PhilMemBib:
A comprehensive philosophy of memory bibliography

About the bibliography: [show/hide]

Rationale: Given the growing coherence of the philosophy of memory as a research field, a comprehensive database of philosophical research on memory is necessary. Existing resources are valuable but unable to fulfill this purpose. (The PhilPapers "memory" category, in particular, includes a large number of nonphilosophical publications and, due to technical constraints imposed by PhilPapers itself, can only be curated to a limited extent.) The CPM is therefore pleased to offer PhilMemBib as a service to the philosophy of memory community.

Coverage: Ideally, this database would include all and only philosophical work on memory. In practice, certain restrictions have proven to be necessary. One important restriction is temporal: PhilMemBib contains only work published since (roughly) the beginning of the twentieth century. Another is linguistic: PhilMemBib contains only English-language work. There are two reasons for the latter restriction. First, the overwhelming majority of contemporary research in the area is published in English. Second, it was practically infeasible to include work in all languages, and no other nonarbitrary set of languages could be defined. (Translations have, however, been included.) Several additional qualifications should be noted. Nonphilosophical work by philosophers (e.g., interdisciplinary collaborations of a primarily empirical character) has been excluded, and philosophical work by nonphilosophers has (where it engages with work by philosophers) been included. The emphasis of the database is on analytic philosophy; coverage of other approaches (e.g., phenomenology, nonwestern philosophy) is relatively incomplete. Works primarily on topics other than memory but including significant discussions of memory have been included; nevertheless, there is relatively limited coverage of certain debates in which memory has played important roles (e.g., content externalism, extended cognition, personal identity). Dissertations and theses have been excluded, as have book reviews (though longer critical reviews or discussion notes have been included). Coverage is certainly better for more recent years than for earlier years and is most likely better for articles and books than for chapters in edited books.

Technical notes: PhilMemBib was produced by Kourken Michaelian, supported by several research assistants. An initial list of entries was generated from Michaelian's personal files. Systematic searches were then performed using the Philosophers' Index, PhilPapers, Google Scholar, and the archives of roughly sixty journals. Finally, bibliographies of key reference works and websites of researchers working in the area were consulted. Metadata for articles were extracted using Mendeley and have been manually checked and edited. The html for this page was generated by JabRef using a custom export filter. With the exception of books, all entries include either an abstract or (where the work was published without an abstract) the first paragraph of the text.

How to use: PhilMemBib currently contains approximately 1500 entries, sorted in reverse chronological order. DOIs have been included where available; these have been checked but may in a small number of cases be incorrect due to errors on publishers' webpages. "URL" links do not work where the source .bib file includes multiple urls; in these cases, either use the "DOI" link or copy and paste one of the URLs from the item's BibTeX entry. PDFs of all works included in PhilMemBib are available to CPM members and visitors.

PhilMemBib will be updated on an ongoing basis. Please send any corrections or additions to Kourken Michaelian.

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Author Title Year Journal/Book/Publisher DOI/URL
Arango-Muñoz, S. Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings Mind & Language [DOI] [URL
Abstract: The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that "there is something it is like" to have cognitive states such as believing , desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non-sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt on the idea that the tip-of-the-tongue and other metacognitive feelings are clear-cut instances of cognitive phenomenology. K E Y W O R D S bodily feelings, cognitive phenomenology, feeling of knowing, introspection, metacognitive feelings, tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon
BibTeX:
@article{Arango-Munoz,
  author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago},
  title = {Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12215},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12215}
}
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Michaelian, K. From collective memory ... to collective metamemory? Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency
Springer
 
Abstract: Our aim in this chapter is to delineate the form of shared agency that we take to be manifested in collective memory. We argue for two theses. First, we argue that, given a relatively weak conception of episodicity, certain small-scale groups display a form of emergent (i.e., genuinely collective) episodic memory, while large-scale groups, in contrast, do not display emergent episodic memory. Second, we argue that this form of emergent memory presupposes (high-level and possibly low-level) metamemorial capacities, capacities that are, however, not themselves emergent group-level features but rather strictly individual-level features. The form of shared agency that we delineate is thus revealed as being minimal in three senses. First, the relevant groups are themselves minimal in terms of their size. Second, the form of memory in question is minimally episodic. And finally, the cognitive capacities attributed to the relevant groups are minimal, in the sense that they need not themselves be capable of metacognition.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Arango-Munoza,
  author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {From collective memory ... to collective metamemory?},
  booktitle = {Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency},
  editor = {Fiebich, Anika},
  publisher = {Springer}
}
Aronowitz, S. Memory is a modeling system Mind & Language [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper aims to reconfigure the place of memory in epistemology. I start by rethinking the problem that memory systems solve; rather than merely functioning to store information, I argue that the core function of any memory system is to support accurate and relevant retrieval. This way of specifying the function of memory has consequences for which structures and mechanisms make up a memory system. In brief, memory systems are modeling systems. This means that they generate, update and manage a series of overlapping, simplified, relational representations that map out features of the world. Succeeding at building and maintaining models requires the kind of active knowledge generation traditionally associated only with deliberative reasoning.
BibTeX:
@article{Aronowitz,
  author = {Aronowitz, Sara},
  title = {Memory is a modeling system},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12220},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12220}
}
Arvan, M. Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and A.I. ethics AI & Society [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article argues that existing approaches to programming ethical AI fail to resolve a serious moral-semantic trilemma, generating interpretations of ethical requirements that are either too semantically strict, too semantically flexible, or overly unpredictable. This paper then illustrates the trilemma utilizing a recently proposed `general ethical dilemma analyzer,' GenEth. Finally, it uses empirical evidence to argue that human beings resolve the semantic trilemma using general cognitive and motivational processes involving `mental time-travel,' whereby we simulate different possible pasts and futures. I demonstrate how mental time-travel psychology leads us to resolve the semantic trilemma through a six-step process of interpersonal negotiation and renegotiation, and then conclude by showing how comparative advantages in processing power would plausibly cause AI to use similar processes to solve the semantic trilemma more reliably than we do, leading AI to make better moral-semantic choices than humans do by our very own lights.
BibTeX:
@article{Arvan,
  author = {Arvan, Marcus},
  title = {Mental time-travel, semantic flexibility, and A.I. ethics},
  journal = {AI & Society},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0848-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00146-018-0848-2}
}
Bernecker, S. and Grundmann, T. Knowledge From forgetting Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification. According
BibTeX:
@article{Bernecker,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven and Grundmann, Thomas},
  title = {Knowledge From forgetting},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12469},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12469}
}
Breyer, T. Phantom sensations: A neurophenomenological exploration of body memory Neuroethics [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper brings neuroscientific experiments into relation with concepts from phenomenological phi- losophy to investigate phantom sensations from the per- spective of embodied subjectivity. Using a mirror device to create intersensory effects in subjects experiencing phantom sensations, one can create illusions aiming at alleviating phantom pain. Neuroplasticity as a general property ofthe brain and cortical remapping as a specific mechanism underlying the success of this procedure are interpreted with the phenomenological notions of body image, body schema, and body memory. It is argued that a phantom can be understood as an ambiguous unity of body-imagistic neglect and body-schematic remember- ing. This neurophenomenological approach highlights the significance of the polarity of subjective-objective embodied experience one the one hand, and the spatial and temporal horizons of the emergence ofphantoms on the other. Thereby, implicit and explicit forms ofremem- bering, habitual and reflective modes of behavioural and cognitive self-representation and -understanding can be compared according to how the body integrates its vari- ous sensations.
BibTeX:
@article{Breyer,
  author = {Breyer, Thiemo},
  title = {Phantom sensations: A neurophenomenological exploration of body memory},
  journal = {Neuroethics},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9356-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-018-9356-9}
}
Coren, D. Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine's alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls's reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that, in order to evaluate EC, we must consider an agent holding a bare belief, that is, a belief stripped of all personal memory and epistemic context. Taking a stylistic cue from Peter Strawson, I argue that, though it does not seem to be self- contradictory to suppose that someone has a bare belief, and so it is not absolutely inconceivable that bare beliefs exist, it is, for us as we are, practically inconceivable that bare beliefs exist. It does not seem practically feasible, then, to evaluate EC on its own terms. Keywords
BibTeX:
@article{Coren,
  author = {Coren, Daniel},
  title = {Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02059-8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-018-02059-8}
}
Cruz, M. Hume's dual criteria for memory Pacific Philosophical Quarterly [DOI] [URL
Abstract: In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas' phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume'saccount ofmemory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts ofhis philosophical system. This paper defends Hume's criteria by showing that they achieve two the- oretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of ‘memory.' In particular, I argue that Hume's definition of ‘memory' is cogent in light of Putnamian considerations about definitions.
BibTeX:
@article{Cruz,
  author = {Cruz, Maité},
  title = {Hume's dual criteria for memory},
  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12272},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/papq.12272}
}
De Brigard, F. Know-How, intellectualism, and memory systems Philosophical Psychology  
Abstract: A longstanding tradition in philosophy distinguishes between know-that and know-how. This traditional "anti-intellectualist" view is so entrenched in folk psychology that it is often invoked in support of an allegedly equivalent distinction between explicit and implicit memory derived from the so-called "standard model of memory". In the last two decades, the received philosophical view has been challenged by an "intellectualist" view of know-how. Surprisingly, defenders of the traditional anti-intellectualist view have turned to the cognitive science of memory, and to the standard model in particular, to defend their view. In this paper, I argue that this strategy is a mistake. As it turns out, upon closer scrutiny, the evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience of memory does not support the anti-intellectualist approach, mainly because the standard model of memory is likely wrong. But this need not be interpreted as good news for the intellectualist, for it is not clear that the empirical evidence necessarily supports their view either. I argue that, currently, the philosophical debate is couched in terms that do not correspond to categories in psychological science. As a result, the debate has to either be re-interpreted in a vocabulary that is amenable to experimental scrutiny, or it cannot be settled empirically.
BibTeX:
@article{DeBrigard,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Know-How, intellectualism, and memory systems},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology}
}
Dinges, A. Relativism and conservatism Erkenntnis [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Relativism and contextualism have been suggested as candidate semantics for ‘‘knowledge'' sentences. I argue that relativism faces a problem concerning the preservation of beliefs in memory. Contextualism has been argued to face a similar problem. I argue that contextualists, unlike relativists, can respond to the concern. The overall upshot is that contextualism is superior to relativism in at least one important respect.
BibTeX:
@article{Dinges,
  author = {Dinges, Alexander},
  title = {Relativism and conservatism},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0047-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-018-0047-z}
}
Dranseika, V. False memories and quasi-memories are memories
3Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy
Oxford University Press
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In this report, I present new data bearing on two constraints that are often taken to be essential features of our ordinary use of ‘remembering' and ‘having a memory': the factivity constraint and the strong previous awareness condition.1 Let me introduce these two constraints in turn.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Dranseika,
  author = {Dranseika, Vilius},
  title = {False memories and quasi-memories are memories},
  volume = {3},
  booktitle = {Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy},
  editor = {Tania, Lombrozom and Nichols, Shaun and Knobe, Joshua},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Fernández, J. Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification (IEM)? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon ofobserver memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion ofobserver memorieswill reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity ofmemory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments are indeed IEM. The main tenet in the account of IEM to be proposed is that this aspect of memory is grounded, on the one hand, on the intentionality of perception and, on the other hand, on the relation between the intentionality of perception and that of memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Fernandez,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02050-3},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-018-02050-3}
}
Fernández, J. The ownership of memories The Sense of Mineness
Oxford University Press
 
