilelesthai) and λήθη (lethe): On Plato's philosophy of forgetting	Socrates 5(3-4) 40-56		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tang2017Epilelesthai, author = {Tang, Man-To}, title = {ἐπιλήθομαι (epilelesthai) and λήθη (lethe): On Plato's philosophy of forgetting}, year = {2017}, journal = {Socrates}, volume = {5}, number = {3-4}, pages = {40--56}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5958/2347-6869.2017.00021.8} }
Teroni, F.	2017	The phenomenology of memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 21-33		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Teroni2017phenomenology, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {The phenomenology of memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {21--33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-3} }
Thakchoe, S.	2017	Candrakīrti on deflated episodic memory: Response to Endel Tulving's challenge	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 432-438	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In my response to Ganeri's [2018] paper, I take Buddhagosha's deflationary account of episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakırti (ca. 570-640) who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakırti deflates episodic memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrantika Yogacara's thesis that episodic memory requires the admission of reflexive awareness. Also, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakırti shows the incoherence of the Mima _msaka-Naiyayika's self-implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulving's challenge to the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that Candrakırti may have even greater success in deflating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Thakchoe2017Candrakirti, author = {Thakchoe, Sonam}, title = {Candrakīrti on deflated episodic memory: Response to Endel Tulving's challenge}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {432--438}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411150} }
Umbelino, L.A.	2017	Onto-phenomenology of spatial memory in adumbrations	Phainomenon 26(1) 185-194	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As we turn to the lived experience of memory, we are confronted with an eerie and enigmatic possibility: the possibility to remember what we ourselves never lived. How to explain phenomenologically this enigmatic but fundamental level of spatialized memory ? I would like to come back to these issues in order to face yet another fundamental question: Does a phenomenology of spatialized memory require any onto-phenomenological concretizations?
BibTeX: @article{Umbelino2017phenomenology, author = {Umbelino, Luís António}, title = {Onto-phenomenology of spatial memory in adumbrations}, year = {2017}, journal = {Phainomenon}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {185--194}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0010} }
Vallega-Neu, D.	2017	Disseminating time: Durations, configurations, and chance	Research in Phenomenology 47 1-18	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay addresses time's dissemination both in the sense of an undoing or fracturing of unifying conceptions of time, as well as in the sense of 'scattering seeds' by conceiving of manifold temporalizing configurations of living beings, things, and events without an overarching sense of time. After a consideration of traditional conceptions of time, this essay explores the notion of duration in Bergson in order to make it fruitful for thinking duration without centering it in human consciousness. The author suggests that we can begin to think the temporal happening of things and events in terms of different temporal configurations of various degrees and qualities of complexity that may be occasioned by chance, whereby chance is understood as the freeing of time-spaces of indeterminacy in which temporal configurations take shape or manifest themselves.
BibTeX: @article{VallegaNeu2017Disseminating, author = {Vallega-Neu, Daniela}, title = {Disseminating time: Durations, configurations, and chance}, year = {2017}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {47}, pages = {1--18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341353} }
Vukov, J.	2017	Enduring questions and the ethics of memory blunting	Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3(02) 227-246	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.
BibTeX: @article{Vukov2017Enduring, author = {Vukov, Joseph}, title = {Enduring questions and the ethics of memory blunting}, year = {2017}, journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association}, volume = {3}, number = {02}, pages = {227--246}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.23} }
Wagoner, B.	2017	Frederic Bartlett	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 537-545		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wagoner2017Frederic, author = {Wagoner, Brady}, title = {Frederic Bartlett}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {537--545}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-46} }
Weir, R.	2017	Implying a self and implying my self	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) 439-443	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ganeri's [2018] article considers three distinct Buddhist accounts of episodic memory to see whether they are able to give a coherent conception of memory while defusing the weight of the self-implication requirement, which he associates most strongly with Endel Tulving's work on episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness. The aim of this commentary is not to consider whether they are successful in this task, but rather to argue that the task itself is unnecessary. Despite the undeniable strengths of Tulving's position, not only does it appear to offer a far too literal account of episodic memory as a form of mental time travel, but the specific version of the self-implication requirement that Tulving appears to affirm confuses the fact that a self is implicated in episodic memory with the idea that episodic memory always implicates myself, in the sense of the one who is having the memory. ART
BibTeX: @article{Weir2017Implying, author = {Weir, Richard}, title = {Implying a self and implying my self}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {439--443}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411151} }
Werning, M. and Cheng, S.	2017	Taxonomy and unity of memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory Routledge 7-20		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Werning2017Taxonomy, author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen}, title = {Taxonomy and unity of memory}, year = {2017}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {7--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315687315-2} }
Zahavi, D.	2017	Ownership, memory, attention: Commentary on Ganeri	Australasian Philosophical Review 1(4) Dan Zahavi 406-415	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In my discussion of Ganeri's[2018] article, I first examine the sense of ownership: Is it post-hoc, backwards directed, and past-oriented? I then consider whether episodic memory, understood as a form of past-directed attention, has to be supplemented by another cognitive mechanism to allow for a sense of ownership, or whether attention in and of itself exemplifies a type of I-consciousness. In the final and most extensive part of my commentary, I discuss whether Ganeri is right in suggesting that a reflexivist account of the subjectivity of experience commits one to a form of solipsism.
BibTeX: @article{Zahavi2017Ownership, author = {Zahavi, Dan}, title = {Ownership, memory, attention: Commentary on Ganeri}, year = {2017}, journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, publisher = {Dan Zahavi}, pages = {406--415}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411152} }
Aho, T.	2016	Descartes's intellectual memory	Rivista di storia della filosofia 71(2) 195-219	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Descartes distinguishes between sensory memory and intellectual memory. The author argues that sensory memory resembles the transmission of information in classical Aristotelian theory, whereas Descartes' intellectual memory, which has often been found puzzling, has analogues in other late scholastic ideas. He seems to use the term 'intellectual memory' in several related senses. It can refer to the recollection of symbolic messages, or it can refer to remembering of meanings, mastery of language. However, the term also has a different use: according to the author, intellectual memory takes care of the remembering subject's own states, in other words, reflective memory. Such a view had its origin in the thought of Scotus, and in Descartes's time it was well-known and popular. It is argued that Descarte's version of the intellectual memory underscores especially the nature of «spiritual memory» as something maintaining the continuous unity of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Aho2016Descartes, author = {Aho, Tuomo}, title = {Descartes's intellectual memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia}, volume = {71}, number = {2}, pages = {195--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3280/SF2016-002002} }
Barash, J.A.	2016	Collective Memory and the Historical Past	University of Chicago Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Barash2016Collective, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Collective Memory and the Historical Past}, year = {2016}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press} }
Brough, J.B.	2016	Some reflections on time and the ego in Husserl's late texts on time-consciousness	Quaestiones Disputatae 7(1) 89-108	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Time- consciousness made its appearance in Husserl's thought in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century in analyses that were notably silent on the issue of the ego. The ego itself made its debut in the Ideas in 1913,1 but without an account of its relationship to time. Husserl described timeconsciousness, particularly what he called the absolute time- constituting fl ow of consciousness, as perhaps the most important matter in all of phenomenology. He also came to view phenomenology as centered on the study of the ego understood as transcendental subjectivity. It was not until the last years of his life, however, in his late writings on timeconsciousness collected as the C-manuscripts, that Husserl made a serious effort to work out the connections between these two themes. The point of this essay is to examine how Husserl sought to understand the relation between the ego and temporal awareness in the C-manuscripts. I will argue that in these late texts, Husserl preserves and deepens his early understanding of the absolute fl ow of time- consciousness but that he also attempts to show how the fl ow is interwoven with the ego's constitution of itself and of the world. Time- consciousness plays a role on every level of egological constitution. At the same time, egological constitution contributes to the consciousness of time, and particularly to the constitution of the Husserlian monad, the ego understood not simply as the bare pole from which conscious acts radiate but in its full concreteness as embracing its unique individual history.
BibTeX: @article{Brough2016Some, author = {Brough, John B.}, title = {Some reflections on time and the ego in Husserl's late texts on time-consciousness}, year = {2016}, journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {89--108}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167116} }
Bublitz, J.C., Dresler, M., Kuehn, S. and Repantis, D.	2016	Who controls the past controls the future: Reconsolidating concerns over memory manipulations	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 247-249		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bublitz2016Who, author = {Bublitz, Jan Christoph and Dresler, Martin and Kuehn, Simone and Repantis, Dimitris}, title = {Who controls the past controls the future: Reconsolidating concerns over memory manipulations}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {247--249}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251992} }
Bugeja, A.	2016	Forgetting your scruples	Philosophical Studies 173(11) 2889-2911	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It can sound absurd to report that you have forgotten a moral truth. Described cases in which people who have lost moral beliefs exhibit the behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting can seem similarly absurd. I examine these phenomena, and evaluate a range of hypotheses that might be offered to explain them. These include the following proposals: that it is hard to forget moral truths because they are believed on the basis of intuition; that moral forgetting seems puzzling for the same reason that forgetting what you approve or disapprove of seems puzzling; and that moral truths matter too much to us to be easily forgotten. I conclude that the best explanation for the phenomena is a non-cognitivist one: moral forgetting seems puzzling because moral judgements are attitudes of a sort that cannot be lost through forgetting (e.g. desires).
BibTeX: @article{Bugeja2016Forgetting, author = {Bugeja, Adam}, title = {Forgetting your scruples}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {173}, number = {11}, pages = {2889--2911}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0642-2} }
Burkell, J.A.	2016	Remembering me: big data, individual identity, and the psychological necessity of forgetting	Ethics and Information Technology 18(1) 17-23	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Each of us has a personal narrative: a story that defines us, and one that we tell about ourselves to our inner and outer worlds. A strong sense of identity is rooted in a personal narrative that has coherence and correspondence (Conway in J Mem Lang 53:594--628, 2005): coherence in the sense that the story we tell is consistent with and supportive of our current version of 'self'; and correspondence in the sense that the story reflects the contents of autobiographical memory and the meaning of our experiences. These goals are achieved by a reciprocal interaction of autobiographical memory and the self, in which memories consistent with the self-image are reinforced, in turn strengthening the self-image they reflect. Thus, personal narratives depend crucially on the malleable nature of autobiographical memory: a strong sense of self requires that one remember what matters, and forget what does not. Today, anyone who is active online generates a highly detailed, ever---expanding, and permanent digital biographical 'memory'---memory that identifies where we go, what we say, who we see, and what we do in increasing detail as our physical lives become more and more enmeshed with electronic devices capable of recording our communications, online activities, movements, and even bodily functions. This paper explores the consequences of this digital record for identity, arguing that it presents a challenge to our ability to construct our own personal narratives--narratives that are central to a sense of 'self'. In the end, the 'right to be forgotten' may be, above all else, a psychological necessity that is core to identity---and therefore a value that we must ensure is protected. textcopyright 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
BibTeX: @article{Burkell2016Remembering, author = {Burkell, Jacquelyn Ann}, title = {Remembering me: big data, individual identity, and the psychological necessity of forgetting}, year = {2016}, journal = {Ethics and Information Technology}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {17--23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9393-1} }
Cabrera, L.Y. and Elger, B.S.	2016	Memory interventions in the criminal justice system: Some practical ethical considerations	Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 13(1) 95-103	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent years, discussion around memory modification interventions hasngained attention. However, discussion around the use of memoryninterventions in the criminal justice system has been mostly absent. Innthis paper we start by highlighting the importance memory has for human-being and personal identity, as well as its role within thencriminal forensic setting; in particular, for claiming and acceptingnlegal responsibility, for moral learning, and for retribution. Wenprovide examples of memory interventions that are currently availablenfor medical purposes, but that in the future could be used in thenforensic setting to modify criminal offenders' memories. In this sectionnwe contrast the cases of (1) dampening and (2) enhancing memories ofncriminal offenders. We then present from a pragmatic approach somenpressing ethical issues associated with these types of memoryninterventions. The paper ends up highlighting how these pragmaticnconsiderations can help establish ethically justified criteria regardingnthe possibility of interventions aimed at modifying criminal offenders'nmemories.
BibTeX: @article{Cabrera2016Memory, author = {Cabrera, Laura Y. and Elger, Bernice S.}, title = {Memory interventions in the criminal justice system: Some practical ethical considerations}, year = {2016}, journal = {Journal of Bioethical Inquiry}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {95--103}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-015-9680-2} }
Cacciatore, G.	2016	Time, narration, memory: Paul Ricoeur's theory of history	The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas Springer 167-173	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The theme of the historical experience of the finite man is what allows Paul Ricoeur to complete a long journey that, from the original agreement with a strictly eidetic phenomenology---through the analysis of the will and its sensible and corporeal instincts---leads him to a life's hermeneutics that is firstly the understanding of ''ontological deficiency'', as the basic trait of the human will's being, of its passions, of its fallibility and continuous exposure to guilt. But Ricoeurian hermeneutics starts from the refusal of every abstract absolutism of the spirit and of its forms, as well as of a similarly abstract idea of the universal essence of the human. And it's along this process that the further moving of perspective occurs towards the hermeneutics of a text, that becomes objective in the story and in its writing and, even more, in the world and in its stories.
BibTeX: @incollection{Cacciatore2016Time, author = {Cacciatore, Giuseppe}, title = {Time, narration, memory: Paul Ricoeur's theory of history}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas}, editor = {Santoianni, Flavia}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {167--173}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_19} }
Carter, J.A. and Kallestrup, J.	2016	Extended cognition and propositional memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(3) 691-714	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to 'extended-memory cases' (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in 1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call 'the epistemic parity principle'. In 2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in 3 several lines of response.
BibTeX: @article{Carter2016Extended, author = {Carter, J. Adam and Kallestrup, Jesper}, title = {Extended cognition and propositional memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {92}, number = {3}, pages = {691--714}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12157} }
Chakrabarti, A.	2016	Remembering Matilal on remembering	Sophia 55(4) 459-476	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although memory is pivotal to consciousness and without it no perceptual judgment or thinking is possible, Nyāya epistemology does not accept memory as a knowledge source (pramā¸ na). Prof Matilal elucidates and defends Udayana's justification for calling into question the knowledgehood or even truth of any recollection. Deepening Matilal's argument, this paper first shows why, if a remembering reproduces exactly the original experience from which it borrows its truth-claim, then there is a mismatch between the time of experience and the time of recall and the remembering ends up being false. To correct that error, if we change the tense in the content of recollection, the added past-ness goes beyond the original experience and violates the purely reproductive nature of memory. The paper ends by responding to this Nyāya position using arguments from Dvaita Vedānta and Jaina epistemology where remembering can be veridical and memory is accepted as an important knowledge source. The additional element of past-ness (a sense of ''back-then'') cannot be derived from sense perception. It has to be a spontaneous contribution of the inner sense.
BibTeX: @article{Chakrabarti2016Remembering, author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam}, title = {Remembering Matilal on remembering}, year = {2016}, journal = {Sophia}, volume = {55}, number = {4}, pages = {459--476}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0559-4} }
Cheng, S. and Werning, M.	2016	What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?	Synthese 193(5) 1345-1385	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Colloquially, episodic memory is described as ''the memory of personally experienced events''. Even though episodic memory has been studied in psychology and neuroscience for about six decades, there is still great uncertainty as to what episodic memory is. Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode that allows for a mnemonic simulation thereof.We call our analysis the Sequence Analysis of EpisodicMemory since episodes will be analyzed in terms of sequences of events. Our philosophical analysis of episodic memory is driven and supported by experimental results from psychology and neuroscience.We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along three cornerstones: First, psychological evidence suggests that a violation of any of the proposed conditions for episodic memory amounts to a deficiency of episodic memory and no form of memory or cognitive process but episodic memory fulfills them. Second, empirical results support a claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Finally, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Cheng2016What, author = {Cheng, Sen and Werning, Markus}, title = {What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?}, year = {2016}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, number = {5}, pages = {1345--1385}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0628-6} }
Cheng, S., Werning, M. and Suddendorf, T.	2016	Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel	Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 60 82-89	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.
BibTeX: @article{Cheng2016Dissociating, author = {Cheng, Sen and Werning, Markus and Suddendorf, Thomas}, title = {Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel}, year = {2016}, journal = {Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews}, volume = {60}, pages = {82--89}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.011} }
Christensen, W., Sutton, J. and McIlwain, D.	2016	Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience	Mind & Language 31(1) 37-66	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cog- nitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory pro- vides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further show that the theory can explain experimental evidence for skill automaticity, including evidence that secondary tasks do not interfere with expert performance, and evidence that experts have reduced memory for performance of sensorimotor skills.
BibTeX: @article{Christensen2016Cognition, author = {Christensen, Wayne and Sutton, John and McIlwain, Doris}, title = {Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience}, year = {2016}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {37--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12094} }
Chung, S.H. and Greenbaum, D.	2016	Memories: More dangerous than the real thing?	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 251-253		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Chung2016Memories, author = {Chung, Seung Hyun and Greenbaum, Dov}, title = {Memories: More dangerous than the real thing?}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {251--253}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244219} }
Clowes, R.W. and Mendonça, D.	2016	Representation redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind?	New Ideas in Psychology 40 26-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The last fifteen years have seen a sea change in cognitive science where issues of embodiment, situatedness and dynamics have become central to the explanatory resources in use. [U+2028]This paper evaluates the suggestion that representation should be eliminated from the explanative vocabulary of cognitive science. We trace the history of the issue by examining the usefulness of action-oriented representation (AOR), and we reassess if there is still a good explanatory role for the notion of representation in contemporary cognitive science by looking at contexts of re-use, contexts of informational fusion and elaboration, contexts of virtualist perception, and contexts of representational extension, restructuring and substitution. We claim that in these contexts the notion of representation continues to fulfill a valuable function in linking the inner informational economy of cognitive systems to how they interact and couple with the world, and that the role of representation in explanation has not been superseded by enactive and radical embodied theories of cognition. The final section of the paper suggests that we might be better off adopting a more pluralist research perspective, accepting that certain branches of cognitive science seem to require the positing of representations in order to develop, whereas others (e.g. research into minimal cognitive systems), do not appear to require it. We conclude that trying to suppress the notion of representation in all areas of cognitive science is seriously misguided.
BibTeX: @article{Clowes2016Representation, author = {Clowes, Robert W. and Mendonça, Dina}, title = {Representation redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind?}, year = {2016}, journal = {New Ideas in Psychology}, volume = {40}, pages = {26--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.03.002} }
Craver, C.F., Keven, N., Kwan, D., Kurczek, J., Duff, M.C. and Rosenbaum, R.S.	2016	Moral judgment in episodic amnesia.	Hippocampus 26(8) 975-979	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well-established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high-conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove. If this bias is mediated by episodic thought, individuals with deficits in episodic thought should not exhibit this effect. We report that individuals with deficits in episodic memory and future thought make moral judgments and exhibit the biasing effect of vivid, personal imaginings on moral judgment. These results strongly suggest that the biasing effect of vivid personal imagining on moral judgment is not due to episodic thought about the past and future.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2016Moral, author = {Craver, Carl F. and Keven, Nazım and Kwan, Donna and Kurczek, Jake and Duff, Melissa C. and Rosenbaum, R. Shayna}, title = {Moral judgment in episodic amnesia.}, year = {2016}, journal = {Hippocampus}, volume = {26}, number = {8}, pages = {975--979}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/hipo.22593} }
Cruz, M.	2016	On The Difficulty of Living Together	Columbia University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Cruz2016Difficulty, author = {Cruz, Manuel}, title = {On The Difficulty of Living Together}, year = {2016}, publisher = {Columbia University Press} }
Dalla Barba, G.	2016	Temporal consciousness and confabulation: When mental time travel takes the wrong track	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 119-134			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DallaBarba2016Temporal, author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco}, title = {Temporal consciousness and confabulation: When mental time travel takes the wrong track}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {119--134} }
De Brigard, F. and Gessell, B.S.	2016	Time is not of the essence	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 153-179		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DeBrigard2016Time, author = {De Brigard, Felipe and Gessell, Bryce S.}, title = {Time is not of the essence}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {153--179}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0008} }
Debus, D.	2016	Imagination and memory	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination Routledge 135-148			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Debus2016Imagination, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Imagination and memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination}, editor = {Kind, Amy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {135--148} }
Debus, D.	2016	Temporal perspectives in imagination	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 217-240		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Debus2016Temporal, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Temporal perspectives in imagination}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {217--240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0011} }
Dorsch, F.	2016	Hume	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination Routledge 40-54			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dorsch2016Hume, author = {Dorsch, Fabian}, title = {Hume}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination}, editor = {Kind, Amy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {40--54} }
Eldridge, P.	2016	The punctum and the past: Sartre and Barthes on memory and fascination	Sartre Studies International 22(1)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article extrapolates a theory of memory as an intentional consciousness from Sartre's early, scattered references to memory. There are three key questions: How does Sartre conceive of memory's intentional structure? Its temporal structure? And how does memory display both continuity and discontinuity in the stream of consciousness? Starting from the Sartrean insight that memory is a 'double consciousness' the article offers an analysis of how memory helps to constitute a temporally complex mode of being-in-theworld. Aside from memory's usefulness in this regard, memory also has the power to disturb consciousness and disrupt its projects. Roland Barthes's concept of the punctum - which is connected to analyses of mourning - helps to clarify this. A synoptic analysis of Sartre and Barthes allows for a phenomenological description of how consciousness can be stuck in the past, confronted by something that was, and which holds the mind captive.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2016punctum, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {The punctum and the past: Sartre and Barthes on memory and fascination}, year = {2016}, journal = {Sartre Studies International}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2016.220109} }
Elsey, J.W.B. and Kindt, M.	2016	Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Ethical implications of a new therapeutic approach	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 225-236	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memories are fundamental to human experience: We are in many ways the products of our pasts, recorded in memory. The influence of memory over current experience is both a blessing and a curse, for just as we find solace in the remembrance of times past, we may also be plagued by pathological memories. Such maladaptive memories are a core feature of several psychiatric conditions, from anxiety disorders to addiction. In this article we present work from our own lab and others that shows the remarkable malleability of human memory, and how the disruption of maladaptive memory reconsolidation is being used for therapeutic purposes. If bioethical concerns about memory modification are to be more than purely hypothetical considerations for the future, they should be grounded in cutting-edge contemporary research. We provide the necessary overview of the field, then raise, challenge, and discuss several old and new ethical concerns.
BibTeX: @article{Elsey2016Manipulating, author = {Elsey, James William Benjamin and Kindt, Merel}, title = {Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Ethical implications of a new therapeutic approach}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {225--236}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1218377} }
Fernández, J.	2016	Epistemic generation in memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92(3) 620-644	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification or belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2016Epistemic, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Epistemic generation in memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {92}, number = {3}, pages = {620--644}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12189} }
Fernández, J.	2016	Externalism, self-knowledge and memory	Externalism and Skepticism Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2016Externalism, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Externalism, self-knowledge and memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Externalism and Skepticism}, editor = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Fuchs, T.	2016	Embodied knowledge - embodied memory	Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium De Gruyter 215-229	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significance through the investigation of implicit memory. This kind of memory is formed in the course of the interaction of organism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor, but also affect-motor schemes. We may speak of an implicit "body memory" that underlies our habits and skills, connecting body and environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualized by suitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarily being made explicit. The paper analyses the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in early childhood. It argues that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basis of intercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others ("theory of mind") are derived from later steps of development; they are not sufficient for explaining the interactive and empathic human capacities. This will finally be illustrated by the example of autism.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fuchs2016Embodied, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Embodied knowledge - embodied memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja and Wiltsche, Harald A}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {215--229}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110450651-015} }
Gagnebin, J.M.	2016	Involuntary memory and apprenticeship to truth: Ricoeur re-reads Proust	Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon Springer 105-113	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter examines Ricœur's reading of In Search of Lost Time by Marcel Proust, which is developed in the second volume of Time and Narrative. It insists first and foremost on the corporeality of involuntary memory. Highlighting both the strengths and weaknesses of Ricoeur's interpretation, it argues that Ricoeur has not sufficiently emphasized the corporeal dimension of memory that is so crucial in Proustian descriptions, where it is primarily the body that remembers through the senses of taste, smell, touch, etc. Far from being secondary, the anchoring of memory in corporeality is essential to the sudden rediscovery of the time that was believed to be lost forever.
BibTeX: @incollection{Gagnebin2016Involuntary, author = {Gagnebin, Jeanne Marie}, title = {Involuntary memory and apprenticeship to truth: Ricoeur re-reads Proust}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon}, editor = {Davidson, Scott and Vallée, Marc-Antoine}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {105--113}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33426-4_8} }
Gerrans, P. and Kennett, J.	2016	Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency	Mind 126(501) 259-268	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot ''feel the future'' they cannot imaginatively inhabit it and hence their agency is compromised. The extent of such losses and consequent impairments to moral agency can be matters of degree.
BibTeX: @article{Gerrans2016Mental, author = {Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette}, title = {Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency}, year = {2016}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {126}, number = {501}, pages = {259--268}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv206} }
Goldman, A.I.	2016	Reply to Kelly	Goldman and His Critics Wiley 66-68		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Goldman2016Replyb, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Reply to Kelly}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Goldman and His Critics}, editor = {Mclaughlin, Brian P and Kornblith, Hilary}, publisher = {Wiley}, pages = {66--68}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609378.ch3} }
Goldman, A.I.	2016	Reply to McGrath	Goldman and His Critics Wiley 85-87		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Goldman2016Reply, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Reply to McGrath}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Goldman and His Critics}, editor = {Mclaughlin, Brian P and Kornblith, Hilary}, publisher = {Wiley}, pages = {85--87}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609378.ch4} }
Harrelson, K.J.	2016	Narrative identity and diachronic self-knowledge	Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2(01) 164-179	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our ability to tell stories about ourselves has captivated many theorists, and some have taken these developments for an opportunity to answer long-standing questions about the nature of personhood. In this essay I employ two skeptical arguments to show that this move was a mistake. The first argument rests on the observation that storytelling is revisionary. The second implies that our stories about ourselves are biased in regard to our existing self-image. These arguments undercut narrative theories of identity, but they leave room for a theory of narrative self-knowledge. The theory accommodates the first skeptical argument because there are event descriptions with retrospective assertibility conditions, and it accommodates the second argument by denying us epistemic privilege in regard to our own past. The result is that we do know our past through storytelling, but that it is a contingent feature of some of our stories that they are about ourselves.
BibTeX: @article{Harrelson2016Narrative, author = {Harrelson, Keven J.}, title = {Narrative identity and diachronic self-knowledge}, year = {2016}, journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association}, volume = {2}, number = {01}, pages = {164--179}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.30} }
Heersmink, R.	2016	The internet, cognitive enhancement, and the values of cognition	Minds and Machines 26(4) 389-407	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper has two distinct but related goals: (1) to identify some of the potential consequences of the Internet for our cognitive abilities and (2) to suggest an approach to evaluate these consequences. I begin by outlining the Google effect, which (allegedly) shows that when we know information is available online, we put less effort into storing that information in the brain. Some argue that this strategy is adaptive because it frees up internal resources which can then be used for other cognitive tasks, whereas others argue that this is maladaptive because it makes us less knowledgeable. I argue that the currently available empirical evidence in cognitive psychology does not support strong conclusions about the negative effects of the Internet on memory. Before we can make value-judgements about the cognitive effects of the Internet, we need more robust and ecologically-valid evidence. Having sketched a more nuanced picture of the Google effect, I then argue that the value of our cognitive abilities is in part intrinsic and in part instrumental, that is, they are both valuable in themselves and determined by the socio-cultural context in which these cognitive abilities are utilised. Focussing on instrumental value, I argue that, in an information society such as ours, having the skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information are (under most circumstances) more valuable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory. This is so, partly because using the Internet as an external memory system has overall benefits for education, navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship.
BibTeX: @article{Heersmink2016internet, author = {Heersmink, Richard}, title = {The internet, cognitive enhancement, and the values of cognition}, year = {2016}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, pages = {389--407}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9404-3} }
Hobuß, S.	2016	Silence, remembering, and forgetting in Wittgenstein, Cage, and Derrida	Beyond Memory: Silence and the Aesthetics of Remembrance Routledge 95-110			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hobus2016Silence, author = {Hobuß, Steffi}, title = {Silence, remembering, and forgetting in Wittgenstein, Cage, and Derrida}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Beyond Memory: Silence and the Aesthetics of Remembrance}, editor = {Dessingu'e, Alexandre}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {95--110} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2016	Making decisions about the future: Regret and the cognitive function of episodic memory	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 241-266		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2016Making, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Making decisions about the future: Regret and the cognitive function of episodic memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {241--266}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0012} }
Hopkins, R.	2016	'Remember Leonard Shelby': Memento and the double life of memory	Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie Oxford University Press 89-99		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hopkins2016Remember, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {'Remember Leonard Shelby': Memento and the double life of memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie}, editor = {Dodd, Julian}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {89--99}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769736.003.0007} }
Huebner, B.	2016	Transactive memory reconstructed: Rethinking Wegner's research program	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54(1) 48-69	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that recent research on episodic memory supports a limited defense of the phenomena that Daniel Wegner has termed transactive memory. Building on psychological and neurological research, targeting both individual and shared memory, I argue that individuals can collaboratively work to construct shared episodic memories. In some cases, this yields memories that are distributed across multiple individuals instead of being housed in individual brains.
BibTeX: @article{Huebner2016Transactive, author = {Huebner, Bryce}, title = {Transactive memory reconstructed: Rethinking Wegner's research program}, year = {2016}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {54}, number = {1}, pages = {48--69}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12160} }
Hui, K. and Fisher, C.E.	2016	The imperative for conceptual accuracy in memory modification	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 237-238		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hui2016imperative, author = {Hui, Katrina and Fisher, Carl E.}, title = {The imperative for conceptual accuracy in memory modification}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {237--238}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244224} }
Hutto, D.D.	2016	Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory	Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences Palgrave Macmillan 229-236		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hutto2016Remembering, author = {Hutto, Daniel D.}, title = {Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences}, editor = {Groes, Sebastian}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {229--236}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137520586_28} }
Hutto, D.D. and McGivern, P.	2016	Updating the story of mental time travel: Narrating and engaging with our possible pasts and futures	Time and the Philosophy of Action Routledge 141-157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hutto2016Updating, author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and McGivern, Patrick}, title = {Updating the story of mental time travel: Narrating and engaging with our possible pasts and futures}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Time and the Philosophy of Action}, editor = {Altshuler, Roman and Sigrist, Michael J.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {141--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315819303} }
Julião, R., Lo Presti, R., Perler, D. and van der Eijk, P.	2016	Mapping memory. Theories in ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy and medicine	eTopoi: Journal for Ancient Studies special vo 678-702	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses theories ofmemory as developed by philosophers and medical writers from Graeco-Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. While philosophers had much to say on the nature ofmemory and recollection, their epistemo- logical role and their relationship to other functions of the soul, medical writers concen- trated on the anatomy, physiology, pathology and indeed the therapeutics ofmemory and recollection.Yet the close relationship between philosophical and medical approaches was most clearly visible in discussions about the bodily location ofmemory,where theoretical concepts ofthe hierarchy offaculties ofthe soul were connected with clinical observations ofmemory failure as a result of injury or disease.
BibTeX: @article{Juliao2016Mapping, author = {Julião, Ricardo and Lo Presti, Roberto and Perler, Dominik and van der Eijk, Philip}, title = {Mapping memory. Theories in ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy and medicine}, year = {2016}, journal = {eTopoi: Journal for Ancient Studies}, volume = {special vo}, pages = {678--702} }
Kebede, M.	2016	Action and forgetting: Bergson's theory of memory	Philosophy Today 60(2) 347-370	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper is about the Bergsonian synchronization of the perpetual present or memory with the passing present or the body. It shows how forgetting narrows and focuses consciousness on the needs of action and how motor memory allows the imagining of the useful side of memory. The paper highlights the strength of Bergson's analysis by respectively confronting classical theories of memory, the highly regarded perspective of the phenomenological school, Deleuze's interpretation of Bergsonism, and Sartre's theory of mental imagery.
BibTeX: @article{Kebede2016Action, author = {Kebede, Messay}, title = {Action and forgetting: Bergson's theory of memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {60}, number = {2}, pages = {347--370}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201647116} }
Kelly, M.R.	2016	Grief: Putting the past before us	Quaestiones Disputatae 7(1) 156-177	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Grief research in philosophy agrees that one who grieves grieves over the irreversible loss of someone whom the griever loved deeply, and that someone thus factored centrally into the griever's sense of purpose and meaning in the world. The analytic literature in general tends to focus its treatments on the paradigm case of grief as the death of a loved one. I want to restrict my account to the paradigm case because the paradigm case most persuades the mind that grief is a past- directed emotion. The phenomenological move I propose will enable us to (1) respect the paradigm case of grief and a broader but still legitimate set of grief- generating states of affairs, (2) liberate grief from the view that grief is past directed or about the past, and thus (3) account for grief in a way that separates it from its closest emotion- neighbor, sorrow, without having to rely on the affective quality of those two emotions.
BibTeX: @article{Kelly2016Grief, author = {Kelly, Michael R.}, title = {Grief: Putting the past before us}, year = {2016}, journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {156--177}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167120} }
Kelly, T.	2016	Historical versus current time slice theories in epistemology	Goldman and His Critics Wiley 43-65		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kelly2016Historical, author = {Kelly, Thomas}, title = {Historical versus current time slice theories in epistemology}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Goldman and His Critics}, editor = {Mclaughlin, Brian P and Kornblith, Hilary}, publisher = {Wiley}, pages = {43--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609378.ch3} }
Keven, N.	2016	Events, narratives and memory	Synthese 193(8) 2497-2517	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Whether non-human animals can have episodic memories remains the subject of extensive debate. A number of prominent memory researchers defend the view that animals do not have the same kind of episodic memory as humans do, whereas others argue that some animals have episodic-like memory---i.e., they can remember what, where and when an event happened. Defining what constitutes episodic memory has proven to be difficult. In this paper, I propose a dual systems account and provide evidence for a distinction between event memory and episodic memory. Event memory is a perceptual system that evolved to support adaptive short-term goal processing, whereas episodic memory is based on narratives, which bind event memories into a retrievable whole that is temporally and causally organized around subject's goals. I argue that carefully distinguishing event memory from episodic memory can help resolve the debate.
BibTeX: @article{Keven2016Events, author = {Keven, Nazım}, title = {Events, narratives and memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, number = {8}, pages = {2497--2517}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0862-6} }
Kirchhoff, M.D.	2016	Composition and transactive memory systems	Philosophical Explorations 19(1) 59-77	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A recurrent theme in research on socially distributed cognition is to establish the claim that the cognitive phenomenon of transactive memory is grounded in a specific mode of organization: mechanistic compositional organization. My topic is the confluence of transactive remembering or transactive memory systems (TMSs) and mechanistic compositional organization. In relation to this confluence, the paper scrutinizes the claim that the kind of organization grounding TMSs and/or tokens of transactive remembering takes the specific form of mechanistic compositional organization -- at least as the latter is usually construed. It is argued (i) that the usual account of mechanistic compositional organization is based on a synchronic composition function, and (ii) that the organization of TMSs and/or transactive remembering is not well understood by way of synchronic composition. The positive account pursued is that TMSs and/or transactive remembering are better understood as grounded in a diachronic composition function.
BibTeX: @article{Kirchhoff2016Composition, author = {Kirchhoff, Michael D}, title = {Composition and transactive memory systems}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {59--77}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1085593} }
Klein, S.B.	2016	Lost feeling of ownership of one's mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.'s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism	Philosophical Psychology 29(4) 490-493	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In her paper ''Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity,'' Rebecca Roache (this issue) makes a number of claims about the nature of memory, the nature of self, and the relation between the two. In particular, she argues that Klein and Nichols's (2012) treatment of Locke's connectivity account of self and memory rests on an ''implausible,'' ''unsupported,'' and ''untenable'' interpretation of patient R.B.'s memory problems. I have no interest in debating Roache's views on the relation between self and memory. Serious treatment of what currently is known about that relation easily would exceed the space provided for commentary. Suffice it to say that psychological discoveries over the past 60 years reveal that no simple account is capable of being fitted to Locke's thesis: the relation, as now understood, consists in a complex interplay between different aspects of the self (for a review, see Klein, 2012; Klein & Gangi, 2010) and different types of memory (e.g., Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; Tulving 1985). These issues are discussed in Klein (2014a). In what follows, I focus on Roache's claim that patient R.B.'s report of losing possessory custody of mental content is not sanctioned by the language he uses to relate his phenomenology. I present evidence (some new) supporting Klein and Nichols's interpretation of patient R.B.'s ownership pathology and, in the process, argue that Roache's re-analysis is unsupported by theory and evidence.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2016Lost, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Lost feeling of ownership of one's mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.'s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {490--493}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126815} }
Klein, S.B. and Steindam, C.	2016	The role of subjective temporality in future-oriented mental time travel	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 135-152		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Klein2016role, author = {Klein, Stanley B. and Steindam, Chloe}, title = {The role of subjective temporality in future-oriented mental time travel}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {135--152}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0007} }
Kreitmair, K.	2016	Memory manipulation in the context of punishment and atonement	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 238-240		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kreitmair2016Memory, author = {Kreitmair, Karola}, title = {Memory manipulation in the context of punishment and atonement}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {238--240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251993} }
Lavazza, A.	2016	What we may forget when discussing human memory manipulation	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 249-251		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lavazza2016What, author = {Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {What we may forget when discussing human memory manipulation}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {249--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251988} }
Lázaro-Muñoz, G. and Diaz-Mataix, L.	2016	Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Stones left unturned	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 244-247		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{LazaroMunoz2016Manipulating, author = {Lázaro-Muñoz, Gabriel and Diaz-Mataix, Lorenzo}, title = {Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Stones left unturned}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {244--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251989} }
Malanowski, S.	2016	Is episodic memory uniquely human? Evaluating the episodic-like memory research program	Synthese 193(5) 1433-1455	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recently, a research program has emerged that aims to show that animals have a memory capacity that is similar to the human episodic memory capacity. Researchers within this program argue that nonhuman animals have episodic-like memory of personally experienced past events. In this paper, I specify and evaluate the goals of this research program and the progress it has made in achieving them. I will examine some of the data that the research program has produced, as well as the operational definitions and assumptions that have gone into producing that data, in order to call into question the ultimate value of the episodic-like memory research program. I argue that there is a gap between the claims that the research program makes and the data it uses to support these claims, and that bridging this gap is essential if we want to claim that human episodic memory has a meaningful analog in animals. I end with some suggestions of how to potentially fix these problems.
BibTeX: @article{Malanowski2016Is, author = {Malanowski, Sarah}, title = {Is episodic memory uniquely human? Evaluating the episodic-like memory research program}, year = {2016}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, number = {5}, pages = {1433--1455}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0966-z} }
Manning, L.	2016	Future mental time travel and the me-self	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 183-198		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Manning2016Future, author = {Manning, Lilianne}, title = {Future mental time travel and the me-self}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {183--198}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0009} }
McCarroll, C.J. and Sutton, J.	2016	Multiperspectival imagery: Sartre and cognitive theory on point of view in remembering and imagining	Phenomenology and Science: Confrontations and Convergences Palgrave Macmillan 181-204		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCarroll2016Multiperspectival, author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sutton, John}, title = {Multiperspectival imagery: Sartre and cognitive theory on point of view in remembering and imagining}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Phenomenology and Science: Confrontations and Convergences}, editor = {Reynolds, J. and Sebold, R.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {181--204}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51605-3_10} }
McGrath, M.	2016	The justification of memory beliefs	Goldman and His Critics Wiley 69-84		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McGrath2016justification, author = {McGrath, Matthew}, title = {The justification of memory beliefs}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Goldman and His Critics}, editor = {Mclaughlin, Brian P and Kornblith, Hilary}, publisher = {Wiley}, pages = {69--84}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609378.ch4} }
Michaelian, K.	2016	Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 63-92		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2016discontinuism, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {63--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0004} }
Michaelian, K.	2016	Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering	Frontiers in Psychology 7 1857	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This articles develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2016Confabulating, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering}, year = {2016}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {7}, pages = {1857}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01857} }
Michaelian, K.	2016	Memory	Philosophy: Mind (Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks) Macmillan 227-243			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Michaelian2016Memory, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Philosophy: Mind (Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks)}, editor = {McLaughlin, Brian}, publisher = {Macmillan}, pages = {227--243} }
Michaelian, K.	2016	Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Michaelian2016Mental, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past}, year = {2016}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Modrak, D.K.W.	2016	Aristotle on phantasia	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination Routledge 15-26			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Modrak2016Aristotle, author = {Modrak, Deborah K. W.}, title = {Aristotle on phantasia}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination}, editor = {Kind, Amy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {15--26} }
Mole, C.	2016	A methodological flaw in 'The neural basis of flashback formation: The impact of viewing trauma'	Psychological Medicine 46(08) 1785-1786		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mole2016methodological, author = {Mole, Christopher}, title = {A methodological flaw in 'The neural basis of flashback formation: The impact of viewing trauma'}, year = {2016}, journal = {Psychological Medicine}, volume = {46}, number = {08}, pages = {1785--1786}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716000040} }
Mole, C.	2016	Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: A response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne	Psychological Medicine 46(15) 3255-3258		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mole2016Causes, author = {Mole, Christopher}, title = {Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: A response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne}, year = {2016}, journal = {Psychological Medicine}, volume = {46}, number = {15}, pages = {3255--3258}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716001793} }
Mole, C.	2016	The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Mole2016Unexplained, author = {Mole, Christopher}, title = {The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought}, year = {2016}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Montemayor, C.	2016	Memory: Epistemic and phenomenal traces	Time and Trace: Multidisciplinary Investigations of Temporality Brill 215-231	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that memory traces are integrated according to tradeoffs concerning accuracy and autobiographical narrative. It concludes that conscious autobiographical memory cannot be reduced to epistemic memory traces, and that autobiographical memory should be associated with a different category of memory traces: phenomenal traces.
BibTeX: @incollection{Montemayor2016Memory, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {Memory: Epistemic and phenomenal traces}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Time and Trace: Multidisciplinary Investigations of Temporality}, editor = {Gross, Sabine and Ostovich, Steve T.}, publisher = {Brill}, pages = {215--231}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004315723_013} }
Naylor, A.	2016	Psychological deprogramming--reprogramming and the right kind of cause	Philosophical Papers 45(1-2) 267-288	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper makes use of an example of Williams's (1970), an example involving so-called psychological deprogramming--reprogramming, in arguing that procedures such as Teletransportation would not provide what matters to us in our self-interested concern for the future. This is so because the beliefs and other psychological states of a resultant person would not be appropriately causally dependent on any beliefs or other psychological states of the original person.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor2016Psychological, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Psychological deprogramming--reprogramming and the right kind of cause}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, volume = {45}, number = {1-2}, pages = {267--288}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2016.1187485} }
Obsieger, B.	2016	Phenomenological temporality	Quaestiones Disputatae 7(1) 141-155	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the structure of temporality as it is originally experienced in time-consciousness. At a pre-reflective level, time-consciousness presents us with changing or unchanging worldly objects as persisting through time. However, time-consciousness is not simply a consciousness of worldly temporal events but, rather, a consciousness of these events as they appear in our experience. Accordingly, the phenomenal time that is experienced in time-consciousness consists in a correlative unity between two different temporal series: that of the appearing objects and that of their modes of appearance. This article concludes with an analysis of the "immanent" side of phenomenal temporality. Following Husserl, I argue that appearances or experiences have the same temporal structure as worldly events, and that this isomorphism makes it possible for worldly processes of change and persistence to present themselves to us as perceptual phenomena.
BibTeX: @article{Obsieger2016Phenomenological, author = {Obsieger, Bernhard}, title = {Phenomenological temporality}, year = {2016}, journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {141--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167119} }
Occhionero, M. and Cicogna, P.	2016	Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering	Philosophical Psychology 29(7) 958-966	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the ''continuity'' of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering.
BibTeX: @article{Occhionero2016Phenomenal, author = {Occhionero, Miranda and Cicogna, Piercarla}, title = {Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {7}, pages = {958--966}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1213800} }
Osek, E.	2016	God bless memory: Plato Phaedrus 250c and the Entella tablet	Philosopher Kings and Tragic Heroes: Essays on Images and Ideas from Western Greece Parnassos Press 93-110			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Osek2016God, author = {Osek, Ewa}, title = {God bless memory: Plato Phaedrus 250c and the Entella tablet}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Philosopher Kings and Tragic Heroes: Essays on Images and Ideas from Western Greece}, editor = {Reid, Heather L. and Tanasi, Davide}, publisher = {Parnassos Press}, pages = {93--110} }
Perrin, D.	2016	Asymmetries in subjective time	Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel Oxford University Press 39-61		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perrin2016Asymmetries, author = {Perrin, Denis}, title = {Asymmetries in subjective time}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel}, editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {39--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0003} }
Rizzo, G.	2016	Wittgenstein on time: From the living present to the clock time	The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas Springer 137-148	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Augustine's analysis of time in Book XI of Confessions represents for Ludwig Wittgenstein a good example of a philosophical question. In dealing with such theme, his thought undergoes relevant changes. In the Philosophical Remarks, written more than 10 years after the drafting of the Tractatus, the Austrian philosopher holds that the essence of the world can be expressed in the grammar of language. Philosophy as ''custodian'' of grammar can grasp the essence of the world by excluding nonsensical combinations of signs. Philosopher, however, are often ''tempted'' to straightly describe the nature of the world, producing logical-grammatical paradoxes. An example of such a temptation is offered by the attempt to take hold of the essence of time using propositions like ''only the present experience has reality.'' The logical mistake hidden in this proposition lies in the bad use of the adjectival word ''present'' that would lose its everyday use and functional role in the language. Only comparing the term ''present'' with the background of other words referring to time experiences like ''past,''''future,'' and so on, we are able to understand the true sense of it. Engaging in a grammatical investigation into the notion of time helps us to dispel the different uses of it staving off logical muddles. Wittgenstein makes, in his lecture held at Cambridge in 1932--1933, a relevant distinction between what he calls ''memory-time'' and ''information-time.'' If the first can be understood as a now-centered system mostly expressed by indexical sentences or as an arrangement relied on memory, and therefore inadequate to give any external physical criteria for time measurements, the second clearly refers to a public chronology, implemented by clocks, calendars, diaries, and so on. Grammatical misconceptions, however occur when we are ''tyrannized'' by a metaphor and not able to ''move outside of'' it. The Austrian philosopher makes no secret of preferring a characterization of time that rejects a truth-functional interpretation. As for the notion of ''game'' in the Philosophical Investigations, it is impossible to have something like a common denominator shared by every sentence involving time.
BibTeX: @incollection{Rizzo2016Wittgenstein, author = {Rizzo, Giorgio}, title = {Wittgenstein on time: From the living present to the clock time}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas}, editor = {Santoianni, Flavia}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {137--148}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_16} }
Roache, R.	2016	Memory and mineness in personal identity	Philosophical Psychology 29(4) 479-489	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols (2012) describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of ''mineness'' usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.'s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols' characterization of R.B.'s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.
BibTeX: @article{Roache2016Memory, author = {Roache, Rebecca}, title = {Memory and mineness in personal identity}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {4}, pages = {479--489}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216} }
Robins, S.K.	2016	Misremembering	Philosophical Psychology 29(3) 432-447	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Archival and Constructive views of memory offer contrasting characterizations of remembering and its relation to memory errors. I evaluate the descriptive adequacy of each by offering a close analysis of one of the most prominent experimental techniques by which memory errors are elicited---the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Explaining the DRM effect requires appreciating it as a distinct form of memory error, which I refer to as misremembering. Misremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. It differs from both successful remembering and from confabulation errors, where the representation produced is wholly inaccurate. As I show, neither the Archival nor the Constructive View can account for the DRM effect because they are insensitive to misremembering's unique explanatory demands. Fortunately, the explanatory limitations of the Archival and Constructive Views are complementary. This suggests a way forward. Explaining misremembering---including how it differs from both successful remembering and confabulation---requires a hybrid theory of memory, combining the Archival commitment to discrete retention with the Constructive approach to retrieval. I conclude the paper with the beginning sketches of such an account.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2016Misremembering, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Misremembering}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, pages = {432--447}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245} }
Robins, S.K.	2016	Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory	Synthese 193(5) 1561-1583	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Constructivists about memory argue that memory is a capacity for building representations of past events from a generalized information store (e.g., De Brigard, in Synthese 191:155--185, 2014a; Michaelian, in Philos Psychol 24:323--342, 2012). The view is motivated by the memory errors discovered in cognitive psychology. Little has been known about the neural mechanisms by which false memories are produced. Recently, using a method I call the Optogenetic False Memory Technique (O-FaMe), neuroscientists have created false memories in mice (e.g., Ramirez et al., in Science 341:388--391, 2013). In this paper, I examine how Constructivism fares in light of O-FaMe results. My aims are two-fold. First, I argue that errors found in O-FaMe and cognitive psychology are similar behaviorally. Second, Constructivists should be able to explain the former since they purport to explain the latter, but they cannot. I conclude that O-FaMe studies reveal details about the mechanism by which false memories are produced that are incompatible with the explanatory approach to false memories favored by Constructivism.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2016Optogenetics, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, number = {5}, pages = {1561--1583}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1045-9} }
Robins, S.K.	2016	Representing the past: Memory traces and the causal theory of memory	Philosophical Studies 173(11) 2993-3013	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the Causal Theory of Memory (CTM), remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher (Philos Rev 75:161--196, 1966) argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker (Memory: A philosophical study. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) and Michaelian (Philos Psychol 24:323--342, 2011), contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural analogues in favor of memory traces as distributed patterns of event features. The proposals are understood as distinct accounts of how memory traces represent past events. But there are two distinct questions one could ask about a trace's representational features. One might ask how memory traces, qua mental representations, have their semantic properties. Or, what makes memory traces, qua mental representations of memories, distinct from other mental representations. Proponents of the CTM, both past and present, have failed to keep these two questions distinct. The result is a serious but unnoticed problem for the CTM in its current form. Distributed memory traces are incompatible with the CTM. Such traces do not provide a way to track the causal history of individual memories, as the CTM requires. If memory traces are distributed patterns of event features, as Bernecker and Michaelian each claim, then the CTM cannot be right.
BibTeX: @article{Robins2016Representing, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Representing the past: Memory traces and the causal theory of memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {173}, number = {11}, pages = {2993--3013}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0647-x} }
Ruin, H.	2016	Memory	The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics John Wiley & Sons 114-121	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What is memory? For modern psychological-neurological science, the question has a straightforward response. Yet, in its extension, it points toward the deepest aporias of a philosophy of subjectivity and of time. As a first step in a discussion of memory and philosophical hermeneutics, we need to briefly survey the ambiguity of the concept of memory itself. For it resonates also in the ambiguity of its position within hermeneutic thinking, where it has vacillated between a marginal and a fundamental position over the years. According to the standard definition, repeated in numerous handbooks, memory is "the processes by which information is encoded, stored, and retrieved, " ultimately in and through neurological brain mechanisms. It ranges from immediate sensory memory, over short-term, to so-called long-term memory. Other important distinctions concern the difference between procedural memory (attained nonconscious capacities) and working memory (what is actively kept in mind at a certain moment), and between semantic and episodic memory. The distinctions can be multiplied. Memory can become the object of training and enhancement, through various mnemonic techniques and educational practices, and it is a persistent concern for medicine and psychology where it surfaces as illness-and age-related deficiencies. Over the course of the last half century, memory has also become a central task of technology, through the invention of machines that seek to reproduce precisely the capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information. The philosophically more difficult and evasive dimension of memory is opened up once we begin to probe the conceptual presupposition of this scientific and technological definition. The key issue here is time. When we say that a biological creature, or a technical artifact, has the ability to retain and recover information over the course of time, time itself is taken for granted as the general, existing framework within which all things exist and occur. As a posited framework for organizing, controlling, and explaining life, this objectified temporal "time-space" is indispensable. With the help of chronom-eters and calendars, it is mastered so that all that happens can be given a distinct location within it, in time as it were, in a before and after. It is when we begin to think philosophically about the nature of this framework that we are led toward the deeper aporias of time and temporality. Time itself does not "exist" in any place. Instead, time somehow "holds" things together, giving them continuity. But this holding together does not take place in any exterior space. Rather, the "holding" is somehow constantly happening in and through Memory Hans Ruin 12
BibTeX: @incollection{Ruin2016Memory, author = {Ruin, Hans}, title = {Memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics}, editor = {Keane, Niall and Lawn, Chris}, publisher = {John Wiley & Sons}, pages = {114--121} }
Schechtman, M.	2016	A mess indeed: Empathic access, narrative, and identity	Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie Oxford University Press 17-34		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Schechtman2016mess, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {A mess indeed: Empathic access, narrative, and identity}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie}, editor = {Dodd, Julian}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {17--34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198769736.003.0002} }
Sepper, D.L.	2016	Descartes	The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination Routledge 27-39			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sepper2016Descartes, author = {Sepper, Dennis L}, title = {Descartes}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination}, editor = {Kind, Amy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {27--39} }
Setiya, K.	2016	Retrospection	Philosophers' Imprint 16(15)			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Setiya2016Retrospection, author = {Setiya, Kieran}, title = {Retrospection}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophers' Imprint}, volume = {16}, number = {15} }
Smith, B.C.	2016	Proust, the madeleine and memory	Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences Palgrave Macmillan 38-41		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Smith2016Proust, author = {Smith, Barry C.}, title = {Proust, the madeleine and memory}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences}, editor = {Groes, Sebastian}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {38--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137520586_3} }
Stinson, C.	2016	Mechanisms in psychology: Ripping nature at its seams	Synthese 193(5) 1585-1614	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent extensions of mechanistic explanation into psychology suggest that cognitive models are only explanatory insofar as they map neatly onto, and serve as scaffolding for more detailed neural models. Filling in those neural details is what these accounts take the integration of cognitive psychology and neuroscience to mean, and they take this process to be seamless. Critics of this view have given up on cognitive models possibly explaining mechanistically in the course of arguing for cognitive models having explanatory value independent of how well they align with neural mechanisms. We can have things both ways, however. The problem with seamless integration accounts is their seamlessness, not that they take cognitive models to be mechanistic. A non-componential view of mechanisms allows for cognitive and neural models that cross cut one another, and for cognitive models that don't decompose into parts. I illustrate the inadequacy of seamless accounts of integration by contrasting how ''filter'' models of attention in psychology and of sodium channels in neuroscience developed; by questioning whether the mappings generated by neuroimaging subtraction studies achieve integration; and by reinterpreting the evidence for cognitive models of memory having been successfully integrated with neural models. I argue that the integrations we can realistically expect are more partial, patchy, and full of loose threads than the mosaic unity Craver describes.
BibTeX: @article{Stinson2016Mechanisms, author = {Stinson, Catherine}, title = {Mechanisms in psychology: Ripping nature at its seams}, year = {2016}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {193}, number = {5}, pages = {1585--1614}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0871-5} }
Stout, N.	2016	Autism, episodic memory, and moral exemplars	Philosophical Psychology 29(6) 858-870	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper presents a challenge for exemplar theories of moral concepts. Some have proposed that we acquire moral concepts by way of exemplars of actions that are prohibited as well as of actions that are required, and we classify newly encountered actions based on their similarity to these exemplars. Judgments of (im)permissibility then follow from these exemplar-based classifications. However, if this were true, then we would expect that individuals who lacked, or were deficient in, the capacity to form or access exemplars of this kind would be similarly deficient in the ability to classify new actions according to them, and this relative inability would be manifested in the moral judgments made by such individuals. However, there is reason to suspect, I think, that a number of individuals who have been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) actually have the deficiencies I have described here but are nevertheless fully able to make sound moral judgments. If this is so, then it must be the case that classifying actions as instances of a given moral concept and making judgments based on said classification does not rely solely on exemplars.
BibTeX: @article{Stout2016Autism, author = {Stout, Nathan}, title = {Autism, episodic memory, and moral exemplars}, year = {2016}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {29}, number = {6}, pages = {858--870}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1164305} }
Tewes, C.	2016	Embodied habitual memory formation: Enacted or extended?	Embodiment in Evolution and Culture Mohr Siebeck 31-56	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is the aim of this paper to explore in more detail what enactivism can contribute to embodied memory research. This is accomplished by a comparative analysis of the formation of memories with regard to the extended mind hypothesis. Proponents of the latter base their views on the supposed "hybrid nature" of the human mind. According to this approach, biological brain-based memories are supplemented by external storage systems , thereby incorporating different forms of cultural technology into the human mind. I argue in this paper that a strong embodied approach to memory formation first needs to develop a phenomenological and autonomous system account of habitual body memory. This lays the foundation for explaining whether memories are integrated into emerging unities or are merely extended.
BibTeX: @incollection{Tewes2016Embodied, author = {Tewes, Christian}, title = {Embodied habitual memory formation: Enacted or extended?}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Embodiment in Evolution and Culture}, editor = {Etzelmüller, Gregor and Tewes, Christian}, publisher = {Mohr Siebeck}, pages = {31--56} }
Tillman, J.	2016	Eternal sunshine on the collective mind	AJOB Neuroscience 7(4) 242-243		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tillman2016Eternal, author = {Tillman, Jennifer}, title = {Eternal sunshine on the collective mind}, year = {2016}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {242--243}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251991} }
Turri, J.	2016	A new paradigm for epistemology from reliabilism to abilism	Ergo 3(8) 189-231	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Contemporary philosophers nearly unanimously endorse knowledge reliabilism, the view that knowledge must be reliably produced. Leading reliabilists have suggested that reliabilism draws support from patterns in ordinary judgments and intuitions about knowledge, luck, reliability, and counterfactuals. That is, they have suggested a proto- reliabilist hypothesis about ''commonsense'' or ''folk'' epistemology. This paper reports nine experimental studies (N = 1262) that test the proto- reliabilist hypothesis by testing four of its principal implications. The main findings are that (a) common- sense fully embraces the possibility of unreliable knowledge, (b) knowledge judg- ments are surprisingly insensitive to information about reliability, (c) ''anti- luck'' intuitions about knowledge have nothing to do with reliability specifically, and (d) reliabilists have mischaracterized the intuitive counterfactual properties of knowl- edge and their relation to reliability. When combined with the weakness of existing arguments for reliabilism and the recent emergence of well- supported alternative views that predict the widespread existence of unreliable knowledge, the present findings are the final exhibit in a conclusive case for abandoning reliabilism in epis- temology. i introduce an alternative theory of knowledge, abilism, which outper- forms reliabilism and well explains all the available evidence.
BibTeX: @article{Turri2016new, author = {Turri, John}, title = {A new paradigm for epistemology from reliabilism to abilism}, year = {2016}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {3}, number = {8}, pages = {189--231}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.008} }
Umbelino, L.A.	2016	Memory, space, oblivion	Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon Springer 115-122	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter examines the philosophical implications of Ricoeur's claim that there is something like a mysterious connection of time and space in memory. How then can we approach memory from the side of space? The answer, according to Ricoeur, is to be found in phenomenological descriptions of bodily spatiality, but also in a hermeneutical approach toward the question of how narrative offers a model to think both human time and human space.
BibTeX: @incollection{Umbelino2016Memory, author = {Umbelino, Luís António}, title = {Memory, space, oblivion}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon}, editor = {Davidson, Scott and Vallée, Marc-Antoine}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {115--122}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33426-4_9} }
Vierra, A.	2016	Psychopathy, mental time travel, and legal responsibility	Neuroethics 9(2) 129-136	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel---episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy's view. Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them. I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument by using an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.
BibTeX: @article{Vierra2016Psychopathy, author = {Vierra, Andrew}, title = {Psychopathy, mental time travel, and legal responsibility}, year = {2016}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {129--136}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6} }
de Warren, N.	2016	Augustine and Husserl on time and memory	Quaestiones Disputatae 7(1) 7-46	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between Augustine's and Husserl's conceptions of time, consciousness, and memory. Although Husserl claims to provide a phenomenological understanding of the paradox of time so famously formulated by Augustine in his Confessions, this paper explores the apparent similarities between Augustine's concept of distentio animi and the Husserlian concept of inner timeconsciousness against their more profound differences. At stake in this confrontation between Augustine and Husserl is a fundamental divergence in the sense of time as the movement of transcendence in immanence. Within this discussion, the contrast between speaking time (rhetoric) and seeing time (perception), time and eternity, and contrasting notions of the past and future are explored.
BibTeX: @article{Warren2016Augustine, author = {de Warren, Nicolas}, title = {Augustine and Husserl on time and memory}, year = {2016}, journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {7--46}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167113} }
White, C., Kelly, R. and Nichols, S.	2016	Remembering past lives	Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy Bloomsbury 169-195			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{White2016Remembering, author = {White, Claire and Kelly, Robert and Nichols, Shaun}, title = {Remembering past lives}, year = {2016}, booktitle = {Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy}, editor = {De Cruz, Helen and Nichols, Ryan}, publisher = {Bloomsbury}, pages = {169--195} }
Wiskus, J.	2016	Rhythm and transformation through memory: On Augustine's confessions after De Musica	Journal of Speculative Philosophy 30(3) 328-338	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I read the whole of Augustine's Confessions (not merely book XI) as an extended essay on the phenomenology of time-consciousness, understanding the Confessions as a performative text - as a text that enacts or performs the very content it describes. The key to this reading lies in a careful study of Augustine's use of psalms and hymns in his work, centered upon "Deus, creator omnium." This hymn not only appears in book XI but forms an important structural element (as referenced also in books IV, IX, and X); it plays a similar and significant role in Augustine's De Musica as well. Through his interpretation of the performance of "Deus, creator omnium" in De Musica, Augustine presents a highly sophisticated notion of rhythm that discloses a nonlinear account of time essential to my reading of book XI of the Confessions; memory comes to be understood as illuminating not only the past but also the present and future. Moreover, the centrality of rhythm in De Musica allows us to understand how the structural whole of the Confessions is organized rhythmically, performing a "beginning" that serves as origin only retroactively, through relation or proportion to the end.
BibTeX: @article{Wiskus2016Rhythm, author = {Wiskus, Jessica}, title = {Rhythm and transformation through memory: On Augustine's confessions after De Musica}, year = {2016}, journal = {Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {30}, number = {3}, pages = {328--338}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/jspecphil.30.3.0328} }
Zarpentine, C.	2016	Moral judgement, agency and affect: A response to Gerrans and Kennett	Mind 126(501) 233-257	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers and psychologists have drawn on neuroscientific and psychological research on the role of affective processes in moral thinking to provide support for moral sentimentalism. Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett (2010) criticize such 'neurosentimentalist' accounts on the grounds that they focus only on synchronic processes occurring at the time of moral judgement. As a result, these accounts face a dilemma: either they fail to accommodate the connection between moral judgement and agency or they are committed to implausible claims about the moral agency of individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). I respond to this criticism, arguing that Gerrans and Kennett fail to appreciate the diachronic aspects of affective mechanisms and that they misinterpret the empirical literature on the vmPFC. I argue that neurosentimentalism does have the resources to explain the connection between moral judgement and agency.
BibTeX: @article{Zarpentine2016Moral, author = {Zarpentine, Chris}, title = {Moral judgement, agency and affect: A response to Gerrans and Kennett}, year = {2016}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {126}, number = {501}, pages = {233--257}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv202} }
Andriopoulos, D.Z.	2015	Can we identify an empiricist theory of memory in Plato's dialogues?	Philosophical Inquiry 39(3) 124-138	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Can an empirisist theory of memory be identifi ed in Plato's dialogues? Research in the dialogues and reconstructing the pertinent references convinced me that- along with the multi-discussed and generally accepted concept of memory within Plato's metaphysical framework of the theory of knowledge- an empirisist version of memory is utilized by the Athenian philosopher in his argumentations, concerning mainly epistemological issues and problems; in fact, given the republished metaphysical concept of memory, one cannot find (or find only), beyond the orthodox, old interpretation related to metempsychosis, ies attributing to Plato such, perhaps heretic, parallel use of sensory material and empiricist structures. Moreover, I contend that the empiricist version of memory is related, or, can be considered, as a precursor, to a great extent, to the so-called empirical theory of memory; the theory where memory is a necessary and decisively functioning constituent to the new and modern theory of knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Andriopoulos2015Can, author = {Andriopoulos, D. Z.}, title = {Can we identify an empiricist theory of memory in Plato's dialogues?}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {39}, number = {3}, pages = {124--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2015393/439} }
Barnett, D.J.	2015	Is memory merely testimony from one's former self?	The Philosophical Review 124(3) 353-392	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An important philosophical tradition treats the deliverances of one's own internal faculties as analogous to the deliverances of external sources of testimony. Pushing back against this tradition in the special case of the deliverances of one's own memory, I aim to highlight the broader interaction between an internal (or first-person) and an external (or third-person) perspective that one might adopt towards one's own states of mind. According to what I call the 'diary model' of memory, one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past states of mind, much as testimony from another person can provide one with evidence about that person's states of mind. I reject the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences.
BibTeX: @article{Barnett2015Is, author = {Barnett, David James}, title = {Is memory merely testimony from one's former self?}, year = {2015}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {124}, number = {3}, pages = {353--392}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895337} }
Behnke, E.A.	2015	Null-body, protean body, potent body, neutral body, wild body	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 69-90			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Behnke2015Null, author = {Behnke, Elizabeth A.}, title = {Null-body, protean body, potent body, neutral body, wild body}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {69--90} }
Belshaw, C.	2015	Immortality, memory and imagination	The Journal of Ethics 19(3-4) 323-348	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Immortality-living forever and avoiding death-seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has been argued (notably by Williams, recently by Scheffler) that an immortal life would fairly soon become boring, trivial, and meaningless, and is not at all the sort of thing that any of us should want. Yet boredom and triviality presuppose our having powerful memories and imaginations, and an inability either to shake off the past or to free ourselves of weighty visions of the future. Suppose, though, that our capacities here are limited, so that our temporal reach is fairly significantly constrained. Then, I argue, these alleged problems with immortality will recede. Moreover, similar limitations might help us in the actual world, where life is short. If we cannot see clearly to its end points, both ahead and behind, life will seem longer.
BibTeX: @article{Belshaw2015Immortality, author = {Belshaw, Christopher}, title = {Immortality, memory and imagination}, year = {2015}, journal = {The Journal of Ethics}, volume = {19}, number = {3-4}, pages = {323--348}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8} }
Bernecker, S.	2015	Memory in analytic philosophy	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 298-315		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2015Memory, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory in analytic philosophy}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {298--315}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0014} }
Bernecker, S.	2015	Visual memory and the bounds of authenticity	Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium De Gruyter 445-464		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2015Visual, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Visual memory and the bounds of authenticity}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {445--464}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110378795.445} }
Bernier, P.	2015	Dignāga on reflexive awareness	Philosophy East and West 65(1) 125-156		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bernier2015Dignaga, author = {Bernier, Paul}, title = {Dignāga on reflexive awareness}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, pages = {125--156}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2015.0015} }
Bietti, L.M. and Sutton, J.	2015	Interacting to remember at multiple timescales: Coordination, collaboration, cooperation and culture in joint remembering	Interaction Studies 16(3) 419-450	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Everyday joint remembering, from family remembering around the dinner table to team remembering in the operating theatre, relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales, which we distinguish for analytic purposes so as better to study their interanimation in practice: (i) faster, lower-level coordination processes of behavioral matching and interactional synchrony occurring at timescale t1; (ii) mid-range collaborative processes which re-evoke past experiences in groups, unfolding at timescale t2; (iii) cooperative processes involved in the transmission of memories over longer periods occurring at timescale t3; and (iv) cultural processes and practices operating within distributed socio-cognitive networks over evolutionary and historical timeframes, unfolding at timescale t4 . In this paper we survey studies of how the processes operating across these overlapping and complementary timescales constitute joint remembering in social interactions. We describe coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and culture as complementary aspects of interacting to remember, which we consider as a complex phenomenon unfolding over multiple timescales (t1, t2, t3, t4) .
BibTeX: @article{Bietti2015Interacting, author = {Bietti, Lucas M. and Sutton, John}, title = {Interacting to remember at multiple timescales: Coordination, collaboration, cooperation and culture in joint remembering}, year = {2015}, journal = {Interaction Studies}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {419--450}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/is.16.3.04bie} }
Blustein, J.	2015	How the past matters: On the foundations of an ethics of remembrance	Historical Justice and Memory University of Wisconsin Press 74-92			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Blustein2015How, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {How the past matters: On the foundations of an ethics of remembrance}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Historical Justice and Memory}, editor = {Neumann, Klaus and Thompson, Janna}, publisher = {University of Wisconsin Press}, pages = {74--92} }
Bogdan, R.J.	2015	Memory as window on the mind	Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science Springer 45-53		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bogdan2015Memory, author = {Bogdan, Radu J.}, title = {Memory as window on the mind}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science}, editor = {Pârvu, Ilie and Sandu, Gabriel and Toader, Iulian D.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {45--53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16655-1_3} }
Bublitz, J.C. and Dresler, M.	2015	A duty to remember, a right to forget? Memory manipulations and the law	Handbook of Neuroethics Springer 1279-1307	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neuroscience might develop interventions that afford editing or erasing memo- ries, changing their content or attenuating accompanying emotions. This section provides an introduction to the intriguing ethical and legal questions raised by such alterations, with a special focus on the report of the President's Council ''Beyond Therapy'' and the proposal of a right to freedom of memory advanced by Adam Kolber.
BibTeX: @incollection{Bublitz2015duty, author = {Bublitz, Jan Christoph and Dresler, Martin}, title = {A duty to remember, a right to forget? Memory manipulations and the law}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Handbook of Neuroethics}, editor = {Clausen, Jens and Levy, Neil}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {1279--1307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_167} }
Carruthers, P.	2015	Perceiving mental states	Consciousness and Cognition 36 498-507	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that our awareness of the mental states of other agents is often perceptual in character. It draws partly on recent experimental findings concerning perception of animacy and intentionality. But it also emphasizes the unencapsulated nature of perception generally, and argues that concepts (including mental-state concepts) can be bound into the contents of conscious perception. One of the main arguments used in support of this conclusion draws on recent work concerning the nature and contents of working memory.
BibTeX: @article{Carruthers2015Perceiving, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {Perceiving mental states}, year = {2015}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {36}, pages = {498--507}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.04.009} }
Carruthers, P.	2015	The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Carruthers2015Centered, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Casey, E.S.	2015	Edges of time, edges of memory	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 254-274			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey2015Edges, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Edges of time, edges of memory}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {254--274} }
Chen, X.	2015	Reflection: Memory and forgetfulness in daoism	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 176-183		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Chen2015Reflection, author = {Chen, Xia}, title = {Reflection: Memory and forgetfulness in daoism}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {176--183}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0007} }
Clowes, R.W.	2015	Thinking in the cloud: The cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology	Philosophy & Technology 28(2) 261-296	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Technologies and artefacts have long played a role in the structure of human memory and our cognitive lives more generally. Recent years have seen an explosion in the production and use of a new regime of information technologies that might have powerful implications for our minds. Electronic-Memory (E-Memory), powerful, portable and wearable digital gadgetry and ''the cloud'' of ever-present data services allow us to record, store and access an ever-expanding range of information both about and of relevance to our lives. Already, for a decade we have been carrying around expansive gadgetry which allows us to collect, store and use what would have been almost unimaginable amounts of digital information only a short time ago. Now, thanks to the wireless internet adding vast processing and storage potential to the powerful portable devices which many of us carry constantly or wear, this information can be accessed and customised in an ever-greater variety of ways. How should we assess the implications of the new portable and pervasive cognitive technologies on offer? Does E-Memory and the wider panoply of cloud-enabled cognitive technologies really promise (as some see it), or threaten (as others do), a radical change to the human cognitive abilities and perhaps the very nature of our minds? If so, how are we to assess the possibilities and attempt to understand whether they offer a hopeful or dangerous turn in the human condition? This investigation is structured around four related factors of the new technology: Totality, Practical Incorporability, Autonomy and Entanglement. We use these factors to inquire into the implications of this cloud-based memory technology for our minds and our sense of self.
BibTeX: @article{Clowes2015Thinking, author = {Clowes, Robert W.}, title = {Thinking in the cloud: The cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophy & Technology}, volume = {28}, number = {2}, pages = {261--296}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0153-z} }
Clucas, S.	2015	Memory in the renaissance and early modern period	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 131-175		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Clucas2015Memory, author = {Clucas, Stephen}, title = {Memory in the renaissance and early modern period}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {131--175}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0006} }
Cosentino, E. and Ferretti, F.	2015	Cognitive foundations of the narrative self	Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 6(2) 311-324	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we tackle the issue of the role of narrative language in the constitution of human subjectivity. There are at least two different approaches to this issue. The first one is consistent with the view that language has a unique constitutive role in cognition. According to this account, human subjectivity is a by-product of the advent of language. We will refer to it as linguistic idealism and will argue that, in spite of its popularity in the philosophy and social sciences, this view is completely unfounded. We will defend a second approach, which acknowledges the relevant role of language in human subjectivity but interprets this role in the light of a relation of coevolution between language and cognition. We will suggest that this relation is asymmetric and the priority is given to the cognitive foundations of human sense of the self. The influence of language on human subjectivity is then analyzed in terms of a retroactive effect. We will argue that the relation of coevolution between language and cognition provides an interpretative tool that allows us to account for human subjectivity in accordance with darwinian naturalism.
BibTeX: @article{Cosentino2015Cognitive, author = {Cosentino, Erica and Ferretti, Francesco}, title = {Cognitive foundations of the narrative self}, year = {2015}, journal = {Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia}, volume = {6}, number = {2}, pages = {311--324}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2015.0029} }
Dogramaci, S.	2015	Forget and forgive: A practical approach to forgotten evidence	Ergo 2 645-677	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem of forgotten evidence.
BibTeX: @article{Dogramaci2015Forget, author = {Dogramaci, Sinan}, title = {Forget and forgive: A practical approach to forgotten evidence}, year = {2015}, journal = {Ergo}, volume = {2}, pages = {645--677}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.026} }
Drain, C. and Strong, R.C.	2015	Situated mediation and technological reflexivity: Smartphones, extended memory, and limits of cognitive enhancement	Social Epistemology and Technology: Toward Public Self-Awareness Regarding Technological Mediation Rowman & Littlefield 187-195	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The situated potentials for action between material things in the world and the interactional processes thereby afforded need to be seen as not only constituting the possibility of agency, but thereby also comprising it. Eo ipso, agency must be de-fused from any local, "contained" subject and be understood as a situational property in which subjects and objects can both participate. Any technological artifact should thus be understood as a complex of agential capacities that function relative to any number of social and material factors. Keeping in mind that we are co-constituted by webs of relations involving increasingly complex collections of artefacts, networks, niches, and communities of practice, our investigation will be guided by interrogating the functional potential of a thing that in the last fifteen years has seamlessly worked its way into the everyday life of millions of human agents. This "thing," the smartphone, is merely a nodal point in a highly complex network. Recognizing this massive "collective," we nevertheless want to show some of the ways in which something as seemingly mundane as a smartphone can reflexively alter the range of actions available to a cognitive agent (Latour 1994). Specifically, we hope to shed light on some of the social-cognitive consequences of technological mediation by looking at the complementary, if not mutually implied, domains of memory and knowledge.
BibTeX: @incollection{Drain2015Situated, author = {Drain, Chris and Strong, Richard Charles}, title = {Situated mediation and technological reflexivity: Smartphones, extended memory, and limits of cognitive enhancement}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Social Epistemology and Technology: Toward Public Self-Awareness Regarding Technological Mediation}, editor = {Scalambrino, Frank}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield}, pages = {187--195} }
Droege, P.	2015	From Darwin to Freud: Confabulation as an adaptive response to dysfunctions of consciousness	Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness MIT Press 141-165		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Droege2015Darwin, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {From Darwin to Freud: Confabulation as an adaptive response to dysfunctions of consciousness}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness}, editor = {Gennaro, Rocco J.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {141--165}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0006} }
Fernández, J.	2015	What are the benefits of memory distortion?	Consciousness and Cognition 33 536-547		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2015What, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {What are the benefits of memory distortion?}, year = {2015}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {33}, pages = {536--547}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.09.019} }
de Freitas, E. and Ferrara, F.	2015	Movement, memory and mathematics: Henri Bergson and the ontology of learning	Studies in Philosophy and Education 34(6) 565-585	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Using the work of philosopher Henri Bergson (1859--1941) to examine the nature of movement and memory, this article contributes to recent research on the role of the body in learning mathematics. Our aim in this paper is to introduce the ideas of Bergson and to show how these ideas shed light on mathematics classroom activity. Bergson's monist philosophy provides a framework for understanding the materiality of both bodies and mathematical concepts. We discuss two case studies of classrooms to show how the mathematical concepts of number and function are themselves mobile and full of potentiality, open to deformation and the remapping of the (im)possible. Bergson helps us look differently at mathematical activity in the classroom, not as a closed set of distinct interacting bodies groping after abstract concepts, but as a dynamic relational assemblage.
BibTeX: @article{Freitas2015Movement, author = {de Freitas, Elizabeth and Ferrara, Francesca}, title = {Movement, memory and mathematics: Henri Bergson and the ontology of learning}, year = {2015}, journal = {Studies in Philosophy and Education}, volume = {34}, number = {6}, pages = {565--585}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9455-y} }
Frise, M.	2015	Epistemology of memory	Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Frise2015Epistemology, author = {Frise, Matthew}, title = {Epistemology of memory}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, url = {http://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-mem/} }
Gordon, B.R. and Theiner, G.	2015	Scaffolded joint action as a micro-foundation of organizational learning	Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past Routledge 154-186		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Gordon2015Scaffolded, author = {Gordon, Brian R. and Theiner, Georg}, title = {Scaffolded joint action as a micro-foundation of organizational learning}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past}, editor = {Stone, Charles and Bietti, Lucas M.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {154--186}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315815398} }
Gordon, M.	2015	Between remembering and forgetting	Studies in Philosophy and Education 34(5) 489-503	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay seeks to add to a growing body of literature in philosophy of education that focuses on issues of historical consciousness and remembrance and their connections to moral education. In particular, I wish to explore the following questions: What does it mean to maintain a tension between remembering and forgetting tragic historical events? And what does an ethical stance that seeks to maintain this tension provide us? In what follows, I first describe two contemporary approaches to cultivating historical consciousness and advocate for the need to integrate the insights from both these strands rather than choosing between them. Based on some of the insights of Nietzsche, Arendt and other thinkers, I then explore the notion of forgetting while highlighting its educational and moral significance. In order to further explore the moral significance of forgetting, I highlight some of the similarities and differences between forgetting and the virtue of forgiving. Next, I consider the case of The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa as a contemporary example of an attempt to strike a balance between remembering and forgetting. I conclude this essay by briefly outlining some of the advantages of an ethic of remembering and forgetting
BibTeX: @article{Gordon2015remembering, author = {Gordon, Mordechai}, title = {Between remembering and forgetting}, year = {2015}, journal = {Studies in Philosophy and Education}, volume = {34}, number = {5}, pages = {489--503}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9451-2} }
Hamilton, C.	2015	Body, memory, and irrelevancies in Hiroshima mon amour	The Philosophy of Autobiography University of Chicago Press 72-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hamilton2015Body, author = {Hamilton, Christopher}, title = {Body, memory, and irrelevancies in Hiroshima mon amour}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography}, editor = {Cowley, Christopher}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, pages = {72--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226268088.003.0004} }
Harman, G.	2015	Thought	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Harman2015Thought, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {Thought}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Hasselmo, M.E.	2015	Remembering by index and content: Response to Sarah Robins	Philosophical Psychology 28(6) 916-919	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In her review of my book How we remember: Brain mechanisms of episodic memory, Sarah Robins highlights my example of the problem of interference between memories accessed by content-addressable memory. However, she points out the difficulty of solving this problem with index-addressable representations such as time cells or arc length cells. Namely, the index-addressable memory requires knowing the unique index in advance in order to perform effective retrieval. This is a difficult problem, but should be solvable by forming bi-directional associations between an index-addressable sequence of time cells and an array of content-addressable features in the environment.
BibTeX: @article{Hasselmo2015Remembering, author = {Hasselmo, Michael E.}, title = {Remembering by index and content: Response to Sarah Robins}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {28}, number = {6}, pages = {916--919}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.895315} }
Hui, K. and Fisher, C.E.	2015	The ethics of molecular memory modification	Journal of Medical Ethics 41(7) 515-520	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Novel molecular interventions have recently shown the potential to erase, enhance and alter specific long-term memories. Unique features of this form of memory modification call for a close examination of its possible applications. While there have been discussions of the ethics of memory modification in the literature, molecular memory modification (MMM) can provide special insights. Previously raised ethical concerns regarding memory enhancement, such as safety issues, the 'duty to remember', selfhood and personal identity, require re-evaluation in light of MMM. As a technology that exploits the brain's updating processes, MMM helps correct the common misconception that memory is a static entity by demonstrating how memory is plastic and subject to revision even in the absence of external manipulation. Furthermore, while putatively safer than other speculative technologies because of its high specificity, MMM raises notable safety issues, including potential insidious effects on the agent's emotions and personal identity. Nonetheless, MMM possesses characteristics of a more permissible form of modification, not only because it is theoretically safer, but because its unique mechanism of action requires a heightened level of cooperation from the agent. Discussions of memory modification must consider the specific mechanisms of action, which can alter the weight and relevance of various ethical concerns. MMM also highlights the need for conceptual accuracy regarding the term 'enhancement'; this umbrella term will have to be differentiated as new technologies are applied to a widening array of purposes.
BibTeX: @article{Hui2015ethics, author = {Hui, Katrina and Fisher, Carl E.}, title = {The ethics of molecular memory modification}, year = {2015}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics}, volume = {41}, number = {7}, pages = {515--520}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101891} }
Hutto, D.D. and Sánchez-García, R.	2015	Choking RECtified: Embodied expertise beyond Dreyfus	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14(2) 309-331	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: On a Dreyfusian account performers choke when they reflect upon and interfere with established routines of purely embodied expertise. This basic explanation of choking remains popular even today and apparently enjoys empirical support. Its driving insight can be understood through the lens of diverse philosophical visions of the embodied basis of expertise. These range from accounts of embodied cognition that are ultra conservative with respect to representational theories of cognition to those that are more radically embodied. This paper provides an account of the acquisition of embodied expertise, and explanation of the choking effect, from the most radically enactive, embodied perspective, spelling out some of its practical implications and addressing some possible philosophical challenges. Specifically, we propose: (i) an explanation of how skills can be acquired on the basis of ecological dynamics; and (ii) a non-linear pedagogy that takes into account how contentful representations might scaffold skill acquisition from a radically enactive perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Hutto2015Choking, author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Sánchez-García, Raúl}, title = {Choking RECtified: Embodied expertise beyond Dreyfus}, year = {2015}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {309--331}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9380-0} }
Ismael, J.	2015	On whether the atemporal conception of the world is also amodal	Analytic Philosophy 56(2) 142-157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ismael2015whether, author = {Ismael, Jenann}, title = {On whether the atemporal conception of the world is also amodal}, year = {2015}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {56}, number = {2}, pages = {142--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12062} }
Jackson, A.	2015	How you know you are not a brain in a vat	Philosophical Studies 172(10) 2799-2822	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat (BIV); but she doesn't panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not infer entially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge---she rejects that 'Moorean' response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological lit erature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that's plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming mechanism employed explains why she overlooks this account of how she knows she is not a BIV, making it seem that there is no way for her to know it. I argue this proposal satisfactorily resolves the skeptical puzzle.
BibTeX: @article{Jackson2015How, author = {Jackson, Alexander}, title = {How you know you are not a brain in a vat}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {172}, number = {10}, pages = {2799--2822}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x} }
Jacobson, K.	2015	The gift of memory: Sheltering the I	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 29-42			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Jacobson2015gift, author = {Jacobson, Kirsten}, title = {The gift of memory: Sheltering the I}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {29--42} }
Jungert, M.	2015	Memory, personal identity, and memory modification	Selbstgestaltung des Menschen durch Biotechnologien Francke 129-140	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory certainly is one of the most significant characteristics of human beings. It is connected with anthropologically essential capabilities like strategic planning, self-reflection, and the development of a unique life story. Although the importance of memory seems to be evident, there is a strong negligence of the role of memory and remembering in theories on personal identity. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that this is mainly due to three factors: 1.) the missing differentiation between various kinds of memory; 2.) the one-sided focus on diachronic identity in the philosophical debate on personal identity; and 3.) the lack of integration of psychological research on memory into philosophical theory. I will discuss how to approach each of these problems and outline possible implications for the debate on memory modification and enhancement.
BibTeX: @incollection{Jungert2015Memory, author = {Jungert, M.}, title = {Memory, personal identity, and memory modification}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Selbstgestaltung des Menschen durch Biotechnologien}, publisher = {Francke}, pages = {129--140} }
Klein, S.B.	2015	A defense of experiential realism: The need to take phenomenological reality on its own terms in the study of the mind	Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 2(1) 41-56	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of " experiential realism, " I offer a critique of modern psychology's all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is " What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative proxies? " I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory)---that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A " science of mind " that approaches its subject matter from a third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed skepticism.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2015defense, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {A defense of experiential realism: The need to take phenomenological reality on its own terms in the study of the mind}, year = {2015}, journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {41--56}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000036} }
Klein, S.B.	2015	What memory is	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 6(1) 1-38	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term 'memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the 'received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory
BibTeX: @article{Klein2015What, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {What memory is}, year = {2015}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {1--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1333} }
Kriegel, U.	2015	Experiencing the present	Analysis 75(3) 407-413		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kriegel2015Experiencing, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {Experiencing the present}, year = {2015}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {407--413}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv039} }
Landes, D.A.	2015	Memory, sedimentation, self: The weight of the ideal in Bergson and Merleau-Ponty	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 131-145			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Landes2015Memory, author = {Landes, Donald A.}, title = {Memory, sedimentation, self: The weight of the ideal in Bergson and Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {131--145} }
Lin, Y.-T.	2015	Memory for prediction error minimization: From depersonalization to the delusion of non-existence: A commentary on Philip Gerrans	Open MIND MIND Group 15(C)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Depersonalization is an essential step in the development of the Cotard delusion. Based on Philip Gerrans' account (this collection), which is an integration of the appraisal theory, the simulation theory, and the predictive coding framework, this commentary aims to argue that the role of memory systems is to update the knowledge of prior probability required for successful predictions. This view of memory systems under the predictive coding framework provides an explanation of how experience is related to the construction of mental autobiographies, how anomalous experience can lead to delusions, and thus how the Cotard delusion arises from depersonalization.
BibTeX: @incollection{Lin2015Memory, author = {Lin, Ying-Tung}, title = {Memory for prediction error minimization: From depersonalization to the delusion of non-existence: A commentary on Philip Gerrans}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Open MIND}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas and Windt, Jennifer M}, publisher = {MIND Group}, pages = {15(C)}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570719} }
Ludwig, K.	2015	Is distributed cognition group level cognition?	Journal of Social Ontology 1(2) 189-224	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper shows that recent arguments from group problem solving and task performance to emergent group level cognition that rest on the social parity and related principles are invalid or question begging. The paper shows that standard attributions of problem solving or task performance to groups require only multiple agents of the outcome, not a group agent over and above its members, whether or not any individual member of the group could have accomplished the task independently.
BibTeX: @article{Ludwig2015Is, author = {Ludwig, Kirk}, title = {Is distributed cognition group level cognition?}, year = {2015}, journal = {Journal of Social Ontology}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {189--224}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0001} }
Martin, M.G.F.	2015	Old acquaintance: Russell, memory and problems with acquaintance	Analytic Philosophy 56(1) 1-44		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin2015Old, author = {Martin, M. G. F.}, title = {Old acquaintance: Russell, memory and problems with acquaintance}, year = {2015}, journal = {Analytic Philosophy}, volume = {56}, number = {1}, pages = {1--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12059} }
Mazis, G.A.	2015	The depths of time in the world's memory of self	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 43-68			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Mazis2015depths, author = {Mazis, Glen A.}, title = {The depths of time in the world's memory of self}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {43--68} }
McCain, K.	2015	Is forgotten evidence a problem for evidentialism?	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 53(4) 471-480	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The ''problem of forgotten evidence'' is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.
BibTeX: @article{McCain2015Is, author = {McCain, Kevin}, title = {Is forgotten evidence a problem for evidentialism?}, year = {2015}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {53}, number = {4}, pages = {471--480}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12152} }
McGrath, S.	2015	Forgetting the difference between right and wrong	Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory Oxford University Press		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McGrath2015Forgetting, author = {McGrath, Sarah}, title = {Forgetting the difference between right and wrong}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory}, editor = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198713227.003.0006} }
Michaelian, K.	2015	Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind?	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 6(6) 475-482	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the ' doors of memory' too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It maybe preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage,and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2015Opening, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind?}, year = {2015}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {6}, number = {6}, pages = {475--482}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1364} }
Montemayor, C.	2015	Trade-offs between the accuracy and integrity of autobiographical narrative in memory reconsolidation	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 e17	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Lane et al. propose an integrative model for the reconsolidation of traces in their timely and impressive article. This commentary draws attention to trade-offs between accuracy and self-narrative integrity in the model. The trade-offs concern the sense of agency in memory and its role in both implicit and explicit memory reconsolidation, rather than balances concerning degrees of emotional arousal.
BibTeX: @article{Montemayor2015Trade, author = {Montemayor, Carlos}, title = {Trade-offs between the accuracy and integrity of autobiographical narrative in memory reconsolidation}, year = {2015}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {38}, pages = {e17}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X14000247} }
Morris, D. and Maclaren, K.	2015	Introduction	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 1-25			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Morris2015Introduction, author = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {1--25} }
Müller, J.	2015	Memory in medieval philosophy	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 92-124		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Mueller2015Memory, author = {Müller, Jörn}, title = {Memory in medieval philosophy}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {92--124}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0004} }
Myin, E. and Zahidi, K.	2015	The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mind	Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium De Gruyter 391-408		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Myin2015extent, author = {Myin, Erik and Zahidi, Karim}, title = {The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mind}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {391--408}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110378795.391} }
Naylor, A.	2015	Justification and forgetting	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96(3) 372-391	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion thereof). The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor2015Justification, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Justification and forgetting}, year = {2015}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {96}, number = {3}, pages = {372--391}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12076} }
Naylor, A.	2015	On inferentially remembering that P	Logos & Episteme 6(2) 225-230	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one's memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker's account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor2015inferentially, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {On inferentially remembering that P}, year = {2015}, journal = {Logos & Episteme}, volume = {6}, number = {2}, pages = {225--230}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20156214} }
Nikulin, D.	2015	Introduction: Memory in recollection of itself	1 Memory: A History Oxford University Press 3-34			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nikulin2015Introduction, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Introduction: Memory in recollection of itself}, year = {2015}, volume = {1}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {3--34} }
Nikulin, D.	2015	Memory in ancient philosophy	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 35-84			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nikulin2015Memory, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Memory in ancient philosophy}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {35--84} }
Nuzzo, A.	2015	Forms of memory in classical German philosophy	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 184-219		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nuzzo2015Forms, author = {Nuzzo, Angelica}, title = {Forms of memory in classical German philosophy}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {184--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0008} }
O'Loughlin, I.	2015	Neither noise nor signal: The role of context in memory models	9405 Modeling and Using Context: 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2015 Lanarca, Cyprus, November 2-6, 2015 Proceedings Springer 398-409	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we tackle the issue of the role of narrative language in the constitution of human subjectivity. There are at least two different approaches to this issue. The first one is consistent with the view that language has a unique constitutive role in cognition. According to this account, human subjectivity is a by-product of the advent of language. We will refer to it as linguistic idealism and will argue that, in spite of its popularity in the philosophy and social sciences, this view is completely unfounded. We will defend a second approach, which acknowledges the relevant role of language in human subjectivity but interprets this role in the light of a relation of coevolution between language and cognition. We will suggest that this relation is asymmetric and the priority is given to the cognitive foundations of human sense of the self. The influence of language on human subjectivity is then analyzed in terms of a retroactive effect. We will argue that the relation of coevolution between language and cognition provides an interpretative tool that allows us to account for human subjectivity in accordance with darwinian naturalism.
BibTeX: @incollection{OLoughlin2015Neither, author = {O'Loughlin, Ian}, title = {Neither noise nor signal: The role of context in memory models}, year = {2015}, volume = {9405}, booktitle = {Modeling and Using Context: 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2015 Lanarca, Cyprus, November 2-6, 2015 Proceedings}, editor = {Christiansen, Henning and Stojanovic, Isidora and Papadopoulos, George A.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {398--409}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25591-0_29} }
Oshana, M.	2015	Memory, self-understanding, and agency	The Philosophy of Autobiography University of Chicago Press 96-121			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Oshana2015Memory, author = {Oshana, Marina}, title = {Memory, self-understanding, and agency}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography}, editor = {Cowley, Christopher}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, pages = {96--121} }
Otgaar, H., Howe, M.L., Clark, A., Wang, J. and Merckelbach, H.	2015	What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015)	Consciousness and Cognition 33 286-290	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area.
BibTeX: @article{Otgaar2015What, author = {Otgaar, Henry and Howe, Mark L. and Clark, Andrew and Wang, Jianqin and Merckelbach, Harald}, title = {What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015)}, year = {2015}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {33}, pages = {286--290}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.015} }
Parker, D.	2015	Was there an ice cube there or am I just remembering it? Does the reversibility argument really imply scepticism about records?	Erkenntnis 80(S3) 587-603	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is commonly thought that the statistical mechanical reversibility objection implies that our putative records of the past are more likely to have arisen as spontaneous fluctuations from equilibrium states than through causal processes that correctly indicate past states of affairs. Hence, so the story goes, without some further assumption that solves the reversibility objection, such as the past hypothesis, all our beliefs about the past would almost surely be false. This claim is disputed and it is argued that at least some of our records of the past can and should be thought to be veridical because the intentional contents of records are not included as part of their statistical mechanical description. The fact that the present state of the world around us coheres so well with the way we would expect it to be if our records were veridical provides good evidence for the claim that they are produced via a common causal structure.
BibTeX: @article{Parker2015Was, author = {Parker, Daniel}, title = {Was there an ice cube there or am I just remembering it? Does the reversibility argument really imply scepticism about records?}, year = {2015}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {80}, number = {S3}, pages = {587--603}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9768-4} }
Proust, J.	2015	Time and action: Impulsivity, habit, strategy	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6(4) 717-743	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed to satisfy the trade-off above when achieving goals of each type. While actions of the first two types depend on non-conceptual appraisals of a given intensity and valence, strategic intentions have a propositional format and guide action within longer-term executive frameworks involving prospective memory.
BibTeX: @article{Proust2015Time, author = {Proust, Joëlle}, title = {Time and action: Impulsivity, habit, strategy}, year = {2015}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {717--743}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0224-1} }
Robins, S.K.	2015	A mechanism for mental time travel? A critical review of Hasselmo's How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory	Philosophical Psychology 28(6) 903-915		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Robins2015mechanism, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {A mechanism for mental time travel? A critical review of Hasselmo's How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory}, year = {2015}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {28}, number = {6}, pages = {903--915}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.877243} }
Rowlands, M.	2015	Rilkean memory	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 141-154	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper identifies a form of remembering sufficiently overlooked that it has not yet been dignified with a name. I shall christen it Rilkean Memory. This form of memory is, typically, embodied and embedded. It is a form of involuntary, autobiographical memory that is neither implicit nor explicit, neither declarative nor procedural, neither episodic nor semantic, and not Freudian. While a discussion of the importance of Rilkean memory lies beyond the scope of this paper, I shall try to show that admitting Rilkean memory into our ontology does point us in the direction of a very different conception of the mind and mental processes.
