Causation in Memory

Call for papers:

Journal: Philosophical Psychology

Editors:

  • Nikola Andonovski (Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes)
  • Kourken Michaelian (Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes)
  • Sarah Robins (Purdue University)

Debates about causation have been at center stage in recent philosophy of memory. On the long-dominant causal theory, memory requires an appropriate causal connection to a past experience, sustained by a memory trace. Recent developments have posed a number of challenges to this received view. New empirical work has raised doubts about the prominence, and even existence, of discrete memory traces. Evidence about the varieties of reconstruction in memory has deepened the suspicion that such traces cannot sustain appropriate causal chains to the past. Even more prominently, the discovery of a close neural connection has led some theorists to re-characterize remembering as a kind of imaginative simulation, a process that does not require a causal link to a specific past experience. Reinvigorating the philosophical study of memory, these developments have raised significant questions about the nature and varieties of causation in memory.

The aim of this special issue is to draw attention to these questions and to bring together researchers examining conceptual and empirical issues pertaining to causation in memory. Questions addressed can include but are not limited to:

  • What is the nature of causal processes involved in remembering?
  • Which notion of causation is most appropriate for the study of memory?
  • When is a causal link in memory appropriate?
  • What is the role of memory traces in remembering?
  • Are there different kinds of memory traces?
  • What does the available evidence tell us about the necessity of appropriate causation in memory?
  • Which notion of necessity is most appropriate for the study of memory?
  • What are the prospects of (post-)causal theories of memory?
  • What is the relation between causation and the content of memory?

Invited contributors include:

  • Donna Rose Addis (University of Toronto)
  • Sara Aronowitz (University of Toronto)
  • Simon Brown (London School of Economics)
  • John Campbell (University of California, Berkeley)
  • Sen Cheng (Ruhr University Bochum)
  • Felipe De Brigard (Duke University)
  • Jonathan Najenson (Technion, Israel Institute of Technology)
  • Denis Perrin (Centre for Philosophy of Memory, UGA)
  • Tomás Ryan (Trinity College Dublin)
  • Markus Werning (Ruhr University Bochum)

Submission instructions: see the journal's website.