Abstract: Is there such a thing as experiencing a memory as one's own? In this chapter, I argue that the phenomenon of disowned memory gives us a reason to believe that memories do carry a sense of mineness, or an experience of ownership. I challenge a proposal about the nature of this experience, according to which the experience of a memory as one's own is the feeling of being identical with the witness of the remembered scene, and I put forward an alternative proposal. According to the alternative proposal, the experience of a memory as one's own is the experience of the memory as matching the past. I argue that the alternative proposal makes better sense of the available reports of disowned memory. I conclude by offering some considerations on how the proposed account of the nature of the experience of memory ownership could accommodate other cases of disowned conscious states.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fernandeza,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {The ownership of memories},
  booktitle = {The Sense of Mineness},
  editor = {García-Carpintero, Manuel and Guillot, Marie},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Fernández, J. Memory A Self-Referential Account
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Fernandezb,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {Memory A Self-Referential Account},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Genot, E.J. and Jacot, J. The brain attics: The strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: M. B. Hintikka (1939–1987) and J. Hintikka (1929–2016) claimed that their reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' can “serve as an explication for the link between intelligence and memory” (1983, p. 159). The claim is vindicated, first for the single-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strate- gies for accessing the content of a distributed and associative memory; then, for the multi-agent case, where the reconstruction captures strategies for accessing knowledge distributed in a community. Moreover, the reconstruction of the ‘Sherlock Holmes sense of deduction' allows to conceptualize those strategies as belonging to a contin- uum of behavioral strategies. Keywords
BibTeX:
@article{Genot,
  author = {Genot, Emmanuel J. and Jacot, Justine},
  title = {The brain attics: The strategic role of memory in single and multi-agent inquiry},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1743-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-018-1743-6}
}
Granados, Z.O. Hegel: Metacritics, philosophical language, and memory Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Hegel has a metacritical standpoint that can be related to but not reduced to the Herderian metacritique. Hegel's philosophical language must not be understood in terms of the opposition between an ‘absolute' and a ‘finite' language; rather, it must be understood in terms of the opposition between abstract and concrete language. At a theoretical level, concrete language cannot be understood without assuming an organic function of memory. At the practical level, the difference between abstract and concrete language will be understood as the difference between everyday language and a philosophical one. Hegel justifies this last difference by following Humboldtian standpoints.
BibTeX:
@article{Granados,
  author = {Granados, Zaida Olvera},
  title = {Hegel: Metacritics, philosophical language, and memory},
  journal = {Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217318000501},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0012217318000501/type/journalarticle}
}
Heersmink, R. and Carter, J.A. The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values Memory Studies [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memory technologies are cultural artifacts that scaffold, transform, and are interwoven with human biological memory systems. The goal of this article is to provide a systematic and integrative survey of their philosophical dimensions, including their metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical dimensions, drawing together debates across the humanities, cognitive sciences, and social sciences. Metaphysical dimensions of memory technologies include their function, the nature of their informational properties, ways of classifying them, and their ontological status. Epistemological dimensions include the truth-conduciveness of external memory, the conditions under which external memory counts as knowledge, and the metacognitive monitoring of external memory processes. Finally, ethical and normative dimensions include the desirability of the effects memory technologies have on biological memory, their effects on self and culture, and their moral status. While the focus in the article is largely philosophical and conceptual, empirical issues such as the way we interact with memory technologies in various contexts are also discussed. We thus take a naturalistic approach in which philosophical and empirical concepts and approaches are seen as continuous.
BibTeX:
@article{Heersminka,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard and Carter, J. Adam},
  title = {The philosophy of memory technologies: Metaphysics, knowledge, and values},
  journal = {Memory Studies},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698017703810},
  url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1750698017703810}
}
Heersmink, R. and McCarroll, C.J. The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects Blade Runner 2049 (Philosophers on Film)
Routledge
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory is everywhere in Blade Runner 2049. From the dead tree that serves as a memorial and a site of remembrance (“Who keeps a dead tree?”), to the ‘flashbulb' memories individuals hold about the moment of the ‘blackout', when all the electronic stores of data were irretrievably erased (“everyone remembers where they were at the blackout”).2 Indeed, the data wiped out in the blackout itself involves a loss of memory (“all our memory bearings from the time, they were all damaged in the blackout”). Memory, and lack of it, permeates place, where from the post-blackout Las Vegas Deckard remembers it as somewhere you could “forget your troubles.” Memory is a commodity, called upon and consumed by the Wallace Corporation, purchased from the memory-maker, Dr Ana Stelline, who constructs and implants “the best memories” in replicants so as to instil in them real human responses. Memory is ubiquitous in Blade Runner 2049, involving humans, replicants, objects, and machines. Even “God,” we are told, “remembered Rachael.”
BibTeX:
@incollection{Heersminkb,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard and McCarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {The best memories: Identity, narrative, and objects},
  booktitle = {Blade Runner 2049 (Philosophers on Film)},
  editor = {Smart, P. and Shanahan, T.},
  publisher = {Routledge}
}
Heersmink, R. and Sutton, J. Cognition and the web: Extended, transactive, or scaffolded? Erkenntnis [DOI] [URL
Abstract: In the history of external information systems, the World Wide Web presents a significant change in terms of the accessibility and amount of available information. Constant access to various kinds of online information has consequences for the way we think, act and remember. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently started to examine the interactions between the human mind and the Web, mainly focussing on the way online information influences our biological memory systems. In this article, we use concepts from the extended cognition and distributed cognition frameworks and from transactive memory theory to analyse the cognitive relations between humans and the Web. We first argue that while neither of these approaches neatly capture the nature of human-Web interactions, both offer useful concepts to describe aspects of such interactions. We then conceptualize relations between the Web and its users in terms of cognitive integration, arguing that most current Web applications are not deeply integrated and are better seen as a scaffold for memory and cognition. Some highly personalised applications accessed on wearable computing devices, however, may already have the capacity for deep integration. Finally, we draw out some of the epistemic implications of our cog-nitive analysis.
BibTeX:
@article{Heersminkd,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard and Sutton, John},
  title = {Cognition and the web: Extended, transactive, or scaffolded?},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0022-8},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0022-8 http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-018-0022-8}
}
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T. Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition Behavioral and Brain Sciences [DOI] [URL
Abstract: We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of our everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterising two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.
BibTeX:
@article{Hoerl,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa},
  title = {Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002157},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X18002157/type/journalarticle}
}
Lavazza, A. Moral bioenhancement through memory-editing: A risk for identity and authenticity? Topoi [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Moral bioenhancement is the attempt to improve human behavioral dispositions, especially in relation to the great ethical challenges of our age. To this end, scientists have hypothesised new molecules or even permanent changes in the genetic makeup to achieve such moral bioenhancement. The philosophical debate has focused on the permissibility and desirability of that enhancement and the possibility of making it mandatory, given the positive result that would follow. However, there might be another way to enhance the overall moral behavior of us humans, namely that of targeting people with lower propensity to trust and altruism. Based on the theory of attachment, people who have a pattern of insecure attachment are less inclined to prosocial behavior. We know that these people are influenced by negative childhood memories: this negative emotional component may be erased or reduced by the administration of propranolol when the bad memory is reactivated, thereby improving prosocial skills. It could be objected that memory-editing might be a threat for the person's identity and authenticity. However, if the notion of rigid identity is replaced by that of extended identity, this objection loses validity. If identity is understood as something that changes over time, moral bioenhancement through memory-editing seems indeed legitimate and even desirable.
BibTeX:
@article{Lavazza,
  author = {Lavazza, Andrea},
  title = {Moral bioenhancement through memory-editing: A risk for identity and authenticity?},
  journal = {Topoi},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9465-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11245-017-9465-9}
}
McCarroll, C.J. Looking at the self: Perspectival memory and personal identity Philosophical Explorations [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Both Marya Schechtman and Galen Strawson appeal to autobiographical memory in developing their accounts of personal identity. Although both scholars share a similar conception of autobiographical memory, they use it to develop theories of personal identity that are radically distinct. Memories that are relevant for personal identity are generally considered to be personal (autobiographical) memories of those events in one's lifetime to which one can gain first-personal access: memories from-the-inside. Both Schechtman and Strawson base their discussion of personal identity on exactly this type of memory. Empirical evidence shows, however, that personal memory imagery is not only visualised from-the-inside, from a “field” perspective. Personal memories may also involve “observer” perspectives, in which one sees oneself from- the-outside in the remembered scene. Both Schechtman and Strawson appeal to the notion of remembering from-the-inside, but they remain silent on the phenomenon of observer perspectives in personal memory. I suggest that accounts of personal identity that appeal to memory should consider observer perspectives as one aspect of personal memory. I explore the implications that the acknowledgment and inclusion of observer perspectives would have for both Schechtman's and Strawson's accounts. Even though autobiographical memory is not their theoretical target, both Schechtman and Strawson base their accounts of personal identity on their understanding of autobiographical memory. Therefore, their depictions of the nature of personal identity are founded upon an incomplete picture of autobiographical memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Mccarroll,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {Looking at the self: Perspectival memory and personal identity},
  journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2018.1562087},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpex20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2018.1562087}
}
McCarroll, C.J. Navigating intertemporal choices: Mental time travel, perspectival imagery, and prudent decision-making Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice [DOI] [URL
Abstract: We have the capacity to mentally project ourselves into the personal past and future. We typically see and feel these past and future events unfold before our mind's eye, “reexpe- riencing” or “preexperiencing” them. This capacity is known as mental time travel (MTT). We can predict, plan, and prepare for the future based, in part, on our knowledge of the past. Often, however, we fail to give sufficient weight to future outcomes. We discount the future, seeking immediate gratification at the expense of long-term reward. It has been proposed that MTT is crucial to overcoming this tendency to discount future rewards. MTT enables us to preexperience the emotional impact of a future reward and this supports future-oriented decision-making. Yet the imagery of MTT involves distinct visual perspec- tives. Sometimes we visualize the event from a field perspective, seeing the scene from our own eyes. But often, the imagery ofMTT involves an external observer perspective, and we see ourselves in the past or future scenario. Observer perspectives are often thought to be phenomenally and affectively dry. This creates a puzzle. If much of the imagery of MTT involves observer perspectives, then using such imagery to think about a future reward may not provide the emotional force necessary for supporting future-oriented decision-making. I examine the role that observer perspectives play in simulating the future and supporting prudent decision-making. I show that observer perspectives can involve emotional imagery and that they can therefore help us to navigate intertemporal choices.
BibTeX:
@article{McCarroll,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {Navigating intertemporal choices: Mental time travel, perspectival imagery, and prudent decision-making},
  journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000177},
  url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/cns0000177}
}
Michaelian, K. Confabulating as unreliable imagining: In defence of the simulationist account of unsuccessful remembering Topoi [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper responds to Bernecker's (Front Psychol 8:1207, 2017) attack on Michaelian's (Front Psychol 7:1857, 2016a) simulationist account of confabulation, as well as his defence of the causalist account of confabulation (Robins, Philos Psy-chol 29(3):432-447, 2016a) against Michaelian's attack on it. The paper first argues that the simulationist account survives Bernecker's attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of unjustified memory and justified confabulation, unscathed. It then concedes that Bernecker's defence of the causalist account against Michaelian's attack, which takes the form of arguments from the possibility of veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning, is partly successful. This concession points the way, however, to a revised simulationist account that highlights the role played by failures of metacognitive monitoring in confabulation and that provides a means of distinguishing between "epistemically innocent" (Bortolotti, Conscious Cogn 33:490-499, 2015) and "epistemically culpable" memory errors. Finally, the paper responds to discussions by Robins (Synthese 1-17, 2018) and Bernecker (Front Psychol 8:1207, 2017) of the role played by the concept of reliability in Michaelian's approach, offering further considerations in support of simulationism.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelian,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Confabulating as unreliable imagining: In defence of the simulationist account of unsuccessful remembering},
  journal = {Topoi},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9591-z},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9591-z http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11245-018-9591-z}
}
Michaelian, K., Perrin, D. and Sant'Anna, A. Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination  
Abstract: Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view-standard in the philosophy of memory-that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them-and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaeliana,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Perrin, Denis and Sant'Anna, André},
  title = {Continuities and discontinuities between imagination and memory: The view from philosophy},
  booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Imagination},
  editor = {Abraham, Anna}
}
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J. Collective mental time travel: Remembering the past and imagining the future together Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar (2015) have recently de- veloped the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individ- ual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while it is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, collective mental time travel nevertheless represents a promising area for future research
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelianb,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John},
  title = {Collective mental time travel: Remembering the past and imagining the future together},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1449-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-017-1449-1}
}
Michaelian, K. and Sant'Anna, A. Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Radical enactivism, an increasingly influential approach to cognition in general, has recently been applied to memory in particular, with Hutto and Peeters (in: Michae-lian and Debus (eds) New directions in the philosophy of memory, Routledge, New York, 2018) providing the first systematic discussion of the implications of the approach for mainstream philosophical theories of memory. Hutto and Peeters argue that radical enactivism, which entails a conception of memory traces as content-less, is fundamentally at odds with current causal and postcausal theories, which remain committed to a conception of traces as contentful: on their view, if radical enactivism is right, then the relevant theories are wrong. Partisans of the theories in question might respond to Hutto and Peeters' argument in two ways. First, they might challenge radical enactivism itself. Second, they might challenge the conditional claim that, if radical enactivism is right, then their theories are wrong. In this paper, we develop the latter response, arguing that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding , radical enactivism in fact aligns neatly with an emerging tendency in the philosophy of memory: radical enactivists and causal and postcausal theorists of memory have begun to converge, for distinct but compatible reasons, on a content-less conception of memory traces. Keywords Episodic memory textperiodcentered Radical enactivism textperiodcentered Memory traces textperiodcentered Mental content textperiodcentered Causal theory of memory textperiodcentered Simulation theory of memory Thanks for feedback to audiences at the Naturally Evolving Minds conference at the University of Wollongong in February 2018 and the Memory and Perception: Fishing for Connections workshop at the University of Otago in May 2018. Thanks also for written comments to Carl Craver and John Sutton and for extremely interesting reports to two referees.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelianc,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sant'Anna, André},
  title = {Memory without content? Radical enactivism and (post)causal theories of memory},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02119-7},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02119-7 http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-019-02119-7}
}
Milburn, J. and Moon, A. Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism New Essays in Epistemological Disjunctivism
Routledge
 