BibTeX: @article{Rowlands2015Rilkean, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {Rilkean memory}, year = {2015}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {53}, pages = {141--154}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12118} }
Ruin, H.	2015	Anamnemic subjectivity: New steps toward a hermeneutics of memory	Continental Philosophy Review 48(2) 197-216	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The topic and theme of memory has occupied an ambiguous position in phenomenological and hermeneutic thinking from the start, at once central and marginalized. Parallel to and partly following upon the general turn toward collective and cultural memory in the human and social sciences over the last decades, the importance of memory in and for phenomenological and hermeneutic theory has begun to emerge more clearly. The article seeks to untangle the reasons for the ambiguous position of this theme. It describes how and why the question of what memory is can provide a unique entrance to thinking the temporality and historicity of human existence, while at the same time it can also block the access to precisely these most fundamental levels of subjectivity. The text argues for a deeper mutual theoretical engagement between phenomenological-hermeneutical thinking and contemporary cultural memory studies, on the basis of an understanding of memory as finite and ec-static temporality, and as the enigma of so-called anamnetic subjectivity.
BibTeX: @article{Ruin2015Anamnemic, author = {Ruin, Hans}, title = {Anamnemic subjectivity: New steps toward a hermeneutics of memory}, year = {2015}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {48}, number = {2}, pages = {197--216}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9323-7} }
Russon, J.	2015	The impossibilities of the I: Self, memory, and language in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 92-105			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Russon2015impossibilities, author = {Russon, John}, title = {The impossibilities of the I: Self, memory, and language in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {92--105} }
Schwarz, W.	2015	Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver	Synthese 192(9) 3011-3036	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision prob- lem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between ''halfing'' and ''thirding'' as well as that between ''evidential'' and ''causal'' decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solu- tions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance.
BibTeX: @article{Schwarz2015Lost, author = {Schwarz, Wolfgang}, title = {Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver}, year = {2015}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {192}, number = {9}, pages = {3011--3036}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0699-z} }
Shapiro, L.	2015	Memory in the Meditations	Res Philosophica 92(1) 41-60	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper considers just how memory works throughout the Meditations to adduce Descartes's conception of memory. Examining the meditator's memory at work raises some questions about the nature of Cartesian memory and its epistemic role. What is the distinction between remembering and repeating a thought? If remembering is not simply repeating a thought, then what is involved in properly remembering? Can we remember properly while adding or shifting content, say, in virtue of articulating relations between ideas? If so, what is the relation between remembering and reasoning, since both would then involve relations of ideas? These questions become salient in considering the meditator's creative recollections in the Third and especially the Sixth Meditations. After briefly considering what Descartes does say about memory, I consider two other strategies for addressing those questions: an analogy with innate ideas, and attending to the role that other thinkers play in one's own recollections.
BibTeX: @article{Shapiro2015Memory, author = {Shapiro, Lisa}, title = {Memory in the Meditations}, year = {2015}, journal = {Res Philosophica}, volume = {92}, number = {1}, pages = {41--60}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.1.3} }
Sridharan, V.	2015	Conscious belief as constructed memory: An empirical challenge to dispositionalism	Mind & Society 14(1) 21-33	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 (S2) processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such ''dual-process'' theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how con- scious beliefs are structurally and functionally similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter's widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain.
BibTeX: @article{Sridharan2015Conscious, author = {Sridharan, Vishnu}, title = {Conscious belief as constructed memory: An empirical challenge to dispositionalism}, year = {2015}, journal = {Mind & Society}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {21--33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6} }
Strawson, G.	2015	'The secrets of all hearts': Locke on personal identity	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76(S) 111-141	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses 'consciousness' to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the 'concernment' that always accompanies 'consciousness', on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term person , in Locke's text, as if it were (only) some kind of fundamental sortal term like 'human being' or 'thinking thing', and to fail to take proper account of Locke's use of it as a 'forensic' term (§26). It's well known that Locke uses person as a forensic term, but the consequences of this have still not been fully worked out.
BibTeX: @article{Strawson2015Secrets, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {'The secrets of all hearts': Locke on personal identity}, year = {2015}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {76}, number = {S}, pages = {111--141}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246115000144} }
Sukhoverkhov, A.V. and Fowler, C.A.	2015	Why language evolution needs memory: Systems and ecological approaches	Biosemiotics 8(1) 47-65	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The main purpose of this article is to consider the significance of different types of memory and non-genetic ('inclusive', 'extended', 'soft') inheritance and different biosemiotic systems for the origin and evolution of language. It presents language and memory as distributed (objectified, external), heteronomous and system-determined processes implemented in biological and social domains. The article emphasises that language and other sign systems are both (1) ecological and inductive systems that were caused by and always correlate with the environment and (2) deductive systems that are inherited by and depend on the internal development of organisms, individuals, and societies. The article also claims that the origin, re-occurrence and evolution of naturally-emerging sign systems presuppose (1) their retention and accumulation in physical, biological, individual, and social types of memory and (2) reinforcement and maintenance by conventional and deliberate social regulation and accumulation. All of this allows language and other sign systems to be situation-relevant and to be transmitted through generations without their constant reinvention. The novelty of the proposed theory of language origin and evolution is in interdisciplinary integration of biosemiotic studies, systems (ecological, holistic, integrative) approaches to language and studies of inheritance systems presented by 'Extended evolutionary synthesis'.
BibTeX: @article{Sukhoverkhov2015Why, author = {Sukhoverkhov, Anton V. and Fowler, Carol A.}, title = {Why language evolution needs memory: Systems and ecological approaches}, year = {2015}, journal = {Biosemiotics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {47--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-014-9202-3} }
Sullivan-Bissett, E.	2015	Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence	Consciousness and Cognition 33 548-560	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.
BibTeX: @article{SullivanBissett2015Implicit, author = {Sullivan-Bissett, Ema}, title = {Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence}, year = {2015}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {33}, pages = {548--560}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.006} }
Summa, M.	2015	Are emotions "recollected in tranquility"? Phenomenological reflections on emotions, memory, and the temporal dynamics of experience	Feeling and Value, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology Springer 163-181	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter discusses the relationship between memory and emotions from a phenomenological perspective. Starting with some remarks on Wordsworth's conception of poetry as ''emotion recollected in tranquility'', the investigation focuses on the three following issues: (1) the overwhelming character of emotional memories; (2) the relationship between the past and the present emotion, and (3) the meaning of ''tranquility'' in emotional recollection. In order to discuss these issues, an analysis of the intentional structure of affective and emotional experiences is first developed. Thereby, it is shown how the self- and world-relatedness of emotional experience fundamentally structures our implicit and explicit awareness of past emotions. Subsequently, the analysis of the relation between emotions and the temporal structure of experience shall allow us to recognize in the irreversible nature of the temporal stream of consciousness the ultimate ground to understand the relationship between emotions and memory. Finally, discussing how irreversibility eminently comes to the fore in the experience of nostalgia, it is argued that the ''tranquility'' of emotional memories has a nostalgic note. Such nostalgic note conveys the awareness of one's own being in a constant process of irreversible temporal becoming.
BibTeX: @incollection{Summa2015Are, author = {Summa, Michela}, title = {Are emotions "recollected in tranquility"? Phenomenological reflections on emotions, memory, and the temporal dynamics of experience}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Feeling and Value, Willing and Action: Essays in the Context of a Phenomenological Psychology}, editor = {Ubiali, Marta and Wehrle, Maren}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {163--181}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10326-6_10} }
Sutton, J.	2015	Remembering as public practice: Wittgenstein, memory, and distributed cognitive ecologies	Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium De Gruyter 409-444		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2015Remembering, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Remembering as public practice: Wittgenstein, memory, and distributed cognitive ecologies}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {409--444}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110378795.409} }
Sutton, J.	2015	Scaffolding memory: Themes, taxonomies, puzzles	Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past Routledge 187-205		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2015Scaffolding, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Scaffolding memory: Themes, taxonomies, puzzles}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past}, editor = {Stone, Charles and Bietti, Lucas M.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {187--205}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315815398-10} }
Symons, S.	2015	The Work of Forgetting, or How Can We Make the Future Possible ?	Rowman and Littlefield			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Symons2015Work, author = {Symons, Stephane}, title = {The Work of Forgetting, or How Can We Make the Future Possible ?}, year = {2015}, editor = {Philosophical Projection}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield} }
Tan, E.J.	2015	Forgetting and forgiving: A Nietzschean perspective	Prajna Vihara 16(1) 20-50			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tan2015Forgetting, author = {Tan, Emily Jean}, title = {Forgetting and forgiving: A Nietzschean perspective}, year = {2015}, journal = {Prajna Vihara}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {20--50} }
Tang, M.-T.	2015	False memories and reproductive imagination: Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory	Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 7(1) 29-51	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In cognitive psychology, a false memory refers to a fabricated or distorted recollection of an event that did not actually happen. Both 'memory-distortion' and 'false memory creation' refer to the processes of recollection in which the recollected events are not actually happened. This paper has three aims: (1) to examine Ricoeur's analysis of memory and imagination; (2) to explain and reinforce the constructive role of memory; (3) to show in what manner the first two aims lead to the conclusion that the phenomena of 'distorted or false memory creation' are reproductive because the nature of recollection is constructive in the sense of representation of past. In this regard, Ricoeur's trajectory not only displaces the essential structure of memory and imagination behind the curtain of their distinction and connection, but also contributes to the debates in cognitive psychology.
BibTeX: @article{Tang2015False, author = {Tang, Man-To}, title = {False memories and reproductive imagination: Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory}, year = {2015}, journal = {Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {29--51} }
Thomas, E.	2015	Hilda Oakeley on idealism, history and the real past	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23(5) 933-953	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the early twentieth century, Hilda Diana Oakeley (1867--1950) set out a new kind of British idealism. Oakeley is an idealist in the sense that she holds mind to actively contribute to the features of experience, but she also accepts that there is a world independent of mind. One of her central contributions to the idealist tradition is her thesis that minds construct our experiences using memory. This paper explores the theses underlying her idealism, and shows how they are intricately connected to the wider debates of her period. I go on to explain how the parts of Oakeley's idealism are connected to further areas of her thought -- specifically, her views on history and her growing block theory of time -- to provide a sense of Oakeley's philosophy as a system. As there is no existing literature on Oakeley, this paper aims to open a path for further scholarship.
BibTeX: @article{Thomas2015Hilda, author = {Thomas, Emily}, title = {Hilda Oakeley on idealism, history and the real past}, year = {2015}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {5}, pages = {933--953}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1055232} }
Tsompanidis, V.	2015	Mental files and times	Topoi 34(1) 233-240	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that applying a mental files framework for singular thought to thoughts about specific times could produce an account of tensed thought with significant advantages over competing theories. After describing the framework (1), I argue for the conceivability of treating particular times as res of singular thoughts (2), and the possibility that humans open 'object files' for them during perception (3). Then I discuss the possible make-up and function of a NOW indexical mental file (4). The last section argues that, if our 'now' thoughts can be coherently analysed as thinking of a time under the NOW mental file, one would have a plausible explanation of the following issues: how tensed thought can refer to extended temporal intervals of various length; why reference to times is not destroyed by thought delays; and how a 'now' thought results in timely actions and, sometimes, relief.
BibTeX: @article{Tsompanidis2015Mental, author = {Tsompanidis, Vasilis}, title = {Mental files and times}, year = {2015}, journal = {Topoi}, volume = {34}, number = {1}, pages = {233--240}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9247-6} }
Vallier, R.	2015	Memory-of the future: Institutions and memory in the later Merleau-Ponty	Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self Ohio University Press 109-129			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Vallier2015Memory, author = {Vallier, Robert}, title = {Memory-of the future: Institutions and memory in the later Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self}, editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym}, publisher = {Ohio University Press}, pages = {109--129} }
Van Cleve, J.	2015	Problems from Reid	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{VanCleve2015Problems, author = {Van Cleve, James}, title = {Problems from Reid}, year = {2015}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Varga, S.	2015	Self-deception, self-knowledge, and autobiography	The Philosophy of Autobiography University of Chicago Press 141-155		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Varga2015Self, author = {Varga, Somogy}, title = {Self-deception, self-knowledge, and autobiography}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography}, editor = {Cowley, Christopher}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, pages = {141--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226268088.003.0007} }
de Warren, N.	2015	Memory in continental philosophy: Metaphor, concept, thinking	Memory: A History Oxford University Press 228-274		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Warren2015Memory, author = {de Warren, Nicolas}, title = {Memory in continental philosophy: Metaphor, concept, thinking}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Memory: A History}, editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {228--274}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199793839.003.0010} }
Weatherson, B.	2015	Memory, belief and time	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45(5-6) 692-715	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius's Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
BibTeX: @article{Weatherson2015Memory, author = {Weatherson, Brian}, title = {Memory, belief and time}, year = {2015}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {45}, number = {5-6}, pages = {692--715}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250} }
White, R.	2015	Dialectics of mourning	Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 20(4) 179-192	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I look at three different perspectives on mourning in recent European thought. First, I consider Freud's discussion in "Mourning and Melancholia" and other writings. Next, I look at Roland Barthes, whose book on photography, Camera Lucida, is itself a work of mourning for his late mother; and Jacques Derrida, who in Memoires for Paul de Man and The Work of Mourning memorializes departed friends and describes the ambiguities of mourning that constrain us. I argue that Freud was mistaken: mourning is not structured in terms of investment and loss. Barthes and Derrida clarify the complexities of mourning, but mourning is intractable and resists all sublimation: It is for the self, but it is also for the departed, who is neither "present" nor "absent" in the ordinary sense of these terms. Hanging on and letting go are both inappropriate responses to bereavement - how then should we mourn?
BibTeX: @article{White2015Dialectics, author = {White, Richard}, title = {Dialectics of mourning}, year = {2015}, journal = {Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {179--192}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2015.1096644} }
Wilson, R.A. and Lenart, B.A.	2015	Extended mind and identity	Handbook of Neuroethics Springer 423-439	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psycho- logical continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative or autobiographical memory of some kind, and special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person's psychological states can physically extend beyond that person's body. Since ''person'' is a term of both metaphysical and moral significance, and discussions of both extended minds and personal identity have often focused on memory, this article explores the relevance of extended cognition for the identity of persons with special attention to neuroethics and memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Wilson2015Extended, author = {Wilson, Robert A. and Lenart, Bartlomiej A.}, title = {Extended mind and identity}, year = {2015}, booktitle = {Handbook of Neuroethics}, editor = {Clausen, Jens and Levy, Neil}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {423--439}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_14} }
Zohny, H.	2015	The myth of cognitive enhancement drugs	Neuroethics 8(3) 257-269	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There are a number of premises underlying much of the vigorous debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. Among these are claims in the enhancement literature that such drugs exist and are effective among the cognitively normal. These drugs are deemed to enhance cognition specifically, as opposed to other non-cognitive facets of our psychology, such as mood and motivation. The focus on these drugs as cognitive enhancers also suggests that they raise particular ethical questions, or perhaps more pressing ones, compared to those raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement. Finally, the use of these drugs is often claimed to be significant and increasing. Taken together, these premises are at the heart of the flurry of debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. In this article, it is argued that these are presumptions for which the evidence does not hold up. Respectively, the evidence for the efficacy of these drugs is inconsistent; neurologically it makes little sense to distinguish the cognitive from non-cognitive as separate targets of pharmacological intervention; ethically, the questions raised by cognitive enhancement are in fact no different from those raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement; and finally the prevalence rates of these drugs are far from clear, with the bulk of the claims resting on poor or misrepresented data. Greater conceptual clarity along with a more tempered appreciation of the evidence can serve to deflate some of the hype in the associated literature, leading to a more realistic and sober assessment of these prospective technologies.
BibTeX: @article{Zohny2015myth, author = {Zohny, Hazem}, title = {The myth of cognitive enhancement drugs}, year = {2015}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, pages = {257--269}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9232-9} }
Aho, T.	2014	Early modern theories	Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind Springer 223-238	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many sixteenth-century accounts of perception were based on an Aristotelian approach supplemented with the medieval species theories (see pp. 68-76 above), though Augustinian and other neo-Platonic views also survived. According to the Aristotelians, a species originated in the perceived object and was transmitted through the medium to the sensory organ. Major problems of this model pertained to the nature of the species in the medium and the processing of the species after it reaches the perceiving subject. Following some late medieval developments, many writers attempted to combine Aristotle's thought with various assumptions about the activity of the soul. As for the particular senses, most detailed arguments were always about the sense of sight (1). An elaborate challenge to the old theories came from the Renaissance naturalists, such as Telesio and Campanella. They associated their conviction of an essentially active nature of perception with their doctrine of a material spirit and rejected the elements of the species theory (2).
BibTeX: @incollection{Aho2014Early, author = {Aho, Tuomo}, title = {Early modern theories}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {223--238}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_15} }
Arango-Muñoz, S.	2014	The nature of epistemic feelings	Philosophical Psychology 27(2) 193-211	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called epistemic feelings. This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.
BibTeX: @article{ArangoMunoz2014nature, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {The nature of epistemic feelings}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, pages = {193--211}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.732002} }
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Michaelian, K.	2014	Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section	Philosophical Inquiries 2(1) 97-122	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic -- or noetic or metacognitive -- feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso-phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by briefly describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4).
BibTeX: @article{ArangoMunoz2014Epistemic, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Inquiries}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {97--122}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v2i1.79} }
Behrendt, K.	2014	Hirsch, Sebald, and the uses and limits of postmemory	The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film Wilfird Laurier University Press 51-67			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Behrendt2014Hirsch, author = {Behrendt, K.}, title = {Hirsch, Sebald, and the uses and limits of postmemory}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film}, editor = {Kilbourn, Russell J. A.; and Ty, Eleanor Rose}, publisher = {Wilfird Laurier University Press}, pages = {51--67} }
Beran, O.	2014	Complying with real-life memory experiences. A notion of memory as performed	Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 21-23	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In my paper, I present some features of Wittgenstein's view on memory, opposite to the mainstream analytical representationalism of memory and congenial rather to phenomenologies of memory. I try to show that his transcendental account of memory can allow elaborating more properly the real-life memory experiences like traumatic memories.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Beran2014Complying, author = {Beran, Ondrej}, title = {Complying with real-life memory experiences. A notion of memory as performed}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja and Wiltsche, Harald A.}, publisher = {Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society}, pages = {21--23} }
Bloch, D.	2014	Ancient and medieval theories	78(253) Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind Springer 205-221		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bloch2014Ancient, author = {Bloch, David}, title = {Ancient and medieval theories}, year = {2014}, volume = {78}, number = {253}, booktitle = {Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Knuuttila, S. and Sihvola, J.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {205--221}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_14} }
Blustein, J.	2014	Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and Public Life	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Blustein2014Forgiveness, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and Public Life}, year = {2014}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Brogaard, B.	2014	A partial defense of extended knowledge	Philosophical Issues 24(1) 39-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a 'situationist-friendly virtue epistemology'.
BibTeX: @article{Brogaard2014partial, author = {Brogaard, Berit}, title = {A partial defense of extended knowledge}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {39--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12025} }
Burgess, A.	2014	What Is It Like To Be Asleep?	The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21(1) 18-22		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burgess2014What, author = {Burgess, Alexis}, title = {What Is It Like To Be Asleep?}, year = {2014}, journal = {The Harvard Review of Philosophy}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, pages = {18--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview2014212} }
Campbell, S.	2014	Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Campbell2014Our, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory}, year = {2014}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Carbonell, V.	2014	Amnesia, anesthesia, and warranted fear	Bioethics 28(5) 245-254	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is a painful experience less bad for you if you will not remember it? Do you have less reason to fear it? These questions bear on how we think about medical procedures and surgeries that use an anesthesia regimen that leaves patients conscious -- and potentially in pain -- but results in complete 'drug‐induced amnesia' after the fact. I argue that drug‐induced amnesia does not render a painful medical procedure a less fitting object of fear, and thus the prospect of amnesia does not give patients a reason not to fear it. I expose three mistakes in reasoning that might explain our tendency to view pain or discomfort as less fearful in virtue of expected amnesia: a mistaken view of personal identity; a mistaken view of the target of anticipation; and a mistaken method of incorporating past evidence into calculations about future experiences. Ultimately my argument has implications for whether particular procedures are justified and how medical professionals should speak with anxious patients about the prospect of drug‐induced amnesia.
BibTeX: @article{Carbonell2014Amnesia, author = {Carbonell, Vanessa}, title = {Amnesia, anesthesia, and warranted fear}, year = {2014}, journal = {Bioethics}, volume = {28}, number = {5}, pages = {245--254}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01995.x} }
Carruthers, P.	2014	On central cognition	Philosophical Studies 170(1) 143-162	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article examines what is known about the cognitive science of working memory, and brings the findings to bear in evaluating philosophical accounts of central cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning. It is argued that central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts. Contrary to a broad spectrum of philosophical opinion, the central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active.
BibTeX: @article{Carruthers2014central, author = {Carruthers, Peter}, title = {On central cognition}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {170}, number = {1}, pages = {143--162}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0171-1} }
Chadha, M.	2014	A buddhist explanation of episodic memory: From self to mind	Asian Philosophy 24(1) 14-27	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that some ofthe work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept ofmind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes ofthis paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu's heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśes:ikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu's theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.
BibTeX: @article{Chadha2014buddhist, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {A buddhist explanation of episodic memory: From self to mind}, year = {2014}, journal = {Asian Philosophy}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {14--27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2014.869093} }
De Brigard, F.	2014	Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking	Synthese 191(2) 155-185	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2014Is, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking}, year = {2014}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {2}, pages = {155--185}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7} }
De Brigard, F.	2014	The nature of memory traces	Philosophy Compass 9(6) 402-414	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory trace was originally a philosophical termused to explain the phenomenon ofremembering. Once debated by Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more recently to have become the exclusive province ofcognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the contrary, scientific research on the nature ofmemory traces can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With that general aim inmind, the present paper has three specific goals.First,it attempts to chart the most relevant philosophical views on the nature ofmemory traces from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it reviews critical findings in the psychology and the neuroscience ofmemory traces. Finally, it explains how such results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical positions on the nature ofmemory traces. This paper also touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research that theories ofmemory traces need to accommodate in order to succeed.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2014nature, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {The nature of memory traces}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {9}, number = {6}, pages = {402--414}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12133} }
Debus, D.	2014	'Mental time travel': Remembering the past, imagining the future, and the particularity of events	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 333-350	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The present paper offers a philosophical discussion of phenomena which in the empirical literature have recently been subsumed under the concept of 'mental time travel'. More precisely, the paper considers differences and similarities between two cases of 'mental time travel', recollective memories ('R-memories') of past events on the one hand, and sensory imaginations ('S-imaginations') of future events on the other. It develops and defends the claim that, because a subject who R-remembers a past event is experientially aware of a past particular event, while a subject who S-imagines a future event could not possibly be experientially aware of a future particular event, R-memories of past events and S-imaginations of future events are ultimately mental occurrences of two different kinds.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2014Mental, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {'Mental time travel': Remembering the past, imagining the future, and the particularity of events}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {333--350}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0182-7} }
Dijkstra, K. and Zwaan, R.A.	2014	Memory and action	The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition Routledge 296-305			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dijkstra2014Memory, author = {Dijkstra, Katinka and Zwaan, Rolf A.}, title = {Memory and action}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition}, editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {296--305} }
Dokic, J.	2014	Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 413-426	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory involves the sense that it is ''first-hand'', i.e., originates directly from one's own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted with other, reductionist two-tiered accounts as well as with reflexive accounts of episodic memory to be found in the literature.
BibTeX: @article{Dokic2014Feeling, author = {Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {413--426}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0183-6} }
Dokic, J.	2014	Feelings of (un)certainty and margins for error	Philosophical Inquiries 2(1) 123-144	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: So-called epistemic or noetic feelings are often recruited in one's reasoning, and we may wonder how this recruitment is realized at the psychological level, and whether it is epistemologically warranted. I tackle these issues by focusing on feelings of subjective certainty and uncertainty in the context of ordinary perceptual categorizations. I first locate epistemic feelings within our cognitive architecture, by reference to the influential two-system framework of reasoning and decision-making as well as recent empirical models of our metacognitive abilities. I then put forward the thesis that in a normal context, feelings of perceptual certainty track the safety of our perceptual beliefs, whereas feelings of perceptual uncertainty track the fact that these beliefs are not safe. In other words, our felt certainty or uncertainty about the category of what we perceive is an indication of the fact that a margin for error has or has not been provided. I conclude by discussing two distinctions relevant to the account presented here, namely the distinction between perceptual and conceptual certainty (or uncertainty), and the distinction between objective and subjective certainty (or uncertainty).
BibTeX: @article{Dokic2014Feelings, author = {Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Feelings of (un)certainty and margins for error}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Inquiries}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {123--144}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v2i1.80} }
Donohoe, J.	2014	Remembering Places: A Phenomenological Study of the Relationship between Memory and Place	Lexington Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Donohoe2014Remembering, author = {Donohoe, Janet}, title = {Remembering Places: A Phenomenological Study of the Relationship between Memory and Place}, year = {2014}, publisher = {Lexington Books} }
Dupont, J.-C.	2014	Memory Traces between brain theory and philosophy	Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy Palgrave Macmillan 17-33		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dupont2014Memory, author = {Dupont, Jean-Claude}, title = {Memory Traces between brain theory and philosophy}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy}, editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {17--33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_2} }
Eldridge, P.	2014	Observer memories and phenomenology	Phenomenology and Mind 7 160-167	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the challenge that the experience of third-person perspective recall (i.e. observer memories) presents to a phenomenological theory of memory. Specifically this paper outlines what husserl describes as the necessary features of recollection, among which he includes the givenness of objects in the first person perspective. The paper notes that, on first sight, these necessary features cannot account for the experience of observer memories as described by Neisser & Nigro (1983). This paper proposes that observer memories do not so much entail a shift of perspective as they do a process of self-objectification and as such do not break with the phenomenological emphasis on the first person perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Eldridge2014Observer, author = {Eldridge, Patrick}, title = {Observer memories and phenomenology}, year = {2014}, journal = {Phenomenology and Mind}, volume = {7}, pages = {160--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19544} }
Fernández, J.	2014	Memory and immunity to error through misidentification	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 373-390	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the two views will yield the outcome that the subject is always an intentional object of her own memories: In episodic memory, one remembers being the subject whose extrinsic properties were experienced in some past perception. For that reason, one cannot misidentify oneself in memory unless one is having an inaccurate memory. Thus, the source of immunity to error through misidentification in memory lies in the nature of mnemonic content.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2014Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory and immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {373--390}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0193-4} }
Gerrans, P.	2014	Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu	Frontiers in Psychology 5 97	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The ability to challenge and revise thoughts prompted by anomalous experiences depends on activity in right dorsolateral prefrontal circuitry. When activity in those circuits is absent or compromised subjects are less likely to make this kind of correction. This appears to be the cause of some delusions of misidentification consequent on experiences of hyperfamiliarity for faces. Comparing the way the mind responds to the experience of hyperfamiliarity in different conditions such as delusions, dreams, pathological and non-pathological déjà vu, provides a way to understand claims that delusions and dreams are both states characterized by deficient "reality testing".
BibTeX: @article{Gerrans2014Pathologies, author = {Gerrans, Philip}, title = {Pathologies of hyperfamiliarity in dreams, delusions and déjà vu}, year = {2014}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {5}, pages = {97}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00097} }
Gerrans, P. and Sander, D.	2014	Feeling the future: Prospects for a theory of implicit prospection	Biology & Philosophy 29(5) 699-710	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of gaining information about the future to shape preferences and guide behaviour.
BibTeX: @article{Gerrans2014Feeling, author = {Gerrans, Philip and Sander, David}, title = {Feeling the future: Prospects for a theory of implicit prospection}, year = {2014}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {29}, number = {5}, pages = {699--710}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9408-9} }
Ghezzi, A., Guimarães Pereira, Â. and Vesnić-Alujević, L.	2014	The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ghezzi2014Ethics, author = {Ghezzi, Alessia and Guimarães Pereira, Ângela and Vesnić-Alujević, Lucia}, title = {The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten}, year = {2014}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Ghisoni da Silva, G.	2014	Russell and Wittgenstein on time and memory: Two different uses of the cinematographic metaphor	Analytica 18(1) 197-227			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{GhisonidaSilva2014Russell, author = {Ghisoni da Silva, Guilherme}, title = {Russell and Wittgenstein on time and memory: Two different uses of the cinematographic metaphor}, year = {2014}, journal = {Analytica}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {197--227} }
Godfrey-Smith, P.	2014	Sender-receiver systems within and between organisms	Philosophy of Science 81(5) 866-878	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender- receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time.Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about ''genetic information'' can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender
BibTeX: @article{GodfreySmith2014Sender, author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter}, title = {Sender-receiver systems within and between organisms}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {81}, number = {5}, pages = {866--878}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/677686} }
Goldberg, S.C.	2014	Interpersonal epistemic entitlements	Philosophical Issues 24(1) 159-183	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes---perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others---is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others' processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are ''interpersonal.'' I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more ''extended'' epistemology---one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2014Interpersonal, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {Interpersonal epistemic entitlements}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {159--183}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12029} }
Halpin, H., Clark, A. and Wheeler, M.	2014	Philosophy of the web: Representation, enaction, collective intelligence	Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web Blackwell 21-30		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Halpin2014Philosophy, author = {Halpin, Harry and Clark, Andy and Wheeler, Michael}, title = {Philosophy of the web: Representation, enaction, collective intelligence}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web}, editor = {Halpin, Harry and Monnin, Alexandre}, publisher = {Blackwell}, pages = {21--30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118700143.ch2} }
Hempinstall, S.	2014	Heads in the cloud: Human memory and external storage implications	American Philosophical Association Newsletters: Philosophy and Computers 13(2) 12-17	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Extended mind theory holds that human memories can be stored outside the head. Computational theories allow for mechanisms that model the mind. Combining the two with respect to human memory yields a Computational Model of Memory (CMM), a processing schema of the architecture and mechanisms in the head which serves to cross-reference, categorize, and sort memories into, at the very minimum, short and long term. I argue that at memory creation, there is no difference in kind; what differs is the storage medium---whether it is internal or external. Furthermore, the location of the memory is not a limiting factor in either storage or subsequent retrieval since both rely on the same conceptual mechanisms. This model is particularly useful for modeling the memory transactions in and between minds. The CMM illustrates distributive, transactive, and collective memory in action. In Part I of this article, I provide the details of the CMM. In Part II, I cover the philosophical basis for moving from Extended Mind to Extended Memory, as well as responses to philosophical objections to Extended Memory. Part II discusses the cross-disciplinary compatibility of the CMM with the psychological properties of memory recall and integration, and computer information processing architectures. In Part III, the model illustrates the implications and entailments of extended memory, especially insofar as increased dependency may affect the mind, both substantially and functionally. Finally, Part IV suggests future work, particularly the philosophical relevance to the field of artificial intelligence.
BibTeX: @article{Hempinstall2014Heads, author = {Hempinstall, Susan}, title = {Heads in the cloud: Human memory and external storage implications}, year = {2014}, journal = {American Philosophical Association Newsletters: Philosophy and Computers}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {12--17} }
Hibbert, R.	2014	How should we study concepts in the cognitive sciences? The example of memory	Logique & Analyse 228 683-699	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is considerable variation in the concept of memory employed in different branches of the cognitive and social sciences. This paper is about how a philosopher of science can make sense of this divergence. First I consider the reasons for focussing on concepts specifically. Then I pose a question about the classifying practices of scientists, and consider various methods for investigating the answer. I defend a historically situated case study method as the best option, and suggest some appropriate case studies for the example of the concept of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Hibbert2014How, author = {Hibbert, Ruth}, title = {How should we study concepts in the cognitive sciences? The example of memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Logique & Analyse}, volume = {228}, pages = {683--699}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078179} }
Hoerl, C.	2014	Remembering events and remembering looks	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 351-372	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the former contains an additional ingredient not present in the latter, but otherwise treating them as the same thing. I also show that a recent 'minimalist' approach to episodic memory (Clayton & Russell in Neuropsychologia 47 (11): 2,330--2,340, 2009; Russell & Hanna in Mind & Language 27 (1): 29--54, 2012) fails to give a satisfactory explanatory account of the difference between the two types of remembering. I finish by sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which turns on the idea that episodic recollection recruits a specific form of causal reasoning that provides for a concrete sense in which remembered events are remembered as belonging to the past.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2014Remembering, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Remembering events and remembering looks}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {351--372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0191-6} }
Hoerl, C.	2014	Time and the domain of consciousness	Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326(1) 90-96	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a perceptual illusion fail, and that it is, in fact, the nature of memory, rather than perception, that explains why we are inclined to think of time as passing. I also offer a diagnosis as to why philosophers have sometimes been tempted to think that an objective passage of time seems to figure directly in perceptual experience, even though it does not.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2014Time, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Time and the domain of consciousness}, year = {2014}, journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, volume = {1326}, number = {1}, pages = {90--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12471} }
Hopkins, R.	2014	Episodic memory as representing the past to oneself	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 313-331	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the remembered episode to be. I argue that episodic memory is active, in the way this view suggests. I clarify the idea that it is, as the view also implies, not a source of knowledge but an expression of knowledge the subject already has. And I suggest the view need not limit memories to states that are in any way experience-like. This position offers a way to articulate the relations between episodic memory and related phenomena: factual memory, generic memory, remembering-how and anticipation. And it allows us to explain how we know which aspects of our episodic memory states to take seriously and which (such as the shift to an observer perspective on the remembered events) to treat as merely incidental. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract)
BibTeX: @article{Hopkins2014Episodic, author = {Hopkins, Robert}, title = {Episodic memory as representing the past to oneself}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {313--331}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0184-5} }
Howarth, E. and Paris, J.B.	2014	Principles of remembering and forgetting	Logique & Analyse 228 489-511	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We propose two principles of inductive reasoning related to how observed information is handled by conditioning, and justify why they may be said to represent aspects of rational reasoning. A partial classification is given of the probability functions which satisfy these principles.
BibTeX: @article{Howarth2014Principles, author = {Howarth, E. and Paris, J. B.}, title = {Principles of remembering and forgetting}, year = {2014}, journal = {Logique & Analyse}, volume = {228}, pages = {489--511} }
Huebner, B.	2014	Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Huebner2014Macrocognition, author = {Huebner, Bryce}, title = {Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality}, year = {2014}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
James, S.	2014	Hallucinating real things	Synthese 191(15) 3711-3732	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth's hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hallucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering. In Act II, Scene I of Shakespeare's Macbeth, the titular character has a visual experi-ence as of a dagger floating before him. To Macbeth it was as though his experience was of a particular worldly object. It was not, and much has been done to make sense of this kind of phenomenon. 1 This paper focuses on another kind of hallucination. As Mac-beth descends deeper into madness, he has a visual experience as of his former comrade Banquo, whom he had recently betrayed. Unlike the dagger-hallucination, this visual 1 See e.g. Crane (2011a), Johnston (2004), Smith (2002), Smith (1983), and especially Macpherson (2013) for discussion of the role this kind of hallucination has had in shaping much of contemporary philosophy of perception over the last hundred or so years.
BibTeX: @article{James2014Hallucinating, author = {James, Steven}, title = {Hallucinating real things}, year = {2014}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {15}, pages = {3711--3732}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4} }
Klein, S.B.	2014	Autonoesis and belief in a personal past: An evolutionary theory of episodic memory indices	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 427-447	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e., autonoetic awareness). What justifies our feeling that the content of awareness refers to the past? How do we determine that our phenomenology is a veridical (or even partly compromised) repre-sentation of our past and not, say, a thought or act of imagination? Such questions have vexed philosophers and psychologists for almost as long as attention has been directed toward the (uniquely human; e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Tulving 2005) act of recollection.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2014Autonoesis, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Autonoesis and belief in a personal past: An evolutionary theory of episodic memory indices}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {427--447}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0181-8} }
Klein, S.B.	2014	Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations	Frontiers in Psychology 5 29	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2014Sameness, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations}, year = {2014}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {5}, pages = {29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029} }
Knez, I.	2014	Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis	Philosophical Psychology 27(2) 164-192	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a ''place of mine'' (personal autobiographical experience) from a ''place'' (declarative knowledge). The function of ''place of mine'' is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.
BibTeX: @article{Knez2014Place, author = {Knez, Igor}, title = {Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, pages = {164--192}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.728124} }
Koch, S.C., Fuchs, T. and Summa, M.	2014	Body memory and kinesthetic body feedback: The impact of light versus strong movement qualities on affect and cognition	Memory Studies 7(3) 272-284	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What influence does body memory from light vs strong movement qualities have on affect and cognition? This article relates the phenomenological theory of body memory, movement observation theory from dance, and psychological conceptual and empirical work on body feedback. Kinesthetic body feedback means efferent feedback from the body's peripheral movements to the higher cortical functions, such as the systematic effects of the adoption of certain gestures or postures on the memory for life events. Meaning of movements is stored in the body in relation to our learning history -ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. Based on the phenomenological theory of body memory, we hypothesize that specific movement qualities will have a differential impact on affect and cognition. In accordance with our hypotheses, our results suggest that strong movements are related to more fighting affect and more negative memory recall, whereas light movements - just as a non-movement control condition - are related to more indulgent affect and more positive memory recall. Results are discussed with reference to the phenomenological framework. textcopyright The Author(s) 2014.
BibTeX: @article{Koch2014Body, author = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela}, title = {Body memory and kinesthetic body feedback: The impact of light versus strong movement qualities on affect and cognition}, year = {2014}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, pages = {272--284}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698014530618} }
Koggel, C.M.	2014	Relational remembering and oppression	Hypatia 29(2) 493-508	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper begins by discussing Sue Campbell's account of memory as she first developed it in Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars and applied it to the context of the false memory debates. In more recent work, Campbell was working on expanding her account of relational remembering from an analysis of personal rememberings to activities of public rememberings in contexts of historic harms and, specifically, harms to Aboriginals and their communities in Canada. The goal of this paper is to draw out the moral and political implications of Campbell's account of relational remembering and thereby to extend its reach and application. As applied to Aboriginal communities, Campbell's account of relational remembering confirms but also explains the important role that Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IRS TRC) is poised to play. It holds this promise and potential, however, only if all Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, engage in a process of remembering that is relational and has the goal of building and rebuilding relationships. The paper ends by drawing attention to what relational remembering can teach us about oppression more generally. textcopyright by Hypatia, Inc.
BibTeX: @article{Koggel2014Relational, author = {Koggel, Christine M.}, title = {Relational remembering and oppression}, year = {2014}, journal = {Hypatia}, volume = {29}, number = {2}, pages = {493--508}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12079} }
Kolber, A.J.	2014	The limited right to alter memory	Journal of Medical Ethics 40(10) 658-659		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kolber2014limited, author = {Kolber, Adam J.}, title = {The limited right to alter memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics}, volume = {40}, number = {10}, pages = {658--659}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101972} }
Lavazza, A.	2014	Documentality, emotions, and motivations. Why we need a kind of internal memory	Rivista di estetica 57(57) 51-66	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory, as is well known, makes up a large part of our identity (even though the criterion of this ''identity'' is controversial). Documents -- understood as inscriptions -- make up our external memory in a peculiar way: they constitute both a stable anchor and a reference-point for our personal transformations over time. There is, however, also an internal memory, residing in our brain. This is based in part on external documentation; but it is of course not exclusively tied thereto. Rather it evolves dynamically over time, in part reflecting ethical debates which we carry on within ourselves and which is influenced also by emotional factors, for example as we try to erase memories that are unpleasant. If, for example, the internal memory of some offense against our person is erased, then the motivation to testify against those who offended against us no longer exists or is greatly reduced, and this is so even though the documents that record the offense remain. Our motivations here depend on the emotional factor in our memories; once this has been lost, even though the autobiographical, episodic memory still remains, then the value- significance of the event fades from our view, and with it the impulse to act. Emotions are in large part responsible for creating a bond with documents; they make it possible for our internal and external memories to have significance. There must be some degree of emotional resonance in inscriptions relating to events in the past, which arises out of our own experience of these events and from our memory of these experiences, for these inscriptions to have significance in our lives. Documents are thus fundamental. But for ourselves and for our social lives, they must be supplemented by internal memories.
BibTeX: @article{Lavazza2014Documentality, author = {Lavazza, Andrea}, title = {Documentality, emotions, and motivations. Why we need a kind of internal memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Rivista di estetica}, volume = {57}, number = {57}, pages = {51--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.685} }
Levy, N.	2014	Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content	Philosophical Psychology 27(3) 351-367	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person-that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person-it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.
BibTeX: @article{Levy2014Psychopaths, author = {Levy, Neil}, title = {Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, pages = {351--367}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.729485} }
Lindemann, H.	2014	Second nature and the tragedy of Alzheimer's	Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood Oxford University Press 11-23		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Lindemann2014Second, author = {Lindemann, Hilde}, title = {Second nature and the tragedy of Alzheimer's}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood}, editor = {Hydén, Lars-Christer and Lindemann, Hilde and Brockmeier, Jens}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {11--23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969265.003.0002} }
Madison, B.J.C.	2014	Epistemic internalism, justification, and memory	Logos & Episteme 5(1) 33-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject's perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.
BibTeX: @article{Madison2014Epistemic, author = {Madison, Brent J. C.}, title = {Epistemic internalism, justification, and memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Logos & Episteme}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {33--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20145122} }
McCormack, T.	2014	Three types of temporal perspective: Characterizing developmental changes in temporal thought	Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326(1) 82-89	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper provides an outline of the development of temporal thinking that is underpinned by the idea that temporal cognition shifts from being event dependent to event independent over the preschool period. I distinguish between three different ways in which it may be possible to have a perspective on time: (1) a perspective that is grounded in script-like representations of repeated events; (2) a more sophisticated perspective that brings in an fundamental categorical distinction between events that have already happened and events that are yet to come; and (3) a mature temporal perspective that involves orienting oneself in time using a linear temporal framework, with a grasp of the distinctions between past, present, and future. I propose that, with development, children possess each of these types of perspective in turn, and that only the last of these involves being able to represent time in an event-independent way.
BibTeX: @article{McCormack2014Three, author = {McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Three types of temporal perspective: Characterizing developmental changes in temporal thought}, year = {2014}, journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, volume = {1326}, number = {1}, pages = {82--89}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12504} }
McGregor, R.	2014	Cinematic philosophy: Experiential affirmation in Memento	Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72(1) 57-66	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article demonstrates that Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) meets both conditions of Paisley Livingston's bold thesis of cinema as philosophy. I delineate my argument in terms of Aaron Smuts's clarifications of Livingston's conditions. The results condition, which is concerned with the nature of the philosophical content, is developed in relation to Berys Gaut's conception of narrational confirmation, which I designate 'experiential affirmation.' Because experiential affirmation is a function of cinematic depiction, it meets Livingston's means condition, which is concerned with the capacities of the medium or art form. I address two objections to my argument and conclude with a brief commentary on the implications for the broader relationship between film and philosophy. textcopyright 2014 The American Society for Aesthetics.
BibTeX: @article{McGregor2014Cinematic, author = {McGregor, Rafe}, title = {Cinematic philosophy: Experiential affirmation in Memento}, year = {2014}, journal = {Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, pages = {57--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12044} }
Michaelian, K.	2014	Review essay: Individual and collective memory consolidation: Analogous processes on different levels	Memory Studies 7(2) MIT Press 254-264		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2014Review, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Review essay: Individual and collective memory consolidation: Analogous processes on different levels}, year = {2014}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {254--264}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698013515365} }
Nikulin, D.	2014	Memory and recollection in Plotinus	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96(2) 183-201	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Beginning with an outline of memory and recollection in Plato and Aristotle, this paper argues that establishing the role of memory and recollection in their mutual relation in Plotinus requires a careful reconstruction. Whereas memory for Plotinus is not a storage of images or imprints that come either from the sensible or the intelligible but rather is a power capable of producing memories, recollection takes the form of a discursive rational rethinking and reproduction of the soul's experience of the noetic objects. Recollection, then, is a triple motion of the descent, stay, and return of the soul to the intelligible.
BibTeX: @article{Nikulin2014Memory, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Memory and recollection in Plotinus}, year = {2014}, journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {96}, number = {2}, pages = {183--201}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2014-0009} }
Nordenfelt, L.	2014	Dignity and dementia: A conceptual exploration	Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood Oxford University Press 39-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Nordenfelt2014Dignity, author = {Nordenfelt, Lennart}, title = {Dignity and dementia: A conceptual exploration}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood}, editor = {Hydén, Lars-Christer and Lindemann, Hilde and Brockmeier, Jens}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {39--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199969265.003.0004} }
Nunan, R.	2014	Film as philosophy in Memento: Reforming Wartenberg's imposition objection	Film and Philosophy 18(1) 1-18		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Nunan2014Film, author = {Nunan, Richard}, title = {Film as philosophy in Memento: Reforming Wartenberg's imposition objection}, year = {2014}, journal = {Film and Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {1--18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/filmphil2014182} }
Ofengenden, T.	2014	Memory formation and belief	Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental Health and Neuro Sciences 7(2) 34-44	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I deal with the constructive and dynamic nature of memory formation and with the nature of memory belief, whether a memory belief reflects the real past experience or a modified memory representation. That is, I grapple with the issue of whether such a belief adheres to the final stage of memory or reflects the whole constructive process of memory. After examining the multiple-trace and reconsolidation theories of memory, I conclude that recent findings in neuroscience fundamentally disturb conventional notions of memory belief, since beliefs do not reflect the reconstructive processes episodic and autobiographical memories go through.
BibTeX: @article{Ofengenden2014Memory, author = {Ofengenden, Tzofit}, title = {Memory formation and belief}, year = {2014}, journal = {Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental Health and Neuro Sciences}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, pages = {34--44} }
Palermos, S.O.	2014	Knowledge and cognitive integration	Synthese 191(8) 1931-1951	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature ofour intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy ofmind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of subjective justification: so long as the agent's belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology treat the process of cognitive inte- gration in the same way, we can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of science.
BibTeX: @article{Palermos2014Knowledge, author = {Palermos, Spyridon Orestis}, title = {Knowledge and cognitive integration}, year = {2014}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {8}, pages = {1931--1951}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0} }
Perri, T.	2014	Bergson's philosophy of memory	Philosophy Compass 9(12) 837-847	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Bergson identifies multiple forms of memory throughout his work. In Matter and Memory,Bergson considers memory from the perspectives of both psychology and metaphysics, and he describes what we might refer to as contraction memory, perception memory, habit memory, recollection memory, and pure memory. Further, in subsequent works, Bergson discusses at least two additional forms ofmem- ory -- namely, a memory ofthe present and a non-intellectual memory ofthe will. However, it is often not clear how these different forms ofmemory relate to one another. With the aim ofproviding an over- view ofBergson's philosophy ofmemory that can also serve as a point of entry to his philosophy as a whole, this article explores the different senses and forms ofmemory that Bergson describes, paying special attention to how they are distinct from one another and how they are unified. It is my intention to show that, although these various senses and forms of memory are different from one another (sometimes essentially so), they are also continuous and unified insofar as they are equivalent to different tones ofone's mental life and to different tensions ofone duration.
BibTeX: @article{Perri2014Bergsons, author = {Perri, Trevor}, title = {Bergson's philosophy of memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {9}, number = {12}, pages = {837--847}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12179} }
Perrin, D. and Rousset, S.	2014	The episodicity of memory: Current trends and issues in philosophy and psychology	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 291-312	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating Tulving's chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion.
BibTeX: @article{Perrin2014episodicity, author = {Perrin, Denis and Rousset, Stéphane}, title = {The episodicity of memory: Current trends and issues in philosophy and psychology}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {291--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0196-1} }
Pöyhönen, S.	2014	Explanatory power of extended cognition	Philosophical Psychology 27(5) 735-759	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory ofexplanation in the special sciences, James Woodward's contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power ofcompeting traditions in psychological memory research, I conclude that internalist and externalist classificatory strategies are characterized by different profiles of explanatory virtues and should often be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches. This suggests a deflationary interpretation ofHEC.
BibTeX: @article{Poeyhoenen2014Explanatory, author = {Pöyhönen, Samuli}, title = {Explanatory power of extended cognition}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {27}, number = {5}, pages = {735--759}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.766789} }
Radzik, L.	2014	Historical memory as forward- and backward-looking collective responsibility	Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38(1) 26-39		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Radzik2014Historical, author = {Radzik, Linda}, title = {Historical memory as forward- and backward-looking collective responsibility}, year = {2014}, journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, pages = {26--39}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12014} }
Robins, S.K.	2014	Memory traces, memory errors, and the possibility of neural lie detection	Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy Palgrave Macmillan 171-191		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Robins2014Memory, author = {Robins, Sarah K.}, title = {Memory traces, memory errors, and the possibility of neural lie detection}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy}, editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {171--191}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_10} }
Russell, J.	2014	Episodic memory as re-experiential memory: Kantian, developmental, and neuroscientific currents	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(3) 391-411	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant's analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will ''inherit'' these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna ( Mind & Language 27(1):29--54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) that the temporal element of re-experiencing involves order/simultaneity. The first of these assumptions is immediately problematic for two reasons. In the first place, if we assume that early episodic recall mediated by processing in the hippocampus, then (a) is clearly in tension with the fact that spatial coding in the hippocampus is allocentric/environment-centred. Second, two of our own recent experiments (described here) show that when only egocentric cues are available in a What/When/Where episodic memory task it is not possible to distinguish young children's performance from semantic memory. I argue that this tension should be resolved by recognising that the egocentric coding of the original experience as being of an objective scene relies upon allocentric representations and these are preserved in re-experiential memory, allowing a recollection of the objective nature of the scene on which one takes a subjective view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
BibTeX: @article{Russell2014Episodic, author = {Russell, James}, title = {Episodic memory as re-experiential memory: Kantian, developmental, and neuroscientific currents}, year = {2014}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {391--411}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0194-3} }
Sebastián, M.Á.	2014	Dreams: An empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness	Synthese 191(2) 263-285	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. textcopyright 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
BibTeX: @article{Sebastian2014Dreams, author = {Sebastián, Miguel Ángel}, title = {Dreams: An empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness}, year = {2014}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {191}, number = {2}, pages = {263--285}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0385-y} }
Slevin, T.	2014	Prosthetic memory	Philosophy of Photography 4(1) 109-112		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Slevin2014Prosthetic, author = {Slevin, Tom}, title = {Prosthetic memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophy of Photography}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {109--112}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1386/pop.4.1.109_7} }
Smart, P.	2014	Embodiment, cognition and the world wide web	The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition Routledge 326-334		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Smart2014Embodiment, author = {Smart, Paul}, title = {Embodiment, cognition and the world wide web}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition}, editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {326--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315775845} }
Smith, R.	2014	Do brains have an arrow of time?	Philosophy of Science 81(2) 265-275	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is a persisting tension that exists between the block universe conception of time in modern physics and philosophy and the conception of time that stems naturally from experience, and entropic asymmetries have been proposed to explain this tension. This article argues that as biochemical processes in the brain depend upon spontaneous entropy increases in the forward-time direction, this should provide an entropic basis for the unidirectionality of psychological processes. As this view does not depend on considerations of abstract information processing or a past hypothesis, it provides advantages over previous entropy-based proposals attempting to explain asymmetries in temporal experience. textcopyright 2014 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
BibTeX: @article{Smith2014Do, author = {Smith, Ryan}, title = {Do brains have an arrow of time?}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {265--275}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/675644} }
Spiegel, G.M.	2014	The future of the past: History, memory and the ethical imperatives of writing history	Journal of the Philosophy of History 8 149-179	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article examines revisions to theories of "linguistic turn" historiography in order to show the ways in which those revisions have created a path for a return of the analysis of individual agency and experience in history, changes that, it is argued, constitute a form of neo-phenomenology as the governing philosophical orientation in historiog-raphy. To the extent that this is correct, it establishes a philosophical and theoretical basis for the integration of memory and memorial testimony into the study of the past. The article proceeds to investigate the methodological, historiographical and ethical implications of the rise of memory studies in contemporary history. Memorial literature , as Berber Bevernage has so compellingly demonstrated, relies on a certain haunting of the present by the past. It thus deploys a conception of historical tempo-rality significantly different from the modernist assumption of the death of the past as the basis of historical understanding. In that sense, as Michael Roth has argued, the "acknowledgement of the past in the present is a necessary ingredient of modern historical consciousness." Yet, to incorporate "memory" and trauma into historical representation will mean acknowledging and accepting as historiographically viable the differing status of analytically recuperated "facts" and victim testimony. This will require, in turn, that we find a way to theorize, as has yet to be done, the materiality and reality of "voices" from the past, without assuming the necessary truth of what they convey, at least in terms of the factuality of its content. In the end, however, what is at stake in not the epistemological question of "truth" but an ethical response to the catastrophes of the last century. At the same time, it is clear that memory is no longer the sole vehicle for the promotion of a new ethical orientation in history, as recent work by Hayden White, Keith Jenkins and Frank Ankersmit, among others, suggest. Precisely how these different approaches to history, memory and ethics can be combined to constitute a viable and coherent mode of historiography remains an open, and debated, question.
BibTeX: @article{Spiegel2014future, author = {Spiegel, Gabrielle M}, title = {The future of the past: History, memory and the ethical imperatives of writing history}, year = {2014}, journal = {Journal of the Philosophy of History}, volume = {8}, pages = {149--179}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341269} }
Stokes, P.	2014	Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13(2) 295-312	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the im- portance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspectives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenomenologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally- figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary.
BibTeX: @article{Stokes2014Crossing, author = {Stokes, Patrick}, title = {Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time}, year = {2014}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {295--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6} }
Strohminger, N. and Nichols, S.	2014	The essential moral self	Cognition 131(1) 159-171	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits-more than any other mental faculty-are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits. textcopyright 2013 Elsevier B.V.
BibTeX: @article{Strohminger2014essential, author = {Strohminger, Nina and Nichols, Shaun}, title = {The essential moral self}, year = {2014}, journal = {Cognition}, volume = {131}, number = {1}, pages = {159--171}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005} }
Sutton, J. and Williamson, K.	2014	Embodied remembering	The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition Routledge 315-325			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2014Embodied, author = {Sutton, John and Williamson, Kellie}, title = {Embodied remembering}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition}, editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {315--325} }
Teroni, F.	2014	The epistemological disunity of memory	Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan Springer 183-202	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory (PastRT), these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this chapter, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. The PastRT offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argument in favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation.
BibTeX: @incollection{Teroni2014epistemological, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {The epistemological disunity of memory}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan}, editor = {Reboul, Anne}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {183--202}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_12} }
Theiner, G.	2014	A beginner's guide to group minds	New Waves in Philosophy of Mind Palgrave Macmillan 301-322		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Theiner2014beginners, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {A beginner's guide to group minds}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {New Waves in Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Sprevak, Mark and Kallestrup, Jesper}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {301--322}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137286734_15} }
Theiner, G.	2014	Varieties of group cognition	The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition Routledge 347-357			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Theiner2014Varieties, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {Varieties of group cognition}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition}, editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {347--357} }
Theiner, G. and Sutton, J.	2014	The collaborative emergence of group cognition	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37(3) 277-278	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We extend Smaldino's approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino's framework, we extend that framework's scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
BibTeX: @article{Theiner2014collaborative, author = {Theiner, Georg and Sutton, John}, title = {The collaborative emergence of group cognition}, year = {2014}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, pages = {277--278}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13003051} }
Vandekerckhove, M., Bulnes, L.C. and Panksepp, J.	2014	The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory	Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 7 210	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person "self-experience," a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of "awareness" or "knowing consciousness" that permits "time-travel" in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one's life and its possibilities within the "mind's eye."
BibTeX: @article{Vandekerckhove2014emergence, author = {Vandekerckhove, Marie and Bulnes, Luis Carlo and Panksepp, Jaak}, title = {The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory}, year = {2014}, journal = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, pages = {210}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00210} }
Walter, S. and Eronen, M.	2014	Reduction, multiple realizability, and levels of reality	The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science Bloomsbury			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Walter2014Reduction, author = {Walter, Sven and Eronen, Markus}, title = {Reduction, multiple realizability, and levels of reality}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science}, editor = {French, Steven and Saatsi, Juha}, publisher = {Bloomsbury} }
Werning, M. and Cheng, S.	2014	Is episodic memory a natural kind? A defense of the sequence analysis	Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Colloquially, episodic memory is described as "the memory of personally experienced events". Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode. We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along two cornerstones: First, empirical results support the claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Second, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Werning2014Is, author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen}, title = {Is episodic memory a natural kind? A defense of the sequence analysis}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.3760.5123} }
Williamson, K. and Sutton, J.	2014	Embodied collaboration in small groups	Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy Palgrave Macmillan 107-133		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Williamson2014Embodied, author = {Williamson, Kellie and Sutton, John}, title = {Embodied collaboration in small groups}, year = {2014}, booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy}, editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {107--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_7} }
Wu, W.	2014	Being in the workspace, from a neural point of view: Comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On central cognition'	Philosophical Studies 170(1) 163-174		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wu2014Being, author = {Wu, Wayne}, title = {Being in the workspace, from a neural point of view: Comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On central cognition'}, year = {2014}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {170}, number = {1}, pages = {163--174}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0169-8} }
Abbott, B.	2013	Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how	Philosophical Perspectives 27(1) 1-21		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Abbott2013Linguistic, author = {Abbott, Barbara}, title = {Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, pages = {1--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12019} }
Arango-Muñoz, S.	2013	Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 135-152	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in supporting cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind --particularly memory-- and the world take place, this paper presents the " selection problem " and the " endorsement problem " as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. 1 Scaffolded Memory I have a terrible memory. I often forget having an appointment, as well as important dates, such as my girlfriend's birthday or submission deadlines. I also forget important words that I used to know in my native language, Spanish, and in my second language, French. I even forget names of people, authors, and artists that I used to like in the past. Fortunately, there are many external ways to deal with my memory failures. Google calendar works very well. I use it to record my appointments and important dates, and it reminds me of each one, either by an email or by an automatic alarm. Electronic synonym and bilingual dictionaries support my semantic memory, and I use Wikipedia to retrieve names that I used to know. Like many people, I resort to all these external supports in order to cope with my impoverished memory and thus enhance it.
BibTeX: @article{ArangoMunoz2013Scaffolded, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {135--152}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0124-1} }
Arel, J.	2013	The necessity of recollection in Plato's Meno and Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind	Epoché 18(1) 187-203	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida not only makes repeated references to anamnēsis in Plato's texts, but writes the text in a way that follows from the discussions found in Plato's Meno. Focusing on the account of recollection given in Plato's Meno reveals a passive structure that is also found in Plato and Derrida's use of hypothesis. Following Derrida, these insights are applied to self-representation, which is revealed to have a similar structure to the structure found in the logic of hypothesis and recollection. These texts provide an argument for the hypothetical nature of self-representation and the limited knowledge one can claim to have of the self.
BibTeX: @article{Arel2013necessity, author = {Arel, Joseph}, title = {The necessity of recollection in Plato's Meno and Derrida's Memoirs of the Blind}, year = {2013}, journal = {Epoché}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {187--203}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche201318123} }
Azeri, S.	2013	Hume's social theory of memory	Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11(1) 53-68	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Traditionally, Hume's account of memory is considered an individualist-atomic representational theory. However, textual evidence suggests that Hume's account is better seen as a first attempt to create a social theory of memory that considers social context, custom and habits, language, and logical structures as constitutive elements of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Azeri2013Humes, author = {Azeri, Siyaves}, title = {Hume's social theory of memory}, year = {2013}, journal = {Journal of Scottish Philosophy}, volume = {11}, number = {1}, pages = {53--68}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2013.0047} }
Bermúdez, J.L.	2013	Immunity to error through misidentification and past-tense memory judgements	Analysis 73(2) 211-220	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Autobiographical memories typically give rise either to memory reports (''I remember going swimming'') or to first person past-tense judgements (''I went swimming''). This article focuses on first person past-tense judgements that are (epistemically) based on autobiographical memories. Some of these judgements have the IEM property of being immune to error through misidentification. This article offers an account of when and why first person past-tense judgements have the IEM property.
BibTeX: @article{Bermudez2013Immunity, author = {Bermúdez, José Luis}, title = {Immunity to error through misidentification and past-tense memory judgements}, year = {2013}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {73}, number = {2}, pages = {211--220}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ant002} }
Casey, E.S.	2013	Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty	A History of Habits Lexington Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey2013Habitual, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {A History of Habits}, publisher = {Lexington Books} }
Chadha, M.	2013	The self in early Nyāya: A minimal conclusion	Asian Philosophy 23(1) 24-42	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I revisit the early Nyāya argument for the existence of a self. In section 1, I reconstruct the argument in Nyāya-sűtra 1.1.10 as an argument from recognition following the interpretation in the Nyāyasűtra-Bhāya and the Nyāya-Vārttika. In Section 2, I reassess the plausibility of the Nyāya argument from memory/recognition in the Bhāya and the Vārttika in the light of recent empirical research. I conclude that the early Nyāya version of the argument from recognition can only establish a minimal conclusion that self is a unitary and persisting conscious agent, in contrast to the ontological conclusion that the self is distinct a substance qualified by consciousness. In the final section, I address the tension between the two conclusions in Nyāya and suggest how it might be resolved.
BibTeX: @article{Chadha2013self, author = {Chadha, Monima}, title = {The self in early Nyāya: A minimal conclusion}, year = {2013}, journal = {Asian Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {24--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2013.749624} }
Chinn, M.	2013	Sensing the wind: The timely music of nature's memory	Environmental Philosophy 10(1) 25-38	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the Zhuangzi, listening to the music of nature draws the self into the silence required to experience things in their self-arising spontaneity. How does this happen? This essay answers by way of the Yue Ji (Record of Music), where it is said that great music embodies the timeliness of nature. Using both texts, I develop timeliness as the opportune moment, temporal natality, and nature's memory. Listening to the timely music of nature is shown to be an act of ecological perception that, by releasing time in favor of timeliness, reveals our aesthetic accordance with nature's own becoming.
BibTeX: @article{Chinn2013Sensing, author = {Chinn, Meilin}, title = {Sensing the wind: The timely music of nature's memory}, year = {2013}, journal = {Environmental Philosophy}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {25--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/envirophil20131013} }
Clowes, R.W.	2013	The cognitive integration of e-memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 107-133	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If we are flexible, hybrid and unfinished creatures that tend to incorporate or at least employ technological artefacts in our cognitive lives, then the sort of techno- logical regimewe live under should shape the kinds ofminds we possess and the sorts of beings we are. E-Memory consists in digital systems and serviceswe use to record, store and access digital memory traces to augment, re-use or replace organismic systems of memory. I consider the various advantages of extended and embedded approaches to cognition in making sense of E-Memory and some of the problems that debate can engender. I also explore how the different approaches imply different answers to questions such as: does our use of internet technology imply the diminishment of ourselves and our cognitive abilities? Whether or not our technologies can become actual parts of ourminds, theymay still influence our cognitive profile. I suggest E- Memory systems have four factors: totality, practical cognitive incorporability, autonomy and entanglement which conjointly have a novel incorporation profile and hence afford some novel cognitive possibilities. I find that thanks to the properties of totality and incorporability we can expect an increasing reliance on E-Memory. Yet the potentially highly entangled and autonomous nature of these technologie pose questions about whether they should really be counted as proper parts of our minds.
BibTeX: @article{Clowes2013cognitive, author = {Clowes, Robert W.}, title = {The cognitive integration of e-memory}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {107--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0130-y} }
Costelloe, T.M.	2013	Fact and fiction: Memory and imagination in Hume's approach to history and literature	David Hume: Historical Thinker, Historical Writer Penn State University Press 181-200		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Costelloe2013Fact, author = {Costelloe, Timothy M.}, title = {Fact and fiction: Memory and imagination in Hume's approach to history and literature}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {David Hume: Historical Thinker, Historical Writer}, editor = {Spencer, Mark G.}, publisher = {Penn State University Press}, pages = {181-200}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9780271062457-012} }
Debus, D.	2013	Thinking about the past and experiencing the past	Mind & Language 28(1) 20-54	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The present article aims to show that a subject can only fully grasp the concept of the past if she has some experiential, or recollective, memories of particular past events. More specifically, I argue that (1) in order for a subject to understand the concept of the past, it is necessary that the subject understand the concept of a particular past event in such a way that it might contribute to her understanding of the concept of the past. (2) But then, in order for a subject to understand the concept of a particular past event in such a way that it might contribute to her understanding of the concept of the past, it is necessary that the subject have some recollective memories of particular past events. (C) Hence, a subject can only understand the concept of the past if she has some recollective memories of particular past events. I defend the premises of the present argument against various objections, indicate why we should accept both premises, and accordingly end by endorsing the argument's conclusion.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2013Thinking, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Thinking about the past and experiencing the past}, year = {2013}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {20--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12006} }
Des Chene, D.	2013	From habits to traces	A History of Habit Lexington Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{DesChene2013From, author = {Des Chene, Dennis}, title = {From habits to traces}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {A History of Habit}, editor = {Sparrow, Tom and Hutchinson, Adam}, publisher = {Lexington Books} }
Donato, A.	2013	Forgetfulness and misology in Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21(3) 463-485	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In book one of the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius is portrayed as a man who suffers because he forgot philosophy. Scholars have underestimated the significance of this portrayal and considered it a literary device the goal of which is simply to introduce the discussion that follows. In this paper, I show that this view is mistaken since it overlooks that this portrayal of Boethius is the key for the understanding of the whole text. The philosophical therapy that constitutes the core of the 'Consolation' can in fact be properly evaluated only if we recognize the condition it is designed to cure. Through the portrayal of Boethius's forgetfulness, the 'Consolation' illustrates that it is the very nature of philosophical knowledge that makes it susceptible to being forgotten. Philosophical knowledge can (i) turn into misology, when it appears unable to solve certain problems, and (ii) be overrun by strong emotions. The therapy offered in the 'Consolation' is designed to make Boethius aware of the 'fragility' of philosophical knowledge and show him how to 'strengthen' it. He is taught how to more fully embody philosophy's precepts and that philosophy's inability to solve certain problems reveals not its failures but its limits.
BibTeX: @article{Donato2013Forgetfulness, author = {Donato, Antonio}, title = {Forgetfulness and misology in Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy}, year = {2013}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {21}, number = {3}, pages = {463--485}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2012.721091} }
Dorsch, F.	2013	Hume and the recreative imagination	Rivista di estetica 53 25-54	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Two particular approaches to the imagination as a recreative capacity have recently gained prominence: neo-Humeanism and simulationatism. According to neo-Humeanism, imaginings have cognitions as a constitutive part of their representational contents; while simulationalists maintain that, in imagining, we essentially simulate the occurrence of certain cognitive states. Two other kinds of constitutive dependence, that figure regularly in the debate, concern the necessity of cognitions for, respectively, the causation and the semantic power of imaginings. In what follows, I discuss each of these kinds of dependence and assess how useful they are for spelling out the conception of imaginings as recreations of cognitions. A particular focus will thereby be on the details of Hume's original conception of imaginings as causal reproductions (or 'copies') of cognitions, as well as on the influence of his view on contemporary approaches to the topic which replace Hume's causal understanding of the representational link between imaginings and cognitions with either an intentional or a relational understanding. My conclusion will be that, if imaginings should be taken to be recreations at all, then they should be taken to be representational recreations. That is, neo-Humeanism turns out to be the most plausible way of understanding imaginings as re-creations of cognitions.
BibTeX: @article{Dorsch2013Hume, author = {Dorsch, Fabian}, title = {Hume and the recreative imagination}, year = {2013}, journal = {Rivista di estetica}, volume = {53}, pages = {25--54} }
Droege, P.	2013	Memory and consciousness	Philosophia Scientae 17(17-2) 171-193	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophical theories of memory rarely distinguish between importantly different sorts of memory: procedural, semantic and episodic. I argue for a temporal representation theory to explain the unique characteristic of episodic memory as the only form of conscious memory. A careful distinction between implicit and explicit representation shows how the past figures in memory. In procedural and semantic memory, the influence of the past is implicit by which I mean that the past experience is used but not represented in the skill or knowledge. Episodic memory, in contrast, depends on representing a past experience as past. On a temporal representation theory of consciousness, a conscious state represents the present moment, and in the case of episodic memory, it includes a representation of past experience. The embedded account of the 'feeling of pastness' takes past experience to be part of the explicit content of a conscious state. An episodic memory is a representation of the present that includes a representation of the past. Whereas a higher-order theory of consciousness can give no reason why only episodic memories are conscious, a temporal theory explains why episodic memories are both higher-order and conscious. Finally, I consider the essential role of episodic memory in the formation of a temporally extended self. The demands of a social environment motivate development of an ability to track the mental states of others and oneself over time. By incorporating past experience (and future experience) into the present, episodic memory extends experience in time to form the sense of self. Through a careful examination of the function of temporal representation, we can see why the past is not consciously represented in procedural and semantic memory and the value of consciously representing the past in episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Droege2013Memory, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {Memory and consciousness}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophia Scientae}, volume = {17}, number = {17-2}, pages = {171--193}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.865} }
Fernández, J.	2013	Memory	A Companion to the Philosophy of Time Wiley-Blackwell 432-443			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2013Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of Time}, editor = {Dyke, Heather and Bardon, Adrian}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, pages = {432--443} }
Fernández, J.	2013	Objects of memory	Encyclopedia of the Mind SAGE Publications 571-573			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Fernandez2013Objects, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Objects of memory}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of the Mind}, editor = {Pashler, Harold}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, pages = {571--573} }
Fernández, J.	2013	Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Fernandez2013Transparent, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Ferretti, F. and Cosentino, E.	2013	Time, language and flexibility of the mind: The role of mental time travel in linguistic comprehension and production	Philosophical Psychology 26(1) 24-46	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to Chomsky, creativity is a critical property of human language, particularly the aspect of ''the creative use of language'' concerning the appropriateness to a situation. How language can be creative but appropriate to a situation is an unsolvable mystery from the Chomskyan point of view. We propose that language appropriateness can be explained by considering the role of the human capacity for Mental Time Travel at its foundation, together with social and ecological intelligences within a triadic language-grounding system. Our proposal is based on the change of perspective from the analysis of individual sentences to the flux of speech in which the temporal dimension of language is much more relevant.
BibTeX: @article{Ferretti2013Time, author = {Ferretti, Francesco and Cosentino, Erica}, title = {Time, language and flexibility of the mind: The role of mental time travel in linguistic comprehension and production}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {24--46}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.625119} }
Feyles, M.	2013	Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12(4) 727-746	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl's position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.
BibTeX: @article{Feyles2013Recollection, author = {Feyles, Martino}, title = {Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl's phenomenology}, year = {2013}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {727--746}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9283-x} }
Ghisoni da Silva, G.	2013	Recognition and identity: Memory as part of the logical structure of the world	O Que nos Faz Pensar 33 251-270	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore three roles ascribed by Wittgenstein to memory in the middle period. Ontologically speaking, memory is regarded as the source of time and as part of the logical structure of the phenomenal world; epistemologically speaking, as the source of our knowledge, that is, as the truth-maker of our phenomenological propositions about the past; and semantically speaking, as the source of identity. I try to show how these three perspectives are interwoven, tracing the epistemological and semantic roles of memory back to its ontological role. I also contrast the phenomenological concept of memory with the physical one (on which memory is a bipolar representation of a past physical event). To understand this contrast, it is crucial to notice that phenomenological time and physical time grant different ontological statuses to present, past, and future. It is the continued existence of the past event in the physicalistic mode of representation of time that makes room for the distinction between the memory of a physical event and its truth-maker. I conclude this paper by showing briefly the importance of the topics discussed for gaining a proper understanding of some of Wittgenstein's later ideas.
BibTeX: @article{GhisonidaSilva2013Recognition, author = {Ghisoni da Silva, Guilherme}, title = {Recognition and identity: Memory as part of the logical structure of the world}, year = {2013}, journal = {O Que nos Faz Pensar}, volume = {33}, pages = {251--270} }
Hacker, P.	2013	The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature	Wiley-Blackwell			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hacker2013Intellectual, author = {Hacker, P.M.S.}, title = {The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell} }
Hamilton, A.	2013	The Self in Question: Memory, the Body and Self-Consciousness	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hamilton2013Self, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {The Self in Question: Memory, the Body and Self-Consciousness}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Hirstein, W.	2013	Confabulation	Encyclopedia of the Mind SAGE Publications 183-186			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirstein2013Confabulation, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Confabulation}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of the Mind}, editor = {Pasher, Harold}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, pages = {183--186} }
Hirstein, W.	2013	Memories of art	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(02) 146-147	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although the art-historical context of a work of art is important to our appreciation of it, it is our knowledge of that history that plays causal roles in producing the experience itself. This knowledge is in the form of memories, both semantic memories about the historical circumstances, but also episodic memories concerning our personal connections with an artwork. We also create representations of minds in order to understand the emotions that artworks express.
BibTeX: @article{Hirstein2013Memories, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Memories of art}, year = {2013}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {36}, number = {02}, pages = {146--147}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12001665} }
Hoerl, C.	2013	Causal theories of memory	Encyclopedia of the Mind SAGE Publications			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2013Causal, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Causal theories of memory}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of the Mind}, editor = {Pashler, Harold}, publisher = {SAGE Publications} }
Hoerl, C.	2013	Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86(2) 376-411		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2013Husserl, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Husserl, the absolute flow, and temporal experience}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {86}, number = {2}, pages = {376--411}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00547.x} }
Hoerl, C.	2013	Memory and knowledge	Encyclopedia of the mind SAGE Publications 489-492			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2013Memory, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Memory and knowledge}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of the mind}, editor = {Pashler, H.}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, pages = {489--492} }
Klein, S.B.	2013	Looking ahead: Memory and subjective temporality	Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 2(4) 254-258		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Klein2013Looking, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {Looking ahead: Memory and subjective temporality}, year = {2013}, journal = {Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {254--258}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.10.007} }
Klein, S.B.	2013	The sense of diachronic personal identity	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12(4) 791-811	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I first consider a famous objection that the standard interpre- tation of the Lockean account of diachronicity (i.e., one's sense of personal identity over time) via psychological connectedness falls prey to breaks in one's personal narrative. I argue that recent case studies show that while this critique may hold with regard to some long-term autobiographical self-knowledge (e.g., episodic memory), it carries less warrant with respect to accounts based on trait-relevant, semantic self- knowledge. The second issue I address concerns the question of diachronicity from the vantage point that there are (at least) two aspects of self---the self of psycho- physical instantiation (what I term the epistemological self) and the self of first person subjectivity (what I term the ontological self; for discussion, see Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474--518, 2012). Each is held to be a necessary component of selfhood, and, in interaction, they are appear jointly sufficient for a synchronic sense of self (Klein SB, The self and its brain, Social Cognition, 30, 474-- 518, 2012). As pertains to diachronicity, by contrast, I contend that while the epistemological self, by itself, is precariously situated to do the work required by a coherent theory of personal identity across time, the ontological self may be better positioned to take up the challenge.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2013sense, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {The sense of diachronic personal identity}, year = {2013}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {12}, number = {4}, pages = {791--811}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9285-8} }
Klein, S.B.	2013	The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction	Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition 2(4) 222-234	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Common wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies - a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. This is not to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities. textcopyright 2013 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2013temporal, author = {Klein, Stanley B.}, title = {The temporal orientation of memory: It's time for a change of direction}, year = {2013}, journal = {Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {222--234}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.08.001} }
Levy, L.	2013	Reflection, memory and selfhood in Jean-Paul Sartre's early philosophy	Sartre Studies International 19(2) 97-111	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article advances an interpretation of the self as an imaginary object. Focusing on the relationship between selfhood and memory in Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that Sartre offers useful resources for thinking about the self in terms of narra- tives. Against interpretations that hold that the ego misrepresents consciousness or distorts it, I argue that the constitution of the ego marks a radical transformation of the conscious field. To prove this point, I turn to the role of reflection and memory in the creation of the self. Reflection and memory weave past, present and future into a consistent and meaningful life story. This story is no other than the self. I propose to understand the self as a fictional or imaginary entity, albeit one that has real presence in human life.
BibTeX: @article{Levy2013Reflection, author = {Levy, Lior}, title = {Reflection, memory and selfhood in Jean-Paul Sartre's early philosophy}, year = {2013}, journal = {Sartre Studies International}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {97--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3167/ssi.2013.190206} }
Loader, P.	2013	Is my memory an extended notebook?	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 167-184	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Clark and Chalmers' conception of spatially extended memory is underpinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a 'storage' approach to memory; criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach; perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition; might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C's characterization of the notebook but also in the notion that Inga's memory is notebook-like. Insofar as Inga's practices; or conceptions; of remembering might be notebook-like this should not be taken as evidence of the existence of an internal store; but could instead be the result of prior interaction with notebook-like artifacts.
BibTeX: @article{Loader2013Is, author = {Loader, Paul}, title = {Is my memory an extended notebook?}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {167--184}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0123-2} }
Malyshkin, E.	2013	Two metaphors of memory in early modern philosophy	Problemos 84 36-45	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article analyses the relation between two metaphors of memory: project and repository. These ancient metaphors in early modern philosophy describe memory as the origin of such a duration which is the foundation of autonomy of contemplating being. That description gives the opportunity to answer the questions: what is the necessity of memory, what is memorabilia (and why memory and mnemonical things are essentially the same), and what it means to remember "by heart". The concept of duration, which is central for Bergson's philosophy, has its roots in early modern thinking and is strongly connected with a special kind of memory machine: machine without movement.
BibTeX: @article{Malyshkin2013Two, author = {Malyshkin, Eugeny}, title = {Two metaphors of memory in early modern philosophy}, year = {2013}, journal = {Problemos}, volume = {84}, pages = {36--45} }
Manning, L., Cassel, D. and Cassel, J.-C.	2013	St. Augustine's reflections on memory and time and the current concept of subjective time in mental time travel	Behavioral Sciences 3(2) 232-243	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Reconstructing the past and anticipating the future, i.e., the ability of travelling in mental time, is thought to be at the heart of consciousness and, by the same token, at the center of human cognition. This extraordinary mental activity is possible thanks to the ability of being aware of 'subjective time'. In the present study, we attempt to trace back the first recorded reflections on the relations between time and memory, to the end of the fourth century's work, the Confessions, by the theologian and philosopher, St. Augustine. We concentrate on Book 11, where he extensively developed a series of articulated and detailed observations on memory and time. On the bases of selected paragraphs, we endeavor to highlight some concepts that may be considered as the product of the first or, at least, very early reflections related to our current notions of subjective time in mental time travel. We also draw a fundamental difference inherent to the frameworks within which the questions were raised. The contribution of St. Augustine on time and memory remains significant, notwithstanding the 16 centuries elapsed since it was made, likely because of the universality of its contents.
BibTeX: @article{Manning2013StAugustine, author = {Manning, Lilianne and Cassel, Daniel and Cassel, Jean-Christophe}, title = {St. Augustine's reflections on memory and time and the current concept of subjective time in mental time travel}, year = {2013}, journal = {Behavioral Sciences}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {232--243}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/bs3020232} }
Matheson, D.	2013	A duty of ignorance	Episteme 10(02) 193-205	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Conjoined with the claim that there is a moral right to privacy, each of the major contemporary accounts of privacy implies a duty of ignorance for those against whom the right is held. In this paper I consider and respond to a compelling argument that challenges these accounts (or the claim about a right to privacy) in the light of this implication. A crucial premise of the argument is that we cannot ever be morally obligated to become ignorant of information we currently know. The plausibility of this premise, I suggest, derives from the thought that there are no epistemically 'non-drastic' ways in which we can cause ourselves to become ignorant of what we already know. Drawing on some recent work in the epistemology and psychology of self-deception and forgetting, I seek to undermine this thought, and thus provide a defense against the challenging argument, by arguing that there are indeed such ways.
BibTeX: @article{Matheson2013duty, author = {Matheson, David}, title = {A duty of ignorance}, year = {2013}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {10}, number = {02}, pages = {193--205}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.16} }
Michaelian, K.	2013	The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck	Synthese 190(12) 2429-2456	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader ''information effect''.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2013information, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck}, year = {2013}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {12}, pages = {2429--2456}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9992-7} }
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J.	2013	Distributed cognition and memory research: History and current directions	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 1-24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research, while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incorporate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing, as we witness an increasing level of interaction between the philosophy and the empirical research. In this editorial, we provide a high-level historical overview of the development of the debates around the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, as well as relevant theory and empirical research on memory, considering both the role of memory in theoretical debates around distributed/extended ideas and strands of memory research that resonate with those ideas; we emphasize recent trends towards increased interaction, including new empirical paradigms for investigating distributed memory systems. We then provide an overview of the special issue itself, drawing out a number of general implications from the contributions, and conclude by sketching promising directions for future research on distributed memory.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2013Distributed, author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John}, title = {Distributed cognition and memory research: History and current directions}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {1--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0131-x} }
Moon, A.	2013	Remembering entails knowing	Synthese 190(14) 2717-2729	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson's view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker's attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker's attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.
BibTeX: @article{Moon2013Remembering, author = {Moon, Andrew}, title = {Remembering entails knowing}, year = {2013}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {190}, number = {14}, pages = {2717--2729}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0065-3} }
Moyal-Sharrock, D.	2013	Wittgenstein's razor: The cutting edge of enactivism	American Philosophical Quarterly 50(3) 263-279			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{MoyalSharrock2013Wittgensteins, author = {Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle}, title = {Wittgenstein's razor: The cutting edge of enactivism}, year = {2013}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, pages = {263--279} }
O'Hara, K.	2013	The technology of collective memory and the normativity of truth	Philosophy and Engineering: Reflections on Practice, Principles and Process Springer 279-290	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neither our evolutionary past, nor our pre-literate culture, has prepared humanity for the use of technology to provide records of the past, records which in many contexts become normative for memory. The demand that memory be true, rather than useful or pleasurable, has changed our social and psychological self-understanding. The current vogue for lifelogging, and the rapid proliferation of digital memory-supporting technologies, may accelerate this change, and create dilemmas for policymakers, designers and social thinkers.
BibTeX: @incollection{OHara2013technology, author = {O'Hara, Kieron}, title = {The technology of collective memory and the normativity of truth}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Philosophy and Engineering: Reflections on Practice, Principles and Process}, editor = {Michelfelder, Diane P. and McCarthy, Natasha and Goldberg, David E.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {279--290}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7762-0_22} }
Radden, J. and Varga, S.	2013	The epistemological value of depression memoirs: A meta-analysis	The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry Oxford University Press 99-115		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Radden2013epistemological, author = {Radden, Jennifer and Varga, Somogy}, title = {The epistemological value of depression memoirs: A meta-analysis}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry}, editor = {Fulford, K.W.M. and Davies, Martin and Gipps, Richard G.T. and Graham, George and Sadler, John Z. and Stanghellini, Giovanni and Thornton, Tim}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {99--115}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0009} }
Reeves, J.	2013	Suspended identification: Atopos and the work of public memory	Philosophy and Rhetoric 46(3) 306-327	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As commemorative artifacts have come to saturate our public culture, many scholars have revisited the question of genre and the commemorative experience. Responding to this work, I argue that by subverting the commonplaces of our commemorative culture, certain works of public memory have the capacity to suspend audiences in a deferred event of identification. I describe the creative potential of this process by arguing that when compelled to forge common ground with an atopon (out-of-place) work of public memory, one can be unsettled in one's ordinary habits and resituated toward the world and toward others. By redescribing the problem of identification as it relates to the disruption of our everyday rhetorical encounters, this article's significance extends beyond public memory and suggests the transformative potential of suspense and the out-of-place in our broader rhetorical culture.
BibTeX: @article{Reeves2013Suspended, author = {Reeves, Joshua}, title = {Suspended identification: Atopos and the work of public memory}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophy and Rhetoric}, volume = {46}, number = {3}, pages = {306--327}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5325/philrhet.46.3.0306} }
Rosen, M. and Sutton, J.	2013	Self-representation and perspectives in dreams	Philosophy Compass 8(11) 1041-1053	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Integrative and naturalistic philosophy of mind can both learn from and contribute to the contempo- rary cognitive sciences of dreaming. Two related phenomena concerning self-representation in dreams demonstrate the need to bring disparate fields together. In most dreams, the protagonist or dream self who experiences and actively participates in dream events is or represents the dreamer: but in an intriguing minority of cases, self-representation in dreams is displaced, disrupted, or even absent. Working from dream reports in established databanks, we examine two key forms of polymorphism of self-representation: dreams (or dream episodes) in which I take an external visuospatial perspective on myself, and those in which I take someone else's perspective on events. In remembering my past experiences or imagining future or possible experiences when awake, I sometimes see myself from an external or 'observer' perspective. By relating the issue of perspective in dreams to established research traditions in the study of memory and imagery, and noting the flexibility of perspective in dreams, we identify new lines of enquiry. In other dreams, the dreamer does not appear to figure at all, and the first person perspective on dream events is occupied by someone else, some other person or character. We call these puzzling cases 'vicarious dreams' and assess some potential ways to make sense of them. Questions about self-representation and perspectives in dreams are intriguing in their own right and pose empirical and conceptual problems about the nature of self-representation with implications beyond the case of dreaming.
BibTeX: @article{Rosen2013Self, author = {Rosen, Melanie and Sutton, John}, title = {Self-representation and perspectives in dreams}, year = {2013}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {8}, number = {11}, pages = {1041--1053}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12082} }
Rosen, M.G.	2013	What I make up when I wake up: Anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams	Frontiers in Psychology 4 514	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I propose a narrative fabrication thesis of dream reports, according to which dream reports are often not accurate representations of experiences that occur during sleep. I begin with an overview of anti-experience theses of Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett who reject the received view of dreams, that dreams are experiences we have during sleep which are reported upon waking. Although rejection of the first claim of the received view, that dreams are experiences that occur during sleep, is implausible, I evaluate in more detail the second assumption of the received view, that dream reports are generally accurate. I then propose a "narrative fabrication" view of dreams as an alternative to the received view. Dream reports are often confabulated or fabricated because of poor memory, bizarre dream content, and cognitive deficits. It is well documented that narratives can be altered between initial rapid eye movement sleep awakenings and subsequent reports. I argue that we have reason to suspect that initial reports are prone to inaccuracy. Experiments demonstrate that subjects rationalize strange elements in narratives, leaving out supernatural or bizarre components when reporting waking memories of stories. Inaccuracies in dream reports are exacerbated by rapid memory loss and bizarre dream content. Waking memory is a process of reconstruction and blending of elements, but unlike waking memory, we cannot reality-test for dream memories. Dream experiences involve imaginative elements, and dream content cannot be verified with external evidence. Some dreams may involve wake-like higher cognitive functions, such as lucid dreams. Such dreams are more likely to elicit accurate reports than cognitively deficient dreams. However, dream reports are generally less accurate than waking reports. I then propose methods which could verify the narrative fabrication view, and argue that although the theory cannot be tested with current methods, new techniques and technologies may be able to do so in the future.
BibTeX: @article{Rosen2013What, author = {Rosen, Melanie G.}, title = {What I make up when I wake up: Anti-experience views and narrative fabrication of dreams}, year = {2013}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {4}, pages = {514}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00514} }
Rovaletti, M.L.	2013	Narrativity and memory: Towards an ethics of the responsibility	Salud Mental 36 411-415	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Prisoners of the Nazi concentration camps explained that the necessity to count all that horror stayed with them in life. In this moment, they were founding an "ethics of the testimony", that is to say, the salvation of the victims by means of their memory. Indeed Ricoeur shows that "time becomes human time in the measurement in which it is articulated in a narrative way". In this sense, he points out that narrative plots constitute "the privileged means by which we form our confused, shapeless and, at limit, dumb, temporary experience". In spite of that, experience not always reaches to being object of a story. Sometimes, the traumatic experience prevents the individual from taking control of his/her personal history. There is a strong temptation to deny that this experience has taken place, or it is lived as if it happened to another person. In those "dark nights" of the soul, in those moments of extreme dispossession, the question of "who am I" does not refer to the nullity, but it refers to the same nudity of the question (Ricoeur). For that reason, so that it is not an unbearable sequence of events, we narrated a story and we looked for its meaning. We do not do it to forgive or to forget, but to obtain "the privilege to judge". If the oblivion leads to a break from tradition, the truth however is not "a discovery that destroys the secret, but the disclosure that makes justice to it and allows to be passed on to the future generations" (Arendt).
BibTeX: @article{Rovaletti2013Narrativity, author = {Rovaletti, Mar\ia Lucrecia}, title = {Narrativity and memory: Towards an ethics of the responsibility}, year = {2013}, journal = {Salud Mental}, volume = {36}, pages = {411--415} }
Rupert, R.D.	2013	Memory, natural kinds, and cognitive extension; or, Martians don't remember, and cognitive science Is not about cognition	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 25-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current state of cognitive science, I conclude that we have no reason to think memory or cognition are generic natural kinds that can ground an argument for cognitive extension.
BibTeX: @article{Rupert2013Memory, author = {Rupert, Robert D.}, title = {Memory, natural kinds, and cognitive extension; or, Martians don't remember, and cognitive science Is not about cognition}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {25--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0129-9} }
Sakuragi, S.	2013	Propositional memory and knowledge	Logos & Episteme 4(1) 69-83	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, to remember that p is simply to retain the knowledge that p. Despite the apparent plausibility of this theory, many putative counterexamples have been raised against it. In this paper, I argue that no clear-cut counterexample to the claim can be proposed since any such attempt is confronted with an insurmountable problem. If there is to be a clear-cut counterexample to the claim, it must be either a case in which one does not believe that p though he remembers that p, or a case in which one remembers that p but his belief that p is somehow unwarranted. I examine a number of putative counterexamples of both types, and show that in neither way can we describe a clear-cut case in which one remembers that p while not knowing that p.
BibTeX: @article{Sakuragi2013Propositional, author = {Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {Propositional memory and knowledge}, year = {2013}, journal = {Logos & Episteme}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {69--83}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20134140} }
Scalambrino, F.	2013	Mnemo-psychography: The origin of mind and the problem of biological memory storage	Origins of mind Springer 327-339	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The internal logic of a semiotic view of life suggests memory is the origin of mind. Interpreting the meaning of ''sign'' by way of Charles S. Peirce, the object of this chapter is to provide a response to the biosemiotic problem of the origin of mind in respect to both its general and specific formulations, i.e., as evolutionary emergence and as human environmental experience. As such, I hope for this chapter to express the biosemiotic view of mind and function heuristically for future research regarding memory and mind. ''Mnemo-psychography'' means that the mind writes itself out of memory. In regard to biosemiotics, the thesis of mnemo-psychography suggests that the mind originates out of interaction between the environment and the biological capacity for memory. By providing a biosemiotic reading of the results of contemporary memory research, specifically the work of Eric Kandel, Daniel Schacter, and Miguel Nicolelis et al., I argue for the thesis of mnemo-psychography, over a biosemiotic version of identity theory, as the solution to the problem of the origin of mind.
BibTeX: @incollection{Scalambrino2013Mnemo, author = {Scalambrino, Frank}, title = {Mnemo-psychography: The origin of mind and the problem of biological memory storage}, year = {2013}, booktitle = {Origins of mind}, editor = {Swan, Liz Stillwaggon}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {327--339}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5419-5_17} }
Schirmer Dos Santos, C.	2013	Memory, environment, and the brain	Filosofia Unisinos 14(3) 204-214	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent decades, investigation of brain injuries associated with amnesia allowed progress in the philosophy and science of memory, but it also paved the way for the hubris of assuming that memory is an exclusively neural phenomenon. Nonetheless, there are methodological and conceptual reasons preventing a reduction of the ecological and contextual phenomenon of memory to a neural phenomenon, since memory is the observed action of an individual before being the simple output of a brain (or, at least, so we will argue), and there is no good reason to suppose that it is necessary to postulate a more basic reality to memory lying behind the mere individual actions. textcopyright 2013 by Unisinos.
BibTeX: @article{DosSantos2013Memory, author = {Schirmer Dos Santos, César}, title = {Memory, environment, and the brain}, year = {2013}, journal = {Filosofia Unisinos}, volume = {14}, number = {3}, pages = {204--214} }
Schroer, R.	2013	Reductionism in personal identity and the phenomenological sense of being a temporally extended self	American Philosophical Quarterly 50(4) 339-356			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Schroer2013Reductionism, author = {Schroer, Robert}, title = {Reductionism in personal identity and the phenomenological sense of being a temporally extended self}, year = {2013}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {50}, number = {4}, pages = {339--356} }
Soteriou, M.	2013	The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Soteriou2013Mind, author = {Soteriou, Matthew}, title = {The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action}, year = {2013}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Stanley, J. and Krakauer, J.W.	2013	Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts	Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 503	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Those in 20th century philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience who have discussed the nature of skilled action have, for the most part, accepted the view that being skilled at an activity is independent of knowing facts about that activity, i.e., that skill is independent of knowledge of facts. In this paper we question this view of motor skill. We begin by situating the notion of skill in historical and philosophical context. We use the discussion to explain and motivate the view that motor skill depends upon knowledge of facts. This conclusion seemingly contradicts well-known results in cognitive science. It is natural, on the face of it, to take the case of H.M., the seminal case in cognitive neuroscience that led to the discovery of different memory systems, as providing powerful evidence for the independence of knowledge and skill acquisition. After all, H.M. seems to show that motor learning is retained even when previous knowledge about the activity has been lost. Improvements in skill generally require increased precision of selected actions, which we call motor acuity. Motor acuity may indeed not require propositional knowledge and has direct parallels with perceptual acuity. We argue, however, that reflection on the specifics of H.M.'s case, as well as other research on the nature of skill, indicates that learning to become skilled at a motor task, for example tennis, depends also on knowledge-based selection of the right actions. Thus skilled activity requires both acuity and knowledge, with both increasing with practice. The moral of our discussion ranges beyond debates about motor skill; we argue that it undermines any attempt to draw a distinction between practical and theoretical activities. While we will reject the independence of skill and knowledge, our discussion leaves open several different possible relations between knowledge and skill. Deciding between them is a task to be resolved by future research.
BibTeX: @article{Stanley2013Motor, author = {Stanley, Jason and Krakauer, John W.}, title = {Motor skill depends on knowledge of facts}, year = {2013}, journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, pages = {503}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00503} }
Sutton, J.	2013	Skill and collaboration in the evolution of human cognition	Biological Theory 8(1) 28-36	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I start with a brief assessment of the implications of Sterelny's anti-individualist, anti-internalist apprentice learning model for a more historical and interdisciplinary cognitive science. In a selective response I then focus on two core features of his constructive account: collaboration and skill. While affirming the centrality of joint action and decision making, I raise some concerns about the fragility of the conditions under which collaborative cognition brings benefits. I then assess Sterelny's view of skill acquisition and performance, which runs counter to dominant theories that stress the automaticity of skill. I suggest that it may still overestimate the need for and ability of experts to decompose and represent the elements of their own practical knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2013Skill, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Skill and collaboration in the evolution of human cognition}, year = {2013}, journal = {Biological Theory}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {28--36}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-013-0097-z} }
Theiner, G.	2013	Transactive memory systems: A mechanistic analysis of emergent group memory	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 65-89	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel (1985) defined the notion of a trans- active memory system (TMS) as a group level memory system that ''involves the operation of the memory systems of the individuals and the processes of communication that occur within the group (p. 191). Those processes are the collaborative procedures (''transactions'') by which groups encode, store, and retrieve information that is distributed among their members. Over the past 25+ years, the conception of a TMS has progressively garnered an increased interest among social and organizational psychologists, communication scholars, and management theorists (Ren & Argote The Academy of Management Annals 5 (1): 189--229, 2011). But there remains considerable disagreement about how exactly Wegner's appeal to group memory should be understood. My goal in this paper is contribute to this debate, by articulating more clearly the value of conceptualizing groups as TMSs. This value, I argue, consists in providing us with a blueprint for how to explain group memory in terms of collective information-processing mechanisms. Collective information-processing mecha- nisms are dependent on, and interact with, the brain-bound information- processing of individuals, but cannot be reduced to the latter. In my analysis, I lean on extant accounts of mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of science (Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000; Wimsatt 2007) that have been used to analyze the explanatory practices of psychology and cognitive neuroscience (Bechtel 2008, Philosophical Psychology 22: 543--564, 2009). BasedonmyreconstructionofWegner's conceptualization of a TMS, I argue that the reality of emergent group cognition is compatible with its mechanistic explanation. More generally, my analysis shows that group cognition cannot be reduced to individual cognition, while avoiding the false dilem- ma between ''wholism'' and ''nothing but-ism'' which has hampered traditional construals of the ''group mind'' thesis (Allport 1968).
