I'm a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy of Memory, where I lead the EU-funded Remembering Objects (2021–24) project.
My principal interests are in the philosophy of mind, but these have often take me into epistemology, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics. My work primarily explores interactions between singular thought (or reference), memory, and perceptual experience. Remembering Objects examines whether there are distinctively objectual forms of remembering and, more generally, what non-episodic forms of conscious recollection can tell us about the content, imagery, and nature of remembering and its relation to imagining.
Prior to joining the CPM I held postdoctoral positions at the University of Warwick (funded by a Mind Association award) and the University of Haifa. I’ve also held teaching posts at the University of Edinburgh and at the University of Oxford, where I received my PhD in 2018.
K. Michaelian, S. Sakuragi, J. Openshaw, and D. Perrin. Forthcoming. Mental time travel. Palgrave Encyclopedia of Memory Studies. Eds. L. Bietti and M. Pogačar. Palgrave.
J. Openshaw. Forthcoming. Does singular thought have an epistemic essence? Inquiry.
J. Openshaw. 2023. (In defence of) preservationism and the previous awareness condition: What is a theory of remembering, anyway? Philosophical Perspectives 37(1): 290-307.
J. Openshaw and A. Weksler. 2022. Perceptual capacitism: An argument for disjunctive disunity. Philosophical Studies 179: 3325–3348.
J. Openshaw. 2022. Remembering objects. Philosophers' Imprint 22(11): 1–20.
J. Openshaw. 2021. Thinking about many. Synthese 199: 2863–2882.
J. Openshaw and A. Weksler. 2020. A puzzle about seeing for representationalism. Philosophical Studies 177: 2625–2646.
J. Openshaw. 2018. Singular thoughts and de re attitude reports. Mind & Language 33(4): 415–437.
J. Openshaw. 2018. Self-ascription and the de se. Synthese 197: 2039–2050.