Abstract: In our paper, we distinguish between two forms of memory knowledge: experiential memory knowledge and stored memory knowledge. We argue that, mutatis mutandis, the case that Pritchard makes for epistemological disjunctivism regarding perceptual knowledge can be made for epistemological disjunctivism regarding experiential memory knowledge. At the same time, we argue against a disjunctivist account of stored memory knowledge.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Milburn,
  author = {Milburn, Joe and Moon, Andrew},
  title = {Two forms of memory knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism},
  booktitle = {New Essays in Epistemological Disjunctivism},
  editor = {Doyle, C. and Milburn, J. and Pritchard, D.},
  publisher = {Routledge}
}
Morgan, D. Thinking about the body as subject Canadian Journal of Philosophy [DOI] [URL
Abstract: The notion of immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself ‘as subject'. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments (e.g. ‘My legs are crossed') can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM.
BibTeX:
@article{Morgan,
  author = {Morgan, Daniel},
  title = {Thinking about the body as subject},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2018.1482432}
}
Murray, S., Murray, E.D., Stewart, G., Sinnott-Armstrong, W. and De Brigard, F. Responsibility for forgetting Philosophical Studies [DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing the forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has important implications for a long-running debate about the nature of responsible agency.
BibTeX:
@article{Murray,
  author = {Murray, Samuel and Murray, Elise D. and Stewart, Gregory and Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Responsibility for forgetting},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3}
}
Puddifoot, K. Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: The misinformation effect and the overcritical juror Episteme [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyewitness testimony compelling and persuasive, it is argued that jurors are likely to give inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony, judging it to be reliable when it is not. It is argued that jurors should be informed about psychological findings on the misinformation effect, to ensure that they lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony to reflect the unreliability of human memory that is demonstrated by the effect. Here I present a new argument, the overcritical juror argument, to support the conclusion that eyewitnesses are likely to make inappropriate credence assignments to eyewitness testimony. Whereas previously authors have argued that jurors will tend to give too much credence to eyewitness testimony, I identify circumstances in which jurors will give too little credence to some pieces of testimony. In my view jurors should be informed by psychological findings relating to the misinformation effect to ensure that they do not lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony when they should not.
BibTeX:
@article{Puddifoota,
  author = {Puddifoot, Katherine},
  title = {Re-evaluating the credibility of eyewitness testimony: The misinformation effect and the overcritical juror},
  journal = {Episteme},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.42},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1742360018000424/type/journalarticle}
}
Puddifoot, K. and O'Donnell, C. Human memory and the limits of technology in education Educational Theory  
Abstract: Human memory systems perform various functions beyond simple storage and retrieval of information. They link together information about events, build abstractions, and perform memory updating. In contrast, typical information storage and access technologies, such as note-taking applications and Wikipedia, tend to store information verbatim. In this article, we use results from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and machine learning to argue that the increased dependence on such technologies in education may come at a price: the missed opportunity for memory systems of student learners to form abstractions and insights from newly learned information. This conclusion has important implications for how technologies should be adopted in education.
BibTeX:
@article{Puddifootb,
  author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and O'Donnell, Cian},
  title = {Human memory and the limits of technology in education},
  journal = {Educational Theory}
}
Robins, S.K. Confabulation and constructive memory Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Confabulation is a symptom central to many psychiatric diagnoses and can be severely debilitating to those who exhibit the symptom. Theorists, scientists, and clinicians have an understandable interest in the nature of confabulation—pursuing ways to define, identify, treat, and perhaps even prevent this memory disorder. Appeals to confabulation as a clinical symptom rely on an account of memory's function from which cases like the above can be contrasted. Accounting for confabulation is thus an important desideratum for any candidate theory of memory. Many contemporary mem-ory theorists now endorse Constructivism, where memory is understood as a capacity for constructing plausible representations of past events (e.g., De Brigard in Synthese 191:155–185, 2014; Michaelian in Philos Psychol 24:323–342, 2012, 2016). Con-structivism's aim is to account for and normalize the prevalence of memory errors in everyday life. Errors are plausible constructions that, on a particular occasion have led to error. They are not, however, evidence of malfunction in the memory system. While Constructivism offers an uplifting repackaging of the memory errors to which we are all susceptible, it has troubling implications for appeals to confabulation in psychiatric diagnosis. By accommodating memory errors within our understanding of memory's function, Constructivism runs the risk of being unable to explain how confabulation errors are evidence of malfunction. After reviewing the literature on confabulation and Constructivism, respectively, I identify the tension between them and explore how different versions of Constructivism may respond. The paper concludes with a proposal for distinguishing between kinds of false memory—specifically, between misremembering and confabulation—that may provide a route to their reconciliation.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2017c,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Confabulation and constructive memory},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1315-1},
  url = {http://www.sarahkrobins.org http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-017-1315-1}
}
Seemann, A. Reminiscing together: joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self Synthese [DOI]  
Abstract: In this essay, I consider a kind of social group that I call 'epistemic'. It is constituted by its members' possession of perceptually grounded common knowledge, which endows them with a particular kind of epistemic authority. This authority, I argue, is invoked in the activity of 'joint reminiscing'—of remembering together a past jointly experienced event. Joint reminiscing, in turn, plays an important role in the constitution of social and personal identity. The notion of an epistemic group, then, is a concept that helps explain an important aspect of a subject's understanding of who she is.
BibTeX:
@article{Seemann2016,
  author = {Seemann, Axel},
  title = {Reminiscing together: joint experiences, epistemic groups, and sense of self},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1156-3}
}
Smart, P. Emerging digital technologies: Implications for extended conceptions of cognition and knowledge Extended Epistemology
Oxford University Press
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Digital technologies play an increasingly important role in shaping the profile of human thought and action. In the few short decades since its invention, for example, the World Wide Web has transformed the way we shop, date, socialize and undertake scientific endeavours. We are also witnessing an unprecedented rate of technological innovation and change, driven, at least in part, by exponential rates of growth in computing power and performance1. The technological landscape is thus a highly dynamic one – new technologies are being introduced all the time, and the rate of change looks set to continue unabated. In view of all this, it is natural to wonder about the effects of new technology on both ourselves and the societies in which we live.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Smart2018,
  author = {Smart, Paul},
  title = {Emerging digital technologies: Implications for extended conceptions of cognition and knowledge},
  booktitle = {Extended Epistemology},
  editor = {Carter, J. Adam and Clark, Andy and Kallestrup, Jesper and Palermos, S. Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Soon, V. Implicit bias and social schema: A transactive memory approach Philosophical Studies [DOI] [URL
Abstract: To what extent should we focus on implicit bias in order to eradicate persistent social injustice? Structural prioritizers argue that we should focus less on individual minds than on unjust social structures, while equal prioritizers think that both are equally important. This article introduces the framework of transactive memory into the debate to defend the equal priority view. The transactive memory framework helps us see how structure can emerge from individual interactions as an irreducibly social product. If this is right, then debiasing interventions are structural interventions. One upshot is that the utility of the individual versus structural dis- tinction is not apparent for the purposes of intervention.
BibTeX:
@article{Soon,
  author = {Soon, Valerie},
  title = {Implicit bias and social schema: A transactive memory approach},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01288-y},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-019-01288-y}
}
Stokes, D. Memory, imagery, and self-knowledge Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies  
Abstract: One distinct interest in self-knowledge is an interest in whether one can know about one's own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one's beliefs, focusing instead on how one distinguishes, for oneself, one's veridical visual memories from mere (non-veridical) visual images. Given robust psychological and phenomenal similarities between episodic memories and mere imagery, the following is a genuine question that one might pose to oneself: "Do I actually remember that happening, or am I just imagining it?" After critical analysis of the transparency method (advocated by Byrne 2010, following Evans 1982) to this latter epistemological question, a brief sketch is offered of a more holistic and inferential method for acquisition of broader self-knowledge (broadly following the interpretive-sensory access account of Carruthers 2011). In a slogan, knowing more of the mind requires using more of the mind.
BibTeX:
@article{Stokes,
  author = {Stokes, Dustin},
  title = {Memory, imagery, and self-knowledge},
  journal = {Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies}
}
Chadha, M. Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self 2019 Mind & Language
34(1), 121-138.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The paper evaluates a well-known argument for a self from episodic memories—that remembering that I did something or thought something involves experiencing the identity of my present self with the past doer or thinker. Shaun Nichols argues that although it phenome- nologically appears to be the case that we are identical with the past self, no metaphysical conclusion can be drawn from the phenomenology. I draw on literature from contemporary psychology and Buddhist resources to arrive at a more radical conclusion: that there is no phe- nomenological sense of identity with a past self; the sense of self in episodic memory depends on narrative construc- tion of the self.
BibTeX:
@article{Chadha,
  author = {Chadha, Monima},
  title = {Reconstructing memories, deconstructing the self},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  volume = {34},
  number = {1},
  pages = {121--138},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12204},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12204}
}
Gatzia, D.E. Cognitive penetration and memory colour effects 2019 Erkenntnis
84(1), 121-143.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Cognition can influence action. Your belief that it is raining outside, for example, may cause you to reach for the umbrella. Perception can also influence cognition. Seeing that no raindrops are falling, for example, may cause you to think that you don't need to reach for an umbrella. The question that has fascinated philosophers and cognitive scientists for the past few decades, however, is whether cognition can influence perception. Can, for example, your desire for a rainy day cause you to see, hear, or feel raindrops when you walk outside? More generally, can our cognitive states (such as beliefs, desires or intentions) influence the way we see the external world? In this paper, I discuss three experiments on memory colour effects. In these experiments, subjects systematically made different colour matches or adjustments for object-patches representing objects that have prototypical colours and neutral object-patches. I argue that these differences are not merely differences in judgments but are best explained in terms of phenomenology. However, I show that these differences in phenomenology can be explained without reference to cognitive states such as colour concepts or beliefs.
BibTeX:
@article{Gatzia,
  author = {Gatzia, Dimitria Electra},
  title = {Cognitive penetration and memory colour effects},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {84},
  number = {1},
  pages = {121--143},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9951-x},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-017-9951-x}
}
Gillett, A.J. and Heersmink, R. How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions 2019 Cognitive Systems Research
56, 36-49.
[DOI]  
Abstract: In this paper, we analyse how GPS-based navigation systems are transforming some of our intellectual virtues and then suggest two strategies to improve our practices regarding the use of such epistemic tools. We start by outlining the two main approaches in virtue epistemology, namely virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. We then discuss how navigation systems can undermine five epistemic virtues, namely memory, perception, attention, intellectual autonomy, and intellectual carefulness. We end by considering two possible interlinked ways of trying to remedy this situation: [i] redesigning the epistemic tool to improve the epistemic virtues of memory, perception, and attention; and [ii] the cultivation of cognitive diligence for wayfinding tasks scaffolding intellectual autonomy and carefulness.
BibTeX:
@article{Gillett2019,
  author = {Gillett, Alexander James and Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {How navigation systems transform epistemic virtues: Knowledge, issues and solutions},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Cognitive Systems Research},
  volume = {56},
  pages = {36--49},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2019.03.004}
}
Klein, S.B. The phenomenology of REM-sleep dreaming: The contributions of personal and perspectival ownership, subjective temporality, and episodic memory 2019 Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
6(1), 55-66.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Although the dream narrative, of (bio)logical necessity, originates with the dreamer, he or she typically is not aware of this. For the dreamer, the dream world is the real world. In this article, I argue that this nightly misattribution is best explained in terms of the concept of mental ownership (e.g., Albahari, 2006; Klein, 2015a; Lane, 2012). Spe- cifically, the exogenous nature of the dream narrative is the result of an individual assuming perspectival, but not personal, ownership of the content she or he authored (i.e., “The content in my head is not mine. Therefore it must be peripherally per- ceived”). Situating explanation within a theoretical space designed to address questions pertaining to the experienced origins of conscious content has a number of salutary consequences. For example, it promotes predictive fecundity by bringing to light empirical generalizations whose presence otherwise might have gone unnoticed (e.g., the severely limited role of mental time travel within the dream narrative).
BibTeX:
@article{Klein,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {The phenomenology of REM-sleep dreaming: The contributions of personal and perspectival ownership, subjective temporality, and episodic memory},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {55--66},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000174},
  url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/cns0000174}
}
Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L. Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs 2019 Philosophical Studies
176(3), 755-780.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Findings from the cognitive sciences suggest that the cognitive mecha- nisms responsible for some memory errors are adaptive, bringing benefits to the organism. In this paper we argue that the same cognitive mechanisms also bring a suite of significant epistemic benefits, increasing the chance of an agent obtaining epistemic goods like true belief and knowledge. This result provides a significant challenge to the folk conception of memory beliefs that are false, according to which they are a sign of cognitive frailty, indicating that a person is less reliable than others or their former self. Evidence of memory errors can undermine a per- son's view of themselves as a competent epistemic agent, but we show that false memory beliefs can be the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms found across the species, which bring substantial epistemic benefits. This challenge to the folk conception is not adequately captured by existing epistemological the- ories. However, it can be captured by the notion of epistemic innocence, which has previously been deployed to highlight how beliefs which have epistemic costs can also bring significant epistemic benefits. We therefore argue that the notion of epistemic innocence should be expanded so that it applies not just to beliefs but also to cognitive mechanisms.
BibTeX:
@article{Puddifoot,
  author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Bortolotti, Lisa},
  title = {Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {176},
  number = {3},
  pages = {755--780},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1038-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-018-1038-2}
}
Sant'Anna, A. and Michaelian, K. Thinking about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought 2019 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
10(1), 187-217.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The debate over the objects of episodic memory has for some time been stalled, with few alternatives to familiar forms of direct and indirect realism being advanced. This paper moves the debate forward by building on insights from the recent psychological literature on memory as a form of episodic hypothetical thought (or mental time travel) and the recent philosophical literature on relationalist and representationalist approaches to perception. The former suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic memory will have to be a special case of an account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought more generally. The latter suggests that an adequate account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought will have to combine features of direct realism and representa-tionalism. We develop a novel pragmatist-inspired account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought that has the requisite features.
BibTeX:
@article{SantAnna2019,
  author = {Sant'Anna, André and Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Thinking about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {187--217},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0391-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-018-0391-6}
}
Senor, T.D. A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory 2019
Bloomsbury
 
BibTeX:
@book{Senor2018,
  author = {Senor, Thomas D.},
  title = {A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory},
  year = {2019},
  publisher = {Bloomsbury}
}
Talay Turner, Z. Nietzsche on memory and active forgetting 2019 The European Legacy
24(1), 46-58.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article explores Nietzsche's approach to the fundamental ques- tion of “how to live one'slife”, and more specifically his view of the role of the past in seeking an answer to this question. By discussing Nietzsche's views of how different nations and cultures relate to their history, I suggest some comparisons with how individuals might do so. Common to both is the relationship between the past as a resource and as a burden: the burden of single events or periods and the burden of the abundance of facts. Key to Nietzsche'sthinking on these questions is his account of the relationship between remembering, promising, and forgetting. He considers “active forget- ting” paradoxically as both a form of forgetting and a way of taking full responsibility for the past.
BibTeX:
@article{TalayTurner2019,
  author = {Talay Turner, Zeynep},
  title = {Nietzsche on memory and active forgetting},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {The European Legacy},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  pages = {46--58},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2018.1538091},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10848770.2018.1538091}
}
Yatczak, J. Everyday material engagement: supporting self and personhood in people with Alzheimer's disease 2019 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
18(1), 223-240.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Threats to the self and personhood of people with ADRD include the disturbing images of Alzheimer's disease as the death before death, culturally based assumption that status as a full human being is dependent upon cognition and memory, and a decrease in personal possessions with a move to a 24-h care setting. This paper presents the findings of an ethnographic study of self and personhood in Alzheimer's disease in an American long-term care facility. It argues that the lifeworld in which the self and personhood of individuals with ADRD is actualized is mediated and negotiated through engagement with everyday objects. Using a framework that integrates Material Engagement Theory with Bourdieu's Practice Theory, it is argued that the study of the material engagement of individuals with ADRD can lead to a better understanding of the lives of individuals with ADRD by focusing on the material and non-discursive aspects of objects. Findings contribute to the understanding of current practice issues in dementia care while shifting the focus away from exclusively biomedical understanding. Paradoxically, people with ADRD, due to their cognitive impairment, may provide us with a more fundamental way to understand the importance of objects in the lives of humans in general.
BibTeX:
@article{Yatczak,
  author = {Yatczak, Jayne},
  title = {Everyday material engagement: supporting self and personhood in people with Alzheimer's disease},
  year = {2019},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {223--240},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9566-y},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9566-y http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-018-9566-y}
}
Andonovsky, N. Is episodic memory a natural kind? A Comment on Cheng and Werning's "What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?" (2016) 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
 