BibTeX: @article{Theiner2013Transactive, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {Transactive memory systems: A mechanistic analysis of emergent group memory}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {65--89}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0128-x} }
Tollefsen, D.P., Dale, R. and Paxton, A.	2013	Alignment, transactive memory, and collective cognitive systems	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1) 49-64	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Research on linguistic interaction suggests that two or more individuals can sometimes form adaptive and cohesive systems. We describe an ''alignment system'' as a loosely interconnected set of cognitive processes that facilitate social interactions. As a dynamic, multi-component system, it is responsive to higher-level cognitive states such as shared beliefs and intentions (those involving collective intentionality) but can also give rise to such shared cognitive states via bottom-up processes. As an example of putative group cognition we turn to transactive memory and suggest how further research on alignment in these cases might reveal how such systems can be genuinely described as cognitive. Finally, we address a prominent critique of collective cognitive systems, arguing that there is much empirical and explanatory benefit to be gained from considering the possibility of group cognitive systems, especially in the context of small-group human interaction.
BibTeX: @article{Tollefsen2013Alignment, author = {Tollefsen, Deborah P. and Dale, Rick and Paxton, Alexandra}, title = {Alignment, transactive memory, and collective cognitive systems}, year = {2013}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {49--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0126-z} }
Van Woudenberg, R.	2013	Thomas Reid between externalism and internalism	Journal of the History of Philosophy 51(1) 75-92		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{VanWoudenberg2013Thomas, author = {Van Woudenberg, René}, title = {Thomas Reid between externalism and internalism}, year = {2013}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, pages = {75--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2013.0015} }
Windt, J.M.	2013	Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports	Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 708	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Are dreams subjective experiences during sleep? Is it like something to dream, or is it only like something to remember dreams after awakening? Specifically, can dream reports be trusted to reveal what it is like to dream, and should they count as evidence for saying that dreams are conscious experiences at all? The goal of this article is to investigate the relationship between dreaming, dream reporting and subjective experience during sleep. I discuss different variants of philosophical skepticism about dream reporting and argue that they all fail. Consequently, skeptical doubts about the trustworthiness of dream reports are misguided, and for systematic reasons. I suggest an alternative, anti-skeptical account of the trustworthiness of dream reports. On this view, dream reports, when gathered under ideal reporting conditions and according to the principle of temporal proximity, are trustworthy (or transparent) with respect to conscious experience during sleep. The transparency assumption has the status of a methodologically necessary default assumption and is theoretically justified because it provides the best explanation of dream reporting. At the same time, it inherits important insights from the discussed variants of skepticism about dream reporting, suggesting that the careful consideration of these skeptical arguments ultimately leads to a positive account of why and under which conditions dream reports can and should be trusted. In this way, moderate distrust can be fruitfully combined with anti-skepticism about dream reporting. Several perspectives for future dream research and for the comparative study of dreaming and waking experience are suggested.
BibTeX: @article{Windt2013Reporting, author = {Windt, Jennifer M.}, title = {Reporting dream experience: Why (not) to be skeptical about dream reports}, year = {2013}, journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience}, volume = {7}, pages = {708}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00708} }
Yang, S.	2013	Emotion, experiential memory and selfhood	Organon F 20(1) 18-36	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long-standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions, I argue, help us in solving one of philosophy's most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to illustrate this claim I elaborate on the conception of 'experiential memory' suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, I argue, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Hence, I argue that experiential memory is not just confined to the recalling of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person's life as a whole. textcopyright 2013 Institute of Philosophy SAS.
BibTeX: @article{Yang2013Emotion, author = {Yang, Sunny}, title = {Emotion, experiential memory and selfhood}, year = {2013}, journal = {Organon F}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, pages = {18--36} }
Alarcón Dávila, M.E.	2012	Body memory and dance	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 105-112	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory implies the retention of the present as well as the expectation of future events, even though these, as soon as they are perceived, pass by and belong to the past. This article investigates the possibility of a subjective bodily experience of time as a form of body memory. In dialog with Husserl's later phenomenology of the body and with the phenomenology of dance, it will be argued that the body is the unconstituted condition of the constitution of time and space.
BibTeX: @incollection{AlarconDavila2012Body, author = {Alarcón Dávila, Mónica E}, title = {Body memory and dance}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {105--112}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.08ala} }
Almäng, J.	2012	Time, mode and perceptual content	Acta Analytica 27(4) 425-439	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Francois Recanati has recently argued that each perceptual state has two distinct kinds of content, complete and explicit content. According to Recanati, the former is a function of the latter and the psychological mode of perception. Furthermore, he has argued that explicit content is temporally neutral and that time-consciousness is a feature of psychological mode. In this paper it is argued, pace Recanati, that explicit content is not temporally neutral. Recanati's position is initially presented. Three desiderata for a theory of time-consciousness are subsequently introduced. It is then argued that a theory locating time-consciousness as a feature of psychological mode will fail to satisfy these desiderata. In the last section the intentionality of memories is discussed. Using the notion of shiftable indexical, it is argued that memories have the same explicit content as perceptions, but that they nevertheless can have different conditions of satisfaction since they are entertained in different modes.
BibTeX: @article{Almaeng2012Time, author = {Almäng, Jan}, title = {Time, mode and perceptual content}, year = {2012}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, pages = {425--439}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-011-0134-0} }
Arstila, V.	2012	Time slows down during accidents	Frontiers in Psychology 3 196	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The experienced speed of the passage of time is not constant as time can seem to fly or slow down depending on the circumstances we are in. Anecdotally accidents and other frightening events are extreme examples of the latter; people who have survived accidents often report altered phenomenology including how everything appeared to happen in slow motion. While the experienced phenomenology has been investigated, there are no explanations about how one can have these experiences. Instead, the only recently discussed explanation suggests that the anecdotal phenomenology is due to memory effects and hence not really experienced during the accidents. The purpose of this article is (i) to reintroduce the currently forgotten comprehensively altered phenomenology that some people experience during the accidents, (ii) to explain why the recent experiments fail to address the issue at hand, and (iii) to suggest a new framework to explain what happens when people report having experiences of time slowing down in these cases. According to the suggested framework, our cognitive processes become rapidly enhanced. As a result, the relation between the temporal properties of events in the external world and in internal states becomes distorted with the consequence of external world appearing to slow down. That is, the presented solution is a realist one in a sense that it maintains that sometimes people really do have experiences of time slowing down.
BibTeX: @article{Arstila2012Time, author = {Arstila, Valtteri}, title = {Time slows down during accidents}, year = {2012}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {3}, pages = {196}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00196} }
Behnke, E.A.	2012	Enduring: A phenomenological investigation	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 83-103	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This investigation describes a particular form of traumatic body memory that I term "enduring. " This is an inner bodily gesture that allows us to endure (with-stand, survive) difficult experiences while we are undergoing them, yet may continue to endure (in the temporal sense) long after these experiences are over, whether we are aware of its effect on our ongoing style of embodiment or not. I use a Husserlian phenomenological approach to elucidate the kinaesthetic structure of "enduring, " linking it with boundary violation and examining its temporal structure before suggesting some ways in which movement and awareness practices can help to restore a more open, fluid relation to the world in the here and now.
BibTeX: @incollection{Behnke2012Enduring, author = {Behnke, Elizabeth A.}, title = {Enduring: A phenomenological investigation}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {83--103}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.07beh} }
Bermúdez, J.L.	2012	Memory judgements and immunity to error through misidentification	Grazer Philosophische Studien 84(1) 123-142	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: First person judgments that are immune to error through misidentifi cation (IEM) are fundamental to self-conscious thought. The IEM status of many such judgments can be understood in terms of the possession conditions of the concepts they involve. However, this approach cannot be extended to fi rst person judgments based on autobiographical memory. Th e paper develops an account of why such judgments have the IEM property and how thinkers are able to exploit this fact in inference.
BibTeX: @article{Bermudez2012Memory, author = {Bermúdez, José Luis}, title = {Memory judgements and immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {2012}, journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien}, volume = {84}, number = {1}, pages = {123--142}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401207904_007} }
Bietti, L.M.	2012	Towards a cognitive pragmatics of collective remembering	Pragmatics & Cognition 20(1) 32-61	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article aims to provide a cognitive and discourse based theory to collective memory research. Despite the fact that a large proportion of studies in collective memory research in social, cognitive, and discourse psychology are based on investigations of (interactional) cognitive and discourse processes, neither linguistics nor cognitive and social psychologists have proposed an integrative, interdisciplinary and discursive-based theory to memory research. I argue that processes of remembering are always embodied and action oriented reconstructions of the past, which are highly dynamic and malleable by means of communication and context. This new approach aims to provide the grounds for a new ecologically valid theory on memory studies which accounts for the mutual interdependencies between communication, cognition, meaning, and interaction, as guiding collective remembering processes in the real-world activities.
BibTeX: @article{Bietti2012Towards, author = {Bietti, Lucas M.}, title = {Towards a cognitive pragmatics of collective remembering}, year = {2012}, journal = {Pragmatics & Cognition}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, pages = {32--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.20.1.02bie} }
Brough, J.B.	2012	Temporality, transcendence, and difference: Some reflections on Nicolas de Warren's Husserl and the Promise of Time	Research in Phenomenology 42(1) 130-137		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brough2012Temporality, author = {Brough, John B.}, title = {Temporality, transcendence, and difference: Some reflections on Nicolas de Warren's Husserl and the Promise of Time}, year = {2012}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {130--137}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916412X628784} }
Cassel, J.-C., Cassel, D. and Manning, L.	2012	From Augustine of Hippo's memory systems to our modern taxonomy in cognitive psychology and neuroscience of memory: A 16-century nap of intuition before light of evidence	Behavioral Sciences 3(1) 21-41	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Over the last half century, neuropsychologists, cognitive psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists interested in human memory have accumulated evidence showing that there is not one general memory function but a variety of memory systems deserving distinct (but for an organism, complementary) functional entities. The first attempts to organize memory systems within a taxonomic construct are often traced back to the French philosopher Maine de Biran (1766-1824), who, in his book first published in 1803, distinguished mechanical memory, sensitive memory and representative memory, without, however, providing any experimental evidence in support of his view. It turns out, however, that what might be regarded as the first elaborated taxonomic proposal is 14 centuries older and is due to Augustine of Hippo (354-430), also named St Augustine, who, in Book 10 of his Confessions, by means of an introspective process that did not aim at organizing memory systems, nevertheless distinguished and commented on sensible memory, intellectual memory, memory of memories, memory of feelings and passion, and memory of forgetting. These memories were envisaged as different and complementary instances. In the current study, after a short biographical synopsis of St Augustine, we provide an outline of the philosopher's contribution, both in terms of questions and answers, and focus on how this contribution almost perfectly fits with several viewpoints OPEN ACCESS Behav. Sci. 2013, 3 22 of modern psychology and neuroscience of memory about human memory functions, including the notion that episodic autobiographical memory stores events of our personal history in their what, where and when dimensions, and from there enables our mental time travel. It is not at all meant that St Augustine's elaboration was the basis for the modern taxonomy, but just that the similarity is striking, and that the architecture of our current viewpoints about memory systems might have preexisted as an outstanding intuition in the philosopher's mind.
BibTeX: @article{Cassel2012Augustine, author = {Cassel, Jean-Christophe and Cassel, Daniel and Manning, Lilianne}, title = {From Augustine of Hippo's memory systems to our modern taxonomy in cognitive psychology and neuroscience of memory: A 16-century nap of intuition before light of evidence}, year = {2012}, journal = {Behavioral Sciences}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {21--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3390/bs3010021} }
Clucas, S.	2012	Magic, Memory and Natural Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries	Routledge			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @book{Clucas2012Magic, author = {Clucas, Stephen}, title = {Magic, Memory and Natural Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Craver, C.F.	2012	A preliminary case for amnesic selves: Toward a clinical moral psychology	Social Cognition 30(4) 449-473	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does episodic memory make us who we are? Scholars from Aristotle to the present claim that episodic memory is necessary for one to be a self, a person, or an agent. A consequence of the episodic necessity hypothesis (n) is that individuals with episodic amnesia fail to qualify as selves, persons, or agents. This ethical demotion requires empirical justification. I show that established dissociations in individuals with episodic amnesia falsify many initially plausible formulations of n. The task going forward is to formulate a hypothesis that avoids falsification or to conclude that no plausible formulation succeeds. This method of clinical moral psychology affords incremental progress in the difficult task of showing how selves, persons, and agents are implemented in cognitive mechanisms.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2012preliminary, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {A preliminary case for amnesic selves: Toward a clinical moral psychology}, year = {2012}, journal = {Social Cognition}, volume = {30}, number = {4}, pages = {449--473}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2012.30.4.449} }
Crone, K.	2012	Phenomenal self-identity over time	Grazer Philosophische Studien 84(1) 201-216	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The analysis of personal identity over time (personal persistence) in terms of properties of the first-person perspective has been neglected for quite a while. However, there seems to be an interesting relation between experiential features on the one hand and the notion of personal persistence on the other hand. Th is idea is famously spelled out in an argument introduced by Barry Dainton (2000; 2005; 2008), according to which diachronic personal persistence consists in experiential continuity (stream of consciousness). This paper challenges one central claim of the argument, whose main target is to ward off the threat of factual interruptions in the stream of consciousness. It will be objected that this problem cannot be properly solved. However, the relevance of experiential features to personal persistence can be shown if one leaves behind the question of criteria of personal identity over time and instead turns to the question of what it means to have a sense of self-identity over time. It will be argued that not only experiential continuity but also experiential features of episodic memory characterise the sense of self-identity over time. Self-consciousness, the first-person perspective, temporality and the persistence of a person are related issues. This becomes evident from the fact that persons normally are aware of their temporal existence and self-identity over time. Even though they only rarely consciously reflect upon their persistence across time, they are nevertheless at least tacitly aware of it. We normally don't have to undergo complicated inferential operations in order to "know" that we have already existed in the past. This description suggests that the awareness of one's persistence across time, being non-inferential, is most notably characterised by experiential (phenomenal) features. This insight seems to have brought some philosophers, most notably Barry Dainton, to defi ne conditions of personal persistence in terms of experiential relations (e.g., Dainton 2000; 2008; Dainton & Bayne 2005).
BibTeX: @article{Crone2012Phenomenal, author = {Crone, Katja}, title = {Phenomenal self-identity over time}, year = {2012}, journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien}, volume = {84}, number = {1}, pages = {201--216}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401207904_010} }
De Brigard, F.	2012	Predictive memory and the surprising gap	Frontiers in Psychology 3 420	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Clark (in press) has offered a forceful defense of the ''hierarchical prediction machine'' (HPM) approach to the brain. Roughly, HPM suggests that brains are in the business of making sense of incoming information by generating top-down models aimed at providing the optimal fit for the input data. A better fit between the model and the data minimizes prediction error, which Clark -- following Friston (e.g., Friston, 2010) -- construes as tantamount to reducing surprisal, i.e., ''the subpersonally computed implausibility of some sensory state given the model of the world'' (p. 17). Notwithstanding the breadth of his defense, Clark's case is entirely built upon research on perception, attention, and action, all of which are on-line cognitive processes. With practically no mention of offline cognition, the theoretical pretensions of the HPM approach, which Clark so vigorously defends as a ''single unifying explanatory framework'' (p. 61) in cognitive science, are questionable.
BibTeX: @article{DeBrigard2012Predictive, author = {De Brigard, Felipe}, title = {Predictive memory and the surprising gap}, year = {2012}, journal = {Frontiers in Psychology}, volume = {3}, pages = {420}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00420} }
Dokic, J.	2012	Seeds of self-knowledge: Noetic feelings and metacognition	Foundations of Metacognition Oxford University Press 302-321		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dokic2012Seeds, author = {Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Seeds of self-knowledge: Noetic feelings and metacognition}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Foundations of Metacognition}, editor = {Beran, M. and Brandl, J. L. and Perner, J. and Proust, J.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {302--321}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199646739.003.0020} }
Dresner, E.	2012	Turing, Matthews and Millikan: Effective memory, dispositionalism and pushmepullyou mental states	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20(4) 461-472	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the first section of the paper I present Alan Turing's notion of effective memory, as it appears in his 1936 paper 'On Computable Numbers, With an Application to The Entscheidungsproblem'. This notion stands in surprising contrast with the way memory is usually thought of in the context of contemporary computer science. Turing's view (in 1936) is that for a computing machine to remember a previously scanned string of symbols is not to store an internal symbolic image of this string. Rather, memory consists in the fact that the past scanning of the string affects the behavior of the computer in the face of potential future inputs. In the second, central section of the paper I begin exploring how this view of Turing's bears upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I argue that Turing's approach can be used to lend support to dispositional conceptions of the propositional attitudes, like the one recently presented by Matthews (2007), and that his effective memory manifests some of the characteristics of Millikan's (1996) pushmepullyou mental states.
BibTeX: @article{Dresner2012Turing, author = {Dresner, Eli}, title = {Turing, Matthews and Millikan: Effective memory, dispositionalism and pushmepullyou mental states}, year = {2012}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {461--472}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2012.713375} }
Droege, P.	2012	Assessing evidence for animal consciousness: The question of episodic memory	Experiencing Animal Minds: An Anthology of Animal-Human Encounters Columbia University Press 231-245	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A squirrel bustles down the tree into the pachysandra to retrieve an acorn and then scurries back up to sit atop a knot in the bark while it shaves the shell and eats the nut meat. What is it like to be a squirrel? Is there any way to tell unless one is that very squirrel? Many people believe that the essentially private nature of consciousness closes off the possibility that science as an objective, third-person form of investigation could tell us anything about the subjective, first-person experience of an animal. This view is compelling. We are all familiar with the frustration of trying to describe our experiences to someone who has not shared those experiences. (What was Cairo like? There is no adequate answer.) Isn't the difficulty magnified to incomprehension when trying to understand the experience of an animal that does not even have the ability to express itself in language? Equally compelling is the opposite intuition that we can indeed tell that the squirrel is conscious. There is no doubt in my mind that squirrels, dogs, bats and babies are conscious, although I am less sure about fish, octopus, ants and other creatures. How can anything as cute and lively as a squirrel not be conscious? Curiously, the same people who are adamant that consciousness is essentially subjective and inaccessible to third-person explanation are the most vociferous in their defense of animal consciousness. i Why think that animal consciousness is indisputable, yet deny that it is explainable? A brief foray into a current controversy about the memory capacity of scrub-jays suggests the limits of behavioral evidence for animal consciousness. While various forms of behavior serve as indicators of consciousness, more specific content is needed to be completely convinced that
BibTeX: @incollection{Droege2012Assessing, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {Assessing evidence for animal consciousness: The question of episodic memory}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Experiencing Animal Minds: An Anthology of Animal-Human Encounters}, editor = {Smith, Julie A. and Mitchell, Robert W.}, publisher = {Columbia University Press}, pages = {231--245} }
Ferencz-Flatz, C.	2012	Objects with a past: Husserl on "ad-memorizing apperceptions"	Continental Philosophy Review 45(2) 171-188	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of ''apperception'' should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically ''indicated'' with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions ''appresenting'' a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to ''ad-memorized'' (hinzuerinnert, ad-memoriert) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of ''apperceptions,'' this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms.
BibTeX: @article{FerenczFlatz2012Objects, author = {Ferencz-Flatz, Christian}, title = {Objects with a past: Husserl on "ad-memorizing apperceptions"}, year = {2012}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {45}, number = {2}, pages = {171--188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-012-9218-9} }
Fuchs, T.	2012	Body Memory and the unconscious	Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically: Phenomenological Theory of Subjectivity and the Psychanalytic Experience Springer 69-82	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In traditional psychoanalysis the unconscious was conceived as a primary intra-psychic reality, hidden 'below consciousness' and only accessible to a 'depth psychology' based on metapsychological premises and concepts. In contrast to this vertical conception, the present paper presents a phenomenological approach to the unconscious as a horizontal dimension of the lived body, lived space and intercor- poreality. This approach is based on a phenomenology of body memory which is defi ned as the totality of implicit dispositions of perception and behavior mediated by the body and sedimented in the course of earlier experiences. What belongs to body memory, therefore, is what perseveres, not in the form of an explicit memory, but as a ''style of existence'' (Merleau-Ponty). This corporeal and intercorporeal unconscious ''… is not to be sought in our innermost [psyche] behind the back of our 'consciousness', but before us, as the structure of our fi eld'' (Merleau- Ponty). Unconscious fi xations are like restrictions in the spatial potentiality of a person, caused by a past which is implicit in the present and resists the progress of life; this includes traumatic experiences in particular. Their traces are not hidden in an interior psychic world, but manifest themselves -- as in a fi gure-background relationship -- in the form of ''blind spots'' or ''empty spaces'' in day-to-day living. They manifest themselves in behavior patterns into which a person repeatedly blun- ders, in actions that she avoids without being aware of it or in the opportunities offered by life which she does not dare to take or even to see. The unconscious of body memory is thus characterized by the absence of forgotten or repressed experi- ences, and at the same time by their corporeal and intercorporeal presence in the lived space and in the day-to-day life of a person.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fuchs2012Body, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Body Memory and the unconscious}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically: Phenomenological Theory of Subjectivity and the Psychanalytic Experience}, editor = {Lohmar, Dieter and Brudziŉska, Jagna}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {69--82}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1848-7_4} }
Fuchs, T.	2012	The phenomenology of body memory	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 9-22	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory comprises not only one's explicit recollections of the past, but also the acquired dispositions, skills, and habits that implicitly influence one's present experience and behavior. This implicit memory is based on the habitual structure of the lived body, which connects us to the world through its operative intentionality. The memory of the body appears in different forms, which are classified as procedural, situational, intercorporeal, incorporative, pain, and traumatic memory. The lifelong plasticity of body memory enables us to adapt to the natural and social environment, in particular, to become entrenched and to feel at home in social and cultural space. On the other hand, the structures accrued in body memory are an essential basis of our experience of self and identity: The individual history and peculiarity of a person is also expressed by his or her bodily habits and behavior. Finally, sensations or situations experienced by the lived body may function as implicit memory cores, which, under suitable circumstances, can release their enclosed content, as in Proust's famous madeleine experience. This unfolding or explication of body memory is of particular importance for therapeutic approaches working with bodily experience.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fuchs2012phenomenology, author = {Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {The phenomenology of body memory}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {9--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.03fuc} }
Gendlin, E.T.	2012	Comment on Thomas Fuchs	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 73-81	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The body has at last entered our current intellectual discourse. Fuchs provides another advance in that development. Until recently the most common question my philosophy would elicit was "But why the body?" Fuchs systematically describes how the body's memory functions in all present living. He brings its ubiquitous performances together and classifies them. I will comment on this valuable treatise, and extend its import. I will add a distinction. I propose concepts of a different kind for some of his major terms.
BibTeX: @incollection{Gendlin2012Comment, author = {Gendlin, Eugene T.}, title = {Comment on Thomas Fuchs}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {73--81}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.06gen} }
Goldie, P.	2012	The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Goldie2012Mess, author = {Goldie, Peter}, title = {The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Goldie, P.	2012	The narrative sense of self	Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18(5) 1064-1069	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article addresses the question of how the narrative sense of self relates to other ideas of selfhood, including three in particular, the idea of personal identity, concerned with the metaphysical question of what it is that makes someone the very same person over time, the idea of survival and the idea of a stable self, whose defining traits remain relatively stable over time. The author tries to show that the relationship between the narrative sense of self and personal identity is not as straightforward as might sometimes be supposed. One's narrative sense of self as the author conceive it really has no direct connection with the metaphysical question of one's identity over time. The author grants that, because of its central role in interpretation, experiential memory plays a special part in the full picture of personhood. But author acceptance of this should not lead us to think that the notion of a stable self in a self narrative is an ideal to which we should aspire. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
BibTeX: @article{Goldie2012narrative, author = {Goldie, Peter}, title = {The narrative sense of self}, year = {2012}, journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice}, volume = {18}, number = {5}, pages = {1064--1069}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2012.01918.x} }
Hägglund, M.	2012	Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, Nabokov	Harvard University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Haegglund2012Dying, author = {Hägglund, Martin}, title = {Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, Nabokov}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Harvard University Press} }
Hochschild, P.E.	2012	Memory in Augustine's Theological Anthropology	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hochschild2012Memory, author = {Hochschild, Paige E.}, title = {Memory in Augustine's Theological Anthropology}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Howard, S.A.	2012	Nostalgia	Analysis 72(4) 641-650	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Nostalgia has become a popular topic of study across various disciplines. It is usually taken for granted in these discussions that we know what we are talking about. In this article, I argue against two dominant accounts of the nature of nostalgia put forward by philosophers and other writers in the humanities and social sciences. These views assume that nostalgia depends, in some way, on comparing a present situation with a past one. However, neither does justice to the full range of recognizably nostalgic experiences available to us -- in particular, 'Proustian' nostalgia directed at involuntary autobiographical memories. While the immediate purpose of this article is to clarify the intentionality of a paradigmatic but neglected emotion type, certain episodes of Proustian nostalgia also raise questions about how to evaluate emotions that are self-consciously directed at non-veridical memories. I will conclude by briefly considering this issue.
BibTeX: @article{Howard2012Nostalgia, author = {Howard, Scott Alexander}, title = {Nostalgia}, year = {2012}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {72}, number = {4}, pages = {641--650}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans105} }
Klein, S.B. and Nichols, S.	2012	Memory and the sense of personal identity	Mind 121(483) 677-702	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory of past episodes provides a sense of personal identity---the sense that I am the same person as someone in the past. We present a neurological case study of a patient who has accurate memories of scenes from his past, but for whom the memories lack the sense of mineness. On the basis of this case study, we propose that the sense of identity derives from two components, one delivering the content of the memory and the other generating the sense of mineness. We argue that this new model of the sense of identity has implications for debates about quasi-memory. In addition, articulating the components of the sense of identity promises to bear on the extent to which this sense of identity provides evidence of personal identity.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2012Memory, author = {Klein, Stanley B. and Nichols, Shaun}, title = {Memory and the sense of personal identity}, year = {2012}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {121}, number = {483}, pages = {677--702}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs080} }
Koch, S.C., Fuchs, T., Summa, M. and Müller, C.	2012	Introduction	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 1-6			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Koch2012Introduction, author = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {1--6} }
Kolter, A., Ladewig, S.H., Summa, M., Müller, C., Koch, S.C. and Fuchs, T.	2012	Body memory and the emergence of metaphor in movement and speech: An interdisciplinary case study	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The present study is an empirical documentation of body memory and the transition from implicit to explicit memory from the cognitive-linguistic, movement analytic, and philosophical perspectives in a therapeutic application. The transition from implicit memory to explicit memory is described using the concept of activated metaphoricity. It is argued that body movements executed in the absence of speech may provide the experiential source for multimodal metaphors. Tracing these bodily movements from speechless contexts to contexts encompassing speech and body movement allows for the empirical documentation of the transition from implicit body memory to explicit verbalized memory. In this chapter, these theoretical claims are substantiated from the results of an inter-disciplinary case study in a dance/movement therapy context.
BibTeX: @incollection{Kolter2012Body, author = {Kolter, Astrid and Ladewig, Silva H. and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia and Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas}, title = {Body memory and the emergence of metaphor in movement and speech: An interdisciplinary case study}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.16kol} }
Leichter, D.J.	2012	Collective identity and collective memory in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur	Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 3(1) 114-131	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Collective memory has been a notoriously difficult concept to define. I appeal to Paul Ricoeur and argue that his account of the relationship of the self and her community can clarify the meaning of collective memory. While memory properly understood belongs, in each case, to individuals, such memory exists and is shaped by a relationship with others. Furthermore, because individuals are constituted over a span of time and through intersubjective associations, the notion of collective memory ought to be understood in terms of the way that memory enacts and reenacts networks of relations among individuals and the communities to which they belong, rather than in terms of a model that reifies either individuals or groups. Ricoeur's account can show sources of oppression and offers ways to respond to them.
BibTeX: @article{Leichter2012Collective, author = {Leichter, David J.}, title = {Collective identity and collective memory in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur}, year = {2012}, journal = {Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {114--131}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/ERRS.2012.125} }
Levy, L.	2012	Rethinking the relationship between memory and imagination in Sartre's The Imaginary	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 43(2) 143-160		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Levy2012Rethinking, author = {Levy, Lior}, title = {Rethinking the relationship between memory and imagination in Sartre's The Imaginary}, year = {2012}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {143--160}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2012.11006764} }
Marbach, E.	2012	Edmund Husserl: Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898--1925)	Husserl Studies 28(3) 225-237		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Marbach2012Edmund, author = {Marbach, Eduard}, title = {Edmund Husserl: Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory (1898--1925)}, year = {2012}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {28}, number = {3}, pages = {225--237}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-012-9110-9} }
Michaelian, K.	2012	(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(4) 481-514	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony. 1
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2012Social, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {(Social) metacognition and (self-)trust}, year = {2012}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, pages = {481--514}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0099-y} }
Michaelian, K.	2012	Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind	Consciousness and Cognition 21(3) 1154-1165	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) claim that an external resource satisfying the following criteria counts as a memory: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available; (3) retrieved information is automatically endorsed; (4) information is stored as a consequence of past endorsement. Research on forgetting and metamemory shows that most of these criteria are not satisfied by biological memory, so they are inadequate. More psychologically realistic criteria generate a similar classification of standard putative external memories, but the criteria still do not capture the function of memory. An adequate account of memory function, compatible with its evolution and its roles in prospection and imagination, suggests that external memory performs a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory is thus not memory. This has implications for: extended mind theorizing, ecological validity of memory research, the causal theory of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2012Is, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind}, year = {2012}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {21}, number = {3}, pages = {1154--1165}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.04.008} }
Michaelian, K.	2012	Metacognition and endorsement	Mind & Language 27(3) 284-307	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the endorsement problem: how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement problem.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2012Metacognition, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Metacognition and endorsement}, year = {2012}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, pages = {284--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01445.x} }
Moon, A.	2012	Knowing without evidence	Mind 121(482) 309-331	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I present counterexamples to the evidence thesis, the thesis that S knows that p at t only if S believes that p on the basis of evidence at t. The outline of my paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain the evidence thesis and make clear what a successful counterexample to the evidence thesis will look like. In section 2, I show that instances of non-occurrent knowledge are counterexamples to the evidence thesis. At the end of section 2, I consider the primary thesis of my paper --- that the evidence thesis is false --- to be successfully defended. In section 3, I consider three variations of the evidence thesis. The first variation restricts the evidence thesis to occurrent knowledge; the second requires for knowledge that one's belief could be based on evidence; and the third requires for knowledge that the belief was based on evidence at a suitable prior time. The secondary thesis of this paper is that these variations are also subject to serious objections.
BibTeX: @article{Moon2012Knowing, author = {Moon, Andrew}, title = {Knowing without evidence}, year = {2012}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {121}, number = {482}, pages = {309--331}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs048} }
Naylor, A.	2012	Belief from the past	European Journal of Philosophy 20(4) 598-620	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor to a belief (as opposed to a mere facilitating cause of the belief) is explicated through a series of examples. The account of having a belief that one did something from having done it is then deployed in criticising Ginet's account of 'memory connection', in assessing Martin and Deutscher's causal theory of remembering, in indicating how diachronic justification functions in a nontraditional theory of memory, and in setting forth one type of psychological connectedness which, according to advocates of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, may be employed (non- circularly) in formulating the theory, and which, according to opponents of the theory, provides a target for criticising the theory.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor2012Belief, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Belief from the past}, year = {2012}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {598--620}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00423.x} }
Nuzzo, A.	2012	Memory, History, Justice in Hegel	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Nuzzo2012Memory, author = {Nuzzo, Angelica}, title = {Memory, History, Justice in Hegel}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Risser, J.	2012	The Life of Understanding: A Contemporary Hermeneutics	Indiana University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Risser2012Life, author = {Risser, James}, title = {The Life of Understanding: A Contemporary Hermeneutics}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Indiana University Press} }
Russel, J. and Hanna, R.	2012	A minimalist approach to the development of episodic memory	Mind & Language 27(1) 29-54	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Episodic memory is usually regarded in a Conceptualist light, in the sense of its being dependent upon the grasp of concepts directly relevant to the act of episodic recollection itself, such as a concept of past times and of the self as an experiencer. Given this view, its development is typically timed as being in the early school-age years (Perner, 2001; Tulving, 2005). We present a minimalist, Non-Conceptualist approach in opposition to this view, but one that also exists in clear contrast to the kind of minimalism ('episodic-like') espoused by Clayton and Dickinson (1998) with regard to memory in food-caching birds. While emphasising the nonconceptual elements of episodic memory (in common with the 'episodic-like' approach) we also insist on the essentially phenomenological nature of the memory (as does the Conceptualist approach). We propose the third year of life as a plausible onset period. Our view is rooted in Kantian assumptions about the spatiotemporal content of experience (and thus of re-experience) and about the synthetic unity of experience---and thus of re-experience. We answer two objections to this position.
BibTeX: @article{Russel2012minimalist, author = {Russel, James and Hanna, Robert}, title = {A minimalist approach to the development of episodic memory}, year = {2012}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, pages = {29--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01434.x} }
Russell, J. and Davies, J.	2012	Space and time in episodic memory: Philosophical and developmental perspectives	Space and Time in Languages and Cultures: Language, Culture, and Cognition John Benjamins 283-303	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter explores the nonconceptual roots of spatiotemporal abilities in the context of episodic memory. Episodic memory is the conscious recollection of an autobiographical episode. We argue (a) that if episodic memory is a form of re-experiencing then it must inherit that which is necessary for something to be an experience, and (b) that this is, following Kant, spatiotemporal content, in addition to its being as of the experience of a single person. We suggest that there is no reason why these minimal conditions should not be met by children too young to be credited with concepts of time and of mentality, and report, for the first time, data we have collected in support of this view.
BibTeX: @incollection{Russell2012Space, author = {Russell, James and Davies, Jonathan}, title = {Space and time in episodic memory: Philosophical and developmental perspectives}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Space and Time in Languages and Cultures: Language, Culture, and Cognition}, editor = {Filipović, Luna; and Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {283--303}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/hcp.37.19rus} }
Scarpelli Cory, T.	2012	Diachronically unified consciousness in Augustine and Aquinas	Vivarium 50(3-4) 354-381	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Medieval accounts of diachronically unified consciousness have been overlooked by contemporary readers, because medieval thinkers have a unique and unexpected way of setting up the problem. This paper examines the approach to diachronically unified consciousness that is found in augustine's and aquinas's treatments of memory. For augustine, although the mind is " zxdistended" by time, it remains resilient, stretching across disparate moments to unify past, present, and future in a single personal present. Despite deceptively different phrasing, aquinas develops a remarkably similar view when, in order to accommodate aristotle's view of memory to augustine's, he insists that an implicit self-awareness "time-stamps" all intellectual acts. according to their shared approach, diachronic unified consciousness is the result of the curious way in which the mind is both drawn into and transcends the temporal succession of its own acts.
BibTeX: @article{ScarpelliCory2012Diachronically, author = {Scarpelli Cory, Therese}, title = {Diachronically unified consciousness in Augustine and Aquinas}, year = {2012}, journal = {Vivarium}, volume = {50}, number = {3-4}, pages = {354--381}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341237} }
Scheiter, K.M.	2012	Images, appearances, and phantasia in aristotle	Phronesis 57(3) 251-278	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Aristotle's account of Phantasia in De Anima 3.3 is notoriously difficult to decipher. At one point he describes Phantasia as a capacity for producing images, but then later in the same chapter it is clear Phantasia is supposed to explain appearances, such as why the sun appears to be a foot wide. Many commentators argue that images cannot explain appearances, and so they claim that Aristotle is using Phantasia in two different ways. In this paper I argue that images actually explain perceptual appearances for Aristotle, and so Phantasia always refers to images. I take a new approach to interpreting DA 3.3, reading it alongside Plato's Theaetetus and Sophist. In the Theaetetus, Socrates explains how memory gives rise to perceptual appearance. I claim that Aristotle adopts Socrates' account of perceptual appearance, but what Socrates calls memory, Aristotle calls Phantasia.
BibTeX: @article{Scheiter2012Images, author = {Scheiter, Krisanna M.}, title = {Images, appearances, and phantasia in aristotle}, year = {2012}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {57}, number = {3}, pages = {251--278}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852812X641272} }
Schlicht, T.	2012	Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11(3) 309-334	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article re-examines Ned Block`s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block's claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Schlicht2012Phenomenal, author = {Schlicht, Tobias}, title = {Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility}, year = {2012}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {11}, number = {3}, pages = {309--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9256-0} }
Shagrir, O.	2012	Structural representations and the brain	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63(3) 519-545	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey suggests that the notion of structural representation is posited by classical theories of cognition, but not by the newer accounts (e.g. connectionist modeling). I challenge the assertion about the newer accounts. I argue that the newer accounts also posit structural representations; in fact, the notion plays a key theoretical role in the current computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. The argument rests on a close examination of computational work on the oculomotor system.
BibTeX: @article{Shagrir2012Structural, author = {Shagrir, Oron}, title = {Structural representations and the brain}, year = {2012}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {63}, number = {3}, pages = {519--545}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr038} }
Sheets-Johnstone, M.	2012	Kinesthetic memory: Further critical reflections and constructive analyses	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 43-72	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay expands and broadens a 2003 article on kinesthetic memory. 1 It does so by critically examining currently favored taxonomies of memory as put forward by scientists, philosophers, and neuroscientists, and, in turn, by presenting a phenomenological perspective on body memory based on investigations by a Jungian analyst/phenomenological philosopher. The perspective brings to light highly complex and subtle dimensions of body memory, thus challenging us to enrich our understanding of body memory by turning studious attention to experience and actively investigating living experiences of body memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{SheetsJohnstone2012Kinesthetic, author = {Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine}, title = {Kinesthetic memory: Further critical reflections and constructive analyses}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {43--72}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.05she} }
Smith, C.	2012	My tattoo may be permanent, but my memory of it isn't	Tattoos: Philosophy for Everyone: I Ink, Therefore I Am Wiley-Blackwell 109-120		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Smith2012My, author = {Smith, Clancy}, title = {My tattoo may be permanent, but my memory of it isn't}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Tattoos: Philosophy for Everyone: I Ink, Therefore I Am}, editor = {Arp, Robert}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, pages = {109--120}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118252789.ch9} }
Summa, M.	2012	Body memory and the genesis of meaning	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 23-41	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter aims to provide a phenomenological account of the role of body memory in the formation of meaning. To this aim, the theory of embodied meaning put forward by experientialism and the phenomenological account of Typoi and typological constitution are comparatively considered. First the difficulties in the experientialist theory of embodied meaning are discussed. Second Husserl's phenomenology of typological apprehension is presented as offering a more appropriate account of the genesis of meaning in relation to implicit body memory. Third it is argued that the refined conceptual background in contemporary cognitive linguistics opens up the field for a fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and cognitive linguistics regarding the constitution of meaning.
BibTeX: @incollection{Summa2012Body, author = {Summa, Michela}, title = {Body memory and the genesis of meaning}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {23--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.04sum} }
Summa, M., Koch, S.C., Fuchs, T. and Müller, C.	2012	Body memory An integration	Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement John Benjamins 417-444	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this final chapter, we summarize the state of the art concerning the research on body memory in phenomenology, in the cognitive sciences, and in embodied therapies. Thereby, we show the impact of the studies collected in this volume for the development of the research in these three fields. Firstly, we consider the contributions from the cognitive sciences and from embodied therapies from a phenomenological standpoint. Secondly, we show how the present volume contributes to the current debate on memory in the cognitive sciences. Thirdly, we discuss the relevance of body memory with selected populations from the perspective of embodied therapies. And finally, we conclude with the most important points of this book.
BibTeX: @incollection{Summa2012Bodyb, author = {Summa, Michela and Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Müller, Cornelia}, title = {Body memory An integration}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Body Memory, Metaphor and Movement}, editor = {Koch, Sabine C. and Fuchs, Thomas and Summa, Michela and Müller, Cornelia}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {417--444}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.84.31sum} }
Sutton, J.	2012	Memory	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2012Memoryb, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Memory}, year = {2012}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, E. N.}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information} }
Sutton, J.	2012	Memory before the game: Switching perspectives in imagining and remembering sport and movement	Journal of Mental Imagery 36(1/2) 85-95	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper addresses relations between memory and imagery in expert sport in relation to visual or visuospatial perspective. Imagining, remembering, and moving potentially interact via related forms of episodic simulation, whether future- or past-directed. Sometimes I see myself engaged in action: many experts report switching between such external visual perspectives and an internal, 'own-eyes', or field perspective on their past or possible performance. Perspective in retrieval and in imagery may be flexible and multiple. I raise a range of topics for empirical research on perspective and visualization.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2012Memory, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Memory before the game: Switching perspectives in imagining and remembering sport and movement}, year = {2012}, journal = {Journal of Mental Imagery}, volume = {36}, number = {1/2}, pages = {85--95} }
Trigg, D.	2012	The Memory of Place: A Phenomenology of the Uncanny	Ohio University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Trigg2012Memory, author = {Trigg, Dylan}, title = {The Memory of Place: A Phenomenology of the Uncanny}, year = {2012}, publisher = {Ohio University Press} }
Walker, M.J.	2012	Neuroscience, self-understanding, and narrative truth	AJOB Neuroscience 3(4) 63-74	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent evidence from the neurosciences and cognitive sciences provides some support for a narrative theory of self-understanding. However, it also suggests that narrative self-understanding is unlikely to be accurate, and challenges its claims to truth. This article examines a range of this empirical evidence, explaining how it supports a narrative theory of self-understanding while raising questions of these narrative's accuracy and veridicality. I argue that this evidence does not provide sufficient reason to dismiss the possibility of truth in narrative self-understanding. Challenges to the possibility of attaining true, accurate self-knowledge through a self-narrative have previously been made on the basis of the epistemological features of narrative. I show how the empirical evidence is consistent with the epistemological concerns, and provide three ways to defend the notion of narrative truth. I also aim to show that neuroethical discussions of self-understanding would benefit from further engagement with the philosophical literature on narrative truth.
BibTeX: @article{Walker2012Neuroscience, author = {Walker, Mary Jean}, title = {Neuroscience, self-understanding, and narrative truth}, year = {2012}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, pages = {63--74}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2012.712603} }
Weinberg, S.	2012	The metaphysical fact of consciousness in Locke's theory of personal identity	Journal of the History of Philosophy 50(3) 387-415	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Locke's theory of personal identity was groundbreaking for its attempt to locate identity in consciousness rather than in substance. But the theory has been accused of both circularity and insufficiency for divine rectification, because it appears to lack a sufficient metaphysical aspect. I argue that in Essay II.xxvii consciousness' is used ambiguously to stand for both a momentary psychological state by means of which we are aware of ourselves as perceiving and as the enduring self we are aware of in these conscious states. Therefore, Locke's theory answers the problems by including a metaphysically robust sense of consciousness that is not identified with substance. I argue also that there is still plenty of room in the theory for Locke's emphasis on the role of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Weinberg2012metaphysical, author = {Weinberg, Shelley}, title = {The metaphysical fact of consciousness in Locke's theory of personal identity}, year = {2012}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {50}, number = {3}, pages = {387--415}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2012.0051} }
Adams, F.	2011	Husker du?	Philosophical Studies 153(1) 81-94	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker's account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.
BibTeX: @article{Adams2011Husker, author = {Adams, Fred}, title = {Husker du?}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {153}, number = {1}, pages = {81--94}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9663-4} }
Arango-Muñoz, S.	2011	Two levels of metacognition	Philosophia 39(1) 71-82	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity---each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain only one of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. The paper characterizes the high-level as a rationalizing level where the subject uses concepts and theories to interpret her own behavior and the low-level as a controlling level where the subject exploits epistemic feelings to adjust her cognitive activities. Finally, the paper explores three kinds of interaction between the levels.
BibTeX: @article{ArangoMunoz2011Two, author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago}, title = {Two levels of metacognition}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {71--82}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9279-0} }
Areces, C., Figueira, D., Figueira, S. and Mera, S.	2011	The expressive power of memory logics	The Review of Symbolic Logic 4(02) 290-318	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We investigate the expressive power of memory logics. These are modal logics extended with the possibility to store (or remove) the current node of evaluation in (or from) a memory, and to perform membership tests on the current memory. From this perspective, the hybrid logic HL(↓), for example, can be thought of as a particular case of a memory logic where the memory is an indexed list of elements of the domain. This work focuses in the case where the memory is a set, and we can test whether the current node belongs to the set or not. We prove that, in terms of expressive power, the memory logics we discuss here lie between the basic modal logic K and HL(↓). We show that the satisfiability problem of most of the logics we cover is undecidable. The only logic with a decidable satisfiability problem is obtained by imposing strong constraints on which elements can be memorized.
BibTeX: @article{Areces2011expressive, author = {Areces, Carlos and Figueira, Diego and Figueira, Santiago and Mera, Sergio}, title = {The expressive power of memory logics}, year = {2011}, journal = {The Review of Symbolic Logic}, volume = {4}, number = {02}, pages = {290--318}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020310000389} }
Audi, R.	2011	Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Audi2011Epistemology, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Routledge}, edition = {3} }
Barash, J.A.	2011	At the threshold of memory: Collective memory between personal experience and political identity	Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 3(2) 2067-3655	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Collective memory is thought to be something "more" than a conglomeration of personal memories which compose it. Yet, each of us, each individual in every society, remembers from a personal point of view. And if there is memory beyond personal experience through which collective identities are configured, in what "place" might one legitimately situate it? In addressing this question, this article examines the political significance of the distinction between two levels of what are often lumped together under the term of "collective memory": memories that are retained through the direct experience of groups or associations of a limited size and those that are rarely the object of direct experience constituting the events marking the identities of mass societies.
BibTeX: @article{Barash2011threshold, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {At the threshold of memory: Collective memory between personal experience and political identity}, year = {2011}, journal = {Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {2067--3655} }
Bernecker, S.	2011	Further thoughts on memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg	Philosophical Studies 153(1) 109-121	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, "Memory and Identity", Fred Adams, "Husker Du?", and Sanford Goldberg "The Metasemantics of Memory".
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2011Further, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Further thoughts on memory: Replies to Schechtman, Adams, and Goldberg}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {153}, number = {1}, pages = {109--121}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9638-5} }
Bernecker, S.	2011	Memory knowledge	The Routledge Companion to Epistemology Routledge 326-334		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker2011Memory, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory knowledge}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Epistemology}, editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Pritchard, Duncan}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {326--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203839065.ch30} }
Bernecker, S.	2011	Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study	Philosophical Studies 153(1) 61-64		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2011Precis, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Précis of Memory: A Philosophical Study}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {153}, number = {1}, pages = {61--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9639-4} }
Bickle, J.	2011	Memory and neurophilosophy	The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives MIT Press 195-215		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bickle2011Memory, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Memory and neurophilosophy}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives}, editor = {Nalbantian, Suzanne and Matthews, Paul M. and McClelland, James L.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {195--215}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8205.003.0014} }
Birch, J.E.	2011	Skills and knowledge - Nothing but memory?	Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5(4) 362-378	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills.
BibTeX: @article{Birch2011Skills, author = {Birch, Jens Erling}, title = {Skills and knowledge - Nothing but memory?}, year = {2011}, journal = {Sport, Ethics and Philosophy}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {362--378}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17511321.2011.579569} }
Bodei, R.	2011	Memory and the construction of personality	Iris: European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 3 87-88	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article proposes a kind of imaginary chess match in seven moves between memory and oblivion in which the construction of collective identity is at stake. Starting from the experience of unexpected changes, such as the collapse of political regimes, it aims to show how the failure to nourish established memory provokes oblivion. Memory and forgetting do not represent neutral territories, but actual battlefields in which identity -- especially collective identity -- is decided, molded, and legitimized. Moreover, every victorious power or faith has always organized a kind of ''vertical forgetting'' in the sense of superimposing itself literally on old beliefs in the places where these traditionally held their celebrations. However, the defense of memory's preciseness also has an ethical dimension, that of protecting a more conscious -- and therefore, freer -- identity. The final move of this game consists in understanding the conflicting complicity of the logic of forgetting and the logic of remembering. Together, they operate according to the formula of ''neither with you nor without you.'' And despite their mutual bitterness, forgetting is just as indispensable to memory as memory is to forgetting.
BibTeX: @article{Bodei2011Memory, author = {Bodei, Remo}, title = {Memory and the construction of personality}, year = {2011}, journal = {Iris: European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate}, volume = {3}, pages = {87--88} }
Burge, T.	2011	Self and self-understanding	The Journal of Philosophy 108(6/7) 287-383			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burge2011Self, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Self and self-understanding}, year = {2011}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {108}, number = {6/7}, pages = {287--383} }
Cabrera, L.Y.	2011	Memory enhancement: The issues we should not forget about	Journal of Evolution and Technology 22(1) 97-109	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The human brain is in great part what it is because of the functional and structural properties of the 100 billion interconnected neurons that form it. These make it the body's most complex organ, and the one we most associate with concepts of selfhood and identity. The assumption held by many supporters of human enhancement, transhumanism, and technological posthumanity seems to be that the human brain can be continuously improved, as if it were another one of our machines. In this paper, I focus on some of the ethical issues that we should keep in mind when thinking about memory enhancement interventions. I start with an overview of one of the most precious capacities of the brain, namely memory. Then I analyze the different kinds of memory interventions that exist or are under research. Finally, I point out the issues that we should not forget when we consider enhancing our memories. In this regard, my argument is not against memory enhancement interventions; rather, it concentrates on the need to ''keep in mind'' what kind of enhancements we want. We should consider whether we want the kind of ''enhancements'' that will end up making us lose synapse connections, or the kind that promote more use of them.
BibTeX: @article{Cabrera2011Memory, author = {Cabrera, Laura Y.}, title = {Memory enhancement: The issues we should not forget about}, year = {2011}, journal = {Journal of Evolution and Technology}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, pages = {97--109} }
Comesana, J.	2011	Conservatism, preservationism, conservationism and mentalism	Analysis 71(3) 489-492		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Comesana2011Conservatism, author = {Comesana, J.}, title = {Conservatism, preservationism, conservationism and mentalism}, year = {2011}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {71}, number = {3}, pages = {489--492}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr043} }
Cosentino, E.	2011	Self in time and language	Consciousness and Cognition 20(3) 777-783	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Time has been considered a crucial factor in distinguishing between two levels of self-awareness: the " core," or " minimal self," and the " extended," or " narrative self." Herein, I focus on this last concept of the self and, in particular, on the relationship between the narrative self and language. In opposition to the claim that the narrative self is a linguistic construction, my idea is that it is created by the functioning of mental time travel, that is, the faculty of human beings to project themselves mentally backwards in time to relive, or forward to anticipate, events. Moreover, I propose that narrative language itself should be considered a product of a core brain network that includes mechanisms, such as mental time travel, mindreading, and visuo-spatial systems.
BibTeX: @article{Cosentino2011Self, author = {Cosentino, Erica}, title = {Self in time and language}, year = {2011}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {20}, number = {3}, pages = {777--783}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.006} }
Dempsey, L.P.	2011	'A compound wholly mortal': Locke and Newton on the metaphysics of (personal) immortality	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19(2) 241-264	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, with distinct characteristics and functions, but are, nevertheless, ontologically interdependent. Consciousness -- the locus of personhood, and thus, a necessary condition for personal immortality -- is an embodied phenomenon; its preservation requires the life and proper functioning of the body. Dying with the dissolution of his body, then, man is a compound wholly mortal. Nevertheless, both Locke and Newton accepted the possibility of personal immortality; with Hobbes, both looked to the Biblical promise of bodily resurrection. For with the re-vitalization of the body -- and a subsequent restoration of consciousness and memory -- personal identity is preserved, even beyond the grave.
BibTeX: @article{Dempsey2011Compound, author = {Dempsey, Liam P.}, title = {'A compound wholly mortal': Locke and Newton on the metaphysics of (personal) immortality}, year = {2011}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {241--264}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2011.555161} }
Dessingué, A.	2011	Towards a phenomenology of memory and forgetting	Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 2(1) 168-178	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Differences and trends in the discourse of memory in France have been consistent since the publication by Henri Bergson of Matter and Memory in 1896. In History, Memory and Forgetting published in 2000, Ricœur's approach goes further than Bergson, Durkheim and Halbwachs. The memory issue in Ricœur is closely linked to a ''hermeneutics of the self'' that he already introduced in Oneself as Another in 1990. It seems that the traditional paradigm between individual and collective memory has been replaced by the affirmation of the dialogical nature of memory related to the dialogical nature of being a self and an other.
BibTeX: @article{Dessingue2011Towards, author = {Dessingué, Alexandre}, title = {Towards a phenomenology of memory and forgetting}, year = {2011}, journal = {Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {168--178}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/ERRS.2011.42} }
Devitt, M.	2011	Methodology and the nature of knowing how	The Journal of Philosophy 108(4) 205-218	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In their delightfully provocative paper, "Knowing How,"1 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (S&W) reject Gilbert Ryle's thesis2 that "there is a fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that" (411). Indeed, they seem to regard that widely accepted thesis as nothing but a "philosophical prejudice" (431). They offer an ingenious linguistic argument for the sharply different view that "knowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that" (411).
BibTeX: @article{Devitt2011Methodology, author = {Devitt, Michael}, title = {Methodology and the nature of knowing how}, year = {2011}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {108}, number = {4}, pages = {205--218}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2011108412} }
Erler, A.	2011	Does memory modification threaten our authenticity?	Neuroethics 4(3) 235-249	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One objection to enhancement technologies is that they might lead us to live inauthentic lives. Memory modification technologies (MMTs) raise this worry in a particularly acute manner. In this paper I describe four scenarios where the use of MMTs might be said to lead to an inauthentic life. I then undertake to justify that judgment. I review the main existing accounts of authenticity, and present my own version of what I call a "true self" account (intended as a complement, rather than a substitute, to existing accounts). I briefly describe current and prospective MMTs, distinguishing between memory enhancement and memory editing. Moving then to an assessment of the initial scenarios in the light of the accounts previously described, I argue that memory enhancement does not, by its very nature, raise serious concerns about authenticity. The main threat to authenticity posed by MMTs comes, I suggest, from memory editing. Rejecting as inadequate the worries about identity raised by the President's Council on Bioethics in Beyond Therapy, I argue instead that memory editing can cause us to live an inauthentic life in two main ways: first, by threatening its truthfulness, and secondly, by interfering with our disposition to respond in certain ways to some past events, when we have reasons to respond in such ways. This consideration allows us to justify the charge of inauthenticity in cases where existing accounts fail. It also gives us a significant moral reason not to use MMTs in ways that would lead to such an outcome.
BibTeX: @article{Erler2011Does, author = {Erler, Alexandre}, title = {Does memory modification threaten our authenticity?}, year = {2011}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, pages = {235--249}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-010-9090-4} }
Feest, U.	2011	Remembering (short-term) memory: Oscillations of an epistemic thing	Erkenntnis 75(3) 391-411	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-Jörg Rheinbergers notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology . I argue that Rheinbergers approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (epistemic things)especially in the contexts of exploratory experimentationnamely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological) categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science.
BibTeX: @article{Feest2011Remembering, author = {Feest, Uljana}, title = {Remembering (short-term) memory: Oscillations of an epistemic thing}, year = {2011}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {75}, number = {3}, pages = {391--411}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9341-8} }
Fisher, L.	2011	Gendering embodied memory	Time in Feminist Phenomenology Indiana University Press	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I take up a field and invent myself (but not without my temporal equipment), just as I move about in the world (but not without the unknown mass of my body). Time is that "body of the spirit" Valéry used to talk about.-Signs, 14-15. Although in the everyday frame of mind (when our deeper awareness is often parenthetical), we tend to think of our bodies as primarily distinguished by their mass and volume and tangibility-in other words, their spatial qualities-our bodies are, of course, eminently temporal. Indeed the temporality of our bodies might well be even more primordial than their spatiality, at least from the perspective of the lived body. Our embodied being is drenched with temporality, from the moment we appear in time to our fading out, our leaving time; when we are, in all senses, out of time. In between, temporality colors, conditions, and etches our experience and being by situating us, while simultaneously moving us along, structuring, regulating, "timing" us, and finally propelling us through life's stages, phases, and shadings as we age and proceed toward our own end of time, inexorably. In what follows I engage these themes of embodied time and temporal bodies from the perspective of feminist phenomenology. Specifically, with the notion and category of gender in view, I consider how temporal embodiment could be gendered, or alternately put, how embodied temporality could be read through the lens of gender. To be sure, analyses of gender and temporality are not unknown. However, within the intertwined approach of feminist phenomenology I wish to look at how phenomenologies of time and temporality might be amenable to and enhanced by a gendered analysis, and in turn accounts of gender extended by incorporating insights from phenomenologies of time and temporality.
BibTeX: @incollection{Fisher2011Gendering, author = {Fisher, Linda}, title = {Gendering embodied memory}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Time in Feminist Phenomenology}, editor = {Schües, Christina and Okowski, Dorothea E. and Fielding, Helen A.}, publisher = {Indiana University Press} }
Froman, W.J.	2011	Attentiveness: A phenomenological study of the relation of memory to mood	Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking Springer 27-38		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Froman2011Attentiveness, author = {Froman, Wayne J.}, title = {Attentiveness: A phenomenological study of the relation of memory to mood}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking}, editor = {Kenaan, H. and Ferber, Ilit}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {27--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1503-5_3} }
Glannon, W.	2011	The neuroethics of memory	The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives MIT Press 233-251		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Glannon2011neuroethics, author = {Glannon, Walter}, title = {The neuroethics of memory}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives}, editor = {Nalbantian, Suzanne and Matthews, Paul M. and McClelland, James L.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {233--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014571.003.0012} }
Glick, E.	2011	Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83(2) 398-434		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Glick2011Two, author = {Glick, Ephraim}, title = {Two methodologies for evaluating intellectualism}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {83}, number = {2}, pages = {398--434}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00438.x} }
Goldberg, S.C.	2011	The metasemantics of memory	Philosophical Studies 153(1) 95-107	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Sven Bernecker' s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the "metasemantics" of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a "pastist externalist" view, according to which the content of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the "external" conditions prevalent at the (past) time of the tokening of the original representation (the one from which the memory-constituting one is causally derived). Bernecker argues that the best version of a pastist externalism about memory contents will have the result that there can be semantically-induced memory losses in cases involving unwitting "world-switching". The burden of this paper is to show that Bernecker' s argument for this conclusion does not succeed. My arguments on this score have implications for our picture of mind-world relations, as these are reflected in a subject's attempts to recall her past thoughts.
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2011metasemantics, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {The metasemantics of memory}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {153}, number = {1}, pages = {95--107}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9642-9} }
Goldie, P.	2011	Empathy with one's past	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49(S1) 193-207	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper presents two ideas in connection with the notion of empathic access to one's past, where this notion is understood as consisting of memories of one's past from the inside, plus a fundamental sympathy for those remembered states. The first idea is that having empathic access is a necessary condition for one's personal identity and survival. I give reasons to reject this view, one such reason being that it in effect blocks off the possibility of profound personal progress through radical change. The second idea is that empathy with one's past should, as a matter of necessity, be modeled on empathy with another person. I reject this two-state model, arguing for the alternative possibility of a one-state model, according to which one's thoughts and memories of one's past can become infused with one's present thoughts about and attitudes toward one's past.
BibTeX: @article{Goldie2011Empathy, author = {Goldie, Peter}, title = {Empathy with one's past}, year = {2011}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {49}, number = {S1}, pages = {193--207}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00067.x} }
Goldman, A.I.	2011	Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? Or: evidentialism's troubles, reliabilism's rescue package	Evidentialism and its Discontents Oxford University Press 254-280		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Goldman2011synthesis, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? Or: evidentialism's troubles, reliabilism's rescue package}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Evidentialism and its Discontents}, editor = {Dougherty, Trent}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {254--280}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.003.0017} }
Hirstein, W.	2011	Confabulations about personal memories, normal and abnormal	The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives MIT Press 217-232		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirstein2011Confabulations, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Confabulations about personal memories, normal and abnormal}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {The Memory Process: Neuroscientific and Humanistic Perspectives}, editor = {Nalbantian, Suzanne and Matthews, Paul M. and McClelland, James L.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {217--232}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014571.003.0011} }
Irvine, E.	2011	Rich experience and sensory memory	Philosophical Psychology 24(2) 159-176	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the possible ways to explain the experience of visual richness is to posit a level of nonconceptual or phenomenal experience. The contents of this level of experience have recently been equated with the contents of sensory memory. It will be argued that sensory memory cannot provide these contents along two broad points. First, the conception of sensory memory relied on by these authors conflates the phenomena of visible and informational persistence, and makes use of an outdated 'iconic' model of visual short-term memory. Second, the way in which subjects' reports are used to show that specific unreported contents are nevertheless experienced on a phenomenal level is questioned, using evidence on gist and high-level categorical perceptual processing. It is concluded that sensory memory, properly understood, cannot provide the kind of visual content required to support a level of richly detailed phenomenal experience, or a pictorial account of perception. Finally, alternative ways of explaining visual richness are suggested.
BibTeX: @article{Irvine2011Rich, author = {Irvine, Elizabeth}, title = {Rich experience and sensory memory}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {24}, number = {2}, pages = {159--176}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.543415} }
Jackson, A.	2011	Appearances, rationality, and justified belief	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(3) 564-593	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing thatp. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have itseem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justi-fication, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferentialjustification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happilywith inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated as 'sound' or 'unsound.' Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even anunsound appearance can 'rationally require' the subject to form the belief. Some ofour intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief's being justified. Theresulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appear-ances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one mustsee that p.
BibTeX: @article{Jackson2011Appearances, author = {Jackson, Alexander}, title = {Appearances, rationality, and justified belief}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {82}, number = {3}, pages = {564--593}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00493.x} }
Jorgensen, L.M.	2011	Leibniz on memory and consciousness	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19(5) 887-916	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article, I develop a higher-order interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness according to which memory is constitutive of consciousness. I offer an account of Leibniz's theory of memory on which his theory of consciousness may be based, and I then show that Leibniz could have developed a coherent higher-order account. However, it is not clear whether Leibniz held (or should have held) such an account of consciousness; I sketch an alternative that has at least as many advantages as the higher-order theory. This analysis provides an important antecedent to the contemporary discussions of higher-order theories of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Jorgensen2011Leibniz, author = {Jorgensen, Larry M}, title = {Leibniz on memory and consciousness}, year = {2011}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {5}, pages = {887--916}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2011.599568} }
Käufer, S.	2011	Heidegger on mineness and memory	Annales Philosophici 2 51-65	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent efforts to analyze notions of subjectivity draw on the notions of autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory from the literature in psychology and cognitive science, and on theories of time consciousness and subjectivity from phenomenology. In doing so, leading interpreters have relied primarily on Husserl"s theories of time consciousness. This paper outlines the significantly different approach grounded in Heidegger"s analysis of the temporality and historicality of the self. Heidegger"s framework proves to be fruitful for an analysis of autonoetic conciousness, and challenges several fundamental presumptions of dominant psychological models of episodic memory.
BibTeX: @article{Kaeufer2011Heidegger, author = {Käufer, Stephan}, title = {Heidegger on mineness and memory}, year = {2011}, journal = {Annales Philosophici}, volume = {2}, pages = {51--65} }
Kellner, B.	2011	Self-awareness (svasad mvedana) and infinite regresses: A comparison of arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti	Journal of Indian Philosophy 39(4-5) 411-426	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper compares and contrasts two infinite regress arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness that were put forward by the Buddhist epistemologists Dignāga (ca. 480--540 CE) and Dharmak\irti (ca. 600--660). The two arguments differ considerably from each other, and they also differ from the infinite regress argument that scholars usually attribute to Dignāga or his followers. The analysis shows that the two philosophers, in these arguments, work with different assumptions for why an object-cognition must be cognised: for Dignāga it must be cognised in order to enable subsequent memory of it, for Dharmak\irti it must be cognised if it is to cognise an object.
BibTeX: @article{Kellner2011Self, author = {Kellner, Birgit}, title = {Self-awareness (svasad mvedana) and infinite regresses: A comparison of arguments by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti}, year = {2011}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {39}, number = {4-5}, pages = {411--426}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-011-9139-7} }
Lavabre, M.-C.	2011	Historiography and memory	A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography Blackwell 362-370		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Lavabre2011Historiography, author = {Lavabre, Marie-Claire}, title = {Historiography and memory}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {A Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography}, editor = {Tucker, Aviezer}, publisher = {Blackwell}, pages = {362--370}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444304916.ch32} }
Levy, L.	2011	Memory and the passions in Descartes' philosophy	History of Philosophy Quarterly 28(4) 339-354			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Levy2011Memory, author = {Levy, Lior}, title = {Memory and the passions in Descartes' philosophy}, year = {2011}, journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, pages = {339--354} }
Magrì, E.	2011	Self-reference and logical memory in Hegel's theory of the concept	Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos 8(15) 66-77	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As Hegel often said, memory is essentially related to thinking. In this paper I will argue that memory plays a crucial role into the Science of Logic as well, although it does not stand for a psychological faculty. I will proceed as follows: first, I will briefly mention the relevance of memory in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, then I will reconstruct the correspondence between the psychological transition from Vorstellung to Denken and the speculative Übergang from Wesen to Begriff. Lastly, I will hint at the difference between self-relation and self-consciousness, focusing on the importance of the first in the Science of Logic.
BibTeX: @article{Magri2011Self, author = {Magrì, Elisa}, title = {Self-reference and logical memory in Hegel's theory of the concept}, year = {2011}, journal = {Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos}, volume = {8}, number = {15}, pages = {66--77} }
Margalit, A.	2011	Nostalgia	Psychoanalytic Dialogues 21(3) 271-280	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper Nostalgia has two distinct parts: One, accounting for nostalgia, by pointing out a systematic distortion in cases of nostalgic memories---idealizing the past and presenting it as a sentimental realm of pure innocence. This distortion typifies kitsch morality, morality guided by sentimentality that can easily turn into brutality. For attacking the innocent seems to justify any brutality in return. Two, an account of what is an ethics of memory, claiming that memory as the case of nostalgia suggests is a fertile ground for ethical discourse, which is different from the politics of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Margalit2011Nostalgia, author = {Margalit, Avishai}, title = {Nostalgia}, year = {2011}, journal = {Psychoanalytic Dialogues}, volume = {21}, number = {3}, pages = {271--280}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10481885.2011.581107} }
McCormack, T. and Hoerl, C.	2011	Tool use, planning, and future thinking in children and animals	Tool Use and Causal Cognition Oxford University Press 129-147		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCormack2011Tool, author = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Tool use, planning, and future thinking in children and animals}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Tool Use and Causal Cognition}, editor = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph and Butterfill, Stephen}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {129--147}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571154.003.0007} }
McCoy, J.	2011	Re-examining recollection: The Platonic account of learning	International Philosophical Quarterly 51(4) 451-466		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McCoy2011Re, author = {McCoy, Joe}, title = {Re-examining recollection: The Platonic account of learning}, year = {2011}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {51}, number = {4}, pages = {451--466}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq201151448} }
Mcfarland, D.	2011	The philosophy of space and memory in Solaris	The Philosophy of Steven Soderbergh University Press of Kentucky 267-279			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McFarland2011philosophy, author = {Mcfarland, Douglas}, title = {The philosophy of space and memory in Solaris}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Steven Soderbergh}, publisher = {University Press of Kentucky}, pages = {267--279} }
McMullin, I.	2011	The amnesia of the modern: Arendt on the role of memory in the constitution of the political	Philosophical Topics 39(2) 91-116	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I consider the essential role that public memory plays in the establishment and maintenance of the political arena and its space of appearance. Without this space and the shared memory that allows it to appear, Hannah Arendt argues, transience and finitude would consume the excellence of word and deed - just as the "natural ruin of time" consumes its mortal performer. The modern era displays a kind of mnemonic failure, however, a situation arising not only from technologi- cal developments that "outsource" memory but from several normative breakdowns that Arendt describes as characteristic of modernity. The consequence is the individual's loss of personal, living access to the community's memories, and the community's own failure to engage in the difficult choice of what counts as worthy of preservation. In failing to ask this question, however, the community abdicates responsibility for establishing the shared norms by which it will govern itself in times of crisis.
BibTeX: @article{McMullin2011amnesia, author = {McMullin, Irene}, title = {The amnesia of the modern: Arendt on the role of memory in the constitution of the political}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {39}, number = {2}, pages = {91--116}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20113926} }
Michaelian, K.	2011	Generative memory	Philosophical Psychology 24(3) 323-342	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for philosophical theories of the metaphysics of memory and for a central question in the epistemology of memory. I first develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. I then argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of Martin and Deutscher's influential causal theory of memory. I conclude by sketching the implications of this updated theory for the question of memory's status as a generative epistemic source. There has been relatively little philosophical work in recent years on the metaphysics of memory (the nature of memory in general). This is presumably because most philosophers have assumed that something close to Martin and Deutscher's (1966) causal theory of memory is right. Bernecker's (2008) recent work, e.g., the first book-length work on the metaphysics of memory to appear in some years, defends a causal theory of memory very much in the spirit of Martin and Deutscher's; and there have been no very recent attacks on the theory. While I, too, ultimately want to defend a theory in the spirit of the classical causal theory, I also maintain that our confidence in the causal theory has been to a certain extent unfounded, for the psychology of constructive memory poses a significant challenge to the causal theory of memory, and few philosophers concerned with the metaphysics of memory have so far taken empirical work on the constructive nature of memory into account. This paper therefore explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for the causal theory of memory. In section 1, I develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. In section 2, I argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of the causal theory of memory and compare the updated theory to existing attempts to take the constructive
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2011Generative, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Generative memory}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {323--342}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.559623} }
Michaelian, K.	2011	Is memory a natural kind?	Memory Studies 4(2) 170-189	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Though researchers often refer to memory as if it were a unitary phenomenon, a natural kind, the apparent heterogeneity of the various 'kinds' of memory casts doubt on this default view. This article argues, first, that kinds of memory are individuated by memory systems. It argues, second, for a view of the nature of kinds of memory informed by the tri-level hypothesis. If this approach to kinds of memory is right, then memory is not in fact a natural kind.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2011Is, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {Is memory a natural kind?}, year = {2011}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {170--189}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698010374287} }
Michaelian, K.	2011	The epistemology of forgetting	Erkenntnis 74(3) 399-424	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that hum memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible to forgetting that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the oppose view: normal human forgetting-the pattern of forgetting characteristic of cogn tively normal adult human beings-approximates a virtue located at the me between the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering t much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer, a certain pattern of forgetting necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, b eliminating "clutter" from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves th overall shape of the subject's total doxastic state. I conclude by reviewing work psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtu pattern of forgetting. 1 Virtuous Forgetting Epistemologists have so far paid scant attention to forgetting. This neglect of suc prominent feature of the human memory system (indeed: of all biological memor systems) is natural given (what I take to be) the default view on the epistemic sta of forgetting, viz., that forgetting is in general1 straightforwardly epistemical counternormative, that our propensity to forget is simply an epistemica 1 The default view should perhaps be understood as allowing that it is epistemically normative fo subject to forget information that she no longer accepts (information that has been left over after bel revision). See Sects. 2 and 3 for discussion of the role of forgetting in eliminating such "left ov information.
BibTeX: @article{Michaelian2011epistemology, author = {Michaelian, Kourken}, title = {The epistemology of forgetting}, year = {2011}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {74}, number = {3}, pages = {399--424}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9232-4} }
Naylor, A.	2011	Remembering-that: Episodic vs. semantic	Philosophical Psychology 24(3) 317-322	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a paper ''The intentionality of memory,'' Jordi Ferna´ndez (2006) proposes a way of distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory. I identify three difficulties with his proposal and provide a way ofdrawing the distinction that avoids these shortcomings.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor2011Remembering, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Remembering-that: Episodic vs. semantic}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {317--322}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.556612} }
Nielsen, J.U.	2011	A hermeneutical sketch of memory and the immemorial	Continental Philosophy Review 44(4) 401-416	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In one of his more recent works, Paul Ricoeur attempts to re-instate the philosophical discussion of memory at the very center of a more general discourse on human existence. In his exposition, Ricoeur relies upon what he himself char- acterizes as a phenomenology of memory. It is the aim of the present article to supplement the phenomenological account of memory discussed by Ricoeur with a hermeneutics of memory conscious of its own limitations. Such a hermeneutical supplement would not only be of complementary value but also provoke a rethinking of the relation between key concepts in the western discourse on memory, such as image, imprint, and trace. In this regard, the proposed herme- neutical reconfiguration of memory exceeds its own limitations and overflows into an investigation of the primordial passive and past ground, which motivates and allows the hermeneutical activity in the first place. Following the analyses of Emmanuel Le´vinas, I will argue that this immemorial past must be conceived in terms of a responsibility that cannot be fulfilled
BibTeX: @article{Nielsen2011hermeneutical, author = {Nielsen, Jon Utoft}, title = {A hermeneutical sketch of memory and the immemorial}, year = {2011}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {44}, number = {4}, pages = {401--416}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-011-9198-1} }
Phillips, I.B.	2011	Attention and iconic memory	Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays Oxford University Press 202-225			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Phillips2011Attention, author = {Phillips, Ian B.}, title = {Attention and iconic memory}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays}, editor = {Mole, Christopher and Smithies, Declan and Wu, Wayne}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {202--225} }
Phillips, I.B.	2011	Perception and iconic memory: What Sperling doesn't show	Mind & Language 26(4) 381-411	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change-detection paradigms (e. g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms are fundamentally different from Sperling's and, for rather different reasons, equally fail to establish controversial claims about perceptual experience.
BibTeX: @article{Phillips2011Perception, author = {Phillips, Ian B.}, title = {Perception and iconic memory: What Sperling doesn't show}, year = {2011}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, pages = {381--411}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01422.x} }
Power, S.E.	2011	Temporal illusions --- Philosophical considerations	Time and Time Perception Springer 11-35	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Does the status of certain temporal experiences as illusory depend on one's conception of time? Our concept of time in part determines our concept of what we hold to be real and unreal; what we hold to be real and unreal partially determines what we hold to be illusory; thus, our concept of time in part determines what we hold to be illusory. This paper argues that this dependency of illusions on the concept of time is applicable to illusions of time. Two possible temporal illusions given the evidence are examined, simultaneity and the experience of the past; it is argued that the evidence points at temporal illusions depending on which conception of time is true.
BibTeX: @incollection{Power2011Temporal, author = {Power, Sean Enda}, title = {Temporal illusions --- Philosophical considerations}, year = {2011}, booktitle = {Time and Time Perception}, editor = {Vatakis, A.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {11--35}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21478-3_2} }
Schechtman, M.	2011	Memory and identity	Philosophical Studies 153(1) 65-79	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker's impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker's analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account. Sven Bernecker's Memory: a Philosophical Study provides a most welcome contribution to what Bernecker rightly describes as an under-studied subject---the philosophy of memory. Bernecker develops an exciting new philosophical account of memory and applies it to a wide range of outstanding problems. Here I will focus on just one of the areas he discusses; the relation between personal identity and memory, and in particular the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity. Bernecker engages in extended discussion of this relation at two
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2011Memory, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Memory and identity}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {153}, number = {1}, pages = {65--79}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9645-6} }
Shanton, K.	2011	Memory, knowledge and epistemic competence	Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2(1) 89-104	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Sosa (2007) claims that a necessary condition on knowledge is manifesting an epistemic competence. To manifest an epistemic competence, a belief must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must derive from the exercise of a reliable belief-forming disposition in appropriate conditions for its exercise and (2) that exercise of the disposition in those conditions would not issue a false belief in a close possible world. Drawing on recent psychological research, I show that memories that are issued by episodic memory retrieval fail to satisfy either of these conditions. This presents Sosa, and other proponents of similar conditions (e.g. some safety theorists and process reliabilists), with a dilemma: (1) deny that episodic memories count as knowledge or (2) give up the conditions as necessary conditions on knowledge. I explore the implications of this dilemma for our understanding of knowledge, memory and the relationship between them.
BibTeX: @article{Shanton2011Memory, author = {Shanton, Karen}, title = {Memory, knowledge and epistemic competence}, year = {2011}, journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {89--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0038-8} }
Sinclair, M.	2011	Is habit 'the fossilised residue of a spiritual activity'? Ravaisson, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42(1) 33-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sinclair2011Is, author = {Sinclair, Mark}, title = {Is habit 'the fossilised residue of a spiritual activity'? Ravaisson, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty}, year = {2011}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {33--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2011.11006730} }
Stiegler, B.	2011	Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise	Stanford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Stiegler2011Technics, author = {Stiegler, Berhard}, title = {Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Stanford University Press} }
Stokes, P.	2011	Uniting the perspectival subject: Two approaches	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10(1) 23-44	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Visual forms of episodic memory and anticipatory imagination involve images that, by virtue of their perspectival organization, imply a ''notional subject'' of experience. But they contain no inbuilt reference to the ''actual subject,'' the person actually doing the remembering or imagining. This poses the problem of what (if anything) connects these two perspectival subjects and what differentiates cases of genuine memory and anticipation from mere ''imagined seeing.'' I consider two approaches to this problem. The first, exemplified by Wollheim and Velleman, claims that genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations are phenomenally ''unselfconscious,'' with the co-identity of the notional and actual subjects secured by a determinate causal history. The second approach posits some distinctive phenomenal property that attaches to genuinely reflexive memories and anticipations and serves to experientially conflate the notional and actual subject. I consider a version of the second approach, derived from Kierkegaard's discussions of phenomenal ''contemporaneity,'' and argue that this approach can better account for the possibility of affective alienation from the selves we were and will be: the way in which our sense of self and awareness of our causal history can sometimes come apart.
BibTeX: @article{Stokes2011Uniting, author = {Stokes, Patrick}, title = {Uniting the perspectival subject: Two approaches}, year = {2011}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {23--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9151-5} }
Strawson, G.	2011	Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Strawson2011Locke, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Sutton, J.	2011	Influences on memory	Memory Studies 4(4) 355-359	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The study of remembering is both compelling and challenging, in part, because of the multiplicity and the complexity of influences on memory. Whatever their interests, memory researchers are always aware of the many different factors that can drive the processes they care about. A search for the phrase 'influences on memory' confirms this daunting and exhilarating array of influences, of many different kinds, operating at many different timescales, and presumably often interacting in ways that we can't yet imagine
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2011Influences, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Influences on memory}, year = {2011}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {4}, number = {4}, pages = {355--359}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698011414082} }
Sutton, J.	2011	Time, experience, and descriptive experience sampling	Journal of Consciousness Studies 18(1) 118-129			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2011Time, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Time, experience, and descriptive experience sampling}, year = {2011}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {118--129} }
Sutton, J., McIlwain, D., Christensen, W. and Geeves, A.	2011	Applying intelligence to the reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between Dreyfus and Descartes	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42(1) 78-103		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2011Applying, author = {Sutton, John and McIlwain, Doris and Christensen, Wayne and Geeves, Andrew}, title = {Applying intelligence to the reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between Dreyfus and Descartes}, year = {2011}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {78--103}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2011.11006732} }
Theiner, G.	2011	Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis	Peter Lang			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Theiner2011Res, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis}, year = {2011}, publisher = {Peter Lang} }
Trigg, D.	2011	The return of the new flesh: Body memory in David Cronenberg's The Fly	Film-Philosophy 15(1) 82-99			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Trigg2011return, author = {Trigg, Dylan}, title = {The return of the new flesh: Body memory in David Cronenberg's The Fly}, year = {2011}, journal = {Film-Philosophy}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {82--99} }
Vandekerckhove, M. and Panksepp, J.	2011	A neurocognitive theory of higher mental emergence: From anoetic affective experiences to noetic knowledge and autonoetic awareness	Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 35(9) 2017-2025	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay provides an overview of evolutionary levels of consciousness, with a focus on a continuum of consciousness: from primarily affective to more advanced cognitive forms of neural processing-from anoetic (without knowledge) consciousness based on affective feelings, elaborated by brain networks that are subcortical- and can function without neocortical involvement, to noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic (higher reflective mental) processes that permits conscious awareness. An abundance of such mind-brain linkages have been established using standard neuropsychological and brain-imaging procedures. Much of the characterization of human mental landscapes has been achieved with long accepted psychometric procedures that often do not adequately tap the lived anoetic experiential phenomenological aspects of mind. Without an understanding of affective based anoetic forms of consciousness, an adequate characterization of the human mind may never be achieved. A full synthesis will require us to view mental-experiential processes concurrently at several distinct neurophysiological levels, including foundational affective-emotional issues that are best probed with cross-species affective neuroscience strategies. This essay attempts to relate these levels of analysis to the neural systems that constitute lived experience in the human mind.
BibTeX: @article{Vandekerckhove2011neurocognitive, author = {Vandekerckhove, Marie and Panksepp, Jaak}, title = {A neurocognitive theory of higher mental emergence: From anoetic affective experiences to noetic knowledge and autonoetic awareness}, year = {2011}, journal = {Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews}, volume = {35}, number = {9}, pages = {2017--2025}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.04.001} }
Vargas, P.A., Fernaeus, Y., Lim, M.Y., Enz, S., Ho, W.C., Jacobsson, M. and Ayllet, R.	2011	Advocating an ethical memory model for artificial companions from a human-centred perspective	AI & Society 26(4) 329-337	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper considers the ethical implications of applying three major ethical theories to the memory structure of an artificial companion that might have different embodiments such as a physical robot or a graphical character on a hand-held device. We start by proposing an ethical memory model and then make use of an action-centric framework to evaluate its ethical implications. The case that we discuss is that of digital artefacts that autonomously record and store user data, where this data are used as a resource for future interaction with users.
BibTeX: @article{Vargas2011Advocating, author = {Vargas, Patricia A. and Fernaeus, Ylva and Lim, Mei Yii and Enz, Sibylle and Ho, Wan Chin and Jacobsson, Mattias and Ayllet, Ruth}, title = {Advocating an ethical memory model for artificial companions from a human-centred perspective}, year = {2011}, journal = {AI & Society}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, pages = {329--337}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-010-0313-3} }
Weinberg, S.	2011	Locke on personal identity	Philosophy Compass 6(6) 398-407	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Locke's account of personal identity has been highly influential because of its emphasis on a psychological criterion. The same consciousness is required for being the same person. It is not so clear, however, exactly what Locke meant by 'consciousness' or by 'having the same consciousness'. Interpretations vary: consciousness is seen as identical to memory, as identical to a first personal appropriation of mental states, and as identical to a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one's own thinking. There is wide agreement, however, that Locke's theory of personal identity is meant to complement his moral and theological commitments to a system of divine punishment and reward in an afterlife. But these commitments seem to require also a metaphysical criterion, and Locke is insistent that it cannot be substance. The difficulty reconciling the psychological and metaphysical requirements of the theory has led, at worst, to charges of incoherence and, at best, to a slew of interpretations, none of which is widely accepted.
BibTeX: @article{Weinberg2011Locke, author = {Weinberg, Shelley}, title = {Locke on personal identity}, year = {2011}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {6}, number = {6}, pages = {398--407}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00402.x} }
Andriopoulos, D.Z.	2010	Notes on the Aristotelian theory of memory and anamnesis	Philosophical Inquiry 32(3) 73-84		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Andriopoulos2010Notes, author = {Andriopoulos, D. Z.}, title = {Notes on the Aristotelian theory of memory and anamnesis}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, pages = {73--84}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2010323/44} }
Ansell-Pearson, K.	2010	Bergson on memory	Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates Fordham University Press 61-76			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{AnsellPearson2010Bergson, author = {Ansell-Pearson, Keith}, title = {Bergson on memory}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates}, editor = {Radstone, S and Schwarz, B.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {61--76} }
Ansell-Pearson, K.	2010	Deleuze and the overcoming of memory	Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates Fordham University Press 161-174			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{AnsellPearson2010Deleuze, author = {Ansell-Pearson, Keith}, title = {Deleuze and the overcoming of memory}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates}, editor = {Radstone, S. and Schwarz, B.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {161--174} }
Barash, J.A.	2010	The place of remembrance: Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's theory of collective memory	A Passion for the Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricoeur Fordham University Press 147-157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Barash2010place, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {The place of remembrance: Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's theory of collective memory}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {A Passion for the Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricoeur}, editor = {Treanor, B. and Venema, H.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {147--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823290789-012} }
Kathy Behrendt	2010	Scraping down the past: Memory and amnesia in W. G. Sebald's anti-narrative	Philosophy and Literature 34(2) 394-408		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{KathyBehrendt2010Scraping, author = {Kathy Behrendt}, title = {Scraping down the past: Memory and amnesia in W. G. Sebald's anti-narrative}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophy and Literature}, volume = {34}, number = {2}, pages = {394--408}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/phl.2010.0006} }
Bernecker, S.	2010	Memory: A Philosophical Study	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bernecker2010Memory, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory: A Philosophical Study}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Bernecker, S. and Bogart, A.	2010	Memory (Oxford Bibliographies)	Oxford University Press		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bernecker2010Memoryb, author = {Bernecker, Sven and Bogart, Aaron}, title = {Memory (Oxford Bibliographies)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0072} }
Blustein, J.	2010	Forgiveness, commemoration, and restorative justice: The role of moral emotions	Metaphilosophy 41(4) 582-617	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Forgiveness of wrongdoing in response to public apology and amends making seems, on the face of it, to leave little room for the continued commemoration of wrongdoing. This rests on am is understanding of forgiveness, however, and we can explain why there need be no incompatibility between them. To do this, I emphasize the role of what I call nonangry negative moral emotions in constituting memories of wrongdoing. Memories so constituted can persist after forgiveness and have important moral functions, and commemorations can elicit these emotions to preserve memories of this sort. Moreover, commemorations can be a restorative justice practice that promotes reconciliation, but only on condition that the memories they preserve are constituted by nonangry negative, not retributive, emotions.
BibTeX: @article{Blustein2010Forgiveness, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {Forgiveness, commemoration, and restorative justice: The role of moral emotions}, year = {2010}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {41}, number = {4}, pages = {582--617}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2010.01652.x} }
Bregant, J., Stožer, A. and Cerkvenik, M.	2010	Molecular reduction: Reality or fiction?	Synthese 172(3) 437-450	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam's razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular-biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle's 'intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally' reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to caus-ally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at the molecular level and then, under controlled experimental conditions, to use generally-accepted rules of behav-iour within psychology to monitor the results of these manipulations. In this article, we argue that Bickle's case example for molecular reduction, i.e. the reduction of long-term memory to its cellular-molecular mechanisms, cannot support his claims, because it turns out that his chosen molecular pathway is neither a sufficient nor a nec-essary condition for the memory consolidation switch, and thus, instead of rejecting the multiple realization argument, Bickle's argument actually speaks in favour of it. Therefore the idea of reductive connections between our mental life and the activity of particular nerves is, at present, still more fiction than reality.
BibTeX: @article{Bregant2010Molecular, author = {Bregant, Janez and Stožer, Andraž and Cerkvenik, Marko}, title = {Molecular reduction: Reality or fiction?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {172}, number = {3}, pages = {437--450}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9401-z} }
Byrne, A.	2010	Recollection, perception, imagination	Philosophical Studies 148(1) 15-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Byrne2010Recollection, author = {Byrne, Alex}, title = {Recollection, perception, imagination}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {148}, number = {1}, pages = {15--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9508-1} }
Child, W.	2010	Remembering intentions	Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide Cambridge University Press 218-234		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Child2010Remembering, author = {Child, William}, title = {Remembering intentions}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide}, editor = {Achmed, A.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {218--234}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750939.013} }
Davies, M.	2010	Double dissociation: Understanding its role in cognitive neuropsychology	Mind & Language 25(5) 500-540	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper makes three points about the role of double dissociation in cognitive neuropsychology. First, arguments from double dissociation to separate modules work by inference to the best, not the only possible, explanation. Second, in the development of computational cognitive neuropsychology, the contribution of connec-tionist cognitive science has been to broaden the range of potential explanations of double dissociation. As a result, the competition between explanations, and the characteristic features of the assessment of theories against the criteria of probability and explanatory value, are more visible. Third, cognitive neuropsychology is a division of cognitive psychology but the practice of cognitive neuropsychology proceeds on assumptions that go beyond the subject matter of cognitive psychology. Given such assumptions, neuro-scientific findings about lesion location may enhance the value of double dissociation in shifting the balance of support between cognitive theories.
BibTeX: @article{Davies2010Double, author = {Davies, Martin}, title = {Double dissociation: Understanding its role in cognitive neuropsychology}, year = {2010}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {25}, number = {5}, pages = {500--540}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01399.x} }
Debus, D.	2010	Accounting for epistemic relevance: A new problem for the causal theory of memory	American Philosophical Quarterly 47(1) 17-29			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Debus2010Accounting, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Accounting for epistemic relevance: A new problem for the causal theory of memory}, year = {2010}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {47}, number = {1}, pages = {17--29} }
Durie, R.	2010	Wandering among shadows: The discordance of time in Levinas and Bergson	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 48(4) 371-392	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the earliest examples of articulating the ''discordance of time''---a theme that serves as a guiding thread woven throughout much of the re-engagement with time that is characteristic of continental philosophy---can be found in a series of essays written by Levinas in the aftermath of World War II. I show how these essays derive from a set of key texts by Bergson and how Bergson already anticipated the distinctive ways of conceptualizing the movement of time that are advanced by Levinas in his early essays. Nevertheless, as I will show, Levinas chooses not to acknowledge this Bergsonian anticipation of his theory of time, despite his recognition, repeated throughout many texts and interviews, of the influence of Bergson on the formation of his own thought. I conclude by reflecting on the complexity of the Bergsonian inheritance in Levinas's philosophy of time.
BibTeX: @article{Durie2010Wandering, author = {Durie, Robin}, title = {Wandering among shadows: The discordance of time in Levinas and Bergson}, year = {2010}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {48}, number = {4}, pages = {371--392}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2010.00039.x} }
Esposito, C.	2010	Memory and temptation: Heidegger reads book X of Augustine's Confessions	A Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life Rodopi 285-307			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Esposito2010Memory, author = {Esposito, C.}, title = {Memory and temptation: Heidegger reads book X of Augustine's Confessions}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {A Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life}, editor = {McGrath, S. J. and Wierciŉski, Andrzej}, publisher = {Rodopi}, pages = {285--307} }
Falvey, K.	2010	The view from nowhen: The Mctaggart-Dummett argument for the unreality of time	Philosophia 38(2) 297-312	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Years ago, Michael Dummett defended McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time, arguing that it cannot be dismissed as guilty of an ''indexical fallacy.'' Recently, E. J. Lowe has disputed Dummett's claims for the cogency of the argument. I offer an elaboration and defense of Dummett's interpretation of the argument (though not of its soundness). I bring to bear some work on tense from the philosophy of language, and some recent work on the concept of the past as it occurs in memory, in an effort to support the claim that McTaggart is not guilty of any simple indexical fallacy. Along the way I criticize an account of what is at stake in disputes about the reality of tense due to A. W. Moore, and I argue for the superiority of the conception of tense-realism that is implicit in McTaggart's work. The paper is intended to prepare the ground for a substantive defense of the reality of tense.
BibTeX: @article{Falvey2010view, author = {Falvey, Kevin}, title = {The view from nowhen: The Mctaggart-Dummett argument for the unreality of time}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {297--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9227-z} }
Faria, P.	2010	Memory as acquaintance with the past: Some lessons from Russell, 1912-1914	Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 51(121) 149-172	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.
BibTeX: @article{Faria2010Memory, author = {Faria, Paulo}, title = {Memory as acquaintance with the past: Some lessons from Russell, 1912-1914}, year = {2010}, journal = {Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia}, volume = {51}, number = {121}, pages = {149--172}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1590/S0100-512X2010000100008} }
Feest, U.	2010	Concepts as tools in the experimental generation of knowledge in cognitive neuropsychology	Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 4(1) 173-190	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper asks (a) how new scientific objects of research are conceptualized at a point in time when little is known about them, and (b) how those conceptualizations, in turn, figure in the process of investigating the phenomena in question. Contrasting my approach with existing notions of concepts and situating it in relation to existing discussions about the epistemology of experimentation, I propose to think of concepts as research tools. I elaborate on the conception of a tool that informs my account. Narrowing my focus to phenomena in cognitive neuropsychology, I then illustrate my thesis with the example of the concept of implicit memory. This account is based on an original reconstruction of the nature and function of operationism in psychology.
BibTeX: @article{Feest2010Concepts, author = {Feest, Uljana}, title = {Concepts as tools in the experimental generation of knowledge in cognitive neuropsychology}, year = {2010}, journal = {Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {173--190}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v4i1.11938} }
Francescotti, R.	2010	Psychological continuity and the necessity of identity	American Philosophical Quarterly 47(4) 337-349			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Francescotti2010Psychological, author = {Francescotti, Robert}, title = {Psychological continuity and the necessity of identity}, year = {2010}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {47}, number = {4}, pages = {337--349} }
Gerrans, P. and Kennett, J.	2010	Neurosentimentalism and moral agency	Mind 119(475) 585-614	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the 'dual process' model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for agency. Agency, in turn, requires a capacity to conceive of oneself as temporally extended: to inhabit, in both memory and imagination, an autobiographical past and future. To plan, to commit to plans, and to act in accordance with previous plans requires a diachronic self, able to transcend the present moment. While this fact about agency is central to much of moral philosophy (e.g. in discussions of autonomy and moral responsibility) it is opaque to the dual process framework and those meta-ethical accounts which situate themselves within this model of cognition. We show how this is the case and argue for an empirically adequate account of moral judgement which gives sufficient role to memory and imagination as cognitive prerequisites of agency. We reconsider the empirical evidence, provide an alternative, agentive, interpretation of key findings, and evaluate the consequences for metaethics.
BibTeX: @article{Gerrans2010Neurosentimentalism, author = {Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette}, title = {Neurosentimentalism and moral agency}, year = {2010}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {119}, number = {475}, pages = {585--614}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzq037} }
Ginsburg, S. and Jablonka, E.	2010	The evolution of associative learning: A factor in the Cambrian explosion	Journal of Theoretical Biology 266(1) 11-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Cambrian explosion is probably the most spectacular diversification in evolutionary history, and understanding it has been a challenge for biologists since the time of Darwin. We propose that one of the key factors that drove this great diversification was associative learning. Although the evolutionary emergence of associative learning required only small modifications in already existing memory mechanisms and may have occurred in parallel in several groups, once this type of learning appeared on the evolutionary scene, it led to extreme diversifying selection at the ecological level: it enabled animals to exploit new niches, promoted new types of relations and arms races, and led to adaptive responses that became fixed through genetic accommodation processes. This learning-based diversification was accompanied by neurohormonal stress, which led to an ongoing destabilization and re-patterning of the epigenome, which, in turn, enabled further morphological, physiological, and behavioral diversification. Our hypothesis combines several previous ideas about the dynamics of the Cambrian explosion and provides a unifying framework that includes both ecological and genomic factors. We conclude by suggesting research directions that would clarify the timing and manner in which associative learning evolved, and the effects it had on the evolution of nervous systems, genomes, and animal morphology.
