I’m an Assistant Professor at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. I’m also an Affiliated Member of the Centre for Philosophy of Memory in Grenoble, where I was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow from 2021–2024.
My area of specialisation is the philosophy of mind, and my core interests concern the nature of intentionality and experience. In my ongoing work I investigate these by teasing out the revealing connections between memory, perception, and singular thought, drawing on robust developments in the sciences.
Prior to joining the CPM, I completed my DPhil (PhD) at the University of Oxford in 2018, after which I held positions at Haifa, Edinburgh, Warwick, and the Ruhr-Universität Bochum.
K. Michaelian, S. Sakuragi, J. Openshaw, and D. Perrin. Forthcoming. Mental time travel. Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies. Eds. L. Bietti and M. Pogačar. Palgrave.
J. Openshaw. Forthcoming. Does singular thought have an epistemic essence? Inquiry.
J. Openshaw. 2023. (In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway? Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 290-307.
J. Openshaw and A. Weksler. 2022. Perceptual capacitism: An argument for disjunctive disunity. Philosophical Studies 179: 3325–3348.
J. Openshaw. 2022. Remembering objects. Philosophers' Imprint 22(11): 1–20.
J. Openshaw. 2021. Thinking about many. Synthese 199: 2863–2882.
J. Openshaw and A. Weksler. 2020. A puzzle about seeing for representationalism. Philosophical Studies 177: 2625–2646.
J. Openshaw. 2018. Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports. Mind & Language 33(4): 415–437.
J. Openshaw. 2018. Self-ascription and the de se. Synthese 197: 2039–2050.