Abstract: In a recent paper, Sen Cheng and Markus Werning argue that the class of episodic memories constitutes a natural kind. Endorsing the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds, they suggest that episodic memories can be characterized by a cluster of properties unified by an underlying neural mechanism for coding sequences of events. Here, I argue that Cheng and Werning's proposal faces some significant, and potentially insurmountable, difficulties. Two are described as most prominent. First, the proposal fails to satisfy an important normative constraint on natural kind theorizing, not providing the requisite theo- retical resources for arbitration between rival taxonomies of memory. Second, the proposal is in direct tension with a foundational principle of the HPC view: the rejection of essentialism. This has far-reaching consequences, which threaten to undermine the coherence of the proposal.
BibTeX:
@article{Andonovski2018,
  author = {Andonovsky, Nikola},
  title = {Is episodic memory a natural kind? A Comment on Cheng and Werning's "What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?" (2016)},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19}
}
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Bermúdez, J.P. Remembering as a mental action 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 75-96.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] There has been a recent shift in our understanding of episodic memory. Traditionally conceived as the capacity to store and retrieve information from our personal past, episodic memory is now thought of as a particular form of a broader cognitive function: that of imagining, or mentally simulating, egocentric events, whether they belong to the past or the future, whether actual, hypothetical, or counterfactual. Understanding episodic memory as part of this more general capacity for ‘mental time-travel' allows us to account for why it often produces not a reliable reconstruction of the specific details of the past, but rather a bare-bones reconstruction of past situations that diverge from the remembered events.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Arango-Munoz2018,
  author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Bermúdez, Juan Pablo},
  title = {Remembering as a mental action},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {75--96}
}
Arcangeli, M. and Dokic, J. Affective memory: A little help from our imagination 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 13-32.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It often happens that when we remember a past situation, the emotional import of the latter transpires in a modified form at the phenomenological level of our present memory. When it does, we experience what is sometimes called an “affective memory.”
BibTeX:
@incollection{Arcangeli2018,
  author = {Arcangeli, Margherita and Dokic, Jérôme},
  title = {Affective memory: A little help from our imagination},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {13--32}
}
Arese, L. Doing justice to the past: Memory and criticism in Herbert Marcuse 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In his inaugural lecture as director of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt (1933), Horkheimer points out the need for a new understanding of history that avoids the contemporary versions of the Hegelian Verklärung. He synthesizes this challenge with an imperative: to do justice to past suffering. The result of this appeal can be found in the works of the members of the Frankfurt School in the form of multiple, even divergent, trains of thought that reach with unlike intensities the current debates on memory and its link with history. This paper focuses on three of these trains, which can be traced back to different periods of the work of Herbert Marcuse. It intends to systematize and present what can be considered alternative—although not necessarily contradictory—approaches aroused from the same concern over the critical power of nonreconciliatory memory: first, a genealogy inquiry that de- constructs the reified character of the given; second, a recollection of past images of happiness; and finally, a memory of the limits of all attainable freedom. Exploring these three moments, their shortcomings and tensions, may shed light on the complexity and present importance of the challenge they intend to face.
BibTeX:
@article{Arese2018,
  author = {Arese, Laura},
  title = {Doing justice to the past: Memory and criticism in Herbert Marcuse},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1615},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/8}
}
Aronowitz, S. Retrieval is central to the distinctive function of episodic memory 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e2.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic retrieval is heavily and asymmetrically dependent on the temporal order of the remembered events. This effect, or rather the underlying structure which it reflects, is a distinctive feature missing from the account in the target article. This structure explains significant successes and failures of episodic retrieval, and it has clear consequences for the fitness of the organism extending beyond communication.
BibTeX:
@article{Aronowitz2018,
  author = {Aronowitz, Sara},
  title = {Retrieval is central to the distinctive function of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e2},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001248},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001248/type/journalarticle}
}
Baysan, U. Memory, confabulation, and epistemic failure 2018 Logos & Episteme
9(4), 369-378.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mnemonic confabulation is an epistemic failure that involves memory error. In this paper, I examine an account of mnemonic confabulation offered by Sarah Robins in a number of works. In Robins' framework, mnemonic cognitive states in general (e.g., remembering, misremembering) are individuated by three conditions: existence of the target event, matching of the representation and the target event, and an appropriate causal connection between the target event and its representation. Robins argues that when these three conditions are not met, the cognitive state in question is an instance of mnemonic confabulation. Here, I argue that this is not true. There are mnemonic cognitive states which don't meet any of these conditions, and they are not cases of mnemonic confabulation. On a more positive note, I argue that mnemonic confabulation requires it to be a failing on behalf of either the subject or her mnemonic system that these conditions are not met.
BibTeX:
@article{Baysan2018,
  author = {Baysan, Umut},
  title = {Memory, confabulation, and epistemic failure},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Logos & Episteme},
  volume = {9},
  number = {4},
  pages = {369--378},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20189430},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=logos-episteme20180009000403690378&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Behnke, E.A. On the transformation of the time-drenched body: Kinaesthetic capability-consciousness and recalcitrant holding patterns 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 89-111.
 
Abstract: Drawing upon Husserlian phenomenological methods and findings throughout, I begin by briefly considering the role of the body in explicit, presentificational memory and in recognizing familiar types of objects and situations, then I review and extend Husserl's account of the formation of bodily memory, focusing on kinaesthetic capability-consciousness (including such themes as 'making-a-body' and the bodily 'how-of-the-receivingness' standing in correlation to the 'how-of-the-givenness' of what we are experiencing) as well as addressing bodily 'amnesia'. Finally, I turn to the formation of 'recal-citrant holding patterns' (persisting patterns of bodily tension one cannot voluntarily release) and propose some practical, phenomeno-logically-inspired strategies that can shift such patterns. In this way the 'time-drenched' body-the body saturated, permeated by time-becomes a body that is not only suffused with and shaped by its past, but already bears the seeds of an open future where something other than the automatic reiteration of a sedimented past is possible.
BibTeX:
@article{Behnke2018,
  author = {Behnke, Elizabeth A.},
  title = {On the transformation of the time-drenched body: Kinaesthetic capability-consciousness and recalcitrant holding patterns},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {89--111}
}
Bernacer, J. An integrative understanding of habit to explore its neural correlates 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 112-146.
 