BibTeX: @article{Ginsburg2010evolution, author = {Ginsburg, Simona and Jablonka, Eva}, title = {The evolution of associative learning: A factor in the Cambrian explosion}, year = {2010}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, volume = {266}, number = {1}, pages = {11--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.017} }
Gustafsson, J.E.	2010	Did Locke defend the memory continuity criterion of personal identity?	Locke Studies 10(1) 113-129			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gustafsson2010Did, author = {Gustafsson, Johan E.}, title = {Did Locke defend the memory continuity criterion of personal identity?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Locke Studies}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {113--129} }
Hagberg, G.L.	2010	In a new light: Wittgenstein, aspect-perception, and retrospective change in self-understanding	Seeing Wittgenstein Anew: New Essays on Aspect-Seeing Cambridge University Press 101-119		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hagberg2010new, author = {Hagberg, Garry L.}, title = {In a new light: Wittgenstein, aspect-perception, and retrospective change in self-understanding}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Seeing Wittgenstein Anew: New Essays on Aspect-Seeing}, editor = {Day, William and Krebs, V\ictor J}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {101--119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511750663} }
Harbecke, J.	2010	Mechanistic constitution in neurobiological explanations	International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24(3) 267-285	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses the constitution relation within the framework of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanation. It develops a regularity theory of constitution as an alternative to the manipulationist theory of constitution advocated by some of the proponents of the mechanistic approach. After the main problems of the manipulationist account of constitution have been reviewed, the regularity account is developed based on the notion of a minimal type relevance theory. A minimal type relevance theory expresses a minimally necessary condition of a given type that consists of a disjunction of minimally sufficient conditions of that type. Afterwards, the attained definition is successfully applied in an analysis of the logical structure of the explanation of spatial learning and memory in rats as a paradigm neurobiological explanation. The overall result is a more robust and more precise version of the mechanistic approach to neurobiological explanations. 1.
BibTeX: @article{Harbecke2010Mechanistic, author = {Harbecke, Jens}, title = {Mechanistic constitution in neurobiological explanations}, year = {2010}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {267--285}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2010.522409} }
Hazlett, A.	2010	The myth of factive verbs	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80(3) 497-522		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hazlett2010myth, author = {Hazlett, Allan}, title = {The myth of factive verbs}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {80}, number = {3}, pages = {497--522}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00338.x} }
Hurley, E.A.	2010	Combat trauma and the moral risks of memory manipulating drugs	Journal of Applied Philosophy 27(3) 221-245	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: To date, 1.7 million US military service personnel have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those, one in five are suffering from diagnosable combat-stress related psychological injuries including Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). All indications are that the mental health toll of the current conflicts on US troops and the medical systems that care for them will only increase. Against this backdrop, research suggesting that the common class of drugs known as beta-blockers might prevent the onset of PTSD is drawing much interest. I urge caution against accepting too quickly the use of beta-blockers for dealing with the psychological injuries that combat experiences can wreak. Beta-blockers are thought to work by disrupting the formation of emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and that in some people manifest as PTSD. Focusing on a single dimension of soldiers' experience in combat, namely, their perpetration of other-directed violence, I argue that some of the emotional memories blunted by beta-blockers play important roles in the recovery of moral aspects of soldiers' selves damaged by experiences of combat violence 2014 specifically, in the achievement of a state of grace2014 and, therefore, that the use of beta-blockers may come with distinct moral costs.
BibTeX: @article{Hurley2010Combat, author = {Hurley, Elisa A.}, title = {Combat trauma and the moral risks of memory manipulating drugs}, year = {2010}, journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy}, volume = {27}, number = {3}, pages = {221--245}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00492.x} }
Hurley, E.A.	2010	Pharmacotherapy to blunt memories of sexual violence: What's a feminist to think?	Hypatia 25(3) 527-552	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It has recently been discovered that propranolol-a beta-blocker traditionally used to treat cardiac arrhythmias and hypertension-might disrupt the formation of the emotionally disturbing memories that typically occur in the wake of traumatic events and consequently prevent the onset of trauma-induced psychological injuries such as Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. One context in which the use of propranolol is generating interest in both the popular and scientific press is sexual violence. Nevertheless, feminists have so far not weighed in on propranolol. I suggest that the time is ripe for a careful feminist analysis of the moral and political implications of propranolol use in the context of sexual violence. In this paper, I map the feminist issues potentially raised by providing propranolol to victims of sexual assault, focusing in particular on the compatibility of propranolol use and availability with an understanding of the social and systematic dimensions of rape's harms. I do not deliver a final verdict on propranolol; in fact, I show that we do not yet have enough information about propranolol's effects to do so. Rather, I provide a feminist framework for evaluating the possibilities and perils opened up by therapeutic memory manipulation in the context of sexual violence against women.
BibTeX: @article{Hurley2010Pharmacotherapy, author = {Hurley, Elisa A.}, title = {Pharmacotherapy to blunt memories of sexual violence: What's a feminist to think?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Hypatia}, volume = {25}, number = {3}, pages = {527--552}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2010.01108.x} }
Jyväsjärvi, M.	2010	Retrieving the hidden meaning: Jain commentarial techniques and the art of memory	Journal of Indian Philosophy 38(2) 133-162	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the peculiar characteristics of the vast body of Jain commentarial literature is the primacy given to artha, meaning, over su¯tra, the root text itself. It is the task of the commentator---or, in a pedagogical context, the teacher---to retrieve and explain a text's true, hidden meaning, which often appears to stretch and even contradict its apparent meaning. This article examines the interpretive processes in one of the most important Jain commentaries on monastic discipline, the Br: hat- kalpabha¯s: ya attributed to the sixth-century CE S´veta¯mbara Jain exegete Sa_ngha- da¯sa. An examination of passages where the commentator claims to uncover the real---but sometimes less-than-apparent---meaning of monastic rules enables us to detect the interpretive moves involved and the underlying assumptions about the nature of text and the work of commentary. I argue that this commentarial tradition presupposes particular practices of memory, and a degree of internalizing the traditional hermeneutical methods, on the part of a monastic practitioner who wants to understand the text correctly and live according to its true meaning.
BibTeX: @article{Jyvaesjaervi2010Retrieving, author = {Jyväsjärvi, Mari}, title = {Retrieving the hidden meaning: Jain commentarial techniques and the art of memory}, year = {2010}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {133--162}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-010-9086-8} }
Kiverstein, J.	2010	Making sense of phenomenal unity: An intentionalist account of temporal experience	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67(67) 155-181	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must also account for phenomenal unity. I look to Edmund Husserl's writings on time consciousness for such an account.
BibTeX: @article{Kiverstein2010Making, author = {Kiverstein, Julian}, title = {Making sense of phenomenal unity: An intentionalist account of temporal experience}, year = {2010}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {67}, number = {67}, pages = {155--181}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246110000081} }
Malpas, J.	2010	Truth, narrative, and the materiality of memory: An externalist approach in the philosophy of history	Journal of the Philosophy of History 4(3) 328-353	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the most influential and significant developments in the philosophy of language over the last thirty years has been the rise of externalist conceptions of content. This essay aims to explore the implications of a form of externalism, largely derived from the work of Donald Davidson, for thinking about history, and in so doing to suggest one way in which contemporary philosophy of language may engage with contemporary philosophy of history. Much of the discussion focuses on the elaboration of the externalism that is at issue, along with the holistic approach to content with which it is connected. It will be argued that such holistic externalism is itself thoroughly in keeping with the very character of historical inquiry itself, and can be seen to provide an underpinning to certain contemporary developments in historical thinking.
BibTeX: @article{Malpas2010Truth, author = {Malpas, Jeff}, title = {Truth, narrative, and the materiality of memory: An externalist approach in the philosophy of history}, year = {2010}, journal = {Journal of the Philosophy of History}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, pages = {328--353}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/187226310X536204} }
Matthen, M.	2010	Is memory preservation?	Philosophical Studies 148(1) 3-14		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Matthen2010Is, author = {Matthen, Mohan}, title = {Is memory preservation?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {148}, number = {1}, pages = {3--14}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9501-8} }
Matthen, M.	2010	Two visual systems and the feeling of presence	Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems Oxford University Press 107-124		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Matthen2010Two, author = {Matthen, Mohan}, title = {Two visual systems and the feeling of presence}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems}, editor = {Gangopadhyay, Nivedita and Madary, Michael and Spicer, Finn}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {107--124}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199551118.003.0007} }
Merleau-Ponty, M.	2010	Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955)	Northwestern University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{MerleauPonty2010Institution, author = {Merleau-Ponty, Maurice}, title = {Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955)}, year = {2010}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press} }
Mirkes, R.	2010	Does pharmacologically-altered memory change personal identity?	Ethics and Medicine 26(3) 175-187			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mirkes2010Does, author = {Mirkes, Renee}, title = {Does pharmacologically-altered memory change personal identity?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Ethics and Medicine}, volume = {26}, number = {3}, pages = {175--187} }
Nichols, S. and Bruno, M.	2010	Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study	Philosophical Psychology 23(3) 293-312	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Williams (1970) argues that our intuitions about personal identity vary depending on how a given thought experiment is framed. Some frames lead us to think that persistence of self requires persistence of ones psychological characteristics; other frames lead us to think that the self persists even after the loss of ones distinctive psychological characteristics. The current paper takes an empirical approach to these issues. We find that framing does affect whether or not people judge that persistence of psychological characteristics is required for persistence of self. Open-ended, abstract questions about what is required for survival tend to elicit responses that appeal to the importance of psychological characteristics. This emphasis on psychological characteristics is largely preserved even when participants are exposed to a concrete case that yields conflicting intuitions over whether memory must be preserved in order for a person to persist. Insofar as our philosophical theory of personal identity should be based on our intuitions, the results provide some support for the view that psychological characteristics really are critical for persistence of self.
BibTeX: @article{Nichols2010Intuitions, author = {Nichols, Shaun and Bruno, Michael}, title = {Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, pages = {293--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490939} }
O'Connor, B.	2010	Adorno on the destruction of memory	Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates Fordham University Press 136-149			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{OConnor2010Adorno, author = {O'Connor, Brian}, title = {Adorno on the destruction of memory}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates}, editor = {Radstone, S. and Schwarz, B.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {136--149} }
Parens, E.	2010	The ethics of memory blunting and the narcissism of small differences	Neuroethics 3(2) 99-107	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: At least since 2003, when the US Presidents Council on Bioethics published Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness, there has been heated debate about the ethics of using pharmacology to reduce the intensity of emotions associated with painful memories. That debate has sometimes been conducted in language that obfuscates as much as it illuminates. I argue that the two sides of the debate actually agree that, in general, it is good to reduce the emotional intensity of memories associated with traumatic events, when (as in the case of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) the intensity of those memories is disproportionate to the precipitating traumatic event. Both sides also agree that, in generalnot as an ironclad ruleit is bad to reduce the emotional intensity of memories associated with difficult but normal human problems of living, when the intensity of the emotions is proportionate to those problems. Between those two areas of agreement, there is a zone of ambiguity, in which reasonable people, who proceed from different but equally ethical frameworks, may indeed reach different conclusions about the same set of facts. But I will argue that even in the zone of ambiguity, there is more agreement than the language favored by the different frameworks sometimes suggests. Ultimately, I suggest that if we see the extent to which the substantive differences between the two frameworks are smaller than their articulators language sometimes suggests, we can engage in a more productive conversation about whether a particular intervention will facilitate or diminish human flourishing.
BibTeX: @article{Parens2010ethics, author = {Parens, Erik}, title = {The ethics of memory blunting and the narcissism of small differences}, year = {2010}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {99--107}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-010-9070-8} }
Perry, J.	2010	Selves and self-concepts	Time and Identity MIT Press 229-247		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perry2010Selves, author = {Perry, John}, title = {Selves and self-concepts}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Time and Identity}, editor = {Campbell, Joseph Keim and O'Rourke, Michael and Silverstein, Harry}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {229--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014090.003.0162} }
Raftopoulos, A.	2010	Can nonconceptual content be stored in visual memory?	Philosophical Psychology 23(5) 639-668	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory (VSTM) stores nonconceptual content (NCC), in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: (1) NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; (2) the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when object-centered attention modulates visual processing and this modulation signifies the onset of the conceptualization of that content; (3) only categorical high-level information that characterizes conceptual content and not metric and precise iconic information that characterizes NCC can be stored in visual memory for long periods; and (4) if NCC were stored in visual memory then this would allow recognitional judgments pertaining to NCC-one could recognize the precise shade of a color that one had seen before. However NCC does not allow such recognitional judgments.
BibTeX: @article{Raftopoulos2010Can, author = {Raftopoulos, Athanassios}, title = {Can nonconceptual content be stored in visual memory?}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {23}, number = {5}, pages = {639--668}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.514571} }
Ramanujam, R.	2010	Memory and logic: A tale from automata theory	Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27(1) 305-337			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ramanujam2010Memory, author = {Ramanujam, R.}, title = {Memory and logic: A tale from automata theory}, year = {2010}, journal = {Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, pages = {305--337} }
Reyes, G.M.	2010	Memory and alterity: The case for an analytic of difference	Philosophy and Rhetoric 43(3) 222-252		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reyes2010Memory, author = {Reyes, G. Mitchell}, title = {Memory and alterity: The case for an analytic of difference}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophy and Rhetoric}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {222--252}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/par.0.0060} }
Richter, G.	2010	Acts of memory and mourning: Derrida and the fictions of anteriority	Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates Fordham University Press 150-160			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Richter2010Acts, author = {Richter, Gerhard}, title = {Acts of memory and mourning: Derrida and the fictions of anteriority}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates}, editor = {Radstone, S. and Schwarz, B.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {150--160} }
Robin, F.	2010	Imagery and memory illusions	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(2) 253-262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article provides a summary of current knowledge about memory illusions. The memory illusions described here focus on the recall of imagined events that have never actually occurred. The purpose is to review theoretical ideas and empirical evidence about the reality-monitoring processes involved in memory illusions. Reality monitoring means deciding whether the memory has been perceptually derived or been self-generated (thought or imagined). A few key findings from the literature have been reported in this paper and these focus on internal source-monitoring judgments which distinguish perceptual events from imagined events. Finally, the experimental paradigms used to shed light on processes occurring in the failure of reality monitoring in healthy subjects may be extended to an examination of the causes and the prevention of hallucinations in patients.
BibTeX: @article{Robin2010Imagery, author = {Robin, Frédérique}, title = {Imagery and memory illusions}, year = {2010}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {253--262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9159-x} }
Rowlands, M.	2010	The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rowlands2010New, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology}, year = {2010}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Rupert, R.D.	2010	Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive systems	Cognitive Systems Research 11(4) 343-356	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay begins by addressing the role of the so-called Parity Principle in arguments for extended cognition. It is concluded that the Parity Principle does not, by itself, demarcate cognition and that another mark of the cognitive must be sought. The second section of the paper advances two arguments against the extended view of cognition, one of which - the conservatism-or-simplicity argument - appeals to principles of theory selection, and the other of which - the argument from demarcation - draws on a systems-based theory of cognition. The final section contests the claim, made by Andy Clark, that empirical work done by Wayne Gray and colleagues supports the extended view.
BibTeX: @article{Rupert2010Extended, author = {Rupert, Robert D.}, title = {Extended cognition and the priority of cognitive systems}, year = {2010}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, pages = {343--356}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.04.002} }
Sakuragi, S.	2010	On memory knowledge	Kagaku Tetsugaku 43(1) 61-77	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper is concerned with a well-known problem concern- ing the retention of propositional knowledge. Although most of what we currently believe ourselves to know originates in the past, we usually do not know how we originally acquired that knowledge. But then, on what grounds can we still know it? In this paper, I outline two different types of approaches to the problem in light of notable epistemic theories, and then examine difficulties faced by them.
BibTeX: @article{Sakuragi2010memory, author = {Sakuragi, Shin}, title = {On memory knowledge}, year = {2010}, journal = {Kagaku Tetsugaku}, volume = {43}, number = {1}, pages = {61--77}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.43.1_61} }
Sekatskiy, A.	2010	The photographic argument of philosophy	Philosophy of Photography 1(1) 81-88	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: More than 150 years have passed since the invention of photography, and we are still finding it hard to accept that the photographic procedure is not as much about the recording of objects as it is about the recording of a different experience of time. Seen in this way, the photograph can reveal to us the limitations of our own perception of time and a glimpse of another time scale. This article traces the evolution of the idea of photographic time in philosophy from Plato to St. Augustine, to Bergson.
BibTeX: @article{Sekatskiy2010photographic, author = {Sekatskiy, Alexander}, title = {The photographic argument of philosophy}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophy of Photography}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {81--88}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1386/pop.1.1.81/1} }
Shanton, K. and Goldman, A.I.	2010	Simulation theory	Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1(4) 527-538	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Simulation plays a significant role in human cognition. This article reviews evidence for a simulational account of mind reading. Drawing on findings in developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience, it shows that mind reading involves the imitation, copying, or reexperience of the mind reading target's mental processes. The article also introduces evidence for simulational accounts of episodic memory and prospection. It identifies relevant similarities between mind reading, memory, and prospection as well as independent evidence for a role for simulation in memory.
BibTeX: @article{Shanton2010Simulation, author = {Shanton, Karen and Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Simulation theory}, year = {2010}, journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {527--538}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.33} }
Shea, N. and Heyes, C.	2010	Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: The type that does the trick	Biology & Philosophy 25(1) 95-110	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The question of whether non-human animals are conscious is of fundamental importance. There are already good reasons to think that many are, based on evolutionary continuity and other considerations. However, the hypothesis is notoriously resistant to direct empirical test. Numerous studies have shown behaviour in animals analogous to consciously-produced human behaviour. Fewer probe whether the same mechanisms are in use. One promising line of evidence about consciousness in other animals derives from experiments on metamemory. A study by Hampton (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98(9):5359--5362, 2001) suggests that at least one rhesus macaque can use metamemory to predict whether it would itself succeed on a delayed matching-to-sample task. Since it is not plausible that mere meta-representation requires consciousness, Hampton's study invites an important question: what kind of metamemory is good evidence for consciousness? This paper argues that if it were found that an animal had a memory trace which allowed it to use information about a past perceptual stimulus to inform a range of different behaviours, that would indeed be good evidence that the animal was conscious. That functional characterisation can be tested by investigating whether successful performance on one metamemory task transfers to a range of new tasks. The paper goes on to argue that thinking about animal consciousness in this way helps in formulating a more precise functional characterisation of the mechanisms of conscious awareness.
BibTeX: @article{Shea2010Metamemory, author = {Shea, Nicholas and Heyes, Cecilia}, title = {Metamemory as evidence of animal consciousness: The type that does the trick}, year = {2010}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {25}, number = {1}, pages = {95--110}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-009-9171-0} }
Stuart, S.A.J.	2010	Conscious machines: Memory, melody and muscular imagination	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 37-51	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A great deal of effort has been, and continues to be, devoted to developing consciousness artificially (A small selection of the many authors writing in this area includes: Cotterill (J Conscious Stud 2:290--311, 1995, 1998), Haikonen (2003), Aleksander and Dunmall (J Conscious Stud 10:7--18, 2003), Sloman (2004, 2005), Aleksander (2005), Holland and Knight (2006), and Chella and Manzotti (2007)), and yet a similar amount of effort has gone in to demonstrating the infeasibility of the whole enterprise (Most notably: Dreyfus (1972/1979, 1992, 1998), Searle (1980), Harnad (J Conscious Stud 10:67--75, 2003), and Sternberg (2007), but there are a great many others). My concern in this paper is to steer some navigable channel between the two positions, laying out the necessary pre-conditions for consciousness in an artificial system, and concentrating on what needs to hold for the system to perform as a human being or other phenomenally conscious agent in an intersubjectively-demanding social and moral environment. By adopting a thick notion of embodiment---one that is bound up with the concepts of the lived body and autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela et al. 2003; and Ziemke 2003, 2007a, J Conscious Stud 14(7):167--179, 2007b)---I will argue that machine phenomenology is only possible within an embodied distributed system that possesses a richly affective musculature and a nervous system such that it can, through action and repetition, develop its tactile-kinaesthetic memory, individual kinaesthetic melodies pertaining to habitual practices, and an anticipatory enactive kinaesthetic imagination. Without these capacities the system would remain unconscious, unaware of itself embodied within a world. Finally, and following on from Damasio's (1991, 1994, 1999, 2003) claims for the necessity of pre-reflective conscious, emotional, bodily responses for the development of an organism's core and extended consciousness, I will argue that without these capacities any agent would be incapable of developing the sorts of somatic markers or saliency tags that enable affective reactions, and which are indispensable for effective decision-making and subsequent survival. My position, as presented here, remains agnostic about whether or not the creation of artificial consciousness is an attainable goal.
BibTeX: @article{Stuart2010Conscious, author = {Stuart, Susan A. J.}, title = {Conscious machines: Memory, melody and muscular imagination}, year = {2010}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {9}, pages = {37--51}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9134-6} }
Sukhoverkhov, A.V.	2010	Memory, sign systems, and self-reproductive processes	Biological Theory 5(2) 161-166	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article presents a project of general theory of memory that embraces different types of memory: physical, biological, and social. The theory of memory presented here revises and unifies the general theory of sign systems and the theory of information, because memory processes in biological and social systems are informational processes that continuously (re)construct and are constructed by sign systems. This article shows that memory cannot be reduced only to inherited information and material structures that "keep," "represent," or "carry" that information (DNA, historic manuscripts, and monuments); mostly, memory is a system-defining and system-defined principle that actively reconstructs information and processes of the system on the basis of inherited information, and is thus constantly reconstructed by it. For the most part, biological and social processes do not look like memory processes, but I will argue that dynamic, evolving, and self-reproductive systems have to be memory systems, and that life, society, and cognition are embodied producers and products of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Sukhoverkhov2010Memory, author = {Sukhoverkhov, Anton V.}, title = {Memory, sign systems, and self-reproductive processes}, year = {2010}, journal = {Biological Theory}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {161--166}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1162/BIOT_a_00037} }
Sullivan, J.A.	2010	A role for representation in cognitive neurobiology	Philosophy of Science 77(5) 875-887	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: What role does the concept of representation play in the contexts of experimentation and explanation in cognitive neurobiology? In this article, a distinction is drawn between minimal and substantive roles for representation. It is argued by appeal to a case study that representation currently plays a role in cognitive neurobiology somewhere in between minimal and substantive and that this is problematic given the ultimate explanatory goals of cognitive neurobiological research. It is suggested that what is needed is for representation to instead play a substantive role.
BibTeX: @article{Sullivan2010role, author = {Sullivan, Jacqueline Anne}, title = {A role for representation in cognitive neurobiology}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {77}, number = {5}, pages = {875--887}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/656818} }
Sullivan, J.A.	2010	Reconsidering 'spatial memory' and the Morris water maze	Synthese 177(2) 261-283	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of "what" phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., "spatial learning", "spatial navigation"), to representational changes (e.g., "cognitive map formation") to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., "water maze performance"). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris's first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze
BibTeX: @article{Sullivan2010Reconsidering, author = {Sullivan, Jacqueline Anne}, title = {Reconsidering 'spatial memory' and the Morris water maze}, year = {2010}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {177}, number = {2}, pages = {261--283}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9849-5} }
Sutton, J.	2010	Observer perspective and acentred memory: Some puzzles about point of view in personal memory	Philosophical Studies 148(1) 27-37	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Sometimes I remember my past experiences from an 'observer' perspective, seeing myself in the remembered scene. This paper analyses the distinction in personal memory between such external observer visuospatial perspectives and 'field' perspectives, in which I experience the remembered actions and events as from my original point of view. It argues that Richard Wollheim's related distinction between centred and acentred memory fails to capture the key phenomena, and criticizes Wollheim's reasons for doubting that observer 'memories' are genuine personal memories. Since field perspectives in personal memory are also likely to be the product of constructive processes, we should reject the common assumption that such constructive processes inevitably bring distortion and error. Yet field perspectives tend to be treated as privileged also in the domains of memory for skilled movement, and memory for trauma. In each case, it is argued that visuospatial perspective in personal memory should be distinguished from other kinds of perspective such as kinesthetic perspective and emotional perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2010Observer, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Observer perspective and acentred memory: Some puzzles about point of view in personal memory}, year = {2010}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {148}, number = {1}, pages = {27--37}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9498-z} }
Sutton, J., Harris, C.B. and Barnier, A.J.	2010	Memory and cognition	Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates Fordham University Press 209-226			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2010Memory, author = {Sutton, John and Harris, Celia B. and Barnier, Amanda J.}, title = {Memory and cognition}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates}, editor = {Radstone, Susannah and Schwarz, Bill}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {209--226} }
Sutton, J., Harris, C.B., Keil, P.G. and Barnier, A.J.	2010	The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9(4) 521-560	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper introduces a new, expanded range of relevant cognitive psychological research on collaborative recall and social memory to the philosophical debate on extended and distributed cognition. We start by examining the case for extended cognition based on the complementarity of inner and outer resources, bywhich neural, bodily, social, and environmental resources with disparate but complementary properties are integrated into hybrid cognitive systems, transforming or augmenting the nature of remembering or decision-making. Adams and Aizawa, noting this distinctive complementarity argument, say that they agreewith it completely: but they describe it as ''a non-revolutionary approach'' which leaves ''the cognitive psychology of memory as the study of processes that take place, essentially without exception, within nervous systems.'' In response,we carve out, on distinct conceptual and empirical grounds, a rich middle ground between internalist forms of cognitivism and radical anti-cognitivism. Drawing both on extended cognition literature and on Sterelny's account of the ''scaffolded mind'' (this issue), we develop a multidimensional framework for understanding varying relations between agents and external resources, both technolog- ical and social. On this basis we argue that, independent of any more ''revolutionary'' metaphysical claims about the partial constitution of cognitive processes by external resources, a thesis of scaffolded or distributed cognition can substantially influence or transform explanatory practice in cognitive science. Critics also cite various empirical results as evidence against the idea that remembering can extend beyond skull and skin. We respond with amore principled, representative survey of the scientific psychology of memory, focussing in particular on robust recent empirical traditions for the study of collaborative recall and transactive social memory. We describe our own empirical research on socially distributed remembering, aimed at identifying conditions for mnemonic emergence in collaborative groups. Philosophical debates about extended, embedded, and distributed cognition can thus make richer, mutually beneficial contact with independently motivated research programs in the cognitive psychology of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2010psychology, author = {Sutton, John and Harris, Celia B. and Keil, Paul G. and Barnier, Amanda J.}, title = {The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering}, year = {2010}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {521--560}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y} }
Theiner, G.	2010	Making sense of group cognition: The curious case of transactive memory systems	Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science 334-342	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The ''extended mind'' thesis (Clark, 2008) has focused primarily on the interactions between single individuals and cognitive artifacts, resulting in a relative neglect of interactions between people. At the same time, the idea that groups can have cognitive properties of their own has gained new ascendancy in various fields concerned with collective behavior. My main goal in this paper is to propose an understanding of group cognition as an emergent form of socially distributed cognition. To that end, I first clarify the relevant notions of cognition and emergence that are at play in the contemporary debate. I then apply our conceptual framework to recent developments in the theory of transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1986), arguing that the idea of group cognition is neither trivial nor shrouded in metaphysical mystery.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Theiner2010Making, author = {Theiner, Georg}, title = {Making sense of group cognition: The curious case of transactive memory systems}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science}, publisher = {Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science}, pages = {334--342}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5096/ASCS200951} }
Theiner, G., Allen, C. and Goldstone, R.L.	2010	Recognizing group cognition	Cognitive Systems Research 11(4) 378-395	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the " extended mind" thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark , 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about " the mark of the cognitive" (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group's ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a " demergentist," and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are " stuck" at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the " coupling-constitution" charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).
BibTeX: @article{Theiner2010Recognizing, author = {Theiner, Georg and Allen, Colin and Goldstone, Robert L.}, title = {Recognizing group cognition}, year = {2010}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, pages = {378--395}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.07.002} }
Theiner, G. and O'Connor, T.	2010	The emergence of group cognition	Emergence in Science and Philosophy Routledge 92-132			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Theiner2010emergence, author = {Theiner, Georg and O'Connor, Timothy}, title = {The emergence of group cognition}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Emergence in Science and Philosophy}, editor = {Corradini, Antonella and O'Connor, Timothy}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {92--132} }
Thompson, E.	2010	Self-no-self? Memory and reflexive awareness	Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions Oxford University Press 157-175	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter examines the so-called 'memory argument' for reflexive awareness in the Yogacara-Madhyamaka school of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. According to this argument, when one remembers one recalls both the past object and the past experience of this object, thus no additional higher-order cognition is required in order to recall the subjective side of the original experience, hence reflexive self-awareness or selfcognition belonged to the original experience. Husserlian phenomenology is used to defend the memory argument against rival Buddhist views that deny reflexive awareness, but it is also argued that such a phenomenological defense exerts pressure on certain versions of the Buddhist no-self doctrine.
BibTeX: @incollection{Thompson2010Self, author = {Thompson, Evan}, title = {Self-no-self? Memory and reflexive awareness}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Self, No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions}, editor = {Siderits, M. and Thompson, E. and Zahavi, D.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {157--175}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0006} }
Vedder, A. and Klaming, L.	2010	Human enhancement for the common good---Using neurotechnologies to improve eyewitness memory	AJOB Neuroscience 1(3) 22-33	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neurotechnologies that are currently applied to treat a range of neurological and psychiatric diseases were found to have a number of positive side effects on cognitive functioning in healthy individuals. Consequently, these neurotechnologies could in theory be used for cognitive enhancement purposes, for instance, the improvement of eyewitness memory. Improving the process of collecting eyewitness testimony would be of great value and is an example of cognitive enhancement for the common good. In this article, we discuss the epistemological and ethical issues such use raises. These issues are not only critical to using neurotechnologies to improve eyewitness memory, but have a wider scope. By discussing enhancement for a purpose that is not primarily self-regarding or self-serving but potentially benefits the society as a whole, we reflect on the consequences of accepting enhancement for the common good for the acceptability of cognitive enhancement in general.
BibTeX: @article{Vedder2010Human, author = {Vedder, Anton and Klaming, Laura}, title = {Human enhancement for the common good---Using neurotechnologies to improve eyewitness memory}, year = {2010}, journal = {AJOB Neuroscience}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, pages = {22--33}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2010.483996} }
Verley, X.	2010	Consciousness, memory, and recollection according to Whitehead	Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind State University of New York Press 387-406			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Verley2010Consciousness, author = {Verley, Xavier}, title = {Consciousness, memory, and recollection according to Whitehead}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Weber, M. and Weekes, A.}, publisher = {State University of New York Press}, pages = {387--406} }
Vosgerau, G.	2010	Memory and content	Consciousness and Cognition 19(3) 838-846	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper argues that any theory of content has to adopt a " functionalistic core" to concord with the cognitive sciences. This functionalistic core requires that representations are defined as substitutes in functions that describe the flexible behavior to be explained by the representation. The content of a representation can thus only be determined if the representation is " in use" , i.e. if it is an argument in such a function. The stored entities in memory are not in use while they are stored, and hence cannot be assigned a specific content. The term " template" is introduced to describe stored entities in memory. The discussion of some implications of this result show that some deep philosophical problems follow from this argument as well as consequences for empirical research on memory.
BibTeX: @article{Vosgerau2010Memory, author = {Vosgerau, Gottfried}, title = {Memory and content}, year = {2010}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {838--846}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.06.021} }
Welz, C.	2010	Identity as self-transformation: emotional conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory	Continental Philosophy Review 43(2) 267-285	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper develops the thesis that personal identity is neither to be taken in terms of an unchanging self-sufficient 'substance' nor in terms of selfhood 'without substance,' i.e. as fluctuating processes of pure relationality and subject-less activity. Instead, identity is taken as self-transformation that is bound to particular embodied individuals and surpasses them as individuated entities. The paper is structured in three parts. Part I describes the experiential givenness of conflicts that support our sense of self-transformation. While the first part develops an inter-subjective topography of emotional movements, the second part pays attention to their temporal dimension. We work with conflicts and get transformed by them also in the way we remember them. Part II focuses on the process of self-understanding that accompanies conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory. Part III compares and discusses different models of a 'relational ontology' of the person, which question the idea that we are defined only by how we define ourselves---just as they question the idea that one's identity is independent of how one relates to one's having changed.
BibTeX: @article{Welz2010Identity, author = {Welz, Claudia}, title = {Identity as self-transformation: emotional conflicts and their metamorphosis in memory}, year = {2010}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {43}, number = {2}, pages = {267--285}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-010-9142-9} }
Yamaguchi, I.	2010	Intermonadic temporalization in simultaneous reciprocal awakening	On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time Springer 295-317	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The problem of the infinite regress and the key to the solution of this problem are quite characteristic features in the development of Husserl's analysis of time consciousness. Although I believe the solution is in principle already given in Hua X (''Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins''), Husserl persistently strives to deepen his analysis of this problem. The central concern of his analysis seems to be the proper interpretation of the character of retentional intentionality as passive egoless intentionality. Such an interpre- tation must continue to maintain the distinction between egoic and egoless intentionality. This distinction leads to the latter distinction between egoic and intermonadic temporalization of the temporal stream of the living present given in the C-manuscripts. The final solution is found in the concept of the reciprocal awakening between the empty shapes of drive intentionality as primal affection and the primal impression (primal hyle) in the process of intermonadic tem- poralization. This unconscious temporalization in genetic phenomenology can establish a cooperative, but limited relation between phenomenology and neural science.
BibTeX: @incollection{Yamaguchi2010Intermonadic, author = {Yamaguchi, Ichiro}, title = {Intermonadic temporalization in simultaneous reciprocal awakening}, year = {2010}, booktitle = {On Time - New Contributions to the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time}, editor = {Lohmar, Dieter and Yamaguchi, Ichiro}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {295--317}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8766-9_15} }
Adams, M.P.	2009	Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction	Synthese 170(1) 97-114	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley andWilliamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411--444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the double dissociation of knowledge-that and knowledge-how and that is also able to do explanatory work elsewhere.
BibTeX: @article{Adams2009Empirical, author = {Adams, Marcus P.}, title = {Empirical evidence and the knowledge-that/knowledge-how distinction}, year = {2009}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {170}, number = {1}, pages = {97--114}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9349-z} }
Alechina, N., Logan, B., Nguyen, H.N. and Rakib, A.	2009	Verifying time, memory and communication bounds in systems of reasoning agents	Synthese 169(2) 385-403	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We present a framework for verifying systems composed of heterogeneous reasoning agents, in which each agent may have differing knowledge and inferential capabilities, and where the resources each agent is prepared to commit to a goal are bounded. The framework allows us to investigate, for example, whether a goal can be achieved if a particular agent, perhaps possessing key information or inferential capabilities, is unable to contribute more than a given portion of its available computational resources or bandwidth to the problem. We present a novel temporal epistemic logic, BMCL-CTL, which allows us to describe a set of reasoning agents with bounds on time, memory and the number of messages they can exchange. The bounds on memory and communication are expressed as axioms in the logic. As an example, we show how to axiomatise a system of agents which reason using resolution and prove that the resulting logic is sound and complete. We then show how to encode a simple system of reasoning agents specified in BMCL-CTL in the description language of the Mocha model checker, and verify that the agents can achieve a goal only if they are prepared to commit certain time, memory and communication resources.
BibTeX: @article{Alechina2009Verifying, author = {Alechina, Natasha and Logan, Brian and Nguyen, Hoang Nga and Rakib, Abdur}, title = {Verifying time, memory and communication bounds in systems of reasoning agents}, year = {2009}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {169}, number = {2}, pages = {385--403}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9557-1} }
Andersen, H.K. and Grush, R.	2009	A brief history of time-consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl	Journal of the History of Philosophy 47(2) 277-307	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: William James' Principles of Psychology , in which he made famous the "specious present" doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl's Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid's essay "Memory" in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , we trace out a line of development of ideas about the temporality of experience that runs through Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, and finally the work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, both of whom were immediate influences on James (though James pseudonymously cites the latter as 'E.R. Clay'). Furthermore, we argue that Hodgson, especially his Metaphysic of Experience (1898), was a significant influence on Husserl.
BibTeX: @article{Andersen2009brief, author = {Andersen, Holly K. and Grush, Rick}, title = {A brief history of time-consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl}, year = {2009}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {277--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.0.0118} }
Barash, J.A.	2009	Memory and the immemorial in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas	Sofia Philosophical Review 3(1) 5-14			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barash2009Memory, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Memory and the immemorial in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas}, year = {2009}, journal = {Sofia Philosophical Review}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {5--14} }
Bechtel, W.	2009	Molecules, systems, and behavior: Another view of memory consolidation	1 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience Oxford University Press	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article examines the behavioural aspects and the molecular and cellular processes in the brain associated with memory consolidation. It suggests that ruthless reduction and mechanistic reduction are both reductionist in that they recognize the importance of seeking knowledge of brain processes at different levels of organization to understand cognitive function. They are also united in standing opposed to the attempts to divorce psychology and cognitive science from being constrained by our rapidly growing knowledge of brain processes and they both agree that information about molecular and cellular processes is also of potentially great relevance to understanding memory consolidation.
BibTeX: @book{Bechtel2009Molecules, author = {Bechtel, William}, title = {Molecules, systems, and behavior: Another view of memory consolidation}, year = {2009}, volume = {1}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience}, editor = {Bickle, John}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195304787.003.0002} }
Bernecker, S.	2009	Self-knowledge and the bounds of authenticity	Erkenntnis 71(1) 107-121	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form 'I believe that p' qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2009Self, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Self-knowledge and the bounds of authenticity}, year = {2009}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {71}, number = {1}, pages = {107--121}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9170-1} }
Bortolotti, L. and Cox, R.E.	2009	'Faultless' ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation	Consciousness and Cognition 18(4) 952-965	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self.
BibTeX: @article{Bortolotti2009Faultless, author = {Bortolotti, Lisa and Cox, Rochelle E.}, title = {'Faultless' ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation}, year = {2009}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, pages = {952--965}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.08.011} }
Bostrom, N. and Sandberg, A.	2009	Cognitive enhancement: Methods, ethics, regulatory challenges	Science and Engineering Ethics 15(3) 311-341	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognitive enhancement takes many and diverse forms. Various methods of cognitive enhancement have implications for the near future. At the same time, these technologies raise a range of ethical issues. For example, they interact with notions of authenticity, the good life, and the role of medicine in our lives. Present and anticipated methods for cognitive enhancement also create challenges for public policy and regulation.
BibTeX: @article{Bostrom2009Cognitive, author = {Bostrom, Nick and Sandberg, Anders}, title = {Cognitive enhancement: Methods, ethics, regulatory challenges}, year = {2009}, journal = {Science and Engineering Ethics}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, pages = {311--341}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9142-5} }
Buford, C.	2009	Memory, quasi-memory, and pseudo-quasi-memory	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(3) 465-478	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Bishop Butler objected to Locke's theory of personal identity on the grounds that memory presupposes personal identity. Most of those sympathetic with Locke's account have accepted Butler's criticism, and have sought to devise a theory of personal identity in the spirit of Locke's that avoids Butler's circularity objection. John McDowell has argued that even the more recent accounts of personal identity are vulnerable to the kind of objection Butler raised against Locke's own account. I criticize McDowell's stance, drawing on a distinction introduced by Annalisa Coliva between two types of immunity to error through misidentification.
BibTeX: @article{Buford2009Memory, author = {Buford, Christopher}, title = {Memory, quasi-memory, and pseudo-quasi-memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {87}, number = {3}, pages = {465--478}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400802257747} }
Carroll, N.	2009	Memento and the phenomenology of comprehending motion picture narration	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 127-146		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Carroll2009Memento, author = {Carroll, Noel}, title = {Memento and the phenomenology of comprehending motion picture narration}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {127--146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118322925.ch13} }
Cirakman, E.	2009	The art of memory in a pluralistic universe: William James's "republican banquet"	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 307-334	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to conduct an inquiry that would illuminate how a phenomenological account of memory may govern some basic issues of our lives: the meaning of our collectivity and spirituality, the cultural embodiment of our experiences and memories, and their collective status, the question of intimacy and unity in the universe of our experiences. I shall consider this account of memory by focusing on William James's radically empiricist, pluralist, and pragmatic philosophy. In reading James, my aim is to propose a notion of collective memory as the cash-value of James's spiritualism. This proposal will inevitably lead us to James's confrontation with Hegelian Spirit, or Absolute, as an alternative hypothesis in understanding the intimacy, the unity, and the spirituality of the universe. I shall seek to derive some implications from their profound articulations in order to suggest a more pragmatic and releasing conception of collective memory as freeing us from the burden of the past by socially transforming it into prospects for action, and by aesthetically deploying it to symbolic expressions embodied in art and cultural works. The approach that I propose aims to relocate the philosophical concept of memory in a perspective that acknowledges life or becoming in terms of its excessive dynamism.
BibTeX: @incollection{Cirakman2009Art, author = {Cirakman, Elif}, title = {The art of memory in a pluralistic universe: William James's "republican banquet"}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {307--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2319-3_21} }
Collins, S.	2009	Remarks on the Visuddhimagga, and on its treatment of the Memory of Former Dwelling(s) (pubbenivāsānussatiñād na)	Journal of Indian Philosophy 37(5) 499-532		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Collins2009Remarks, author = {Collins, Steven}, title = {Remarks on the Visuddhimagga, and on its treatment of the Memory of Former Dwelling(s) (pubbenivāsānussatiñād na)}, year = {2009}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {5}, pages = {499--532}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-009-9073-0} }
Copenhaver, R.	2009	Reid on memory and personal identity	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Copenhaver2009Reid, author = {Copenhaver, Rebecca}, title = {Reid on memory and personal identity}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, E. N.}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information}, url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reid-memory-identity/} }
Cozma, C.	2009	Phenomenology of life on memory: Revealing the creative human condition in the music art universe	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 53-59	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A novelty brought by the Phenomenology of Life is the approach of memory as a specific function in the creative process making the human ''self- individualizing-in-existence''. Together with intellect, will, and imagination, the memory operates in the complex schema of the ''logos of life'' expand- ing; it decisively contributes to the ''creative orchestration'' of the transition from the vital stage to that of the Human Condition within the ''ontopoietical design of life''. Considering the peculiar creative situation of human being as ''self-interpretation-in-life'', the thesis of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka concern- ing memory finds a pivot in the area of the music art's experience by man. In this essay, we try to bring out part of the primacy significance of the original view on memory introduced by the phenomenologist of life, as a fruitful one to encompassing the hermeneutical effort to catch the meaningfulness in the living universe by man-listener-to-music art, as being able to enjoy a sublime experience of self-creation in life.
BibTeX: @incollection{Cozma2009Phenomenology, author = {Cozma, Carmen}, title = {Phenomenology of life on memory: Revealing the creative human condition in the music art universe}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {53--59}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_4} }
Craver, C.F.	2009	Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Craver2009Explaining, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Dalla Barba, G.	2009	Temporal consciousness and confabulation: Escape from unconscious explanatory idols	Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy Oxford University Press 223-260	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter addresses the following questions: Why confabulating patients make errors when retrieving their pasts? Why is confabulation on some occasions indistinguishable from a true memory, whereas on other occasions it has such bizarre or semantically anomalous content? Is confabulation a pure memory disorder, or does the fact that it involves the patient's past, present, and future reflect a disruption of how personal temporality is experienced?
BibTeX: @incollection{DallaBarba2009Temporal, author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco}, title = {Temporal consciousness and confabulation: Escape from unconscious explanatory idols}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy}, editor = {Hirstein, W.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {223--260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190241537.003.0006} }
Deutscher, M.	2009	In response	Crossroads 4(1) 92-98			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Deutscher2009In, author = {Deutscher, Max}, title = {In response}, year = {2009}, journal = {Crossroads}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {92--98} }
Dimitrova, M.	2009	In response to Jeffrey Andrew Barash: Memory and the immemorial in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas	Sofia Philosophical Review 3(1) 17-29			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dimitrova2009response, author = {Dimitrova, Maria}, title = {In response to Jeffrey Andrew Barash: Memory and the immemorial in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas}, year = {2009}, journal = {Sofia Philosophical Review}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {17--29} }
Donohoe, J.	2009	Where were you when ... ? On the relationship between individual and collective memory	Philosophy in the Contemporary World 16(1) 105-113	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that private, individual memory is often only made possible through a collectivelhistorical memory that makes itself felt at a most fundamental level of place. It draws upon Husserl's concept of the lifeworld in opposition to Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity. I show that in focusing on narrative, Ricoeur fails to recognize the ways in which the very constitution of the world, of places, becomes the avenue of support for narratives, intersubjectivity, and collective memory. The analysis makes explicit the manner in which experience itself can be collective and is grounded not only in narrative, but in the world, specifically in places in the world that are not private, isolated places, but places of communality. The idea of lifeworld serves as a foundation for collective memory in terms not only of shared experiences, but also in terms of traditions that have been inherited through built places.
BibTeX: @article{Donohoe2009Where, author = {Donohoe, Janet}, title = {Where were you when ... ? On the relationship between individual and collective memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Philosophy in the Contemporary World}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {105--113}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/pcw20091619} }
Driver, J.	2009	Memory, desire, and value in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 80-93			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Driver2009Memory, author = {Driver, Julia}, title = {Memory, desire, and value in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Grau, Christopher}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {80--93} }
Droege, P.	2009	Now or never: How consciousness represents time	Consciousness and Cognition 18(1) 78-90	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence; conscious states represent their contents as now. To understand how conscious states come to represent time in this way, we need a distinction between a mental state that represents now and one that simply occurs now. A teleofunctional theory accounts for the distinction in terms of the development and function of explicit temporal representation. The capacity to represent a situation explicitly as 'now' and compare it with past situations in order to prepare for the future involves the separation of goals from the particular action required to attain them. That is, when a creature is able to consider alternative paths of action, it becomes necessary to conceive of alternate future times as distinct from the present moment. The developmental, functional approach of a teleofunctional theory is promising in its ability to integrate research from diverse empirical fields for support of its claims.
BibTeX: @article{Droege2009Now, author = {Droege, Paula}, title = {Now or never: How consciousness represents time}, year = {2009}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {78--90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.10.006} }
Duffy, M.	2009	Paul Ricoeur's Pedagogy of Pardon A Narrative Theory of Memory and Forgetting from Another Time	Continuum			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Duffy2009Paul, author = {Duffy, M.}, title = {Paul Ricoeur's Pedagogy of Pardon A Narrative Theory of Memory and Forgetting from Another Time}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Continuum} }
Eng, E.	2009	A history of the idea of organic memory	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 17-24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ''Organic memory'' means that I -- more exactly me -- am (or is) by memory remembered. Not I but the organic, namely that which has become differentiated in and through my own vital activity, and this must include the differentiated world, this memory remembers me. It is different from the way in which we ordinarily experience memory, namely as its users, hence the dif- ficulty of conceptualizing it. Such memory involves the world as its medium, whether of our own body taken as part of the world, or of various parts of the world which emerge as something like ''found objects''. In and through my own activity I am as it were remembered by my body and by parts of the world. ''Organism'' holds both the meaning of being remembered by its past, as well as meaning of the world construed in my ''dismembering'' of it, in and through my own activity. While I as it were dismember the organic, the organic is remembering me. My usual experience of the organic is that of waking consciousness, while the condition in which the organic remembers me lie outside consciousness, rather more like dreaming or trance awareness.
BibTeX: @incollection{Eng2009history, author = {Eng, Erling}, title = {A history of the idea of organic memory}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {17--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_2} }
Frankfurt, H.G.	2009	Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's "Meditations"	Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's "Meditations" Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Frankfurt2009Demons, author = {Frankfurt, Harry G.}, title = {Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's "Meditations"}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's "Meditations"}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Freiberga, E.	2009	Memory and creativity in the context of ontopoiesis of beingness: A-T. Tymieniecka and A. Bergson	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 233-242		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Freiberga2009Memory, author = {Freiberga, Elga}, title = {Memory and creativity in the context of ontopoiesis of beingness: A-T. Tymieniecka and A. Bergson}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {233--242}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_20} }
Giberman, D.	2009	Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory	Philosophical Studies 144(2) 297-311	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se ele ments or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity -- facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it puta tively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical
BibTeX: @article{Giberman2009Who, author = {Giberman, Daniel}, title = {Who they are and what de se: Burge on quasi-memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {144}, number = {2}, pages = {297--311}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9211-7} }
Goldman, A.I.	2009	Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification	The Journal of Philosophy 106(6) 309-338		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Goldman2009Internalism, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification}, year = {2009}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {106}, number = {6}, pages = {309--338}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199812875.003.0005} }
Gruca, G.	2009	Faces of memory - the work of Franz Kafka as a record of consciousness lost in the labirynth of being in the context of existential philosophy	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 67-77	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The literary achievements of Franz Kafka make the reader think and force him to repeat the questions about existing and the purpose and end of existence. Novels as well as Kafka's shorter works shocked the 20th century reader, aroused his fears and anxieties, they also influenced the present day culture and its understanding by the Western societies; apart from that, they formally and qualitatively enriched the symbolism and possibilities of creating new worlds of novels. These are only a few arguments that can be quoted and which incline to take up and recall the topic of literary work of one of the masters of 20th century prose and the author of unforgettable The Trial.
BibTeX: @incollection{Gruca2009Faces, author = {Gruca, Grzogorz}, title = {Faces of memory - the work of Franz Kafka as a record of consciousness lost in the labirynth of being in the context of existential philosophy}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {67--77} }
Hamilton, A.	2009	Memory and self-consciousness: Immunity to error through misidentification	Synthese 171(3) 409-417	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein defined a category of uses of ''I'' which he termed ''I''-as-subject, contrasting them with ''I''-as-object uses. The hallmark of this category is immunity to error through misidentification (IEM). This article extends Wittgenstein's characterisation to the case ofmemory-judgments, discusses the signif- icance of IEM for self-consciousness---developing the idea that having a first-person thought involves thinking about oneself in a distinctive way in which one cannot think of anyone or anything else---and refutes a common objection to the claim that memory-judgments exhibit IEM.
BibTeX: @article{Hamilton2009Memory, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {Memory and self-consciousness: Immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {2009}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {171}, number = {3}, pages = {409--417}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9318-6} }
Handerek, J.	2009	The symbol - code of the past, record of human (existence) life, and ontopoiesis of life	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 125-141	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article focuses on the analysis of the memory in the aspect of its functioning in culture as a symbol. Starting from Ernst Cassirer, the author shows, that the symbolical consciousness is the basis of cultural world of man. In Cassires's philosophy the man, as a animal symbolicum cannot free himself from symbolizing. Ipso facto, the reality is given to us in an intermediary, symbolical from. The symbolical forms constitute background for language, thinking and what is the most important, the memory in historical and psychological aspect. Going further to the concept of Paul Ricoeur, one can grasp the complex structure of the symbol and its importance for man's culture. The symbol is, above all, the space of human communication, reciprocation, myth, consciousness and memory. The memory is understood as a cultural phenomenon, which unifies with tradition and creates the identity of man. As Paul Ricoeur wrote, The symbol gives rise to the thought, which means engagement of man in culture and it's various contents. Such engaging symbol doesn't allow indifference to appear, making from memory's ambiguous contents the foundation of existential development.
BibTeX: @incollection{Handerek2009symbol, author = {Handerek, Joanna}, title = {The symbol - code of the past, record of human (existence) life, and ontopoiesis of life}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {125--141}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2319-3_9} }
Hanley, R.	2009	Memento and personal identity: Do we have It backwards?	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 107-126			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hanley2009Memento, author = {Hanley, R.}, title = {Memento and personal identity: Do we have It backwards?}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {107--126} }
Higginbotham, J.	2009	Remembering, imagining, and the first person	Tense, Aspect, and Intentionality Oxford University Press 212-244		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Higginbotham2009Remembering, author = {Higginbotham, James}, title = {Remembering, imagining, and the first person}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Tense, Aspect, and Intentionality}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {212--244}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239313.003.0012} }
Hirstein, W.	2009	Confabulation	The Oxford Companion to Consciousness Oxford University Press 174-177			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirstein2009Confabulation, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Confabulation}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Oxford Companion to Consciousness}, editor = {Wilken, P. and Axel, C. and Bayne, T}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {174--177} }
Hirstein, W.	2009	Introduction: What is confabulation?	Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy Oxford University Press 1-12		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirstein2009Introduction, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Introduction: What is confabulation?}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Confabulation: Views from Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy}, editor = {Hirstein, William}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {1--12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208913.003.13} }
Hirstein, W.	2009	The name and nature of confabulation	The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology Routledge 647-658		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hirstein2009name, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {The name and nature of confabulation}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology}, editor = {Symons, John and Calvo, Paco}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {647--658}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-45} }
Jollimore, T.	2009	Miserably ever after: Forgetting, repeating and affirming love in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 31-61			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Jollimore2009Miserably, author = {Jollimore, Troy}, title = {Miserably ever after: Forgetting, repeating and affirming love in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Grau, Christopher}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {31--61} }
Kale, G.	2009	Notion of forgetting and rememering in Piranesi: Fireplace as the setting of a Dionysian play	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 119-132	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ''Continuing dreaming knowing that you are dreaming'' while holding on to the ''weak thought'' in order not to lose the horizon for a meaningful human action; maybe this is the only path we can follow to find Giovanni Battista Piranesi staring at us from his imaginary world. In the threshold of the episte- mological split, the mysterious dimension of the world became the only space, where an architect could act poetically. At this point, ''how did the true world finally became a fable?'' How did Piranesi create his ''fictionalized experience of reality''2 to open a way for aletheia by opposing the ideal of an objectified truth? How did he communicate with the ancient times within an excess of history? These questions become crucial when we place Piranesi on the edge of an era whose grounds are shifting towards the age of reason. In order to be able to understand Piranesi, we have to interpret, which ideas constituted his reactionary and avant-garde position in his time. Piranesi stands as a dreamer, who was not naïve about the realities of the world. He engaged himself with the ''disclosedness of beings'', not to lose himself in them, but rather as Hei- degger denotes ''such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are, and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them.''
BibTeX: @incollection{Kale2009Notion, author = {Kale, Gül}, title = {Notion of forgetting and rememering in Piranesi: Fireplace as the setting of a Dionysian play}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {119--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_10} }
Kania, A.	2009	Introduction	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 1-12			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kania2009Introduction, author = {Kania, Andrew}, title = {Introduction}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {1--12} }
Kania, A.	2009	Memento	The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kania2009Memento, author = {Kania, Andrew}, title = {Memento}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film}, editor = {Livingston, Paisley and Plantinga, Carl}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Kania, A.	2009	What is Memento? Ontology and interpretation in mainstream film	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 167-188			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kania2009What, author = {Kania, Andrew}, title = {What is Memento? Ontology and interpretation in mainstream film}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {167--188} }
Kałuża, M.	2009	Memory as a challenge to human existence - aspects of temporality and the role of memory in reference to Guitton's concept of time	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 147-152	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article describes the attitude of Jean Guitton towards the category of time, concentrating on two essential notions: dissociation and contamination. The author presents the phenomenon of memory in different philosophical, cultural and psychological backgrounds. Memory is presented in its connection with cultural symbols, language and individual aspects of man, as well as psychological explorations of the way it is developed from early stages of child's experience. Going further these examples are analyzed according to Guitton's proposition of perceiving the role of memory, with two different solutions of its function: either moving it away from the present condition of man or, on the contrary, making it an essential factor of man's present choices. Answering the question of the importance of memory for phenomenological analysis, the categories of dissociation and contamination are used as a tool to determine not only the individual approach towards memory of the individual, but also in a broader sense, taking into consideration the cultural and linguistic aspects of man.
BibTeX: @incollection{Kaluza2009Memory, author = {Kałuża, Maciej}, title = {Memory as a challenge to human existence - aspects of temporality and the role of memory in reference to Guitton's concept of time}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {147--152}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_13} }
Kennett, J. and Matthews, S.	2009	Mental time travel, agency, and responsibility	Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives Oxford University Press 327-349	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We have argued elsewhere that moral responsibility over time depends in part upon the having of psychological connections which facilitate forms of self-control. In this chapter we explore the importance of mental time travel - our ordinary ability to mentally travel to temporal locations outside the present, involving both memory of our personal past and the ability to imagine ourselves in the future - to our agential capacities for planning and control. We suggest that in many individuals with dissociative disorders, forms of amnesia, or other frontal lobe damage, our capacity for mental time travel is impaired, resulting in commensurate losses to agency autonomy, and a forensic condition essential for holding persons responsible: in legal terms, the capacity for mens rea.
BibTeX: @incollection{Kennett2009Mental, author = {Kennett, Jeanette and Matthews, Steve}, title = {Mental time travel, agency, and responsibility}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives}, editor = {Broome, Matthew R. and Bortolotti, L.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {327--349}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/med/9780199238033.003.0017} }
Khalilov, S.	2009	About the correlation of memory and remembrance in the structure of the sould	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 243-250	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper discusses some peculiarities -- similarities and differences -- of memory and remembrance (personal life memory). The mechanisms of storing knowledge and recollection have been analysed. It was shown that earlier used spirit-body or soul-body methods could not adequately explain the correla- tion between memory and remembrance. For consideration specific details of the correlation of memory and remembrance more realistic model of ''spirit-soul-body'' or ''mind-soul-body'' was developed.
BibTeX: @incollection{Khalilov2009correlation, author = {Khalilov, Salahaddin}, title = {About the correlation of memory and remembrance in the structure of the sould}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {243--250} }
King, R.A.H.	2009	Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory	De Gruyter			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{King2009Aristotle, author = {King, R. A. H.}, title = {Aristotle and Plotinus on Memory}, year = {2009}, publisher = {De Gruyter} }
Knight, D. and McKnight, G.	2009	Reconfiguring the past: Memento and neo-noir	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 147-166		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Knight2009Reconfiguring, author = {Knight, Deborah and McKnight, George}, title = {Reconfiguring the past: Memento and neo-noir}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {147--166}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876596-15} }
Kovacs, D.M.	2009	Memory and imagery in Russell's The Analysis of Mind	Prolegomena 8(2) 193-206	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the theory Russell defends in The Analysis of Mind, 'true memories' (roughly, memories that are not remembering-hows) are recollections of past events accompanied by a feeling of familiarity. While memory images play a vital role in this account, Russell does not pay much attention to the fact that imagery plays different roles in different sorts of memory. In most cases that Russell considers, memory is based on an image that serves as a datum (image-based memories), but there are other cases in which memory judgment requires an image without being based on it (answer-memories). A good example for the former is when a person, asked what the colour of the sea was last afternoon, recalls an image and forms a judgment on this basis. In the second case she may recognize the sea and entertain a memory image of it without 'reading off' the memory judgment from this picture. That is, the image does not prompt but itself is part of the propositional content of answer memories. Since in this latter case the feeling of familiarity is constitutive of the recollection but cannot serve as its explanans, answer memories do not conform to Russell's account. According to Lindsay Judson this is not a vice of the theory, since Russell never meant to extend it to answer memories. Despite having a certain appeal of benevolence, Judson's interpretation is not supported by textual evidence. Taking side with David Pears, I will argue that Russell did not properly differentiate between image-based memory and answer memory, and illegitimately extended his theory to the latter.
BibTeX: @article{Kovacs2009Memory, author = {Kovacs, David M}, title = {Memory and imagery in Russell's The Analysis of Mind}, year = {2009}, journal = {Prolegomena}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, pages = {193--206} }
Kriegel, U.	2009	Temporally token-reflexive experiences	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39(4) 585-617		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kriegel2009Temporally, author = {Kriegel, Uriah}, title = {Temporally token-reflexive experiences}, year = {2009}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {39}, number = {4}, pages = {585-617}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0064} }
Lawlor, K.	2009	Memory	The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind Clarendon Press 663-677	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The psychological study of memory has made exciting advances. In the last two decades neurophysiology has given us insight into what happens in the brain when we remember. First, the biology of nerve cells is much better understood; since signalling by nerve cells is altered by experience, these cells might be the elementary devices of information storage. At the higher level of brain systems, researchers have identified mechanisms that make possible various memory functions. One task for neuropsychology is to unite the results at the level of nerve cells and brain systems. One moral for the rest of us is that while we often speak of a unified capacity --- memory --- responsible for much that is distinctive in human life, we are really talking about a range of capacities, variously realized in the brain and nervous system.
BibTeX: @incollection{Lawlor2009Memory, author = {Lawlor, Krista}, title = {Memory}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Beckermann, Ansgar and McLaughlin, Brian P. and Walter, Sven}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, pages = {663--677}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0039} }
Levine, J.	2009	Leonard's system: Why doesn't it work?	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 45-64			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Levine2009Leonards, author = {Levine, Joseph}, title = {Leonard's system: Why doesn't it work?}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {45--64} }
Levy, N.	2009	Neuroethics: Ethics and the sciences of the mind	Philosophy Compass 4(1) 69-81	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Neuroethics is a rapidly growing subfield, straddling applied ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of mind. It has clear affinities to bioethics, inasmuch as both are responses to new developments in science and technology, but its scope is far broader and more ambitious because neuroethics is as much concerned with how the sciences of the mind illuminate traditional philosophical questions as it is with questions concerning the permissibility of using technologies stemming from these sciences. In this article, I sketch the two branches of neuroethics, the applied and the philosophical, and illustrate how they interact. I also consider representative themes from each: the ethics of dampening memory and of cognitive enhancement, on the one hand, and the attack upon the reliability of deontological intuitions and upon free will, on the other.
BibTeX: @article{Levy2009Neuroethics, author = {Levy, Neil}, title = {Neuroethics: Ethics and the sciences of the mind}, year = {2009}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {69--81}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00195.x} }
Mandolini, C.	2009	Memory and action: The conscience of time in personal becoming in Bergson and Blondel	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 25-49	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of the article is to highlight the role of memory in subjective practical human becoming, in its particular relation given by action. Bergson and Blondel have both paid particular attention to action, conceived as a sphere of emerging of the conscience of the passing of time. Nonetheless, their anal- yses differ in the meaning attributed to action: while Bergson considers it as a limited part of human life, requiring a homogeneous and ''spatial'' approach to reality, Blondel enlarges the meaning of the term ''action'' to reach what, even in cosmic becoming, represents the radical spring of ontological novelty and tendency to fulfilment. According to a different evaluation of action in the context of human life, their works also offer a different conceptualisation of becoming and of the role of memory, as a deeper concept than a simple collection of memories.
BibTeX: @incollection{Mandolini2009Memory, author = {Mandolini, Clara}, title = {Memory and action: The conscience of time in personal becoming in Bergson and Blondel}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {25--49}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_3} }
Martin, R.	2009	The value of memory: Reflections on Memento	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 87-106			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Martin2009value, author = {Martin, Raymond}, title = {The value of memory: Reflections on Memento}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {87--106} }
McKenna, M.	2009	Moral monster or responsible person? Memento's Leonard as a case study in defective agency	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 23-44			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McKenna2009Moral, author = {McKenna, Michael}, title = {Moral monster or responsible person? Memento's Leonard as a case study in defective agency}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Kania, A}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {23--44} }
Moyal-Sharrock, D.	2009	Wittgenstein and the memory debate	New Ideas in Psychology 27(2) 213-227	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein's elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein's reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and, therefore, that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty.
BibTeX: @article{MoyalSharrock2009Wittgenstein, author = {Moyal-Sharrock, Danièle}, title = {Wittgenstein and the memory debate}, year = {2009}, journal = {New Ideas in Psychology}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, pages = {213--227}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2008.04.015} }
Mróz, P.	2009	Structure as a collective memory of cultural systems	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 251-261	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The main assumption of the paper centers around the notion of memory as an apriori mechanism of culture formation. According to the founders of the structuralist movement all phenomena are based on differentiation that is, binary structuring. The latter is unconsciously carried on and passed on to following stages of human development of various sections of human culture and civilization.
BibTeX: @incollection{Mroz2009Structure, author = {Mróz, Piotr}, title = {Structure as a collective memory of cultural systems}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {251--261} }
de Noronha, M.T.	2009	Saudade and memory in the ontopoiesis of life	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 195-205	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to confirm how the categories saudade and memory express themselves differently within one's consciousness through the philosophy of Saudade. The explanation of Saudade as a liberator of memory records is implied in the function of a Poetic Reason and a Poetic Logos achievable through the phenomenal movement of existence in its ontological and ethical sphere.
BibTeX: @incollection{Noronha2009Saudade, author = {de Noronha, Maria Teresa}, title = {Saudade and memory in the ontopoiesis of life}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {195--205} }
Pawliszyn, A.	2009	Memory - the possibility of creation in a learning world - interpretation	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 283-301	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I would like to present the memory question in the context of the phenomenological grasp of time and in the context of language (interpretation). Our considerations are at first concerned with the phenomenological way of consciousness, and with constitutes in the same way the intentionality of retention as the source of memory. We also consider Husserlian category of in-feeling (to enter into one's spirit) (Einfülung) as describing an experience of the essence of an indirectness -- so just directness in an access to the spiritual sphere of someone who is not mine. It presents the responsibility as the essential characteristic of a meditating (interpreting) transcendental ''I'', in the inter-subjective context of other people. With regard to our interest it will be worth to investigate how phenomenology develops into an ontology of corporality (la chair) (M. Merleau-Ponty) and into philosophical hermeneutics (M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur). In both developments, it a language matter has been described and the question of the status of the reason -- generating an attempt (a hard work) to interpret the world -- as the acting reason.
BibTeX: @incollection{Pawliszyn2009Memory, author = {Pawliszyn, Aleksandra}, title = {Memory - the possibility of creation in a learning world - interpretation}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {283--301} }
Phillips, I.B.	2009	Review of Robin Le Poidevin The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60(2) 439-446		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Phillips2009Review, author = {Phillips, Ian B.}, title = {Review of Robin Le Poidevin The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation}, year = {2009}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {60}, number = {2}, pages = {439--446}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axn057} }
Poselskaya, L.N.	2009	Memory as a positive and negative motivation component in a person's activity	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 181-190		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Poselskaya2009Memory, author = {Poselskaya, Ludmila Nikolayevna}, title = {Memory as a positive and negative motivation component in a person's activity}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {181--190}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_16} }
Ray, S.	2009	"Smritir bhumika" (the role of memory): Some memory-related poems and songs of Rabindranath	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 141-146	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is the catalytic agent between the past days and the present. ''Smritir Bhumika'', in this respect, is an excellent poem of Tagore. It is in his poetical work ''Sanai''. Poetry aims at configuration of memory by virtue of encoding a feeling in words. We are bound in the trap of temporary existence. But, our memory, combined with our imagination is spread throughout time and space of the world of our consciousness. This paper aims at correlating some such memory related poems and songs of Tagore from the perspective of phenomenology.
BibTeX: @incollection{Ray2009Smritir, author = {Ray, Sitansu}, title = {"Smritir bhumika" (the role of memory): Some memory-related poems and songs of Rabindranath}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {141--146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_12} }
Reeve, C.D.C.	2009	Two blue ruins: Love and memory in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 15-30			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Reeve2009Two, author = {Reeve, C. D. C.}, title = {Two blue ruins: Love and memory in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Grau, Christopher}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {15--30} }
Rhoda, A.R.	2009	Presentism, truthmakers, and God	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90(1) 41-62	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The truthmaker objection to presentism (the view that only what exists now exists simpliciter) is that it lacks sufficient metaphysical resources to ground truths about the past. In this paper I identify five constraints that an adequate presentist response must satisfy.
BibTeX: @article{Rhoda2009Presentism, author = {Rhoda, Alan R.}, title = {Presentism, truthmakers, and God}, year = {2009}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {90}, number = {1}, pages = {41--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2009.01328.x} }
Robbins, S.E.	2009	The COST of explicit memory	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(1) 33-66	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time - a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piagetís stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include, 1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, 2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a non-differentiable time contained in Bergsonís theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, 3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, 4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience "stored in the brain."
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2009COST, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {The COST of explicit memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {33--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9088-0} }
Rodemeyer, L.M.	2009	How do we imagine the past? Reconsidering retention and recollection in Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 40(2) 171-187		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rodemeyer2009How, author = {Rodemeyer, Lanei M.}, title = {How do we imagine the past? Reconsidering retention and recollection in Husserl's Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness}, year = {2009}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {40}, number = {2}, pages = {171--187}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2009.11006680} }
Rokstad, K.	2009	Memory and the historicity of human existence	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 231-250	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we shall first look into the phenomena of memory as they are functioning quite naturally, life-worldly -- and then, on that foundation, ask questions into the depth of the phenomena reflecting descriptively on the functions and structures that constitute the phenomena in a phenomenological manner, in its essence. The core of memory thus has to be decided, but then, as this is to be constituted, the context and the inter-related other functions in which the phenomena are interwoven, have to be taken into consideration as well. The whole field of relevant phenomena eventually leads to the ques- tion of human existence, now examined as a question of historicity founded in the life-world. Memory thus, closely connecting historicity, yields clues for examining (inner) time-consciousness in its various aspects. The point, then, is to ''dismantle'' the phenomena of memory so that both its obviousness and its radically transcendental significance can be further examined. Thus the solidity (and existence) of actuality proves interdependent on the functioning subjectivity living in a historical world, always transcending and (re)creating oneself/ourselves -- yet keeping the identity of both ourselves and the things of the world relatively constant in the genuine sense of historical human existence.
BibTeX: @incollection{Rokstad2009Memory, author = {Rokstad, Konrad}, title = {Memory and the historicity of human existence}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {231--250}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2319-3_15} }
Rowlands, M.	2009	Memory	The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology Routledge 336-345		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Rowlands2009Memory, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {Memory}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology}, editor = {Symons, John and Calvo, Paco}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {336--345}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-20} }
Rowlatt, P.	2009	Consciousness and memory	Journal of Consciousness Studies 16(5) 68-78			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rowlatt2009Consciousness, author = {Rowlatt, Penelope}, title = {Consciousness and memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {16}, number = {5}, pages = {68--78} }
Rupert, R.D.	2009	Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rupert2009Cognitive, author = {Rupert, Robert D.}, title = {Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Schechtman, M.	2009	Personal identity	The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology Routledge 634-646		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Schechtman2009Personal, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Personal identity}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology}, editor = {Symons, John and Calvo, Paco}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {634--646}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-44} }
Senor, T.D.	2009	Memory	A Companion to Epistemology Wiley-Blackwell 520-524			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Senor2009Memory, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Memory}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {A Companion to Epistemology}, editor = {Dancy, J. and Sosa, E. and Steup, M.}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell}, edition = {2}, pages = {520--524} }
¸ Senürkmez, K.Y.	2009	Time, memory and the musical perception	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 153-163	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to discuss certain issues, concerning musical perception, in relation to Edmund Husserl's (1859--1938) phenomenology of time-consciousness. Starting with the basic concepts of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness, I will try to focus on examining the subject, specifically from the point of view of a musicologist. The discussions on time in music do not generally explain the specific characteristics of the temporal order of sound directly. However, rare discussions come up on the basis of this issue too. Among those, the phenomenological approach offers a comprehensive view. The basic assumption in this paper is that the phenomenological view which is developed on time-consciousness provides us a detailed view for the perception of the temporal and spatial natures of music.
BibTeX: @incollection{Senuerkmez2009Time, author = {¸ Senürkmez, Kıvılcım Yıldız}, title = {Time, memory and the musical perception}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {153--163}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_14} }
Sezgin, E.	2009	The interplay of light and dark: "Historical sickness" (Nietzsche) and the possibility of freedom, sanity, universal wisdom, salvation for east and west	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 153-182	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I develop and expand the Idea of use of pictures that Wittgenstein elucidates in the context of his thought experiments and reminders assembled as ''language-games'' which is not an ordinary concept, but a sign signaling its own flashes by Wittgenstein's movements of thinking the articulations of which are capable of evoking the same insightful attention that may now enable us to understand and philosophically articulate the universal wisdom expressed by eastern ways of thinking which otherwise remains incomprehensible with the western standards and habits of thinking and imagining, and which are therefore misjudged as mystifications of eastern thinking in positive or negative senses. I also try to show the contribution of Wittgenstein's elucidations to the understanding of phenomena phenomenologically, free from pictures of phenomena as representations which circles and closes one's thinking in entanglement with the images of world imagined as resembling to those imagined pictures, while pictures owe their conceptual differentiations represented to the operations with signs woven with the significations of phenomena and to the rules of the naming and describing based on the internal connections of learning to operate with signs. That makes a texture texturing its own text, narrations, representations that may easily capture and mislead the imagination of the imprudent in its own labyrinthine ways, with a language-game of its own reverberating and prolonging with imagination, and possibly ''sickening'' psyche, as Nietzsche diagnosed once, as one's life energy decays and one doesn't require more and more light, if one does not move by contacting with the glimmers of light out from the labyrinth of the cave so to speak in resonance with Plato's metaphor. But that requires more than the deconstruction of the text and narratives on the level of interpretations that may soften the hard structures of imagination by providing it with different imaginings with different continuations in the language-game of culture with which hermeneutic methods seem to rest contented.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sezgin2009interplay, author = {Sezgin, Erkut}, title = {The interplay of light and dark: "Historical sickness" (Nietzsche) and the possibility of freedom, sanity, universal wisdom, salvation for east and west}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {153--182}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_22} }
Shoemaker, S.	2009	Careers and quareers: A reply to Burge	The Philosophical Review 118(1) 87-102		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shoemaker2009Careers, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Careers and quareers: A reply to Burge}, year = {2009}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {118}, number = {1}, pages = {87--102}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-030} }
Sol, A. and Akbay, G.	2009	Memory, personal identity, and moral responsibility	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 167-179	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this essay, we investigate the relevance of memory to personal identity and moral responsibility. In so doing, we make a distinction between personal identity characterized by the continuity of memory and narrative self-identity characterized by bio-physical continuity and connectedness which allows us to examine moral responsibility in the presence and absence of memory. We argue that memory provides direct access to our past experiences which one immediately appropriates, in contrast to imputing our unremembered acts to ourselves from the third-person perspective. We also maintain that we would be morally responsible for those acts that we remember and those that we don't, since these acts become either part of our personal identity or narrative self-identity.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sol2009Memory, author = {Sol, Ayhan and Akbay, Gökhan}, title = {Memory, personal identity, and moral responsibility}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {167--179}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2501-2_15} }
Sprevak, M.	2009	Extended cognition and functionalism	The Journal of Philosophy 106(9) 503-527		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sprevak2009Extended, author = {Sprevak, Mark}, title = {Extended cognition and functionalism}, year = {2009}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {106}, number = {9}, pages = {503--527}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2009106937} }
Sturmberg, J.P. and Cilliers, P.	2009	Time and the consultation - an argument for a 'certain slowness'	Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 15(5) 881-885	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When natural time sequences were replaced by clocks, time became a measurable commodity and the 'speedy use of time' a virtue. In medical practice shorter consultations allow more patients to be seen, whereas longer consultations result in a better understanding of the patient and her problems. Crossing the line of time-efficiency and time-effectiveness compromises the balance between short-term turnover and long-term outcomes. The consultation has all the hallmarks of a complex adaptive system whose characteristics are not determined by the characteristics of the components, but by the patterns of interaction among the components. Systems are dynamic and change over time; the dynamic nature is not incidental, but necessary as complex systems operate at conditions far from equilibrium. The central notion when we talk of time and complexity is that of 'memory'. Memory is carrying something from the past over into the future. Memory is filtered/interpreted, separating noise from information. Memory therefore is not an instantaneous thing, it takes time to develop; it is slow. The dynamics between the participating agents in the consultation will create shared memories that live on to shape future interactions. Shared memories are stronger and contain more relevant knowledge if they are based on frequent interactions and ongoing doctor-patient relationships, leading to a better understanding of the whole person - a process that takes time. Sufficient time, that is, 'a certain slowness', is an essential element of the healing relationship in the consultation. It creates a sufficiently stable, but adaptive, environment that can withstand changing demands. Hence a more complete understanding of the consultation and its time demands will not only lead to more effective treatment, it will also humanize a situation which has become to a large extent purely instrumental. This process of humanization is important not only for the patient, but also for the doctor.
BibTeX: @article{Sturmberg2009Time, author = {Sturmberg, Joachim P. and Cilliers, Paul}, title = {Time and the consultation - an argument for a 'certain slowness'}, year = {2009}, journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice}, volume = {15}, number = {5}, pages = {881--885}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2753.2009.01270.x} }
Sutton, J.	2009	Adaptive misbeliefs and false memories	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32(6) 535-536	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: McKay & Dennett (M&D) suggest that some positive illusions are adaptive. But there is a bidirectional link between memory and positive illusions: Biased autobiographical memories filter incoming information, and self-enhancing information is preferentially attended and used to update memory. Extending M&D's approach, I ask if certain false memories might be adaptive, defending a broad view of the psychosocial functions of remembering.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2009Adaptive, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Adaptive misbeliefs and false memories}, year = {2009}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {32}, number = {6}, pages = {535--536}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09991488} }
Sutton, J.	2009	Dreaming	The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology Routledge 524-544		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2009Dreaming, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Dreaming}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology}, editor = {Symons, John and Calvo, Paco}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {524--544}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429244629-36} }
Sutton, J.	2009	Remembering	The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition Cambridge University Press 217-235		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2009Remembering, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Remembering}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition}, editor = {Aydede, Murat and Robbins, Phillip}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {217--235}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511816826.013} }
Sutton, J.	2009	The feel of the world: Exograms, habits and confusion of types of memory	Memento (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 65-86		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2009feel, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {The feel of the world: Exograms, habits and confusion of types of memory}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Memento (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Karnia, Andrew}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {65--86}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203876596} }
Sutton, J. and Windhorst, C.	2009	Extended and constructive remembering: Two notes on Martin and Deutscher	Crossroads 4(1) 79-91	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Martin and Deutscher's remarkable 1966 paper 'Remembering' still offers great riches to memory researchers across distinctive traditions, both in its methodological ambition (successfully marrying phenomenological and causal discourses) and in its content. In this short discussion, after briefly setting the paper in its context, we hone in on two live and under-explored issues which have gained attention recently under new labels-the extended mind hypothesis, and the constructive nature of memory. We suggest that Martin and Deutscher's causal analysis of memory is compatible with the idea that activities of remembering may be distributed across heterogeneous social and external resources, focussing in on their neglected example of creatures who 'remember as we do' as long as they carry round metal boxes which are given to them at birth. We then argue that the causal analysis is in some tension with the extent to which remembering is a constructive activity, because there may be no clear way to determine the appropriate 'limits of accuracy' within which a past event or experience must be represented.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2009Extended, author = {Sutton, John and Windhorst, Carl}, title = {Extended and constructive remembering: Two notes on Martin and Deutscher}, year = {2009}, journal = {Crossroads}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {79--91} }
Teloni, M.-C.	2009	The functions of memory in Edith Stein and in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 103-124	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This study aims mainly at showing the functions of memory coming out of Edith Stein's phenomenological route, passing on to the innovative ontopoietic context of the Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life, both feed on the common source of phenomenological research. In Edith Stein, the theme of memory emerges as a basically anthropological matter, that is concerning the specific human condition of the flowing of life. The man in his wholeness, indeed, that is in his multiple dimensions, physical, psychical, spiritual and intersubjective, is the starting point and the main thread of the entire philosophical research carried out by Stein since her dissertation, on the problem of empathy. On the other side, in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's treatment memory has a wider range, owing especially to the fact that it is still anchored to the extended background of the ontopoiesis of life. Tymieniecka, indeed, presents memory as an essential element of the ontopoiesis since its dawning, not only as it is subject to this process itself, but as it constitutes and plays an active role in the progressive positive self-individualizing deployment of the logos-of-life. An interesting possibility of integration between the two positions appears, that would need, however, further specific analyses.
BibTeX: @incollection{Teloni2009functions, author = {Teloni, Maria-Chiara}, title = {The functions of memory in Edith Stein and in Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's phenomenology of life}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {103--124}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2319-3_8} }
Textor, M.	2009	'Demonstrative' colour concepts: Recognition versus preservation	Ratio 22(2) 234-249	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Arguments for and against the existence ofdemonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents ofpropositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as colour univer- sals. Shade a is different from shade b iff it is possible to distinguish a from b visually. In this paper I will argue that the standard argument is based on a mistaken view of inference. We can correctly draw inferences from a demonstrative judgement about something x, even if we are not able to recognise or re-identify the previously demonstrated x during our reasoning. We are prima facie entitled to rely on our preservative memory as retaining our initial demonstrative apprehension of x. The fact that preservative memory entitles us to assume sameness of referent over time is linguistically manifest in the use of anaphoric pronouns: if we can no longer recognise and demonstrate our original demonstratum, we can use anaphoric expressions to pick it up, thereby ensuring sameness of reference. ('That is a nice bird. Now it has vanished. So there is a nice bird that has just vanished.') Since preservation of the initial episode of apprehending x grounds our reasoning from demonstrative judgements, there is no longer a reason to require demonstrative concepts to be recognitional capacities. The standard argument does not get off the ground.
BibTeX: @article{Textor2009Demonstrative, author = {Textor, Mark}, title = {'Demonstrative' colour concepts: Recognition versus preservation}, year = {2009}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, pages = {234--249}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00428.x} }
Thompson, J.	2009	Apology, historical obligations and the ethics of memory	Memory Studies 2(2) 195-210	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article defends a conception of citizenship and political solidarity that encompasses an ethics of memory and the recognition of obligations that come from history. It claims that citizens ought to remember the deeds of their predecessors and to apologize and make recompense for historical injustices. To establish that such obligations exist it is necessary to contend with a tradition of liberal philosophical thought that regards history as irrelevant to the duties of citizens and their relationship as members of a political society. 'Ahistorical liberalism' not only fails to appreciate the importance to people of historical memories. It also faces serious philosophical and moral difficulties. The obligations and rights of citizens are best understood in the framework of a relationship of intergenerational cooperation that gives citizens duties in respect to the past as well as the future.
BibTeX: @article{Thompson2009Apology, author = {Thompson, Janna}, title = {Apology, historical obligations and the ethics of memory}, year = {2009}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {195--210}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698008102052} }
Tian, P.	2009	Narrow memory and wide knowledge: An argument for the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge	Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4(4) 604-615	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian's memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian's argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since it gives memory a burden that is too heavy for it to carry. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow and take that of self-knowledge to be wide and replace Cartesian self-knowledge with contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended.
BibTeX: @article{Tian2009Narrow, author = {Tian, Ping}, title = {Narrow memory and wide knowledge: An argument for the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge}, year = {2009}, journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China}, volume = {4}, number = {4}, pages = {604--615}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-009-0040-3} }
Tiberius, V.	2009	Bad memories, good decisions, and the three Joels	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 62-79			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Tiberius2009Bad, author = {Tiberius, Valerie}, title = {Bad memories, good decisions, and the three Joels}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Grau, Christopher}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {62--79} }
Toles, G.	2009	Trying to remember Clementine	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film) Routledge 112-157			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Toles2009Trying, author = {Toles, George}, title = {Trying to remember Clementine}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Philosophers on Film)}, editor = {Grau, Christopher}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {112--157} }
Trigg, D.	2009	The place of trauma: Memory, hauntings, and the temporality of ruins	Memory Studies 2(1) 87-101	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Implicit in theoretical treatments of the memory of trauma is the fragmented reception of the past. While a great deal of research has approached this issue from the perspective of oral testimony, what has remained underdeveloped is the role sites of memory play in contributing to our understanding of trauma. Accordingly, in this article, I intend make a foray into this convergence between place and trauma through undertaking a phenomenological investigation of the testimonial attributes of ruins. In doing so, I will pursue two central questions. First, insofar as the built environment is able to contain memory, how does the place of trauma testify to history? Second, if ruins are by their nature contingent and dynamic, how can the past be spatially preserved without creating a false unity between time and the event? In response to these questions, I will put forward the notion that sites of trauma articulate memory precisely through refusing a continuous temporal narrative. My conclusion is that the appearance of the ruin, understood phenomenologically, allows us to approach the spatio-temporality of trauma in terms of a logic of hauntings and voids.
BibTeX: @article{Trigg2009place, author = {Trigg, Dylan}, title = {The place of trauma: Memory, hauntings, and the temporality of ruins}, year = {2009}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {87--101}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698008097397} }
Turan, H.	2009	Memory and the myth of Prometheus	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer 5-15	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Aeschylus' interpretation of the myth, Prometheus is depicted as having bestowed upon humankind not only the techne of reproducing and using fire for any conceivable art, but practically all arts and sciences. Memory, in this interpretation seems to be the necessary condition of all sciences. If any systematic inquiry is possible only through keeping past experience in memory, then Prometheus' keeping the fire in a narthex must be a metaphor that refers to ''keeping'' in a universal sense. Hence, what Prometheus stole away from Zeus by keeping it in a narthex is not simply fire as a tool, but the method to reproduce that tool. The ancients seem to have drawn relations between keeping characteristic features and orders of phenomena in memory and mastery in arts, but do not seem to have thought of an evolution of the human capacity of reasoning, they simply assumed that that power was a godly gift. Prometheus' contrivance of carrying the ember in a hollow narthex, similarly the Lockean conception of memory as storehouse for ideas refer to locations and distances for things which can hardly be in space as actual objects of perception are. It is possible to conceive the capacity in question as a product of the entities that are said to be stored, that this power of keeping evolved through repercussions of past perceptions. Further, against skeptical arguments concerning the reality of the past, the reliability of memory can be shown in terms of mastery in technai: if one has the power to employ efficient tools to change the course of events, either in nature or in society, the reliability of memory is justified in Promethean terms.
BibTeX: @incollection{Turan2009Memory, author = {Turan, Halil}, title = {Memory and the myth of Prometheus}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {5--15} }
Tymieniecka, A.-T.	2009	Memory's sustenance of the human orbit	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 5-11			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Tymieniecka2009Memorys, author = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, title = {Memory's sustenance of the human orbit}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {5--11} }
Tymieniecka, A.-T.	2009	Toward the reformulation of a classic problem: Memory in the ontopoiesis of life	Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life Springer xi-xvii			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Tymieniecka2009reformulation, author = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, title = {Toward the reformulation of a classic problem: Memory in the ontopoiesis of life}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CI: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 1. Memory in the Generation and Unfolding of Life}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {xi--xvii} }
Van Ditmarsch, H., Herzig, A., Lang, J. and Marquis, P.	2009	Introspective forgetting	Synthese 169(2) 405-423	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We model the forgetting of propositional variables in a modal logical context where agents become ignorant and are aware of each others' or their own resulting ignorance. The resulting logic is sound and complete. It can be compared to variable-forgetting as abstraction from information, wherein agents become unaware of certain variables: by employing elementary results for bisimulation, it follows that beliefs not involving the forgotten atom(s) remain true.
BibTeX: @article{Ditmarsch2009Introspective, author = {Van Ditmarsch, Hans and Herzig, Andreas and Lang, Jérôme and Marquis, Pierre}, title = {Introspective forgetting}, year = {2009}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {169}, number = {2}, pages = {405--423}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9554-4} }
Vandekerckhove, M.	2009	Memory, autonoetic consciousness and the self: Consciousness as a continuum of stages	Self and Identity 8(1) 4-23	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article addresses some open questions about the self, development, consciousness and memory, especially episodic memory, and is meant to make an attempt to clarify on a descriptive manner these phenomena and especially the relationship between them. In particular, cognitive child development of memory and current theorizing on semantic and episodic memory and related developmental states of consciousness teaches us here to see how different levels of development of the self, identity and memory relate to the ontogenetic development of different stages of consciousness of being in the world. A gradual distinction becomes outlined: from a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or unknowing consciousness as a biological adaptive function with a first sort of “self-experience” already apparent at an anoetic level of consciousness relying on implicit experiential and procedural memory, towards “knowing consciousness”, including “noetic” and “autonoetic” consciousness based on semantic and episodic memory systems.
BibTeX: @article{Vandekerckhove2009Memory, author = {Vandekerckhove, Marie}, title = {Memory, autonoetic consciousness and the self: Consciousness as a continuum of stages}, year = {2009}, journal = {Self and Identity}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {4--23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15298860801961927} }
Vandekerckhove, M. and Panksepp, J.	2009	The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing (anoetic) and knowing (noetic) consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures	Consciousness and Cognition 18(4) 1018-1028	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person 'self-experience' which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher 'knowing consciousness'.
BibTeX: @article{Vandekerckhove2009flow, author = {Vandekerckhove, Marie and Panksepp, Jaak}, title = {The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing (anoetic) and knowing (noetic) consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures}, year = {2009}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, pages = {1018--1028}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2009.08.002} }
Verolini, R. and Petrelli, F.	2009	Ontopoietic vestige: Memories of ontogenesis in biology and human culture	Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence Springer 15-38	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Thanks to some examples of the always more effective research on ''vestigial structures'' in the field of biology, this work puts in evidence as the evolutionistic paradigm, on the contrary of what is still believed by some opposite currents of thought, can extend its valence to spheres usually seen in incompatible opposition with the evolutionistic vision. At first we show how molecular analysis of modern proteins and DNA, which are considered as evolutive vestiges, can solve some of the hard questions of systematics biology. Then we analyse the results of an interesting research which allows to propose a pro-evolutionistic conception of the first Genesis' passages (Gn 1,3) defining a new ''evolutionistic theosophy''. The abovementioned interpretation is based on anthropological evidences about a sociocultural transformation, dated back to the Neolithic age, that gave rise to new religious models. Such a new scenario leads to different philosophic evaluations concerning the conceptions of anthropology and cosmology strongly coherent with the modern scientific branches; it also provides a prove of the strong degeneration of such transformation from a cognitive and psychosocial point of view.
BibTeX: @incollection{Verolini2009Ontopoietic, author = {Verolini, Roberto and Petrelli, Fabio}, title = {Ontopoietic vestige: Memories of ontogenesis in biology and human culture}, year = {2009}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana CII: Memory in the Ontopoiesis of Life. Book 2. Memory in the Orbit of the Human Creative Existence}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {15--38} }
de Warren, N.	2009	Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Warren2009Husserl, author = {de Warren, Nicolas}, title = {Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology}, year = {2009}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Weigel, P.	2009	Memory and the unity of the imagination in Spinoza's Ethics	International Philosophical Quarterly 49(2) 229-246	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Spinoza assigns to the imagination a wide-ranging and often disparate looking set of operations. Commentators have long recognized that these operations share a certain proximity to the body and a common tendency to lead people into error. Yet others remark on the apparent thinness of an overarching theme. This article examines the prominent and often underappreciated role of memory in unifying Spinoza's account of imaginative cognition. The discussion revisits various aspects of imagination in light of their integrated characterization as forms of remembering. The article also assesses reasons other than memory that Spinoza has for grouping them in common. The examination focuses on the intrinsic character of the imagination and its related operations in the Ethics, while occasionally bringing other works into play
BibTeX: @article{Weigel2009Memory, author = {Weigel, Peter}, title = {Memory and the unity of the imagination in Spinoza's Ethics}, year = {2009}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {49}, number = {2}, pages = {229--246}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq200949228} }
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K.	2008	The Bounds of Cognition	Wiley-Blackwell			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Adams2008Bounds, author = {Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken}, title = {The Bounds of Cognition}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell} }
Aoki, C.R.A.	2008	Rewriting my autobiography: The legal and ethical implications of memory-dampening agents	Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 28(4) 349-359	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The formation and recall of memories are fundamental aspects of life and help preserve the complex collection of experiences that provide us with a sense of identity and autonomy. Scientists have recently started to investigate pharmacological agents that inhibit or ''dampen'' the strength of memory formation and recall. The development of these memory-dampening agents has been investigated for the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Currently, these agents are being tested in multicenter clinical trials and will likely soon be approved for the treatment of PTSD. With advancements in technology, more targeted memory-dampening techniques may be developed in the future. Accessibility to these agents will inevitably affect one's sense of identity and also one's sense of autonomy. Therefore, it is essential that the legal and ethical implications of using these agents be examined for governments and courts to appropriately address issues that may emerge.
BibTeX: @article{Aoki2008Rewriting, author = {Aoki, Cynthia R. A.}, title = {Rewriting my autobiography: The legal and ethical implications of memory-dampening agents}, year = {2008}, journal = {Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, pages = {349--359}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0270467608320223} }
Balodis, A.	2008	Revitalization of the past: Henri Bergson's theory of memory	54(1) Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy Philosophy Documentation Center 3-12	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The concept of memory rests at the heart of Bersgon's theory of consciousness. His theory of memory is the novelty in the history of philosophy. It is not an affirmation either of the metaphysical conceptions (versions à la Platonism) where ''all knowledge is recollection'', nor of empiricist psychology possibly traceble back to Aristotle, where, briefly speaking, the faculty of memory depends on the general perceptual capacity. Contrary to the majority of the philosophical and psychological theories of his epoch, Bergson assigns memory the most important role in the intellectual process, denying the characteristic of passivity (from greek word pathos meaning kind of affection) attached to it, instead concerning with the creative, productive and vital power of memory rather than merely its retentive and recalling capacity.
BibTeX: @incollection{Balodis2008Revitalization, author = {Balodis, A.}, title = {Revitalization of the past: Henri Bergson's theory of memory}, year = {2008}, volume = {54}, number = {1}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, pages = {3--12}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp222008541} }
Barash, J.A.	2008	Heidegger and the metaphysics of memory	Studia Phaenomenologica 8(1) 401-409	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: My analysis in the following paper will focus on a subtle development in Heidegger's interpretation of the theme of memory, from the period of his early Freiburg lectures to Being and Time and then in the works of the late 1920s. There is in this period an apparent shift in Heidegger's understanding of this theme, which comes to light above all in his way of examining memory in the 1921 Freiburg course lectures Augustine and Neo-Platonism, then in Being and Time (1927) and finally in the 1928 lectures on the metaphysical foundations of logic (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz) and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). This shift is of interest, as I will argue, not only in indicating an internal development of Heidegger's thinking, but above all in regard to the problem of the finitude of memory which Heidegger brings into focus and which I will interpret in my concluding remarks.
BibTeX: @article{Barash2008Heidegger, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Heidegger and the metaphysics of memory}, year = {2008}, journal = {Studia Phaenomenologica}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {401--409}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7761/SP.8.401} }
Barash, J.A.	2008	The chasm of memory: Collective memory between personal experience and historical representation	Sofia Philosophical Review 2(1) 5-14			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barash2008chasm, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {The chasm of memory: Collective memory between personal experience and historical representation}, year = {2008}, journal = {Sofia Philosophical Review}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {5--14} }
Barnier, A.J. and Sutton, J.	2008	From individual to collective memory: Theoretical and empirical perspectives	Memory 16(3) 177-182		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barnier2008individual, author = {Barnier, Amanda J. and Sutton, John}, title = {From individual to collective memory: Theoretical and empirical perspectives}, year = {2008}, journal = {Memory}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {177--182}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09541440701828274} }
Barnier, A.J., Sutton, J., Harris, C.B. and Wilson, R.A.	2008	A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory	Cognitive Systems Research 9(1-2) 33-51	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, we aim to show that the framework of embedded, distributed, or extended cognition offers new perspectives on social cognition by applying it to one specific domain: the psychology of memory. In making our case, first we specify some key social dimensions of cognitive distribution and some basic distinctions between memory cases, and then describe stronger and weaker versions of distributed remembering in the general distributed cognition framework. Next, we examine studies of social influences on memory in cognitive psychology, and identify the valuable concepts and methods to be extended and embedded in our framework; we focus in particular on three related paradigms: transactive memory, collaborative recall, and social contagion. Finally, we sketch our own early studies of individual and group memory developed within our framework of distributed cognition, on social contagion of autobiographical memories, collaborative flashbulb memories, and memories of high school at a high school reunion. We see two reciprocal benefits of this conceptual and empirical framework to social memory phenomena: that ideas about distributed cognition can be honed against and tested with the help of sophisticated methods in the social-cognitive psychology of memory; and conversely, that a range of social memory phenomena that are as yet poorly understood can be approached afresh with theoretically motivated extensions of existing empirical paradigms.