Abstract: Scientific research leans on the theoretical assumptions that have been taken for granted through decades of research. Experimental psychology, mostly rooted in experiments with rodents, defines habits as rigid, unconscious, and non-teleological behaviours opposed to goal-directed actions. This definition has been transferred to human research as such, and habits are thus viewed as compulsions, obsessions, slips-of-action, and addictions. From an experiential point of view, however, humans possess habits that go beyond these behaviours. According to Aristotle, habits are dispositions of thought and performance, usually acquired by repetition, which predispose our future actions. This 'new' understanding of human habits would be associated with a brain configuration that goes beyond the rigid carving of motor routines in certain areas. An empirical application of this interpretation is explained. In conclusion, a novel perspective is proposed to study the neural correlates of habits and their impact on behaviour.
BibTeX:
@article{Bernacer2018,
  author = {Bernacer, Javier},
  title = {An integrative understanding of habit to explore its neural correlates},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {112--146}
}
Bernecker, S. On the blameworthiness of forgetting 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 241-258.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Broadly speaking there are two kinds of phenomena the ethics of forgetting is concerned with. First, there are the moral and legal ramifications of the fact that we sometimes forget about our past wrongdoings. Consider two agents accused of the same kind of wrongdoing. One agent has suffered memory loss, albeit through no fault of his own, and cannot remember anything about the action he is accused of. In this case, the forgetting may be used as evidence of incompetence to stand trial or in mitigation of criminal and moral responsibility. The other agent intentionally brought about the memory loss (say, by taking a forgetting pill) before committing the wrongdoing. The voluntary nature of his forgetting has the consequence that it does not mitigate his responsibility (Birch, 2000). This suggests that whether the fact that an agent has forgotten about his past wrongdoing can be used as an excuse for a wrongdoing crucially depends on whether the forgetting was brought about intentionally and voluntary.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bernecker2018,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven},
  title = {On the blameworthiness of forgetting},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {241--258}
}
Bilbrough, A. Memory and the true self: When moral knowledge can and cannot be forgotten 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Why is it that forgetting moral knowledge, unlike other paradigmatic examples of knowledge, seems so deeply absurd? Previous authors have given accounts whereby moral forgetting in itself either is uniformly absurd and impossible (Gilbert Ryle, Adam Bugeja) or is possible and only the speech act is absurd (Sarah McGrath). Considering findings in moral psychology and the experimental philosophy of personal iden- tity, I argue that the knowledge of some moral truths—especially those that are emotional, widely held, subjectively important, and contribute to social relationships—cannot be forgotten because they're too tightly tied to one's true self. Moral knowledge at the level of individual propositions, when it does not have these attributes and so is not so tied to the agent's identity, can sometimes be forgotten. I identify two such cases: (1) where the moral knowledge results partly from an emotional trigger that has been forgotten, and (2) where the moral knowledge results partly from a process of reflection that has been forgotten. Essays
BibTeX:
@article{Bilbrough2016,
  author = {Bilbrough, André},
  title = {Memory and the true self: When moral knowledge can and cannot be forgotten},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1614},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/7}
}
Bortolotti, L. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions 2018 Mind & Language
33(3), 263-279.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In some neuropsychological disorders, distorted reports seem to fill gaps in people's memory of their past, where people's self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people's capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people's sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological well-being. Here, we consider both the psychological benefits and epistemic costs and argue that distorting the past is likely to also have epistemic benefits that cannot be obtained otherwise, such as enabling people to exchange information, receive feedback, and retain key beliefs about themselves.
BibTeX:
@article{Bortolotti,
  author = {Bortolotti, Lisa and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema},
  title = {The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  volume = {33},
  number = {3},
  pages = {263--279},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12175},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12175}
}
Bortolotti, L. Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation 2018 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
9(2), 227-249.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the costs and benefits of confabulation, focusing on the type of confabulation people engage in when they offer explanations for their attitudes and choices. What makes confabulation costly? In the philosophical literature confabulation is thought to undermine claims to self-knowledge. I argue that when people confabulate they do not necessarily fail at mental-state self-attributions, but offer ill-grounded explanations which often lead to the adoption of other ill-grounded beliefs. What, if anything, makes confabulation beneficial? As people are unaware of the information that would make their explanations accurate, they are not typically in a position to acknowledge their ignorance or provide better-grounded explanations for their attitudes and choices. In such cases, confabulating can have some advantages over offering no explanation because it makes a distinctive contribution to people's sense of themselves as competent and largely coherent agents. This role of ill-grounded explanations could not be as easily played by better-grounded explanations should these be available. In the end, I speculate about the implications of this conclusion for attempting to eliminate or reduce confabulation.
BibTeX:
@article{Bortolotti2018,
  author = {Bortolotti, Lisa},
  title = {Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  number = {2},
  pages = {227--249},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0367-y},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-017-0367-y}
}
Brison, S.J. Outliving oneself: Trauma, memory, and personal identity 2018 Feminists Rethink the Self
Westview Press, 12-39.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Survivors of trauma frequently remark that they are not the same people they were before being traumatized. As a survivor of the Nazi death camps observed, "One can be alive after Sobibor without having survived Sobi- bor."1 Jonathan Shay, a therapist who works with Vietnam veterans, has often heard his patients say, "I died in Vietnam."2 Migael Scherer expresses a loss commonly experienced by rape survivors when she writes, "I will al- ways miss myself as I was" (1992, 179). What are we to make of these cryptic comments ?3 How can one miss oneself? How can one die in Vietnam or fail to survive a death camp and still live to tell one's story? How does a life- threatening event come to be experienced as self-annihilating? And what self is it who remembers having had this experience?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Brison2018,
  author = {Brison, Susan J.},
  title = {Outliving oneself: Trauma, memory, and personal identity},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Feminists Rethink the Self},
  editor = {Meyers, D.},
  publisher = {Westview Press},
  pages = {12--39}
}
Brogaard, B. Phenomenal dogmatism, seeming evidentialism and inferential justification 2018 Believing in Accordance with the Evidence
Springer, 53-67.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Let ‘strong normative evidentialism' be the view that a belief is doxasti- cally justified just when (i) the belief is (properly) based on evidence in the agent's possession, and (ii) the evidence constitutes a good reason for the belief. Strong normative evidentialism faces two challenges. One is that of explaining which kinds of evidence can serve as a good reason for belief. The other is to explain how inferential justification is possible. If a belief p is based on a belief q that justifies p,then it wouldseemthatthesubject wouldneed to bejustifiedin believing that q makes p likely. The problem for the evidentialist is to explain what justifies this belief about likelihood. I will argue that the evidentialist can respond to both worries by construing basic evidence as seemings and then adopt a version of phenomenal dogmatism – the view that seemings can confer immediate and full justification upon belief – that takes seemings to be good reasons when they are evidence- insensitive in virtue of their phenomenology. This view meets the first challenge by explaining what kinds of evidence constitute a good reason. It meets the second challenge by taking beliefs that one phenomenon makes another phenomenon more likely to be immediately and fully justified by memory seemings.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Brogaard2018,
  author = {Brogaard, Berit},
  title = {Phenomenal dogmatism, seeming evidentialism and inferential justification},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Believing in Accordance with the Evidence},
  editor = {McCain, Kevin},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {53--67},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-15}
}
Carruthers, P. Episodic memory isn't essentially autonoetic 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e6.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I argue that the function attributed to episodic memory by Mahr & Csibra (M&C) – that is, grounding one's claims to epistemic authority over past events – fails to support the essentially autonoetic character of such memories. I suggest, in contrast, that episodic event memories are sometimes purely first order, sometimes autonoetic, depending on relevance in the context.
BibTeX:
@article{Carruthers2018,
  author = {Carruthers, Peter},
  title = {Episodic memory isn't essentially autonoetic},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e6},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001285},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001285/type/journalarticle}
}
Brogaard, B. and Gatzia, D.E. The epistemic significance of perceptual learning 2018 Inquiry
61(5-6), 543-558.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
BibTeX:
@article{Chudnoff2018,
  author = {Brogaard, Berit and Gatzia, Dimitria Electra},
  title = {The epistemic significance of perceptual learning},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Inquiry},
  volume = {61},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {543--558},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1368172},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1368172}
}
Colaço, D. Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon 2018 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
72, 32-40.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the nature of empirical findings that provide evidence for the characterization of a scientific phenomenon, and the defeasible nature of this evidence. To do so, I explore an exemplary instance of the rejection of a characterization of a scientific phenomenon: memory transfer. I examine the reason why the characterization of memory transfer was rejected, and analyze how this rejection tied to researchers' failures to resolve experimental issues relating to replication and confounds. I criticize the presentation of the case by Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, who claim that no sufficient reason was provided to abandon research on memory transfer. I argue that skeptics about memory transfer adopted what I call a defeater strategy, in which researchers exploit the defeasibility of the evidence for a characterization of a phenomenon.
BibTeX:
@article{Colaco,
  author = {Colaço, David},
  title = {Rip it up and start again: The rejection of a characterization of a phenomenon},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
  volume = {72},
  pages = {32--40},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.04.003},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S003936811730211X}
}
Corsa, A.J. and Walker, W.R. Moral psychology of the fading affect bias 2018 Philosophical Psychology
31(7), 1097-1113.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We argue that many of the benefits theorists have attribu- ted to the ability to forget should instead be attributed to what psychologists call the “fading affect bias,” namely the tendency for the negative emotions associated with past events to fade more substantially than the positive emo- tions associated with those events. Our principal contention is that the disposition to display the fading affect bias is normatively good. Those who possess it tend to lead better lives and more effectively improve their societies. Secondarily, we note that if Julia Driver's moral theory is correct, then the disposition to display the fading affect bias is a moral virtue.
BibTeX:
@article{Corsa,
  author = {Corsa, Andrew J. and Walker, W. Richard},
  title = {Moral psychology of the fading affect bias},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {31},
  number = {7},
  pages = {1097--1113},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2018.1477126},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2018.1477126}
}
Craver, C.F. and Rosenbaum, R.S. Consent without memory 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 259-275.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Can someone with episodic amnesia consent to participate in a scientific experiment? Episodic memory is widely regarded as the capacity to remem- ber knowingly experiences of specific events from one's personal past (Tul- ving, 1985). Individuals with severe episodic amnesia sometimes cannot episodically remember even a single such event and fail to lay down new episodic memories going forward. In some special cases, such individuals have maximally severe deficits in episodic memory while their intellectual ability and other cognitive functions (e.g., semantic recall, procedural learn- ing, working memory) remain in control range (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Such individuals afford the unique opportunity to investigate how episodic memory specifically contributes to other cognitive capacities and more gen- erally, to the distinctive lives of persons. We can thus invert the opening question: What, if anything, does episodic memory contribute to the fact that persons can, and so deserve the right to, consent?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Craver2018,
  author = {Craver, Carl F. and Rosenbaum, R. Shayna},
  title = {Consent without memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {259--275}
}
Curry, D.S. Cartesian critters can't remember 2018 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
69, 72-85.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Descartes held the following view of declarative memory: to remember is to reconstruct an idea that you intellectually recognize as a reconstruction. Descartes countenanced two overarching varieties of declarative memory. To have an intellectual memory is to intellectually reconstruct a universal idea that you recognize as a reconstruction, and to have a sensory memory is to neurophysiologically reconstruct a particular idea that you recognize as a reconstruction. Sensory remembering is thus a capacity of neither ghosts nor machines, but only of human beings qua mind-body unions. This interpretation unifies Descartes's various remarks (and conspicuous silences) about remembering, from the 1628 Rules for the Direction of the Mind through the suppressed-in-1633 Treatise of Man to the 1649 Passions of the Soul. It also rebuts a prevailing thesis in the current secondary literature—that Cartesian critters can remember—while incorporating the textual evidence for that thesis—Descartes's detailed descriptions of the corporeal mechanisms that construct sensory memories.
BibTeX:
@article{Curry2018,
  author = {Curry, Devin Sanchez},
  title = {Cartesian critters can't remember},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A},
  volume = {69},
  pages = {72--85},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.03.001},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368117302376}
}
Dace, T. Memory as a property of nature 2018 Axiomathes
28(5), 507-519.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Prerequisite to memory is a past distinct from present. Because wave evolution is both continuous and time-reversible, the undisturbed quantum system lacks a distinct past and therefore the possibility of memory. With the quantum tran- sition, a reversibly evolving superposition of values yields to an irreversible emer- gence of definite values in a distinct and transient moment of time. The succession of such moments generates an irretrievable past and thus the possibility of mem- ory. Bohm's notion of implicate and explicate order provides a conceptual basis for memory as a general feature of nature akin to gravity and electromagnetism. I pro- pose that natural memory is an outcome of the continuity of implicate time in the context of discontinuous explicate time. Among the ramifications of natural memory are that laws of nature can propagate through time much like habits and that per- sonal memory does not require neural information storage.
BibTeX:
@article{Dace2018,
  author = {Dace, Ted},
  title = {Memory as a property of nature},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Axiomathes},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {507--519},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9381-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10516-018-9381-7}
}
De Brigard, F. Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing 2018 New DIrections in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 200-219.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Since grammar school was far away from home, I often endured long bus rides in heavy traffic. To avoid boredom, my friends and I used to play “Veo Veo”—“I See, I See”—the Colombian equivalent of “I spy.” One of us, gaz- ing through the window of the bus, would glance over the busy scenery of the city. Meanwhile, everybody else would keep their eyes closed. Eventu- ally, the kid surveying the scene would single out a particular object and would say “Veo Veo.” That was the sign for the rest of us to open our eyes and ask “¿Qué ves?”—“What do you see?” He would then give us a clue, a particular feature of the selected object, and we would then try to guess the object he had in mind. We could ask up to five questions of the form “Does it have an X?” where X was a property of the object we thought the kid was attending to. If the kid said “no,” that meant we were focused on the wrong object, so we would have to attend to a different one. If the kid said “yes,” then one could either keep asking—to make sure one had the right object in mind—or one could try to guess what the object was. If you were wrong, you were out. But if you guessed correctly, you'd get to pick the next object. The point of the game was to be the first one to attend to the same object as the kid who got to pick it.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeBrigard2018,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Memory, attention, and joint reminiscing},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New DIrections in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {200--219}
}
De Brigard, F. Memory and the intentional stance 2018 The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett
Oxford University Press, 62-91.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] There is a wealth of topics one can't help but associate with the Daniel Dennett: consciousness, free-will, evolution, intentionality, religion, and so on. In discussions of memory, however, his name may not come up as readily. This is perhaps because memory is seldom mentioned in his writings and, if so, it is usually in reference to something else, like its role on consciousness (Dennett, 1978; 1991) or dreaming (1976), rather than as a central topic—except for one paper, Mining the Past to Construct the Future: Memory and Belief as Forms of Knowledge, which he co-authored with one of his undergraduates at a time, Chris Westbury, and that was published in a relatively obscure volume on memory and belief published in 2000. Google Scholar tells me that, despite being 16 years old, this paper has been cited only 37 times, with less than 10 of such citations in philosophy venues. This is an unfortunate overlook, I believe, because in their paper, Westbury and Dennett (2000; henceforth W&D) delineate a viable and coherent view of episodic memory that has received substantial support during the last decade and a half of scientific research. Or so I argue in the current paper.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeBrigard2018a,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Memory and the intentional stance},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett},
  editor = {Huebner, Bryce},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {62--91}
}
De Brigard, F. and Gessell, B.S. Why episodic memory may not be for communication 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e8.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Three serious challenges to Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) proposal are presented. First, we argue that the epistemic attitude that they claim is unique to remembering also applies to some forms of imaginative simulations that aren't memories. Second, we argue that their account cannot accommodate critical neuropsychological evidence. Finally, we argue that their proposal looks unconvincing when compared to more parsimonious evolutionary accounts.
BibTeX:
@article{DeBrigard2018b,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe and Gessell, Bryce S.},
  title = {Why episodic memory may not be for communication},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e8},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001303},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001303/type/journalarticle}
}
Debus, D. Memory, imagination, narrative 2018 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Oxford University Press, 73-95.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Sometimes we remember past objects or events in a particularly vivid way. The relevant memories have experiential characteristics, and we often say that a subject in such a situation ‘re-experiences' the remembered past object or event. Thus, for example, try to remember the last dinner party you went to. Chances are that you remember at least some aspects of the event in an experiential way. You might have an experience as if seeing again the person who sat opposite. Or you might have an experience as if hearing once more some particular sounds or noises—the sudden bang emanating from the kitchen at some point, or a new tune played towards the end of the party. In any case, it seems likely that your memory will have some experiential aspects. Indeed, in an attempt to describe those occurrences, we might say that ‘you see the person again in front of your mind's eye', that you can ‘hear the tune in your head', and so on for the other senses. Memories of this kind are here called ‘recollective memories' (or ‘R-memories'). R-memories are memories which have experiential characteristics. They are those cases of remembering which characteristically ‘correspond to our use of the distinct senses'.
BibTeX:
@book{Debus2018,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {Memory, imagination, narrative},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory},
  editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabian},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {73--95}
}
Debus, D. Handle with care: Activity, passivity, and the epistemological role of recollective memories 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 119-135.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The present chapter is concerned with one particular type of memory, namely with memories that have experiential characteristics. Such ‘experiential' or ‘recollective' memories are common, everyday occurrences. For example, try to remember what you did last Sunday. Chances are that when you do so, you'll have at least some ‘recollective' memories of some of the events that occurred in your life last Sunday. Recollective memories (or ‘R-memories') are memories that have experiential characteristics. They are those cases of remembering that characteristically “correspond to our use of the distinct senses” (Martin, 2002, p. 403)—that is, they are those memories that are ‘as if' seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, or smelling the remembered event (or process, or state of affairs) again.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Debus2018a,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {Handle with care: Activity, passivity, and the epistemological role of recollective memories},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {119--135}
}
Michaelian, K. and Robins, S.K. Beyond the causal theory? Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 13-32.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It is natural to think of remembering in terms of causation: I can recall a recent dinner with a friend because I experienced that dinner. Some fifty years ago, Martin and Deutscher (1966) turned this basic thought into a full-fledged theory of memory, a theory that—due both to its intuitive plausibility and its apparent success in distinguishing remembering from related processes, including imagining—came over the following decades to dominate the landscape in the philosophy of memory. Previous approaches, such as the empiricist theory,2 had attempted to capture the nature of remembering from a first-person perspective, in terms of its characteristic phenomenology. The causal theory, in contrast, offered a third-personal account of the nature of remembering. Remembering, Martin and Deutscher argue, boils down to the existence of a specific sort of causal connection between the rememberer's original experience of an event and his later representation of that event: a causal connection sustained by a memory trace.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Deutscher2018,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Beyond the causal theory? Fifty years after Martin and Deutscher},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Dennis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {13--32}
}
Fernández, J. The functional character of memory 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 52-71.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something?1 The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining that features those mental states that qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states that do not qualify as such typically lack. I will proceed as follows.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fernandez2018,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {The functional character of memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {52--71}
}
Meurer, C.F. Mental time travel: Towards a computational account 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 72-80.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The paper aims to highlight similarities between computational routines of mentally travel- ing the present time, on the one hand, and routines of mentally traveling other times, on the other hand. The first and second sections, in which I lay out an eternalist view of the world and the massive modularity account of the architecture of the human mind, are intended to set the stage. Subsequently, I clarify the idea that we mentally travel the present. This explanation resorts to a cognitive mechanism I have proposed elsewhere. Finally, I submit that a similar computational routine takes place when we travel other times, be they earlier or later than the present moment.
BibTeX:
@article{FernandoMeurer2018,
  author = {Meurer, César Fernando},
  title = {Mental time travel: Towards a computational account},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {72--80},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.08},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/15596}
}
Figueiredo, N.M. On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as awareness of past events 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 63-71.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experi- mental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving's view on memory and con- sciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker's distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves ve- ridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving's conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Figueiredo2018,
  author = {Figueiredo, Nara M.},
  title = {On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as awareness of past events},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {63--71},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.07},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/15586}
}
Folescu, M. Remembering events: A Reidean account of (episodic) memory 2018 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
97(2), 304-321.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memory is essential to our functioning as fully developed, social individuals. Being in the world without remembering most of what we did would leave us unable to process and acquire any kind of knowledge about ourselves, the world we live in, and everyone else around us. Without memory to help us retain new information, our lives would be devoid of continuity, so that questions about our identity as persons and our place in the world would be impossible to answer. According to psychologists, there are several types of memory, and one type in particular, the so-called “episodic memory”, is essential for keeping track of our relationships with things in our environment. One project here is to determine exactly what type of things we are related to via episodic memory. Intuitively, physical objects, broadly construed, and their properties should be on the list.In addition, events seem like good candidates. But it is difficult to understand how we can have direct access to past events, given their essentially ephemeral character.
BibTeX:
@article{Folescu2016,
  author = {Folescu, Marina},
  title = {Remembering events: A Reidean account of (episodic) memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  volume = {97},
  number = {2},
  pages = {304--321},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12333},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12333}
}
Folescu, M. Thomas Reid's view of memorial conception 2018 Journal of Scottish Philosophy
16(3), 211-226.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?
BibTeX:
@article{Folescu2018,
  author = {Folescu, Marina},
  title = {Thomas Reid's view of memorial conception},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Scottish Philosophy},
  volume = {16},
  number = {3},
  pages = {211--226},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0204},
  url = {https://www.euppublishing.com/doi/10.3366/jsp.2018.0204}
}
Follesa, L. Learning and vision: Johann Gottfried Herder on memory 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A consistent thread throughout Johann Gottfried Herder's thought is his interest in human knowledge and in its origins. Although he never formulated a systematic theory of knowledge, elements of one are disseminated in his writings, from the early manuscript Plato sagte (1766–68) to one of his last works, the periodical Adrastea (1801–3). Herder assigned a very special function to memory and to the related idea of a recollection of “images,” as they play a pivotal role in the formation of personal identity. He provided an original description of the Platonic theory of recollection, trying to merge ancient and modern meta- physical views and to interpret them from a less metaphysical and more psychological point of view. I then analyze Herder's notion of memory via another research line, which is basically founded upon the analogy between the childhood of an individual and the infancy of the human race. Finally, I explore Herder's view that memory and imagination, as “forces” of the soul, can have negative effects on an individual when they are not equally balanced.
BibTeX:
@article{Follesa2018,
  author = {Follesa, Laura},
  title = {Learning and vision: Johann Gottfried Herder on memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1610},
  url = {https://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/3/}
}
Frise, M. Forgetting 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 223-240.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter is about how you will forget this chapter. It's about what forgetting anything is. We forget often, and psychologists research why. But neither they nor philosophers have tried much to unearth the nature of forgetting. The little shoveling in the area has turned topsoil only
BibTeX:
@incollection{Frise2018a,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Forgetting},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, K. and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {223--240}
}
Frise, M. Metacognition as evidence for evidentialism 2018 Believing in Accordance with the Evidence
Springer, 91-107.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Metacognition is the monitoring and controlling of cognitive processes. I examine the role of metacognition in 'ordinary retrieval cases', cases in which it is intuitive that via recollection the subject has a justified belief. Drawing on psychological research on metacognition, I argue that evidentialism has a unique, accurate prediction in each ordinary retrieval case: the subject has evidence for the proposition she justifiedly believes. But, I argue, process reliabilism has no unique, accurate predictions in these cases. I conclude that ordinary retrieval cases better support evidentialism than process reliabilism. This conclusion challenges several common assumptions. One is that non-evidentialism alone allows for a naturalized epistemology, i.e., an epistemology that is fully in accordance with scientific research and methodology. Another is that process reliabilism fares much better than evidentialism in the epistemology of memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Frise2018b,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Metacognition as evidence for evidentialism},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Believing in Accordance with the Evidence},
  editor = {McCain, Kevin},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {91--107},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_7},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-17 http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-17}
}
Froese, T. and Izquierdo, E.J. A dynamical approach to the phenomenology of body memory: Past interactions can shape present capacities without neuroplasticity 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 20-46.
 