BibTeX: @article{Barnier2008conceptual, author = {Barnier, Amanda J. and Sutton, John and Harris, Celia B. and Wilson, Robert A.}, title = {A conceptual and empirical framework for the social distribution of cognition: The case of memory}, year = {2008}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {9}, number = {1-2}, pages = {33--51}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.07.002} }
Bechtel, W.	2008	Mechanisms in cognitive psychology: What are the operations?	Philosophy of Science 75(5) 983-994	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cognitive psychologists, like biologists, frequently describe mechanisms when explaining phenomena. Unlike biologists, who can often trace material transformations to identify operations, psychologists face a more daunting task in identifying operations that transform information. Behavior provides little guidance as to the nature of the operations involved. While not itself revealing the operations, identification of brain areas involved in psychological mechanisms can help constrain attempts to characterize the operations. In current memory research evidence that the same brain areas are involved in what are often taken to be different memory phenomena or in other cognitive phenomena is playing such a heuristic function.
BibTeX: @article{Bechtel2008Mechanisms, author = {Bechtel, William}, title = {Mechanisms in cognitive psychology: What are the operations?}, year = {2008}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {75}, number = {5}, pages = {983--994}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/594540} }
Bechtel, W.	2008	Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bechtel2008Mental, author = {Bechtel, William}, title = {Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Bennett, M. and Hacker, P.	2008	History of Cognitive Neuroscience	Blackwell			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bennett2008History, author = {Bennett, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S.}, title = {History of Cognitive Neuroscience}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Blackwell} }
Bernecker, S.	2008	The Metaphysics of Memory	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bernecker2008Metaphysics, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {The Metaphysics of Memory}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Springer} }
Bickle, J.	2008	The molecules of social recognition memory: Implications for social cognition, extended mind, and neuroethics	Consciousness and Cognition 17(2) 468-474	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to the consolidation of memories of particular conspecific organisms. Some new experimental techniques for positive interventions into these hypothesized mechanisms offer opportunities for establishing direct causal linkages between intra-neuronal molecular events and the behaviors used to measure social cognitive phenomena. Predicted results from an experiment described below also cast doubt on the application of the "extended mind" approach from recent cognitive science to ground the neuroscience of social cognition. Since neuroethics relies heavily on our best neuroscience of social cognition, that field may soon need to extend its attention beyond cognitive neuroscience, and into neuroscience's cellular and molecular mainstream.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2008molecules, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {The molecules of social recognition memory: Implications for social cognition, extended mind, and neuroethics}, year = {2008}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {468--474}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.015} }
Blustein, J.	2008	The Moral Demands of Memory	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Blustein2008Moral, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {The Moral Demands of Memory}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Bragues, G.	2008	Memory and morals in Memento : Hume at the movies	Film-Philosophy 12(2) 62-82			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bragues2008Memory, author = {Bragues, George}, title = {Memory and morals in Memento : Hume at the movies}, year = {2008}, journal = {Film-Philosophy}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {62--82} }
Buceniece, E.	2008	To remember memory: Phenomenologically-hermeneutical punctuations	21(1) Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy Philosophy Documentation Center 15-24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: At present, when we live under the duress of the speed/quantity/fleeting impressions dictatorship, no possibility avails to formulate one's total identity in horizontal and vertical dimensions, and therefore a serious danger confronts us to loose our historical consciousness and the taste of the wholeness of life. In trying to reach ever-new modes of acceleration, we tend to forget what is really worthwhile. Loosing of memories as to the events, emotions, places, people and things, culminates in the total loss of memory concerning Memory itself -- not only as a psychological quality of remembering, but Memory as a phenomenon of life-consciousness. This leads us to the question of memory and its connections with consciousness, with being (also with the forgetting of being) with time, with the past and with the future; also with death and the wholeness of life. In the paper different understanding of memory have been considered: memory as being in philosophy of St. Augustin, memory as Bildbewustsein in Husserl's phenomenology and memory and narrative in W. Benjamin's philosophy.
BibTeX: @incollection{Buceniece2008remember, author = {Buceniece, E}, title = {To remember memory: Phenomenologically-hermeneutical punctuations}, year = {2008}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, pages = {15--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp22200821715} }
Burton, J.	2008	Bergson's non-archival theory of memory	Memory Studies 1(3) 321-339	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Literal and metaphorical associations between memory and archives are found throughout traditional and contemporary thinking about memory. Despite a longrunning tendency in the western tradition to doubt the adequacy of archival metaphors for memory, and despite much recent research that implicitly treats memory in terms of dynamic mnemonic and memorial processes, imprint/substrate models epitomized by Plato's wax tablet seem extraordinarily resistant to attempts to think memory beyond them. Henri Bergson's Matter and Memory, in which he makes a radical separation between the processes of recollection and 'pure memory', provides both an argument for the tenacity of the memory--archive relation and an alternative, non-archival model of memory. In this article, I suggest the possible implications of this model for the way we think about both memory and the archive, and on the basis of this point towards Bergson's potential significance for the emergent field of memory studies.
BibTeX: @article{Burton2008Bergsons, author = {Burton, James}, title = {Bergson's non-archival theory of memory}, year = {2008}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {1}, number = {3}, pages = {321--339}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698008093797} }
Bzdak, D.	2008	On amnesia and knowing-how	Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 12(1) 36-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s 2001 account of knowledge-how as a species of knowledge-that is wrong. They argue that a claim such as “Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle” is true if and only if Hannah has some relevant knowledge-that. I challenge their claim by considering the case of a famous amnesic patient named Henry M. who is capable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-how but who is incapable of acquiring and retaining new knowledge-that.In the first two sections of the paper, I introduce the topic of knowledge-how and give a brief overview of Stanley and Williamson’s position. In the third and fourth sections, I discuss the case of Henry M. and explain why it is plausible to describe him as someone who can retain new knowledge-how but not new knowledge-that. In the final sections of the paper, I argue that Henry M.’s case does indeed provide a counterexample to Stanley and Williamson’s analysis of knowing-how as a species of knowing-that, and I consider and respond to possible objections to my argument.
BibTeX: @article{Bzdak2008On, author = {Bzdak, David}, title = {On amnesia and knowing-how}, year = {2008}, journal = {Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {36--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/techne200812113} }
Campbell, S.	2008	The second voice	Memory Studies 1(1) 41-48	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Understanding of social aspects of remembering in diverse communities requires a focus on the listener, and on the role of uptake in memory's inter-individual dramas. We come repeatedly under the influence not only of our own pasts as understood by others, but of the pasts of others. Sharing memory is our default. So we can respond to any preoccupation with accuracy in the philosophy and psychology of memory by theorizing the self as relationally shaped, and by acknowledging the value of ongoing renegotiation over the significance of shared experiences as communities forge a useable past together.
BibTeX: @article{Campbell2008second, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {The second voice}, year = {2008}, journal = {Memory Studies}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {41--48}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698007083887} }
Cantón, C.G.	2008	Globalisation, technology and reason: Hans Blumenberg's ethics of memory	22(1) Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy Philosophy Documentation Center 51-59	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper intends to explore an aspect of Blumenberg's metaphorology as memory of mankind and the ethical commitment derived from it. It is seen as the culmination of the fight that the human being maintains against the senselessness of reality. It manifests itself and it is perceived by a human being as the immensurability of world time and life time (i.e. that the human being is born and dies), that impedes the human being from having all of the world i.e. the satisfaction of its infinite desires. In the fight against finity technology and money play a vital role. They have in common the power to enable an expansion of human capacities over the boundaries of factual existence: through technology and money the human being can do more or, do the same in less time. That is: to bring closer life time and world time. But in this process the instrumental character of technology and money causes homogenisation in the societies where they thrive. That's one of the characteristics of globalization. This homogenisation is to be understood as the forgetting of other essential possibilities of the human creation of meaning. Thus, what technological and monetary processes construct on one side, come to be destroyed on the other side. Blumenberg's metaphorology is the adequate response: it is understood both as the self-consciousness of the process of reason in its making sense of the universe, and as an ''ideal store'' of everything the human being has come to make in this process.
BibTeX: @incollection{Canton2008Globalisation, author = {Cantón, César González}, title = {Globalisation, technology and reason: Hans Blumenberg's ethics of memory}, year = {2008}, volume = {22}, number = {1}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, pages = {51--59}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp22200822702} }
Christensen, W., McIlwain, D., Sutton, J. and Geeves, A.	2008	Critical review of 'Practicing perfection: Memory & piano performance'	Empirical Musicology Review 3(3)	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How do concert pianists commit to memory the structure of a piece of music like Bach's Italian Concerto, learning it well enough to remember it in the highly charged setting of a crowded performance venue, yet remaining open to the freshness of expression of the moment? Playing to this audience, in this state, now, requires openness to specificity, to interpretation, a working dynamicism that mere rote learning will not provide. Chaffin, Imreh and Crawford's innovative and detailed research suggests that the key to this skill is a declarative mental roadmap aiding musical performance. This hypothesis is neatly and unintentionally summarized by professional pianist Imreh, who states when learning a new piece of music ''My fingers were playing the notes just fine. The practice I needed was in my head. I had to learn to keep track of where I was. It was a matter of learning exactly what I needed to be thinking of as I played, and at exactly what point. . .'' (Chaffin & Imreh 1997, p.326).
BibTeX: @article{Christensen2008Critical, author = {Christensen, Wayne and McIlwain, Doris and Sutton, John and Geeves, Andrew}, title = {Critical review of 'Practicing perfection: Memory & piano performance'}, year = {2008}, journal = {Empirical Musicology Review}, volume = {3}, number = {3}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.18061/1811/34109} }
Christman, J.	2008	Why search for lost time? Memory, autonomy, and practical reason	Practical Identity and Narrative Agency Routledge 146-166			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Christman2008Why, author = {Christman, John}, title = {Why search for lost time? Memory, autonomy, and practical reason}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {Practical Identity and Narrative Agency}, editor = {Mackenzie, Catriona and Atkins, Kim}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {146--166} }
Cobb, J.B.	2008	Memory in a Whiteheadian perspective	World Futures 64(2) 116-124	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Whitehead does not provide us with a systematic account of the various types ofexperience to which the word ''memory'' is applied. Nevertheless, he does provideus with a way of understanding the world, and living creatures who inhabit it,that places the discussion in a different context from the usual one: the diversefeatures of human experience that we call memory are developed forms of basicpatterns of relationship that characterize all actual entities. I will first review therelevant features of Whitehead's conceptuality, then contrast the resulting viewwith its usual formulation, and then speculate about some forms of memory inWhiteheadian categories.
BibTeX: @article{Cobb2008Memory, author = {Cobb, John B.}, title = {Memory in a Whiteheadian perspective}, year = {2008}, journal = {World Futures}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, pages = {116--124}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020701845657} }
Conee, E. and Feldman, R.	2008	Evidence	Epistemology: New Essays Oxford University press 83-104	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Evidentialism is the view that epistemic justification is a product of evidence. Evidentialism holds that the justification of attitudes other than belief is also determined by evidence.When one's evidence supports the negation of a proposition,disbelief is the justified attitude. When one's evidence is counterbalanced, suspension of judgment is the justified attitude. This chapter clarifies the nature of evidence and evidential support. The chapter also responds to some objections and assesses some rival views.
BibTeX: @incollection{Conee2008Evidence, author = {Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard}, title = {Evidence}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {Epistemology: New Essays}, editor = {Smith, Quentin}, publisher = {Oxford University press}, pages = {83--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.003.0005} }
Dainton, B.	2008	Sensing change	Philosophical Issues 18(1) 362-384		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dainton2008Sensing, author = {Dainton, Barry}, title = {Sensing change}, year = {2008}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {362--384}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2008.00152.x} }
Danziger, K.	2008	Marking the Mind: A History of Memory	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Danziger2008Marking, author = {Danziger, Kurt}, title = {Marking the Mind: A History of Memory}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Debus, D.	2008	Experiencing the past: A relational account of recollective memory	Dialectica 62(4) 405-432	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Sometimes we remember past objects or events in a vivid, experiential way. The present paper addresses some fundamental questions about the metaphysics of such experiential or 'recollective' memories. More specifically, it develops the 'Relational Account' of recollective memory, which consists of the following three claims. (1) A subject who recollectively remembers (or 'R-remembers') a past object or event stands in an experiential relation (namely, a 'recollective relation') to the relevant past object or event. (2) The R-remembered object or event itself is a part of the R-memory; that is, the subject's present R-memory is partly constituted by the relevant past object or event. (3) When a subject R-remembers a past object, the past object is a constitutive part of the conscious experience itself; that is, the object is immediately available to the subject in conscious experience. In developing the Relational Account, the present paper hopes to make a substantial contribution to any attempt to account for the nature of recollective memory. Furthermore, in order to explain how a subject could understand the beliefs that she forms about the past on the basis of an R-memory, and how a subject could, on the basis of an R-memory, gain any knowledge about the past, we arguably also need to rely on the Relational Account of recollective memory. Thus, the Relational Account will also play an important role in an attempt to account for various other ways in which a subject might be related to the past in general, and to her own past in particular. Standing in such relations to the past is, in turn, a central feature of our human existence. Ultimately, therefore, the Relational Account of recollective memory should also play a crucial role in furthering our understanding of ourselves, and of our own existence in time.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2008Experiencing, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Experiencing the past: A relational account of recollective memory}, year = {2008}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {62}, number = {4}, pages = {405--432}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2008.01165.x} }
Devitt, S.K.	2008	Remembering beliefs	Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society Cognitive Science Society 1504-1509	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Optimal decision-making requires us to accurately pinpoint the basis of our thoughts, e.g. whether they originate from our memory or our imagination. This paper argues that the phenomenal qualities of our subjective experience provide permissible evidence to revise beliefs, particularly as it pertains to memory. I look to the source monitoring literature to reconcile circumstances where mnemic beliefs and mnemic qualia conflict. By separating the experience of remembering from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (e.g. déjà vu, false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. functional amnesia, unintentional plagiarism). I argue that a pragmatic, probabilistic approach to belief revision is a way to rationally incorporate information from conscious experience, whilst acknowledging its inherent difficulties as an epistemic source. I conclude with a Bayesian defense of source monitoring based on C.I. Lewis' coherence argument for memorial knowledge.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Devitt2008Remembering, author = {Devitt, Susannah Kate}, title = {Remembering beliefs}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}, editor = {Love, B. C. and McRae, K. and Sloutsky, V. M.}, publisher = {Cognitive Science Society}, pages = {1504--1509} }
Fernández, J.	2008	Memory and time	Philosophical Studies 141(3) 333-356	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a positive view. According to this view, when a subject seems to remember a certain event, that event is presented to her as making true a perceptual experience that caused the very memory experience that she is having.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2008Memoryb, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory and time}, year = {2008}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {141}, number = {3}, pages = {333--356}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9177-x} }
Fernández, J.	2008	Memory, past and self	Synthese 160(1) 103-121	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the 'attribution of pastness' feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the 'attribution of existence' feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next, I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call 'perceptual' and 'self-based' theories. I argue that those theories that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2008Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory, past and self}, year = {2008}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {160}, number = {1}, pages = {103--121}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9104-2} }
Fox, D.	2008	Brain imaging and the bill of rights: Memory detection technologies and American criminal justice	The American Journal of Bioethics 8(1) 34-36		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Fox2008Brain, author = {Fox, Dov}, title = {Brain imaging and the bill of rights: Memory detection technologies and American criminal justice}, year = {2008}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {34--36}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701828451} }
Glannon, W.	2008	Psychopharmacological enhancement	Neuroethics 1(1) 45-54	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Many drugs have therapeutic off-label uses for which they were not originally designed. Some drugs designed to treat neuropsychiatric and other disorders may enhance certain normal cognitive and affective functions. Because the long-term effects of cognitive and affective enhancement are not known and may be harmful, a precautionary principle limiting its use seems warranted. As an expression of autonomy, though, competent individuals should be permitted to take cognition- and mood-enhancing agents. But they need to be aware of the risks in chronic use of these agents and to take responsibility for their effects. A reasonable middle ground between these positions is to warn those who choose to enhance that doing so entails risks.
BibTeX: @article{Glannon2008Psychopharmacological, author = {Glannon, Walter}, title = {Psychopharmacological enhancement}, year = {2008}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {45--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9005-9} }
Gunter, P.A.Y.	2008	Perception, memory, and duration: The binding problem and the synthesis of the past	World Futures 64(2) 125-132	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Theories of perception and of memory are closely allied. The binding problem (which considers how bits of perception are reassembled by the brain) leads to neurophysiological subjectivism. This could be outflanked by arguing with Bergson that perceiving consciousness is out in the world. Thus the brain would bind only behavioral ''maps.'' In turn, consciousness would retain our personal pasts. Such personal (episodic) memories both help us to recognize present objects and to perform creative acts. Memory, although retentive, is also creative. This is important in rethinking biological and evolutionary memory.
BibTeX: @article{Gunter2008Perception, author = {Gunter, Pete A. Y.}, title = {Perception, memory, and duration: The binding problem and the synthesis of the past}, year = {2008}, journal = {World Futures}, volume = {64}, number = {2}, pages = {125--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020701845673} }
Hagberg, G.L.	2008	Describing Ourselves: Wittgenstein and Autobiographical Consciousness	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hagberg2008Describing, author = {Hagberg, Garry L.}, title = {Describing Ourselves: Wittgenstein and Autobiographical Consciousness}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Hoerl, C.	2008	On being stuck in time	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7(4) 485-500	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively 'stuck in time'. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in 'mental time travel'. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2008being, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {On being stuck in time}, year = {2008}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {485--500}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-008-9089-z} }
van Hooff, J.C.	2008	Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues	The American Journal of Bioethics 8(1) 25-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hooff2008Neuroimaging, author = {van Hooff, Johanna C.}, title = {Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues}, year = {2008}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {25--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701828501} }
Jungert, M.	2008	In memory we trust? Philosophical remarks on the relation between memory, self and truthfulness	54(1) Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy Philosophy Documentation Center 13-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Common sense regards memory as fairly exact, reliable and trustworthy in the majority of cases. However, recent scientific findings in psychology and biology seem to object this point of view. According to them, memory appears as a highly constructive and often deceptive phenomenon. These assumptions lead to various philosophical problems. The talk will briefly outline some of them. At first, some general statements about philosophy and memory research will be made. Second, the relationship between self and (autobiographical) memory is being analyzed. This can be illustrated by case-studies of traumatical disorders, a field which is so far stunningly unnoted in philosophy. Third, some aspects of the relation between memory and truth will be examined.
BibTeX: @incollection{Jungert2008memory, author = {Jungert, M.}, title = {In memory we trust? Philosophical remarks on the relation between memory, self and truthfulness}, year = {2008}, volume = {54}, number = {1}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy}, publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center}, pages = {13--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/wcp222008542} }
Kelly, M.R.	2008	Husserl, Deleuzean Bergsonism and the sense of the past in general	Husserl Studies 24(1) 15-30	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Those familiar with contemporary continental philosophy know well the defenses Husserlians have offered of Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness against post-modernism's deconstructive criticisms. As post-modernism gives way to Deleuzean post-structuralism, Deleuze's Le bergsonisme has grown into the movement of Bergsonism. This movement, designed to present an alternative to phenomenology, challenges Husserlian phenomenology by criticizing the most ''important… of all phenomenological problems.'' Arguing that Husserl's theory of time-consciousness detailed a linear succession of iterable instants in which the now internal to consciousness receives prejudicial favor, Bergsonism concludes that Husserl derived the past from the present and cannot account for the sense of the past, which differs in kind from the present. Consequently, everything on Husserl's account remains present and his theory cannot accommodate for time's passage. In this paper, I renew the Husserlian defense of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness in response to the recent movement of Deleuzean Bergsonism. Section one presents Bergsonism's notion of the past in general and its critique of Husserl's theory of time-consciousness. Section two presents a rejoinder to Bergsonism's critique of Husserl, questioning (1) its understanding of the living-present as linearly extended, (2) its conflation of the living-present with Husserl's early schema-apprehension interpretation, and (3) its failure to grasp Husserl's revised understanding of primary memory as a result of (2). In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl's theory of retention might articulate a notion of the past more consistent with Bergson than Bergsonism itself.
BibTeX: @article{Kelly2008Husserl, author = {Kelly, Michael R.}, title = {Husserl, Deleuzean Bergsonism and the sense of the past in general}, year = {2008}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {15--30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-007-9031-1} }
Kolber, A.J.	2008	Freedom of memory today	Neuroethics 1(2) 145-148	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Emerging technologies raise the possibility that we may be able to treat trauma victims by pharmaceutically dampening factual˚nor emotional aspects of their memories. Such technologies raise a panoply of legal and ethical issues. While many of these˚nissues remain off in the distance, some have already arisen. In this brief commentary, I discuss a real-life case of memory˚nerasure. The case reveals why the contours of our freedom of memory---our limited bundle of rights to control our memories and˚nbe free of outside control---already merit some attention.
BibTeX: @article{Kolber2008Freedom, author = {Kolber, Adam J.}, title = {Freedom of memory today}, year = {2008}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {145--148}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9011-y} }
Krondorfer, B.	2008	Is forgetting reprehensible? Holocaust eemembrance and the task of oblivion	Journal of Religious Ethics 36(2) 233-267	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ''Forgetting'' plays an important role in the lives of individuals and communities. Although a few Holocaust scholars have begun to take forgetting more seriously in relation to the task of remembering---in popular parlance as well as in academic discourse on the Holocaust--- forgetting is usually perceived as a negative force. In the decades follow- ing 1945, the terms remembering and forgetting have often been used antithetically, with the communities of victims insisting on the duty to remember and a society of perpetrators desiring to forget. Thus, the discourse on Holocaust memory has become entrenched on this issue. This essay counters the swift rejection of forgetting and its labeling as a reprehensible act. It calls attention to two issues: first, it offers a critical argument for different forms of forgetting; second, it concludes with suggestions of how deliberate performative practices of forgetting might benefit communities affected by a genocidal past. Is it possible to conceive of forgetting not as the ugly twin of remembering but as its necessary companion?
BibTeX: @article{Krondorfer2008Is, author = {Krondorfer, Björn}, title = {Is forgetting reprehensible? Holocaust eemembrance and the task of oblivion}, year = {2008}, journal = {Journal of Religious Ethics}, volume = {36}, number = {2}, pages = {233--267}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2008.00345.x} }
Lackey, J.	2008	Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Lackey2008Learning, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Liao, S.M. and Sandberg, A.	2008	The normativity of memory modification	Neuroethics 1(2) 85-99	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The prospect of using memory modifying technologies raises interesting and important normative concerns. We first point out that those developing desirable memory modifying technologies should keep in mind certain technical and user-limitation issues. We next discuss certain normative issues that the use of these technologies can raise such as truthfulness, appropriate moral reaction, self-knowledge, agency, and moral obligations. Finally, we propose that as long as individuals using these technologies do not harm others and themselves in certain ways, and as long as there is no prima facie duty to retain particular memories, it is up to individuals to determine the permissibility of particular uses of these technologies.
BibTeX: @article{Liao2008normativity, author = {Liao, S. Matthew and Sandberg, Anders}, title = {The normativity of memory modification}, year = {2008}, journal = {Neuroethics}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {85--99}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9009-5} }
Macdonald, S.	2008	The paradox of inquiry in Augustine's Confessions	Metaphilosophy 39(1) 20-38	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The Confessions recounts Augustine's successful search for God. But Augustine worries that one cannot search for God if one does not already know God. That version of the paradox of inquiry dominates and structures Confessions 1-10. I draw connections between the dramatic opening lines of book 1 and the climactic discussion in book 10.26-38 and argue that the latter discussion contains Augustine's resolution of the paradox of inquiry as it applies to the special case of searching for God. I claim that he develops a model, relying on the universal human experience of joy and truth, that identifies a starting point that (1) is common to all human beings, (2) is sufficient for guiding a successful search for God, and (3) avoids commitment to recollection of experiences prior to birth. The model is crucial to Augustine's rejection of traditional Platonist views about recollection.
BibTeX: @article{Macdonald2008paradox, author = {Macdonald, Scott}, title = {The paradox of inquiry in Augustine's Confessions}, year = {2008}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {20--38}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00529.x} }
McCain, K.	2008	The virtues of epistemic conservatism	Synthese 164(2) 185-200	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although several important methodologies implicitly assume the truth of epistemic conservatism, the view that holding a belief confers some measure of justification on the belief, recent criticisms have led some to conclude that epistemic conservatism is an implausible view. That conclusion is mistaken. In this article, I propose a new formulation of epistemic conservatism that is not susceptible to the criticisms leveled at earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism. In addition to withstanding these criticisms, this formulation of epistemic conservatism has several benefits. First, this formulation has the benefits of earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism, that is to say it makes sense of our intuitions about justification in regard to both memory beliefs and beliefs for which we have forgotten our evidence. Second, it provides a good way of responding to the skeptic's challenge concerning the possibility of possessing knowledge of the external world posed by the Alternative Hypotheses argument. Third, it provides responses to both forms of a new skeptical problem plaguing basic knowledge structure theories, the Problem of Easy Knowledge formulated by Stewart Cohen. I argue that given the many benefits of this formulation of epistemic conservatism and the fact that it is not vulnerable to the criticisms that undermine earlier formulations of epistemic conservatism, this formulation of epistemic conservatism is a plausible view to maintain.
BibTeX: @article{McCain2008virtues, author = {McCain, Kevin}, title = {The virtues of epistemic conservatism}, year = {2008}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {164}, number = {2}, pages = {185--200}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9222-5} }
Meegan, D.V.	2008	Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues	The American Journal of Bioethics 8(1) 9-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is considerable interest in the use of neuroimaging techniques for forensic purposes. Memory detection techniques, including the well-publicized Brain Fingerprinting technique (Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., Seattle WA), exploit the fact that the brain responds differently to sensory stimuli to which it has been exposed before. When a stimulus is specifically associated with a crime, the resulting brain activity should differentiate between someone who was present at the crime and someone who was not. This article reviews the scientific literature on three such techniques: priming, old/new, and P300 effects. The forensic potential of these techniques is evaluated based on four criteria: specificity, automaticity, encoding flexibility, and longevity. This article concludes that none of the techniques are devoid of forensic potential, although much research is yet to be done. Ethical issues, including rights to privacy and against self-incrimination, are discussed. A discussion of legal issues concludes that current memory detection techniques do not yet meet United States standards of legal admissibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
BibTeX: @article{Meegan2008Neuroimaging, author = {Meegan, Daniel V.}, title = {Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical, and legal issues}, year = {2008}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {9--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701842007} }
Meegan, D.V.	2008	Response to open peer commentaries on "Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical and legal issues"	The American Journal of Bioethics 8(1) W1-W4		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Meegan2008Response, author = {Meegan, Daniel V.}, title = {Response to open peer commentaries on "Neuroimaging techniques for memory detection: Scientific, ethical and legal issues"}, year = {2008}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {W1--W4}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160801891219} }
Meyer, M.J.	2008	Reflections on comic reconciliations: Ethics, memory, and anxious happy endings	Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66(1) 77-87		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Meyer2008Reflections, author = {Meyer, Michael J.}, title = {Reflections on comic reconciliations: Ethics, memory, and anxious happy endings}, year = {2008}, journal = {Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism}, volume = {66}, number = {1}, pages = {77--87}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-594X.2008.00289.x} }
Miller, J.C.	2008	Hume's impression of succession (time)	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 47(3-4) 603-617	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article I argue that Hume's empiricism allows for time to exist as a real distinct impression of succession, not, as many claim, merely as a nominal abstract idea. In the first part of this article I show how for Hume it is succession and not duration that constitutes time, and, further, that only duration is fictional. In the second part, I show that according to the way Hume describes the functions of the memory and imagination, it is possible to explain how we are able to perceive a distinct impression of succession.
BibTeX: @article{Miller2008Humes, author = {Miller, Jon Charles}, title = {Hume's impression of succession (time)}, year = {2008}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {47}, number = {3-4}, pages = {603--617}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300002869} }
Nikulin, D.	2008	Memory and history	Idealistic Studies 38(1) Routledge 75-90	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article traces some modern conceptions of memory in history (Halbwachs, Nora), indirectly comparing them with the ancient poetic tradition of so-called ''catalogue poetry.'' In the discussion of memory and oblivion, I argue that history encompasses multiple histories rather than constituting one single teleological and universal history. Every history is produced by a histori- cal narrative that follows and interprets what may be called the historical proper, which comprises lists of names of people, things, or events that have to be kept and transmitted within a history. The historical and the narrative within a history are relatively independent, insofar as the narrative that interprets the historical may in principle change, whereas the historical has to be preserved, which is the primary task of historical memory. Historical being, then, is being remembered within a history.
BibTeX: @article{Nikulin2008Memory, author = {Nikulin, Dmitri}, title = {Memory and history}, year = {2008}, journal = {Idealistic Studies}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {75--90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/idstudies2008381/26} }
Nuzzo, A.	2008	History and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology	Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 29(1) 161-198		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Nuzzo2008History, author = {Nuzzo, Angelica}, title = {History and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology}, year = {2008}, journal = {Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal}, volume = {29}, number = {1}, pages = {161--198}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371033_2} }
Parr, A.	2008	Deleuze and Memorial Culture: Desire, Singular Memory and the Politics of Trauma	Edinburgh University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Parr2008Deleuze, author = {Parr, Adrian}, title = {Deleuze and Memorial Culture: Desire, Singular Memory and the Politics of Trauma}, year = {2008}, publisher = {Edinburgh University Press}, edition = {Edinburgh} }
Phillips, I.B.	2008	Perceiving temporal properties	European Journal of Philosophy 18(2) 176-202	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers have long struggled to understand our perceptual experience of temporal properties such as succession, persistence and change. Indeed, strikingly, a number have felt compelled to deny that we enjoy such experience. Philosophical puzzlement arises as a consequence of assuming that, if one experiences succession or temporal structure at all, then one experiences it at a moment. The two leading types of theory of temporal awareness---specious present theories and memory theories---are best understood as attempts to explain how temporal awareness is possible within the constraints of this principle. I argue that the principle is false. Neither theory of temporal awareness can be made workable unless it is rejected. Our experience of temporal phenomena cannot be understood if we attempt to break experience down into instantaneous slices. In order to understand the perception of temporal properties we must look beyond the instant.
BibTeX: @article{Phillips2008Perceiving, author = {Phillips, Ian B.}, title = {Perceiving temporal properties}, year = {2008}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, pages = {176--202}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2008.00299.x} }
Poole, R.	2008	Memory, responsibility, and identity	Social Research 75(1) 263-286			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Poole2008Memory, author = {Poole, Ross}, title = {Memory, responsibility, and identity}, year = {2008}, journal = {Social Research}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {263--286} }
Pouget, P.	2008	To wink or to blink: Technical limits or phenomenological difficulties	The American Journal of Bioethics 8(1) 32-34		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pouget2008wink, author = {Pouget, Pierre}, title = {To wink or to blink: Technical limits or phenomenological difficulties}, year = {2008}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {32--34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701828477} }
Qureshi, A. and Johri, A.	2008	Issues involving informed consent for research participants with Alzheimer's disease	Journal of Academic Ethics 6(3) 197-203	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementia which is estimated to impact 350,000 people over 65 years of age in Canada. The lack of effective treatment and the growing number of people who are expected to be diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease in the near future are compelling reasons why continued research in this area is necessary. With additional research, there needs to be greater recognition of the complexity of seeking ongoing informed consent from those with Alzheimer's disease. This complexity is because the impairment of memory and cognitive ability does not diminish in a linear manner, but rather fluctuates between periods of impairment and relatively normal cognitive lucidness. There is limited discussion in the guidelines of those progressing from early stages of Alzheimer's disease who have intermittent cognitive function. Guidelines to research and research ethics boards require further development to facilitate research including those with Alzheimer's disease while protecting this growing pool of potential participants.
BibTeX: @article{Qureshi2008Issues, author = {Qureshi, Adnan and Johri, Amer}, title = {Issues involving informed consent for research participants with Alzheimer's disease}, year = {2008}, journal = {Journal of Academic Ethics}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, pages = {197--203}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10805-008-9066-8} }
Schroer, R.	2008	Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89(1) 74-85	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distin- guishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection. 1.
BibTeX: @article{Schroer2008Memory, author = {Schroer, Robert}, title = {Memory foundationalism and the problem of unforgotten carelessness}, year = {2008}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {89}, number = {1}, pages = {74--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00310.x} }
Soteriou, M.	2008	The epistemological role of episodic recollection	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(2) 472-492	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation---it is neither justified nor unjustified---but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgments about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one's attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time-travel---a case of re-visiting, or re-acquaintance with, some past episode.
BibTeX: @article{Soteriou2008epistemological, author = {Soteriou, Matthew}, title = {The epistemological role of episodic recollection}, year = {2008}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {77}, number = {2}, pages = {472--492}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00199.x} }
Sullivan, J.A.	2008	Memory consolidation, multiple realizations, and modest reductions	Philosophy of Science 75(5) 501-513	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state--physical state to function-mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists themselves have claimed.
BibTeX: @article{Sullivan2008Memory, author = {Sullivan, Jacqueline Anne}, title = {Memory consolidation, multiple realizations, and modest reductions}, year = {2008}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {75}, number = {5}, pages = {501--513}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/594502} }
Sutton, J.	2008	Between individual and collective memory: Coordination, interaction, distribution	Social Research 75(1) 23-48			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2008individual, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Between individual and collective memory: Coordination, interaction, distribution}, year = {2008}, journal = {Social Research}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {23--48} }
Sutton, J.	2008	Material agency, skills and history: Distributed cognition and the archaeology of memory	Material Agency Springer 37-55	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Agency is a key theme that cross-cuts a wide raft of disciplines in the humanities, social sciences and beyond; yet it is invariably discussed separately behind closed disciplinary doors. Within archaeology, agency has been characterized as a uniquely human attribute, and a means of incorporating individual intentionality into theoretical discourse. In other domains, however, notions of non-human and 'material' agency have been finding currency, and it is our aim to introduce some of these themes into archaeology and develop a non-anthropocentric approach to agency. It is anticipated that such a perspective will not only help us achieve more convincing interpretations of the past, giving a more active role to material culture, but also throw new light on the changing role of artifacts in the present and the future. This book is a groundbreaking attempt to address questions of non-human and material agency from a wide range of perspectives and disciplines: archaeology, anthropology, sociology, cognitive science, philosophy, and economics. The editors and authors demostrate that a distributed, relational approach to agency, incorporating both humans and artifacts, has important ramifications for how we understand material culture.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2008Material, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Material agency, skills and history: Distributed cognition and the archaeology of memory}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {Material Agency}, editor = {Knappett, C. and Malafouris, L.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {37--55}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-74711-8_3} }
Traiger, S.	2008	Hume on memory and imagination	A Companion to Hume Blackwell 58-71		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Traiger2008Hume, author = {Traiger, Saul}, title = {Hume on memory and imagination}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {A Companion to Hume}, editor = {Radcliffe, Elizabeth S.}, publisher = {Blackwell}, pages = {58--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470696583.ch3} }
Varner, G.	2008	Personhood, memory and elephant management	Elephants and Ethics : Toward a Morality of Coexistence Johns Hopkins University Press 40-67			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Varner2008Personhood, author = {Varner, G.}, title = {Personhood, memory and elephant management}, year = {2008}, booktitle = {Elephants and Ethics : Toward a Morality of Coexistence}, editor = {Wemmer, C. and Christen, C.}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, pages = {40--67} }
Wallis, C.	2008	Consciousness, context, and know-how	Synthese 160(1) 123-153	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Specifically, I claim that Carr's necessary conditions for know-hownfail to capture the distinction he himself draws between abilitynand knowing-how. Moreover, Carr ties knowing-how to conscious intent,nand to an explicit knowledge of procedural rules. I argue that bothnmoves are mistakes, which together render Carr's theory an inadequatenaccount both of common ascriptions of knowledge-how and of widelynaccepted ascriptions of knowledge-how within explanations in cognitivenscience. Finally, I note that Carr's conditions fail to capture intuitions(he shares) regarding the ascription of know-how to persons lackingnability. I then consider the position advocated by Stanley &nWilliamson (2001), which seems avoid Carr's commitments to consciousnintent and explicit knowledge while still maintaining that "knowledge-hownis simply a species of knowledge-that" (Stanley & Williamson,2001, p. 411). I argue that Stanley and Williamson's attempt to framena reductionist view that avoids consciously occurrent beliefs duringnexercises of knowledge-how and explicit knowledge of procedural rulesnis both empirically implausible and explanatorily vacuous. In criticizingnthese theories I challenge the presuppositions of the most pervasivenresponse to Ryle in the philosophic literature, what might be describednas "the received view." I also establish several facts about knowing-how.(edited)
BibTeX: @article{Wallis2008Consciousness, author = {Wallis, Charles}, title = {Consciousness, context, and know-how}, year = {2008}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {160}, number = {1}, pages = {123--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9103-3} }
Wasserman, R.	2008	On a common and unmooted (neo-)platonic source for the Husserlian and Augustinian conceptions of memory	American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 82(2) 293-315	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although Michael Kelly, in his article, ''On the Mind's Pronouncement of Time'' (Proceedings of the ACPA 78 [2005]: 247--62), is correct to maintain that Augustine and Husserl share a common conception of time-consciousness, I argue that the similarity does not lie where he thinks nor is it restricted to Husserl's early period. Instead I locate the source of this commonality in a shared response to a particular Platonic problematic, which I find expressed at Parmenides 151e--152e. This essay shows how the Neoplatonic conception of time, which I claim inspired Augustine, emerged from that problematic and how Husserl, in a thought experiment from 1901, wrestles with a similar problematic before adopting a model of time-consciousness roughly analogous to that of Augustine. It is suggested that Kelly is misled by his Aristotelian approach, which causes him to regard the Augustinian and Husserlian models of memory as ''trapped'' in the present. The point is a significant one if, as I conclude, there is no escaping the conception of time as absolute flow, once we abandon the Platonic view of time as a completed succession of nows, eternally fixed.
BibTeX: @article{Wasserman2008common, author = {Wasserman, Roger}, title = {On a common and unmooted (neo-)platonic source for the Husserlian and Augustinian conceptions of memory}, year = {2008}, journal = {American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {82}, number = {2}, pages = {293--315}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq20088225} }
Aizawa, K.	2007	The biochemistry of memory consolidation: A model system for the philosophy of mind	Synthese 155(1) 65-98	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper argues that the biochemistry of memory consolidation provides valuable model systems for exploring the multiple realization of psychological states.
BibTeX: @article{Aizawa2007biochemistry, author = {Aizawa, Ken}, title = {The biochemistry of memory consolidation: A model system for the philosophy of mind}, year = {2007}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {155}, number = {1}, pages = {65--98}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2566-9} }
Al-Saji, A.	2007	The temporality of life: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the immemorial past	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 45(2) 177-206	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Borrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau-Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau- Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage.
BibTeX: @article{AlSaji2007temporality, author = {Al-Saji, Alia}, title = {The temporality of life: Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the immemorial past}, year = {2007}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {45}, number = {2}, pages = {177--206}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00048.x} }
Bernecker, S.	2007	Remembering without knowing	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1) 137-156	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2007Remembering, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Remembering without knowing}, year = {2007}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {85}, number = {1}, pages = {137--156}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400601176460} }
Bingham, C.	2007	Montaigne, Nietzsche, and the mnemotechnics of student agency	Educational Philosophy and Theory 39(2) 168-181	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay explores the educational implications of the thought of Michel de Montaigne and Friedrich Nietzsche on the subject of memory. It explores the sorts of cultural memory practices that Nietzsche has called 'mnemotechnics', that is, the aspects of memory use that allow human beings to live life more fully. Nietzsche and Montaigne's work is explored because their work offers a different, and much more philosophically oriented, perspective on memory than is commonly discussed when educators speak of memory. Nietzsche and Montaigne show how remembering and forgetting might be understood more thoroughly and deployed with more finesse. The case is made that such deployments, such mnemotechnics, have great relevance for enhancing the agency of students.
BibTeX: @article{Bingham2007Montaigne, author = {Bingham, Charles}, title = {Montaigne, Nietzsche, and the mnemotechnics of student agency}, year = {2007}, journal = {Educational Philosophy and Theory}, volume = {39}, number = {2}, pages = {168--181}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00303.x} }
Bloch, D.	2007	Aristotle on Memory and Recollection	Brill			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bloch2007Aristotle, author = {Bloch, David}, title = {Aristotle on Memory and Recollection}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Brill} }
Brunson, D.J.	2007	Memory and Peirce's pragmatism	Cognitio-Estudos: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia 4(2) 71-80	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Interpretations of Peirce's frequent references to a proof of his brand of pragmatism vary, ranging from its impossibility to its substantive completion. This paper takes seriously Peirce's claim that a philosophical argument should be composed of multiple fibers and suggests a relatively neglected perspective that connects much of Peirce's thought. This additional fiber is Peirce's account of memory, often only intimated. The importance of this account arises from Peirce's claim that the practically indubitable existence of memory is a strong argument for synechism, the doctrine of continuity. Indeed, the nature of memory relates to several of Peirce's philosophical commitments, including fallibilism and realism. As an opening to inquiry, this paper will explore the role of memory in Peirce's account of cognition and its bearing on many of his philosophical positions. Working roughly chronologically, we will look at the implications concerning memory in Peirce's denial of intuition in 1868, his revision of the Kantian mental faculties in 1887, his account of perception, claims about pragmatism and abduction in 1903, and some brief remarks about memory within his mature semeiotic. By covering so much material, I intend only to show the pervasive and richly suggestive theme of memory in Peirce's thought. Accordingly, I raise more questions than I answer. Nonetheless, a probationary conclusion is that Peirce's pragmatism, considered as the logic of abduction, concerns the self-control of memory. Alternatively, under this perspective much of Peirce's philosophy is an attempt to account for knowledge based upon only fallible memory, rather than intuition.
BibTeX: @article{Brunson2007Memory, author = {Brunson, Daniel James}, title = {Memory and Peirce's pragmatism}, year = {2007}, journal = {Cognitio-Estudos: Revista Eletrônica de Filosofia}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {71--80} }
Casey, E.S.	2007	Public memory in the making: Ethics and place in the wake of 9/11	Architecture, Ethics, and the Personhood of Place University of New England Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey2007Public, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Public memory in the making: Ethics and place in the wake of 9/11}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {Architecture, Ethics, and the Personhood of Place}, editor = {Caicco, Gregory}, publisher = {University of New England Press} }
Casullo, A.	2007	Testimony and a priori knowledge	Episteme 4(03) 322-334	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory on the scope of a priori knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Casullo2007Testimony, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {Testimony and a priori knowledge}, year = {2007}, journal = {Episteme}, volume = {4}, number = {03}, pages = {322--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/E1742360007000111} }
Child, W.	2007	Dreaming, calculating, thinking: Wittgenstein and anti-realism about the past	The Philosophical Quarterly 57(227) 252-272	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: For the anti-realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by wh is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti-realist interpretat Wittgenstein's view ofpast-tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti-realist about dreaming. His account of c ating in the head suggests anti-realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realis does not endorse general anti-realism about past thoughts; but his treatment does in some involve elements of anti-realism, unacceptable in some instances but possibly correct in others.
BibTeX: @article{Child2007Dreaming, author = {Child, William}, title = {Dreaming, calculating, thinking: Wittgenstein and anti-realism about the past}, year = {2007}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {57}, number = {227}, pages = {252--272}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.483.x} }
Debus, D.	2007	Being emotional about the past: On the nature and role of past-directed emotions	Noûs 41(4) 758-779	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events (or situations) which we witnessed at the time when they occurred (or obtained). The present paper explores the role which such "autobiographically past-directed emotions" (or "APD-emotions") play in a subject's mental life. A defender of the "Memory-Claim" holds that an APD-emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred (or the situation obtained) towards which the APD-emotion is directed. On this view, APD-emotions might play an important role in our acquiring knowledge about our own past emotions, which renders the view rather attractive. However, as I show in the present paper, none of the various possible versions of the Memory-Claim are tenable. This leaves us with the "Universal-New-Emotion-Claim", according to which all APD-emotions are new emotional responses to the past events (or situations) towards which the relevant APD-emotions are directed. Further consideration of the "Universal-New-Emotion-Claim" shows that while APD-emotions do not play the epistemological role they could have played had some version of the Memory-Claim turned out to be true, a subject's APD-emotions nevertheless do play a vital role in a subject's mental life: they help the subject to develop a balanced sense of self.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2007Being, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Being emotional about the past: On the nature and role of past-directed emotions}, year = {2007}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {41}, number = {4}, pages = {758--779}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00669.x} }
Debus, D.	2007	Perspectives on the past: A study of the spatial perspectival characteristics of recollective memories	Mind & Language 22(2) 173-206	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The following paper considers one important feature of our experiential or 'recollective' memories, namely their spatial perspectival characteristics. I begin by considering the 'Past-Dependency-Claim', which states that every recollective memory (or 'R-memory') has its spatial perspectival characteristics in virtue of the subject's present awareness of the spatial perspectival characteristics of a relevant past perceptual experience. Although the Past-Dependency-Claim might for various reasons seem particularly attractive, I show that it is false. I then proceed to develop and defend the 'Present-Dependency-Claim', namely the claim that the spatial perspectival characteristics of an R-memory depend on the spatial perspectival characteristics of perceptual experiences that the subject has at the time at which the R-memory occurs. Lastly, I discuss the phenomenon of so-called 'observer-memories', which presents a special challenge for any attempt to account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of R-memories. I argue that we have no good reason to deny that the relevant experiences should count as memories, and I show that we can account for the spatial perspectival characteristics of observer-memories with the help of the 'Present-Dependency-Claim'. More generally, the paper shows that certain events that occur in a subject's mental life (namely, a subject's R-memories) are necessarily dependent on other events that occur in the relevant subject's mental life (namely, on certain perceptual experiences). This more general conclusion in turn should be relevant for any attempt to develop an appropriate account of a subject's mental life as a whole.
BibTeX: @article{Debus2007Perspectives, author = {Debus, Dorothea}, title = {Perspectives on the past: A study of the spatial perspectival characteristics of recollective memories}, year = {2007}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {22}, number = {2}, pages = {173--206}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00305.x} }
Dekkers, W. and Rikkert, M.O.	2007	Memory enhancing drugs and Alzheimer's disease: Enhancing the self or preventing the loss of it?	Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10(2) 141-151	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we analyse some ethical and philosophical questions related to the development of memory enhancing drugs (MEDs) and anti-dementia drugs. The world of memory enhancement is coloured by utopian thinking and by the desire for quicker, sharper, and more reliable memories. Dementia is characterized by decline, fragility, vulnerability, a loss of the most important cognitive functions and even a loss of self. While MEDs are being developed for self-improvement, in Alzheimer's Disease (AD) the self is being lost. Despite this it is precisely those patients with AD and other forms of dementia that provide the subjects for scientific research on memory improvement. Biomedical research in the field of MEDs and anti-dementia drugs appears to provide a strong impetus for rethinking what we mean by 'memory', 'enhancement', 'therapy', and 'self'. We conclude (1) that the enhancement of memory is still in its infancy, (2) that current MEDs and anti-dementia drugs are at best partially and minimally effective under specific conditions, (3) that 'memory' and 'enhancement' are ambiguous terms, (4) that there is no clear-cut distinction between enhancement and therapy, and (5) that the research into MEDs and anti-dementia drugs encourages a reductionistic view of the human mind and of the self.
BibTeX: @article{Dekkers2007Memory, author = {Dekkers, Wim and Rikkert, Marcel Olde}, title = {Memory enhancing drugs and Alzheimer's disease: Enhancing the self or preventing the loss of it?}, year = {2007}, journal = {Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, pages = {141--151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-007-9055-5} }
Evers, K.	2007	Perspectives on memory manipulation: Using beta-blockers to cure post-traumatic stress disorder	Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16(02) 138-146	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The human mind strives to maintain equilibrium between memory and oblivion and rejects irrelevant or disruptive memories. However, extensive amounts of stress hormones released at the time of a traumatic event can give rise to such powerful memory formation that traumatic memories cannot be rejected and do not vanish or diminish with time: Post-traumatic stress disorder may then develop. Recent scientific studies suggest that beta-blockers stopping the action of these stress hormones may reduce the emotional impact of disturbing memories or prevent their consolidation. Using such an intervention could, in principle, help people who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, but the idea of doing so is controversial. I shall here discuss memory manipulation in this perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Evers2007Perspectives, author = {Evers, Kathinka}, title = {Perspectives on memory manipulation: Using beta-blockers to cure post-traumatic stress disorder}, year = {2007}, journal = {Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics}, volume = {16}, number = {02}, pages = {138--146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0963180107070168} }
Gerrans, P.	2007	Mental time travel, somatic markers and ''myopia for the future''	Synthese 159(3) 459-474	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) arenoften described as having impaired ability for planning and decisionnmaking despite retaining intact capacities for explicit reasoning. Thensomatic marker hypothesis is that the VMPFC associates implicitlynrepresented affective information with explicit representations ofnactions or outcomes. Consequently, when the VMPFC is damaged explicitnreasoning is no longer scaffolded by affective information, leading toncharacteristic deficits. These deficits are exemplified in performancenon the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which subjects with VMPFC performnsignificantly worse than neurotypicals in a task which requires themnlearn from rewarding and punishing experience to make decisions. Thensomatic marker theory adopts a canonical theory of emotion, in whichnemotions function as part of a valencing system, to explain the role ofnaffective processes. The first part of the paper argues against thisncanonical account. The second part provides a different account of thenrole of the role of the VMPFC in decision-making which does not dependnon the canonical account of emotion. Together the first and second partsnof the paper provide the basis for a different interpretation of resultsnon the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In fact the IGT may be probing andeficit in what has been called mental time travel: the ability tonaccess and use information from previous experience and imaginativelynrehearse future experiences as part of the process of deliberation.
BibTeX: @article{Gerrans2007Mental, author = {Gerrans, Philip}, title = {Mental time travel, somatic markers and ''myopia for the future''}, year = {2007}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {159}, number = {3}, pages = {459--474}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9238-x} }
Ginsburg, S. and Jablonka, E.	2007	The transition to experiencing: I. Limited learning and limited experiencing	Biological Theory 2(3) 218-230	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Abstract This is the first of two papers in which we propose an evolutionary route for the transition from sensory processing to unlimited experiencing, or basic consciousness. We argue that although an evolutionary analysis does not provide a formal definition and set of sufficient conditions for consciousness, it can identify crucial factors and suggest what evolutionary changes enabled the transition. We believe that the raw material from which feelings were molded by natural selection was a global sensory state that we call overall sensation, which is a by-product of the incessant activity of the highly interconnected nervous systems that characterize all neural animals. We argue that global sensory states generated limited experiencing once they became coupled to the simplest kinds of nervous-system-mediated learning, a coupling that occurred in the most ancient taxa of neural animals, which were similar to present-day cnidarians and ctenophores. In such animals, limited experiencing involves a small...
BibTeX: @article{Ginsburg2007transition, author = {Ginsburg, Simona and Jablonka, Eva}, title = {The transition to experiencing: I. Limited learning and limited experiencing}, year = {2007}, journal = {Biological Theory}, volume = {2}, number = {3}, pages = {218--230}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.218} }
Ginsburg, S. and Jablonka, E.	2007	The transition to experiencing: II. The evolution of associative learning based on feelings	Biological Theory 2(3) 231-243	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We discuss the evolutionary transition from animals with limited experiencing to animals with unlimited experiencing and basic consciousness. This transition was, we suggest, intimately linked with the evolution of associative learning and with flexible reward systems based on, and modifiable by, learning. During associative learning, new pathways relating stimuli and effects are formed within a highly integrated and continuously active nervous system. We argue that the memory traces left by such new stimulus-effect relations form dynamic, flexible, and varied global sensory states, which we call categorizing sensory states (CSSs). These CSSs acquired a function: they came to act as internal "evaluators" and led to positive and negative reinforcement of new behavior. They are therefore the simplest, distinct, first-person motivational states that an animal can have. They constitute what we call basic consciousness, and are the hallmark of animals that can experience. Since associative learning has been found in many invertebrate taxa that first appeared during the Cambrian era, we propose that the processes underlying basic consciousness are phylogenetically ancient, and that their emergence may have fueled the Cambrian explosion.
BibTeX: @article{Ginsburg2007transitionb, author = {Ginsburg, Simona and Jablonka, Eva}, title = {The transition to experiencing: II. The evolution of associative learning based on feelings}, year = {2007}, journal = {Biological Theory}, volume = {2}, number = {3}, pages = {231--243}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2007.2.3.231} }
Goldberg, S.C.	2007	Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification	Noûs 41(2) 178-203	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti-Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person authority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAI's implications for the epistemology of reasoning. In this paper I argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos-sian's main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and "the a priority of logical abilities" (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossian's argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAI's implications for the nature of discursive justification.
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2007Anti, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification}, year = {2007}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {41}, number = {2}, pages = {178--203}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00643.x} }
Henry, M., Fishman, J.R. and Youngner, S.J.	2007	Propranolol and the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder: Is it wrong to erase the "sting" of bad memories?	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 12-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The National Institute of Mental Health (Bethesda, MD) reports that approximately 5.2 million Americans experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) each year. PTSD can be severely debilitating and diminish quality of life for patients and those who care for them. Studies have indicated that propranolol, a beta-blocker, reduces consolidation of emotional memory. When administered immediately after a psychic trauma, it is efficacious as a prophylactic for PTSD. Use of such memory-altering drugs raises important ethical concerns, including some futuristic dystopias put forth by the President's Council on Bioethics. We think that adequate informed consent should facilitate ethical research using propranolol and, if it proves efficacious, routine treatment. Clinical evidence from studies should certainly continue to evaluate realistic concerns about possible ill effects of diminishing memory. If memory-attenuating drugs prove effective, we believe that the most immediate social concern is the over-medicalization of bad memories, and its subsequent exploitation by the pharmaceutical industry.
BibTeX: @article{Henry2007Propranolol, author = {Henry, Michael and Fishman, Jennifer R. and Youngner, Stuart J.}, title = {Propranolol and the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder: Is it wrong to erase the "sting" of bad memories?}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {12--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518474} }
Henry, M., Fishman, J.R. and Youngner, S.J.	2007	Response to open commentaries for "Propranolol and the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder: Is it wrong to erase the 'sting' of bad memories?"	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) W1-W3		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Henry2007Response, author = {Henry, Michael and Fishman, Jennifer R. and Youngner, Stuart J.}, title = {Response to open commentaries for "Propranolol and the prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder: Is it wrong to erase the 'sting' of bad memories?"}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {W1--W3}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701632325} }
Hershenov, D.B.	2007	The memory criterion and the problem of backward causation	International Philosophical Quarterly 47(2) 181-185	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Lockeans, as well as their critics, have pointed out that the memory criterion is likely to mean that none of us were ever fetuses or even infants due to the lack of direct psychological connections between then and now. But what has been overlooked is that the memory criterion leads to either backward causation and a violation of Locke's own very plausible principle that we can have only one origin, or backward causation and a number of overlapping people where we thought there was just one. I will argue that such problems cannot be avoided by replacing direct psychological connections with overlapping chains of connectedness---what has been called ''psychological continuity.''
BibTeX: @article{Hershenov2007memory, author = {Hershenov, David B.}, title = {The memory criterion and the problem of backward causation}, year = {2007}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {181--185}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq200747241} }
Hoerl, C.	2007	Episodic memory, autobiographical memory, narrative: On three key notions in current approaches to memory development	Philosophical Psychology 20(5) 621-640	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to recent social interactionist accounts in developmental psychology, a child's learning to talk about the past with others plays a key role in memory development. Most accounts of this kind are centered on the theoretical notion of autobiographical memory and assume that socio-communicative interaction with others is important, in particular, in explaining the emergence of memories that have a particular type of connection to the self. Most of these accounts also construe autobiographical memory as a species of episodic memory, but its episodic character, as such, is not typically seen as falling within the remit of an explanation in social interactionist terms. I explore the idea that socio-communicative interaction centered on talk about the past might also have an important role to play, quite independently of considerations about the involvement of the self in memory, in accounting for the emergence of memories that are episodic in character, i.e., memories that involve the recollection of particular past events. In doing so, I also try to shed light on a distinctive role that talk about the past plays in socio-communicative interaction.
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl2007Episodic, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Episodic memory, autobiographical memory, narrative: On three key notions in current approaches to memory development}, year = {2007}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {20}, number = {5}, pages = {621--640}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080701537988} }
Hoskins, G.	2007	The politics of memory and the World Trade Center memorial site	Journal of Social Philosophy 38(2) 242-254		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hoskins2007politics, author = {Hoskins, Gregory}, title = {The politics of memory and the World Trade Center memorial site}, year = {2007}, journal = {Journal of Social Philosophy}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {242--254}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00377.x} }
Hurley, E.A.	2007	The moral costs of prophylactic propranolol	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 35-36		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hurley2007moral, author = {Hurley, Elisa A.}, title = {The moral costs of prophylactic propranolol}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {35--36}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518607} }
Kabasenche, W.P.	2007	Emotions, memory suppression, and identity	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 33-34		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kabasenche2007Emotions, author = {Kabasenche, William Paul}, title = {Emotions, memory suppression, and identity}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {33--34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518581} }
Kolber, A.J.	2007	Clarifying the debate over therapeutic forgetting	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 25-27		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kolber2007Clarifying, author = {Kolber, Adam J.}, title = {Clarifying the debate over therapeutic forgetting}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {25--27}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518508} }
Lackey, J.	2007	Why memory really is a generative epistemic source: A reply to Senor	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1) 209-219		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lackey2007Why, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {Why memory really is a generative epistemic source: A reply to Senor}, year = {2007}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {209--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00010.x} }
Lännström, A.	2007	Locke's account of personal identity: Memory as fallible evidence	History of Philosophy Quarterly 24(1) 39-56			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Laennstroem2007Lockes, author = {Lännström, A.}, title = {Locke's account of personal identity: Memory as fallible evidence}, year = {2007}, journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {39--56} }
Lasusa, D.M.	2007	Eiffel tower keychains and other pieces of rality: The philosophy of souvenirs	The Philosophical Forum 38(3) 271-287		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lasusa2007Eiffel, author = {Lasusa, Danielle M.}, title = {Eiffel tower keychains and other pieces of rality: The philosophy of souvenirs}, year = {2007}, journal = {The Philosophical Forum}, volume = {38}, number = {3}, pages = {271--287}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2007.00267.x} }
Le Poidevin, R.	2007	The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{LePoidevin2007Images, author = {Le Poidevin, Robin}, title = {The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Lennon, T.M.	2007	Proust and the phenomenology of memory	Philosophy and Literature 31(1) 52-66		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lennon2007Proust, author = {Lennon, Thomas M.}, title = {Proust and the phenomenology of memory}, year = {2007}, journal = {Philosophy and Literature}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {52--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/phl.2007.0010} }
Levy, N.	2007	Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Levy2007Neuroethics, author = {Levy, Neil}, title = {Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st Century}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Levy, N.	2007	Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis	American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 3-11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.
BibTeX: @article{Levy2007Rethinking, author = {Levy, Neil}, title = {Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis}, year = {2007}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {3--11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518466} }
Liao, S.M. and Wasserman, D.T.	2007	Neuroethical concerns about moderating traumatic memories	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 38-40	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The article presents an opinion about the medical ethics and bioethics issues in the use of propranolol and other memory-modification drugs as therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Alteration of memory may impact persons' beliefs, doubts, and knowledge about the world and about themselves. Self-knowledge and self-control may be sacrificed in the use of propranolol.
BibTeX: @article{Liao2007Neuroethical, author = {Liao, S. Matthew and Wasserman, David T.}, title = {Neuroethical concerns about moderating traumatic memories}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {38--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518623} }
McGrath, M.	2007	Memory and epistemic conservatism	Synthese 157(1) 1-24	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its pros pects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epis temology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conserva tism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in certain ways. Appropriately qualified, conservatism is no longer the powerful anti-skeptical tool some have hoped for, but a doctrine closely connected with memo
BibTeX: @article{McGrath2007Memory, author = {McGrath, Matthew}, title = {Memory and epistemic conservatism}, year = {2007}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {157}, number = {1}, pages = {1--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-0011-3} }
Meillassoux, Q.	2007	Subtraction and contraction: Deleuze, immanence, and Matter and Memory	Collapse 3 Falmouth: Urbanomic 63-107			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Meillassoux2007Subtraction, author = {Meillassoux, Quentin}, title = {Subtraction and contraction: Deleuze, immanence, and Matter and Memory}, year = {2007}, journal = {Collapse}, volume = {3}, publisher = {Falmouth: Urbanomic}, pages = {63--107} }
Miner, R.	2007	Augustinian recollection	Augustinian Studies 38(2) 435-450		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Miner2007Augustinian, author = {Miner, Robert}, title = {Augustinian recollection}, year = {2007}, journal = {Augustinian Studies}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {435--450}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/augstudies200738233} }
Perner, J., Kloo, D. and Stöttinger, E.	2007	Introspection and remembering	Synthese 159(2) 253-270	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We argue that episodic remembering, understood as the ability to re-experience past events, requires a particular kind of introspective ability and understanding. It requires the understanding that first person experiences can represent actual events. In this respect it differs from the understanding required by the traditional false belief test for children, where a third person attribution (to others or self) of a behavior governing representation is sufficient. The understanding of first person experiences as representations is also required for problem solving with images. In support of this argument we review developmental evidence that children's episodic remembering is independent of and emerges after mastery of the false belief task but emerges together with the use of imagery for solving visual rotation tasks.
BibTeX: @article{Perner2007Introspection, author = {Perner, Josef and Kloo, Daniela and Stöttinger, Elisabeth}, title = {Introspection and remembering}, year = {2007}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {159}, number = {2}, pages = {253--270}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9207-4} }
Randall, W.L.	2007	From computer to compost: Rethinking our metaphors for memory	Theory & Psychology 17(5) 611-633	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper introduces the compost heap as a metaphor for auto- biographical memory. As an alternative to the computer, such a metaphor, it is argued, comes closer to capturing the dynamics of memory across the lifespan and how it feels to us as we age, particularly memory's narrative dimensions. After citing concerns expressed by psychologists and others regarding computationalism, the paper considers four entailments of the compost heap analogy that may serve, very roughly, as counterparts to such concepts as encoding, storage, and retrieval. They are: laying it on, break- ing it down, stirring it up, and mixing it in. The paper concludes with reflec- tions on the advantages of a more organic model of memory and some suggestions for further inquiry concerning issues of interest to the psychology of aging.
BibTeX: @article{Randall2007computer, author = {Randall, William L.}, title = {From computer to compost: Rethinking our metaphors for memory}, year = {2007}, journal = {Theory & Psychology}, volume = {17}, number = {5}, pages = {611--633}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354307081619} }
Recanati, F.	2007	Content, mode, and self-reference	John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind Cambridge University Press 49-63		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Recanati2007Content, author = {Recanati, François}, title = {Content, mode, and self-reference}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind}, editor = {Tsohatzidis, Savas L.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {49--63}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511619489.003} }
Recanati, F.	2007	Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Recanati2007Perspectival, author = {Recanati, François}, title = {Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism}, year = {2007}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Robbins, S.E.	2007	Time, form and the limits of qualia	Journal of Mind and Behavior 28(1) 19-43	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Our understanding of qualia is extremely weak when considerations of time are brought into play. Ignored has been the fact that the scale of time imposed by the brain on the events of the matter field already defines quality, and that there is an essential "primary memory" or continuity of time that underlies all qualitative events. This weakness is magnified when the concept of qualia is applied to form. The origin of the dilemma lies in the fact that the problem of qualia is posed in the context of an abstract space and time. When the time evolution of the matter field is taken as indivisible or nondifferentiable, the problem can be reposed. It becomes a problem of the optimal specification of properties of an already qualitative matter-field at a particular scale of time.
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2007Time, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {Time, form and the limits of qualia}, year = {2007}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {19--43} }
Senor, T.D.	2007	Preserving preservationism: A reply to Lackey	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1) 199-208		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Senor2007Preserving, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Preserving preservationism: A reply to Lackey}, year = {2007}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {74}, number = {1}, pages = {199--208}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00009.x} }
Sheets-Johnstone, M.	2007	Kinesthetic memory	Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 7(1) 69-92	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper attempts to elucidate the nature of kinesthetic memory, demonstrate its centrality to everyday human movement, and thereby promote fresh cognitive and phenomenological understandings of movement in everyday life. Prominent topics in this undertaking include kinesthesia, dynamics, and habit. The endeavor has both a critical and constructive dimension. The constructive dimension is anchored in Luria's seminal notion of a kinetic melody and in related phenomenological analyses of movement. The dual anchorage stems from the general fact that kinesthetic memory is based on kinesthetic experience, hence on the bodily felt dynamics of movement, and on the particular fact that any movement creates a distinctive kinetic dynamics in virtue of its spatio-temporal- energic qualities. The critical dimension focuses on constructs that commonly anchor discussions of movement but bypass the reality of a kinetic dynamics, notably, Merleau-Ponty's ''motor intentionality,'' and the notions of a body schema and body image. The pointillist conception of movement and the Western metaphysics that undergird these constructs is examined in the concluding section of the paper.
BibTeX: @article{SheetsJohnstone2007Kinesthetic, author = {Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine}, title = {Kinesthetic memory}, year = {2007}, journal = {Theoria et Historia Scientiarum}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {69--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.12775/ths.2003.005} }
Slegers, R.	2007	A phenomenological groundwork for involuntary memory: Henri Bergson's aesthetics and Marcel Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu	International Studies in Philosophy 39(1) 79-91	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the most famous distinctions made by Marcel Proust in his À la recherche du temps perdu is the one between voluntary and involuntary memory. Voluntary memory, according to Samuel Beckett in his work Proust,''presents the past in monochrome''(P, 19). The memories it concerns can be recalled, studied and analyzed at will; they have been made to fit the past self of which one is aware. In contrast with the controlled and tidy character of voluntary memory, involuntary
BibTeX: @article{Slegers2007phenomenological, author = {Slegers, Rosa}, title = {A phenomenological groundwork for involuntary memory: Henri Bergson's aesthetics and Marcel Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu}, year = {2007}, journal = {International Studies in Philosophy}, volume = {39}, number = {1}, pages = {79--91}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil200739127} }
Smith, B.	2007	John Locke, personal identity, and Memento	The Philosophy of Neo Noir University Press of Kentucky 35-46			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Smith2007John, author = {Smith, Basil}, title = {John Locke, personal identity, and Memento}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of Neo Noir}, editor = {Conard, Mark T}, publisher = {University Press of Kentucky}, pages = {35--46} }
Strawson, G.	2007	Episodic ethics	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 85-116		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Strawson2007Episodic, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {Episodic ethics}, year = {2007}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {60}, pages = {85--116}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0009} }
Sutton, J.	2007	Batting, habit and memory: The embodied mind and the nature of skill	Sport in Society 10(5) 763-786	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cricket is suffused in memory. Both playing and appreciating the game centrally involve various forms of remembering. This essay focuses on the distinction between explicit autobiographical remembering and the kind of habitual or 'procedural' memory involved in complex embodied skills like batting. Generally considered the province of psychology or cognitive science, the phenomenon of habit or skill memory has been largely neglected by philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of mind. However a number of intrinsically interesting questions concerning batting in particular arise when considered from this perspective. While drawing upon ideas from psychology and cognitive anthropology, the argument is supplemented with accounts from general testimony and cricket writing, phenomenology, and other investigations of the embodied mind. While starting from the prevalent view that thinking too much disrupts the practised, embodied skills involved in batting, the essay suggests that experts do in fact successfully learn mental techniques for how to influence themselves in action, and that the kinds of explicit thought and memory in question are themselves active, dynamic and context-sensitive.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2007Batting, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Batting, habit and memory: The embodied mind and the nature of skill}, year = {2007}, journal = {Sport in Society}, volume = {10}, number = {5}, pages = {763--786}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/17430430701442462} }
Sutton, J.	2007	Integrating the philosophy and psychology of memory: Two case studies	Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection Springer 81-92	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is studied across a bewildering range of disciplines and subdisciplines in the neural, cognitive, and social sciences, and the term covers a wide range of related phenomena. In an integrative spirit, this chapter examines two case studies in memory research in which empirically-informed philosophy and philosophically-informed sciences of the mind can be mutually informative, such that the interaction between psychology and philosophy can open up new research problems-and set new challenges-for our understanding of certain aspects of memory. In each case, there is already enough interdisciplinary interaction on specific issues to give some confidence in the potential productivity of mutual exchange: but in each case, residual gulfs in research style and background assumptions remain to be addressed. The two areas are the developmental psychology of autobiographical memory, and the study of shared memories and social memory phenomena. I show points of contact between a flourishing social-interactionist tradition in developmental psychology and one line of thought in recent philosophy of mind concerning memory, time, and causation; and, more briefly, I sketch a series of connected issues about memory in social psychology and the social sciences which have recently been brought into contact with theoretical ideas about distributed cognition and the "extended mind". These are, then, two focussed forays into a vast array of live topics for the cross-disciplinary study of memory over the next decade: I have offered broader surveys of the field elsewhere.T P 1 P T Just one further example of another, different area very much in need of cross-disciplinary integration is the study of habit memory and skill memory, where philosophers of cognitive science have been just beginning to catch up with the phenomenologists in looking to empirical work for mutual illumination.T P 2 P T Obviously there are other issues and other paths through related terrain, and readers should also pursue different integrative and constructive treatments, from both philosophical and psychological starting-points.T P 3 P T One integrative role of philosophy in the cognitive sciences lies in the juxtaposition of related concepts and theoretical commitments from different branches of these sciences which have not yet been addressed together: this is not a negligible job, for increasing specialization in empirical fields brings the danger that scientists remain unaware of or misunderstand the relevance of work in neighbouring subdisciplines. But naturalistically oriented philosophers of cognitive
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2007Integrating, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Integrating the philosophy and psychology of memory: Two case studies}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection}, editor = {Marraffa, M. and De Caro, M. and Ferretti, F.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {81--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5444-0_6} }
Sutton, J.	2007	Language, memory, and concepts of memory: Semantic diversity and scientific psychology	The Language of Memory in a Cross-Linguistic Perspective John Benjamins 41-65	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In a theoretical commentary on the Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) approach to the semantics of memory and remembering, this paper argues that evidence of rich cross-linguistic diversity in this domain is entirely compatible with the best interpretations of our interdisciplinary cognitive sciences. In particular, it responds to Anna Wierzbicka's critique of contemporary psychology, suggests some specifi c modifi cations to her proposed explications of some ways of talking about what happened before, and questions her claim that certain historically contingent features of modern Western views of memory are built in to the semantics of English terms. The paper concludes by suggesting a different approach to semantic diversity and the study of memory, and a more positive vision of a culturally-sensitive interdisciplinary science.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2007Language, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Language, memory, and concepts of memory: Semantic diversity and scientific psychology}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {The Language of Memory in a Cross-Linguistic Perspective}, editor = {Amberber, M.}, publisher = {John Benjamins}, pages = {41--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/hcp.21.05sut} }
Tenenbaum, E.M. and Reese, B.	2007	Memory-altering drugs: Shifting the paradigm of informed consent	The American Journal of Bioethics 7(9) 40-42		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tenenbaum2007Memory, author = {Tenenbaum, Evelyn M. and Reese, Brian}, title = {Memory-altering drugs: Shifting the paradigm of informed consent}, year = {2007}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {7}, number = {9}, pages = {40--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518649} }
Wetzel, J.	2007	The force of memory: Reflections on the interrupted self	Augustinian Studies 38(1) 147-159		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wetzel2007force, author = {Wetzel, James}, title = {The force of memory: Reflections on the interrupted self}, year = {2007}, journal = {Augustinian Studies}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, pages = {147--159}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/augstudies20073819} }
Yeo, R.	2007	Before Memex: Robert Hooke, John Locke, and Vannevar Bush on external memory	Science in Context 20(01) 21-47	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In 1945 Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution, proposed the design of a machine that would act as a supplement to human memory and would meet the particular information needs of its user. Because this proposed "memex" machine would record "trails" of selected documents, it has been seen as a precursor to hypertext. This article, however, considers Bush's concept in relation to earlier concerns about memory and information, via the ideas of Robert Hooke (1635-1703) and John Locke (1632-1704). Whereas Bush modeled the memex on the associative processes of natural memory, Hooke and Locke concluded that an external archive had to allow collective reason to overcome the limits of individual memory, including its tendency to freeze and repeat patterns of ideas. Moreover, they envisaged an institutional archive rather than one controlled by the interests and mental associations of an individual. From this early modern perspective, Bush's proposed memex appears as a personal device for managing information that incorporates assumptions inimical to the strategies required for scientific analysis.
BibTeX: @article{Yeo2007Memex, author = {Yeo, Richard}, title = {Before Memex: Robert Hooke, John Locke, and Vannevar Bush on external memory}, year = {2007}, journal = {Science in Context}, volume = {20}, number = {01}, pages = {21--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269889706001128} }
Zehfuss, M.	2007	Derrida's memory, war and the politics of ethics	Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy Edinburgh University Press 97-111		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Zehfuss2007Derridas, author = {Zehfuss, Maja}, title = {Derrida's memory, war and the politics of ethics}, year = {2007}, booktitle = {Derrida: Negotiating the Legacy}, editor = {Fagan, Madeleine and Glorieux, Ludovic and Hasimbegovic, Indira and Suetsugu, Marie}, publisher = {Edinburgh University Press}, pages = {97--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9780748631032-007} }
Ambury, J.	2006	Towards a monumental phenomenology: Paul Ricoeur and the politics of memory	Journal of French Philosophy 16(1-2) 105-120		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ambury2006Towards, author = {Ambury, James}, title = {Towards a monumental phenomenology: Paul Ricoeur and the politics of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Journal of French Philosophy}, volume = {16}, number = {1-2}, pages = {105--120}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2006.187} }
Bickle, J.	2006	Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience	Synthese 151(3) 411-434	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a " ruthless reductionism " is alive and thriving in " molecular and cellular cognition " ---a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philoso-phers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neu-rons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current main-stream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals.
BibTeX: @article{Bickle2006Reducing, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience}, year = {2006}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {151}, number = {3}, pages = {411--434}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9015-2} }
Booth, W.J.	2006	Communities of Memory: on Witness, Identity, and Justice	Cornell University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Booth2006Communities, author = {Booth, W. James}, title = {Communities of Memory: on Witness, Identity, and Justice}, year = {2006}, publisher = {Cornell University Press} }
Campbell, J.	2006	Ordinary thinking about time	Time and History: Proceedings of the 28. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium De Gruyter 1-12			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Campbell2006Ordinary, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Ordinary thinking about time}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Time and History: Proceedings of the 28. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium}, editor = {Stöltzner, Michael and Stadler, Friedrich}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {1--12} }
Campbell, S.	2006	Our faithfulness to the past: Reconstructing memory value	Philosophical Psychology 19(3) 361-380	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The reconstructive turn in memory theory challenges us to provide an account of successful remembering that is attentive to the ways in which we use memory, both individually and socially. I investigate conceptualizations of accuracy and integrity useful to memory theorists and argue that faithful recollection is often a complex epistemological/ethical achievement.
BibTeX: @article{Campbell2006Our, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {Our faithfulness to the past: Reconstructing memory value}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {361--380}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080600690573} }
Child, W.	2006	Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73(1) 54-76	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: How should we understand our capacity to remember our past intentional states? And what can we learn from Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic? Three questions are considered. First, what is the relation between our past attitudes and our present beliefs about them? Realism about past attitudes is defended. Second, how should we understand Wittgenstein's view that self-ascriptions of past attitudes are a kind of ''response'' and that the ''language-game'' of reporting past attitudes is ''the primary thing''? The epistemology and metaphysics of past-tense self-ascription are examined in the light of those comments, and our acquisition of the concept of past attitudes is discussed. Third, does Wittgenstein give us reason to think that the identity of a past attitude may be constituted, not by anything that was true of the subject at the time, but by her retrospective tendency to self-ascribe it? It is argued that, contrary to some interpretations, he does not.
BibTeX: @article{Child2006Memory, author = {Child, William}, title = {Memory, expression, and past-tense self-knowledge}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {73}, number = {1}, pages = {54--76}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00604.x} }
Cilliers, P.	2006	On the importance of a certain slowness	Emergence: Complexity and Organization 8(3) 105-112	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the analysis of complex systems there is often an emphasis on the plasticity and adaptability of the system. Coupled with perspectives from chaos theory-like the sensitivity to initial conditions , critical organization, bifurcations, and fractal complexity-this has led to a general understanding of complex systems as something in constant flux and susceptible to rapid change. Although these may indeed be important characteristics of complexity, it has led to descriptions that neglect the stability and the enduring structures necessary for the existence of complex systems. In order for a system to have any identity whatsoever, it cannot merely reflect its environment and the changes therein, it must also resist some of these changes. This is not always recognized in a culture where speed is linked with efficiency , and has become a virtue in itself. This paper argues for a certain "slow-ness." It is not necessary to follow every trend in the environment; as a matter of fact it can be detrimental. This has implications for the way in which we interact with each other, and for the way in which we use new technology, especially the technologies for media and communication. Being too "quick" also has implications for our understanding of important notions like integrity and reliability. The way in which complexity theory is used to analyze the contemporary cultural landscape by certain theorists, particularly Mark Taylor, will be criticized. In the process reference will be made to novels by Sten Nadolny and Milan Kundera.
BibTeX: @article{Cilliers2006importance, author = {Cilliers, Paul}, title = {On the importance of a certain slowness}, year = {2006}, journal = {Emergence: Complexity and Organization}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, pages = {105--112} }
Coliva, A.	2006	Error through misidentification: Some varieties	The Journal of Philosophy 103(8) 403-425		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Coliva2006Error, author = {Coliva, Annalisa}, title = {Error through misidentification: Some varieties}, year = {2006}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {103}, number = {8}, pages = {403--425}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2006103824} }
Copenhaver, R.	2006	Thomas Reid's theory of memory	History of Philosophy Quarterly 23(2) 171-189			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Copenhaver2006Thomas, author = {Copenhaver, Rebecca}, title = {Thomas Reid's theory of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {History of Philosophy Quarterly}, volume = {23}, number = {2}, pages = {171--189} }
Dooley, P.K.	2006	William James's "specious present'' and Willa Cather's phenomenology of memory	Philosophy Today 50(4) 444-449		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dooley2006William, author = {Dooley, Patrick K}, title = {William James's "specious present'' and Willa Cather's phenomenology of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {50}, number = {4}, pages = {444--449}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200650431} }
Fernández, J.	2006	Memory and perception: Remembering snowflake	Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia 21(56) 147-164	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If I remember something, I tend to believe that I have perceived it. Similarly, if I remember something, I tend to believe that it happened in the past. My aim here is to propose a notion of mnemonic contentac- counts for these facts. Certain proposals build perceptual experiences into the content of memories. I argue that they Have trouble with the second belief. Other proposals build references to temporal locations into mnemonic content. I argue that they have trouble with the second one. I propose a notion of mnemonic Content that can account for the rationality of both beliefs.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2006Memory, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Memory and perception: Remembering snowflake}, year = {2006}, journal = {Theoria-Revista De Teoria Historia Y Fundamentos De La Ciencia}, volume = {21}, number = {56}, pages = {147--164}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.534} }
Fernández, J.	2006	The intentionality of memory	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(1) 39-57	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory differs from both introspection and perception in scope. One can only introspect one's own mental states and one can only perceive events in the external world. However, one can remember events in the world as well as one's own perceptual experiences of them. An interesting phenomenological fact about memory is that those two kinds of memories come together. You can't apparently remember a fact without apparently remember having perceived it. And you can't apparently remember what perceiving a certain fact was like without apparently remembering the fact in question. Why is that? The project in this essay is to try to explain this by appealing to the content that memory experiences have.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2006intentionality, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {The intentionality of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {84}, number = {1}, pages = {39--57}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400600571695} }
Frisch, A.	2006	Montaigne and the ethics of memory	L'Esprit Créateur 46(1) 23-31		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Frisch2006Montaigne, author = {Frisch, Andrea}, title = {Montaigne and the ethics of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {L'Esprit Créateur}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {23--31}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/esp.2006.0004} }
Gennaro, R.J., Herrmann, D.J. and Sarapata, M.	2006	Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures	Consciousness and Cognition 15(2) 372-385	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the "unity of consciousness" can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one's mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion (e.g., in Dissociative Identity Disorder), but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for an important formal meeting. After providing some philosophical background into the notions of "unity of consciousness" and "functionalism," we offer preliminary analyses of three examples of everyday memory failure. We then introduce and develop what we call the "unity model" of memory failure and show how it explains the examples. We also describe different ways that unity can break down which, in turn, can lead to memory failure and inappropriate behavior. We then show how slips of action and other kinds of cognitive failures (e.g., memory blocks) differ from everyday memory failures. Finally, we examine alternative models (e.g., Absentmindedness and Multimodal) arguing that the unity model is preferable, and then show how our model is consistent with some experimental results.
BibTeX: @article{Gennaro2006Aspects, author = {Gennaro, Rocco J. and Herrmann, Douglas J. and Sarapata, Michael}, title = {Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures}, year = {2006}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {15}, number = {2}, pages = {372--385}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2005.09.008} }
Genone, J.	2006	Concepts and imagery in episodic memory	Anthropology and Philosophy 7(1-2) 95-107	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The relationship between perceptual experience and memory can seem to pose a challenge for conceptualism, the thesis that perceptual experiences require the actualization of conceptual capacities. Since subjects can recall features of past experiences for which they lacked corresponding concepts at the time of the original experience, it would seem that a subject's conceptual capacities do not impose a limit on what he or she can experience perceptually. But this conclusion ignores the fact that concepts can be composed of other simpler concepts that a subject possessed earlier, and that demonstrative capacities can explain how a subject can experience a particular feature of her environment, even when she lacks a fully general concept for that feature. Using these resources, conceptualism can explain the relation between perceptual experience and memory. Nevertheless, a puzzle remains for the defender of conceptualism. A certain view about the relation between perceptual experience and mental imagery in episodic memory that imagery in recall matches the experience retained in it can make it difficult to understand how conceptualism could be true. For if a subject's conceptual capacities determine what the phenomenology of an experience (or memory of it) is like, then one would expect a perceptual experience and its recall in memory to differ in phenomenology if they involve different concepts. In this essay, I solve this puzzle for conceptualism by undermining the assumption that there is a match between imagery in episodic memory and the phenomenal character of experience.
BibTeX: @article{Genone2006Concepts, author = {Genone, James}, title = {Concepts and imagery in episodic memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Anthropology and Philosophy}, volume = {7}, number = {1-2}, pages = {95--107} }
Goldberg, S.C. and Henderson, D.	2006	Monitoring and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3) 600-617	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the central points of contention in the epistemology of testimony concerns the uniqueness (or not) of the justification of beliefs formed through testimony -- whether such justification can be accounted for in terms of, or 'reduced to,' other familiar sort of justification, e.g., without relying on any epistemic principles unique to testimony. One influential argument for the reductionist position, found in the work of Elizabeth Fricker, argues by appeal to the need for the hearer to monitor the testimony for credibility. Fricker (1994) argues, first, that some monitoring for trustworthiness is required if the hearer is to avoid being gullible, and second, that reductionism but not antireductionism is compatible with ascribing an important role to the process of monitoring in the course of justifiably accepting observed testimony. In this paper we argue that such an argument fails.
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2006Monitoring, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C. and Henderson, David}, title = {Monitoring and anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {72}, number = {3}, pages = {600--617}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00586.x} }
Grau, C.	2006	Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and the morality of memory	Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64(1) 119-133		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Grau2006Eternal, author = {Grau, Christopher}, title = {Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and the morality of memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism}, volume = {64}, number = {1}, pages = {119--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-8529.2006.00234.x} }
Hagberg, G.L.	2006	Autobiographical memory: Wittgenstein, Davidson, and the 'descent into ourselves'	Literature and Philosophy: A Guide to Contemporary Debates Palgrave Macmillan 53-65			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hagberg2006Autobiographical, author = {Hagberg, Garry L.}, title = {Autobiographical memory: Wittgenstein, Davidson, and the 'descent into ourselves'}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Literature and Philosophy: A Guide to Contemporary Debates}, editor = {Rudrum, D.}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, pages = {53--65} }
Hampe, M.	2006	Truthfullness and memory: Philosophical notes on trauma	Subjectivity, Process, and Rationality Ontos Verlag 285-302			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hampe2006Truthfullness, author = {Hampe, Michael}, title = {Truthfullness and memory: Philosophical notes on trauma}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Subjectivity, Process, and Rationality}, editor = {Neumann, Klaus and Thompson, Janna}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, pages = {285--302} }
Kolak, D., Hirstein, W., Mandik, P. and Waskan, J.	2006	Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Kolak2006Cognitive, author = {Kolak, Daniel and Hirstein, William and Mandik, Peter and Waskan, Jonathan}, title = {Cognitive Science: An Introduction to Mind and Brain}, year = {2006}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Kolber, A.J.	2006	Therapeutic forgetting: The legal and ethical implications of memory dampening	Vanderbilt Law Review 59(5) 1561-1626			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kolber2006Therapeutic, author = {Kolber, Adam J.}, title = {Therapeutic forgetting: The legal and ethical implications of memory dampening}, year = {2006}, journal = {Vanderbilt Law Review}, volume = {59}, number = {5}, pages = {1561--1626} }
Lawlor, L.	2006	Bergson revisited	Symposium 10(1) 35-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lawlor2006Bergson, author = {Lawlor, Leonard}, title = {Bergson revisited}, year = {2006}, journal = {Symposium}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {35--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/symposium20061014} }
Le Poidevin, R.	2006	Memory and the A-series	Time and History. Zeit und Geschichte Ontos Verlag 31-42		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{LePoidevin2006Memory, author = {Le Poidevin, Robin}, title = {Memory and the A-series}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Time and History. Zeit und Geschichte}, editor = {Stadler, F and Stöltzner, M}, publisher = {Ontos Verlag}, pages = {31--42}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110333213.31} }
LeBlanc, J.R.	2006	Memory and justice: Narrative sources of community in Camus's The First Man	Philosophy and Literature 30(1) 140-157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{LeBlanc2006Memory, author = {LeBlanc, John Randolph}, title = {Memory and justice: Narrative sources of community in Camus's The First Man}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy and Literature}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {140--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/phl.2006.0014} }
Ljudmila, M.	2006	On phenomenology of memory and memorial (in terms of architectural and landscaping creations)	Analecta Husserliana XCII: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Five. Aesthetic Ciphering in Fine Arts, Literature and Aesthetics Springer 113-129		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ljudmila2006phenomenology, author = {Ljudmila, Molodkina}, title = {On phenomenology of memory and memorial (in terms of architectural and landscaping creations)}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana XCII: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Five. Aesthetic Ciphering in Fine Arts, Literature and Aesthetics}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {113--129}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3744-9_10} }
Malatesta, M.	2006	Memory in St. Augustine's philosophy as an "anticipation" of memory in Dubois' computing anticipatory perspective	Metalogicon 19(1) 31-44	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper analyses some passages of The magnitude of the soul, Confessions and The Trinity by St Augustine (353-430), in which remote roots of both non formalised ideas and technical algorithms by Daniel Maurice Dubois like the following are put down: distinction between memory of past, present and anticipated future; selfconsciousness; intentionality; self-referential finality; the conceptual philosophical distinction between RAM and sequence memory; the inclusive recursive function of memory; the memory trend to expand to infinity.
BibTeX: @article{Malatesta2006Memory, author = {Malatesta, M.}, title = {Memory in St. Augustine's philosophy as an "anticipation" of memory in Dubois' computing anticipatory perspective}, year = {2006}, journal = {Metalogicon}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {31--44} }
Malmgren, A.-S.	2006	Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?	The Philosophical Review 115(2) 199-241		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Malmgren2006Is, author = {Malmgren, Anna-Sara}, title = {Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?}, year = {2006}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {115}, number = {2}, pages = {199--241}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-015} }
McIlwain, D.	2006	Already filtered: Affective immersion and personality differences in accessing present and past	Philosophical Psychology 19(3) 381-399	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Schemas contribute to adaptation, filtering novelty though knowledge-expectancy structures, the residue of past contingencies and their consequences. Adaptation requires a balance between flexible, dynamic context-sensitivity and the cognitive efficiency that schemas afford in promoting persistent goal pursuit despite distraction. Affects can form and disrupt schemas. Transient affective experiences systematically alter selectivity of attentiveness to the directly experienced present environment, the internal environment, and to the stored experiences of memory. Enduring personal stylistic predispositions, like implicit motives and affective schemas, influence how experience is perceived, responded to, and integrated; they shape memory and influence present experiential patterns, individually and intersubjectively. Such systematic influences are potential sources of error in the study of memory if not mapped; so far, individual personality differences have just been a source of complication in the literature on emotion-congruent perception and memory. I synthesize what findings there are about how personality differences, emotions, and affects contribute to the structuring and integration of perceptions and memories both directly and by way of hot, affectively-anchored schemas. Case studies from experimental and personality psychology highlight a conception of personality and affective experience relevant to memory research and cognitive science.
BibTeX: @article{McIlwain2006Already, author = {McIlwain, Doris}, title = {Already filtered: Affective immersion and personality differences in accessing present and past}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {381--399}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080600690581} }
Reiheld, A.	2006	Erasure of the past: How failure to remember can be a morally blameworthy act	The American Journal of Bioethics 6(5) 25-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reiheld2006Erasure, author = {Reiheld, Alison}, title = {Erasure of the past: How failure to remember can be a morally blameworthy act}, year = {2006}, journal = {The American Journal of Bioethics}, volume = {6}, number = {5}, pages = {25--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160600859813} }
Roache, R.	2006	A defence of quasi-memory	Philosophy 81(02) 323-355		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Roache2006defence, author = {Roache, Rebecca}, title = {A defence of quasi-memory}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {81}, number = {02}, pages = {323--355}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819106316075} }
Robbins, S.E.	2006	Bergson and the holographic theory of mind	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5(3-4) 365-394	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Bergson's model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson's very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson's ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems of consciousness, direct realism, qualia and illusions. The model implies an entirely different basis for memory and cognition, and a brief overview is given for the basis of direct memory, compositionality and systematicity.
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2006Bergson, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {Bergson and the holographic theory of mind}, year = {2006}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {5}, number = {3-4}, pages = {365--394}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9023-1} }
Robbins, S.E.	2006	On the possibility of direct memory	New Developments in Consciousness Research Nova Science	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is experience stored in the brain? The answer to this question is critical, for it strongly constrains possible theories of the nature and origin of consciousness. If the answer is ''yes,'' conscious experience must be generated from stored ''elements'' within the neural structure. If the answer is ''no,'' Searle's principle of neurobiological sufficiency, as one example, carries no force. On the other hand, a theory of direct perception can be construed to actually require a ''no'' answer, but then would require a theory of memory not reliant on brain storage. Perception research is reviewed which describes the invariance laws defining the elementary, time-extended, perceived events that must be ''stored'' and which speaks simultaneously to the nature of the qualia of these events. To support this description of perceived, external events, a model of ''direct memory'' is described, wherein the brain is viewed as supporting a modulated reconstructive wave passing through a holographic matter-field. The modulation pattern is determined or driven by the invariance laws defining external events. The model is applied to several areas of memory theory in cued-recall, to include verbal paired-associate learning, concreteness and imagery, subject performed tasks and priming. Some implications are reviewed for cognition in general, mental imagery, eye-witness phenomena and the question of whether everything experienced is ''stored.'' The model is predictive and at the very least holds its own relative to current theory without appealing to storage of experience within the brain.
BibTeX: @incollection{Robbins2006possibility, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {On the possibility of direct memory}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {New Developments in Consciousness Research}, editor = {Fallio, V. W.}, publisher = {Nova Science} }
Rodemeyer, L.M.	2006	Intersubjective Temporality: It's About Time	Springer		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rodemeyer2006Intersubjective, author = {Rodemeyer, Lanei M.}, title = {Intersubjective Temporality: It's About Time}, year = {2006}, publisher = {Springer}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4214-0_8} }
Steineck, C.	2006	The body as a medium of memory	Time and Memory Brill 41-52			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Steineck2006body, author = {Steineck, C.}, title = {The body as a medium of memory}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Time and Memory}, editor = {Parker, J and Crawford, M and Harris, P.}, publisher = {Brill}, pages = {41--52} }
Sutton, J.	2006	Distributed cognition: Domains and dimensions	Pragmatics & Cognition 14(2) 235-247	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Synthesizing the domains of investigation highlighted in current research in distributed cognition and related fields, this paper offers an initial taxonomy of the overlapping types of resources which typically contribute to distributed or extended cognitive systems. It then outlines a number of key dimensions on which to analyse both the resulting integrated systems and the components which coalesce into more or less tightly coupled interaction over the course of their formation and renegotiation.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2006Distributed, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Distributed cognition: Domains and dimensions}, year = {2006}, journal = {Pragmatics & Cognition}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {235--247}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/pc.14.2.05sut} }
Sutton, J.	2006	Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing process	The Extended Mind MIT Press 189-225		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2006Exograms, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, and the civilizing process}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {The Extended Mind}, editor = {Menary, Richard}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {189--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009} }
Sutton, J.	2006	Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind	Philosophical Psychology 19(3) 281-289	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, Jerome Dokic, Richard Menary, Jenann Ismael, Sue Campbell, Doris McIlwain, and Mark Rowlands. This paper explains the motivation for an alliance between the sciences of memory and the extended mind hypothesis. It examines in turn the role of worldly, social, and internalized forms of scaffolding to memory and cognition, and also highlights themes relating to affect, agency, and individual differences.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2006Introduction, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {19}, number = {3}, pages = {281--289}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080600702550} }
Sutton, J.	2006	Memory	The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Macmillan Reference 122-128			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2006Memory, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Memory}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Borchert, Donald}, publisher = {Macmillan Reference}, edition = {2}, pages = {122--128} }
Tell, D.	2006	Beyond mnemotechnics: Confession and memory in Augustine	Philosophy and Rhetoric 39(3) 233-253		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tell2006mnemotechnics, author = {Tell, David}, title = {Beyond mnemotechnics: Confession and memory in Augustine}, year = {2006}, journal = {Philosophy and Rhetoric}, volume = {39}, number = {3}, pages = {233--253}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/par.2006.0026} }
Teroni, F.	2006	Meinong on memory	The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy Routledge 64-88			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Teroni2006Meinong, author = {Teroni, Fabrice}, title = {Meinong on memory}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy}, editor = {Textor, Mark}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {64--88} }
Thompson, J.	2006	Memory, identity and obligation	Identity, Self-Determination, and Secession Ashgate 107-119		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Thompson2006Memory, author = {Thompson, Janna}, title = {Memory, identity and obligation}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Identity, Self-Determination, and Secession}, editor = {Primoratz, I. and Pavković, A.}, publisher = {Ashgate}, pages = {107--119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351156080-8} }
Tollefsen, D.P.	2006	From extended mind to collective mind	Cognitive Systems Research 7(2-3) 140-150	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Although the notion of collective intentionality has received considerable attention over the past decade, accounts of collective belief and intention remain individualistic. Most accounts analyze group intentional states in terms of a complex set of individual intentional states and, thus, it is individuals not groups that have intentional states. In this paper, I attempt to undermine one of the motivations for refusing to acknowledge groups as the bearers of mental states. The resistance to collective mental states is motivated by the view that mental states are located in minds and minds are in heads. Since groups do not have heads or brains, they cannot have minds or mental states. There is a significant and important thesis in cognitive science, however, which suggests that the mind is not bounded by skin and bones. If "the mind ain't in the head", then this removes a major barrier to the idea of collective minds.
BibTeX: @article{Tollefsen2006extended, author = {Tollefsen, Deborah P.}, title = {From extended mind to collective mind}, year = {2006}, journal = {Cognitive Systems Research}, volume = {7}, number = {2-3}, pages = {140--150}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2006.01.001} }
Volf, M.	2006	The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World	William B. Eerdmans			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Volf2006End, author = {Volf, Miroslav}, title = {The End of Memory: Remembering Rightly in a Violent World}, year = {2006}, publisher = {William B. Eerdmans} }
Winkler, R.	2006	Husserl and Bergson on time and consciousness	Analecta Husserliana XC: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Three. Logos of History - Logos of Life. Historicity, Time, Nature, Communication, Consciousness, Alterity, Culture Springer 93-115		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Winkler2006Husserl, author = {Winkler, Rafael}, title = {Husserl and Bergson on time and consciousness}, year = {2006}, booktitle = {Analecta Husserliana XC: Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the Logos. Book Three. Logos of History - Logos of Life. Historicity, Time, Nature, Communication, Consciousness, Alterity, Culture}, editor = {Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {93--115}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3718-X_6} }
Anidjar, G.	2005	Memory, history, forgiveness: A dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Sorin Antohi	Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts 8(1) 8-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Sorin Antohi took place in Budapest on March 10, 2003 at Pasts, Inc., Center for Historical Studies, which is affiliated with Central European University (CEU). Ricoeur was the honorary president of Pasts, Inc., and its spiritus rector. On March 8, he had given a lecture on ''History, Memory, and Forgetting'' in the context of an international conference entitled ''Haunting Memories? History in Europe after Authoritarianism,'' and organized by Pasts Inc. and the Körber Foundation. On March 9, Ricoeur had received the first Honoris Causa doctorate ever granted by CEU. Ricoeur had already visited Hungary in 1933. At the time, he was participating in a Boy Scouts European jamboree at Gödöllö (where he also saw Horthy on his white horse). After WWII, he went back to Hungary to meet with Lukács. Mona Antohi has transcribed and edited the recording of the dialogue. The two interlocutors have then made some minor revisions. The original text, in French, is available on the website of Pasts, Inc. (www.ceu.hu/pasts). This English version, translated and annotated by Gil Anidjar, will be included in Sorin Antohili's book, Talking History. Making Sense of Pasts, forthcoming in 2006 from CEU Press. His own Romanian translation of the dialogue was published in the Iasi-based journal, Xenopoliana (3-4, 2004), as was the Hungarian translation by Réka Toth, which appeared in the Budapest-based journal, 2000 (November-December 2003).
BibTeX: @article{Anidjar2005Memory, author = {Anidjar, G.}, title = {Memory, history, forgiveness: A dialogue between Paul Ricoeur and Sorin Antohi}, year = {2005}, journal = {Janus Head: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature, Continental Philosophy, Phenomenological Psychology, and the Arts}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {8--25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jh20058131} }
Audi, R.	2005	The sources of knowledge	The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology Oxford University Press	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article identifies the sources from which one acquires knowledge or justified belief. It distinguishes the ''four standard basic sources'': perception, memory, consciousness, and reason. A basic source yields knowledge or justified belief without positive dependence on another source. This article distinguishes each of the above as a basic source of knowledge, with the exception of memory. Memory, while a basic source of justification, plays a preservative rather than a generative role in knowledge. This article contrasts basic sources with nonbasic sources, concentrating on testimony. After clarifying the relationship between a source and a ground, or ''what it is in virtue of which one knows or justifiedly believes,'' this article evaluates the basic sources' individual and collective autonomy as well as their vulnerability to defeasibility. It examines the relationship of coherence to knowledge and justification, noting the distinction between a negative dependence on incoherence and a positive dependence on coherence.
BibTeX: @incollection{Audi2005sources, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {The sources of knowledge}, year = {2005}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology}, editor = {Moser, Paul K.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/0195130057.003.0003} }
Bernet, R.	2005	A present folded back on the past (Bergson)	Research in Phenomenology 35(1) 55-76	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In Matter and Memory, Bergson examines the relationship between perception and memory, the status of consciousness in its relation to the brain, and more generally, a possible conjunction of matter and mind. Our reading focuses in particular on his understanding of the evanescent presence of the present and of its debt vis-A-vis the unconscious" consciousness of a "virtual" past. We wish to show that the Bergsonian version of a critique of "the metaphysics of presence" is, for all that, an offshoot of a Platonic type of metaphysics. It is trite that Bergson departs from traditional standpoints on the side of a self-sufficient and original present and a form of presence to which the transparency of consciousness would confer the character of immediate evidence. All the same, it can hardly be claimed that his rehabilitation of the past and the unconscious opens up new perspectives on how forgetting and death are bound up with the work of memory.
BibTeX: @article{Bernet2005present, author = {Bernet, Rudolf}, title = {A present folded back on the past (Bergson)}, year = {2005}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {35}, number = {1}, pages = {55--76}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/1569164054905465} }
Clark, A.	2005	Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind	Analysis 65(1) 1-11		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Clark2005Intrinsic, author = {Clark, Andy}, title = {Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind}, year = {2005}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, pages = {1--11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.1.1} }
Craver, C.F.	2005	Beyond reduction: Mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience	Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36(2) 373-395	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Philosophers of neuroscience have traditionally described interfield integration using reduction models. Such models describe formal inferential relations between theories at different levels. I argue against reduction and for a mechanistic model of interfield integration. According to the mechanistic model, different fields integrate their research by adding constraints on a multilevel description of a mechanism. Mechanistic integration may occur at a given level or in the effort to build a theory that oscillates among several levels. I develop this alternative model using a putative exemplar of reduction in contemporary neuroscience: the relationship between the psychological phenomena of learning and memory and the electrophysiological phenomenon known as Long-Term Potentiation. A new look at this historical episode reveals the relative virtues of the mechanistic model over reduction as an account of interfield integration.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2005reduction, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Beyond reduction: Mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience}, year = {2005}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, volume = {36}, number = {2}, pages = {373--395}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.008} }
Farah, M.J.	2005	Neuroethics: the practical and the philosophical	Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9(1) 34-40	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In comparison with the ethical issues surrounding molecular genetics, there has been little public awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience. Yet recent progress in cognitive neuroscience raises a host of ethical issues of at least comparable importance. Some are of a practical nature, concerning the applications of neurotechnology and their likely implications for individuals and society. Others are more philosophical, concerning the way we think about ourselves as persons, moral agents and spiritual beings. This article reviews key examples of each type of issue, including the relevant advances in science and technology and their accompanying social and philosophical problems.
BibTeX: @article{Farah2005Neuroethics, author = {Farah, Martha J.}, title = {Neuroethics: the practical and the philosophical}, year = {2005}, journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, pages = {34--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.001} }
Franklin, L.	2005	Recollection and philosophical reflection in Plato's Phaedo	Phronesis 50(4) 289-314	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Interpretations of recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary interpretations , on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all, and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. A sophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophical understanding and reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explain the advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4). Furthermore, it seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one who recollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars to Forms (74a5-7). I provide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argument. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which constitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learning which is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning by which we see, as philosophers, that we must recollect. At the same time, we must also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wants to explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as the origin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning as its ultimate explanandum.
BibTeX: @article{Franklin2005Recollection, author = {Franklin, Lee}, title = {Recollection and philosophical reflection in Plato's Phaedo}, year = {2005}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {50}, number = {4}, pages = {289--314}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852805774481379} }
Frey, B.S.	2005	"Just forget it." Memory distortions as bounded rationality	Mind & Society 4(1) 13-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Distortions in memory impose important bounds on rationality but have been largely disregarded in economics. While it is possible to learn, it is more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to unlearn. This retention effect lowers individual utility directly or via reduced productivity, and adds costs to principal-agent relationships. The engraving effect states that the more one tries to forget a piece of information the more vivid it stays in memory, leading to a paradoxical outcome. The effects are based on, and are sup- ported by, psychological experiments, and it is shown that they are relevant in many economic situations and beyond.
BibTeX: @article{Frey2005Just, author = {Frey, Bruno S.}, title = {"Just forget it." Memory distortions as bounded rationality}, year = {2005}, journal = {Mind & Society}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {13--25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-005-0004-9} }
Frost, S.	2005	Hobbes and the matter of self-consciousness	Political Theory 33(4) 495-517	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Observing that Rend Descartes's dualistic philosophy haunts our conceptualization of matter, this essay argues that Thomas Hobbes develops a non-Cartesian materialism, which is to say that he articulates a materialism in which matter is not construed as essentially unthinking. Trac- ing his accounts of sense, perception, and thinking, this essay reconstructs Hobbes's account of self-consciousness and proposes that in a subject conceived as wholly embodied, self-knowledge or self-awareness takes theform ofmemory. The essay elaborates how Hobbes 's account ofself- consciousness as memory transforms our understanding both of the form taken by the subject's self-mastery and of the relationship between the individual and the collective. It concludes by speculating about the implications of this accountfor our understanding ofHobbes's theories of ethics and politics.
BibTeX: @article{Frost2005Hobbes, author = {Frost, Samantha}, title = {Hobbes and the matter of self-consciousness}, year = {2005}, journal = {Political Theory}, volume = {33}, number = {4}, pages = {495--517}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591705274752} }
Gillett, G.	2005	Schechtman's narrative account of identity	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12(1) 23-24		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gillett2005Schechtmans, author = {Gillett, Grant}, title = {Schechtman's narrative account of identity}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {23--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2005.0022} }
Goldberg, S.C.	2005	The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(1) 135-148		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2005dialectical, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument}, year = {2005}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {35}, number = {1}, pages = {135--148}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2005.10716584} }
Hannoum, A.	2005	Paul Ricoeur on memory	Theory, Culture & Society 22(6) 123-137		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hannoum2005Paul, author = {Hannoum, Abdelmajid}, title = {Paul Ricoeur on memory}, year = {2005}, journal = {Theory, Culture & Society}, volume = {22}, number = {6}, pages = {123--137}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276405059418} }
Herzog, A.	2005	Levinas, memory, and the art of writing	The Philosophical Forum 36(3) 333-343		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Herzog2005Levinas, author = {Herzog, Annabel}, title = {Levinas, memory, and the art of writing}, year = {2005}, journal = {The Philosophical Forum}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, pages = {333--343}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2005.00206.x} }
Hirstein, W.	2005	Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hirstein2005Brain, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation}, year = {2005}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2005	Joint reminiscing as joint attention to the past	Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 260-286		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2005Joint, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Joint reminiscing as joint attention to the past}, year = {2005}, booktitle = {Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Eilan, N. and Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T and Roessler, J.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {260--286}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0012} }
Husserl, E.	2005	Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Husserl2005Phantasy, author = {Husserl, E.}, title = {Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory}, year = {2005}, editor = {Brough, John B.}, publisher = {Springer} }
Jacobson, A.J.	2005	Is the brain a memory box?	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(3) 271-278	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.
BibTeX: @article{Jacobson2005Is, author = {Jacobson, Anne J.}, title = {Is the brain a memory box?}, year = {2005}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, pages = {271--278}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-4069-z} }
Kelly, M.R.	2005	What's phenomenological about Bergsonism (?) Critical notice of Leonard Lawlor's The Challenge of Bergsonism	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13(1) 95-119		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kelly2005Whats, author = {Kelly, Michael R.}, title = {What's phenomenological about Bergsonism (?) Critical notice of Leonard Lawlor's The Challenge of Bergsonism}, year = {2005}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {95--119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0967255042000324371} }
Kelly, S.	2005	Temporal awareness	Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind Clarendon press 222-234	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The problem of temporal awareness manifests itself in many ways: in our experience of the passage of time, in our experience of the movement of objects across space, in our experience of temporally separated objects as belonging together (as in the case of the notes in a melody), and so on. Each of these cases makes it clear that our experience, in some sense, extends beyond what's happening now. But what model of experience accounts for this phenomenon? This chapter argues that two classical models --- the specious present theory and the retention theory --- are both unsatisfactory. It concludes by suggesting some of the richer phenomenological features that ought to play a central role in any more satisfactory account.
BibTeX: @incollection{Kelly2005Temporal, author = {Kelly, Sean}, title = {Temporal awareness}, year = {2005}, booktitle = {Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind}, editor = {Smith, David Woodruff and Thomasson, Amie L.}, publisher = {Clarendon press}, pages = {222--234} }
Klaassen, J.A.	2005	Models of memory and the logic of domination	Social Philosophy Today 21(1) 257-260		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Klaassen2005Models, author = {Klaassen, Johann A.}, title = {Models of memory and the logic of domination}, year = {2005}, journal = {Social Philosophy Today}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, pages = {257--260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday2005218} }
Lackey, J.	2005	Memory as a generative epistemic source	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(3) 636-658	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is widely assumed that memory has only the capacity to preserve epistemic features that have been generated by other sources. Specifically, if S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that p via memory at T2, then it is argued that (i) S must have known (justifiedly believedkationally believed) that p when it was originally acquired at T1, and (ii) S must have acquired knowledge that p (justification with respect to phationality with respect to p) at TI via a non-memorial source. Thus, according to this view, memory cannot make an unknown proposition known, an unjustified belief justified, or an irrational belief rational-it can only preserve what is already known, justified, or rational. In this paper, I argue that condition (i) is false and, a forfiori, that condition (ii) is false. Hence, 1 show that, contrary to received wisdom in contemporary epistemology, memory can function as a generative epistemic source.
BibTeX: @article{Lackey2005Memory, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {Memory as a generative epistemic source}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {70}, number = {3}, pages = {636--658}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00418.x} }
Lawlor, K.	2005	Reason and the past: The role of rationality in diachronic self-knowledge	Synthese 145(3) 467-495	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Knowing one's past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one's rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account.
BibTeX: @article{Lawlor2005Reason, author = {Lawlor, Krista}, title = {Reason and the past: The role of rationality in diachronic self-knowledge}, year = {2005}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {145}, number = {3}, pages = {467--495}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-6220-3} }
Lin, M.	2005	Memory and personal identity in Spinoza	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35(2) 243-268	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Locke is often thought to have introduced the topic of personal identity into philosophy when, in the second edition of the Essay, he distinguished the person from both the human being and the soul. Each of these entities differs from the others with respect to their identity conditions, and so they must be ontologically distinct. In particular, Locke claimed, a person cannot survive total memory loss, although a human being or soul can.
BibTeX: @article{Lin2005Memory, author = {Lin, Martin}, title = {Memory and personal identity in Spinoza}, year = {2005}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {35}, number = {2}, pages = {243--268}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2005.10716589} }
Marbach, E.	2005	On bringing consciousness into the house of science -- with the help of Husserlian phenomenology	Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 10(1) 145-162	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper argues that for scientists studying the workings of the brain with the aim of looking for a scientific explanation of consciousness, a clear conception of what they are seeking is requisite. It proposes that concepts elaborated in philosophical phenomenology concerned with possible experiences should play a heuristic role in neuroscientific experiments concerned with actually occurring conscious experiences. The thesis is illustrated with regard to work on episodic remembering, mental imagery, and autobiographical memory in search of corresponding neural correlates. In conclusion some assets of the proposal for a methodologically controlled integration of neuroscientific and phenomenological data are highlighted.
BibTeX: @article{Marbach2005bringing, author = {Marbach, Eduard}, title = {On bringing consciousness into the house of science -- with the help of Husserlian phenomenology}, year = {2005}, journal = {Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {145--162}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09697250500225818} }
Medin, D. and Rips, L.	2005	Concepts and categories: Memory, meaning, and metaphysics	The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning Cambridge University Press 37-72		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Medin2005Concepts, author = {Medin, D. and Rips, L.}, title = {Concepts and categories: Memory, meaning, and metaphysics}, year = {2005}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning}, editor = {Holyoak, K. and Morrison, R.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {37--72}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199734689.013.0011} }
Michau, M.R.	2005	Forgetting: Deconstructive strategies in light of phenomenology	Arhe 2(4) 103-116	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, I propose a Derridean deconstructive account of forgetting as an aporetic structure, and compare this with Husserl's phenomenological description of memory. The Derridean interpretation is based off of Derrida's analyses of the gift and of forgiveness. For the Derridean, forgetting is an ethical impossibility, whereas for Husserl, it is an epistemologi-cal impossibility. Husserlian phenomenology maintains that memory is a re-activation of specific acts of intentionality. The Husserlian and Derridean accounts of forgetting join to directly challenge the Nietzschean and Jamesian contentions that forgetting is necessary to human survival. Instead of claiming that forgetting is necessary, Derrida and Husserl support the claim that it is impossible to fully forget.
BibTeX: @article{Michau2005Forgetting, author = {Michau, Michael R.}, title = {Forgetting: Deconstructive strategies in light of phenomenology}, year = {2005}, journal = {Arhe}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {103--116} }
Nagasawa, Y.	2005	Externalism and the memory argument	Dialectica 56(4) 335-346	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Paul Boghossian's 'Memory Argument' allegedly shows, using the familiar slow-switching sce- nario, that externalism and authoritative self-knowledge are incompatible. The aim of this paper is to undermine the argument by examining two distinct externalist responses. I demonstrate that the Memory Argument equivocates on the notion of forgetting.
BibTeX: @article{Nagasawa2005Externalism, author = {Nagasawa, Yujin}, title = {Externalism and the memory argument}, year = {2005}, journal = {Dialectica}, volume = {56}, number = {4}, pages = {335--346}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2002.tb00249.x} }
Olsson, E.J.	2005	Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Olsson2005Coherence, author = {Olsson, Erik J.}, title = {Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification}, year = {2005}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Pincock, C.	2005	Richard Semon and Russell's Analysis of Mind	Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 26(2) 101-125	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Russell's study of the biologist and psychologist Richard Semon is traced to contact with the experimental psychologist Adolf Wohlgemuth and dated to the summer of 1919. This allows a new interpretation of when Russell embraced neutral monism and presents a case-study in Russell's use of scientific results for philosophical purposes. Semon's distinctive notion of mnemic causation was used by Russell to clarify both how images referred to things and how the existence of images could be reconciled with a neutral monist metaphysics.
BibTeX: @article{Pincock2005Richard, author = {Pincock, Christopher}, title = {Richard Semon and Russell's Analysis of Mind}, year = {2005}, journal = {Russell: Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies}, volume = {26}, number = {2}, pages = {101--125} }
Reagan, C.	2005	Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's memory, history, forgetting	Philosophy Today 49(3) 309-316		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reagan2005Reflections, author = {Reagan, Charles}, title = {Reflections on Paul Ricoeur's memory, history, forgetting}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {49}, number = {3}, pages = {309--316}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200549349} }
Reid, M.D.	2005	Memory as initial experiencing of the past	Philosophical Psychology 18(6) 671-698	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This analysis explores theories of recollective memories and their shortcomings to show how certain recollective memories are to some extent the initial experiencing of past conscious mental states. While dedicated memory theorists over the past century show remembering to be an active and subjective process, they usually make simplistic assumptions regarding the experience that is remembered. Their treatment of experience leaves unexplored the notion that the truth of memory is a dynamic interaction between experience and recollection. The argument's seven sections examine how experience, consciousness, and the self produce memories in odd but actual situations. Examples are presented that are either actual or technologically possible, and they pose a challenge for some theories of memory. Showing that an experience and a memory must be bound by psychological continuity, the sections build upon each other to challenge aprioristic beliefs about the self and consciousness. The later sections examine the lack of available accounts of memory that acknowledge consciousness, dissociation, and "selfhood" to be matters of degree, thus rendering memory theories next to useless when trying to effectively incorporate the notions of experience and reality.
BibTeX: @article{Reid2005Memory, author = {Reid, Mark D.}, title = {Memory as initial experiencing of the past}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {18}, number = {6}, pages = {671--698}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080500355194} }
Riegler, A.	2005	Constructive memory	Kybernetes 34(1-2) 89-104	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The mainstream conception of memory as an encoding–storage–retrieval device is criticized for not being able to account for various phenomena such as false recognition, intrusion, and confabulation. Based on Heinz von Foerster’s insight that cognitive functions should not be treated as separate units, I present an alternative constructivist perspective that does not treat memory as a separate module. Rather it emphasizes the inseparable nature of the cognition–memory compound. Finally, I outline the importance of this insight for radical constructivism.
BibTeX: @article{Riegler2005Constructive, author = {Riegler, Alexander}, title = {Constructive memory}, year = {2005}, journal = {Kybernetes}, volume = {34}, number = {1-2}, pages = {89-104} }
Rosenkrantz, G.	2005	An epistemic argument for enduring human persons	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(1) 209-224	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A typical human person has privileged epistemic access to its identity over time in virtue of having a first-person point of view. In explaining this phenomenon in terms of an intimate relation of self-attribution or the like, I infer that a typical human person has direct consciousness of itself through inner awareness or personal memory. Direct consciousness of oneself is consciousness of oneself, but not by consciousness of something else. Yet, a perduring human person, S_p, i.e., a human person with temporal parts, is identical with the complete series of its temporal parts. I argue that because S_p is diverse from any incomplete series of its temporal parts, and because S_p cannot be conscious of all of its temporal parts through inner awareness or personal memory, S_p cannot have direct consciousness of itself. I conclude that a human person endures, i.e., wholly exists at each of the times it exists.
BibTeX: @article{Rosenkrantz2005epistemic, author = {Rosenkrantz, Gary}, title = {An epistemic argument for enduring human persons}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {70}, number = {1}, pages = {209--224}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00512.x} }
Russell, C.	2005	Fictive time - Bachelard on memory, duration and consciousness	KronoScope 5(1) 3-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I am concerned here with an analysis of time and memory as human creations. Drawing on the work of Bachelard, but also on Guyau and Janet, I argue that time and memory can be thought of as "fictive", as a work of human imagination and creativity. Temporal rhythms are not simple repetitions, but acts of will, marked by an attempt to perfect earlier repetitions. Memory is not simply a photographic record of the past accessed by intuition, but rather a cinematic act of narration. Time is a human creative act, as is the self, with which it is closely bound up. The very nature of reasoning and of our engagement with the world, imply that both time and the self are discontinuous and open. Thought and creation involve negations and ruptures. As such, Bachelardian time is at odds with Bergsonian duration. This paper follows Bachelard as he develops his own understanding of time and memory through a "subversive" critique of Bergson's thought.
BibTeX: @article{Russell2005Fictive, author = {Russell, Conrad}, title = {Fictive time - Bachelard on memory, duration and consciousness}, year = {2005}, journal = {KronoScope}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {3--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/1568524054005258} }
Schechtman, M.	2005	Personal identity and the past	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12(1) 9-22	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the second edition of the Essay Concern- ing Human Understanding, John Locke argues that personal identity over time consists in sameness of consciousness rather than the persistence of any sub- stance, material or immaterial. Something about this view is very compelling, but as it stands it is too vague and problematic to provide a viable account of per- sonal identity. Contemporary ''psychological continu- ity theorists'' have tried to amend Locke's view to capture his insights and avoid his difficulties. This paper argues that the standard approach fails because it takes Locke to be a memory theorist, and does not focus enough on his claim that we need continuity of consciousness for personal persistence. An alternative reading of Locke is offered, emphasizing the role of self-understanding in producing continuity of con- sciousness. This alternative overcomes the difficulties with the standard approach, and shows how it is possible to attribute unconscious psychological ele- ments to a person, even when personal persistence is defined in terms of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2005Personal, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Personal identity and the past}, year = {2005}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {9--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2005.0032} }
Senor, T.D.	2005	Epistemological Problems of Memory	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Centre for the Study of Language and Information		[URL]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Senor2005Epistemological, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Epistemological Problems of Memory}, year = {2005}, booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Zalta, E. N.}, publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information}, url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory-episprob/} }
Sutton, J.	2005	Memory and the extended mind: Embodiment, cognition, and culture	Cognitive Processing 6(4) 223-226		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2005Memory, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Memory and the extended mind: Embodiment, cognition, and culture}, year = {2005}, journal = {Cognitive Processing}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {223--226}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-005-0022-x} }
Tommy, C.A. and Varadarajan, N.	2005	A Berkeleian model of memory	Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 22(3) 93-122	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: George Berkeley, in his Principles and Dialogues, admits that memory is an important source of knowledge. However, there is hardly any discussion, in these works, on the question of the possibility of memory knowledge. The issue becomes more complicated when we consider Berkeley's central doctrine esse est percipi, which rules out the revival of ideas perceived earlier. If this is the case, is there an avenue open for Berkeley to justify memory knowledge? It is this question that this paper addresses and attempts to answer. First, we will show how, given Berkeley's doctrine esse est percipi, memory cannot be accounted as the revival of ideas perceived earlier. Second, we shall develop a Berkeleian model of memory which does not assume that the ideas perceived and the ideas remembered are identical. According to this model, ideas remembered 'stand for' ideas perceived in the past without being replicas of the latter. Further, we argue that memory, for Berkeley, is a form of indirect perception. Finally, memorial ideas are distinguished from ideas of imagination on the basis of two features that the former essentially possess, namely, adequacy and truth.
BibTeX: @article{Tommy2005Berkeleian, author = {Tommy, C. A. and Varadarajan, N.}, title = {A Berkeleian model of memory}, year = {2005}, journal = {Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research}, volume = {22}, number = {3}, pages = {93--122} }
Wilson, R.A.	2005	Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis	Cognitive Processing 6(4) 227-236	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While memory is conceptualized predominantly as an individual capacity in the cognitive and biological sciences, the social sciences have most commonly construed memory as a collective phenomenon. Collective memory has been put to diverse uses, ranging from accounts of nationalism in history and political science to views of ritualization and commemoration in anthropology and sociology. These appeals to collective memory share the idea that memory "goes beyond the individual" but often run together quite different claims in spelling out that idea. This paper reviews a sampling of recent work on collective memory in the light of emerging externalist views within the cognitive sciences, and through some reflection on broader traditions of thought in the biological and social sciences that have appealed to the idea that groups have minds. The paper concludes with some thoughts about the relationship between these kinds of cognitive metaphors in the social sciences and our notion of agency.
BibTeX: @article{Wilson2005Collective, author = {Wilson, Robert A.}, title = {Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis}, year = {2005}, journal = {Cognitive Processing}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {227--236}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10339-005-0012-z} }
Yamagata, N.	2005	Plato, memory, and performance	Oral Tradition 20(1) 111-129		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Yamagata2005Plato, author = {Yamagata, Naoko}, title = {Plato, memory, and performance}, year = {2005}, journal = {Oral Tradition}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, pages = {111--129}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ort.2005.0013} }
Al-Saji, A.	2004	The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time	Continental Philosophy Review 37(2) 203-239	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Through the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze, my paper explores a different theory of time. I reconstitute Deleuze's paradoxes of the past in Difference and Repetition and Bergsonism to reveal a theory of time in which the relation between past and present is one of coexistence rather than succession. The theory of memory implied here is a non-representational one. To elaborate this theory, I ask: what is the role of the "virtual image" in Bergson's Matter and Memory? Far from representing the simple afterimage of a present perception, the "virtual image" carries multiple senses. Contracting the immediate past for the present, or expanding virtually to hold the whole of memory (and even the whole of the universe), the virtual image can form a bridge between the present and the non-representational past. This non-representational account of memory sheds light not only on the structure of time for Bergson, but also on his concepts of pure memory and virtuality. The rereading of memory also opens the way for Bergsonian intuition to play an intersubjective role; intuition becomes a means for navigating the resonances and dissonances that can be felt between different rhythms of becoming or planes of memory, which constitute different subjects.
BibTeX: @article{AlSaji2004memory, author = {Al-Saji, Alia}, title = {The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time}, year = {2004}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, pages = {203--239}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-005-5560-5} }
Andersen, H.K.	2004	The development of the "specious present" and James's views on temporal experience	Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality MIT Press 25-42	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This chapter examines the philosophical discussion concerning the relationship between time, memory, attention, and consciousness, from Locke through the Scottish Common Sense tradition, in terms of its influence on James' development of the specious present doctrine. The specious present doctrine is the view that the present moment in experience is non punctate, but instead comprises some nonzero amount of time; it contrasts with the mathematical view of the present, in which the divide between past and future is merely a point or a line with no thickness. The anonymous source for the term 'specious present' is revealed as a retired businessman-turned-amateur philosopher. The more likely source for the idea itself is a little-known philosopher, Shadworth Hollway Hodgson, who was not merely a significant influence on James but also on Husserl's development of the tripartite account of internal time consciousness. I conclude by demonstrating how James' changing views on the relationship between concepts and experience meant that by the later period of his writings, including those in which he develops his own views on pragmatism, James would have not merely noted the contrast between a mathematical conception of the present and our actual experience of it, he would have taken a further step and condoned the thick experience of the present as demonstrating the inadequacy of the intellectualized mathematical characterization.
BibTeX: @incollection{Andersen2004development, author = {Andersen, Holly K.}, title = {The development of the "specious present" and James's views on temporal experience}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality}, editor = {Arstila, V. and Lloyd, D.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {25--42} }
Argullol, R.	2004	The eros of memory	Diogenes 51(1) 49-53	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The author considers the tension and contradiction between memory and consciousness. Memory brings to the surface the critical peaks of our lives and weaves them into the present, but in a seemingly arbitrary way that the author describes as the 'instinct of consciousness'; memory constructs a secret story, a personal 'golden age', of our lives that diverges from the official story we try to legitimize, not only to the external world but also in our own personal world. This secret story is unsettling, subversive and, in the only possible sense of the word, true.
BibTeX: @article{Argullol2004eros, author = {Argullol, Rafael}, title = {The eros of memory}, year = {2004}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, pages = {49--53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192104041692} }
Audi, R.	2004	The a priori authority of testimony	Philosophical Issues 14(1) 18-34		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Audi2004priori, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {The a priori authority of testimony}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {18--34}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00018.x} }
Bennett, J.	2004	Time in human experience	Philosophy 79(02) 165-183	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A sequence of eight minipapers on loosely related topics that come under the umbrella of the title. (1) Temporal Direction, Vonnegut. (2) Temporal Direction, Augustine. (3) Living outside Time. (4) Constructing Memory, Kant. (5) Self-prediction and Determinism. (6) The Newcomb Problem. (7) Voluntary Action as Arising from Discontent with the Present or From a Preference for One Rather Than Another Future? (8) The Strangeness of the Past qua Past, Tennyson.
BibTeX: @article{Bennett2004Time, author = {Bennett, Jonathan}, title = {Time in human experience}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {79}, number = {02}, pages = {165--183}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819104000221} }
Bernecker, S.	2004	Memory and externalism	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(3) 605-632	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Content externalism about memory says that the individuation of memory contents depends on relations the subject bears to his past environment. I defend externalism about memory by arguing that neither philosophical nor psychological considerations stand in the way of accepting the context dependency of memory that follows from externalism.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2004Memory, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Memory and externalism}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {69}, number = {3}, pages = {605--632}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00520.x} }
Bonanno, G.	2004	A characterization of von Neumann games in terms of memory	Synthese 139(2) 281-295	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An information completion of an extensive game is obtained by extending the information partition of every player from the set of her decision nodes to the set of all nodes. The extended partition satisfies Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) if at any node a player remembers what she knew at earlier nodes. It is shown that MPK can be satisfied in a game if and only if the game is von Neumann (vN) and satisfies memory at decision nodes (the restriction of MPK to a player's own decision nodes). A game is vN if any two decision nodes that belong to the same information set of a player have the same number of predecessors. By providing an axiom for MPK we also obtain a syntactic characterization of the said class of vN games.
BibTeX: @article{Bonanno2004characterization, author = {Bonanno, Giacomo}, title = {A characterization of von Neumann games in terms of memory}, year = {2004}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {139}, number = {2}, pages = {281--295}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024905.25386.3d} }
Bonanno, G.	2004	Memory and perfect recall in extensive games	Games and Economic Behavior 47(2) 237-256	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn [in: Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, 1953, p. 193], who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves." We provide a syntactic and semantic characterization of perfect recall based on two independent notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.
BibTeX: @article{Bonanno2004Memory, author = {Bonanno, Giacomo}, title = {Memory and perfect recall in extensive games}, year = {2004}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {237--256}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.002} }
Campbell, S.	2004	Models of minds and memory activities	Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Rowman & Littlefield 119-137			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Campbell2004Models, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {Models of minds and memory activities}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory}, editor = {DesAutels, P and Walker, M}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield}, pages = {119--137} }
Casey, E.S.	2004	Public memory in place and time	Framing Public Memory University of Alabama Press 17-44			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey2004Public, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Public memory in place and time}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {Framing Public Memory}, editor = {Phillips, Kendall}, publisher = {University of Alabama Press}, pages = {17--44} }
Craver, C.F.	2004	Dissociable realization and kind splitting	Philosophy of Science 71(5) 960-971	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2004Dissociable, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Dissociable realization and kind splitting}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {71}, number = {5}, pages = {960--971}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/425945} }
De Cruz, H.	2004	Why humans can count to large quantities accurately	Philosophica 74 63-83		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{DeCruz2004Why, author = {De Cruz, Helen}, title = {Why humans can count to large quantities accurately}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophica}, volume = {74}, pages = {63--83}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.21825/philosophica.82217} }
Delich, F.	2004	The social construction of memory and forgetting	Diogenes 51(1) 65-75		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Delich2004social, author = {Delich, Francisco}, title = {The social construction of memory and forgetting}, year = {2004}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, pages = {65--75}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192104041694} }
DePrince, A.P., Allard, C.B., Oh, H. and Freyd, J.J.	2004	What's in a name for memory errors? Implications and ethical issues arising from the use of the term "false memory" for errors in memory for details	Ethics & Behavior 14(3) 201-233	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The term "false memories" has been used to refer to suggestibility experiments in which whole events are apparently confabulated and in media accounts of contested memories of childhood abuse. Since 1992 psychologists have increasingly used the term "false memory" when discussing memory errors for details, such as specific words within lists. Use of the term to refer to errors in details is a shift in language away from other terms used historically (e.g., "memory intrusions"). We empirically examine this shift in language and discuss implications of the new use of the term "false memories." Use of the term presents serious ethical challenges to the data-interpretation process by encouraging over-generalization and misapplication of research findings on word memory to social issues.
BibTeX: @article{DePrince2004Whats, author = {DePrince, Anne P. and Allard, Carolyn B. and Oh, Hannah and Freyd, Jennifer J.}, title = {What's in a name for memory errors? Implications and ethical issues arising from the use of the term "false memory" for errors in memory for details}, year = {2004}, journal = {Ethics & Behavior}, volume = {14}, number = {3}, pages = {201--233}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327019eb1403_1} }
Greisch, J.	2004	Trace and forgetting: Between the threat of erasure and the persistence of the unerasable	Diogenes 51(1) 77-97		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Greisch2004Trace, author = {Greisch, Jean}, title = {Trace and forgetting: Between the threat of erasure and the persistence of the unerasable}, year = {2004}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, pages = {77--97}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192104041695} }
Kelly, M.R.	2004	On the mind's pronouncement of time: Aristotle, Augustine, and Husserl on time-consciousness	Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78(1) 247-262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay contests the standard historical comparison that links Husserl's account of time-consciousness to the tradition by way of Book XI of Augustine's Confessions. This comparison rests on the mistaken assumption that both thinkers attribute the soul's distention and corresponding apprehension of time to memory. While true for Augustine and Husserl's 1905 lectures on time, Husserl concluded after 1907 that these lectures advanced the flawed and counter-intuitive position that memory extends perception. I will trace the shortcomings of Augustine's and Husserl's conflation of memory with perception. After developing Husserl's maturely articulated distinction between memory and retention from 1911, I suggest chapters 10--14 of Aristotle's Physics IV as a more apt anticipation of this second, more adequate half of the Husserlian story. A reconstruction of Aristotle's definition of time as ''the number of movement,'' one that privileges the activity of ''the mind pronouncing that the 'nows' are two,'' intimates Husserl's distinction between memory and retention. For Aristotle, the soul's recognition of the 'nows' as two depends not on memory, but on the soul's intentional activity of counting, itself dependent on the ability to, as Aristotle writes in his Metaphysics, ''grasp mentally and [have] already grasped'' at the same time.
BibTeX: @article{Kelly2004minds, author = {Kelly, Michael R.}, title = {On the mind's pronouncement of time: Aristotle, Augustine, and Husserl on time-consciousness}, year = {2004}, journal = {Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association}, volume = {78}, number = {1}, editor = {Baur, Michael}, pages = {247--262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2004786} }
Kutz, C.	2004	Justice in reparations: The cost of memory and the value of talk	Philosophy & Public Affairs 32(3) 277-312		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kutz2004Justice, author = {Kutz, Christopher}, title = {Justice in reparations: The cost of memory and the value of talk}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophy & Public Affairs}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, pages = {277--312}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00015.x} }
Landy, J.	2004	Philosophy As Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Landy2004Philosophy, author = {Landy, Joshua}, title = {Philosophy As Fiction: Self, Deception, and Knowledge in Proust}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Latona, M.	2004	The tale is not my own (οὐκ ἐμὸς ό μῦθος): Myth and recollection in Plato	Apeiron 37(3) 181-210		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Latona2004tale, author = {Latona, Max}, title = {The tale is not my own (οὐκ ἐμὸς ό μῦθος): Myth and recollection in Plato}, year = {2004}, journal = {Apeiron}, volume = {37}, number = {3}, pages = {181--210}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/APEIRON.2004.37.3.181} }
Ludlow, P.	2004	What was I thinking? Social externalism, self-knowledge, and shifting memory targets	The Externalist Challenge de Gruyter 419-425		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ludlow2004What, author = {Ludlow, Peter}, title = {What was I thinking? Social externalism, self-knowledge, and shifting memory targets}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {The Externalist Challenge}, editor = {Schantz, R.}, publisher = {de Gruyter}, pages = {419--425}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110915273.419} }
Marder, M.	2004	History, memory, and forgetting in Nietzsche and Derrida	Epoché 9(1) 137-157	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this article I begin to explore Friedrich Nietzsche's and Jacques Derrida's philosophies of history in terms of the persistence of forgetting within (non-subjective) memory. In section I, I shall outline the totalizing production of history understood as an unsuccessful attempt to erase the indifference of animality and the difference of madness. The following two sections are concerned with the particular kinds of non-subjective memories---memorials---that arise in the aftermath of this erasure and include writing and the archive (section II), as well as the ghostly and genealogical confusions (section III). Throughout these sections I shall argue that each of the externalizations of memory in non-subjective memorials is contaminated by forgetting, both shaping and shaking up the foundations of history. Finally, section IV revisits the memorials and states of forgetting discussed in the previous sections in light of the (im)possibility of justice.
BibTeX: @article{Marder2004History, author = {Marder, Michael}, title = {History, memory, and forgetting in Nietzsche and Derrida}, year = {2004}, journal = {Epoché}, volume = {9}, number = {1}, pages = {137--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche20049118} }
Ribeiro, R.J.	2004	Imagination and memory in Stendhal	Diogenes 51(1) 55-63		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ribeiro2004Imagination, author = {Ribeiro, Renato Janine}, title = {Imagination and memory in Stendhal}, year = {2004}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {51}, number = {1}, pages = {55--63}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192104041693} }
Ricoeur, P.	2004	Memory, History, Forgetting	University of Chicago Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ricoeur2004Memory, author = {Ricoeur, Paul}, title = {Memory, History, Forgetting}, year = {2004}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press} }
Robbins, S.E.	2004	On time, memory and dynamic form	Consciousness and Cognition 13(4) 762-788	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended-a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a rigidity constraint are examined. The reliance of these models on the instantaneous specification of form at an instant, t, or across a series of such instants forces the consideration of the primary memory supporting both the perception of time-extended events and the time-extension of consciousness. This cannot be reduced to an integration over space and time. The difficulty of defining the basis for this memory is highlighted in considerations of dynamic form in relation to scales of time. Ultimately, the possibility is raised that psychology must follow physics in a more profound approach to time and motion.
BibTeX: @article{Robbins2004time, author = {Robbins, Stephen E.}, title = {On time, memory and dynamic form}, year = {2004}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, volume = {13}, number = {4}, pages = {762--788}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.006} }
Rosen, S.	2004	Memory and human time	Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 19(1) 85-101		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rosen2004Memory, author = {Rosen, Stanley}, title = {Memory and human time}, year = {2004}, journal = {Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {85--101}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134417-90000052} }
Rupert, R.D.	2004	Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition	The Journal of Philosophy 101(8) 389-428		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rupert2004Challenges, author = {Rupert, Robert D.}, title = {Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition}, year = {2004}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {101}, number = {8}, pages = {389--428}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2004101826} }
Schechtman, M.	2004	Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival	American Philosophical Quarterly 41(2) 87-105			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman2004Personality, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival}, year = {2004}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {41}, number = {2}, pages = {87--105} }
Shoemaker, S.	2004	Brown-Brownson revisited	Monist 87(4) 573-593		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shoemaker2004Brown, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Brown-Brownson revisited}, year = {2004}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {87}, number = {4}, pages = {573--593}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200487429} }
Shoemaker, S.	2004	Reply to Wiggins	Monist 87(4) 610-613		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shoemaker2004Reply, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Reply to Wiggins}, year = {2004}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {87}, number = {4}, pages = {610--613}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200487430} }
Shogenji, T.	2004	Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewis's coherence argument	Synthese 142(1) 21-41	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence -- what he calls "congruence'' -- in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of independently obtained items of evidence -- such as converging memories or testimonies -- raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification, or, to use Lewis's expression, ''rational and practical reliance''.It turns out that, while the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis's account of independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability -- a connection of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory -- is contingent on the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter fact for Lewis's theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.
BibTeX: @article{Shogenji2004Can, author = {Shogenji, Tomoji}, title = {Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewis's coherence argument}, year = {2004}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {142}, number = {1}, pages = {21--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000047708.33913.2b} }
Sorabji, R.	2004	Aristotle on Memory	University of Chicago Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sorabji2004Aristotle, author = {Sorabji, Richard}, title = {Aristotle on Memory}, year = {2004}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, edition = {2} }
Strawson, G.	2004	Against narrativity	Ratio 17(4) 428-452	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I argue against two popular claims. The first is a descriptive, empiri- cal thesis about the nature of ordinary human experience: 'each of us constructs and lives a ''narrative'' ...this narrative is us, our identities' (Oliver Sacks); 'self is a perpetually rewritten story . . . in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we ''tell about'' our lives' (Jerry Bruner); 'we are all virtuoso novelists. ...We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our autobiography. The chief fictional char- acter ... of that autobiography is one's self' (Dan Dennett). The second is a normative, ethical claim: we ought to live our lives narratively, or as a story; a 'basic condition of making sense of ourselves is that we grasp our lives in a narrative' and have an understanding of our lives 'as an unfolding story' (Charles Taylor). A person 'creates his identity [only] by forming an autobiograph- ical narrative -- a story of his life', and must be in possession of a full and 'explicit narrative [of his life] to develop fully as a person' (Marya Schechtman).
BibTeX: @article{Strawson2004narrativity, author = {Strawson, Galen}, title = {Against narrativity}, year = {2004}, journal = {Ratio}, volume = {17}, number = {4}, pages = {428--452}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00264.x} }
Sutton, J.	2004	Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory	Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation Elsevier 187-216		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2004Representation, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation}, publisher = {Elsevier}, pages = {187--216}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044394-2/50013-0} }
Van Woudenberg, R.	2004	Reid on memory and the identity of persons	The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid Cambridge University Press 204-221		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Woudenberg2004Reid, author = {Van Woudenberg, René}, title = {Reid on memory and the identity of persons}, year = {2004}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid}, editor = {Cuneo, T. and Van Woudenberg, R.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {204--221}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521812704.009} }
Wiggins, D.	2004	Reply to Shoemaker	Monist 87(4) 594-609		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wiggins2004Replyb, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Reply to Shoemaker}, year = {2004}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {87}, number = {4}, pages = {594--609}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200487427} }
Wiggins, D.	2004	Reply to Shoemaker's reply	Monist 87(4) 614-615		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wiggins2004Reply, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Reply to Shoemaker's reply}, year = {2004}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {87}, number = {4}, pages = {614--615}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist200487431} }
Wilson, R.A.	2004	Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Wilson2004Boundaries, author = {Wilson, Robert A.}, title = {Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Cognition}, year = {2004}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Woolf, R.	2004	A shaggy soul story: How not to read the wax tablet model in Plato's Theaetetus	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(3) 573-604	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper sets out to re-examine the famous Wax Tablet model in Plato's Theaetetus, in particular the section of it which appeals to the quality of individual souls'wax as an explanation of why some are more liable to make mistakes than others (194c-195a). This section has often been regarded as an ornamental flourish or a humorous appendage to the model's main explanatory business. Yet in their own appropriations both Aristotle and Locke treat the notion of variable wax quality as an important part of the model's utility in dealing with mistake. What, then, is its status for Plato? I shall argue that the section on variable wax quality is there to suggest to the reader a tempting way of misinterpreting the model. This will highlight the distinctive character of the model in its original version, and provide an unusual example of a philosopher describing how not to read one of his own doctrines.
BibTeX: @article{Woolf2004shaggy, author = {Woolf, Raphael}, title = {A shaggy soul story: How not to read the wax tablet model in Plato's Theaetetus}, year = {2004}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {69}, number = {3}, pages = {573--604}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00519.x} }
Abrams, N.	2003	'Are you still you?': Memory, identity, and self-positioning in Total Recall	Film and Philosophy 7(1) 48-59		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Abrams2003Are, author = {Abrams, Nathan}, title = {'Are you still you?': Memory, identity, and self-positioning in Total Recall}, year = {2003}, journal = {Film and Philosophy}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {48--59}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/filmphil200375} }
Arvidson, P.S.	2003	A lexicon of attention: From cognitive science to phenomenology	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 99-132	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness. Phenomenological philosophers studying attention increasingly express acute interest in the findings of cognitive scientists. Meanwhile, more cognitive scientists engaged in attention research are making room for reflective methodological critique and first-person report, two things that a phenomenology of science would prescribe, and are occasionally using traditional phenomenological terminology and the term "phenomenology" itself. How does the cognitive scientist's terminology translate from the laboratory to a phenomenology of attention? As a preface to an abridged translation lexicon, I will outline a model of the dynamic structure of the field of attention, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch (1901-1973), a student of Edmund Husserl. Then, in light of that model, I will translate some key cognitive science terms into phenomenological ones. The result is a kind of cognitive science-phenomenology lexicon for attention researchers, an abridged, basic translation dictionary. I will also pick out two special questions for further discussion: where or what is the attending subject in the field of attention, and is the field of attention identically the same as the field of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Arvidson2003lexicon, author = {Arvidson, P. Sven}, title = {A lexicon of attention: From cognitive science to phenomenology}, year = {2003}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {2}, pages = {99--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024895827774} }
Bickle, J.	2003	Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bickle2003Philosophy, author = {Bickle, John}, title = {Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Springer} }
Bonanno, G.	2003	Memory of past beliefs and actions	Studia Logica 75(1) 7-30	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Two notions of memory are studied both syntactically and semantically: memory of past beliefs and memory of past actions. The analysis is carried out in a basic temporal logic framework enriched with beliefs and actions.
BibTeX: @article{Bonanno2003Memory, author = {Bonanno, Giacomo}, title = {Memory of past beliefs and actions}, year = {2003}, journal = {Studia Logica}, volume = {75}, number = {1}, pages = {7--30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026112530502} }
Burge, T.	2003	Memory and persons	The Philosophical Review 112(3) 289-337			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burge2003Memory, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Memory and persons}, year = {2003}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {112}, number = {3}, pages = {289--337} }
Campbell, S.	2003	Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars	Rowman & Littlefield			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Campbell2003Relational, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield} }
Casey, E.S.	2003	Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory	Imagination and Its Pathologies MIT Press 65-91			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey2003Imagination, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory}, year = {2003}, booktitle = {Imagination and Its Pathologies}, editor = {Phillips, J. and Morley, J.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {65--91} }
Craver, C.F.	2003	The making of a memory mechanism	Journal of the History of Biology 36 153-195	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Long-Term Potentiation (LTP) is a kind of synaptic plasticity that many contemporary neuroscientists believe is a component in mechanisms of memory. This essay describes the discovery of LTP and the development of the LTP research program. The story begins in the 1950's with the discovery of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (a medial temporal lobe structure now associated with memory), and it ends in 1973 with the publication of three papers sketching the future course of the LTP research program. The making of LTP was a protracted affair. Hippocampal synaptic plasticity was initially encountered as an experimental tool, then reported as a curiosity, and finally included in the ontic store of the neurosciences. Early researchers were not investigating the hippocampus in search of a memory mechanism; rather, they saw the hippocampus as a useful experimental model or as a structure implicated in the etiology of epilepsy. The link between hippocampal synaptic plasticity and learning or memory was a separate conceptual achievement. That link was formulated in at least three different ways at different times: reductively (claiming that plasticity is identical to learning), analogically (claiming that plasticity is an example or model of learning), and mechanistically (claiming that plasticity is a component in learning or memory mechanisms). The hypothesized link with learning or memory, coupled with developments in experimental techniques and preparations, shaped how researchers understood LTP itself. By 1973, the mechanistic formulation of the link between LTP and memory provided an abstract framework around which findings from multiple perspectives could be integrated into a multifield research program.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2003making, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {The making of a memory mechanism}, year = {2003}, journal = {Journal of the History of Biology}, volume = {36}, pages = {153--195}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022596107834} }
Dimas, P.	2003	Recollecting forms in the Phaedo	Phronesis 48(3) 175-214	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to an interpretation that has dominated the literature, the traditional interpretation as I call it, the recollection argument aims at establishing the thesis that our learning in this life consists in recollecting knowledge the soul acquired before being born into a body, or thesis R, by using the thesis that there exist forms, thesis F, as a premise. 1 These entities, the forms, are incorporeal, immut-able, and transcendent in the sense that they exist separately from material per-ceptibles, which in turn are related to them through participation and by being caused by them in some sense. But the properties of transcendence, immutability and incorporeality are suf cient to signal forms, and so the thesis that there exist forms claims that there exists entities with at least these three properties. In the rst section of this paper, I argue that strong textual and more general exegetical reasons suggest that the traditional interpretation is mistaken. Furthermore, this interpretation, as I argue in the second section, fails to credit Plato with a proper argument for recollection. In section III, I present an alternative account of the argument for R in the Phaedo. At the same time I defend a more general interpretation according to which the metaphysical doctrine Plato offers in the Phaedo represents a natural continuation of the philosophical position that stands at the centre of the dialectical conversations we nd in the shorter Socratic dialogues.
BibTeX: @article{Dimas2003Recollecting, author = {Dimas, Panos}, title = {Recollecting forms in the Phaedo}, year = {2003}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {48}, number = {3}, pages = {175--214}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852803322519217} }
Ennen, E.	2003	Phenomenological coping skills and the striatal memory system	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2(4) 299-325	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Most cognitive scientists are committed to some version of representationalism, the view that intelligent behavior is caused by internal processes that involve computations over representations. Phenomenologists, however, argue that certain types of intelligent behavior, engaged "coping" skills, are nonrepresentational. Recent neuroscientific work on multiple memory systems indicates that while many types of intelligent behavior are repre-sentational, the types of intelligent behavior cited by phenomenologists are indeed nonrepre-sentational. This neuroscientific research thus vindicates a key phenomenological claim about the nature of intelligent behaviour. It also provides a framework for the ongoing reconciliation of cognitive science and phenomenology.
BibTeX: @article{Ennen2003Phenomenological, author = {Ennen, Elizabeth}, title = {Phenomenological coping skills and the striatal memory system}, year = {2003}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {299--325}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000007368.66888.78} }
Falvey, K.	2003	Memory and knowledge of content	New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge MIT Press 219-240			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Falvey2003Memory, author = {Falvey, Kevin}, title = {Memory and knowledge of content}, year = {2003}, booktitle = {New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge}, editor = {Nuccetelli, S.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {219--240} }
Fernández, J.	2003	Privileged access naturalized	The Philosophical Quarterly 53(212) 352-372	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I offer an account of subjects'privileged access to their own minds. The main tenet of that one may have the very same groundsfor both a given belief that p and a higher-ord this belief, a feature which separates the believer's epistemic situation from that of ob account appeals only to those conceptual elements that, arguably, we already use in ord for perceptual knowledge. It constitutes a naturalizing account in that it does not posit iousfaculty of introspection or 'inner perception' mechanism.
BibTeX: @article{Fernandez2003Privileged, author = {Fernández, Jordi}, title = {Privileged access naturalized}, year = {2003}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {53}, number = {212}, pages = {352--372}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00317} }
Garrett, D.	2003	Locke on personal identity, consciousness, and "fatal errors"	Philosophical Topics 31(1) 95-125		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Garrett2003Locke, author = {Garrett, Don}, title = {Locke on personal identity, consciousness, and "fatal errors"}, year = {2003}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {31}, number = {1}, pages = {95--125}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics2003311/214} }
Goldie, P.	2003	One's remembered past: Narrative thinking, emotion, and the external perspective	Philosophical Papers 32(3) 301-319	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Narrative thinking has a very important role in our ordinary everyday lives---in our thinking about fiction, about the historical past, about how things might have been, and about our own past and our plans for the future. In this paper, which is part of a larger project, I will be focusing on just one kind of narrative thinking: the kind that we sometimes engage in when we think about, evaluate, and respond emotionally to, our own past lives from a perspective that is external to the remembered events. Being able to do this is an essential part of what it is to have a narrative sense of self. Sometimes, I will suggest, we fail to have such responses---we are not able to think and feel as we should about an episode in our lives. On such occasions, there is a gap in our narrative sense of self---a gap which opens up especially where the past is in some sense tragic or traumatic. The desire to close this gap is what I will call a desire for emotional closure.
BibTeX: @article{Goldie2003Ones, author = {Goldie, Peter}, title = {One's remembered past: Narrative thinking, emotion, and the external perspective}, year = {2003}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, pages = {301--319}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640309485129} }
Hamilton, A.	2003	'Scottish commonsense' about memory: A defence of Thomas Reid's direct knowledge account	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2) 229-245	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Reid rejects the image theory¾the representative or indirect realist position¾that memory-judgements are inferred from or otherwise justified by a present image or introspectible state. He also rejects the trace theory, which regards memories as essentially traces in the brain. In contrast he argues for a direct knowledge account in which personal memory yields unmediated knowledge of the past. He asserts the reliability of memory, not in currently fashionable terms as a reliable belief-forming process, but more elusively as a principle of Commonsense. There remains a contemporary consensus against Reid's position. I argue that Reid's critique is essentially sound, and that the consensus is mistaken; personal memory judgements are spontaneous and non-inferential in the same way as perceptual judgements. But I question Reid's account of the connection between personal memory and personal identity. My primary concern is rationally reconstructive rather than scholarly, and downplays recent interpretations of Reid's faculty psychology as a precursor of functionalism and other scientific philosophies of mind.
BibTeX: @article{Hamilton2003Scottish, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {'Scottish commonsense' about memory: A defence of Thomas Reid's direct knowledge account}, year = {2003}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {81}, number = {2}, pages = {229--245} }
Lawlor, L.	2003	The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics	Continuum			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Lawlor2003Challenge, author = {Lawlor, Leonard}, title = {The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Continuum} }
Lawlor, L.	2003	The ontology of memory: Bergson's reversal of Platonism	Epoché 8(1) 69-102	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay attempts to reflect on Bergson's contribution to the reversal of Platonism. Heidegger, of course, had set the standard for reversing Platonism. Thus the question posed in this essay, following Heidegger, is: does Bergson manage not only to reverse Platonism but also to twist free of it. The answer presented here is that Bergson does twist free, which explains Deleuze's persistent appropriations of Bergsonian thought. Memor y in Bergson turns out to be not a memory of an idea, or even of the good, which is one, but a memory of multiplicity. Therefore Bergson's memory is really, from a Platonistic standpoint, forgetfulness or, even, a counter-memory.
BibTeX: @article{Lawlor2003ontology, author = {Lawlor, Leonard}, title = {The ontology of memory: Bergson's reversal of Platonism}, year = {2003}, journal = {Epoché}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {69--102}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche20038110} }
Mandik, P.	2003	Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks	Biology & Philosophy 18(1) 95-130	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I discuss one of the key issuesin the philosophy of neuroscience:neurosemantics. The project of neurosemanticsinvolves explaining what it means for states of neurons and neural systems to have representational contents. Neurosemantics thusinvolves issues of common concern between the philosophy of neuroscience and philosophy ofmind. I discuss a problem that arises for accounts of representational content that I call ''the economy problem'': the problem ofshowing that a candidate theory of mental representation can bear the work required within in the causal economy of a mind and an organism. My approach in the current paper is to explore this and other key themes in neurosemantics through the use of computer models of neural networks embodied and evolvedin virtual organisms. The models allow for the laying bare of the causal economies of entire yet simple artificial organisms so that therelations between the neural bases of, forinstance, representation in perception andmemory can be regarded in the context of an entire organism. On the basis of these simulations, I argue for an account of neurosemantics adequate for the solution of the economy problem.
BibTeX: @article{Mandik2003Varieties, author = {Mandik, Peter}, title = {Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks}, year = {2003}, journal = {Biology & Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {95--130}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023336924671} }
Naas, M.	2003	History's remains: Of memory, mourning, and the event	Research in Phenomenology 33(1) 75-96	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Jacques Derrida has written much in recent years on the topic of mourning. This essay takes Derrida's insights into mourning in general and collective mourning in particu- lar in order to ask about the relationship between mourning and politics. Taking a lead from a recent work of Derrida's on Jean-François Lyotard, the essay develops its argument through two examples, one from ancient Greece and one from twentieth- century America: the role mourning plays in the constitution and maintenance of the state in Plato's Laws and the controversy surrounding the consecration of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier of Vietnam in Arlington National Cemetery. This latter exam- ple provides the occasion for questioning the possibilities of mourning the unknown or the unidenti?able and for addressing some of the ways in which the United States has mourned or failed to mourn, remembered or failed to remember, in the wake of September 11.
BibTeX: @article{Naas2003Historys, author = {Naas, Michael}, title = {History's remains: Of memory, mourning, and the event}, year = {2003}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, pages = {75--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640360699618} }
Noonan, H.W.	2003	Personal Identity	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Noonan2003Personal, author = {Noonan, Harold W}, title = {Personal Identity}, year = {2003}, publisher = {Routledge}, edition = {2} }
Sutton, J.	2003	Constructive memory and distributed cognition: Towards an interdisciplinary framework	Constructive Memory New Bulgarian University Press 290-303			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2003Constructive, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Constructive memory and distributed cognition: Towards an interdisciplinary framework}, year = {2003}, booktitle = {Constructive Memory}, editor = {Kokinov, B. and Hirst, W.}, publisher = {New Bulgarian University Press}, pages = {290--303} }
Sutton, J.	2003	Truth in memory: The humanities and the cognitive sciences	Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert Australian Academy of the Humanities 145-163			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2003Truth, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Truth in memory: The humanities and the cognitive sciences}, year = {2003}, booktitle = {Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert}, editor = {McCalman, I and McGrath, A.}, publisher = {Australian Academy of the Humanities}, pages = {145--163} }
Ansell-Pearson, K.	2002	Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{AnsellPearson2002Philosophy, author = {Ansell-Pearson, Keith}, title = {Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Barash, J.A.	2002	Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and the politics of remembrance	International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10(2) 171-182	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: While the recent publication of the Hannah Arendt-Martin Heidegger correspondence confirms that there existed a close personal tie between these two thinkers, the relation between their philosophies is far more problematic. This article argues that Arendt's originality presents itself in its full light in her two major theoretical works of the 1950s, Between Past and Future and The Human Condition , when these works are considered to present a thinly veiled, implicit critique of Heidegger's philosophy. Arendt's critique becomes especially visible in the 'existential' role that she attributed to natality in its relation to political action and to remembrance, placing in question the central orientation of Heidegger's existential ontology in terms of being-toward-death.
BibTeX: @article{Barash2002Martin, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and the politics of remembrance}, year = {2002}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies}, volume = {10}, number = {2}, pages = {171--182}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550210121522} }
Bartsch, R.	2002	Consciousness Emerging: The Dynamics of Perception, Imagination, Action, Memory, Thought, and Language	John Benjamins			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bartsch2002Consciousness, author = {Bartsch, Renate}, title = {Consciousness Emerging: The Dynamics of Perception, Imagination, Action, Memory, Thought, and Language}, year = {2002}, publisher = {John Benjamins} }
Bernet, R.	2002	Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 327-351	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ("phantasy") and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives.
BibTeX: @article{Bernet2002Unconscious, author = {Bernet, Rudolf}, title = {Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud}, year = {2002}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {1}, pages = {327--351}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021316201873} }
Borsic, L.	2002	The concept of memory in presocratic culture	Skepsis 13-14 25-42			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Borsic2002concept, author = {Borsic, L.}, title = {The concept of memory in presocratic culture}, year = {2002}, journal = {Skepsis}, volume = {13-14}, pages = {25--42} }
Campbell, J.	2002	Reference and Consciousness	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Campbell2002Reference, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Reference and Consciousness}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Cassin, B.	2002	The politics of memory: How to treat hate	Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy 41(1-2) 18-35	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay examines three heterogeneous models in the management of the relation between the past and the future which have decisive implications for the political present. These three different models refer to the Athenian civil war of 403 B.C., the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa and the French management of classified archives such as during the Second World War. It is the author's view that these models shed light on certain relations between politics, discursive practices and deliberation.
BibTeX: @article{Cassin2002politics, author = {Cassin, Barbara}, title = {The politics of memory: How to treat hate}, year = {2002}, journal = {Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {41}, number = {1-2}, pages = {18--35} }
Clarke, M.	2002	The space-time image: The case of Bergson, Deleuze, and Memento	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16(3) 167-181		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Clarke2002space, author = {Clarke, Melissa}, title = {The space-time image: The case of Bergson, Deleuze, and Memento}, year = {2002}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {167--181}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/jsp.2003.0003} }
Craver, C.F.	2002	Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory	Philosophy of Science 69(S3) S83-S97	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The dominant neuroscientific theory of spatial memory is, like many theories in neuroscience, a multilevel description of a mechanism. The theory links the activities of molecules, cells, brain regions, and whole organisms into an integrated sketch of an explanation for the ability of organisms to navigate novel environments. Here I develop a taxonomy of interlevel experimental strategies for integrating the levels in such multilevel mechanisms. These experimental strategies include activation strategies, interference strategies, and additive strategies. These strategies are mutually reinforcing, providing a kind of interlevel and intratheoretic robustness that has not previously been recognized.
BibTeX: @article{Craver2002Interlevel, author = {Craver, Carl F.}, title = {Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory}, year = {2002}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {69}, number = {S3}, pages = {S83--S97}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/341836} }
Dalla Barba, G.	2002	Memory, Consciousness, and Temporality	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{DallaBarba2002Memory, author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco}, title = {Memory, Consciousness, and Temporality}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Springer} }
Ismael, J.	2002	Rememberances, mementos, and time-capsules	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50 317-328		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ismael2002Rememberances, author = {Ismael, Jenann}, title = {Rememberances, mementos, and time-capsules}, year = {2002}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {50}, pages = {317--328}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100010626} }
Jackson, F.	2002	Memory traces and representation	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(4) 409-410		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Jackson2002Memory, author = {Jackson, Frank}, title = {Memory traces and representation}, year = {2002}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {1}, number = {4}, pages = {409--410}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021355707117} }
Klein, J.R.	2002	Memory and the extension of thinking in Descartes's Regulae	International Philosophical Quarterly 42(1) 23-40	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article discusses the impact of Descartes's substance-dualism on his account of discursive reason. Taking the presentation of deduction in the Rules as a paradigmatic case of thought's extension and movement in time, I analyze the relation between intuitive and discursive understanding and that between intellect and imagination. I focus specifically on the mediation of corporeal impressions and of intellectual ideas by ingenium. As intellectual, ingenium is a faculty of understanding; as joining with phantasia, ingenium has access to corporeal affections, images, and memory. Deduction involves both of these aspects of ingenium, and Descartes's dualism complicates efforts to clarify the operations and nature of ingenium. Thus the dynamics of dualistic psychology account for some of the limitations of deduction in particular and discursive rationality in general.
BibTeX: @article{Klein2002Memory, author = {Klein, Julie R.}, title = {Memory and the extension of thinking in Descartes's Regulae}, year = {2002}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {23--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq200242171} }
Kortooms, T.	2002	Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Kortooms2002Phenomenology, author = {Kortooms, Toine}, title = {Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Springer} }
Kraay, K.	2002	Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge	Erkenntnis 56(3) 297-317	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge's influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian's claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response tothis charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value.
BibTeX: @article{Kraay2002Externalism, author = {Kraay, K.J.}, title = {Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge}, year = {2002}, journal = {Erkenntnis}, volume = {56}, number = {3}, pages = {297--317}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016307111148} }
Lawlor, K.	2002	Memory, anaphora, and content preservation	Philosophical Studies 109(2) 97-119	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Tyler Burge defends the idea that memory preserves beliefs with their justifications, so that memory's role in inference adds no new justificatory demands. Against Burge's view, Christensen and Kornblith argue that memory is reconstructive and so introduces an element of a posteriori justification into every inference. I argue that Burge is right, memory does preserve content, but to defend this view we need to specify a preservative mechanism. Toward that end, I develop the idea that there is something worth calling anaphoric thinking, which preserves content in Burge's sense of ''content preservation.'' I provide a model on which anaphoric thought is a fundamental feature of cognitive architecture, consequently rejecting the idea that there are mental pronouns in a Language of Thought. Since preservative memory is a matter of anaphoric thinking, there are limits on the analogy of memory and testimony.
BibTeX: @article{Lawlor2002Memory, author = {Lawlor, Krista}, title = {Memory, anaphora, and content preservation}, year = {2002}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {109}, number = {2}, pages = {97--119}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016209126269} }
Mahadevan, R., Malone, J.C. and Bailey, J.	2002	Radical behaviorism and exceptional memory phenomena	Behaviour and Philosophy 30(1) 1-13	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The central claim of this paper is that radical behaviorism and cognitive psychology can both make important contributions to an experimental analysis of a cognitive skill such as memory performance. Though they currently differ in what constitutes an explanation of many phenomena, behaviorists and cognitive psychologists share interests in such human activities as problem solving and memory. We show how the behavioral approach may apply to one case that seems to epitomize cognition?the dramatic improvement in the memory span performance of one individual on a task often used by cognitive psychologists to assess short-term memory. After 230 hours of practice, ability to recall random digits improved from a span of 7 digits to a span of 80. Although a detailed account of the mechanisms that mediated such improvement has been given, we show that the acquisition of such exceptional memory skill can also be explained within the framework of behavior analysis.
BibTeX: @article{Mahadevan2002Radical, author = {Mahadevan, Rajan and Malone, John C. and Bailey, Jon}, title = {Radical behaviorism and exceptional memory phenomena}, year = {2002}, journal = {Behaviour and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {1--13} }
Margalit, A.	2002	The Ethics of Memory	Harvard University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Margalit2002Ethics, author = {Margalit, Avishai}, title = {The Ethics of Memory}, year = {2002}, publisher = {Harvard University Press} }
McDonough, J.K.	2002	Hume's account of memory	British Journal for the History of Philosophy 10(1) 71-87	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay divides into three main sections. The first section isolates three puzzles in Hume's account of memory. The second section argues that while Hume's difficulties are exacerbated on the assumption that Hume held the causal thesis, they are reduced on the hypothesis that Hume did not fully appreciate the analytic connection between memory and causation. Finally, the third section looks at how the reading of Hume's account of memory offered in the first two sections fits into the larger context of Hume's work by considering the roles Hume assigns the memory in his famous account of personal identity.
BibTeX: @article{McDonough2002Humes, author = {McDonough, Jeffrey K.}, title = {Hume's account of memory}, year = {2002}, journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {71--87}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780110099877} }
Motzkin, G.	2002	Representation	Synthese 130 201-212		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Motzkin2002Representation, author = {Motzkin, Gabriel}, title = {Representation}, year = {2002}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {130}, pages = {201--212}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014487229958} }
Moulard, V.	2002	The time-image and Deleuze's transcendental experience	Continental Philosophy Review 35 325-345	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I examine the meaning of Deleuze's 'transcendental empiricism' by means of the kind of experience that his project opens up for us--an experience that I want to call transcendental. Primarily on the basis of his works on cinema, famously dedicated to freely investigating Bergson's thought, I argue that Deleuze's notion of the time-image, together with his search for its real and necessary conditions, consists in the liberation of experience from its Kantian limitative conditioning. I then examine both the new kind of subjectivity (the fissured ego) that emerges from this enlarged experience and the new conception of temporality (time out of joint) that subtends it. Finally, I try to bring out the concrete relations between (transcendental) experience, thought and the brain that Deleuze brings to light in his analysis of great cinema's reinvention of the relationship between time and movement.; In this paper I examine the meaning of Deleuze's ''transcendental empiricism'' by means of the kind of experience that his project opens up for us -- an experience that I want to call transcendental. Primarily on the basis of his works on cinema, famously dedicated to freely investigating Bergson's thought, I argue that Deleuze's notion of the time-image, together with his search for its real and necessary conditions, consists in the liberation of experience from its Kantian limitative conditioning. I then examine both the new kind of subjectivity (the fissured ego) that emerges from this enlarged experience and the new conception of temporality (time out of joint) that subtends it. Finally, I try to bring out the concrete relations between (transcendental) experience, thought and the brain that Deleuze brings to light in his analysis of great cinema's reinvention of the relationship between time and movement.; In this paper I examine the meaning of Deleuze's "transcendental empiricism" by means of the kind of experience that his project opens up for us - an experience that I want to call transcendental. Primarily on the basis of his works on cinema, famously dedicated to freely investigating Bergson's thought, I argue that Deleuze's notion of the time-image, together with his search for its real and necessary conditions, consists in the liberation of experience from its Kantian limitative conditioning. I then examine both the new kind of subjectivity (the fissured ego) that emerges from this enlarged experience and the new conception of temporality (time out of joint) that subtends it. Finally, I try to bring out the concrete relations between (transcendental) experience, thought and the brain that Deleuze brings to light in his analysis of great cinema's reinvention of the relationship between time and movement.
BibTeX: @article{Moulard2002time, author = {Moulard, Valentine}, title = {The time-image and Deleuze's transcendental experience}, year = {2002}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {35}, pages = {325--345}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022687422795} }
Rakover, S.S.	2002	Reconstruction of past events from memory: An alternative to the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method	Behaviour and Philosophy 30 101-122	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the demand of the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method, a theory is confirmed when the prediction-observation (p-o) gap is small and disconfirmed when the gap is large. A major goal of this paper is to introduce a research domain for which this demand does not hold. In contrast to the H-D method's demand, this research, called the Catch model for reconstructing a face previously seen from memory, requires an increase, within limits, in the p-o gap. The Catch model research substantiates theoretically and empirically a new proposed method that I call the ''Deductive-Reconstruction'' (D-R) method. This method provides essential conditions whose fulfillment guarantees successful reconstruction of past events (a face previously seen) from memory. It is argued that the DR method fits the area of research of reconstructing past events from memory better than the H-D method. Application of the H-D method to the Catch model's research domain leads to an internal contradiction and failure to reconstruct past events (a face previously seen) from memory. Finally, the nature of the D-R method along with the Catch model is discussed from three points of view: confirmation, explanation, and generality.
BibTeX: @article{Rakover2002Reconstruction, author = {Rakover, Sam S}, title = {Reconstruction of past events from memory: An alternative to the hypothetico-deductive (H-D) method}, year = {2002}, journal = {Behaviour and Philosophy}, volume = {30}, pages = {101--122} }
Robinson, W.S.	2002	Jackson's apostasy	Philosophical Studies 111(3) 277-293	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" (1998). This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct argument, are discussed and found not to materially affect the force of the knowledge argument.
BibTeX: @article{Robinson2002Jacksons, author = {Robinson, William S}, title = {Jackson's apostasy}, year = {2002}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {111}, number = {3}, pages = {277--293}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021231827144} }
Simmons, P.C.	2002	John Locke, memory, and narratives of origin	Lumen: Selected Proceedings from the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 21(1) 61-85		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Simmons2002John, author = {Simmons, Patricia C.}, title = {John Locke, memory, and narratives of origin}, year = {2002}, journal = {Lumen: Selected Proceedings from the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies}, volume = {21}, number = {1}, pages = {61--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7202/1012268ar} }
Stawarska, B.	2002	Memory and subjectivity: Sartre in dialogue with Husserl	Sartre Studies International 8(2) 94-111		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Stawarska2002Memory, author = {Stawarska, Beata}, title = {Memory and subjectivity: Sartre in dialogue with Husserl}, year = {2002}, journal = {Sartre Studies International}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, pages = {94--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.3167/135715502781825064} }
Sutton, J.	2002	Cognitive conceptions of language and the development of autobiographical memory	Language & Communication 22(3) 375-390	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The early development of autobiographical memory is a useful case study both for examining general relations between language and memory, and for investigating the promise and the difficulty of interdisciplinary research in the cognitive sciences of memory. An otherwise promising social-interactionist view of autobiographical memory development relies in part on an overly linguistic conception of mental representation. This paper applies an alternative, 'supra-communicative' view of the relation between language and thought, along the lines developed by Andy Clark, to this developmental framework. A pluralist approach to current theories of autobiographical memory development is sketched: shared early narratives about the past function in part to stabilize and structure the child's own autobiographical memory system.
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2002Cognitive, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Cognitive conceptions of language and the development of autobiographical memory}, year = {2002}, journal = {Language & Communication}, volume = {22}, number = {3}, pages = {375--390}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/S0271-5309(02)00013-7} }
Sutton, J.	2002	Memory, Philosophical issues about	Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science Macmillan 1109-1113	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is a set of cognitive capacities by which humans and other animals retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes. Philosophical investigation into memory is in part continuous with the development ofcogni- tive scientific theories, but includes related inquiries into metaphysics and personal identity.
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2002Memory, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Memory, Philosophical issues about}, year = {2002}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science}, publisher = {Macmillan}, pages = {1109--1113} }
Sutton, J.	2002	Porous memory and the cognitive life of things	Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History MIT Press 130-141			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2002Porous, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Porous memory and the cognitive life of things}, year = {2002}, booktitle = {Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History}, editor = {Tofts, D. and Jonson, A. and Cavallaro, A.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {130--141} }
Adalier, G.	2001	The case of Theaetetus	Phronesis 46(1) 1-37	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Any comprehensive interpretation of the Theaetetus has to provide answers to, among others, two very general questions concerning that dialogue: "What is Plato's relation to the problems faced in the Theaetetus?" and "What is the significance of the absence of the Forms from the discussion of the Theaetetus, given their undoubted relevance to the topic of the dialogue, i.e. knowledge?" Predominantly, the answer given to the first question in the literature has been that the problems are those that Plato is trying to tackle and the one to the second question, when it has been addressed at all, that the Forms are left out of the discussion because Plato no longer thought them relevant, either for having abandoned or seriously revised them, by the time of writing the Theaetetus. In this study of the Wax Block and the Aviary models of judgment that occur in the second part of the Theaetetus as part of its discussion of the problem of false judgment, I argue that the problems faced there actually arise because of the neglect of Forms. The discussion of the second part is, I contend, carried out on a materialist ontology, an ontology assumed because it suits the definition of knowledge as true judgment which inaugurates that part of the dialogue, an ontology in no way subscribed to by Plato. The Wax Block is, I explain, a materialist model and fails in the case of judgments about numbers for treating them on a par with material subjects, ignoring their intelligible status. In particular, it fails to distinguish judging 5 and 7 to be 11 from judging 12 to be 11 because of its neglect of Forms; Plato would distinguish those judgments by distinguishing 5 and 7 from 12 with help from his part-whole analysis, to which the Forms are essential.
BibTeX: @article{Adalier2001case, author = {Adalier, Gokhan}, title = {The case of Theaetetus}, year = {2001}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {1--37}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15685280151091332} }
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K.	2001	The bounds of cognition	Philosophical Psychology 14(1) 43-64	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranialism about the cognitive.
BibTeX: @article{Adams2001bounds, author = {Adams, Fred and Aizawa, Ken}, title = {The bounds of cognition}, year = {2001}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {43--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080120033571} }
Adshead, G.	2001	"Impossible things before breakfast": A commentary on Burman and Richmond	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8(1) 33-37		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Adshead2001Impossible, author = {Adshead, Gwen}, title = {"Impossible things before breakfast": A commentary on Burman and Richmond}, year = {2001}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {33--37}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2002.0001} }
Baldwin, T.	2001	Russell on memory	Principia 5(1-2) 187-208	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Russell famously propounded scepticism about memory in The Analysis of Mind (1921). As he there acknowledged, one way to counter this sceptical position is to hold that memory involves direct acquaintance with past, and this is in fact a thesis Russell had advanced in The Problems of Philosophy (1911). Indeed he had there used the case of memory to develop a sophisticated fallibilist, non-sceptical, epistemology. By 1921, however, Russell had rejected the early conception of memory as incompatible with the neutral monism he now affirmed. In its place he argued that memory involves a distinctive type of belief whose content is given by imagery. Russell's language here is off-putting but without much distortion his later position can be interpreted as an early formulation of a functionalist theory of mind based on a causal theory of mental representation. Thus interpreted it provides the basis for a different response to Russell's sceptical thesis.
BibTeX: @article{Baldwin2001Russell, author = {Baldwin, Thomas}, title = {Russell on memory}, year = {2001}, journal = {Principia}, volume = {5}, number = {1-2}, pages = {187--208} }
Bechtel, W.	2001	The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research	Minds and Machines 11(4) 483-502	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Some theorists who emphasize the complexity of biological and cognitive systems and who advocate the employment of the tools of dynamical systems theory in explaining them construe complexity and reduction as exclusive alternatives. This paper argues that reduction, an approach to explanation that decomposes complex activities and localizes the components within the complex system, is not only compatible with an emphasis on complexity, but provides the foundation for dynamical analysis. Explanation via decomposition and localization is nonetheless extremely challenging, and an analysis of recent cognitive neuroscience research on memory is used to illustrate what is involved. Memory researchers split between advocating memory systems and advocating memory processes, and I argue that it is the latter approach that provides the critical sort of decomposition and localization for explaining memory. The challenges of linking distinguishable functions with brain processes is illustrated by two examples: competing hypotheses about the contribution of the hippocampus and competing attempts to link areas in frontal cortex with memory processing.
BibTeX: @article{Bechtel2001compatibility, author = {Bechtel, William}, title = {The compatibility of complex systems and reduction: A case analysis of memory research}, year = {2001}, journal = {Minds and Machines}, volume = {11}, number = {4}, pages = {483--502}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011803931581} }
Bernecker, S.	2001	Russell on mnemic causation	Principia 5(1-2) 149-185	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: According to the stand.ard view, the causal process connecting a past representation and its subsequent recall involves intermediary memory traces. Yet Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein held that since the physiological evidence for memory traces isn't quite conclusive, it is prudent to come up with an account of memory causation-referred to as nmemic causation---that manages without the stipulation of memory traces. Given mnemic causation, a past representation is directly causally active over a temporal distance. I argue that the stipulation of memory traces is indeed indispensable for analyzing mernory causation.
BibTeX: @article{Bernecker2001Russell, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Russell on mnemic causation}, year = {2001}, journal = {Principia}, volume = {5}, number = {1-2}, pages = {149--185} }
Borradori, G.	2001	The temporalization of difference: Reflections on Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson	Continental Philosophy Review 34 1-20	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper provides an in-depth analysis of Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson, based on his largely ignored 1956 essay, "Bergson's Conception of Difference." In this essay , Deleuze first attacks the Hegelian tradition for misunderstanding the notion of difference by reducing it to negation and then uses Bergson's concept of duration-a flow of purely qualitative mental states-to formulate a notion of difference utterly "internal" to itself, that is, irreducible to negation. The paper argues that this temporalization of difference represents a permanent feature of Deleuze's philosophy-one particularly visible in his highly influential book on Nietzsche-and concludes that Deleuze's Nietzsche therefore appears molded by a Bergsonian imprint.
BibTeX: @article{Borradori2001temporalization, author = {Borradori, Giovanna}, title = {The temporalization of difference: Reflections on Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson}, year = {2001}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {34}, pages = {1--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011418818792} }
Burman, E.	2001	Reframing current controversies around memory: Feminist contributions	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 8(1) 21-32	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper offers a feminist review of the debates surrounding delayed (false/recovered) memories. It highlights the philosophical and conceptual issues involved to attempt to illuminate this complex and controversial area. Going beyond disputes around the validity of False Memory Syndrome (FMS) or practical prescriptions, it first considers broader effects of the rhetorical reality this has achieved---in particular in supporting a discourse of disbelief that undermines therapeutic work with abuse survivors. Secondly, four tensions within feminist responses to the memory debate are explored that also highlight constitutive features of its cultural and disciplinary contexts. The third section explores how the memorial controversies reflect prevailing social concerns with familial and existential disintegration, and rely upon an elision between popularly circulating notions of inner childhood and the adult recalling their childhood. Fourthly, it is suggested that the same conceptual difficulties apply to some of the empirical psychological literature drawn upon as evidence in determining the status of false/ recovered memories. From this conceptual analysis the paper concludes by highlighting implications for practice, suggesting that it is the false memory advocates rather than their opponents who are insufficiently constructionist in their approach to memory.
BibTeX: @article{Burman2001Reframing, author = {Burman, E.}, title = {Reframing current controversies around memory: Feminist contributions}, year = {2001}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {21--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2002.0002} }
Campbell, J.	2001	Memory demonstratives	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 169-186		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Campbell2001Memory, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Memory demonstratives}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {169--186}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/0199243816.003.0010} }
Campbell, S.	2001	Neo-Lockeanism and circularity	Philosophia 28(1-4) 477-489		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Campbell2001Neo, author = {Campbell, Scott}, title = {Neo-Lockeanism and circularity}, year = {2001}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {28}, number = {1-4}, pages = {477--489}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379796} }
Cockburn, D.	2001	Memories, traces, and the significance of the past	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 393-409		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Cockburn2001Memories, author = {Cockburn, David}, title = {Memories, traces, and the significance of the past}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {393--409}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2004.03.007} }
Conee, E. and Feldman, R.	2001	Internalism defended	American Philosophical Quarterly 38(1) 1-18			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Conee2001Internalism, author = {Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard}, title = {Internalism defended}, year = {2001}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, pages = {1--18} }
Craver, C.F. and Darden, L.	2001	Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory	Theory and Method in the Neurosciences University of Pittsburgh Press 112-137		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Craver2001Discovering, author = {Craver, Carl F. and Darden, Lindley}, title = {Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, editor = {Machamer, Peter K. and Grush, Rick and McLaughlin, Peter}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, pages = {112--137}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498442.004} }
Crocker, S.	2001	Into the interval: On Deleuze's reversal of time and movement	Continental Philosophy Review 34 45-67	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The reversal in the relation of time and movement which Deleuze describes in his Cinema books does not only concern a change in the filmic arts. Deleuze associates it with a wider 'Copernican turn' in science, philosophy, art and indeed modern experience as a whole. Experience no longer consists of an idea plus the time it takes to realize it. Instead, time is implicated in the determination, literally the creation of the terminus of any movement of experience. Deleuze describes this open movement structure as 'determinable virtuality'. Because it is 'determinable', experience as a whole is neither actual nor actualisable. The whole is virtual. I use the phrase determinable virtuality as a kind of organizational device with which to organise a study of the reversal of time and movement in Deleuze's work. I study the concept of determinability as it appears in Deleuze's reading of the relation of time and movement in Kant's description of the whole of possible experience, or the Transcendental Ideas. In a following section I take up the idea of virtuality which I trace back to Duns Scotus who uses the idea of the virtual to distinguish between univocal and equivocal movements, forms of movement which, I argue, anticipate the kinostructures and chronogeneses, or movement and time-images which Deleuze places at the center of his work on cinema.
BibTeX: @article{Crocker2001interval, author = {Crocker, Stephen}, title = {Into the interval: On Deleuze's reversal of time and movement}, year = {2001}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {34}, pages = {45--67}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011449930514} }
Dalla Barba, G.	2001	Beyond the memory-trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus: A hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality	Journal of Consciousness Studies 8(3) 51-78	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Most theories andmodels ofmemory are basedon two assumptions that contain theoretical problems. These problems are reflected in the memory-trace paradox, which consists in believing that the past is contained in the memory trace, and in the fallacy of the homunculus, which consists in assuming the existence of an unconscious intentional subject. We will discuss these and present an alternative hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality. This holds that consciousness is not a unitary dimension, but is the set of distinct and original modes to address the object. Among the modes of consciousness, a distinction is made between Knowing Consciousness (KC) and Temporal Consciousness (TC). KC describes the mode of addressing the object in order to know it. TC describes the mode of consciousness that temporalizes its object according the subordinate structures of temporality, the past, the present and the future. Finally, it is shown how the hypothesis accounts for a variety of memory disorders and phenomena while avoiding the memory-trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus.
BibTeX: @article{DallaBarba2001memory, author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco}, title = {Beyond the memory-trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus: A hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and temporality}, year = {2001}, journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies}, volume = {8}, number = {3}, pages = {51--78} }
Dokic, J.	2001	Is memory purely preservative?	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 213-232			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dokic2001Is, author = {Dokic, Jérôme}, title = {Is memory purely preservative?}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {213--232} }
Ebersole, F.B.	2001	Things We Know: Fourteen Essays on the Problem of Knowledge	University of Oregon Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ebersole2001Things, author = {Ebersole, Frank B.}, title = {Things We Know: Fourteen Essays on the Problem of Knowledge}, year = {2001}, publisher = {University of Oregon Books} }
Ginet, C.	2001	Norman Malcolm (1911-1990)	A Companion to Analytic Philosophy Blackwell 231-238			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ginet2001Norman, author = {Ginet, Carl}, title = {Norman Malcolm (1911-1990)}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {A Companion to Analytic Philosophy}, editor = {Martinich, A. P. and Sosa, David}, publisher = {Blackwell}, pages = {231--238} }
Hoerl, C.	2001	The phenomenology of episodic recall	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 315-335			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2001phenomenology, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {The phenomenology of episodic recall}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {315--335} }
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.	2001	Perspectives on time and memory: An introduction	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 1-33			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hoerl2001Perspectives, author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Perspectives on time and memory: An introduction}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {1--33} }
Martin, M.G.F.	2001	Out of the past: Episodic recall as retained acquaintance	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 257-284			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Martin2001Out, author = {Martin, M. G. F.}, title = {Out of the past: Episodic recall as retained acquaintance}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {257--284} }
McCormack, T.	2001	Attributing episodic memory to animals and children	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 285-313			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCormack2001Attributing, author = {McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Attributing episodic memory to animals and children}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {285--313} }
McCormack, T. and Hoerl, C.	2001	The child in time: Temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory	The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives Erlbaum 203-227			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{McCormack2001child, author = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {The child in time: Temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives}, editor = {Moore, C and Lemmon, K}, publisher = {Erlbaum}, pages = {203--227} }
Moore, A.	2001	Apperception and the unreality of tense	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Oxford University Press 375-391			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Moore2001Apperception, author = {Moore, A.W.}, title = {Apperception and the unreality of tense}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {375--391} }
Peacocke, C.	2001	Understanding the past tense	Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology Clarendon Press 339-374			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Peacocke2001Understanding, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {Understanding the past tense}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology}, editor = {Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T.}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, pages = {339--374} }
Sen, J.	2001	Plotinus and Wittgenstein on memory	Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought SUNY Press 303-311			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sen2001Plotinus, author = {Sen, Joseph}, title = {Plotinus and Wittgenstein on memory}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {Neoplatonism and Contemporary Thought}, editor = {Harris, R. Baine}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {303--311} }
Slors, M.	2001	Personal identity, memory, and circularity: An alternative for Q-memory	The Journal of Philosophy 98(4) 186-214		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Slors2001Personal, author = {Slors, Marc}, title = {Personal identity, memory, and circularity: An alternative for Q-memory}, year = {2001}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {98}, number = {4}, pages = {186--214}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20019845} }
Teske, R.	2001	Augustine's philosophy of memory	The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Cambridge University Press 148-158		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Teske2001Augustines, author = {Teske, Roland}, title = {Augustine's philosophy of memory}, year = {2001}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Augustine}, editor = {Stump, Eleonore and Kretzmann, Norman}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {148--158}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521650186.012} }
Ward, D.E.	2001	Did I dream that or did it really happen? A phenomenological criterion for distinguishing remembered dream experiences from remembered waking experiences	Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia 24(1) 85-101	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Is there a way to tell whether what you remember was something you dreamt or something that really happened without making reference to coherence criteria? I suggest contra Descartes that there is a certain sign 'by means of which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep'. This certain sign is the intensive magnitude (Kant's term) associated with every sensation.
BibTeX: @article{Ward2001Did, author = {Ward, David E.}, title = {Did I dream that or did it really happen? A phenomenological criterion for distinguishing remembered dream experiences from remembered waking experiences}, year = {2001}, journal = {Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {85--101} }
Wiggins, D.	2001	Sameness and Substance Renewed	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Wiggins2001Sameness, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Sameness and Substance Renewed}, year = {2001}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Birch, C.	2000	Memory and punishment	Criminal Justice Ethics 19(2) 17-31	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Lawyers and legal philosophers have both recognized that our prevailing concepts of criminal responsibility and punishment depend upon a particular notion of personal identity, namely our possession of conscious minds to which are ascribed the qualities of unity, continuity through time, and the clear separation of each person from all others and the rest of the world. With the rebirth of interest in the philosophy of mind in the last twenty years, the nature of personal identity has again become philosophically important. The issue has gained philosophical notoriety with the publication in 1984 of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Parfit's book contains a long and detailed argument that seeks to refute the common view of personal identity, namely, that an individual's identity is a special further fact additional to the sequence of that person's mental states. Although not the first, Parfit's work is one of the most sustained efforts to advocate a reductive theory of mind.
BibTeX: @article{Birch2000Memory, author = {Birch, Christopher}, title = {Memory and punishment}, year = {2000}, journal = {Criminal Justice Ethics}, volume = {19}, number = {2}, pages = {17--31}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2000.9992088} }
Blustein, J.	2000	On taking responsibility for one's past	Journal of Applied Philosophy 17(1) 1-19	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper gives an account of a group of related ways of taking responsibility for one's past. It begins by considering what about the past explains why people often do not take responsibility for it. Taking responsibility for one's past is then analysed in terms of three interrelated ideas, retrospective construction of meaning, appropriation, and thematisation. The final section shows the relevance of this topic to the concerns of moral psychology by exploring the connections between taking responsibility for one's past, humility, and self-forgiveness.
BibTeX: @article{Blustein2000taking, author = {Blustein, Jeffrey}, title = {On taking responsibility for one's past}, year = {2000}, journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {1--19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00136} }
Carr, B.	2000	Śankara on memory and the continuity of the self	Religious Studies 36(4) 419-434	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An issue much discussed by Indian philosophers and Western philosophers alike is one that concerns the need to assume a continuing self (or subject of experience) in giving an account of the world and our experience of it. This paper concentrates on two arguments put forward by the eighth-century AD Indian philosopher Śankara, in a short passage of his commentary on Bādarāyana's Brahmasűtra. The innovative peculiarity of these arguments is that they rest on an appeal to the content of memory judgements. Śankara takes the line that an analysis of the content of memory judgements shows that a Buddhist attempt to reconstrue memory as mere similarity between successive experiences is fundamentally flawed. Our concern, therefore, is whether Śankara's account of the content of memory judgements is correct, and whether it establishes the required continuity.
BibTeX: @article{Carr2000Sankara, author = {Carr, Brian}, title = {Śankara on memory and the continuity of the self}, year = {2000}, journal = {Religious Studies}, volume = {36}, number = {4}, pages = {419--434}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412500005370} }
Casey, E.S.	2000	Remembering: A Phenomenological Study	Indiana University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Casey2000Remembering, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Remembering: A Phenomenological Study}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Indiana University Press}, edition = {2} }
Casey, E.S.	2000	Stompin' on Scott: A cursory critique of mind and memory	Research in Phenomenology 30(1) 223-239		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey2000Stompin, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Stompin' on Scott: A cursory critique of mind and memory}, year = {2000}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {223--239}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916400746533} }
Dalla Barba, G.	2000	Memory, consciousness, and the brain	Brain and Cognition 42(1) 20-22		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{DallaBarba2000Memory, author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco}, title = {Memory, consciousness, and the brain}, year = {2000}, journal = {Brain and Cognition}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {20--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1006/brcg.1999.1150} }
Draaisma, D.	2000	Metaphors of memory: A history of ideas about the mind	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Draaisma2000Metaphors, author = {Draaisma, Douwe}, title = {Metaphors of memory: A history of ideas about the mind}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Edwards, J.	2000	Burge on testimony and memory	Analysis 60(265) 124-131	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Tyler Burge sees a close analogy between the acquisition of warranted belief from the testimony of others and the preservation of warranted belief in memory. I shall bring out a problem with his common account of testimony and memory, and offer two solutions. The first solution weakens the analogy between testimony and memory. The second keeps the close analogy but modifies the common account of both. Although the first solution has some plausibility, I think the second fits Burge's intentions better.
BibTeX: @article{Edwards2000Burge, author = {Edwards, Jim}, title = {Burge on testimony and memory}, year = {2000}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {60}, number = {265}, pages = {124--131}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00212} }
Gibbs, R.	2000	Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Gibbs2000Why, author = {Gibbs, Robert}, title = {Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Gilbertson, E.	2000	Externalism and memory	Southwest Philosophy Review 16(1) 51-58		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gilbertson2000Externalism, author = {Gilbertson, Eric}, title = {Externalism and memory}, year = {2000}, journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {51--58}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200016130} }
Goldberg, S.C.	2000	Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy	Philosophical Studies 100(1) 51-79	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justified self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompatibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest nanother way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justified true self-ascriptive judgement about one's occurrent thought does not amount to or imply that one 'knows the content' of the self-ascribed thought. While the difference between present-tense self-ascription and knowledge of content has previously been brought out using the familiar trappings of world-switching examples, here I attempt to establish the difference by appeal to actual (real-life) memory-involving cases. To this end, I present a 'recollection problem' and argue that, so long as one conflates present-tense self-ascription and self-knowledge of content, there can be no satisfactory response to this problem. The result is that, even if the compatibilist strategy is correct in what it asserts about self-ascription, it has not delivered the relevant goods if it aims to establish a thesis asserting externalism's compatibility with knowledge of content. I conclude by speculating how the recollection argument to be presented here can be transformed, from an argument against the compatibilist strategy, into an argument for incompatibilism.
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg2000Externalism, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {100}, number = {1}, pages = {51--79}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018642507178} }
Hammer, D.	2000	Freedom and fatefulness: Augustine, Arendt, and the journey of memory	Theory, Culture & Society 17(2) 83-104	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article reassesses Arendt's relationship to Augustine, exploring the Augustinian context for Arendt's own thinking about the relationship between thought and action. What Arendt drew from Augustine, the contours of which remain in her later work, is a journey of memory in which reflection, as it removes us from the world, paradoxically reveals us as inserted into this world. Out of this ontology of origins emerges an ethic of beginning as we recognize, in the moment of reflection, a bond of kinship and an equality toward each other that is constituted by our common relationship of beginning and fatefulness to the world. It is this Augustinian journey of memory that continued to guide Arendt's thinking in developing a political ethic that shared with action the ontological foundation of beginning.
BibTeX: @article{Hammer2000Freedom, author = {Hammer, Dean}, title = {Freedom and fatefulness: Augustine, Arendt, and the journey of memory}, year = {2000}, journal = {Theory, Culture & Society}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {83--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/02632760022051121} }
Hatfield, G.	2000	The brain's "new" science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint	Philosophy of Science 67(Proceedings) S388-S403	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments about the fundamentality or objectivity of physics or physiology in relation to psychology.
BibTeX: @article{Hatfield2000brains, author = {Hatfield, Gary}, title = {The brain's "new" science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {67}, number = {Proceedings}, pages = {S388--S403}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/392833} }
Hirstein, W.	2000	Self-deception and confabulation	Philosophy of Science 67(Proceedings) S418-S429	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about the structure of normal human knowledge- gathering processes.