Abstract: Body memory comprises the acquired dispositions that constitute an individual's present capacities and experiences. Phenomenological accounts of body memory describe its effects using dynamical metaphors: it is conceived of as curvatures in an agent-environment relational field, leading to attracting and repelling forces that shape ongoing sensorimotor interaction. This relational perspective stands in tension with traditional cognitive science, which conceives of the underlying basis of memory in representational-internal terms: it is the encoding and storing of informational content via structural changes inside the brain. We propose that this tension can be resolved by replacing the traditional approach with the dynamical approach to cognitive science. Specifically, we present three of our simulation models of embodied cognition that can help us to rethink the basis of several types of body memory. The upshot is that, at least in principle, there is no need to explain their basis in terms of content or to restrict their basis to neuroplasticity alone. Instead these models support the perspective developed by phenomenology: body memory is a relational property of a whole brain-body-environment system that emerges out of its history of interactions.
BibTeX:
@article{Froese2018,
  author = {Froese, Tom and Izquierdo, Eduardo J},
  title = {A dynamical approach to the phenomenology of body memory: Past interactions can shape present capacities without neuroplasticity},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {20--46}
}
Fuchs, T. The cyclical time of the body and its relation to linear time 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 47-65.
 
Abstract: While linear time results from the measurement of physical events, the temporality of life is characterized by cyclical processes, which also manifest themselves in subjective bodily experience. This applies for the periodicity of heartbeat, respiration, sleep-wake cycle, or circadian hormone secretion, among others. The central integration of rhythmic bodily signals in the brain forms the biological foundation of the phenomenal sense of temporal continuity. Cyclical repetitions are also found in the recurring phases of need, drive, and satisfaction. Finally, the cyclical structure of bodily time manifests itself at an extended level in the form of implicit or body memory. However, this cyclical structure of lived time comes into tension with the orders of linear time which have been increasingly established in Western societies since the modern age. This tension creates both individual as well as societal conflicts and may also result in psycho-pathological phenomena. As an example, depression and burnout syndromes will be discussed.
BibTeX:
@article{Fuchs2018,
  author = {Fuchs, Thomas},
  title = {The cyclical time of the body and its relation to linear time},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {47--65}
}
Gerrans, P. Painful memories 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 158-177.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Recent discussions of episodic memory converge on the idea that it involves “unique awareness of re-experiencing here and now something that hap- pened before, at another time and in another place” (Klein & Nichols, 2012). The phenomenology of subjective reacquaintance with past events is baptized autonoesis, a term introduced by Endel Tulving (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Tulving, 2002; Tulving, 2005). It refers to the experience of being the subject of experience. This experience is subtle and hard to describe and as with some other subtle phenomenologies its nature and role come more into focus when it is selectively impaired in neuropsychological and psychiatric disorders.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Gerrans2018,
  author = {Gerrans, Philip},
  title = {Painful memories},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, D.},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {158--177}
}
Gottlieb, J. Consciousness and the limits of memory 2018 Synthese
195(12), 5217-5243.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: IIntermodal representationalism is a popular theory of consciousness. This paper argues that intermodal representationalism is false, or at least likely so. The argument turns on two forms of exceptional episodic memory: hyperthymesia and prodigious visual memory in savant syndrome. Emerging from this argument is a broader lesson about the relationship between memory and perception; that it may be possible to entertain in memory the very same content as in a corresponding perceptual experience, and that the ‘overflow' interpretation of the classic Sperling paradigm experiments may not fully generalize.
BibTeX:
@article{Gottlieb2018,
  author = {Gottlieb, Joseph},
  title = {Consciousness and the limits of memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {195},
  number = {12},
  pages = {5217--5243},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1793-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-018-1793-9}
}
Gregory, D. Sensory memories and recollective images 2018 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Oxford University Press, 28-45.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] We talk about what we ‘remember' in a pretty wide range of circumstances.1 Some of what we remember has no special connection to our own pasts, as it amounts simply to things we have previously learned: I remember in this way that York is north of Sheffield. But many of our memories are bound much more tightly to our awareness of our own histories. In particular, our memories often revolve around sensory mental images that seem to us to correspond to how things were on specific occasions during our own lives.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Gregory2018,
  author = {Gregory, Dominic},
  title = {Sensory memories and recollective images},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory},
  editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {28--45}
}
Gross, S. Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access from the perspective of capacity-unlimited working memory 2018 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
373(1755), 20170343.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Theories of consciousness divide over whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse in specific representational content and whether it requires cognitive access. These two issues are often treated in tandem because of a shared assumption that the representational capacity of cognitive access is fairly limited. Recent research on working memory challenges this shared assumption. This paper argues that abandoning the assumption undermines post-cue-based “overflow” arguments, according to which perceptual conscious is rich and does not require cognitive access. Abandoning it also dissociates the rich/sparse debate from the access question. The paper then explores attempts to reformulate overflow theses in ways that don't require the assumption of limited capacity. Finally, it discusses the problem of relating seemingly non-probabilistic perceptual consciousness to the probabilistic representations posited by the models that challenge conceptions of cognitive access as capacity-limited.
BibTeX:
@article{Gross2018,
  author = {Gross, Steven},
  title = {Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access from the perspective of capacity-unlimited working memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
  volume = {373},
  number = {1755},
  pages = {20170343},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2017.0343},
  url = {http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/lookup/doi/10.1098/rstb.2017.0343}
}
Hardt, R. Storytelling agents: Why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental 2018 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
17(3), 535-554.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I propose that we can explain the contribution of mental time travel to agency through understanding it as a specific instance of our more general capacity for narrative understanding. Narrative understanding involves the experience of a pre-reflective and embodied sense of self, which co-emerges with our emotional involvement with a sequence of events (Velleman 2003). Narrative understanding of a sequence of events also requires a 'recombinable system', that is, the ability to combine parts to make myriad sequences. Mental time travel shares these two characteristics: it involves an embodied sense of self and the ability to create novel scenarios. What is unique about mental time travel is that it is a story explicitly about our selves, and it involves metarepresentation. Agency is enabled by narrative understanding when we are able to put our current situation into a larger narrative context, whereby some possible actions, but not others, make sense. However, new features of agency are enabled when we understand stories that are explicitly about our selves: we gain the ability to plan and act on plans.
BibTeX:
@article{Hardt,
  author = {Hardt, Rosa},
  title = {Storytelling agents: Why narrative rather than mental time travel is fundamental},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {17},
  number = {3},
  pages = {535--554},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9530-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-017-9530-2}
}
Heersmink, R. The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects 2018 Philosophical Studies
175(8), 1829-1849.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct. Keywords
BibTeX:
@article{Heersmink2017,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {The narrative self, distributed memory, and evocative objects},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {175},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1829--1849},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0935-0},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-017-0935-0}
}
Henry, J. and Craver, C.F. Episodic memory and the witness trump card 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e16.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We accept Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) causal claim that episodic memory provides humans with the means for evaluating the veracity of reports about non-occurrent events. We reject their evolutionary argument that this is the proper function of episodic memory. We explore three intriguing implications of the causal claim, for cognitive neuropsychology, comparative psychology, and philosophy.
BibTeX:
@article{Henry2018,
  author = {Henry, Jeremy and Craver, Carl F.},
  title = {Episodic memory and the witness trump card},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e16},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001376},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001376/type/journalarticle}
}
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T. Animal minds in time: The question of episodic memory 2018 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds
Routledge, 56-64.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In his book Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson writes: When a dog welcomes his master, barking and wagging his tail, he certainly recognizes him; but does this recognition imply the evocation of a past image . . .? [The] past does not interest the animal enough to detach it from the fascinating present [. . .]. To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the useless, we must have the will to dream. Man alone is capable of such an effort. (Bergson 1911: 93f.) Bergson's words evoke a trope that can be found in the works of philosophers as diverse as Aris- totle (1930: 453a4–13), Friedrich Nietzsche (1983: 60f.), and Daniel Dennett (2005: 168f.). The idea is that there is a deep discontinuity between us and the rest of the animal kingdom when it comes to the role of time in our mental lives: nonhuman animals are, in some sense, cognitively stuck in the present. This idea has recently received fresh attention, and is now typically framed in terms of the question as to whether animals are capable of having episodic memories (Tulving 2001). The thought, in short, is that the human capacity to consciously recollect particular past events constitutes an important way in which we can cognitively transcend the present. As it is sometimes put, it constitutes a form of ‘mental time travel'. And the question is whether nonhu- man animals, too, are capable of mentally transporting themselves to another time in this way.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hoerl2018,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa},
  title = {Animal minds in time: The question of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds},
  editor = {Andrews, Kristin and Beck, Jacob},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {56--64}
}
Hoerl, C. Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered 2018 Mind & Language
33(2), 148-160.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A familiar claim in the literature on episodic memory in both psychology and philosophy is that engaging in epi- sodic recollection requires grasp of a theory of mind. In this paper, I re-examine what connection, if any, there is between episodic memory and theory of mind. I first criti- cize the dominant way in which this connection has been construed theoretically, which has sought to link the pos- session of episodic memory with a grasp of the idea of rep- resentation, or the idea of informational access. I then argue for a novel, alternative, way of connecting episodic mem- ory and theory of mind, which focuses on the role a grasp of the category of an experience might be seen to play in episodic recollection. In doing so, I also draw attention to a dimension of our understanding of the mental which is as yet underexplored in the literature on theory of mind.
BibTeX:
@article{Hoerl2018a,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {Episodic memory and theory of mind: A connection reconsidered},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  volume = {33},
  number = {2},
  pages = {148--160},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12170},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12170}
}
Hoerl, C. Remembering past experiences: Episodic memory, semantic memory, and the epistemic asymmetry 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 313-328.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] There seems to be a distinctive way in which we can remember events we have experienced ourselves, which differs from the capacity to retain infor- mation about events that we can also have when we have not experienced the relevant events ourselves but just learned about them in some other way. Psychologists and increasingly also philosophers have tried to capture this difference in terms of the idea of two different types of memory: epi- sodic memory and semantic memory. Yet, the demarcation between episodic memory and semantic memory remains a contested topic in both disciplines, to the point of there being researchers in each of them who question the usefulness of the distinction between the two concepts.1 In this chapter, I outline a new characterization of the difference between episodic memory and semantic memory, which connects that difference to what is sometimes called the ‘epistemic asymmetry' between the past and the future, or the ‘epistemic arrow' of time. My proposal will be that episodic memory and semantic memory exemplify the epistemic asymmetry in two different ways, and for somewhat different reasons, and that the way in which episodic memory exemplifies the epistemic asymmetry is manifest to the remember- ing subject in a way in which this is not the case for semantic memory
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hoerl2018b,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {Remembering past experiences: Episodic memory, semantic memory, and the epistemic asymmetry},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaeliean, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {313--328}
}
Homan, M. Memory aids and the Cartesian circle 2018 British Journal for the History of Philosophy
26(6), 1064-1083.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In answering the circularity charge, Descartes consistently distinguished between truths whose demonstrations we currently perceive clearly and distinctly (call these ‘C-truths') and truths whose demonstrations we merely remember having perceived clearly and distinctly (call these ‘R-truths'). Descartes uses C-truths to prove God's existence, thus validating R-truths. While avoiding one form of circularity (using C-truths to validate C-truths), this introduces another circle, for Descartes believes that God's existence validates R-truths even when itself an R-truth. I consider Newman and Nelson's grounds enhancement strategy according to which this problem is solved when God's existence is rendered axiomatic. I argue that since it is still possible to doubt axioms when not directly apprehending them, this strategy cannot work; having to reproduce the argument for God's existence in face of sceptical doubt is unavoidable. Drawing both on Newman and Nelson's notion of grounds enhancement and on reproducibility interpretations, I argue that reproducibility can be enhanced via memory aids. Although discussion of memory and the Cartesian circle has been sidelined since Frankfurt's 1962 refutation of Doney's memory interpretation, I argue that memory is at the heart of the matter after all (though not in the same way Doney thought).
BibTeX:
@article{Homan2018,
  author = {Homan, Matthew},
  title = {Memory aids and the Cartesian circle},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
  volume = {26},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1064--1083},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2018.1450217},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2018.1450217}
}
Hopkins, R. Imagining the past 2018 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Oxford University Press, 46-71.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Philosophers and psychologists commonly distinguish at least two kinds of memory: ‘factual' or ‘semantic' memory versus memory in ‘experiential' or ‘episodic' form.1 Factual memory is, roughly, the retention of belief. It is at heart a matter of my cur- rently believing that p, where my doing so depends, in the right way, on my earlier believing that p.2 An example would be my current belief that salt is sodium chloride. Episodic memory is more problematic. It takes longer to spell out even the uncontro- versial aspects of that idea (see section 2). But an intuitive grip on the notion is given by the thought that episodic memory is distinctive in both its scope and its vehicle. Its scope is limited to past episodes: past events I have witnessed or experiences I have undergone. As to its vehicle, the idea is that paradigm cases of episodic remembering essentially involve memory imagery. If I can picture in memory my first university exam, summon an auditory image of the instruction to begin, or recall the accompany- ing nervous feeling in the pit of my stomach, chances are that I am episodically remem- bering that event. (Note that imagery need not be visual, or even restricted to the traditional senses.) Of course, imagery can be bound up with factual memory too. Perhaps I remember the chemical composition of salt by forming an image of two sub- stances being combined, one labelled ‘sodium', the other ‘chlorine'. But here the image plays the role of mere accompaniment or aide-mémoire. The imagistic state of mind is not itself the memory, not even in part—unlike in the examination case.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hopkins2018,
  author = {Hopkins, Robert},
  title = {Imagining the past},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory},
  editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {46--71}
}
Hutto, D.D. and Peeters, A. The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 97-118.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Our understanding of what lies at the roots of remembering needs to evolve. Recent years have witnessed some daring new thinking about this topic in response to empirical findings from three main sources. Two of these sources paint a picture of remembering as transactional and extraindividual, on the one hand, and reconstructive and re-creative, on the other. The third set of findings challenge standard assumptions about the fundamentally representational character of remembering. Going
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hutto2018,
  author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Peeters, Anco},
  title = {The roots of remembering: Radically enactive recollecting},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {97--118}
}
Keven, N. Carving event and episodic memory at their joints 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e19.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) argue that event and episodic memories share the same scenario construction process. I think this way of carving up the distinction throws the baby out with the bathwater. If there is a substantive difference between event and episodic memory, it is based on a difference in the construction process and how they are organized, respectively.
BibTeX:
@article{Keven2018,
  author = {Keven, Nazim},
  title = {Carving event and episodic memory at their joints},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001406},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001406/type/journalarticle}
}
King, R.A.H. Aristotle on distinguishing phantasia and memory 2018 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Oxford University Press, 9-27.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Like many ancient philosophers Coriscus worked for a potentate: he left Athens where he had been a member of Plato's Academy for Atarneus near his home city of Scepsis in Asia Minor, where Hermias held power. And Aristotle remembers Coriscus.1 What does he do, when he does this?
BibTeX:
@incollection{King2018,
  author = {King, R. A. H.},
  title = {Aristotle on distinguishing phantasia and memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory},
  editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {9--27}
}
Klein, S.B. Remembering with and without memory: A theory of memory and aspects of mind that enable its experience. 2018 Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
5(2), 117-130.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article builds on ideas presented in Klein (2015c) concerning the importance of a more nuanced, conceptually rigorous approach to the scientific understanding and use of the construct Memory. I first summarize my model, taking care to situate discussion within the terminological practices of contemporary philosophy of mind. I then eluci- date the implications of the model for a particular operation of mind—the manner in which content presented to consciousness realizes its particular phenomenological character (i.e., mode of presentation). Finally, I discuss how the model offers a reconceptualization of the technical language used by psychologists and neuroscientists to formulate and test ideas about memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2018,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {Remembering with and without memory: A theory of memory and aspects of mind that enable its experience.},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice},
  volume = {5},
  number = {2},
  pages = {117--130},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000142},
  url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/cns0000142}
}
Klein, M., Osorio-Kupferblum, N. and Tóth, O.I. Preface: Remembering consciousness 2018 Society and Politics
12, 5-7.
 