BibTeX: @article{Hirstein2000Self, author = {Hirstein, William}, title = {Self-deception and confabulation}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {67}, number = {Proceedings}, pages = {S418--S429}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/392835} }
James, S.	2000	Feminism in philosophy of mind: The question of personal identity	The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy Cambridge University Press 29-48			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{James2000Feminism, author = {James, Susan}, title = {Feminism in philosophy of mind: The question of personal identity}, year = {2000}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy}, editor = {Fricker, Miranda and Hornsby, Jennifer}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {29--48} }
Kukla, R.	2000	Myth, memory and misrecognition in Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"	Philosophical Studies 101 161-211		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kukla2000Myth, author = {Kukla, Rebecca}, title = {Myth, memory and misrecognition in Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {101}, pages = {161--211}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026493029153} }
Martin, R.	2000	Locke's psychology of personal identity	Journal of the History of Philosophy 38(1) 41-61		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin2000Lockes, author = {Martin, Raymond}, title = {Locke's psychology of personal identity}, year = {2000}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {38}, number = {1}, pages = {41--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2005.0097} }
Mascuch, M.	2000	How to connect with the past	Metascience 9 208-217			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mascuch2000How, author = {Mascuch, Michael}, title = {How to connect with the past}, year = {2000}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {9}, pages = {208--217} }
McInerney, P.K.	2000	Conceptions of persons and persons through time	American Philosophical Quarterly 37(2) 121-133			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McInerney2000Conceptions, author = {McInerney, Peter K.}, title = {Conceptions of persons and persons through time}, year = {2000}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, pages = {121--133} }
Meyering, T.C.	2000	How to connect with the past	Metascience 9 218-225			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Meyering2000How, author = {Meyering, Theo C.}, title = {How to connect with the past}, year = {2000}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {9}, pages = {218--225} }
Moya, C.J. and Grimaltos, T.	2000	Memory and justification: Hookway and Fumerton on scepticism	Philosophical Issues 10(1) 386-394		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Moya2000Memory, author = {Moya, Carlos J. and Grimaltos, Tobies}, title = {Memory and justification: Hookway and Fumerton on scepticism}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {386--394}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00033.x} }
Nagasawa, Y.	2000	'Very-slow-switching' and memory (a critical note on Ludlow's paper)	Acta Analytica 15(25) 173-174	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper critically examines Peter Ludlow's social externalism and argues that, congrary to what Ludlow believes, the truth-value of the memory content could change from being true to false (or vice versa) in a certain situation without violating his criteria of slow-switchng. A 'very-slow-switching' case is proposed to support this argument.
BibTeX: @article{Nagasawa2000Very, author = {Nagasawa, Yujin}, title = {'Very-slow-switching' and memory (a critical note on Ludlow's paper)}, year = {2000}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, volume = {15}, number = {25}, pages = {173--174} }
Northoff, G.	2000	Are "q-memories" empirically realistic?: A neurophilosophical approach	Philosophical Psychology 13(2) 191-211	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ''Quasi-memories,'' necessarily presupposing a distinction between an ''experiencing'' and a ''remembering'' person, are considered by Par?t and Shoemaker as necessary and/or suf?cient criteria for personal identity. However, the concept of ''q-memories'' is rejected by Schechtman since, according to her, neither ''content'' and ''experience'' can be separated from each other in ''q-mem- ories'' (''principal inseparability'') nor can they be distinguished from delusions/confabulations (''principal indistinguishability''). The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that, relying on a neurophilosophical approach, both arguments can be rejected. Neuropsychological research shows that ''contents'' ofmemories are classi?ed according to the accompanying psychological state such that the same ''content'' can be classi?ed either as auto- or heterobiographical by the respective ''experience.'' Since ''content'' and ''experience'' can be separated from each other, the argument of ''principal inseparability'' must be rejected on empirical grounds. In addition, as demonstrated in an example ofa schizophrenic patient, ''q-memories'' can be distinguished from delusions/confabulations considering the ability to distinguish between different sources of autobiographical memories as a differential criterion. In conclusion, both arguments by Schechtman against the concept of ''q-mem- ories'' have to be rejected on the basis ofneurophilosophical considerations. Consequently, the concept of ''q-memories'' can be considered as compatible with current empirical knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Northoff2000Are, author = {Northoff, G.}, title = {Are "q-memories" empirically realistic?: A neurophilosophical approach}, year = {2000}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {191--211}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080050075681} }
Norton, J.D.	2000	What can we learn about physical laws from the fact that we have memories only of the past?	International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14(1) 11-23	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Not much. I demonstrate this by constructing a model of a memory system governed by deterministic, time reversible laws only, thereby, showing that the mere fact of our having memories solely of the past does not necessitate an indeterministic, time asymmetric or stochastic physics, essentially thermodynamic processes or a primitive notion of time asymmetric causation.
BibTeX: @article{Norton2000What, author = {Norton, John D.}, title = {What can we learn about physical laws from the fact that we have memories only of the past?}, year = {2000}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {14}, number = {1}, pages = {11--23}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/026985900111873} }
Owens, D.	2000	Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Owens2000Reason, author = {Owens, David}, title = {Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Rossi, P.	2000	Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal Language	Continuum			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rossi2000Logic, author = {Rossi, Paolo}, title = {Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal Language}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Continuum} }
Scott, C.E.	2000	Mnemosyne and Lethe: Memory, Jung, phenomenology	Pathways into the Jungian World: Phenomenological and Analytical Psychology Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Scott2000Mnemosyne, author = {Scott, Charles E.}, title = {Mnemosyne and Lethe: Memory, Jung, phenomenology}, year = {2000}, booktitle = {Pathways into the Jungian World: Phenomenological and Analytical Psychology}, editor = {Brooke, Roger}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Scott, C.E.	2000	Responsibility with memory	Research in Phenomenology 30(1) 240-251		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Scott2000Responsibility, author = {Scott, Charles E.}, title = {Responsibility with memory}, year = {2000}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {240--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916400746542} }
Sokolowski, R.	2000	Introduction to Phenomenology	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sokolowski2000Introduction, author = {Sokolowski, Robert.}, title = {Introduction to Phenomenology}, year = {2000}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Sutton, J.	2000	Author's response	Metascience 9(2) 226-237			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sutton2000Authors, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Author's response}, year = {2000}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {226--237} }
Sutton, J.	2000	Body, mind, and order: Local memory and the control of mental representations in medieval and renaissance sciences of self	1543 And All That: Word and Image in the Proto-scientific revolution. Kluwer 117-150	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Historical cognitive science works between two projects. One is the analysis of other and older theories of mind, of how they relate to and differ from current approaches, and of wh at forgotten or neglected explananda they bring into focus. The other, relating to cognitive practices rather than theories, is the task of working out how such views about mind and self reflect or partly cause different historical forms of mental activity. The delicate equilibrium to be maintained is between allowing for the plasticity in human cognition which anthropological and historical data can suggest, and yet remaining not just aware of but embedded in the diversity of approaches in contemporary theories of mind, in order to make the history effective and utilisable in the growing interdisciplinary environment. In specific domains, such as visual perception, dreams, emotion, inductive reasoning, or (as he re) memory and learning, the shifting interdependencies of cognition and culture can be traced from two directions. Firstly, tensions can be addressed in many periods between social or moral norms and theoretical commitments concerning body, brain, and mind; then, more self-consciously present-centred inquiry can employ polemically, within cognitive science, the extra breadth, context-sensitivity, and attention to discontinuity which historical work requires. This paper, then, is a tentative step, at a very general level, towards the proposal of one set of analytical devices for historical cognitive science. The domain is an area of problems about memory and personal identity which cross levels between philosophy of mind, 'psychology', neurophysiology and medicine. The case, crudely, is that embroiled with these problems have often been aseries of related conceptual dichotomies or, better, continua between G. Freeland and A. Corones (eds.), 1543 and All ThaI. 117-150
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton2000Body, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Body, mind, and order: Local memory and the control of mental representations in medieval and renaissance sciences of self}, year = {2000}, booktitle = {1543 And All That: Word and Image in the Proto-scientific revolution.}, editor = {Freeland, G. and Corones, A.}, publisher = {Kluwer}, pages = {117--150}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9478-3_4} }
Tarrant, H.	2000	Recollection and prophesy in the De Divinatione	Phronesis 45(1) 64-76	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In the light of Gluckers claim to have found in De Divinatione 1.115 a separate, unnamed Pythagorean-Platonic influence on Cicero, I examine the passage again with special reference to early Platonic interpretation. I find that the Menos influence is wider than had been suspected, suggesting (i) the correspondence between the two types of natural divination, dreams and ecstatic prophecy, and (ii) the kin- ship of souls. Posidonius influence on the underlying interpretation of Platonic psychology is to be detected, insofar as he would have read Meno 81d as a statement about all souls (together) having all available knowledge. However, Cratippus, Ciceros other main source, can be held to have directly borrowed from Meno 81d2-3 for his crowning argument (De Div. 1.71), and it is likely that other material that uses 81d would also stem from Cratippus. A little is known elsewhere of early interpretation of the Meno. Comparison with other early Platonist material suggests strongly that we must look to Antiochus school for this view that dreams regularly contain substantial truth explicable in terms of the nature of soul. This would lead once again to Cratippus, and nothing prevents our detecting his hand behind 1.115. Indeed 1.70, which Glucker uses to argue that Cratippus dream-divining soul would literally have to leave the body, only makes good sense when understood metaphorically.
BibTeX: @article{Tarrant2000Recollection, author = {Tarrant, H.}, title = {Recollection and prophesy in the De Divinatione}, year = {2000}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, pages = {64--76}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852800510126} }
Westbury, C. and Dennett, D.C.	2000	Mining the past to construct the future: Memory and belief as forms of knowledge	Memory, Brain and Belief Harvard University Press 11-32			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Westbury2000Mining, author = {Westbury, Chris and Dennett, Daniel C.}, title = {Mining the past to construct the future: Memory and belief as forms of knowledge}, year = {2000}, booktitle = {Memory, Brain and Belief}, editor = {Schacter, Daniel and Scarry, Elaine}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, pages = {11--32} }
Wilson, C.	2000	How to connect with the past	Metascience 9 Cambridge University Press 203-208		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wilson2000How, author = {Wilson, Catherine}, title = {How to connect with the past}, year = {2000}, journal = {Metascience}, volume = {9}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {203--208}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02913605} }
Barash, J.A.	1999	The politics of memory: Reflections on practical wisdom and political identity	Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy Routledge 33-43	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I take as the starting-point for my reflection, in the pages that follow, the ethico-political thought of Paul Ricoeur, as elaborated both in and following the work Oneself as Another. I will focus on Ricoeur's notion of practical wisdom-la sagesse pratique-in its application to the theme of political identity. My analysis will concern primarily a difficulty to which the phenomenon of identity, in its political and therefore plural dimension, gives rise: that of comprehending the precise contours of this phenomenon as it extends beyond oneself and the other as individual persons to encompass identity in its 'collective' dimension. It is to the task of analyzing this politically charged notion of 'collective' identity that, in what follows, I will apply the concept of practical wisdom that Paul Ricoeur has placed at the center of his most recent philosophical investigations. Before examining the specific manner in which I will delimit this task, however, I will recall, by way of introduction, Ricoeur's interpretation of the phenomenon of 'collective' or plural identity in the work Oneself as Another.
BibTeX: @incollection{Barash1999politics, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {The politics of memory: Reflections on practical wisdom and political identity}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy}, editor = {Kearney, Richard and Dooley, Mark}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {33--43} }
Campbell, S.	1999	A singular and representative life: Personal memory and systematic harms	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29(sup1) 227-257		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Campbell1999singular, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {A singular and representative life: Personal memory and systematic harms}, year = {1999}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {29}, number = {sup1}, pages = {227--257}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10716838} }
Caygill, H.	1999	Meno and the internet: Between memory and the archive	History of the Human Sciences 12(2) 1-11	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article is an analysis of the Internet as a mnemonic system and an assessment of its debt to and impact upon the classical tropes of memory established by Plato in the dialogue Meno.
BibTeX: @article{Caygill1999Meno, author = {Caygill, Howard}, title = {Meno and the internet: Between memory and the archive}, year = {1999}, journal = {History of the Human Sciences}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {1--11}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519901200201} }
Craig, W.L.	1999	Tensed time and our differential experience of the past and future	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37(4) 515-537		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Craig1999Tensed, author = {Craig, William Lane}, title = {Tensed time and our differential experience of the past and future}, year = {1999}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {4}, pages = {515--537}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00880.x} }
Donougho, M.	1999	Hegel's art of memory	Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger Northwestern University Press 139-159			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Donougho1999Hegels, author = {Donougho, Martin}, title = {Hegel's art of memory}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger}, editor = {Comay, Rebecca and McCumber, John}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press}, pages = {139--159} }
Evers, K.	1999	Korsakoff syndrome: The amnesic self	International Journal of Applied Philosophy 13(2) 193-208	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The belief that memory is essential to the self is common. Extreme amnesia, e.g., Korsakoff Syndrome, is held to dissolve the af- flicted person's self. This belief is a misconception that rests on a confu- sion of epistemic with ontological relevance. Epistemically, memory is relevant to the self: a subject's self-knowledge partly depends on memo- ries of past experiences. However, it is not by virtue of these memories that the subject is a self: ontologically, memory is irrelevant to that status. The fact that an individuals conception of herself as existing through time is wanting does not prevent that individual from being a self at a given point in time. As the past is there whether or not it is remembered, so the self is there whether or not it remembers. If in- stead we define the self as awareness of being a subject of experi- ence, the self may survive even the most extreme forms of amnesia. Being a self is an important social value, a prerequisite of numerous legal or moral rights. This in itself is questionable, like the social exclu- sion it may entail. Denying an amnesic person a self is therefore more than'a logical mistake: it is a social exclusion that can also be questioned on ethical grounds.
BibTeX: @article{Evers1999Korsakoff, author = {Evers, Kathinka}, title = {Korsakoff syndrome: The amnesic self}, year = {1999}, journal = {International Journal of Applied Philosophy}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {193--208}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ijap199913217} }
Ganeri, J.	1999	Self-intimation, memory and personal identity	Journal of Indian Philosophy 27(5) 469-483		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ganeri1999Self, author = {Ganeri, Jonardon}, title = {Self-intimation, memory and personal identity}, year = {1999}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {27}, number = {5}, pages = {469--483}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004490802605} }
Gennaro, R.J.	1999	Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness	New Essays on the Rationalists Oxford University Press 353-371		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Gennaro1999Leibniz, author = {Gennaro, Rocco J.}, title = {Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {New Essays on the Rationalists}, editor = {Gennaro, Rocco J. and Huenemann, Charles}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {353--371}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/0195165411.003.0017} }
Gifford, M.	1999	Aristotle on Platonic recollection and the paradox of knowing universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30	Phronesis 44(1) 1-29	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The paper provides close commentary on an important but generally neglected passage in Prior Analytics B.21 where, in the course of solving a logical puzzle concerning our knowledge of universal statements, Aristotle offers his only explicit treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Recollection. I show how Aristotle defends his solution to the Paradox of Knowing Universals, as we might call it, and why he introduces Recollection into his discussion of the puzzle. The readng I develop undermines the traditional view of the passage and lends fresh in-sight into Aristotle’s conception of Plato’s particular version of innatism; more specifically, when understood as I recommend, the passage strongly suggests that, on Aristotle’s view, Plato’s theory of Recollection is specifically designed to explain our apprehension of universal truths. The reading I propose also enables us to see how the allegedly non-standard use of the technical term ‘επαγωγή’I n B.21 can be understood in a perfectly straightforward fashion to refer to an inductive inference from singular statements to the universal truth they exemplify. Owing to this last point in particular, the paper carries serious consequences for our understanding of the purported doublet in the problematic opening chapter to the Posterior Analytics where Aristotle offers his only explicit attempt to solve Meno’s Paradox
BibTeX: @article{Gifford1999Aristotle, author = {Gifford, Mark}, title = {Aristotle on Platonic recollection and the paradox of knowing universals: Prior Analytics B.21 67a8-30}, year = {1999}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {1--29}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852899762447610} }
Goldman, A.I.	1999	Internalism exposed	The Journal of Philosophy 96(6) 271-293		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Goldman1999Internalism, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Internalism exposed}, year = {1999}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {96}, number = {6}, pages = {271--293}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2564679} }
Hankala, A.	1999	Meta-metaphors for human memory	Dialogue and Universalism 9(11-12) 85-97			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hankala1999Meta, author = {Hankala, A.}, title = {Meta-metaphors for human memory}, year = {1999}, journal = {Dialogue and Universalism}, volume = {9}, number = {11-12}, pages = {85--97} }
Hoerl, C.	1999	Memory, amnesia and the past	Mind & Language 14(2) 227-251	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper defends the claim that, in order to have a concept of time, subjects must have memories of particular events they once witnessed. Some patients with severe amnesia arguably still have a concept of time. Two possible explanations of their grasp of this concept are discussed. They take as their respective starting points abilities preserved in the patients in question: (1) the ability to retain factual information over time despite being unable to recall the past event or situation that information stems from, and (2) the ability to remember at least some past events or situations themselves (typically because retrograde amnesia is not complete). It is argued that a satisfactory explanation of what it is for subjects to have a concept of time must make reference to their having episodic memories such as those mentioned under (2). It is also shown how the question as to whether subjects have such memor-ies, and thus whether they possess a concept of time, enters into our explanation of their actions. My aim in this paper is to study the connections between the way we think about time on the one hand and the fact that we possess memories on the other. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, vol. II pt xiii) puts some of the questions surrounding this connection as follows:
BibTeX: @article{Hoerl1999Memory, author = {Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Memory, amnesia and the past}, year = {1999}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {227--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00111} }
Huemer, M.	1999	The problem of memory knowledge	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80(4) 346-357	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When one recalls that P, how is one justified in believing that P? I refute the three most natural answers to this question: a memory belief is not justified by a belief in the reliability of memory; a memory experience does not provide a new, foundational justification for a belief; and memory does not merely preserve the same justification a belief had when first adopted. Instead, the justification of a memory belief is a product of both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories.
BibTeX: @article{Huemer1999problem, author = {Huemer, Michael}, title = {The problem of memory knowledge}, year = {1999}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {80}, number = {4}, pages = {346--357}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00088} }
Hvide, H.K.	1999	Bounds to memory loss	Theory and Decision 46(1) 1-21	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: If we express our knowledge in sentences, we will find that these sentences are linked in complex patterns governed by our observations and our inferences from these observations. These inferences are to a large extent driven by logical rules. We ask whether the structure logic imposes on our knowledge restricts what we forget and what we remember. The model is a two period S5 logic. In this logic, we propose a memory loss operator: the agent forgets a sentence pif and only if he knows pat time 1 and he does not know pat time 2. Equipped with the operator, we prove theorems on the relation between knowledge and memory loss. The main results point to classes of formulas that an agent cannot forget, and classes of formulas he must forget. A desirable feature is that most results hold in the S4 logic. The results illustrate bounds to memory loss, and thus to bounded rationality. We apply the model to single-agent conventions: conventions made between an agent and himself.
BibTeX: @article{Hvide1999Bounds, author = {Hvide, Hans K}, title = {Bounds to memory loss}, year = {1999}, journal = {Theory and Decision}, volume = {46}, number = {1}, pages = {1--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004942613175} }
Kaitaro, T.	1999	Ideas in the brain: The localization of memory traces in the eighteenth century	Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(2) 301-322		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kaitaro1999Ideas, author = {Kaitaro, Timo}, title = {Ideas in the brain: The localization of memory traces in the eighteenth century}, year = {1999}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {2}, pages = {301--322}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0966} }
Kearney, R.	1999	Narrative and the ethics of remembrance	Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy Routledge 18-32			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Kearney1999Narrative, author = {Kearney, Richard}, title = {Narrative and the ethics of remembrance}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy}, editor = {Kearney, Richard and Dooley, Mark}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {18--32} }
Krell, D.F.	1999	Stuff - thread - point - fire: Hölderlin on historical memory and tragic dissolution	Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger Northwestern University Press 174-196			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Krell1999Stuff, author = {Krell, David Farrell}, title = {Stuff - thread - point - fire: Hölderlin on historical memory and tragic dissolution}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger}, editor = {Comay, Rebecca and McCumber, John}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press}, pages = {174--196} }
Lackey, J.	1999	Testimonial knowledge and transmission	The Philosophical Quarterly 49(197) 471-490	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. Thisnsuggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory.nFor instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative sourcenof knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speakernto another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another.nThese considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesisnregarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The strongernthesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmissionnmust know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. Thenweaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that pnin order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony.nI argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory,ncan be a generative source of knowledge.
BibTeX: @article{Lackey1999Testimonial, author = {Lackey, Jennifer}, title = {Testimonial knowledge and transmission}, year = {1999}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {49}, number = {197}, pages = {471--490}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00154} }
Loptson, P.	1999	Memory, skepticism, and time in the first Enquiry	Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 48(1) 269-280			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Loptson1999Memory, author = {Loptson, P.}, title = {Memory, skepticism, and time in the first Enquiry}, year = {1999}, journal = {Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {48}, number = {1}, pages = {269--280} }
Ludlow, P.	1999	First person authority and memory	Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy Springer 159-170		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ludlow1999First, author = {Ludlow, Peter}, title = {First person authority and memory}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy}, editor = {de Caro, Mario}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {159--170}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9227-7_11} }
McCormack, T.	1999	Temporal concepts and episodic memory: A response to Hoerl	Mind & Language 14(2) 252-262	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Hoerl claims that episodic memory is necessary for a concept of the past, and that we should consider some severely amnesic patients as lacking such a concept. I question whether this description of such patients is plausible, and whether it helps us understand lack of insight in amnesia. I finish by arguing that Hoerl's analysis of what constitutes a concept of the past raises interesting developmental issues.
BibTeX: @article{McCormack1999Temporal, author = {McCormack, Teresa}, title = {Temporal concepts and episodic memory: A response to Hoerl}, year = {1999}, journal = {Mind & Language}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {252--262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00112} }
McCormack, T. and Hoerl, C.	1999	Memory and temporal perspective: The role of temporal frameworks in memory development	Developmental Review 19(1) 154-182	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An account of the development of temporal understanding is proposed which links such understanding with the development of episodic memory. We distinguish between different ways of representing time in terms of the kinds of temporal frameworks they involve. Distinctions are made between frameworks that are perspectival or nonperspectival and those that represent recurrent sequences or particular times. Even primitive temporal understanding integrates both perspectival and nonperspec-tival components. However, since early frameworks are event-based and localized, they are not yet sufficient for episodic memory in that they do not enable the child to think of events as having occurred at particular points in time. We describe the emergence of new kinds of frameworks in terms of the development of temporal decentering. Two levels of temporal decentering are distinguished, with the higher level involving an appreciation of how event representations depend on one's temporal perspective.
BibTeX: @article{McCormack1999Memory, author = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph}, title = {Memory and temporal perspective: The role of temporal frameworks in memory development}, year = {1999}, journal = {Developmental Review}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {154--182}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1006/drev.1998.0476} }
McNamara, P.	1999	Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory and the Self	Praeger			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{McNamara1999Mind, author = {McNamara, P}, title = {Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory and the Self}, year = {1999}, publisher = {Praeger} }
Mullarkey, J.	1999	Bergson and Philosophy	Edinburgh University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Mullarkey1999Bergson, author = {Mullarkey, John}, title = {Bergson and Philosophy}, year = {1999}, publisher = {Edinburgh University Press} }
Owens, D.	1999	The authority of memory	European Journal of Philosophy 7(3) 312-329	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Nothing is more common than for us to continue to believe without rehearsing the reasons which led us to believe in the first place. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise. Were we obliged constantly to re-trace our cognitive steps, to reas- sure ourselves that we are entitled to our convictions, how could we ever move forward? We have probably forgotten why we adopted many of our current beliefs and even if we could dredge the evidence for them up from memory, we couldn't do this for more than a tiny subset of our beliefs at any one time. Since enquiry involves a reliance on many different beliefs, progress is possible only if we can use established results in future deliberation without re-fighting the battles of the past.
BibTeX: @article{Owens1999authority, author = {Owens, David}, title = {The authority of memory}, year = {1999}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {7}, number = {3}, pages = {312--329}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00091} }
Park, S.M.	1999	Re-viewing the memory wars: Some feminist philosophical reflections	Fragment by Fragment: Feminist Perspectives on Memory and Child Sex Abuse Gynergy Books 283-308			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Park1999Re, author = {Park, Shelley M.}, title = {Re-viewing the memory wars: Some feminist philosophical reflections}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Fragment by Fragment: Feminist Perspectives on Memory and Child Sex Abuse}, editor = {Rivera, Margo}, publisher = {Gynergy Books}, pages = {283--308} }
Pollock, J.L. and Cruz, J.	1999	Contemporary Theories of Knowledge	Rowman & Littlefield			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Pollock1999Contemporary, author = {Pollock, John L and Cruz, Joseph}, title = {Contemporary Theories of Knowledge}, year = {1999}, publisher = {Rowman & Littlefield}, edition = {2} }
Pryor, J.	1999	Immunity to error through misidentification	Philosophical Topics 26(1) 271-304		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pryor1999Immunity, author = {Pryor, James}, title = {Immunity to error through misidentification}, year = {1999}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {271--304}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics1999261/246} }
Ricoeur, P.	1999	Memory and forgetting	Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy Routledge 5-11			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ricoeur1999Memory, author = {Ricoeur, Paul}, title = {Memory and forgetting}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy}, editor = {Kearney, Richard and Dooley, Mark}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {5--11} }
Rowlands, M.	1999	The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Rowlands1999Body, author = {Rowlands, Mark}, title = {The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes}, year = {1999}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Schmidt, D.J.	1999	Ruins and roses: Hegel and Heidegger on sacrifice, mourning, and memory	Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger Northwestern University Press 97-113		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Schmidt1999Ruins, author = {Schmidt, Dennis J.}, title = {Ruins and roses: Hegel and Heidegger on sacrifice, mourning, and memory}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger}, editor = {Comay, Rebecca and McCumber, John}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press}, pages = {97--113}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/heideggercircle1990244} }
Scott, C.E.	1999	Memory of time in the light of flesh	Continental Philosophy Review 32(4) 421-432	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I wish to show that living is composed of events that are defined by memories, that memories are inclusive of what we might call animality, that memories are definitive of the occurrence of time, and that experiences of light and of animality are inseparably associated. Our ability to communicate with animals, our projections onto them, and our own experiences of animality show memories of something that is intrinsic to our lives and to events of appearance as well as something that Heidegger leaves out of his thought. (edited)
BibTeX: @article{Scott1999Memory, author = {Scott, Charles E.}, title = {Memory of time in the light of flesh}, year = {1999}, journal = {Continental Philosophy Review}, volume = {32}, number = {4}, pages = {421--432}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010080417112} }
Scott, C.E.	1999	The Time of Memory	SUNY Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Scott1999Time, author = {Scott, Charles E.}, title = {The Time of Memory}, year = {1999}, publisher = {SUNY Press} }
Sutton, J.	1999	Distributed memory, coupling, and history	Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference University of Newcastle	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A case study in historical cognitive science, this paper addresses two claims made by radical proponents of new dynamical approaches. It queries their historical narrative, which sees embodied, situated cognition as correcting an individualist, atemporal framework originating in Descartes. In fact, new Descartes scholarship shows that 17th-century animal spirits neurophysiology realized a recognizably distributed model of memory; explicit representations are patterns of spirit flow, and memory traces are changes left by experience in connections between brain pores. This historical sketch supports the second dynamicist claim, that connectionists' stress on the cognitive importance of pattern-recreation needs supplementing by dynamicists' real-time focus and attention to the active roles of body and environment. Animal spirits theory exhibits just the 'continuous reciprocal causation' between brain, body, and environment which Andy Clark sees as dynamicism's central contribution, and allows for the embedding of brains in culture as well as the physical world.
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Sutton1999Distributed, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Distributed memory, coupling, and history}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Dynamical Cognitive Science: Proceedings of the Fourth Australasian Cognitive Science Conference}, editor = {Heath, R. and Hayes, B. and Heathcote, A. and Hooker, C.}, publisher = {University of Newcastle} }
Van Woudenberg, R.	1999	Thomas Reid on Memory	Journal of the History of Philosophy 37(1) 117-133		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Woudenberg1999Thomas, author = {Van Woudenberg, René}, title = {Thomas Reid on Memory}, year = {1999}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {117--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0913} }
Wright, K.	1999	Heidegger on Hegel's Antigone: The memory of gender and the forgetfulness of the ethical difference	Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger Northwestern University Press 160-173			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wright1999Heidegger, author = {Wright, Kathleen}, title = {Heidegger on Hegel's Antigone: The memory of gender and the forgetfulness of the ethical difference}, year = {1999}, booktitle = {Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger}, editor = {Comay, Rebecca and McCumber, John}, publisher = {Northwestern University Press}, pages = {160--173} }
Beck, S.	1998	Back to the self and the future	South African Journal of Philosophy 17(3) 211-225	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The thought-experiment presented by Bernard Williams in 'The self and the future' continues to draw the attention of writers in the debate about personal identity. While few of them agree on what implications it has for the debate, almost all agree that those implications are significant ones. Some have even claimed that it has consequences not only for personal identity, but also concerning the viability of thought-experiment as a method. This paper surveys what these consequences might be at both levels - as a substantive contribution to the debate on identity, and as to what it shows about the usefulness of thought-experiments. It argues ultimately that thought-experiments like Williams's do provide a useful philosophical tool as long as we temper our expectations of them, and that it offers some support to a view of personal identity but one which is at odds with Williams's own view.
BibTeX: @article{Beck1998Back, author = {Beck, Simon}, title = {Back to the self and the future}, year = {1998}, journal = {South African Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {211--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.1998.10878162} }
Bernecker, S.	1998	Self-knowledge and closure	Externalism and Self-Knowledge CSLI publications 333-349			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Bernecker1998Self, author = {Bernecker, Sven}, title = {Self-knowledge and closure}, year = {1998}, booktitle = {Externalism and Self-Knowledge}, editor = {Ludlow, P and Martin, N}, publisher = {CSLI publications}, pages = {333--349} }
Bloomfield, P.	1998	Dennett's misremenberings	Philosophia 26(1-2) 207-218		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bloomfield1998Dennetts, author = {Bloomfield, Paul}, title = {Dennett's misremenberings}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {26}, number = {1-2}, pages = {207--218}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02380068} }
Braude, S.E.	1998	Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(4) 299-304			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Braude1998Commentary, author = {Braude, Stephen E.}, title = {Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {299--304} }
Burge, T.	1998	Memory and self-knowledge	Externalism and Self-Knowledge CSLI Publication 351-371	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: ‘Memory and Self‐knowledge’ (1998) criticizes errors in two arguments by Paul Boghossian. One attempts to show that anti‐individualism and non‐empirical self‐knowledge are incompatible. The other attempts to show that anti‐individualism is incompatible with our ability to determine non‐empirically whether an inference is valid. The key error in the first argument is the unargued and question‐begging assumption that memory of one’s thoughts requires identificational discrimination. The second argument raises more complex issues. The essay points out that by relying on purely preservative memory, one can always avoid equivocation. When one does fall into the relevant sort of equivocation, however, one is non‐empirically entitled to a fallible presumption that the concepts are the same. Lack of introspective infallibility in determining validity in these special cases is compatible with apriori warrant to rely on one’s deductive competencies.
BibTeX: @incollection{Burge1998Memory, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Memory and self-knowledge}, year = {1998}, booktitle = {Externalism and Self-Knowledge}, editor = {Ludlow, Peter and Martin, Norah}, publisher = {CSLI Publication}, pages = {351--371}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672028.003.0004} }
Clark, A. and Chalmers, D.	1998	The extended mind	Analysis 58(1) 7-19		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Clark1998extended, author = {Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David}, title = {The extended mind}, year = {1998}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {58}, number = {1}, pages = {7--19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8284.00096} }
Conee, E.	1998	Epistemology of memory	Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Routledge	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory appears to preserve knowledge, but there are epistemic questions about how this could be. Memory is fallible, and empirical research has identified various ways in which people systematically misremember. Even wholesale error seems possible: Russell (1927) proposed that it is logically possible for the world to have sprung into existence five minutes ago, complete with spurious ostensible memories of earlier times. In light of such possibilities, some sceptics argue that memory cannot yield knowledge. Assuming that memory provides knowledge, there are serious epistemic issues about how it does this. For instance, does some introspectible quality of remembering provide distinctive evidence for what is remembered, or is it some other feature of memory that secures the epistemic justification needed for knowledge? How readily recollectible must a proposition be in order for it to be known while it is not being recalled? Does a full retention in memory of a previous basis for knowing something assure continuing knowledge of it? Does forgetting an original basis for knowing without replacing it imply a loss of knowledge?
BibTeX: @incollection{Conee1998Epistemology, author = {Conee, Earl}, title = {Epistemology of memory}, year = {1998}, booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-P032-1} }
Deutscher, M.	1998	Memory	Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Routledge	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Memory is central to every way in which we deal with things. One might subsume memory under the category of intellect, since it is our capacity to retain what we sense, enjoy and suffer, and thus to become knowing in our perception and other activities. As intelligent retention, memory cannot be distinguished from our acquisition of skills, habits and customs - our capabilities both for prudence and for deliberate risk. As retention, memory is a vital condition of the formation of language. Amnesia illustrates dramatically the difference between memory as retention of language and skills, and memory as the power to recollect and to recognize specific things. In amnesia we lose, not our general power of retention, but recall of facts - the prior events of our life, and our power to recognize people and places. Amnesiacs recognize kinds of things. They know it is a wristwatch they are wearing, while unable to recognize it as their own. This recall of events and facts which enables us to recognize things as our own, is more than just the ability to give correctly an account of them. One might accurately describe some part of one's past inadvertently, or after hypnosis, or by relying on incidental information. Thus, present research on memory both as retention and as recall of specific episodes, attempts to characterize the connection which persists between experience and recall. Neurological or computer models of connectivity owe something to traditional notions of a memory trace, but emphasize also the re-tracing of original memories by later experience and by intervening episodes of recall.
BibTeX: @incollection{Deutscher1998Memory, author = {Deutscher, Max}, title = {Memory}, year = {1998}, booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Craig, Edward}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Eacott, M.J.	1998	Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(4) 305-307			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Eacott1998Commentary, author = {Eacott, M J}, title = {Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {305--307} }
Hamilton, A.	1998	False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims: A philosophical perspective	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(4) 283-297	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: My central argument is that the theoretical presuppositions of psychology serve to obscure the debate over false memory. Psychologists have failed to recognize that the reliability of personal memory is a presupposition human knowledge; we have to adopt a non-neutral stance to personal memory-claims as testimony. Memory may not be " reproductive, " but it is not " reconstructive " either, in the sense defended for instance by Elizabeth Loftus in The Myth of Repressed Memories. Philosophical accounts of personal memory emphasize the distinction between personal and merely factual memory of one's own past, which tends to be neglected in psychology. This is a datum, not a result of theorizing. I elucidate the distinction, and contrast direct and indirect realist theories of memory, defending the former as emphasizing the spontaneous, authoritative nature of personal memory-claims. The " reconstructive " conception of " memory as narrative " assumed by psychologists such as Loftus disparages reliability and spontaneity. It claims that I integrate my personal memories with less direct sources of knowledge into a " narrative " that appears consistent to myself now. This view has not been much discussed in the philosophical literature. I argue that the " memory as narrative " conception is mistaken, and serves to confuse the debate over false memory. I also argue that the debate is unlikely to be undermined by Ian Hacking's argument that past human actions are to a certain extent indeterminate. My points of disagreement with Loftus concern: (1) Her mis-assimilation of false memory with ordinary memory-errors. Where memories are mistaken, they are almost invariably " false-in-detail " . " Completely-false " memories are necessarily rare. Loftus and other psychologists tend to gloss over this vital distinction. The results of therapeutic suggestion are not part of a general pattern of " reconstruction " of the past through personal memory, as the narrative conception suggests. (2) Her wholesale rejection of repression. However, she may be right in arguing that there is a distinct and questionable category of " robust repression. " (3) Her conviction that scientific theory can make us change our ordinary methods of assessing the reliability of testimony. There are strict limits to such change. I conclude by examining the tension between repression and the paradigm of a spontaneous memory-judgment.
BibTeX: @article{Hamilton1998False, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims: A philosophical perspective}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {283--297} }
Hamilton, A.	1998	Response to the commentaries	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(4) 311-316			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hamilton1998Response, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {Response to the commentaries}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {311--316} }
Heal, J.	1998	Externalism and memory	Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72(1) 95-109	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Tye claims that an externalist should say that memory content invoking natural kind concepts floats free of the setting where the memory is laid down and is at later times determined by the context in which the memory is revived. His argument assumes the existence of 'slow switching' of the meaning of natural kind terms when a person is transported from Earth to Twin Earth. But proper understanding of natural kind terms suggests that slow switching (contrary to what is often presupposed) is likely never to be completed. Hence the situation of a person unknowingly transported to Twin Earth is not that his memories switch content but rather that he gets two natural kinds confused.
BibTeX: @article{Heal1998Externalism, author = {Heal, Jane}, title = {Externalism and memory}, year = {1998}, journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, pages = {95--109}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00037} }
Jacob, P.	1998	Memory, learning and metacognition	Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences - Series III - Sciences de la Vie 321(2-3) 253-259		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Jacob1998Memory, author = {Jacob, Pierre}, title = {Memory, learning and metacognition}, year = {1998}, journal = {Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences - Series III - Sciences de la Vie}, volume = {321}, number = {2-3}, pages = {253--259}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/S0764-4469(97)89831-9} }
Kearney, R.	1998	Remembering the past: The question of narrative memory	Philosophy & Social Criticism 24(2-3) 49-60		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kearney1998Remembering, author = {Kearney, Richard}, title = {Remembering the past: The question of narrative memory}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism}, volume = {24}, number = {2-3}, pages = {49--60}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/019145379802400205} }
Lowe, E.J.	1998	Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 5(4) 309-310			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lowe1998Commentary, author = {Lowe, E. J.}, title = {Commentary on "False memory syndrome and the authority of personal memory-claims"}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {309--310} }
Lyle, R.R.	1998	Toward a hermeneutics of memory and multiple personality	Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5(2) 39-43	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Barnhardt, in "Dissociation: An Evolutionary Interpretation," makes a case for understanding mUltiple personality as a "natural" phenomenon resulting from human biological evolution. He also argues that the reason that "multiple personalities" are not encountered more frequently is a result of a social construction encouraging" single" personalities. He concludes that it isfrom the interaction between the two that ethics derive. In this response I offer an alternative hermeneutic, using memory as the interpretive key, and by introducing Ricoeur's work on narrative. highlight how Barnhardt's argument limits us to a "scientific" understanding of Multiple Personality and thus limits our ability to understand and enact a viable "ethic" of care. .
BibTeX: @article{Lyle1998hermeneutics, author = {Lyle, Randall R}, title = {Toward a hermeneutics of memory and multiple personality}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophy in the Contemporary World}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {39--43}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/pcw199852/310} }
Martin, T.	1998	Self-deception and intentional forgetting: A reply to Whisner	Philosophia 26(1-2) 181-194		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin1998Self, author = {Martin, Thomas}, title = {Self-deception and intentional forgetting: A reply to Whisner}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {26}, number = {1-2}, pages = {181--194}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02380066} }
Matthews, S.	1998	Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood	Philosophical Psychology 11(1) 67-88	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: M. Schechtman (1990) argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by D. Parfit's (1971, 1984) account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this, the present author argues firstly that circularity may be escaped using quasi-psychological states even with the addition of the coherence condition. Secondly, it is argued that there is something right about the coherence condition, and a major task of this paper is to identify its proper theoretical role. The author does this by reflection on integration therapies for people with multiple personality disorder. The familiar distinction between the moral and the metaphysical concept of the person is developed alongside such reflection. Connecting these 2 issues is the argument that coherence acts as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity, but that the normative dimension of personhood is not essential to our notion of a person tout court. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
BibTeX: @article{Matthews1998Personal, author = {Matthews, Steve}, title = {Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood}, year = {1998}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {1}, pages = {67--88}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089808573249} }
Shulman, D.	1998	The prospects of memory	Journal of Indian Philosophy 26 309-334		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shulman1998prospects, author = {Shulman, D.}, title = {The prospects of memory}, year = {1998}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {26}, pages = {309--334}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004338308796} }
Stevenson, G.P.	1998	Humean self-consciousness explained	Hume Studies 24(1) 95-129		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Stevenson1998Humean, author = {Stevenson, Gordon Park}, title = {Humean self-consciousness explained}, year = {1998}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {95--129}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0153} }
Sutton, J.	1998	Controlling the passions: Passion, memory, and the moral physiology of self in seventeenth-century neurophilosophy	The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century Routledge 115-146			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sutton1998Controlling, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Controlling the passions: Passion, memory, and the moral physiology of self in seventeenth-century neurophilosophy}, year = {1998}, booktitle = {The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century}, editor = {Gaukroger, Stephen}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {115--146} }
Sutton, J.	1998	Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sutton1998Philosophy, author = {Sutton, John}, title = {Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism}, year = {1998}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Tye, M.	1998	Externalism and memory	Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72(1) 77-94	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories.
BibTeX: @article{Tye1998Externalism, author = {Tye, Michael}, title = {Externalism and memory}, year = {1998}, journal = {Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, pages = {77--94}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8349.00036} }
Wolff, L.	1998	When I imagine a child: The idea of childhood and the philosophy of memory in the enlightenment	Eighteenth-Century Studies 31(4) 377-401		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wolff1998When, author = {Wolff, Larry}, title = {When I imagine a child: The idea of childhood and the philosophy of memory in the enlightenment}, year = {1998}, journal = {Eighteenth-Century Studies}, volume = {31}, number = {4}, pages = {377--401}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ecs.1998.0043} }
Barash, J.A.	1997	The sources of memory	Journal of the History of Ideas 58(4) 707-717		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barash1997sources, author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew}, title = {The sources of memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {58}, number = {4}, pages = {707--717}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3653967} }
Brueckner, A.	1997	Externalism and memory	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78(1) 1-12	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Paul Boghossian has put forward an influential argument against Tyler Burge's account of basic self-knowledge. The argument focuses on the relation between externalism about mental content and memory. In this paper, I attempt to analyze and answer Boghossian's argument.
BibTeX: @article{Brueckner1997Externalism, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {Externalism and memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {78}, number = {1}, pages = {1--12} }
Burge, T.	1997	Interlocution, perception, and memory	Philosophical Studies 86(1) 21-47		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burge1997Interlocution, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Interlocution, perception, and memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {21--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004261628340} }
Campbell, J.	1997	The realism of memory	Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett Oxford University Press 157-181			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Campbell1997realism, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {The realism of memory}, year = {1997}, booktitle = {Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett}, editor = {Heck, Richard and Dummett, M.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {157--181} }
Campbell, J.	1997	The structure of time in autobiographical memory	European Journal of Philosophy 5(2) 105-118		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Campbell1997structure, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {The structure of time in autobiographical memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {European Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {105--118}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00031} }
Campbell, S.	1997	Women, "false" memory, and personal identity	Hypatia 12(2) 51-82	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: We contest each other's memory claims all the time. I am concerned with how the contesting of memory claims and narratives may be an integral part of many abusive situations. 1 use the writings of Otto Weininger and the False Memory Syndrome Foundation to explore a particular strategy of discrediting women as rememberers, making them more vulnerable to sexual harm. This strategy relies on the presentation of women as unable to maintain a stable enough sense of self or identity to be trustworthy testifiers to their own harm.
BibTeX: @article{Campbell1997Women, author = {Campbell, Sue}, title = {Women, "false" memory, and personal identity}, year = {1997}, journal = {Hypatia}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {51--82}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1997.tb00019.x} }
Casey, E.S.	1997	Memory	Encyclopedia of Phenomenology Springer 452-457	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Whether one focuses on allopathic medicine or the altematives mentioned or refiects on the traditional diversity of medical history, the two core clues for a phenomenology of medicine are the afflicted and vulnerable person who seeks help and those who profess the ability to help. Whichever tradition or approach is followed, the relationship between healer and person needing help is critica!: the clinica! event is the common thematic thread. On that basis, an array of other issues inherent to the relationship must be probed. Because medicine in any form falls within the moral order, a range of ethical questions must also be addressed: values governing "helping"; diversity of moral values (patient, family, professional, institutional, cultural) and how inevitable confiicts may be resolved; whether or not different moral traditions can comprehend the range of ethical, social, and politica! issues raised by the "new genetics"; whether or not "health" and "illness" are moral values; and still others. Medicine is a rich mine for detailed phenomenologi-cal work: the place of "free phantasy variation" in diagnostic and linguistic interpretations; the forms of EVIDENCE and TRUTH in medical work; the precise ways in which "doctoring" involves special forms ofEPOCHE AND REDUCTJON; and the phenomena of embodiment, self, person, intersubjectivity, and the forms of social-ity-and how these are constituted within the clinica! event.
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1997Memory, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Memory}, year = {1997}, booktitle = {Encyclopedia of Phenomenology}, editor = {Embree, Lester and Behnke, Elizabeth A. and Carr, David and Evans, J. Claude and Huertas-Jourda, José and Kockelmans, Joseph J. and McKenna, William R. and Mickunas, Algis and Mohanty, Jitendra Nath and Seebohm, Thomas M. and Zaner, Richard M.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {452--457} }
Christensen, D. and Kornblith, H.	1997	Testimony, memory, and the limits of the a priori	Philosophical Studies 86(1) 1-20		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Christensen1997Testimony, author = {Christensen, David and Kornblith, Hilary}, title = {Testimony, memory, and the limits of the a priori}, year = {1997}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {86}, number = {1}, pages = {1--20}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004268430546} }
Cockburn, D.	1997	Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Cockburn1997Other, author = {Cockburn, David}, title = {Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future}, year = {1997}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Collins, A.W.	1997	Personal identity and the coherence of Q-memory	The Philosophical Quarterly 47(186) 73-80	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Brian Garrett constructs cases satisfying Andy Hamilton's definition of weak q‐memory. This does not establish that a peculiar kind of memory is at least conceptually coherent. Any 'apparent memory experiences' that satisfy the definition turn out not to involve remembering anything at all. This conclusion follows if we accept, as both Hamilton and Garrett do, a variety of first‐person authority according to which memory judgements may be false, but not on the ground that someone other than the remembering subject had the remembered experience. Garrett's brain‐bisection illustration sounds convincing, but only because we retain the idea that the subjects created by implanting a hemisphere each in two different bodies are entitled to say that they remember experiences before the surgery in the ordinary sense. To that extent the illustration presents a case of ordinary memory, not q‐memory.
BibTeX: @article{Collins1997Personal, author = {Collins, Arthur W.}, title = {Personal identity and the coherence of Q-memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {47}, number = {186}, pages = {73--80}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00047} }
Gärdenfors, P.	1997	The role of memory in planning and pretense	Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20(1) 24-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Corresponding to Glenberg's distinction between the automatic and effortful modes of memory, I propose a distinction between cued and detached mental representations. A cued representation stands for some- thing that is present in the external situation of the representing organism, while a detached representation stands for objects or events that are not present in the current situation. This distinction is important for understanding the role of memory in different cognitive functions like planning and pretense.
BibTeX: @article{Gaerdenfors1997role, author = {Gärdenfors, Peter}, title = {The role of memory in planning and pretense}, year = {1997}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, pages = {24--25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X97280015} }
Goldberg, S.C.	1997	Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument	Analysis 57(3) 211-219		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Goldberg1997Self, author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.}, title = {Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument}, year = {1997}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {57}, number = {3}, pages = {211--219}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/57.3.211} }
Joyce, R.	1997	Cartesian memory	Journal of the History of Philosophy 35(3) 375-393		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Joyce1997Cartesian, author = {Joyce, Richard}, title = {Cartesian memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {35}, number = {3}, pages = {375--393}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0046} }
Mariano, L.B.	1997	Another intrusion of privacy	科学哲学 30 123-138		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mariano1997Another, author = {Mariano, L. B.}, title = {Another intrusion of privacy}, year = {1997}, journal = {科学哲学}, volume = {30}, pages = {123--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.30.123} }
Olberding, A.	1997	Mourning, memory, and identity	International Philosophical Quarterly 37(1) 29-44		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Olberding1997Mourning, author = {Olberding, Amy}, title = {Mourning, memory, and identity}, year = {1997}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {29--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq199737161} }
Park, S.M.	1997	False memory syndrome: A feminist philosophical approach	Hypatia 12(2) 1-50	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this essay, I attempt to outline afeminist philosophical qproach to the current debate concerning (allegedly) fake memories of childhood sexual abuse. Bringing the voices of feminist philosophers to bear on this issue highlights the implicit and sometimes questionable epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical-political commitments of some therapists and scientists involved in these debates. It also illuminates some current debates in and about feminist philosophy. Recently a spate of media attention has focused on the veracity (or lack thereof) of adults' recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse. This media attention has been fueled (although not solely) by precedent-setting legal cases, both criminal and civil, wherein eyewitness testimony of incest, rape, and murder that took place decades ago has been the crucial prosecutorial or plaintiff evidence.' This has sparked a public debate between those therapists, psychologists, and psychiatrists who testify for the victim and those who testify for the accused. Victim advocates sometimes suggest that all memories of abuse are trustworthy, and that attempts to cast doubt on these memories further victimize the already violated. Defenders of the accused sometimes suggest that false memories are common, and that this casts reasonable doubt on all accusations of abuse stemming from recovered memories. Given the highly public nature of this debate, the lay public itself has begun to divide into believers and skeptics concerning survivor reports of childhood abuse. In a recent article aimed at promoting "rational discourse" between victims' advocates and advocates for the accused, the polarization of this debate is explained as follows: The question of belief and abuse allegations evokes such intense debate partly because how the issue is resolved has such great implications for individuals and social policy.
BibTeX: @article{Park1997False, author = {Park, Shelley M.}, title = {False memory syndrome: A feminist philosophical approach}, year = {1997}, journal = {Hypatia}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {1--50}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1997.tb00018.x} }
Persson, I.	1997	The involvement of our identity in experiential memory	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27(4) 447-465		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Persson1997involvement, author = {Persson, Ingmar}, title = {The involvement of our identity in experiential memory}, year = {1997}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, pages = {447--465}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717481} }
Phaf, R.H. and Wolters, G.	1997	A constructivist and connectionist view on conscious and nonconscious processes	Philosophical Psychology 10(3) 287-307	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Recent experimental findings reveal dissociations of conscious and nonconscious perform- ance in many fields of psychological research, suggesting that conscious and nonconscious effects result from qualitatively different processes. A connectionist view of these processes is put forward in which consciousness is the consequence of construction processes taking place in three types of working memory in a specific type of recurrent neural network. The recurrences arise by feeding back output to the input of a central (representational) network. They are assumed to be intemalizations of motor-sensory feedback through the environment. In this manner, a subvocal-phonological, a visuo-spatial, and a somatosensory working memory may have developed. Representations in the central network, which constitutes long-term memory, can be kept active by rehearsal in the feedback loops. The sequentially recurrent architecture allows for recursive symbolic operations and the formation of (auditory, visual, or somatic) models of the external world which can be maintained, transformed and temporarily combined with other information in working memory. Moreover, the quasi-input from the loop directs subsequent attentional processing. The view may contribute to a formal framework to accommodate findings from disparate fields such as working memory, sequential reasoning, and conscious and nonconscious processes in memory and emotion. In theory, but probably not very soon in practice, such connectionist models might simulate aspects of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Phaf1997constructivist, author = {Phaf, R. Hans and Wolters, Gezinus}, title = {A constructivist and connectionist view on conscious and nonconscious processes}, year = {1997}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {10}, number = {3}, pages = {287--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089708573221} }
Picart, C.J.("K.S.	1997	Memory, pictoriality, and mystery: (Re)viewing Husserl via Magrette and Escher	Philosophy Today 41(9999) 118-126		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Picart1997Memory, author = {Picart, Caroline Joan ("Kay") S.}, title = {Memory, pictoriality, and mystery: (Re)viewing Husserl via Magrette and Escher}, year = {1997}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {41}, number = {9999}, pages = {118--126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199741Supplement69} }
Rupp-Eisenreich, B.	1997	Culture and memory: Reminiscences and symmetries	Diogenes 45(180) 135-154		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{RuppEisenreich1997Culture, author = {Rupp-Eisenreich, Britta}, title = {Culture and memory: Reminiscences and symmetries}, year = {1997}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {45}, number = {180}, pages = {135--154}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/039219219704518008} }
Black, D.L.	1996	Memory, individuals, and the past in Averroes's psychology	Medieval Philosophy & Theology 5(2) 161-187		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Black1996Memory, author = {Black, Deborah L.}, title = {Memory, individuals, and the past in Averroes's psychology}, year = {1996}, journal = {Medieval Philosophy & Theology}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {161--187}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/medievalpt1996527} }
Cherry, C.	1996	What matters about memory	Philosophy 71(278) 541-552		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cherry1996What, author = {Cherry, Christopher}, title = {What matters about memory}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {71}, number = {278}, pages = {541--552}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100053468} }
Code, L.	1996	Commentary on "Loopholes, gaps, and what is held fast"	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 4(3) 255-260		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Code1996Commentary, author = {Code, Lorraine}, title = {Commentary on "Loopholes, gaps, and what is held fast"}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, pages = {255--260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.1996.0039} }
Garrett, B.	1996	Hamilton's new look: A reply	The Philosophical Quarterly 46(183) 220-225		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Garrett1996Hamiltons, author = {Garrett, Brian}, title = {Hamilton's new look: A reply}, year = {1996}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {46}, number = {183}, pages = {220--225}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2956389} }
Hacking, I.	1996	Memory sciences, memory politics	Tense Past Routledge 67-88			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Hacking1996Memory, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {Memory sciences, memory politics}, year = {1996}, booktitle = {Tense Past}, editor = {Antze, P and Lambek, M}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {67--88} }
Houlgate, S.	1996	Hegel, Derrida, and restricted economy: The case of mechanical memory	Journal of the History of Philosophy 34(1) 79-93		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Houlgate1996Hegel, author = {Houlgate, Stephen}, title = {Hegel, Derrida, and restricted economy: The case of mechanical memory}, year = {1996}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {34}, number = {1}, pages = {79--93}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1996.0012} }
Lyon, G.	1996	The experience of perceptual familiarity	Philosophy 71(275) 83-100		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lyon1996experience, author = {Lyon, Gordon}, title = {The experience of perceptual familiarity}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {71}, number = {275}, pages = {83--100}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100053274} }
Motzkin, G.	1996	The invention of history and the reinvention of memory	Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 45 25-39			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Motzkin1996invention, author = {Motzkin, Gabriel}, title = {The invention of history and the reinvention of memory}, year = {1996}, journal = {Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {45}, pages = {25--39} }
Mullarkey, J.	1996	Bergson: The philosophy of durée-différence	Philosophy Today 40(3) 367-380		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mullarkey1996Bergson, author = {Mullarkey, John}, title = {Bergson: The philosophy of durée-différence}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, pages = {367--380}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199640313} }
Olkowski, D.	1996	Beside us, in memory	Man and World 29(3) 283-292		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Olkowski1996us, author = {Olkowski, Dorothea}, title = {Beside us, in memory}, year = {1996}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, pages = {283--292}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248438} }
Owens, D.	1996	A Lockean theory of memory experience	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(2) 319-332		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Owens1996Lockean, author = {Owens, David}, title = {A Lockean theory of memory experience}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {56}, number = {2}, pages = {319--332}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2108522} }
Potter, N.	1996	Loopholes, gaps, and what is held fast	Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3(4) 237-252	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper raises questions about who counts as a knower with regard to his or her own memories, what gets counted as a genuine memory, and who will a?irm those memories within an epistemic community. I argue for a democratic epistemology informed by an understanding of relations of power. I investigate implications of the claim that knowledge is both social and political and suggest ways it is related to trust. Given the tendency of epistemology to draw lines that discriminate unfairly against some, it is vital that e?orts to create democratic epistemologies be sensitive to the potential for exploitation. Standards of credibility o?en favor members of dominant groups, and our ontological commitments may intersect with patterns of domination. While acknowledging di?iculties in evaluating what counts as credible claims to memories, I argue that one's engagement with clients must be mapped onto the larger moral and political domain.
BibTeX: @article{Potter1996Loopholes, author = {Potter, Nancy}, title = {Loopholes, gaps, and what is held fast}, year = {1996}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology}, volume = {3}, number = {4}, pages = {237--252}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.1996.0047} }
Reiss, T.J.	1996	Denying the body? Memory and the dilemmas of history in Descartes	Journal of the History of Ideas 57(4) 587-607		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reiss1996Denying, author = {Reiss, Timothy J.}, title = {Denying the body? Memory and the dilemmas of history in Descartes}, year = {1996}, journal = {Journal of the History of Ideas}, volume = {57}, number = {4}, pages = {587--607}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3654083} }
Ricoeur, P.	1996	Memory, forgetfulness, and history	Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 45(1) 237-248			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ricoeur1996Memory, author = {Ricoeur, Paul}, title = {Memory, forgetfulness, and history}, year = {1996}, journal = {Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, pages = {237--248} }
Rychlak, J.F.	1996	Memory: A logical learning theory account	Journal of Mind and Behavior 17(3) 229-250	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An interpretation of memory from the perspective of logical learning theory (LLT) is presented. In contrast to traditional associationistic theories of learning and memory, which rest on mediation modeling, LLT rests on a predication model. Predication draws on formal and final causation whereas mediation is limited to material and efficient causation. It is held in LLT that memory begins in predicate organization, where framing meanings are logically extended to targets. Passage of time is irrelevant in this meaning extension. The effectiveness of memory depends on the cohesiveness or "tightness" of meaningful organization as framed by a relevant context. Well-organized contexts facilitate memory and poorly organized contexts are detrimental to memory. Possible reasons for good or poor organization in memory are discussed, and relevant research findings cited. The paper closes with a separate definition of memory as a content and as a process.
BibTeX: @article{Rychlak1996Memory, author = {Rychlak, Joseph F.}, title = {Memory: A logical learning theory account}, year = {1996}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {229--250} }
Sharma, A.	1996	The issue of memory as a pramana and its implication for the confirmation of reincarnation in Hinduism	Journal of Indian Philosophy 24(1) 21-36		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sharma1996issue, author = {Sharma, Arvind}, title = {The issue of memory as a pramana and its implication for the confirmation of reincarnation in Hinduism}, year = {1996}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {21--36}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00219274} }
Audi, R.	1995	Memorial justification	Philosophical Topics 23(1) 31-45		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Audi1995Memorial, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Memorial justification}, year = {1995}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {31--45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics199523123} }
Brewer, W.F.	1995	What is recollective memory?	Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory Cambridge University Press 19-66		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Brewer1995What, author = {Brewer, William F.}, title = {What is recollective memory?}, year = {1995}, booktitle = {Remembering Our Past: Studies in Autobiographical Memory}, editor = {Rubin, David C.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {19--66}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511527913.002} }
Dennett, D.C.	1995	Is perception the "leading edge" of memory?	Iride: Luoghi della memoria e dell'oblio 8(14) 59-78			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dennett1995Is, author = {Dennett, Daniel C.}, title = {Is perception the "leading edge" of memory?}, year = {1995}, journal = {Iride: Luoghi della memoria e dell'oblio}, volume = {8}, number = {14}, pages = {59--78} }
Falk, A.	1995	A connectionist solution to problems posed by Plato and Aristotle	Behaviour and Philosophy 23(3) 1-12	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Intentionality occurs in connectionist nets among those traits of the nets that scientists call flaws. This label has obscured for philosophers the fact that the naturalistic basis of intentionality has been discovered. I show this while staying on our profession's common ground of discourse about ancient philosophy. In the Theaetetus, Plato invokes a homunculus to explain perceptual misrecognition, and in On Memory and Recollection, Aristotle invokes a mental operation of disregarding in order to overcome the extraneous determinateness of mental images. I develop a connectionist alternative to images that does not invoke a homunculus or spurious mental operations. I describe in detail an ultra-simple Hopfield net that provides an inus (indispensable part of a sufficient) condition for misrecognition. In addition, it exhibits properties that make it an inus condition for two marks of the intentionality of singular terms, namely, failures of existential generalization and of intersubstitutability of names. I also define the sense of a singular term.
BibTeX: @article{Falk1995connectionist, author = {Falk, Arthur}, title = {A connectionist solution to problems posed by Plato and Aristotle}, year = {1995}, journal = {Behaviour and Philosophy}, volume = {23}, number = {3}, pages = {1--12} }
Frongia, G.	1995	Wittgenstein and memory	Wittgenstein: Mind & Language Kluwer 263-277		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Frongia1995Wittgenstein, author = {Frongia, Guido}, title = {Wittgenstein and memory}, year = {1995}, booktitle = {Wittgenstein: Mind & Language}, editor = {Eigidi, R.}, publisher = {Kluwer}, pages = {263--277}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3691-6_20} }
Hacking, I.	1995	Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hacking1995Rewriting, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory}, year = {1995}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Hamilton, A.	1995	A new look at personal identity	The Philosophical Quarterly 45(180) 332-349		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hamilton1995new, author = {Hamilton, Andy}, title = {A new look at personal identity}, year = {1995}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {45}, number = {180}, pages = {332--349}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2219654} }
ter Hark, M.	1995	Electric brain fields and memory traces: Wittgenstein and gestalt psychology	Philosophical Investigations 18(2) 113-138	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The goal of this article is to show that the purport of Wittgenstein's much discussed remarks about mind and brain in "Zettel", par 608 ff. is not radical anti-physicalistic. Evidence is provided that the intended target of Wittgenstein's remarks is Kohler's metaphysical thesis of psychophysical isomorphism and his theory of electrical brainfields. It is argued that Wittgenstein is especially critical of Kohler's idea that memory traces isomorphically related to what they are traces of "must" be postulated in order to bridge the gap between a causally inefficacious part event and present recall. It is argued that Wittgenstein's Jottings analogy has to be seen in this light. The point of this analogy is that just as the connection between the jottings and the text is not made before the text is actually cited, but is made by us in the act of reciting the text, the fact that I am able to, e.g., resume the thread is evidence that a memory trace was a memory trace, rather than the trace being a standard for correct recall already present ahead of time. The article concludes with a critical discussion of earlier interpretations of these remarks by M Budd, C McGinn and R Donough. The upshot of this discussion is that Wittgenstein not a radical anti- physicalist as these authors have pictured him.
BibTeX: @article{Hark1995Electric, author = {ter Hark, Michel}, title = {Electric brain fields and memory traces: Wittgenstein and gestalt psychology}, year = {1995}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, pages = {113--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1995.tb00317.x} }
King, P.J.	1995	Other times	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(4) 532-547		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{King1995Other, author = {King, Peter J.}, title = {Other times}, year = {1995}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {73}, number = {4}, pages = {532--547}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409512346881} }
Koutstaal, W.	1995	Situating ethics and memory	American Philosophical Quarterly 32(3) 253-262			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Koutstaal1995Situating, author = {Koutstaal, Wilma}, title = {Situating ethics and memory}, year = {1995}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, pages = {253--262} }
Larrabee, M.J.	1995	The time of trauma: Husserl's phenomenology and post-traumatic stress disorder	Human Studies 18(4) 351-366	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The phenomenology of inner temporalizing developed by Edmund Husserl provides a helpful framework for understanding a type of experiencing that can be part of the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). My paper extrapolates hints from Husserl's work in order to describe those memories-flashbacks-that come so strongly to consciousness as to overtake the experiencer. Husserl's work offers several clues: his view of inner temporalization by which conscious experiences flow in both a serial and a nonserial manner; a characterization of process memory as distinct from representational memory; and the notion of telos, which takes human subjectivity as intrinsically changeable, for example, by means of a retroactive cancellation that would allow the PTSD experiencer to reprocess the original meaning of the traumatic experience into a meaning that fits the current situation and thus allows a recovery.
BibTeX: @article{Larrabee1995time, author = {Larrabee, Mary Jeanne}, title = {The time of trauma: Husserl's phenomenology and post-traumatic stress disorder}, year = {1995}, journal = {Human Studies}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, pages = {351--366}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01318616} }
Ludlow, P.	1995	Social externalism and memory: A problem?	Acta Analytica 14(S.) 69-76	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: One of the leading issues in the philosophy of mind has been the question of whether the content of our mental states depends solely on facts about us in isolation (i.e. on what takes place in our heads), or whether the contents of our mental states depend at least in part on relations between ourselves and the environment. In this note some of the consequences of externalism are pursued. One of the most interesting threads in the pursuit had been the question of what consequences externalism may have for the doctrine that we have a priori knowledge of our mental states. In a recent paper, I argued that certain problems about social externalism and self-knowledge might be avoided in one adopted an externalist view about the nature of memory. Since then, Frank Hofman has observed that the view of memory I suggested itself gives rise to a number of unwelcome consequences. In this note, I comment on these alleged consequences and offer one possible solution
BibTeX: @article{Ludlow1995Social, author = {Ludlow, Peter}, title = {Social externalism and memory: A problem?}, year = {1995}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, volume = {14}, number = {S.}, pages = {69--76} }
Ludlow, P.	1995	Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory	Analysis 55(3) 157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ludlow1995Socialb, author = {Ludlow, Peter}, title = {Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory}, year = {1995}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {55}, number = {3}, pages = {157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3328573} }
Raffman, D.	1995	On the persistence of phenomenology	Conscious Experience Ferdinand Schoningh 293-308			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Raffman1995Persistence, author = {Raffman, Diana}, title = {On the persistence of phenomenology}, year = {1995}, booktitle = {Conscious Experience}, editor = {Metzinger, Thomas}, publisher = {Ferdinand Schoningh}, pages = {293--308} }
Senor, T.D.	1995	Harman, negative coherentism, and the problem of ongoing justification	Philosophia 24(3-4) 271-294		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Senor1995Harman, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Harman, negative coherentism, and the problem of ongoing justification}, year = {1995}, journal = {Philosophia}, volume = {24}, number = {3-4}, pages = {271--294}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02379959} }
Audi, R.	1994	Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe	Noûs 28(4) 419-434		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Audi1994Dispositional, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe}, year = {1994}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {28}, number = {4}, pages = {419--434}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2215473} }
Bennett, H.L.	1994	Trees and heads: The objective and the subjective in painful procedures	The Journal of Clinical Ethics 5(2) 149-151			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bennett1994Trees, author = {Bennett, H. L.}, title = {Trees and heads: The objective and the subjective in painful procedures}, year = {1994}, journal = {The Journal of Clinical Ethics}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {149--151} }
Breyfogle, T.	1994	Memory and imagination in Augustine's Confessions	New Blackfriars 75(881) 210-223		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Breyfogle1994Memory, author = {Breyfogle, Todd}, title = {Memory and imagination in Augustine's Confessions}, year = {1994}, journal = {New Blackfriars}, volume = {75}, number = {881}, pages = {210--223}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1994.tb01487.x} }
Campbell, J.	1994	Past, Space, and Self	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Campbell1994Past, author = {Campbell, John}, title = {Past, Space, and Self}, year = {1994}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Dummett, M.	1994	Testimony and memory	Knowing from Words Springer 251-272		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Dummett1994Testimony, author = {Dummett, Michael}, title = {Testimony and memory}, year = {1994}, booktitle = {Knowing from Words}, editor = {Matilal, B. and Chakrabarti, A.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {251--272}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2018-2_12} }
Dupré, L.	1994	Hegel reflects on remembering	Owl of Minerva 25(2) 141-146		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dupre1994Hegel, author = {Dupré, Louis}, title = {Hegel reflects on remembering}, year = {1994}, journal = {Owl of Minerva}, volume = {25}, number = {2}, pages = {141--146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/owl199425222} }
Falk, B.	1994	Doing what one meant to do	Synthese 98(3) 379-399	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: When I engage in some routine activity, it will usually be the case that I mean or intend the present move to be followed by others. What does 'meaning' the later moves consist in? How do I know, when I come to perform them, that they were what I meant? Problems familiar from Wittgenstein's and Kripke's discussions of linguistic meaning arise here. Normally, I will not think of the later moves. But, even if I do, there are reasons to deny that thinking of them can constitute what it is to mean to perform them. I argue that the problem can be solved, in the case of routine action, by the notion that our behavioural routines are guided by what I call modest agent memory. It will help explain both how we can have future moves 'in mind' and how we can be in a position to avow the fact.
BibTeX: @article{Falk1994Doing, author = {Falk, Barrie}, title = {Doing what one meant to do}, year = {1994}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {98}, number = {3}, pages = {379--399}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063926} }
Hacking, I.	1994	Memoro-politics, trauma and the soul	History of the Human Sciences 7(2) 29-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hacking1994Memoro, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {Memoro-politics, trauma and the soul}, year = {1994}, journal = {History of the Human Sciences}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, pages = {29--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519400700203} }
Harré, R.	1994	Emotion and memory: The second cognitive revolution	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 37(S(37)) 25-40		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Harre1994Emotion, author = {Harré, Rom}, title = {Emotion and memory: The second cognitive revolution}, year = {1994}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {37}, number = {S(37)}, pages = {25--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100009954} }
Mehlman, M.J., Kanoti, G.A. and Orlowski, J.P.	1994	Informed consent to amnestics, or: What sound does a tree make in the forest when it falls on your head?	The Journal of Clinical Ethics 5(2) 105-108			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mehlman1994Informed, author = {Mehlman, Maxwell J. and Kanoti, George A. and Orlowski, James P.}, title = {Informed consent to amnestics, or: What sound does a tree make in the forest when it falls on your head?}, year = {1994}, journal = {The Journal of Clinical Ethics}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {105--108} }
Morris, P.E.	1994	Theories of memory: An historical perspective	Theoretical Aspects of Memory Routledge 1-28			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Morris1994Theories, author = {Morris, P. E.}, title = {Theories of memory: An historical perspective}, year = {1994}, booktitle = {Theoretical Aspects of Memory}, editor = {Morris, P. E. and Gruneberg, M. M.}, publisher = {Routledge}, pages = {1--28} }
Schechtman, M.	1994	The truth about memory	Philosophical Psychology 7(1) 3-18	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Contemporary philosophical discussion of personal identity has centered on refinements and defenses of the ''psychological continuity theory''---the view that identity is created by the links between present and past provided by autobiographical experience memories. This view is structured in such a way that these memories must be seen as providing simple connections between two discrete, well‐defined moments of consciousness. There is, however, a great deal of evidence---both introspective and empirical---that autobiographical memory often does not provide such links, but instead summarizes, and condenses life experiences into, a coherent narrative. A brief exploration of some of the mechanisms of this summarizing and condensing work furthers the philosophical discussion of personal identity by showing why a view with the structure of the psychological continuity theory will not work, and by illuminating the role of autobiographical memory in the constitution of personal identity.
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman1994truth, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {The truth about memory}, year = {1994}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {3--18}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089408573107} }
Tinnin, L.	1994	Conscious forgetting and subconscious remembering of pain	The Journal of Clinical Ethics 5(2) 151-2			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tinnin1994Conscious, author = {Tinnin, L.}, title = {Conscious forgetting and subconscious remembering of pain}, year = {1994}, journal = {The Journal of Clinical Ethics}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {151--2} }
Truog, R.D. and Waisel, D.	1994	Amnesia instead of anesthesia: Not always a question of consent	The Journal of Clinical Ethics 5(2) 153-155			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Truog1994Amnesia, author = {Truog, Robert D and Waisel, David}, title = {Amnesia instead of anesthesia: Not always a question of consent}, year = {1994}, journal = {The Journal of Clinical Ethics}, volume = {5}, number = {2}, pages = {153--155} }
Warnock, M.	1994	Memory: The triumph over time	MLN 109(5) 938-950		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Warnock1994Memory, author = {Warnock, Mary}, title = {Memory: The triumph over time}, year = {1994}, journal = {MLN}, volume = {109}, number = {5}, pages = {938--950}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2904713} }
Adams, M.M. and Wolter, A.B.	1993	Memory and intuition: A focal debate in fourteenth century cognitive psychology	Franciscan Studies 53(1) 175-192		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Adams1993Memory, author = {Adams, Marilyn Mccord and Wolter, Allan B.}, title = {Memory and intuition: A focal debate in fourteenth century cognitive psychology}, year = {1993}, journal = {Franciscan Studies}, volume = {53}, number = {1}, pages = {175--192}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/frc.1993.0006} }
Baillie, J.	1993	Recent work on personal identity	Philosophical Books 34(4) 193-206		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Baillie1993Recent, author = {Baillie, J.}, title = {Recent work on personal identity}, year = {1993}, journal = {Philosophical Books}, volume = {34}, number = {4}, pages = {193--206}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1993.tb02364.x} }
Burge, T.	1993	Content Preservation	The Philosophical Review 102(4) 457-488		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burge1993Content, author = {Burge, Tyler}, title = {Content Preservation}, year = {1993}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {102}, number = {4}, pages = {457--488}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2185680} }
Casey, E.S.	1993	Mind and memory	Phenomenology: East and West: Essays in Honor of J.N. Mohanty Springer 177-194		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1993Mind, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Mind and memory}, year = {1993}, booktitle = {Phenomenology: East and West: Essays in Honor of J.N. Mohanty}, editor = {Kirkland, F. and Chattopadhyaya, D.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {177--194}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1612-1_12} }
Casey, E.S.	1993	On the phenomenology of remembering: The neglected case of place memory	Natural and Artificial Minds State University of New York Press 165-186			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1993phenomenology, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {On the phenomenology of remembering: The neglected case of place memory}, year = {1993}, booktitle = {Natural and Artificial Minds}, editor = {Burton, Robert G.}, publisher = {State University of New York Press}, pages = {165--186} }
Flage, D.E.	1993	On Friedman's look	Hume Studies 19(1) 187-197		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Flage1993Friedmans, author = {Flage, Daniel E}, title = {On Friedman's look}, year = {1993}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {187--197}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0443} }
Friedman, L.	1993	Another look at Flage's Hume	Hume Studies 19(1) 177-186		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Friedman1993Another, author = {Friedman, Lesley}, title = {Another look at Flage's Hume}, year = {1993}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {177--186}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0429} }
Friedman, L.	1993	Reply to Flage	Hume Studies 19(1) 199-202		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Friedman1993Reply, author = {Friedman, Lesley}, title = {Reply to Flage}, year = {1993}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {19}, number = {1}, pages = {199--202}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0457} }
Larson, G.J.	1993	The triműrti of smd rti in classical Indian thought	Philosophy East and West 43(3) 373-388		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Larson1993trimurti, author = {Larson, Gerald James}, title = {The triműrti of smd rti in classical Indian thought}, year = {1993}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {43}, number = {3}, pages = {373--388}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1399575} }
Schmidt, D.J.	1993	On the memory of last things	Research in Phenomenology 23(1) 92-104		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Schmidt1993memory, author = {Schmidt, Dennis J.}, title = {On the memory of last things}, year = {1993}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {92--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916493X00042} }
Senor, T.D.	1993	Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief	Synthese 94(3) 453-476	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epistemic status of our justified nonoccurrent beliefs, and hence are drastically incomplete.
BibTeX: @article{Senor1993Internalistic, author = {Senor, Thomas D.}, title = {Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory belief}, year = {1993}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {94}, number = {3}, pages = {453--476}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064489} }
Shepherdson, C.	1993	Vital signs: The place of memory in psychoanalysis	Research in Phenomenology 23(1) 22-72		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shepherdson1993Vital, author = {Shepherdson, Charles}, title = {Vital signs: The place of memory in psychoanalysis}, year = {1993}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {23}, number = {1}, pages = {22--72}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916493X00024} }
Sorabji, R.	1993	Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate	Cornell University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sorabji1993Animal, author = {Sorabji, Richard}, title = {Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate}, year = {1993}, publisher = {Cornell University Press} }
Verene, D.	1993	Two sources of philosophical memory: Vico versus Hegel	Philosophical Imagination and Cultural Memory Duke University Press 40-63			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Verene1993Two, author = {Verene, Donald}, title = {Two sources of philosophical memory: Vico versus Hegel}, year = {1993}, booktitle = {Philosophical Imagination and Cultural Memory}, editor = {Cook, Patricia}, publisher = {Duke University Press}, pages = {40--63} }
Annas, J.	1992	Aristotle on memory and the self	Essays on Aristotle's De Anima Clarendon Press 297-311	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This essay argues that Aristotle's view of memory is more like that of the modern psychologist than that of a modern philosopher; he is more interested in accurately delineating different kinds of memory than in discussing philosophical problems of memory. The short treatise On Memory and Recollection is considered a treatise on memory and loosely associated phenomenon and recollection. It is suggested that this work is better regarded as a treatise on two kinds of memory.
BibTeX: @incollection{Annas1992Aristotle, author = {Annas, Julia}, title = {Aristotle on memory and the self}, year = {1992}, booktitle = {Essays on Aristotle's De Anima}, editor = {Nussbaum, Martha C. and Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, pages = {297--311}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/019823600X.003.0017} }
Arcaya, J.M.	1992	Why is time not included in modern theories of memory?	Time & Society 1(2) 301-314	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper challenges a central tenet of most traditional theories of memory, namely, that memory is stored materially in the brain. Arguing that the storage hypothesis makes any contact with the real past impossible (since the transcendent experience of remembering is presumed to arise from purely present physical processes), it goes on to critique mainstream explanations of memory by noting that their plausibility ultimately rests upon an indefensible homuncular explanation of consciousness. Suggested instead is a phenomenological explanation of remembering rooted in E. Husserl's theory of temporality. This immanent-structural model of time is contrasted with the spatial-linear account of temporality underlying practically all traditional theories of memory. The paper then goes on to give a phenomenological account of the recollective process itself. Finally, the theoretical and research implications of this alternative view of memory for the field of psychology are discussed.
BibTeX: @article{Arcaya1992Why, author = {Arcaya, Jose M.}, title = {Why is time not included in modern theories of memory?}, year = {1992}, journal = {Time & Society}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {301--314}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/0961463X92001002011} }
Bodei, R.	1992	Farewell to the past: Historical memory, oblivion and collective identity	Philosophy & Social Criticism 18(3-4) 251-265		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bodei1992Farewell, author = {Bodei, Remo}, title = {Farewell to the past: Historical memory, oblivion and collective identity}, year = {1992}, journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism}, volume = {18}, number = {3-4}, pages = {251--265}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/019145379201800303} }
Casey, E.S.	1992	Forgetting remembered	Man and World 25(3-4) 281-311		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1992Forgetting, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Forgetting remembered}, year = {1992}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {25}, number = {3-4}, pages = {281--311}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01252422} }
Casey, E.S.	1992	Remembering resumed: Pursuing Buddhism and phenomenology in practice	In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism SUNY Press 271-291			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1992Remembering, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Remembering resumed: Pursuing Buddhism and phenomenology in practice}, year = {1992}, booktitle = {In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism}, editor = {Gyatso, J.}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {271--291} }
Coleman, J.	1992	Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Coleman1992Ancient, author = {Coleman, Janet}, title = {Ancient and Medieval Memories: Studies in the Reconstruction of the Past}, year = {1992}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Gennaro, R.J.	1992	Consciousness, self‐consciousness and episodic memory	Philosophical Psychology 5(4) 333-347	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Argues that consciousness (CSN) entails self-consciousness (SCSN) by focusing on the relationship between CSN and memory. Philosophical argument in conjunction with case examples of amnesia patients is used to address the questions of whether CSN requires episodic memory (EM) and whether EM requires SCSN. EM is defined and distinguished from other types of memory, and Kantian considerations and empirical data are used to support the notion that CSN does require EM. This also helps determine that EM does require SCSN. Two broad ways in which SCSN must be involved in having EMs are discussed: SCSN involved in having thoughts about one's self or in the ability to have some kind of self-concept, and SCSN required to apply temporal concepts to one's present mental states.
BibTeX: @article{Gennaro1992Consciousness, author = {Gennaro, Rocco J.}, title = {Consciousness, self‐consciousness and episodic memory}, year = {1992}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {4}, pages = {333--347}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089208573067} }
Gyatso, J.	1992	In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism	State University of New York Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Gyatso1992Mirror, author = {Gyatso, Janet}, title = {In the Mirror of Memory: Reflections on Mindfulness and Remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism}, year = {1992}, publisher = {State University of New York Press} }
Martin, M.G.F.	1992	Perception, concepts, and memory	The Philosophical Review 101(4) 745-763		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin1992Perception, author = {Martin, M. G. F.}, title = {Perception, concepts, and memory}, year = {1992}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {101}, number = {4}, pages = {745--763}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2185923} }
Reeves, R.	1992	Nostalgia and the nostalgic	Southwest Philosophical Studies 14 92-97			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reeves1992Nostalgia, author = {Reeves, R.}, title = {Nostalgia and the nostalgic}, year = {1992}, journal = {Southwest Philosophical Studies}, volume = {14}, pages = {92--97} }
Schumacher, C.	1992	A logic for memory	Nonclassical Logics and Information Processing Springer 23-45	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper, a logic for memory will be presented in which conditions for factual memory can be stated in precise terms. A close analysis of the most commonly stated condition for factual memory in the philosophical literature shows that in factual memory ascription independent knowledge of the fact in question is essential. Then, a first basic logic for memory is presented using a type of neighborhood-semantics together with syntactic restrictions which are interpreted as long-term and short-term memory. Secondly, logics for knowledge, belief and imagination are introduced as similar logics of short-term memory. Thirdly, the respective models are linked together and yield a logic for general memory, in which basic relations be-tween the discussed propositional attitudes hold. Finally, factual memory is shown to consist of a conjunction of knowledge and memory, for which several cases of differing epistemic strength can be distinguished. The last section contains completeness proofs for the different logics presented.
BibTeX: @incollection{Schumacher1992logic, author = {Schumacher, Christian}, title = {A logic for memory}, year = {1992}, booktitle = {Nonclassical Logics and Information Processing}, editor = {Pearce, David and Wansing, Heinrich}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {23--45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0031921} }
Wiggins, D.	1992	Remembering directly	Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art Blackwell			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wiggins1992Remembering, author = {Wiggins, David}, title = {Remembering directly}, year = {1992}, booktitle = {Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art}, editor = {Hopkins, Jim and Savile, Anthony}, publisher = {Blackwell} }
Arcaya, J.M.	1991	Making time for memory: A transcendental approach	Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology 11(2) 75-90	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The storage view of memory (that it is deposited in the brain as a material record of the past) is criticized by this paper. Given that this viewpoint assumes that memory emerges when such physical traces are electrically stimulated in the brain, the paper notes that this account gives no good philosophical account of how past events are able to arise from purely present brain activity. It argues that such an explanation of memory would make any contact with the real past (as actually experienced by the remembering subject) impossible. Attributing the difficulties of the storage hypothesis to its underlying linear view of time (i.e., that moments are strictly sequential and atomized), the paper proposes an alternative immanent view based on the phenomenological writings of E. Straus, E. Husserl, M. Merleau-Ponty, and M. Heidegger. In this vein it proposes a transcendental account of remembering to overcome the logical and philosophical contradictions contained in the more traditional theories of the same. Implications for future memory research is drawn following this phenomenological-transcendental perspective.
BibTeX: @article{Arcaya1991Making, author = {Arcaya, Jose M.}, title = {Making time for memory: A transcendental approach}, year = {1991}, journal = {Theoretical & Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {75--90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/h0091518} }
Bedu-Addo, J.T.	1991	Sense-experience and the argument for recollection in Plato's Phaedo	Phronesis 36(1) 27-60		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{BeduAddo1991Sense, author = {Bedu-Addo, J. T.}, title = {Sense-experience and the argument for recollection in Plato's Phaedo}, year = {1991}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {36}, number = {1}, pages = {27--60}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852891321052804} }
Bergson, H.	1991	Matter and Memory	Zone Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bergson1991Matter, author = {Bergson, Henri}, title = {Matter and Memory}, year = {1991}, publisher = {Zone Books} }
Elgot-Drapkin, J.J., Miller, M. and Perlis, D.	1991	Memory, reason, and time: The step-logic approach	Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface MIT Press 79-103			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{ElgotDrapkin1991Memory, author = {Elgot-Drapkin, Jennifer J and Miller, Michael and Perlis, Donald}, title = {Memory, reason, and time: The step-logic approach}, year = {1991}, booktitle = {Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface}, editor = {Cummins, R. and Pollock, J.}, publisher = {MIT Press}, pages = {79--103} }
Husserl, E.	1991	On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time	Kluwer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Husserl1991Phenomenology, author = {Husserl, E.}, title = {On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time}, year = {1991}, editor = {Brough, John (trans.)}, publisher = {Kluwer} }
Kenyon, T.	1991	Russell on pastness	Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau April 57-59			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kenyon1991Russell, author = {Kenyon, T.}, title = {Russell on pastness}, year = {1991}, journal = {Dialogue: Journal of Phi Sigma Tau}, volume = {April}, pages = {57--59} }
McKee, P.	1991	A dilemma of late life memory	Journal of Applied Philosophy 8(1) 83-86	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Unexpected but vivid and compelling memories are a wide-spread expm*- ence in late life. The experience has often been described in literature, and in recent years has been the object of extensive gerontological research under the label 'life review'. Such memories often include a reversal of judgment about a past act, relationship, event, etc. What earlier was judged to be so is, in the retrospect of late life, judged not to have been so after all. This presents a question: which judgment-the earlier or the later-has better epistemological credentials in such cases? Some obvious possible answers are considered and rejected. It would seem that the issue is not resolvable on epistemological grounds. A parallel dilemma seems to appear in other dimensions of experience. An example from aesthetic experience is briejly considered.
BibTeX: @article{McKee1991dilemma, author = {McKee, Patrick}, title = {A dilemma of late life memory}, year = {1991}, journal = {Journal of Applied Philosophy}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {83--86}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00408.x} }
Ross, D.L.	1991	Time, the heaven of heavens, and memory in Augustine's Confessions	Augustinian Studies 22 191-205		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ross1991Time, author = {Ross, Donald L.}, title = {Time, the heaven of heavens, and memory in Augustine's Confessions}, year = {1991}, journal = {Augustinian Studies}, volume = {22}, pages = {191--205}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/augstudies1991228} }
Stern, D.G.	1991	Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science	Philosophical Psychology 4(2) 203-218	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The model of memory as a store, from which records can be retrieved, is taken for granted by many contemporary researchers. On this view, memories are stored by memory traces, which represent the original event and provide a causal link between that episode and one's ability to remember it. I argue that this seemingly plausible model leads to an unacceptable conception of the relationship between mind and brain, and that a non‐representational, connectionist, model offers a promising alternative. I also offer a new reading of Wittgenstein's paradoxical remarks about thought and brain processes: as a critique of the cognitivist thesis that information stored in the brain has a linguistic structure and a particular location. On this reading, Wittgenstein's criticism foreshadows some of the most promising contemporary work on connectionist models of neural functioning.
BibTeX: @article{Stern1991Models, author = {Stern, David G.}, title = {Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science}, year = {1991}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {4}, number = {2}, pages = {203--218}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089108573027} }
Aho, T. and Niiniluoto, I.	1990	On the logic of memory	Acta Philosophica Fennica 49 408-429		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Aho1990logic, author = {Aho, Tuomo and Niiniluoto, Ilkka}, title = {On the logic of memory}, year = {1990}, journal = {Acta Philosophica Fennica}, volume = {49}, pages = {408--429}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2179295} }
Bales, E.F.	1990	Memory, forgetfulness and the disclosure of being in Heidegger and Plotinus	Philosophy Today 34(2) 141-151		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bales1990Memory, author = {Bales, Eugene F.}, title = {Memory, forgetfulness and the disclosure of being in Heidegger and Plotinus}, year = {1990}, journal = {Philosophy Today}, volume = {34}, number = {2}, pages = {141--151}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday199034221} }
Frede, M.	1990	An empiricist view of knowledge: Memorism	Epistemology (Companions to Ancient Thought I) Cambridge University Press 225-250			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Frede1990empiricist, author = {Frede, Michael}, title = {An empiricist view of knowledge: Memorism}, year = {1990}, booktitle = {Epistemology (Companions to Ancient Thought I)}, editor = {Everson, S.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, pages = {225--250} }
van Inwagen, P.	1990	Material Beings	Cornell University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{VanInwagen1990Material, author = {van Inwagen, Peter}, title = {Material Beings}, year = {1990}, publisher = {Cornell University Press} }
Krell, D.F.	1990	Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge	Indiana University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Krell1990Memory, author = {Krell, David Farrell}, title = {Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge}, year = {1990}, publisher = {Indiana University Press} }
Mishara, A.L.	1990	Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious	Husserl Studies 7(1) 29-58		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mishara1990Husserl, author = {Mishara, Aaron L.}, title = {Husserl and Freud: Time, memory and the unconscious}, year = {1990}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {29--58}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00144886} }
Pears, D.	1990	Hume's System: An Examinaton of the First Book of His Treatise	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Pears1990Humes, author = {Pears, David}, title = {Hume's System: An Examinaton of the First Book of His Treatise}, year = {1990}, publisher = {Oxford University Press} }
Schechtman, M.	1990	Personhood and personal identity	The Journal of Philosophy 87(2) 71-92		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Schechtman1990Personhood, author = {Schechtman, Marya}, title = {Personhood and personal identity}, year = {1990}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {87}, number = {2}, pages = {71--92}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2026882} }
Taber, J.	1990	The mīmād msā theory of self-recognition	Philosophy East and West 40(1) 35-57		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Taber1990mimamsa, author = {Taber, John}, title = {The mīmād msā theory of self-recognition}, year = {1990}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {40}, number = {1}, pages = {35--57}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1399548} }
Arcaya, J.M.	1989	Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative	Philosophical Psychology 2(1) 101-110	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The notion of memory storage, central to most contemporary theories of remembering, is challenged from a philosophical perspective as being contradictory and untenable. It criticizes this storage hypothesis as relying upon a linear explanation of time, an assumption which results in infinite regression, solipsism, and a failure to contact the real past. A model based on the phenomenological viewpoints of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau‐Ponty is offered as an alternative paradigm. Finally, a research method suggested by this descriptive approach to memory is presented and illustrated.
BibTeX: @article{Arcaya1989Memory, author = {Arcaya, Jose M.}, title = {Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {101--110}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515088908572965} }
Beardsmore, R.W.	1989	Autobiography and the brain: Mary Warnock on memory	British Journal of Aesthetics 29(3) 261-269		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Beardsmore1989Autobiography, author = {Beardsmore, R. W.}, title = {Autobiography and the brain: Mary Warnock on memory}, year = {1989}, journal = {British Journal of Aesthetics}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, pages = {261--269}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/29.3.261} }
Boghossian, P.A.	1989	Content and self-knowledge	Philosophical Topics 17(1) 5-26		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Boghossian1989Content, author = {Boghossian, Paul A}, title = {Content and self-knowledge}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {5--26}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics198917110} }
Deutscher, M.	1989	Remembering 'Remembering'	Cause, Mind, and Reality Springer 53-72		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Deutscher1989Remembering, author = {Deutscher, Max}, title = {Remembering 'Remembering'}, year = {1989}, booktitle = {Cause, Mind, and Reality}, editor = {Heil, John}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {53--72}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-9734-2_5} }
Edwin, S.C.L.	1989	Can there be a possible world in which memory is unreliable?	Philosophical Inquiry 11(3-4) 46-47			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @article{Edwin1989Can, author = {Edwin, Sing Choe Leung}, title = {Can there be a possible world in which memory is unreliable?}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophical Inquiry}, volume = {11}, number = {3--4}, pages = {46--47} }
Flage, D.E.	1989	Remembering the past	Hume Studies 15(1) 236-246		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Flage1989Remembering, author = {Flage, Daniel E}, title = {Remembering the past}, year = {1989}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {236--246}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0496} }
Fleming, B.E.	1989	Proust and Peirce, time and memory	Philosophy and Literature 13(1) 127-133		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Fleming1989Proust, author = {Fleming, Bruce E.}, title = {Proust and Peirce, time and memory}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophy and Literature}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {127--133}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/phl.1989.0086} }
Griffiths, P.	1989	Why Buddhas can't remember their previous lives	Philosophy East and West 39(4) 449-451		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Griffiths1989Why, author = {Griffiths, P.}, title = {Why Buddhas can't remember their previous lives}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {39}, number = {4}, pages = {449--451}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1399318} }
Haight, D. and Haight, M.	1989	Time, memory, and self-remembering	The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3(1) 1-11			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Haight1989Time, author = {Haight, David and Haight, Marjorie}, title = {Time, memory, and self-remembering}, year = {1989}, journal = {The Journal of Speculative Philosophy}, volume = {3}, number = {1}, pages = {1--11} }
Pensky, M.	1989	On the use and abuse of memory: Habermas, "anamnestic solidarity," and the historikerstreit	Philosophy & Social Criticism 15(4) 351-380		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pensky1989use, author = {Pensky, Max}, title = {On the use and abuse of memory: Habermas, "anamnestic solidarity," and the historikerstreit}, year = {1989}, journal = {Philosophy & Social Criticism}, volume = {15}, number = {4}, pages = {351--380}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/019145378901500402} }
White, A.	1989	As I remember...	The Philosophical Quarterly 39(154) 94-97			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{White1989As, author = {White, Alan}, title = {As I remember...}, year = {1989}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {39}, number = {154}, pages = {94--97} }
Audi, R.	1988	Belief, Justification and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology	Wadsworth			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Audi1988Belief, author = {Audi, Robert}, title = {Belief, Justification and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Wadsworth} }
Casey, E.S.	1988	Levinas on memory and the trace	The Collegium Phaenomenologicum, the First Ten Years Springer 241-255		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1988Levinas, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Levinas on memory and the trace}, year = {1988}, booktitle = {The Collegium Phaenomenologicum, the First Ten Years}, editor = {Sallis, J. and Moneta, G. and Taminiaux, J.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {241--255}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2805-3_13} }
Feldman, R.	1988	Having Evidence	Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example Springer 83-104		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Feldman1988Having, author = {Feldman, Richard}, title = {Having Evidence}, year = {1988}, booktitle = {Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example}, editor = {Austin, D.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {83--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2909-8_6} }
Ginet, C.	1988	Memory knowledge	The Handbook of Western philosophy Macmillan 159-178			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ginet1988Memory, author = {Ginet, Carl}, title = {Memory knowledge}, year = {1988}, booktitle = {The Handbook of Western philosophy}, editor = {Parkinson, G.}, publisher = {Macmillan}, pages = {159--178} }
Goldman, A.I.	1988	Epistemology and Cognition	Harvard University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Goldman1988Epistemology, author = {Goldman, Alvin I.}, title = {Epistemology and Cognition}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Harvard University Press} }
Hermann, D.J. and Chaffin, R.	1988	Memory in Historical Perspective: The Literature Before Ebbinghaus	Springer			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hermann1988Memory, author = {Hermann, D. J. and Chaffin, R.}, title = {Memory in Historical Perspective: The Literature Before Ebbinghaus}, year = {1988}, publisher = {Springer} }
Judson, L.	1988	Russell on memory	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88(1) 65-82		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Judson1988Russell, author = {Judson, Lindsay}, title = {Russell on memory}, year = {1988}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {88}, number = {1}, pages = {65--82}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/88.1.65} }
Mazis, G.A.	1988	Merleau-Ponty: The depth of memory as the depth of the world	The Horizons of Continental Philosophy Springer 227-250		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Mazis1988Merleau, author = {Mazis, Glen A.}, title = {Merleau-Ponty: The depth of memory as the depth of the world}, year = {1988}, booktitle = {The Horizons of Continental Philosophy}, editor = {Silverman, H. and Mickunas, A. and Kisie, T. and Lingis, A.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {227--250}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3350-2_10} }
Natsoulas, T.	1988	The intentionality of retrowareness	Journal of Mind and Behavior 9(4) 549-574	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: An instance of retrowareness is a veridical nonperceptual occurrent awareness of something or other about a particular past event or state of affairs. Accordingly, this occurrence is intentional, or exemplifies the property of intentiònality, in the sense that it is as though it were about something (which it is, given the requirement of veridicality) in contrast to other equally intentional mental occurrences that only seem to be about something. That a retrowareness has intentionality must be explained, therefore, in terms of its own content and structure, rather than in terms of its success in being about an actual past state of affairs or event. Such an explanation will help us to understand both (a) how a retrowareness succeeds in being about its intentional object, and (b) how mental occurrences lacking an intentional object nevertheless may possess an intentional character.
BibTeX: @article{Natsoulas1988intentionality, author = {Natsoulas, Thomas}, title = {The intentionality of retrowareness}, year = {1988}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {549--574} }
Casey, E.S.	1987	The world of nostalgia	Man and World 20(4) 361-384		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1987world, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {The world of nostalgia}, year = {1987}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {361--384}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01252103} }
Cockburn, D.	1987	The problem of the past	The Philosophical Quarterly 37(146) 54		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cockburn1987problem, author = {Cockburn, David}, title = {The problem of the past}, year = {1987}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {37}, number = {146}, pages = {54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2220061} }
Ehring, D.	1987	Personal identity and time travel	Philosophical Studies 52(3) 427-433		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ehring1987Personal, author = {Ehring, Douglas}, title = {Personal identity and time travel}, year = {1987}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {52}, number = {3}, pages = {427--433}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354057} }
Johnson, O.	1987	'Lively' memory and 'past' memory	Hume Studies 13(2) 343-359		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Johnson1987Lively, author = {Johnson, Oliver}, title = {'Lively' memory and 'past' memory}, year = {1987}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {13}, number = {2}, pages = {343--359}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.1987.a389747} }
Martin, R.	1987	Memory, connecting and what matters in survival	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65(1) 82-97		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin1987Memory, author = {Martin, Raymond}, title = {Memory, connecting and what matters in survival}, year = {1987}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, pages = {82--97}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408712342781} }
Scott, D.	1987	Platonic anamnesis revisited	The Classical Quarterly 37(02) 346-366		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Scott1987Platonic, author = {Scott, Dominic}, title = {Platonic anamnesis revisited}, year = {1987}, journal = {The Classical Quarterly}, volume = {37}, number = {02}, pages = {346--366}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S000983880003055X} }
Warnock, M.	1987	Memory	Faber and Faber			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Warnock1987Memory, author = {Warnock, Mary}, title = {Memory}, year = {1987}, publisher = {Faber and Faber} }
Belli, R.F.	1986	Mechanist and organicist parallels between theories of memory and science	Journal of Mind and Behavior 7(1) 63-86	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Pepper's (1942) world views of mechanism and organicism are useful toward drawing parallels between theories of memory and science. Associationist theories of memory and logical empiricist theories of science both consider thinking and knowing to be mechanistically built-up from simpler phenomena. The mechanist theories all incorporate certain categories of mechanism: parts, rules, and complex activity. In constrast, Bartletv ts (1932) schema theory of memory and Kuhn's (1970) paradigm theory of science both employ an organicist approach by emphasizing that thinking and knowing cannot be veridically reduced to simple parts. The organicist theories consider cognition as an adaptive process involving such categories as organic whole, oppositions, and integrations. The influence of world views not only permeates the conflicting traditions within psychology and philosophy, but with regard to theories of memory and science, provides conflicting conceptions on the nature of cognition.
BibTeX: @article{Belli1986Mechanist, author = {Belli, Robert F.}, title = {Mechanist and organicist parallels between theories of memory and science}, year = {1986}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {63--86} }
Ben-Zeev, A.	1986	Two approaches to memory	Philosophical Investigations 9(4) 288-301	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The metaphor of memory as a storage place for mental entities is a prevailing one. This metaphor belongs to a substantive approach to the mind. An alternative approach is a relational (or functional) approach in which the mind consists of dispositional and actualized states. Memory in this view is the capacity of the organism to arrive at states similar to its previous states of awareness while knowing about their past origin. Remembering here is an intentional state of awareness directed to events that happened or were learnt in the past. In this approach, the metaphor of internal storage is inadequate since capacities and states are not stored but rather retained. The relational approach to memory has some important implications for other issues in the philosophy of mind.
BibTeX: @article{BenZeev1986Two, author = {Ben-Zeev, Aaron}, title = {Two approaches to memory}, year = {1986}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {288--301}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1986.tb00428.x} }
Casey, E.S.	1986	Earle on memory and the past	The Life of the Transcendental Ego: Essays in Honor of William Earle SUNY Press 179-192			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1986Earle, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Earle on memory and the past}, year = {1986}, booktitle = {The Life of the Transcendental Ego: Essays in Honor of William Earle}, editor = {Casey, E and Morano, D.}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, pages = {179--192} }
Cherniak, C.	1986	Minimal Rationality	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Cherniak1986Minimal, author = {Cherniak, Christopher}, title = {Minimal Rationality}, year = {1986}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Ducharme, H.M.	1986	Personal identity in Samuel Clarke	Journal of the History of Philosophy 24(3) 359-383		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ducharme1986Personal, author = {Ducharme, Howard M}, title = {Personal identity in Samuel Clarke}, year = {1986}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {24}, number = {3}, pages = {359--383}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1986.0062} }
Harman, G.	1986	Change in View: Principles of Reasoning	MIT Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Harman1986Change, author = {Harman, Gilbert}, title = {Change in View: Principles of Reasoning}, year = {1986}, publisher = {MIT Press} }
Natsoulas, T.	1986	Consciousness and memory	Journal of Mind and Behavior 7(4) 463-501	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This article introduces the concept of retrowareness - which refers to the veridical nonperceptual occurrent awareness of something about a particular past event or state of affairs. The first major section considers various features of this new concept and the concept of reporting the past. The second major section discusses what it is for a retrowareness to be a conscious as opposed to an unconscious mental occurrence. This discussion requires that kinds of unconsciousness, including the Freudian kind, receive some attention. The third major section examines the relation of retrowareness to remembering, with special reference to Tulving's recent discussion of autonoetic consciousness. The final section addresses some objections and qualifications of views already appearing in the article.
BibTeX: @article{Natsoulas1986Consciousness, author = {Natsoulas, Thomas}, title = {Consciousness and memory}, year = {1986}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {463--501} }
Naylor, A.	1986	Remembering without knowing ? Not without justification	Philosophical Studies 49(3) 295-311		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1986Remembering, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Remembering without knowing ? Not without justification}, year = {1986}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {49}, number = {3}, pages = {295--311}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00355519} }
Pelikan, J.	1986	The Mystery of Continuity: Time and History, Memory and Eternity in the Thought of Saint Augustine	University Press of Virginia			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Pelikan1986Mystery, author = {Pelikan, J.}, title = {The Mystery of Continuity: Time and History, Memory and Eternity in the Thought of Saint Augustine}, year = {1986}, publisher = {University Press of Virginia} }
Risser, J.	1986	Hermeneutic experience and memory: Rethinking knowledge as recollection	Research in Phenomenology 16(1) 41-55		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Risser1986Hermeneutic, author = {Risser, James}, title = {Hermeneutic experience and memory: Rethinking knowledge as recollection}, year = {1986}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {16}, number = {1}, pages = {41--55}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916486X00031} }
Rundle, B.	1986	Memory and causation	Philosophical Investigations 9(4) 302-307		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rundle1986Memory, author = {Rundle, Bede}, title = {Memory and causation}, year = {1986}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {302--307}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1986.tb00429.x} }
Sjoman, N.	1986	The memory eye: An examination of memory in traditional knowledge systems	Journal of Indian Philosophy 14(2) 195-213		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sjoman1986memory, author = {Sjoman, N.E.}, title = {The memory eye: An examination of memory in traditional knowledge systems}, year = {1986}, journal = {Journal of Indian Philosophy}, volume = {14}, number = {2}, pages = {195--213}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00194196} }
Brennan, A.	1985	Amnesia and psychological continuity	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15(sup1) 195-209		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brennan1985Amnesia, author = {Brennan, Andrew}, title = {Amnesia and psychological continuity}, year = {1985}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {15}, number = {sup1}, pages = {195--209}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1985.10715896} }
Casey, E.S.	1985	Memory and phenomenological method	Phenomenology in Practice and Theory Springer 35-52		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1985Memory, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Memory and phenomenological method}, year = {1985}, booktitle = {Phenomenology in Practice and Theory}, editor = {Hamrick, W.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {35--52}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-9612-6_3} }
Dancy, J.	1985	Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology	Wiley-Blackwell			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Dancy1985Introduction, author = {Dancy, Jonathan}, title = {Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology}, year = {1985}, publisher = {Wiley-Blackwell} }
Ehring, D.	1985	Personal identity and the causal theory of memory	The Modern Schoolman 63(1) 65-69		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ehring1985Personal, author = {Ehring, Douglas}, title = {Personal identity and the causal theory of memory}, year = {1985}, journal = {The Modern Schoolman}, volume = {63}, number = {1}, pages = {65--69}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/schoolman19856314} }
Flage, D.E.	1985	Hume on memory and causation	Hume Studies 1985 168-188		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Flage1985Hume, author = {Flage, Daniel E}, title = {Hume on memory and causation}, year = {1985}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {1985}, pages = {168--188}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0073} }
Flage, D.E.	1985	Perchance to dream: A reply to Traiger	Hume Studies 11(2) 173-182		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Flage1985Perchance, author = {Flage, Daniel E}, title = {Perchance to dream: A reply to Traiger}, year = {1985}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {173--182}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0563} }
Gross, D.	1985	Bergson, Proust, and the revaluation of memory	International Philosophical Quarterly 25(4) 369-380		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gross1985Bergson, author = {Gross, David}, title = {Bergson, Proust, and the revaluation of memory}, year = {1985}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {25}, number = {4}, pages = {369--380}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq198525429} }
Naylor, A.	1985	In defense of a nontraditional theory of memory	Monist 68(1) 136-150		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1985defense, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {In defense of a nontraditional theory of memory}, year = {1985}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {68}, number = {1}, editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.}, pages = {136--150}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568123} }
Sanders, J.T.	1985	Experience, memory and intelligence	Monist 68(4) 507-521		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sanders1985Experience, author = {Sanders, John T.}, title = {Experience, memory and intelligence}, year = {1985}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {68}, number = {4}, pages = {507--521}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19856847} }
Traiger, S.	1985	Flage on Hume's account of memory	Hume Studies 11(2) 166-172		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Traiger1985Flage, author = {Traiger, Saul}, title = {Flage on Hume's account of memory}, year = {1985}, journal = {Hume Studies}, volume = {11}, number = {2}, pages = {166--172}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2011.0606} }
Cascardi, A.J.	1984	Remembering	Review of Metaphysics 38(2) 275-302			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cascardi1984Remembering, author = {Cascardi, A. J.}, title = {Remembering}, year = {1984}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {38}, number = {2}, pages = {275--302} }
Casey, E.S.	1984	Commemoration and perdurance in the Analects. Books I and II	Philosophy East and West 34(4) 389-399		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1984Commemoration, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Commemoration and perdurance in the Analects. Books I and II}, year = {1984}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {34}, number = {4}, pages = {389--399}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1399174} }
Casey, E.S.	1984	Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty	Man and World 17(3-4) 279-297		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1984Habitual, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Habitual body and memory in Merleau-Ponty}, year = {1984}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {17}, number = {3-4}, pages = {279--297}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-5081-8_4} }
Fóti, V.M.	1984	Heidegger: Remembrance and metaphysics	Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 15(3) 243-248		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Foti1984Heidegger, author = {Fóti, Véronique M.}, title = {Heidegger: Remembrance and metaphysics}, year = {1984}, journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, pages = {243--248}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.1984.11007678} }
Jacobs, J.	1984	The idea of a personal history	International Philosophical Quarterly 24(2) 179-187		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Jacobs1984idea, author = {Jacobs, Jonathan}, title = {The idea of a personal history}, year = {1984}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {24}, number = {2}, pages = {179--187}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq198424216} }
Mohr, R.	1984	The divided line and the doctrine of recollection in Plato	Apeiron 18(1) 34-41		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mohr1984divided, author = {Mohr, Richard}, title = {The divided line and the doctrine of recollection in Plato}, year = {1984}, journal = {Apeiron}, volume = {18}, number = {1}, pages = {34--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/APEIRON.1984.18.1.34} }
Morgan, M.L.	1984	Sense-perception and recollection in the Phaedo	Phronesis 29(3) 237-251		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Morgan1984Sense, author = {Morgan, Michael L.}, title = {Sense-perception and recollection in the Phaedo}, year = {1984}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {29}, number = {3}, pages = {237--251}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852884X00021} }
Oaklander, L.N.	1984	Perry, personal identity and the "characteristic" way	Metaphilosophy 15(1) 35-44		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Oaklander1984Perry, author = {Oaklander, L. Nathan}, title = {Perry, personal identity and the "characteristic" way}, year = {1984}, journal = {Metaphilosophy}, volume = {15}, number = {1}, pages = {35--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1984.tb00133.x} }
Parfit, D.	1984	Reasons and Persons	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Parfit1984Reasons, author = {Parfit, Derek}, title = {Reasons and Persons}, year = {1984}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Shanon, B.	1984	Meno---a cognitive psychological view	British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35(2) 129-147		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shanon1984Meno, author = {Shanon, Benny}, title = {Meno---a cognitive psychological view}, year = {1984}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, volume = {35}, number = {2}, pages = {129--147}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/35.2.129} }
Teske, R.	1984	Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine	New Scholasticism 58(2) 220-235		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Teske1984Platonic, author = {Teske, Roland}, title = {Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine}, year = {1984}, journal = {New Scholasticism}, volume = {58}, number = {2}, pages = {220--235}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas198458232} }
Wollheim, R.	1984	The Thread of Life	Harvard University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Wollheim1984Thread, author = {Wollheim, Richard}, title = {The Thread of Life}, year = {1984}, publisher = {Harvard University Press} }
Casey, E.S.	1983	Keeping the past in mind	Review of Metaphysics 37(1) 77-95			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1983Keeping, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Keeping the past in mind}, year = {1983}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {37}, number = {1}, pages = {77--95} }
Cherniak, C.	1983	Rationality and the structure of human memory	Synthese 57(2) 163-186	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: A tacit and highly idealized model of the agent's memory is presupposed in philosophy. The main features of a more psychologically realistic duplex (or n-plex) model are sketched here. It is argued that an adequate understanding of the rationality of an agent's actions is not possible without a satisfactory theory of the agent's memory and of the trade-offs involved in management of the memory, particularly involving "compartmentalization" of the belief set. The discussion identifies some basic constraints on the organization of knowledge representations in general.
BibTeX: @article{Cherniak1983Rationality, author = {Cherniak, Christopher}, title = {Rationality and the structure of human memory}, year = {1983}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {57}, number = {2}, pages = {163--186}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064000} }
Dretske, F. and Yourgrau, P.	1983	Lost knowledge	The Journal of Philosophy 80(6) 356-367		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dretske1983Lost, author = {Dretske, Fred and Yourgrau, Palle}, title = {Lost knowledge}, year = {1983}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {80}, number = {6}, pages = {356--367}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2026336} }
Johnson, D.M.	1983	Memory and knowledge: The epistemological significance of biology	American Philosophical Quarterly 20(4) 375-382			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Johnson1983Memory, author = {Johnson, D. M.}, title = {Memory and knowledge: The epistemological significance of biology}, year = {1983}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {20}, number = {4}, pages = {375--382} }
Kurtzman, H.S.	1983	Modern conceptions of memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(1) 1-19		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kurtzman1983Modern, author = {Kurtzman, Howard S}, title = {Modern conceptions of memory}, year = {1983}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {1--19}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2107576} }
Lewis, D.	1983	Dualism and the causal theory of memory	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(1) 21-30		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lewis1983Dualism, author = {Lewis, Delmas}, title = {Dualism and the causal theory of memory}, year = {1983}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {21--30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2107577} }
Lloyd, D.I.	1983	I experientially remember, therefore I exist? A reply to R. D. Smith	Journal of Philosophy of Education 17(1) 97-102		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lloyd1983I, author = {Lloyd, D. I.}, title = {I experientially remember, therefore I exist? A reply to R. D. Smith}, year = {1983}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {97--102}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1983.tb00019.x} }
Malcolm, N.	1983	A definition of factual memory	Causal Theories of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference De Gruyter 197-212		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Malcolm1983definition, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {A definition of factual memory}, year = {1983}, booktitle = {Causal Theories of Mind: Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference}, editor = {Davis, Steven}, publisher = {De Gruyter}, pages = {197--212}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110843828.197} }
Naylor, A.	1983	Justification in memory knowledge	Synthese 55(2) 269-286	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The definition of memory knowledge that p put forward in this paper is nontraditional in that the justification for the belief that p which constitutes that knowledge is not located in any memory-impression or other present state of the subject. Rather it is the subject's actual past justification for p, or a proper part thereof, that justifies this present belief that p. It is argued (1) that the notion under definition is that of knowing straight from memory, (2) that an adequate definition here must take into account a difference, as to conflicting evidence one does not possess, between evidence one has forgotten and evidence one has never had, (3) that compared to Ginet's traditional definition (1975), the definition has several advantages, and (4) that the definition handles at least one type of situation where there can be memory knowledge that p without previous knowledge that p.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1983Justification, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Justification in memory knowledge}, year = {1983}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, pages = {269--286}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485072} }
Pappas, G.S.	1983	Ongoing knowledge	Synthese 55(2) 253-267	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Ongoing knowledge is that knowledge that a person possesses continuously across a period of time. Given the plausible assumption that knowledge implies justification, it then follows that ongoing knowledge implies ongoing justification. However, the actual character of a person's justification for a belief often changes as time passes. Two' types of changes in one's ongoing justification are explored: content change and structure change. It is argued that justification held over time often undergoes both content and structure change, and that the latter sort of change has interesting implications for theories of epistemic justification.
BibTeX: @article{Pappas1983Ongoing, author = {Pappas, George S.}, title = {Ongoing knowledge}, year = {1983}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {55}, number = {2}, pages = {253--267}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00485071} }
Rakover, S.S.	1983	In defense of memory viewed as stored mental representation	Behaviorism 11(1) 53-62	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The present paper develops a defense for the representational approach to memory which Wilcox and Katz believe leads to logical paradoxes. It is suggested that three of the central arguments of Wilcox and Katz make sense when one ascribes to the representational theory a "human-like" model, rather than a "computer-like" model, on which, in effect, the representational approach is based. The fourth major argument of Wilcox and Katz, which in the present article has been labelled the "eliminative" argument, has been shown to confuse ontological assumptions with logical considerations.
BibTeX: @article{Rakover1983defense, author = {Rakover, Sam S.}, title = {In defense of memory viewed as stored mental representation}, year = {1983}, journal = {Behaviorism}, volume = {11}, number = {1}, pages = {53--62} }
Scheer, R.	1983	Remembering grandmother	Philosophical Investigations 6(3) 192-199	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: I will be discussing two of the many views as to what it is that one remembers when he remembers such things as something he did, an event or incident which he happened to see or in which he was involved, a period of his life, a person with whom he was acquainted, or the house in which he lived, a room, town, book or the like, of which he had had extended personal experience. I will not discuss the view which I share with many others,' the view that what one remembers in the cases mentioned is simply the events, incidents, one's actions and experiences, the people, places and things. This is not a philosophical theory, or not, at least, a theory that needs to be defended here. I will be principally concerned with the inadequacies of the view that one's present memory is (always) just previous knowledge
BibTeX: @article{Scheer1983Remembering, author = {Scheer, R.}, title = {Remembering grandmother}, year = {1983}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {6}, number = {3}, pages = {192--199}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1983.tb00343.x} }
Sharma, A.	1983	The role of memory in hindu epistemology and its religious implications	Indian Philosophical Quarterly 10(4) 485-491			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sharma1983role, author = {Sharma, Arvind}, title = {The role of memory in hindu epistemology and its religious implications}, year = {1983}, journal = {Indian Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {10}, number = {4}, pages = {485--491} }
Smith, R.D.	1983	The use of memory	Journal of Philosophy of Education 17(1) 85-96		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Smith1983use, author = {Smith, R. D.}, title = {The use of memory}, year = {1983}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy of Education}, volume = {17}, number = {1}, pages = {85--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1983.tb00018.x} }
Tyman, S.	1983	The phenomenology of forgetting	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(1) 45		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tyman1983phenomenology, author = {Tyman, Stephen}, title = {The phenomenology of forgetting}, year = {1983}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {45}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2107579} }
Zemach, E.M.	1983	Memory: What it is, and what it cannot possibly be	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(1) 31-44		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Zemach1983Memory, author = {Zemach, E. M.}, title = {Memory: What it is, and what it cannot possibly be}, year = {1983}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {44}, number = {1}, pages = {31--44}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2107578} }
Evans, G.	1982	The Varieties of Reference	Clarendon Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Evans1982Varieties, author = {Evans, Gareth}, title = {The Varieties of Reference}, year = {1982}, publisher = {Clarendon Press} }
Krell, D.F.	1982	Phenomenology of memory from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42(4) 492-505		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Krell1982Phenomenology, author = {Krell, David Farrell}, title = {Phenomenology of memory from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty}, year = {1982}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {42}, number = {4}, pages = {492--505}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2107372} }
Naylor, A.	1982	Defeasibility and memory knowledge	Mind 91(363) 432-437	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper examines a leading traditional account of memory knowledge. ("traditional" accounts of memory knowledge locate whatever positive justification there may be for the belief which constitutes that knowledge in a present memory-Impression). The paper (1) presents a pair of cases designed to show that carl ginet's four-Part, Defeasibility-Type definition of memory knowledge that 'p' is either too weak or too strong, And (2) suggests how these cases could be handled by one sort of non-Traditional account.
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1982Defeasibility, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {Defeasibility and memory knowledge}, year = {1982}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {91}, number = {363}, pages = {432--437}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCI.363.432} }
Rowe, C.J., Welbourne, M. and Williams, C.J.F.	1982	Knowledge, perception and memory: Theaetetus 166 B	The Classical Quarterly 32(02) 304-306		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rowe1982Knowledge, author = {Rowe, C. J. and Welbourne, M. and Williams, C. J. F.}, title = {Knowledge, perception and memory: Theaetetus 166 B}, year = {1982}, journal = {The Classical Quarterly}, volume = {32}, number = {02}, pages = {304--306}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838800026471} }
Ward, A.	1982	Materialism and memory	Analysis 42(3) 153-157		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ward1982Materialism, author = {Ward, Andrew}, title = {Materialism and memory}, year = {1982}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {42}, number = {3}, pages = {153--157}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3327589} }
Wolter, A.B.	1982	Duns Scotus on intuition, memory and knowledge of individuals	History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday University Press of America 81-104		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wolter1982Duns, author = {Wolter, Allan B.}, title = {Duns Scotus on intuition, memory and knowledge of individuals}, year = {1982}, booktitle = {History of Philosophy in the Making: A Symposium of Essays to Honor Professor James D. Collins on his 65th Birthday}, editor = {Thro, Linus}, publisher = {University Press of America}, pages = {81--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684885.003.0003} }
Anscombe, G.E.M.	1981	Memory, 'experience' and causation	Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind Basil Blackwell 120-130			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Anscombe1981Memory, author = {Anscombe, G. E. M.}, title = {Memory, 'experience' and causation}, year = {1981}, booktitle = {Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, pages = {120--130} }
Anscombe, G.E.M.	1981	The reality of the past	Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind vol. 2 Basil Blackwell 103-119			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Anscombe1981reality, author = {Anscombe, G. E. M.}, title = {The reality of the past}, year = {1981}, booktitle = {Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind vol. 2}, editor = {Black, Max}, publisher = {Basil Blackwell}, pages = {103--119} }
Brooks, D.H.M.	1981	Memories and the world	Analysis 41(3) 141-145		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brooks1981Memories, author = {Brooks, D. H. M.}, title = {Memories and the world}, year = {1981}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {41}, number = {3}, pages = {141--145}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/41.3.141} }
Casey, E.S.	1981	The memorability of the filmic image	Quarterly Review of Film Studies spring 241-263		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1981memorability, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {The memorability of the filmic image}, year = {1981}, journal = {Quarterly Review of Film Studies}, volume = {spring}, pages = {241--263}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10509208109361090} }
Ferrari, D.	1981	Retention - memory: Perception and the cognition of enduring objects	Aletheia : an international journal of philosophy 2(1) 65-123			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ferrari1981Retention, author = {Ferrari, D.}, title = {Retention - memory: Perception and the cognition of enduring objects}, year = {1981}, journal = {Aletheia : an international journal of philosophy}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {65--123} }
Krell, D.F.	1981	Memory as malady and therapy in Freud and Hegel	Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 12(2) 33-50		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Krell1981Memory, author = {Krell, David Farrell}, title = {Memory as malady and therapy in Freud and Hegel}, year = {1981}, journal = {Journal of Phenomenological Psychology}, volume = {12}, number = {2}, pages = {33--50}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916281X00137} }
McGoldrick, P.M.	1981	Memory and personal identity	Southwest Philosophical Studies 6(1) 62-68			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McGoldrick1981Memory, author = {McGoldrick, P. M.}, title = {Memory and personal identity}, year = {1981}, journal = {Southwest Philosophical Studies}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {62--68} }
Morreall, J.	1981	My body, my memory and me	Philosophical Studies 28(1) 221-228		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Morreall1981My, author = {Morreall, John}, title = {My body, my memory and me}, year = {1981}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {221--228}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philstudies19812858} }
Pears, D.	1981	The function of acquaintance in Russell's philosophy	Synthese 46(2) 149-166		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pears1981function, author = {Pears, David}, title = {The function of acquaintance in Russell's philosophy}, year = {1981}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {46}, number = {2}, pages = {149--166}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064385} }
Wilcox, S. and Katz, S.	1981	A direct realistic alternative to the traditional conception of memory	Behaviorism 9(2) 227-239	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: In this paper we criticize the commonly accepted theory of memory, and offer an alternative. According to the traditional view, memory is a stored men tal representation of things past. We show, through an analysis of a single act of recognition, the logical oddities to which this view leads. Since, however, these are generally ignored, we also consider those characteristics of the traditional view which apparently make it attractive to those who hold it, namely its con sonance with the commonly held conception of time, its explanation for the fallibility of memory, and its way of making behavior predictable. We then pre sent the alternative view, the direct realist theory. According to it, there is no such thing as a stored mental representation. The theory redefines memory as the perception of sequential structure, and in so doing successfully treats of the fallibility of memory and the necessity for making behavior predictable. More over, and perhaps most importantly, it does not lead to the logical difficulties of the traditional theory.
BibTeX: @article{Wilcox1981direct, author = {Wilcox, Stephen and Katz, Stuart}, title = {A direct realistic alternative to the traditional conception of memory}, year = {1981}, journal = {Behaviorism}, volume = {9}, number = {2}, pages = {227--239} }
Annis, D.B.	1980	Memory and justification	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40(3) 324-333	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Propositional memory is the retention of knowledge. Thus a per- son S remembers that h at t1 if and only if there is a prior time t such that S knows that h at t1 because he knew that h at t. Although philosophers have proposed counterexamples to the conditions of past and present knowledge, I believe that a careful analysis of the examples reveals that they fail. To avoid tedious polemics however let me simply stipulate that I am concerned with cases of memory where these two conditions are satisfied. Thus the burden of the analysis is to explain the relation between the past and present knowledge. Some philosophers have sought to do this in terms of causation. Thus they stress the existence of certain factual relations that obtain between a person and the world or between states of a person. My approach however will be to appeal to a family of epistemic terms and relations. Although I will not offer a causal analysis, my account will be compatible with such an approach. It may very well be the case that the two approaches yield coextensive results.
BibTeX: @article{Annis1980Memory, author = {Annis, David B.}, title = {Memory and justification}, year = {1980}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, pages = {324--333}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2106396} }
Casey, E.S.	1980	Piaget and Freud on childhood memory	Piaget, Philosophy, and the Human Sciences Humanities Press 63-93			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Casey1980Piaget, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Piaget and Freud on childhood memory}, year = {1980}, booktitle = {Piaget, Philosophy, and the Human Sciences}, editor = {Silverman, H. J.}, publisher = {Humanities Press}, pages = {63--93} }
Cusmariu, A.	1980	A definition of impure memory	Philosophical Studies 38(3) 305-308		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cusmariu1980definition, author = {Cusmariu, Arnold}, title = {A definition of impure memory}, year = {1980}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {38}, number = {3}, pages = {305--308}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00375664} }
Lang, H.S.	1980	On memory: Aristotle's corrections of Plato	Journal of the History of Philosophy 18(4) 379-393		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lang1980memory, author = {Lang, Helen S.}, title = {On memory: Aristotle's corrections of Plato}, year = {1980}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {18}, number = {4}, pages = {379--393}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0252} }
Pappas, G.S.	1980	Lost justification	Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1) 127-134		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pappas1980Lost, author = {Pappas, George S.}, title = {Lost justification}, year = {1980}, journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {127--134}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00400.x} }
Stiffler, E.	1980	Malcolm on impure memory	Philosophical Studies 38(3) 299-304		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Stiffler1980Malcolm, author = {Stiffler, Eric}, title = {Malcolm on impure memory}, year = {1980}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {38}, number = {3}, pages = {299--304}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00375663} }
Ward, A.	1980	Materialism and the unity of consciousness	Analysis 40(3) 144-146		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ward1980Materialism, author = {Ward, Andrew}, title = {Materialism and the unity of consciousness}, year = {1980}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {40}, number = {3}, pages = {144--146}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/40.3.144} }
Williamson, J.	1980	The persistence of memory	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80(1) 17-30		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Williamson1980persistence, author = {Williamson, John}, title = {The persistence of memory}, year = {1980}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {80}, number = {1}, pages = {17--30}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/80.1.17} }
Ayer, A.J.	1979	Replies	Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with his Replies Cornell University Press 277-333			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ayer1979Replies, author = {Ayer, A. J.}, title = {Replies}, year = {1979}, booktitle = {Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with his Replies}, editor = {Ayer, Alfred Jules and Macdonald, Graham}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, pages = {277--333} }
Beebe, M.	1979	How beliefs find their objects	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9(4) 595-608		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Beebe1979How, author = {Beebe, Michael}, title = {How beliefs find their objects}, year = {1979}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {9}, number = {4}, pages = {595--608}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1979.10716270} }
Casey, E.S.	1979	Perceiving and remembering	Review of Metaphysics 32(3) 407-436			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1979Perceiving, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Perceiving and remembering}, year = {1979}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {32}, number = {3}, pages = {407--436} }
Helm, P.	1979	Locke's theory of personal identity	Philosophy 54(208) 173-185	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By 'theory' here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity 'remember' should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness.
BibTeX: @article{Helm1979Lockes, author = {Helm, Paul}, title = {Locke's theory of personal identity}, year = {1979}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {54}, number = {208}, pages = {173--185}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100048427} }
Johnson, D.M.	1979	Forgetting dreams	Philosophy 54(209) 407-414		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Johnson1979Forgetting, author = {Johnson, D. M.}, title = {Forgetting dreams}, year = {1979}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {54}, number = {209}, pages = {407--414}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S003181910004883X} }
Lehnert, W.	1979	Representing physical objects in memory	Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence Humanities press 81-109		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Lehnert1979Representing, author = {Lehnert, W.}, title = {Representing physical objects in memory}, year = {1979}, booktitle = {Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence}, editor = {Ringle, M.}, publisher = {Humanities press}, pages = {81--109}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.7916/D8154R14} }
Mourant, J.	1979	Saint Augustine on Memory	Villanova University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Mourant1979Saint, author = {Mourant, John}, title = {Saint Augustine on Memory}, year = {1979}, publisher = {Villanova University Press} }
Munsat, S.	1979	Memory and causality	Body, Mind, and Method Springer 167-177		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Munsat1979Memory, author = {Munsat, Stanley}, title = {Memory and causality}, year = {1979}, booktitle = {Body, Mind, and Method}, editor = {Gustafson, Donald F. and Tapscott, Bangs L.}, publisher = {Springer}, pages = {167--177}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_10} }
Scheer, R.K.	1979	Margolis on remembering	Mind 88(1) 280-281		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Scheer1979Margolis, author = {Scheer, Richard K.}, title = {Margolis on remembering}, year = {1979}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {88}, number = {1}, pages = {280--281}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXVIII.1.280} }
Wollheim, R.	1979	Memory, experiential memory and personal identity	Perception and Identity: Essays presented to A. J. Ayer, with his replies to them Cornell University Press 186-234		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Wollheim1979Memory, author = {Wollheim, Richard}, title = {Memory, experiential memory and personal identity}, year = {1979}, booktitle = {Perception and Identity: Essays presented to A. J. Ayer, with his replies to them}, editor = {MacDonald, G. and Ayer, A.}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, pages = {186--234}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_9} }
Bursen, H.	1978	Dismantling the Memory Machine: A Philosophical Investigation of Machine Theories of Memory	Reidel			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Bursen1978Dismantling, author = {Bursen, H.}, title = {Dismantling the Memory Machine: A Philosophical Investigation of Machine Theories of Memory}, year = {1978}, publisher = {Reidel} }
Emmett, K.	1978	Oneiric experiences	Philosophical Studies 34(4) 445-450		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Emmett1978Oneiric, author = {Emmett, Kathleen}, title = {Oneiric experiences}, year = {1978}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {34}, number = {4}, pages = {445--450}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00364709} }
Forrest, P.	1978	Reincarnation without survival of memory or character	Philosophy East and West 28(1) 91-97		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Forrest1978Reincarnation, author = {Forrest, Peter}, title = {Reincarnation without survival of memory or character}, year = {1978}, journal = {Philosophy East and West}, volume = {28}, number = {1}, pages = {91--97}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1397928} }
Heil, J.	1978	Traces of things past	Philosophy of Science 45(1) 60-72	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known Criticisms of the trace theory of memory is Discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called "logical" notion of a memory trace. Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.).
BibTeX: @article{Heil1978Traces, author = {Heil, John}, title = {Traces of things past}, year = {1978}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {45}, number = {1}, pages = {60--72}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/288779} }
McCumber, J.	1978	Anamnesis as memory of intelligibles in Plotinus	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60(2) 160-167		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McCumber1978Anamnesis, author = {McCumber, John}, title = {Anamnesis as memory of intelligibles in Plotinus}, year = {1978}, journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie}, volume = {60}, number = {2}, pages = {160--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/agph.1978.60.2.160} }
Perry, J.	1978	A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality	Hackett Publishing			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Perry1978Dialogue, author = {Perry, John}, title = {A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality}, year = {1978}, publisher = {Hackett Publishing} }
Radford, C.	1978	"It's on the tip of my tongue"	Philosophical Investigations 1(2) 70-79		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Radford1978Its, author = {Radford, Colin}, title = {"It's on the tip of my tongue"}, year = {1978}, journal = {Philosophical Investigations}, volume = {1}, number = {2}, pages = {70--79}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1978.tb00186.x} }
Sardello, R.	1978	A phenomenological approach to memory	Existential-Phenomeological Alternatives for Psychology Oxford University Press 136-151			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Sardello1978phenomenological, author = {Sardello, R.}, title = {A phenomenological approach to memory}, year = {1978}, booktitle = {Existential-Phenomeological Alternatives for Psychology}, editor = {Valle, R. and King, M.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {136--151} }
Traiger, S.	1978	Some remarks on Lehrer and Richard's 'Remembering without knowing'	Grazer Philosophische Studien 6 107-111		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Traiger1978Some, author = {Traiger, Saul}, title = {Some remarks on Lehrer and Richard's 'Remembering without knowing'}, year = {1978}, journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien}, volume = {6}, pages = {107--111}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gps197868} }
Ameriks, K.	1977	Criteria of personal identity	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7(1) 47-69	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The primary objective of this paper is to improve the defense of the thesis that (1) bodily continuity is the primary criterion of personal identity. This is to be done by establishing (in Parts III and IV) that there is a unique sense in which (2) bodily continuity is a necessary condition of personal identity. A secondary objective of the paper is to illustrate (in Part I) the way in which the value and validity of (2) has been obscured in recent defenses and criticisms of (1), which inappropriately interpret it in terms of the claim that (3) bodily continuity is a sufficient condition of personal identity. Since the truth of (3) will be denied, the defense of (1) will also involve arguing (in Part II) that the traditional alternative to the bodily criterion, namely the criterion of memory and psychological characteristics, not only is not a necessary condition of personal identity but also is not a sufficient condition.
BibTeX: @article{Ameriks1977Criteria, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Criteria of personal identity}, year = {1977}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {47--69}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1977.10716176} }
Čapek, M.	1977	Immediate and mediate memory	Process Studies 7(2) 90-96		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Capek1977Immediate, author = {Čapek, Milič}, title = {Immediate and mediate memory}, year = {1977}, journal = {Process Studies}, volume = {7}, number = {2}, pages = {90--96}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/process19777228} }
Casey, E.S.	1977	Imagining and remembering	Review of Metaphysics 31(2) 187-209			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Casey1977Imagining, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Imagining and remembering}, year = {1977}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {31}, number = {2}, pages = {187--209} }
Gray, J.G.	1977	Heidegger on remembering and remembering Heidegger	Man and World 10(1) 62-78		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gray1977Heidegger, author = {Gray, J. Glenn}, title = {Heidegger on remembering and remembering Heidegger}, year = {1977}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {62--78}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01252376} }
Malcolm, N.	1977	Memory and Mind	Cornell University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Malcolm1977Memory, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {Memory and Mind}, year = {1977}, publisher = {Cornell University Press} }
Margolis, J.	1977	Remembering	Mind 86(342) 186-205		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Margolis1977Remembering, author = {Margolis, Joseph}, title = {Remembering}, year = {1977}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {86}, number = {342}, pages = {186--205}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXVI.342.186} }
Puccetti, R.	1977	Memory and self: A neuropathological approach	Philosophy 52(200) 147-153		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Puccetti1977Memory, author = {Puccetti, Roland}, title = {Memory and self: A neuropathological approach}, year = {1977}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {52}, number = {200}, pages = {147--153}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100023093} }
Ameriks, K.	1976	Personal identity and memory transfer	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 14(4) 385-391		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ameriks1976Personal, author = {Ameriks, Karl}, title = {Personal identity and memory transfer}, year = {1976}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {14}, number = {4}, pages = {385--391}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1976.tb01295.x} }
Baier, A.	1976	Mixing memory and desire	American Philosophical Quarterly 13(3) 213-220			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Baier1976Mixing, author = {Baier, Annette}, title = {Mixing memory and desire}, year = {1976}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {13}, number = {3}, pages = {213--220} }
Biro, J.I.	1976	Hume on self-identity and memory	Review of Metaphysics 30(1) 19-38			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Biro1976Hume, author = {Biro, J. I.}, title = {Hume on self-identity and memory}, year = {1976}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {30}, number = {1}, pages = {19--38} }
Burton, R.G.	1976	The human awareness of time: An analysis	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36(3) 303-318		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burton1976human, author = {Burton, Robert G}, title = {The human awareness of time: An analysis}, year = {1976}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {36}, number = {3}, pages = {303--318}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2106920} }
Casey, E.S.	1976	Comparative phenomenology of mental activity: Memory, hallucination, and fantasy contrasted with imagination	Research in Phenomenology 6(1) 1-25	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: It is a quite remarkable fact that many previous philosophies and psychologies of mind, however perspicuous or profound they may be in other ways, have failed to provide adequate accounts of basic differences between imagining, remembering, hallucinating, and fantasying. Even the most elementary descriptions of such differences are often lacking. Perhaps it has been presumed that the four acts in question are so closely affiliated as not to need descriptive differentiation. In this vein, they are frequently regard- ed as sibling acts having the same progenitor: perception. Yet each of the acts is related to perception very differently, ranging from apparent replication (in hallucination) to distinct discontinuity (in imagination). It is not my present purpose, however, to delineate this particular series of relationships. Rather, in this essay I shall concentrate on eidetic differences be- tween imagining on the one hand and memory, hallucination, and fantasy on the other. Each of the latter three acts will be described in terms of its most salient features, features which serve to distinguish it from imagining in fundamental respects.' Thus the present project represents an exercise in the comparative phenomenology of mind - a neglected but important part of the eidetics of human experience.
BibTeX: @article{Casey1976Comparative, author = {Casey, Edward S.}, title = {Comparative phenomenology of mental activity: Memory, hallucination, and fantasy contrasted with imagination}, year = {1976}, journal = {Research in Phenomenology}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {1--25}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916476X00014} }
Dennett, D.C.	1976	Are dreams experiences?	The Philosophical Review 85(2) 151-171		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dennett1976Are, author = {Dennett, Daniel C.}, title = {Are dreams experiences?}, year = {1976}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {85}, number = {2}, pages = {151--171}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183728} }
Geach, P.	1976	Reason and Argument	University of California Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Geach1976Reason, author = {Geach, P.}, title = {Reason and Argument}, year = {1976}, publisher = {University of California Press} }
Marsh, M.	1976	Toward a framework for memory : Straus and some others	Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 7(1) 34-54		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Marsh1976framework, author = {Marsh, Michael}, title = {Toward a framework for memory : Straus and some others}, year = {1976}, journal = {Journal of Phenomenological Psychology}, volume = {7}, number = {1}, pages = {34--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916276X00160} }
Noxon, J.	1976	Remembering and imagining the past	Hume: A Re-evaluation Fordham University Press 270-295		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Noxon1976Remembering, author = {Noxon, James}, title = {Remembering and imagining the past}, year = {1976}, booktitle = {Hume: A Re-evaluation}, editor = {Livingston, D. and King, J.}, publisher = {Fordham University Press}, pages = {270--295}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-020-00499-1} }
Perkins, R.	1976	Russell's realist theory of remote memory	Journal of the History of Philosophy 14(3) 358-360		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Perkins1976Russells, author = {Perkins, Ray}, title = {Russell's realist theory of remote memory}, year = {1976}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {14}, number = {3}, pages = {358--360}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0264} }
Schumacher, J.A.	1976	Memory unchained again	Analysis 36(2) 101-104		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Schumacher1976Memory, author = {Schumacher, John A.}, title = {Memory unchained again}, year = {1976}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {36}, number = {2}, pages = {101--104}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3327102} }
Brockelman, P.	1975	Of memory and things past	International Philosophical Quarterly 15(3) 309-325		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brockelman1975memory, author = {Brockelman, Paul}, title = {Of memory and things past}, year = {1975}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, pages = {309--325}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq197515328} }
Brough, J.B.	1975	Husserl on memory	Monist 59(1) 40-62		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brough1975Husserl, author = {Brough, John B.}, title = {Husserl on memory}, year = {1975}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {59}, number = {1}, editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.}, pages = {40--62}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19755914} }
Bubacz, B.S.	1975	Augustine's account of factual memory	Augustinian Studies 6 181-192		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bubacz1975Augustines, author = {Bubacz, Bruce Stephen}, title = {Augustine's account of factual memory}, year = {1975}, journal = {Augustinian Studies}, volume = {6}, pages = {181--192}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/augstudies1975611} }
Dulin, J.T.	1975	Memory in Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians	Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: Investigation of the function which we call "memory." As psychology developed during the past century, the area of memory was strongly influended on the theoretical level by the thinking of the British Associationists and on the experimental level by the work of Ebbinghaus. This influence has tended to overshadow other significant work and to narrow the approach to memory to those hypotheses and experiments which were consistent with or derived from the Associationist tradition. The recent challenge to "associationism" by "contextualism" 1 appears to be a healthy move, but it is insufficient to account for the complexities of memory and it illustrates a prevailing weakness in modern psychology, viz., a lack of historical perspective as well as an inadequate model and conceptual frame of reference. This paper will attempt to provide an overview of Aristotle's theoretical model, his conceptual tools and basic distinctions on the subject of memory. It is well known that he first proposed similarity, contrariety, and contiguity as memory clues. What is not so well known is that he also proposed a theory of memory which was integrated into his framework of psychological functions and ultimately into his theory of man. I have not attempted to follow the refinements and variations of,Aristotle's theory through the centuries of Greek, Arabian, and Scholastic traditions. Rather, I have moved directly from Aristotle's work to the twentieth century and have selected two scholars who have used the Aristotelian model to integrate and evaluate modern work in psychology and neurology. Aristotle's discussion of memory is related to and embedded in a broad 2
BibTeX: @inproceedings{Dulin1975Memory, author = {Dulin, John T.}, title = {Memory in Aristotle and some neo-Aristotelians}, year = {1975}, booktitle = {Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association} }
Ginet, C.	1975	Knowledge, Perception, and Memory	Reidel			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ginet1975Knowledge, author = {Ginet, Carl}, title = {Knowledge, Perception, and Memory}, year = {1975}, publisher = {Reidel} }
Lehrer, K. and Richard, J.	1975	Remembering without knowing	Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 121-126		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lehrer1975Remembering, author = {Lehrer, Keith and Richard, Joseph}, title = {Remembering without knowing}, year = {1975}, journal = {Grazer Philosophische Studien}, volume = {1}, pages = {121--126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/gps197518} }
Malcolm, N.	1975	Memory as direct awareness of the past	Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 9 1-22		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Malcolm1975Memory, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {Memory as direct awareness of the past}, year = {1975}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement}, volume = {9}, pages = {1--22}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100000965} }
Pears, D.	1975	Causation and memory	Philosophic Exchange 6(1) 29-40			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Pears1975Causation, author = {Pears, David}, title = {Causation and memory}, year = {1975}, journal = {Philosophic Exchange}, volume = {6}, number = {1}, pages = {29--40} }
Perry, J.	1975	Personal identity, memory and the problem of circularity	Personal Identity University of California Press 135-155		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Perry1975Personal, author = {Perry, John}, title = {Personal identity, memory and the problem of circularity}, year = {1975}, booktitle = {Personal Identity}, editor = {Perry, John}, publisher = {University of California Press}, pages = {135--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2678477} }
Rosen, D.A.	1975	An argument for the logical notion of a memory trace	Philosophy of Science 42(1) 1-10	[abstract]		[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: During the past decade there has been a very effective campaign against any explanation of remembering whose basic concept is that of a causally mediating trace. This paper attempts to provide such an explanation by presenting an explicit deductive argument for the existence of the memory trace. The conclusion is shown to follow from reasonable, empirical assumptions of which the most interesting is a spatiotemporal contiguity thesis. Set-theoretic techniques are used to provide a framework of analysis and probabilistic definitions of some causal notions, as that of a causal chain, are presented.
BibTeX: @article{Rosen1975argument, author = {Rosen, Deborah A.}, title = {An argument for the logical notion of a memory trace}, year = {1975}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {1--10} }
Sallis, J.	1975	Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues	Indiana University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Sallis1975Being, author = {Sallis, John}, title = {Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues}, year = {1975}, publisher = {Indiana University Press} }
Cooper, D.E.	1974	Memories, bodies and persons	Philosophy 49(189) 255-263		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cooper1974Memories, author = {Cooper, D. E.}, title = {Memories, bodies and persons}, year = {1974}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {49}, number = {189}, pages = {255--263}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S003181910004821X} }
Ehman, R.R.	1974	Temporal self-identity	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 12(3) 333-341		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Ehman1974Temporal, author = {Ehman, Robert R.}, title = {Temporal self-identity}, year = {1974}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {12}, number = {3}, pages = {333--341}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1974.tb01182.x} }
Furlong, E.J.	1974	Memory re-chained	Problems in the Theory of Knowledge Martinus Nijhoff 17-22			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Furlong1974Memory, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {Memory re-chained}, year = {1974}, booktitle = {Problems in the Theory of Knowledge}, editor = {Von Wright, G.}, publisher = {Martinus Nijhoff}, pages = {17--22} }
Holland, A.	1974	Retained knowledge	Mind 83(331) 355-371		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Holland1974Retained, author = {Holland, Alan}, title = {Retained knowledge}, year = {1974}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {83}, number = {331}, pages = {355--371}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXIII.331.355} }
Irwin, T.	1974	Recollection and Plato's moral theory	Review of Metaphysics 27(4) 752-772			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Irwin1974Recollection, author = {Irwin, Terence}, title = {Recollection and Plato's moral theory}, year = {1974}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {27}, number = {4}, pages = {752--772} }
Johnson, D.M.	1974	The temporal dimension of perceptual experience: A non-traditional empiricism	American Philosophical Quarterly 11(1) 71-76			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Johnson1974temporal, author = {Johnson, D. M.}, title = {The temporal dimension of perceptual experience: A non-traditional empiricism}, year = {1974}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {11}, number = {1}, pages = {71--76} }
Kvale, S.	1974	The temporality of memory	Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 5(1) 7-31		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kvale1974temporality, author = {Kvale, Steinar}, title = {The temporality of memory}, year = {1974}, journal = {Journal of Phenomenological Psychology}, volume = {5}, number = {1}, pages = {7--31}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156916274X00144} }
Laird, J.	1974	On mnemic certainty, with some remarks concerning history	Knowledge, Belief and Opinion The Century Company 292-314			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Laird1974Mnemic, author = {Laird, John}, title = {On mnemic certainty, with some remarks concerning history}, year = {1974}, booktitle = {Knowledge, Belief and Opinion}, publisher = {The Century Company}, pages = {292--314} }
Lang, B.	1974	Remembering feelings	The Philosophical Forum 6(2-3) 213-217			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Lang1974Remembering, author = {Lang, B.}, title = {Remembering feelings}, year = {1974}, journal = {The Philosophical Forum}, volume = {6}, number = {2-3}, pages = {213--217} }
Mannison, D.S.	1974	Lemmon on knowing	Synthese 26(3-4) 383-390		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mannison1974Lemmon, author = {Mannison, D. S.}, title = {Lemmon on knowing}, year = {1974}, journal = {Synthese}, volume = {26}, number = {3-4}, pages = {383--390}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00883101} }
Pears, D.	1974	Russell's theories of memory 1912-1921	Bertrand Russell's Philosophy Duckworth 117-137			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Pears1974Russells, author = {Pears, David}, title = {Russell's theories of memory 1912-1921}, year = {1974}, booktitle = {Bertrand Russell's Philosophy}, editor = {Nakhnikian, George}, publisher = {Duckworth}, pages = {117--137} }
Pollock, J.L.	1974	Knowledge and Justification	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Pollock1974Knowledge, author = {Pollock, John L}, title = {Knowledge and Justification}, year = {1974}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Salmon, W.	1974	Memory and perception in Human Knowledge	Bertrand Russell's Philosophy Duckworth 139-167			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Salmon1974Memory, author = {Salmon, Wesley}, title = {Memory and perception in Human Knowledge}, year = {1974}, booktitle = {Bertrand Russell's Philosophy}, editor = {Nakhnikian, George}, publisher = {Duckworth}, pages = {139--167} }
Cobb, W.S.	1973	Anamnesis: Platonic doctrine or sophistic absurdity?	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 12(04) 604-628		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cobb1973Anamnesis, author = {Cobb, William S.}, title = {Anamnesis: Platonic doctrine or sophistic absurdity?}, year = {1973}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {12}, number = {04}, pages = {604--628}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300028079} }
Hart, J.G.	1973	Toward a phenomenology of nostalgia	Man and World 6(4) 397-420		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hart1973phenomenology, author = {Hart, James G.}, title = {Toward a phenomenology of nostalgia}, year = {1973}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {397--420}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01246601} }
Meinong, A.	1973	Toward an epistemological assessment of memory	Empirical Knowledge: Readings from Contemporary Sources Prentice Hall 253-270			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Meinong1973epistemological, author = {Meinong, A.}, title = {Toward an epistemological assessment of memory}, year = {1973}, booktitle = {Empirical Knowledge: Readings from Contemporary Sources}, editor = {Chisholm, Roderick M; and Swartz, Robert J}, publisher = {Prentice Hall}, pages = {253--270} }
Miri, M.	1973	Memory and personal identity	Mind 82(325) 1-21		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Miri1973Memory, author = {Miri, Mrinal}, title = {Memory and personal identity}, year = {1973}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {82}, number = {325}, pages = {1--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXII.325.1} }
Naylor, A.	1973	On the evidence of one's "memories"	Analysis 33(5) 160-167		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1973evidence, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {On the evidence of one's "memories"}, year = {1973}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {33}, number = {5}, pages = {160--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/33.5.160} }
Perkins, R.	1973	Russell on memory	Mind 82(328) 600-601		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Perkins1973Russell, author = {Perkins, Ray}, title = {Russell on memory}, year = {1973}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {82}, number = {328}, pages = {600--601}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXXII.328.600} }
Puccetti, R.	1973	Remembering the past of another	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2(4) 523-532		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Puccetti1973Remembering, author = {Puccetti, Roland}, title = {Remembering the past of another}, year = {1973}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {523--532}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1973.10716062} }
Shope, R.K.	1973	Remembering, knowledge, and memory traces	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33(3) 303-322		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shope1973Remembering, author = {Shope, Robert K.}, title = {Remembering, knowledge, and memory traces}, year = {1973}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {33}, number = {3}, pages = {303--322}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2106945} }
Tallon, A.	1973	Memory and man's composite nature according to Bergson	New Scholasticism 47(4) 483-489		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tallon1973Memory, author = {Tallon, Andrew}, title = {Memory and man's composite nature according to Bergson}, year = {1973}, journal = {New Scholasticism}, volume = {47}, number = {4}, pages = {483--489}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas19734745} }
Brough, J.B.	1972	The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness	Man and World 5(3) 298-326		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brough1972emergence, author = {Brough, John B.}, title = {The emergence of an absolute consciousness in Husserl's early writings on time-consciousness}, year = {1972}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {5}, number = {3}, pages = {298--326}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01248638} }
Brown, J.V.	1972	Henry of Ghent on internal sensation	Journal of the History of Philosophy 10(1) 15-28		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brown1972Henry, author = {Brown, J. V.}, title = {Henry of Ghent on internal sensation}, year = {1972}, journal = {Journal of the History of Philosophy}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {15--28}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.1213} }
Dorter, K.	1972	Equality, recollection, and purification	Phronesis 17(3) 198-218		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Dorter1972Equality, author = {Dorter, Kenneth}, title = {Equality, recollection, and purification}, year = {1972}, journal = {Phronesis}, volume = {17}, number = {3}, pages = {198--218}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/156852872X00024} }
Earle, W.	1972	The Autobiographical Consciousness	Quadrangle Books			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Earle1972Autobiographical, author = {Earle, William}, title = {The Autobiographical Consciousness}, year = {1972}, publisher = {Quadrangle Books} }
Kneale, M.	1972	Our knowledge of the past and of the future	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 1-12			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kneale1972Our, author = {Kneale, Martha}, title = {Our knowledge of the past and of the future}, year = {1972}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {72}, pages = {1--12} }
Saatkamp, H.J.	1972	Whitehead and the concept of memory	The Modern Schoolman 49(4) 319-329		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Saatkamp1972Whitehead, author = {Saatkamp, Herman Joseph}, title = {Whitehead and the concept of memory}, year = {1972}, journal = {The Modern Schoolman}, volume = {49}, number = {4}, pages = {319--329}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/schoolman197249494} }
Shoemaker, S.	1972	Memory	The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Macmillan 265-274			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Shoemaker1972Memory, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Memory}, year = {1972}, booktitle = {The Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, editor = {Edwards, P.}, publisher = {Macmillan}, pages = {265--274} }
Goff, R.	1971	The language of self-transformation in Plato and Augustine	Man and World 4(4) 413-435		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Goff1971language, author = {Goff, Robert}, title = {The language of self-transformation in Plato and Augustine}, year = {1971}, journal = {Man and World}, volume = {4}, number = {4}, pages = {413--435}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01579034} }
Hampshire, S.	1971	Freedom of Mind and Other Essays	Princeton University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hampshire1971Freedom, author = {Hampshire, Stuart}, title = {Freedom of Mind and Other Essays}, year = {1971}, publisher = {Princeton University Press} }
Johnston, W.	1971	Reminding and factual memory	Mind LXXX(319) 447-448		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Johnston1971Reminding, author = {Johnston, William}, title = {Reminding and factual memory}, year = {1971}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {LXXX}, number = {319}, pages = {447--448}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXX.319.447} }
Locke, D.	1971	Memory	Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Locke1971Memory, author = {Locke, Don}, title = {Memory}, year = {1971}, publisher = {Macmillan} }
Naylor, A.	1971	"B remembers that P from time T"	The Journal of Philosophy 68(2) 29-41		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1971remembers, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {"B remembers that P from time T"}, year = {1971}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {68}, number = {2}, pages = {29--41}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2025220} }
Odell, S.J.	1971	Malcolm on 'remembering that'	Mind 80(320) 593-593		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Odell1971Malcolm, author = {Odell, S. Jack}, title = {Malcolm on 'remembering that'}, year = {1971}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {80}, number = {320}, pages = {593--593}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXX.320.593} }
Urmson, J.O.	1971	Memory and imagination	Mind 80(320) 607-607		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Urmson1971Memory, author = {Urmson, J. O.}, title = {Memory and imagination}, year = {1971}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {80}, number = {320}, pages = {607--607}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXX.320.607} }
Furlong, E.J.	1970	Mr. Urmson on memory and imagination	Mind 79(313) 137-138		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Furlong1970Urmson, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {Mr. Urmson on memory and imagination}, year = {1970}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {79}, number = {313}, pages = {137--138}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXIX.313.137} }
Hamlyn, D.W.	1970	The Theory of Knowledge	Macmillan Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Hamlyn1970Theory, author = {Hamlyn, D. W.}, title = {The Theory of Knowledge}, year = {1970}, publisher = {Macmillan Press} }
Hartnack, J.	1970	Remarks on personal identity	International Logic Review 1(1) 107-110			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hartnack1970Remarks, author = {Hartnack, J.}, title = {Remarks on personal identity}, year = {1970}, journal = {International Logic Review}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {107--110} }
King-Farlow, J.	1970	Recollecting and 'recollecting'	Mind 79(316) 604-606		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{KingFarlow1970Recollecting, author = {King-Farlow, John}, title = {Recollecting and 'recollecting'}, year = {1970}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {79}, number = {316}, pages = {604--606}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXIX.316.604} }
Locke, D.	1970	Memory, memories and me	Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 3 1968/9 Macmillan 210-235		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Locke1970Memory, author = {Locke, Don}, title = {Memory, memories and me}, year = {1970}, booktitle = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures Vol. 3 1968/9}, publisher = {Macmillan}, pages = {210--235}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100000692} }
Maitland, J.A.	1970	Rememberings	Philosophical Studies 21(6) 91-94		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Maitland1970Rememberings, author = {Maitland, Jeffrey A.}, title = {Rememberings}, year = {1970}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {21}, number = {6}, pages = {91--94}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00505349} }
Malcolm, N.	1970	Memory and representation	Noûs 4(1) 59-70		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Malcolm1970Memory, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {Memory and representation}, year = {1970}, journal = {Noûs}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {59--70}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2214294} }
Merrill, K.R.	1970	Comments on Professor H. D. Lewis', "Self-identity and memory"	Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1(1) 230-236		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Merrill1970Comments, author = {Merrill, Kenneth R.}, title = {Comments on Professor H. D. Lewis', "Self-identity and memory"}, year = {1970}, journal = {Southwestern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {230--236}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swjphil197011/226} }
Reck, A.J.	1970	Critical remarks on H. D. Lewis' "Self-identity and memory"	Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 1(1) 224-229		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Reck1970Critical, author = {Reck, Andrew J.}, title = {Critical remarks on H. D. Lewis' "Self-identity and memory"}, year = {1970}, journal = {Southwestern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {1}, number = {1}, pages = {224--229}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swjphil197011/225} }
Santayana, G.	1970	On synthesis and memory with prefatory note	The Journal of Philosophy 67(1) 5-17		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Santayana1970synthesis, author = {Santayana, George}, title = {On synthesis and memory with prefatory note}, year = {1970}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {67}, number = {1}, pages = {5--17}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2024102} }
Shoemaker, S.	1970	Persons and their pasts	American Philosophical Quarterly 7(4) 269-285			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shoemaker1970Persons, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Persons and their pasts}, year = {1970}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {269--285} }
Williams, B.	1970	The self and the future	The Philosophical Review 79(2) 161-180		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Williams1970self, author = {Williams, Bernard}, title = {The self and the future}, year = {1970}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {79}, number = {2}, pages = {161--180}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183946} }
Morris, J.	1969	Pattern recognition in Descartes' automata	Isis 60(4) 451-460		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Morris1969Pattern, author = {Morris, John}, title = {Pattern recognition in Descartes' automata}, year = {1969}, journal = {Isis}, volume = {60}, number = {4}, pages = {451--460}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/350536} }
Odegard, D.	1969	Personal and bodily identity	The Philosophical Quarterly 19(74) 69-71		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Odegard1969Personal, author = {Odegard, Douglas}, title = {Personal and bodily identity}, year = {1969}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {19}, number = {74}, pages = {69--71}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2218190} }
Squires, R.	1969	Memory unchained	The Philosophical Review 78(2) 178-196		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Squires1969Memory, author = {Squires, Roger}, title = {Memory unchained}, year = {1969}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {78}, number = {2}, pages = {178--196}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2184180} }
Barton, W.B.	1968	Remembrance of things past	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 6(4) 251-254		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Barton1968Remembrance, author = {Barton, William B.}, title = {Remembrance of things past}, year = {1968}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {6}, number = {4}, pages = {251--254}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1968.tb02182.x} }
Mayo, B.	1968	Traces and portents	The Philosophical Quarterly 18(73) 289-298		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mayo1968Traces, author = {Mayo, Bernard}, title = {Traces and portents}, year = {1968}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {18}, number = {73}, pages = {289--298}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2217790} }
Sharpe, R.	1968	Factual memory	Mind 77(305) 131-132		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Sharpe1968Factual, author = {Sharpe, Robert}, title = {Factual memory}, year = {1968}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {77}, number = {305}, pages = {131--132}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXVII.305.131} }
Zemach, E.M.	1968	A definition of memory	Mind 77(308) 526-536			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Zemach1968definition, author = {Zemach, E. M.}, title = {A definition of memory}, year = {1968}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {77}, number = {308}, pages = {526--536} }
Čapek, M.	1967	Time and eternity in Royce and Bergson	Revue internationale de philosophie 21(1/2) 22-45			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Capek1967Time, author = {Čapek, Milič}, title = {Time and eternity in Royce and Bergson}, year = {1967}, journal = {Revue internationale de philosophie}, volume = {21}, number = {1/2}, pages = {22--45} }
Crosson, P.	1967	Memory, models and meaning	Philosophy and Cybernetics: Essays Delivered to the Philosophic Institute for Artificial Intelligence at the University of Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press 183-202			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Crosson1967Memory, author = {Crosson, P.}, title = {Memory, models and meaning}, year = {1967}, booktitle = {Philosophy and Cybernetics: Essays Delivered to the Philosophic Institute for Artificial Intelligence at the University of Notre Dame}, editor = {Crosson, F. and Sayre, K.}, publisher = {University of Notre Dame Press}, pages = {183--202} }
Greenwood, T.	1967	Personal identity and memory	The Philosophical Quarterly 17(69) 334-344		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Greenwood1967Personal, author = {Greenwood, Terence}, title = {Personal identity and memory}, year = {1967}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {17}, number = {69}, pages = {334--344}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2217455} }
Odegard, D.	1967	Locke, habitual knowledge and memory	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 6(03) 379-382		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Odegard1967Locke, author = {Odegard, Douglas}, title = {Locke, habitual knowledge and memory}, year = {1967}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {6}, number = {03}, pages = {379--382}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S001221730003482X} }
Siegler, F.A.	1967	Remembering dreams	The Philosophical Quarterly 17(66) 14-24		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Siegler1967Remembering, author = {Siegler, Frederick A.}, title = {Remembering dreams}, year = {1967}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {17}, number = {66}, pages = {14--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2218362} }
Urmson, J.O.	1967	Memory and imagination	Mind 76(301) 83-91			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Urmson1967Memory, author = {Urmson, J. O.}, title = {Memory and imagination}, year = {1967}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {76}, number = {301}, pages = {83--91} }
Alexander, S.	1966	Space, Time, and Deity	Palgrave Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Alexander1966Space, author = {Alexander, Samuel}, title = {Space, Time, and Deity}, year = {1966}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan} }
Cornman, J.W.	1966	More on mistaken memory	Analysis 27(2) 57-58		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cornman1966More, author = {Cornman, James W.}, title = {More on mistaken memory}, year = {1966}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, pages = {57--58}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/27.2.57} }
Gibson, Q.	1966	Knowing the future	Analysis 27(2) 59-64		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gibson1966Knowing, author = {Gibson, Quentin}, title = {Knowing the future}, year = {1966}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {27}, number = {2}, pages = {59--64}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3326301} }
Hartshorne, C.	1966	Determinism, memory, and the metaphysics of becoming	World Futures 4(4) 81-85		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hartshorne1966Determinism, author = {Hartshorne, Charles}, title = {Determinism, memory, and the metaphysics of becoming}, year = {1966}, journal = {World Futures}, volume = {4}, number = {4}, pages = {81--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.1966.9971549} }
Martin, C. and Deutscher, M.	1966	Remembering	The Philosophical Review 75(2) 161-196		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Martin1966Remembering, author = {Martin, C.B. and Deutscher, Max}, title = {Remembering}, year = {1966}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {75}, number = {2}, pages = {161--196}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183082} }
Munsat, S.	1966	The Concept of Memory	Random House			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Munsat1966Concept, author = {Munsat, Stanley}, title = {The Concept of Memory}, year = {1966}, publisher = {Random House} }
Naylor, A.	1966	On "remembering" an unreal past	Analysis 26(4) 122-128		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Naylor1966remembering, author = {Naylor, Andrew}, title = {On "remembering" an unreal past}, year = {1966}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {26}, number = {4}, pages = {122--128}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3326544} }
Smith, B.	1966	Memory	George Allen and Unwin			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Smith1966Memory, author = {Smith, Brian}, title = {Memory}, year = {1966}, publisher = {George Allen and Unwin} }
Starobinski, J.	1966	The idea of nostalgia	Diogenes 14(54) 81-103		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Starobinski1966idea, author = {Starobinski, Jean}, title = {The idea of nostalgia}, year = {1966}, journal = {Diogenes}, volume = {14}, number = {54}, pages = {81--103}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/039219216601405405} }
Stocker, M.A.G.	1966	Memory and the private language argument	The Philosophical Quarterly 16(62) 47-53		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Stocker1966Memory, author = {Stocker, Michael A. G.}, title = {Memory and the private language argument}, year = {1966}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {16}, number = {62}, pages = {47--53}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2217880} }
Swinburne, R.G.	1966	Knowledge of past and future	Analysis 26(5) 166-172		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Swinburne1966Knowledge, author = {Swinburne, R G}, title = {Knowledge of past and future}, year = {1966}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {26}, number = {5}, pages = {166--172}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/3326452} }
Tilghman, B.R.	1966	Causality and memory	World Futures 4(4) 71-80		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Tilghman1966Causality, author = {Tilghman, B. R.}, title = {Causality and memory}, year = {1966}, journal = {World Futures}, volume = {4}, number = {4}, pages = {71--80}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/02604027.1966.9971548} }
Cornman, J.W.	1965	Malcolm's mistaken memory	Analysis 25(5) 161-167		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cornman1965Malcolms, author = {Cornman, James W.}, title = {Malcolm's mistaken memory}, year = {1965}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {25}, number = {5}, pages = {161--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/25.5.161} }
Frankfurt, H.G.	1965	A reply to Mr. Nelson	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 4(01) 92-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Frankfurt1965reply, author = {Frankfurt, Harry G.}, title = {A reply to Mr. Nelson}, year = {1965}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {4}, number = {01}, pages = {92--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300033345} }
Kourany, J.A.	1965	Memory	The Journal of Philosophy 62(15) 387-398		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kourany1965Memory, author = {Kourany, Janet A.}, title = {Memory}, year = {1965}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {62}, number = {15}, pages = {387--398}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2023450} }
Krimerman, L.I.	1965	Memory and Justification	The Southern Journal of Philosophy 3(2) 70-76		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Krimerman1965Memory, author = {Krimerman, Leonard I.}, title = {Memory and Justification}, year = {1965}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {3}, number = {2}, pages = {70--76}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1965.tb01692.x} }
Matthews, G.B.	1965	Augustine on speaking from memory	American Philosophical Quarterly 2(2) 157-160			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Matthews1965Augustine, author = {Matthews, Gareth B.}, title = {Augustine on speaking from memory}, year = {1965}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {157--160} }
Meissner, W.	1965	The function of memory and psychic structure	Journal of Existentialism 6(21) 41-52			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Meissner1965function, author = {Meissner, W}, title = {The function of memory and psychic structure}, year = {1965}, journal = {Journal of Existentialism}, volume = {6}, number = {21}, pages = {41--52} }
Munsat, S.	1965	A note on factual memory	Philosophical Studies 16(3) 33-40		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Munsat1965note, author = {Munsat, Stanley}, title = {A note on factual memory}, year = {1965}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {33--40}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00422636} }
Rozeboom, W.W.	1965	The concept of memory	Psychological Record 15(3) 329-368	[abstract]	[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
Abstract: The primary thesis here developed is that virtually nothing in modern research on "memory" has actually dealt with memory at all, for the simple reason that (put oversimply) this research has concerned itself with the retention of associations whereas memory proper is the recall of beliefs. Related objectives are clarification of the concept of "learning," and introduction of a methodological distinction between process variables and state variables which has profound importance not merely for analysis of a behavior system's formal dynamics but also for the practical development of psychological theory .
BibTeX: @article{Rozeboom1965concept, author = {Rozeboom, William W.}, title = {The concept of memory}, year = {1965}, journal = {Psychological Record}, volume = {15}, number = {3}, pages = {329--368}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03393601} }
Saunders, J.T.	1965	Does all memory imply factual memory?	Analysis 25(Suppl-3) 109-115		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Saunders1965Does, author = {Saunders, John Turk}, title = {Does all memory imply factual memory?}, year = {1965}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {25}, number = {Suppl-3}, pages = {109--115}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/25.Suppl-3.109} }
Saunders, J.T.	1965	Professor Malcolm's definition of 'factual memory'	Theoria 31 282-288			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Saunders1965Professor, author = {Saunders, John Turk}, title = {Professor Malcolm's definition of 'factual memory'}, year = {1965}, journal = {Theoria}, volume = {31}, pages = {282--288} }
Vlastos, G.	1965	Anamnesis in the Meno	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 4(02) 143-167		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Vlastos1965Anamnesis, author = {Vlastos, Gregory}, title = {Anamnesis in the Meno}, year = {1965}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {4}, number = {02}, pages = {143--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300033539} }
Warren, E.W.	1965	Memory in Plotinus	The Classical Quarterly 15(02) 252-260		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Warren1965Memory, author = {Warren, Edward W.}, title = {Memory in Plotinus}, year = {1965}, journal = {The Classical Quarterly}, volume = {15}, number = {02}, pages = {252--260}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0009838800008910} }
Garver, N.	1964	Criterion of personal identity	The Journal of Philosophy 61(24) 779-784		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Garver1964Criterion, author = {Garver, Newton}, title = {Criterion of personal identity}, year = {1964}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {61}, number = {24}, pages = {779--784}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2023393} }
Nelson, J.O.	1964	In defence of Descartes: Squaring a reputed circle	Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie 3(03) 262-272		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Nelson1964defence, author = {Nelson, John O.}, title = {In defence of Descartes: Squaring a reputed circle}, year = {1964}, journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie}, volume = {3}, number = {03}, pages = {262--272}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S001221730003540X} }
Palma, A.	1964	Memory and personal identity	Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42(1) 53-68		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Palma1964Memory, author = {Palma, A.B.}, title = {Memory and personal identity}, year = {1964}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {42}, number = {1}, pages = {53--68}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048406412341041} }
Bond, E.J.	1963	The concept of the past	Mind 72(288) 533-544		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bond1963concept, author = {Bond, Edward J.}, title = {The concept of the past}, year = {1963}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {72}, number = {288}, pages = {533--544}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXXII.288.533} }
Chappell, V.C.	1963	The concept of dreaming	The Philosophical Quarterly 13(52) 193-213		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Chappell1963concept, author = {Chappell, V. C.}, title = {The concept of dreaming}, year = {1963}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {13}, number = {52}, pages = {193--213}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2955487} }
Malcolm, N.	1963	Knowledge and Certainty	Prentice-Hall			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Malcolm1963Knowledge, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {Knowledge and Certainty}, year = {1963}, publisher = {Prentice-Hall} }
Malcolm, N.	1963	Memory and the past	Monist 47(2) 247-266		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Malcolm1963Memory, author = {Malcolm, Norman}, title = {Memory and the past}, year = {1963}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {47}, number = {2}, pages = {247--266}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist196347215} }
Nelson, J.O.	1963	The validation of memory and our conception of a past	The Philosophical Review 72(1) 35-47		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Nelson1963validation, author = {Nelson, John O.}, title = {The validation of memory and our conception of a past}, year = {1963}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {72}, number = {1}, pages = {35--47}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183055} }
Saunders, J.T.	1963	Skepticism and memory	The Philosophical Review 72(4) 477		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Saunders1963Skepticism, author = {Saunders, John Turk}, title = {Skepticism and memory}, year = {1963}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {72}, number = {4}, pages = {477}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183032} }
Shoemaker, S.	1963	Self-knowledge and self-identity	Cornell University Press			[BibTeX]
BibTeX: @book{Shoemaker1963Self, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Self-knowledge and self-identity}, year = {1963}, publisher = {Cornell University Press} }
Singer, M.G.	1963	Meaning, memory, and the moment of creation	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63(1) 187-202		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Singer1963Meaning, author = {Singer, Marcus G.}, title = {Meaning, memory, and the moment of creation}, year = {1963}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {63}, number = {1}, pages = {187--202}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/63.1.187} }
Frankfurt, H.G.	1962	Memory and the Cartesian circle	The Philosophical Review 71(4) 504-511		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Frankfurt1962Memory, author = {Frankfurt, Harry G.}, title = {Memory and the Cartesian circle}, year = {1962}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {71}, number = {4}, pages = {504--511}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2183463} }
Landesman, C.	1962	Philosophical problems of memory	The Journal of Philosophy 59(3) 57-65		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Landesman1962Philosophical, author = {Landesman, Charles}, title = {Philosophical problems of memory}, year = {1962}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {59}, number = {3}, pages = {57--65}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2023577} }
Straus, E.	1962	On memory traces	Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 24(1) 91-122			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Straus1962memory, author = {Straus, E.}, title = {On memory traces}, year = {1962}, journal = {Tijdschrift voor Filosofie}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {91--122} }
Coburn, R.C.	1960	A defect in Harrod's inductive justification of memory	Philosophical Studies 11(6) 81-85		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Coburn1960defect, author = {Coburn, Robert C}, title = {A defect in Harrod's inductive justification of memory}, year = {1960}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {11}, number = {6}, pages = {81--85}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00420813} }
Von Leyden, W.	1960	Remembering: A Philosophical Problem	Duckworth			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{VonLeyden1960Remembering, author = {Von Leyden, W.}, title = {Remembering: A Philosophical Problem}, year = {1960}, publisher = {Duckworth} }
Butler, R.J.	1959	Other dates	Mind 68(269) 16-33			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Butler1959Other, author = {Butler, Richard J.}, title = {Other dates}, year = {1959}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {68}, number = {269}, pages = {16--33} }
Penelhum, T.	1959	Personal identity, memory, and survival	The Journal of Philosophy 56(22) 882-903		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Penelhum1959Personal, author = {Penelhum, Terence}, title = {Personal identity, memory, and survival}, year = {1959}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {56}, number = {22}, pages = {882--903}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2022318} }
Shoemaker, S.	1959	Personal identity and memory	The Journal of Philosophy 56(22) 868-882		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shoemaker1959Personal, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Personal identity and memory}, year = {1959}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {56}, number = {22}, pages = {868--882}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2022317} }
Taylor, R.	1959	Moving about in time	The Philosophical Quarterly 9(37) 289-301		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Taylor1959Moving, author = {Taylor, Richard}, title = {Moving about in time}, year = {1959}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {9}, number = {37}, pages = {289--301}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2216362} }
Ryle, G.	1958	On forgetting the difference between right and wrong	Essays in Moral Philosophy University of Washington Press 147-159			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ryle1958forgetting, author = {Ryle, Gilbert}, title = {On forgetting the difference between right and wrong}, year = {1958}, booktitle = {Essays in Moral Philosophy}, editor = {Melden, A.}, publisher = {University of Washington Press}, pages = {147--159} }
Hallie, P.P.	1957	Empiricism, memory and verification	Mind 66(261) 93-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Hallie1957Empiricism, author = {Hallie, Philip P.}, title = {Empiricism, memory and verification}, year = {1957}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {66}, number = {261}, pages = {93--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXVI.261.93} }
Shaffer, J.	1957	Taylor's analogy of memory and vision	The Philosophical Review 66(2) 242-250		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Shaffer1957Taylors, author = {Shaffer, Jerome}, title = {Taylor's analogy of memory and vision}, year = {1957}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {66}, number = {2}, pages = {242--250}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2182378} }
Strawson, P.F.	1957	Professor Ayer's "The Problem of Knowledge"	Philosophy 32(123) 302-314			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Strawson1957Professor, author = {Strawson, P. F.}, title = {Professor Ayer's "The Problem of Knowledge"}, year = {1957}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {32}, number = {123}, pages = {302--314} }
Ayer, A.J.	1956	The Problem of Knowledge	Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ayer1956Problem, author = {Ayer, A. J.}, title = {The Problem of Knowledge}, year = {1956}, publisher = {Macmillan} }
Benjamin, B.	1956	Remembering	Mind 65(1) 312-331			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Benjamin1956Remembering, author = {Benjamin, B.S.}, title = {Remembering}, year = {1956}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, pages = {312--331} }
Earle, W.	1956	Memory	Review of Metaphysics 10(1) 3-27			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Earle1956Memory, author = {Earle, William}, title = {Memory}, year = {1956}, journal = {Review of Metaphysics}, volume = {10}, number = {1}, pages = {3--27} }
Furlong, E.J.	1956	The empiricist theory of memory	Mind 65(1) 542-547		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Furlong1956empiricist, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {The empiricist theory of memory}, year = {1956}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {65}, number = {1}, pages = {542--547}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/65.1.542} }
Harrod, R.F.	1956	Foundations of Inductive Logic	Macmillan Education			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Harrod1956Foundations, author = {Harrod, R. F.}, title = {Foundations of Inductive Logic}, year = {1956}, publisher = {Macmillan Education} }
McGechie, J.E.	1956	Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"	Analysis 16(6) 122-123		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McGechie1956Report, author = {McGechie, J. E.}, title = {Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"}, year = {1956}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {16}, number = {6}, pages = {122--123}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/16.6.122} }
Searle, J.R.	1956	Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"	Analysis 16(6) 124-125		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Searle1956Report, author = {Searle, John R.}, title = {Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"}, year = {1956}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {16}, number = {6}, pages = {124--125}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/16.6.124} }
Taylor, R.	1956	Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"	Analysis 16(6) 125-126		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Taylor1956Report, author = {Taylor, Richard}, title = {Report on Analysis 'Problem' No. 9 "Does it Make Sense to Suppose That All Events, Including Personal Experiences, Could Occur in Reverse?"}, year = {1956}, journal = {Analysis}, volume = {16}, number = {6}, pages = {125--126}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/16.6.125} }
Taylor, R.	1956	The "justification" of memories and the analogy of vision	The Philosophical Review 65(2) 192-205		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Taylor1956justification, author = {Taylor, Richard}, title = {The "justification" of memories and the analogy of vision}, year = {1956}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {65}, number = {2}, pages = {192--205}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2182831} }
Brandt, R.B.	1955	The epistemological status of memory beliefs	The Philosophical Review 64(1) 78-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brandt1955epistemological, author = {Brandt, Richard B.}, title = {The epistemological status of memory beliefs}, year = {1955}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {64}, number = {1}, pages = {78--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2182234} }
Waters, B.	1955	The past and the historical past	The Journal of Philosophy 52(10) 253-269		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Waters1955past, author = {Waters, Bruce}, title = {The past and the historical past}, year = {1955}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {52}, number = {10}, pages = {253--269}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2021145} }
Brandt, R.B.	1954	A puzzle in Lewis's theory of memory	Philosophical Studies 5(6) 88-95		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Brandt1954puzzle, author = {Brandt, Richard B.}, title = {A puzzle in Lewis's theory of memory}, year = {1954}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, volume = {5}, number = {6}, pages = {88--95}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02223697} }
Furlong, E.J.	1954	Memory and the argument from illusion	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54(1) 131-144		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Furlong1954Memory, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {Memory and the argument from illusion}, year = {1954}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {54}, number = {1}, pages = {131--144}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/54.1.131} }
Holland, R.F.	1954	The empiricist theory of memory	Mind 63(252) 464-486			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Holland1954empiricist, author = {Holland, R. F.}, title = {The empiricist theory of memory}, year = {1954}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {63}, number = {252}, pages = {464--486} }
Elsasser, W.M.	1953	A reformulation of Bergson's theory of memory	Philosophy of Science 20(1) 7-21		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Elsasser1953reformulation, author = {Elsasser, Walter M.}, title = {A reformulation of Bergson's theory of memory}, year = {1953}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, volume = {20}, number = {1}, pages = {7--21}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/287232} }
Moore, G.E.	1953	Some Main Problems of Philosophy	George Allen and Unwin Ltd.			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Moore1953Some, author = {Moore, George Edward}, title = {Some Main Problems of Philosophy}, year = {1953}, publisher = {George Allen and Unwin Ltd.} }
Price, H.H.	1953	Thinking and Experience	Hutchinson & Co			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Price1953Thinking, author = {Price, H. H.}, title = {Thinking and Experience}, year = {1953}, publisher = {Hutchinson & Co} }
Ayer, A.J.	1952	Statements about the past: The presidential address	52(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society i-xx			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @incollection{Ayer1952Statements, author = {Ayer, A. J.}, title = {Statements about the past: The presidential address}, year = {1952}, volume = {52}, number = {1}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, pages = {i--xx} }
Price, H.H.	1952	Discussion: E. J. Furlong's 'Memory'	The Philosophical Quarterly 2(9) 350-355			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Price1952Discussion, author = {Price, H. H.}, title = {Discussion: E. J. Furlong's 'Memory'}, year = {1952}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {2}, number = {9}, pages = {350--355} }
Price, H.H.	1952	Memory	The Philosophical Quarterly 2(9) 350-355		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Price1952Memory, author = {Price, H. H.}, title = {Memory}, year = {1952}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, volume = {2}, number = {9}, pages = {350--355}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2216815} }
Furlong, E.J.	1951	A Study in Memory: A Philosophical Essay	Thomas Nelson & Sons			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Furlong1951Study, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {A Study in Memory: A Philosophical Essay}, year = {1951}, publisher = {Thomas Nelson & Sons} }
Mabbott, J.D.	1951	Our direct experience of time	Mind 60(238) 153-167		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mabbott1951Our, author = {Mabbott, J. D.}, title = {Our direct experience of time}, year = {1951}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {60}, number = {238}, pages = {153--167}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LX.238.153} }
Ryle, G.	1949	The Concept of Mind	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Ryle1949Concept, author = {Ryle, Gilbert}, title = {The Concept of Mind}, year = {1949}, publisher = {Routledge} }
Woozley, A.D.	1949	Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction	Hutchinson & Co.			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Woozley1949Theory, author = {Woozley, A. D.}, title = {Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction}, year = {1949}, publisher = {Hutchinson & Co.} }
Furlong, E.J.	1948	Memory	Mind 57(225) 16-44			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Furlong1948Memory, author = {Furlong, E. J.}, title = {Memory}, year = {1948}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {57}, number = {225}, pages = {16--44} }
Merlan, P.	1947	Time consciousness in Husserl and Heidegger	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8(1) 23-54		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Merlan1947Time, author = {Merlan, Philip}, title = {Time consciousness in Husserl and Heidegger}, year = {1947}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, volume = {8}, number = {1}, pages = {23--54}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2102915} }
Lewis, C.I.	1946	An Analysis Of Knowledge And Valuation	Open Court			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Lewis1946Analysis, author = {Lewis, C. I.}, title = {An Analysis Of Knowledge And Valuation}, year = {1946}, publisher = {Open Court} }
Rowell, E.M.	1946	Memory as accompaniment	Philosophy 21(80) 258-262		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rowell1946Memory, author = {Rowell, E. M.}, title = {Memory as accompaniment}, year = {1946}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {21}, number = {80}, pages = {258--262}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100005544} }
Mackay, D.S.	1945	The illusion of memory	The Philosophical Review 54(4) 297-320		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Mackay1945illusion, author = {Mackay, D. S.}, title = {The illusion of memory}, year = {1945}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {54}, number = {4}, pages = {297--320}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2181745} }
Rowell, E.M.	1944	Memory: A cloud of witness	Philosophy 19(73) 130-135		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rowell1944Memory, author = {Rowell, E. M.}, title = {Memory: A cloud of witness}, year = {1944}, journal = {Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {73}, pages = {130--135}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819100004629} }
Harrod, R.F.	1942	Memory	Mind 51(201) 47-68		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Harrod1942Memory, author = {Harrod, R. F.}, title = {Memory}, year = {1942}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {51}, number = {201}, pages = {47--68}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LI.201.47} }
Bourke, V.J.	1941	Intellectual memory in the Thomistic theory of knowledge	The Modern Schoolman 18(2) 21-24		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bourke1941Intellectual, author = {Bourke, Vernon J}, title = {Intellectual memory in the Thomistic theory of knowledge}, year = {1941}, journal = {The Modern Schoolman}, volume = {18}, number = {2}, pages = {21--24}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/schoolman194118217} }
Harvey, J.W.	1941	Knowledge of the past	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 41(1) 149-166		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Harvey1941Knowledge, author = {Harvey, J. W.}, title = {Knowledge of the past}, year = {1941}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {41}, number = {1}, pages = {149--166}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/41.1.149} }
Taylor, D.	1938	Realism and memory	Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 16(3) 218-232		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Taylor1938Realism, author = {Taylor, D.}, title = {Realism and memory}, year = {1938}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy}, volume = {16}, number = {3}, pages = {218--232}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00048403808541115} }
Laird, J.	1936	Memory-knowledge	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society S15 34-41			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Laird1936Memory, author = {Laird, John}, title = {Memory-knowledge}, year = {1936}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {S15}, pages = {34--41} }
Price, H.H.	1936	Memory-knowledge	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society S15 16-33			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Price1936Memory, author = {Price, H. H.}, title = {Memory-knowledge}, year = {1936}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {S15}, pages = {16--33} }
Wright, J.N.	1936	Memory-knowledge	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society S15 42-60			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wright1936Memory, author = {Wright, J. N.}, title = {Memory-knowledge}, year = {1936}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {S15}, pages = {42--60} }
McGilvary, E.B.	1933	Perceptual and memory perspectives	The Journal of Philosophy 30(12) 309-330		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{McGilvary1933Perceptual, author = {McGilvary, Evander Bradley}, title = {Perceptual and memory perspectives}, year = {1933}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {30}, number = {12}, pages = {309--330}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2016539} }
Oakeley, H.D.	1932	The status of the past	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 32(1) 227-250		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Oakeley1932status, author = {Oakeley, H. D.}, title = {The status of the past}, year = {1932}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {32}, number = {1}, pages = {227--250}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/32.1.227} }
Stout, G.F.	1931	Mind and Matter	Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Stout1931Mind, author = {Stout, G. F.}, title = {Mind and Matter}, year = {1931}, publisher = {Macmillan} }
Stout, G.F.	1930	Studies in Philosophy and Psychology	Macmillan			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Stout1930Studies, author = {Stout, G. F.}, title = {Studies in Philosophy and Psychology}, year = {1930}, publisher = {Macmillan} }
Oakeley, H.D.	1927	The world as memory and as history	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27(1) 291-316		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Oakeley1927world, author = {Oakeley, H. D.}, title = {The world as memory and as history}, year = {1927}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {27}, number = {1}, pages = {291--316}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/27.1.291} }
Broad, C.D.	1925	The Mind and Its Place in Nature	Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Broad1925Mind, author = {Broad, C. D.}, title = {The Mind and Its Place in Nature}, year = {1925}, publisher = {Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.} }
Collingwood, R.G.	1925	Some perplexities about time: With an attempted solution	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 26 135-150			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Collingwood1925Some, author = {Collingwood, R. G.}, title = {Some perplexities about time: With an attempted solution}, year = {1925}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {26}, pages = {135--150} }
Gregory, J.C.	1923	Memory, forgetfulness, and mistakes of recognition in waking and dreaming	Monist 33(1) 15-32		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gregory1923Memory, author = {Gregory, Joshua C.}, title = {Memory, forgetfulness, and mistakes of recognition in waking and dreaming}, year = {1923}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {33}, number = {1}, editor = {Sugden, Sherwood J. B.}, pages = {15--32}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19233314} }
Kantor, J.R.	1922	Memory: A triphase objective action	The Journal of Philosophy 19(23) 624-639		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kantor1922Memory, author = {Kantor, J. R.}, title = {Memory: A triphase objective action}, year = {1922}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {19}, number = {23}, pages = {624--639}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2939359} }
Rogers, A.K.	1922	The logic of memory	The Philosophical Review 31(3) 281-285		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Rogers1922logic, author = {Rogers, A. K.}, title = {The logic of memory}, year = {1922}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {31}, number = {3}, pages = {281--285}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2179295} }
Demos, R.	1921	Memory as knowledge of the past	Monist 31(3) 397-408		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Demos1921Memory, author = {Demos, Raphael}, title = {Memory as knowledge of the past}, year = {1921}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {31}, number = {3}, pages = {397--408}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist192131337} }
Russell, B.	1921	The Analysis of Mind	Routledge			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Russell1921Analysis, author = {Russell, Bertrand}, title = {The Analysis of Mind}, year = {1921}, publisher = {Routledge}, edition = {2005} }
Laird, J.	1920	A Study in Realism	Cambridge University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Laird1920Study, author = {Laird, John}, title = {A Study in Realism}, year = {1920}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press} }
Wrinch, D.	1920	On the nature of memory	Mind 29(1) 46-61		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Wrinch1920nature, author = {Wrinch, Dorothy}, title = {On the nature of memory}, year = {1920}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {29}, number = {1}, pages = {46--61}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXIX.1.46} }
Baillie, J.B.	1917	On the nature of memory knowledge	Mind 26(1) 249-272		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Baillie1917nature, author = {Baillie, J. B.}, title = {On the nature of memory knowledge}, year = {1917}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {249--272}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXVI.1.249} }
Laird, J.	1917	Recollection, association and memory	Mind 26(1) 407-427		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Laird1917Recollection, author = {Laird, John}, title = {Recollection, association and memory}, year = {1917}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {26}, number = {1}, pages = {407--427}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXVI.1.407} }
Russell, B.	1915	On the experience of time	Monist 25(2) 212-233		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Russell1915experience, author = {Russell, Bertrand}, title = {On the experience of time}, year = {1915}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {25}, number = {2}, pages = {212--233}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191525217} }
Costelloe, K.	1914	An answer to Mr. Bertrand Russell's article on the philosophy of Bergson	Monist 24(1) 145-155		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Costelloe1914answer, author = {Costelloe, Karin}, title = {An answer to Mr. Bertrand Russell's article on the philosophy of Bergson}, year = {1914}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {145--155}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191424130} }
Russell, B.	1914	On the nature of acquaintance	Monist 24(1) 1-16		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Russell1914nature, author = {Russell, Bertrand}, title = {On the nature of acquaintance}, year = {1914}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {24}, number = {1}, pages = {1--16}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist191424222} }
Robinson, A.	1913	Memory and consciousness	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 13(1) 313-327		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Robinson1913Memory, author = {Robinson, Arthur}, title = {Memory and consciousness}, year = {1913}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, pages = {313--327}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/13.1.313} }
Alexander, S.	1912	Discussion	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12 206-215			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Alexander1912Discussion, author = {Alexander, Samuel}, title = {Discussion}, year = {1912}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {12}, pages = {206--215} }
Edgell, B.	1912	Imagery and memory	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12(1) 188-215		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Edgell1912Imagery, author = {Edgell, Beatrice}, title = {Imagery and memory}, year = {1912}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, volume = {12}, number = {1}, pages = {188--215}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/12.1.188} }
Fawcett, E.D.	1912	Matter and memory	Mind 21(82) 201-232		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Fawcett1912Matter, author = {Fawcett, Edward Douglas}, title = {Matter and memory}, year = {1912}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {21}, number = {82}, pages = {201--232}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXI.82.201} }
Russell, B.	1912	The Problems of Philosophy	Oxford University Press			[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @book{Russell1912Problems, author = {Russell, Bertrand}, title = {The Problems of Philosophy}, year = {1912}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, edition = {2001} }
Bradley, F.H.	1908	On memory and judgement	Mind 17(2) 153-174		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bradley1908memory, author = {Bradley, F. H.}, title = {On memory and judgement}, year = {1908}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {17}, number = {2}, pages = {153--174}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.2.153} }
Cook, O.F.	1908	Heredity related to memory and instinct	Monist 18(3) 363-387		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Cook1908Heredity, author = {Cook, O. F.}, title = {Heredity related to memory and instinct}, year = {1908}, journal = {Monist}, volume = {18}, number = {3}, pages = {363--387}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/monist190818325} }
Kuhlmann, F.	1907	Problems in the analysis of the memory consciousness	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4(1) 5-14		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Kuhlmann1907Problems, author = {Kuhlmann, F.}, title = {Problems in the analysis of the memory consciousness}, year = {1907}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {5--14}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2011390} }
Perry, R.B.	1906	The knowledge of past events	The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3(23) 617-626		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Perry1906knowledge, author = {Perry, Ralph Barton}, title = {The knowledge of past events}, year = {1906}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods}, volume = {3}, number = {23}, pages = {617--626}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2011547} }
Bradley, F.H.	1899	Some remarks on memory and inference	Mind 8(2) 145-166		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bradley1899Some, author = {Bradley, F. H.}, title = {Some remarks on memory and inference}, year = {1899}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {8}, number = {2}, pages = {145--166}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/VIII.2.145} }
Titchener, E.B.	1895	Affective memory	The Philosophical Review 4(1) 65-76		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Titchener1895Affective, author = {Titchener, E. B.}, title = {Affective memory}, year = {1895}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, volume = {4}, number = {1}, pages = {65--76}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/2175845} }
Burnham, W.H.	1889	Memory, historically and experimentally considered. II. Modern conceptions of memory	The American Journal of Psychology 2(2) 225-270		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burnham1889Memory, author = {Burnham, W. H.}, title = {Memory, historically and experimentally considered. II. Modern conceptions of memory}, year = {1889}, journal = {The American Journal of Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {2}, pages = {225--270}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1411781} }
Burnham, W.H.	1889	Memory, historically and experimentally considered. III. Paramnesia	The American Journal of Psychology 2(3) 431-464		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burnham1889Memoryb, author = {Burnham, W. H.}, title = {Memory, historically and experimentally considered. III. Paramnesia}, year = {1889}, journal = {The American Journal of Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {3}, pages = {431--464}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1411957} }
Burnham, W.H.	1889	Memory, historically and experimentally considered. IV	The American Journal of Psychology 2(4) 568-622		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burnham1889Memoryc, author = {Burnham, W. H.}, title = {Memory, historically and experimentally considered. IV}, year = {1889}, journal = {The American Journal of Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {4}, pages = {568--622}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1411858} }
Burnham, W.H.	1888	Memory, historically and experimentally considered. I. An historical sketch of the older conceptions of memory	The American Journal of Psychology 2(1) 39-90		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Burnham1888Memory, author = {Burnham, W. H.}, title = {Memory, historically and experimentally considered. I. An historical sketch of the older conceptions of memory}, year = {1888}, journal = {The American Journal of Psychology}, volume = {2}, number = {1}, pages = {39--90}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.2307/1411406} }
Gurney, E.	1888	Hallucination of memory and 'telepathy'	Mind 13(51) 415-417		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Gurney1888Hallucination, author = {Gurney, Edmund}, title = {Hallucination of memory and 'telepathy'}, year = {1888}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {13}, number = {51}, pages = {415--417}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-XIII.51.415} }
Royce, J.	1888	Hallucination of memory and 'telepathy'	Mind 13(50) 244-248		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Royce1888Hallucination, author = {Royce, Josiah}, title = {Hallucination of memory and 'telepathy'}, year = {1888}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {13}, number = {50}, pages = {244--248}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-XIII.50.244} }
Bradley, F.H.	1887	Why do we remember forwards and not backwards?	Mind os-12(48) Oxford University Press 579-582		[DOI]	[BibTeX]	[file]
BibTeX: @article{Bradley1887Why, author = {Bradley, F. H.}, title = {Why do we remember forwards and not backwards?}, year = {1887}, journal = {Mind}, volume = {os-12}, number = {48}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, pages = {579--582}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/os-12.48.579} }

PhilMemBib:A comprehensive philosophy of memory bibliography

PhilMemBib:
A comprehensive philosophy of memory bibliography