Abstract: Research in ancient and mediaeval philosophy has made it increasingly clear that questions similar to modern concerns about consciousness were already considered before the early modern period, even if those debates took place in their particular contexts and in different conceptual frameworks. These philosophical and historical studies of pre-modern conceptions have, in turn, changed our perspective regarding the works of early modern philosophers. More and more, we come to see the historical-philosophical background of early modern thinkers and which aspects in their new philosophies built on, or responded to, tralatitious views. It seems to us that a better understanding of their (our) heritage furthers the understanding and appreciation of all the breaches and innovation they brought to European philosophy. This issue, therefore, aims to contribute to research in the history of medieval and early modern philosophy of mind by shedding new light on the continuities and innovations during the transition from medieval to early modern philosophy of mind. The four papers focus on consciousness and, more specifically, on one of its less frequently considered aspects: memory. Memory gave rise to explanatory problems related to consciousness already in medieval philosophy, even if these issues were not necessarily formulated in terms of what modern philosophy came to regard as the problem of consciousness. Nevertheless, aspects of consciousness were clearly addressed when the schoolmen debated questions such as how it is possible to recall one"s own past experiences; whether sensual memories are still in the mind when not entertained, and if so, how we can be unaware of them; how their non-physical counterparts, i.e. intellectual memories, are retained; and whether the objects of sensual and intellectual memory are experienced separately in the stream of consciousness or rather as one object. In the early modern period, starting with Descartes, a new concept of mind emerged, which was inspired by and compatible with the advances of a new natural science based on mechanical principles. Nevertheless, the debates concerning specific
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2018a,
  author = {Klein, Martin and Osorio-Kupferblum, Naomi and Tóth, Olivér István},
  title = {Preface: Remembering consciousness},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Society and Politics},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {5--7}
}
Lavazza, A. Memory-modulation: Self-improvement or self-depletion? 2018 Frontiers in Psychology
9, 469.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Autobiographical memory is fundamental to the process of self-construction. Therefore, the possibility of modifying autobiographical memories, in particular with memory-modulation and memory-erasing, is a very important topic both from the theoretical and from the practical point of view. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the state of the art of some of the most promising areas of memory-modulation and memory-erasing, considering how they can affect the self and the overall balance of the "self and autobiographical memory" system. Indeed, different conceptualizations of the self and of personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory are what makes memory-modulation and memory-erasing more or less desirable. Because of the current limitations (both practical and ethical) to interventions on memory, I can only sketch some hypotheses. However, it can be argued that the choice to mitigate painful memories (or edit memories for other reasons) is somehow problematic, from an ethical point of view, according to some of the theories of the self and personal identity in relation to autobiographical memory, in particular for the so-called narrative theories of personal identity, chosen here as the main case of study. Other conceptualizations of the "self and autobiographical memory" system, namely the constructivist theories, do not have this sort of critical concerns. However, many theories rely on normative (and not empirical) conceptions of the self: for them, the actions aimed at mitigating or removing specific (negative) memories can be seen either as an improvement or as a depletion or impairment of the self.
BibTeX:
@article{Lavazza2018,
  author = {Lavazza, Andrea},
  title = {Memory-modulation: Self-improvement or self-depletion?},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {469},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00469},
  url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00469/full}
}
Lin, Y.-T. Visual perspectives in episodic memory and the sense of self 2018 Frontiers in Psychology
9, 2196.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The connection between memory and self-consciousness has been a central topic in philosophy of memory. When remembering an event we experienced in the past, not only do we experience being the subject of the conscious episode, but we also experience being the protagonist in the memory scene. This is the "phenomenal presence of self." To explore this special sense of self in memory, this paper focuses on the issue of how one identifies oneself in episodic simulation at the retrieval of memory and draws attention to the field and observer perspectives in episodic memory. Metzinger (2013a,b, 2017) recently introduced the concept of the phenomenal unit of identification (UI) to characterize the phenomenal property that gives rise to the conscious experience of "I am this." This paper shows how observer-perspective remembering provides an interesting opportunity for studying the sense of self. It is argued that observer-perspective remembering is a stable state of consciousness that is distinct from autoscopic phenomena with respect to the dimensions of minimal phenomenal self (MPS). Together, the notion of UI and the particular style of remembering offer a way of understanding the phenomenal presence of self, and three possible ways in which phenomenal properties constitute UI in memory are raised. The study of perspectives in episodic simulation may prompt new empirical and conceptual issues concerning both the sense of identity and the relationship between MPS and extended self.
BibTeX:
@article{Lin2018,
  author = {Lin, Ying-Tung},
  title = {Visual perspectives in episodic memory and the sense of self},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {2196},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02196},
  url = {www.frontiersin.org https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02196/full}
}
Macpherson, F. Perceptual imagination and perceptual memory: An overview 2018 Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory
Oxford University Press, 1-5.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The essays in this volume explore the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory. How do perceptual imagination and memory resemble and differ from each other and from other kinds of sensory experience? And what role does each play in perception and in the acquisition of knowledge? These are the two central questions that the essays in this volume seek to address.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Macpherson2018,
  author = {Macpherson, Fiona},
  title = {Perceptual imagination and perceptual memory: An overview},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory},
  editor = {Macpherson, Fiona and Dorsch, Fabien},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {1--5}
}
Mahr, J.B. and Csibra, G. Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e1.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.
BibTeX:
@article{Mahr2018,
  author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Csibra, Gergely},
  title = {Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e1},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000012},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17000012/type/journalarticle}
}
Mahr, J.B. and Csibra, G. What is it to remember? 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e35.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In response to the commentaries, we clarify and defend our characterization of both the nature and function of episodic memory. Regarding the nature of episodic memory, we extend the distinction between event and episodic memory and discuss the relational role of episodic memory. We also address arguments against our characterization of autonoesis and argue that, while self-referential, it needs to be distinguished from an agentive notion of self. Regarding the function of episodic memory, we review arguments about the relation between future mental time travel and memory veridicality; clarify the relation between autonoesis, veridicality, and confidence; and finally discuss the role of episodic memory in diachronic commitments.
BibTeX:
@article{Mahr2018a,
  author = {Mahr, Johannes B. and Csibra, Gergely},
  title = {What is it to remember?},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e35},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001959},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001959/type/journalarticle}
}
Malafouris, L. and Koukouti, M.D. How the body remembers its skills: Memory and material engagement 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 158-80.
 
Abstract: What are bodily memories made of? Where do body memories reside and what forms do they take? What is the relationship between embodied memory and material culture? This paper adopts a material engagement approach and sets out to explore body memory as a skilful engagement with the material world. We examine the nature of body memory from a distributed, enactive, and trans-actional perspective. We use the examples of bicycle riding and pottery making to examine more closely what is changing in the way we understand bodily memory when we approach it from such a distributed and enactive anthropological perspective. Overall, we wish to make a case for the primacy of material engagement over body memory and to propose that the way a body remembers its skills is by re-enacting them inside the world using available forms of material culture and not by representing them inside the brain.
BibTeX:
@article{Malafouris2018,
  author = {Malafouris, Lambros and Koukouti, Maria Danae},
  title = {How the body remembers its skills: Memory and material engagement},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {158--80}
}
McCarroll, C.J. Remembering From the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind 2018
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{McCarroll2018,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {Remembering From the Outside: Personal Memory and the Perspectival Mind},
  year = {2018},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Carvalho, F.M. Situating mental time travel in the broad context of temporal cognition: A neural systems approach 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 81-88.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability of remembering personal past events or thinking about possible personal future happenings. This mental property is possible due to our capacity to be aware of subjective time, which enables us to experience the flow of time, to conceive non-present times, and to process time as a dimension of real world phe- nomena. Temporal cognition encompasses the mental functions which rely on temporal information enabling the experience of the temporal flow and the processing of the tem- poral dimension of external phenomena. Given the broad range of our time experiences and, hence, the broad scope of our temporal cognition, it is expected that certain kinds of temporal information can be of particular importance when we mentally transport ourselves to events in the past or future, whereas others could be unrelated to this mental property. The present paper seeks to situate the process of MTT within human temporal cognition. This will be done by identifying the commonalities and differences in the neural correlates of MTT and those of the three main subjective time processing systems, namely metric tim- ing, ordinal timing and autobiographical timing.
BibTeX:
@article{MesquitaCarvalho2018,
  author = {Carvalho, Fabiana Mesquita},
  title = {Situating mental time travel in the broad context of temporal cognition: A neural systems approach},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {81--88},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.09},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/15568}
}
Micali, S. The anticipation of the present: Phenomenology of déjà vu 2018 Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
49(2), 156-170.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper analyses the déjà-vu experience in order to deepen the understanding of the complex nature of time-consciousness from a phenomenological point of view. The paper is divided into two sections: the first section focuses on Bergson's research on déjà vu in order to assess the validity of his position; the second section describes a specific form of déjà-vu experience from a phenomenological perspective. This investigation will question the widespread assumption according to which déjà vu should be conceived as a disturbance of the memory of the past. On the contrary, the author shows that the disturbance primarily pertains to the dimension of the future. In order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to focus on the coherent deformation of the immediate expectation of the imminent future.
BibTeX:
@article{Micali2018,
  author = {Micali, Stefano},
  title = {The anticipation of the present: Phenomenology of déjà vu},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology},
  volume = {49},
  number = {2},
  pages = {156--170},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2017.1403748},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00071773.2017.1403748}
}
Michael, J., Székely, M. and Christensen, W. Using episodic memory to gauge implicit and/or indeterminate social commitments 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e21.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In discussing Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) observations about the role of episodic memory in grounding social commitments, we propose that episodic memory is especially useful for gauging cases of implicit commitment and cases in which the content of a commitment is indeterminate. We conclude with some thoughts about how commitment may relate to the evolution of episodic memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Michael2018,
  author = {Michael, John and Székely, Marcell and Christensen, Wayne},
  title = {Using episodic memory to gauge implicit and/or indeterminate social commitments},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e21},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1700142X},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X1700142X/type/journalarticle}
}
Michaelian, K., Debus, D. and Perrin, D. The philosophy of memory today and tomorrow: Editors' introduction 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 1-9.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] As Bernecker and Michaelian point out in their introduction to the recent Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (2017), it is hardly surprising, given that memory is one of our most fundamental cognitive capacities and the source of an enormous fraction of our knowledge, that philosophical interest in memory dates back to the dawn of philosophy and has remained strong throughout the history of the discipline. What is surprising is the fact that the philosophy of memory has only recently emerged as a recognized field of research. Whatever the explanation for the delayed emergence of the field, it now most definitely has emerged, with the publication of the Handbook being only the most obvious sign of this development. Other signs include the rapid proliferation of workshops, conferences, and special issues on the topic of memory and the establishment, at the Issues in Philosophy of Memory conference held in Cologne in 2017, of the PHilosophy Of Memory Organization (phomo.org). There is, in short, a lot going on in the philosophy of memory today, and, whereas the entries for the Handbook were compiled so as to provide a systematic overview of historical and contemporary philosophical research on memory, the present volume, New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, offers a snapshot of some of the most active and dynamic areas of current research.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2018,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  title = {The philosophy of memory today and tomorrow: Editors' introduction},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin. Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {1--9}
}
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J. Collective memory 2018 The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality
Routledge, 140-151.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Th ere has been relatively little interaction between research on collective intentionality in philosophy and research on collective memory in psychology and the social sciences. Rather than being due to a lack of mutual relevance—as this chapter will demonstrate, the two traditions are very much relevant to each other—this lack of interaction is due largely to somewhat arbitrary disciplinary barriers. But disciplinary barriers, even when arbitrary, have real consequences, and one message of this chapter is that the lack of inter- action has had negative consequences for both fi elds. Psychologists and social scientists have tended not to take advantage of philosophical resources that might sharpen their analyses of collective memory. Philosophers, meanwhile, have oft en presupposed overly simple models of the interactions among group members that are at work in the forma- tion of collective memories and collective intentional states more broadly. Th ere are thus important potential benefi ts to be realized for each fi eld through increased interaction with the other.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2018a,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John},
  title = {Collective memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality},
  editor = {Jankovic, Marija and Ludwig, Kirk},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {140--151}
}
Michaelian, K. Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering systematically misleading? 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e22.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) view autonoesis as being essential to episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us about the past.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelian2018b,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering systematically misleading?},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e22},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001431},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001431/type/journalarticle}
}
Michaelian, K. Naturalistic descriptions of knowledge 2018 Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy
Bloomsbury, 69-88.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Is knowledge naturalistically describable? Can and should epistemology become a naturalistic fi eld? To a non- epistemologist, the answer to these questions might seem to be obvious. For epistemology to become naturalistic would be for it to become empirical . Th e central goals of epistemology are to tell us what knowledge is and how to go about acquiring it, and, surely, if we are to have any hope of attaining those goals, then we will have to investigate knowledge empirically. How else might we hope to formulate an adequate description of something as complex as human knowledge? How else might we hope to give useful advice about how to acquire knowledge?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2018c,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Naturalistic descriptions of knowledge},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy},
  editor = {Hetherington, Stephen and Valaris, Markos},
  publisher = {Bloomsbury},
  pages = {69--88}
}
Michaelian, K. Episodic and semantic memory and imagination: The need for definitions 2018 The American Journal of Psychology
131(1), 99-103.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Humphreys and Chalmers's stimulating book sets out a novel and ambitious approach to thinking about human memory. Rather than thinking about memory in terms of general memory systems, they argue, we should think about it primarily in terms of specific memory tasks. In practice, thinking about memory in terms not of systems but of tasks requires us to break tasks into five components: the subject's goals in performing the task, the cues used by the subject to perform the task, the information needed by the sub- ject in order to perform it, the opportunities available to the subject to learn the necessary information, and the sources of noise involved in the memory process. Humphreys and Chalmers refer to this approach to understanding memory in terms of tasks and their components aqs the Gold CIONs approach for goals, cues, information, opportunities, and noise.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelian2018d,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Episodic and semantic memory and imagination: The need for definitions},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {The American Journal of Psychology},
  volume = {131},
  number = {1},
  pages = {99--103},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5406/amerjpsyc.131.1.0099},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/amerjpsyc.131.1.0099}
}
Michaelian, K. and Arango-Muñoz, S. Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective 2018 Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications
Oxford University Press, 231-247.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Collaborative remembering, in which two or more individuals cooperate to remember together, is an ordinary occurrence. We will argue that, ordinary though it may be, it challenges traditional understandings of remembering as a cognitive process unfolding within a single subject, as well as traditional understandings of memory knowledge as a justified memory belief held within the mind of a single subject. Collaborative memory has come to be a major area of research in psy- chology, but it has so far not been investigated in epistemology. In this chapter, we attempt an initial exploration of the epistemological implications of collaborative memory research, taking as our starting point the “extended knowledge” debate which has resulted from the recent encounter between extracranialist theories of cognition and externalist theories of knowledge (Carter et al., 2014; Carter et al., forthcoming).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2018e,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Arango-Muñoz, Santiago},
  title = {Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications},
  editor = {Meade, Michelle and Harris, Celia B. and Van Bergen, Penny and Sutton, John and Barnier, Amanda J.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {231--247}
}
Moeller, H.-G. Necessity and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A reconstruction 2018 Frontiers of Philosophy in China
13(4), 505-517.
[DOI]  
Abstract: This paper discusses two core concepts in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: necessity (Notwendigkeit) and memory (Erinnerung). The analysis is based on an investigation of the connotations and linguistic components of the two terms as they are used in the German language. Occurrences of the terms in decisive passages in the Phenomenology of Spirit are investigated and seen as a key to an understanding of Hegel's overall project of constructing a "scientific" (wissenschaftlich) philosophy in the form of a conceptual system. The paper aims at showing that this project can in part be understood as an attempt to transform the contingency of all moments of the path of the self-cultivation, maturation, and growth (Bildung) of spirit (Geist)-understood both in terms of its personal dimension and as "world spirit"-into necessity. It is argued that memory plays a decisive role in this endeavor, not only in the sense of a recalling of the past, but also as a prerequisite for a future that opens up room for further cultivation, maturation, and growth.
BibTeX:
@article{Moeller2018,
  author = {Moeller, Hans-Georg},
  title = {Necessity and memory in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A reconstruction},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Frontiers of Philosophy in China},
  volume = {13},
  number = {4},
  pages = {505--517},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3868/s030-007-018-0040-3}
}
Montemayor, C. Consciousness and memory: A transactional approach 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The prevailing view about our memory skills is that they serve a complex epistemic function. I shall call this the “monistic view.” Instead of a monistic, exclusively epistemic approach, I propose a transactional view. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic functions of episodic memory because of its essentially moral and empathic character. I argue that this transactional view pro- vides a more plausible and integral account of memory capacities in humans, based on theoretical and empirical reasons. Memory, on this account, plays two distinctive roles. The episodic memory system satisfies epistemic needs and is valuable because it is a source of justification for beliefs about the past. Autobiographical memory satisfies moral and narrative-autonoetic needs, and is valuable because it is a source of personally meaningful and insightful experiences about our past. Unlike autobiographical memory, episodic memory is only weakly autonoetic. The relation between these two roles of memory is captured by the tension between a narrative and an accurate report. Essays
BibTeX:
@article{Montemayor2018,
  author = {Montemayor, Carlos},
  title = {Consciousness and memory: A transactional approach},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1612},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/5}
}
Müller, P.N. Locke and Descartes on mental transparency 2018 Society and Politics
12, 72-94.
 
Abstract: The transparency thesis-i.e. the doctrine that every mental state is necessarily conscious-was a widespread view in early modern philosophy. In this paper, I inquire into the role of mental transparency in the philosophies of John Locke and René Descartes. I begin by sketching a shared Lockean-Cartesian picture of mind as it pertains to the psychological or structural aspects of consciousness. I then distinguish mental transparency from the closely related concept of epistemic transparency and argue that the thesis must allow for different degrees of conscious awareness, which is needed to address some of our uneasy intuitions. Afterwards, I examine Locke"s and Descartes"s reasons for adopting transparency in their respective philosophies. In the case of Descartes, I present consciousness as a necessary condition for knowledge of our own minds in the larger context of his epistemological goals in the Meditations. In the case of Locke, I examine three of his arguments in order to illustrate the indispensable role of transparency in his polemic against central Cartesian doctrines such as innatism and the thesis that the soul always thinks.
BibTeX:
@article{Muller2018,
  author = {Müller, Philipp N},
  title = {Locke and Descartes on mental transparency},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Society and Politics},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {72--94}
}
Nagel, J. Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e24.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The distinctive feature of episodic memory is autonoesis, the feeling that one's awareness of particular past events is grounded in firsthand experience. Autonoesis guides us in sharing our experiences of past events, not by telling us when our credibility is at stake, but by telling us what others will find informative; it also supports the sense of an enduring self.
BibTeX:
@article{Nagel2018,
  author = {Nagel, Jennifer},
  title = {Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e24},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001443},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001443/type/journalarticle}
}
Nennig, P.R. Mechanical memory and the speculative sentence: The importance of language for Hegel in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia 2018 Southwest Philosophy Review
34(1), 181-188.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper examine the relation between the account of mechanical memory in Hegel's Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the speculative sentence in his Phenomenology of Spirit. Both accounts involve a transition to speculative thinking, a kind of thinking that is free from given images and representations. By discussing them together I hope to illuminate how speculative thinking functions for Hegel and why it is important. Specifically, I try to show how what Hegel calls mechanical memory can shed light on Hegel's more familiar notion of the speculative sentence. I also draw out implications of language and mechanical memory for what Hegel calls speculative thinking. First, I examine Hegel's account of language acquisition in the Encyclopedia, which involves an account of mechanical memory, to show how Hegel thinks the mind can produce a vehicle for thinking that it has produced both in form and content. Second, I show how this vehicle of language works in the speculative sentence in the Phenomenology.
BibTeX:
@article{Nennig2018,
  author = {Nennig, Peter R.},
  title = {Mechanical memory and the speculative sentence: The importance of language for Hegel in the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review},
  volume = {34},
  number = {1},
  pages = {181--188},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201834118},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=swphilreview20180034000101810188&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
O'Loughlin, I. and Robins, S.K. The philosophy of memory: Introduction 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] As a pervasive and fundamental feature of human experience, memory has long provided fertile ground for philosophical work. Memory appears in a wide and disparate range of philosophical projects and traditions—from the writings of Plato and Aristotle in Ancient Greece to the work of early Buddhist philosophers like Śabara and Buddhaghosa, from epistemological questions about the retention of knowledge, to metaphysical debates about the nature of personal identity, to phenomenological inquiries into our experience of time and history. As a primary mental capacity, memory has played a particularly important role in the work of philosophers interested in minds and cognition, especially as interdisciplinary cognitive science has developed over the last several decades. The extensive points of contact between memory and philosophy are not surprising: interest in memory arises nearly any time a concept, ability, or entity needs to be extended and retained, as in investigations of persons, time, knowledge, the self, and experience. Whenever we are doing philosophy, memory is not far.
BibTeX:
@article{OLoughlin2018,
  author = {O'Loughlin, Ian and Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {The philosophy of memory: Introduction},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1608},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/1}
}
Perrin, D. A case for procedural causality in episodic recollection 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 33-51.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter aims at making a case for what I propose to call “procedural causality” that is operative in episodic memory. To do so, I rely on the widely accepted notion of episodic memory understood as a mental occurrence of remembering. Indeed, among the many forms memory can take, one should distinguish declarative memory, i.e., the form of memory that provides explicit representations of personal or general facts. This mnemonic form is usually distinguished from procedural memory in the wide sense, which includes (among other things) motor and cognitive skills and does not involve any representation. Declarative memory, in turn, can come in either of two ways. On the one hand, semantic memory is the memory for facts conceptually represented, and on the other hand, episodic memory is the quasi-experiential representation of past personal episodes. Now, such episodes can be the objects of a semantic memory as well as of an episodic memory. So, a question is what makes a mental occurrence an episodic memory, rather than a semantic memory, of a personal episode experienced in the past. One can refine this question in three main sub- questions (Fernandez, 2013):
BibTeX:
@incollection{Perrin2018,
  author = {Perrin, Denis},
  title = {A case for procedural causality in episodic recollection},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {33--51}
}
Prinz, J. Attention, working memory, and animal consciousness 2018 The Routledge Handbook of Animal Minds
Routledge, 185-195.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In order to decide whether nonhuman animals are conscious, it is helpful to begin with an empirically motivated account of the precise conditions under which consciousness arises in human beings. Reliance on behavior alone can lead to shaky inferences. Many animals behave very differently from humans, and behaviors associated with consciousness can be carried out without a central nervous system; for example, an excised octopus leg will avoid noxious stimuli (Alupay et al., 2014), and scratching behavior in sea turtles can be controlled by the spine (Stein, et al. 1995). In humans, much of what can be done consciously can also be done unconsciously (e.g., Prinz, 2017). Confidence about other animals will increase if we can identify mechanisms that match the correlates of consciousness in us. Here I will briefly summarize an account of those mechanisms, defended at great length elsewhere, and I will suggest that a surprising num- ber of taxa may satisfy its fairly demanding conditions.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Prinz2018,
  author = {Prinz, Jesse},
  title = {Attention, working memory, and animal consciousness},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Animal Minds},
  editor = {Andrews, Kristin and Beck, Jacob},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {185--195}
}
Puddifoot, K. and Bortolotti, L. The bright side of memory errors 2018 Philosophers' Magazine
82, 41-47.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] On several occasions in 2001, following the attacks the World Trade Centre on 9/11, US President George Bush said he remembered watching on TV the first plane crashing into the Towers. However, at the time there was no footage of the first plane crash, so his recollection could not be accurate. He was told about the crash, but did not watch it on TV. More recently, in 2015, presidential candidate Donald Trump said he remembered witnessing large crowds of Muslims celebrating the 9/11 attacks in New Jersey. There is no evidence that such a celebration occurred, although there was a rumour at the time that some Muslims had cheered at the news of the terrorist attack. This rumour was never confirmed, and later proved false.
BibTeX:
@article{Puddifoot2018,
  author = {Puddifoot, Katherine and Bortolotti, Lisa},
  title = {The bright side of memory errors},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophers' Magazine},
  volume = {82},
  pages = {41--47}
}
Rau, P. and Botterill, G. Enhanced action control as a prior function of episodic memory 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e27.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Improved control of agency is likely to be a prior and more important function of episodic memory than the epistemic-communicative role pinpointed by Mahr & Csibra (M&C). Taking the memory trace upon which scenario construction is based to be a stored internal model produced in past perceptual processing promises to provide a better account of autonoetic character than metarepresentational embedding.
BibTeX:
@article{Rau2018,
  author = {Rau, Philipp and Botterill, George},
  title = {Enhanced action control as a prior function of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e27},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001479},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001479/type/journalarticle}
}
Reiheld, A. Rightly or for ill: The ethics of individual memory 2018 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
28(4), 377-410.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this investigation, I focus on individual memory behaviors for which we commonly blame and praise each other. Alas, we too often do so unreflectively. Blame and praise should not be undertaken lightly or without a good grasp on both what we are holding people responsible for, and the conditions under which they can be held responsible. I lay out the constructivist view of memory with consideration for both remembering and forgetting, and special attention to how we remember events
BibTeX:
@article{Reiheld2018,
  author = {Reiheld, Alison},
  title = {Rightly or for ill: The ethics of individual memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal},
  volume = {28},
  number = {4},
  pages = {377--410},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2018.0023},
  url = {https://muse.jhu.edu/article/715808}
}
Robins, S.K. Mnemonic confabulation 2018 Topoi [DOI] [URL
Abstract: Clinical use of the term “confabulation” began as a reference to false memories in dementia patients. The term has remained in circulation since, which belies shifts in its definition and scope over time. “Confabulation” now describes a range of disor- ders, deficits, and anomalous behaviors. The increasingly wide and varied use of this term has prompted many to ask: what is confabulation? In recent years, many have offered answers to this question. As a general rule, recent accounts are accounts of broad confabulation: attempts to unify the seemingly disparate features of all or most confabulatory phenomena under a shared set of characteristics or mechanisms. In this paper, I approach the question differently. I focus on a particular form of confabulation—mnemonic confabulation—so as to understand its distinctive features and the ways in which it does (or does not) fit into accounts of broad confabulation. Understanding mnemonic confabulation is a project in the philosophy of memory; it plays an important role in guiding theories of remembering, as a form of error that must be distinguished from genuine remembering. Mnemonic confabulation, as I define it in Sect. 2, occurs when there is no relation between a person's seeming to remember a particular event or experience and any event or experience from their past—either because there is no such event in their past or because any similarity to such an event is entirely coincidental. This account draws on my own theory of remembering, but shares many important points of consensus with other accounts of mnemonic confabulation, which I highlight in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, I turn to accounts of broad confabulation—identifying three features such accounts have in common—and, for each, I argue that mnemonic confabulation lacks the requisite feature. As an error, mnemonic confabulation has more in common with perceptual hallucination than with the confabulatory phenomena included in standard accounts of broad confabulation. Recognizing that, despite the shared use of the term “confabulation” mnemonic confabulation and broad forms of confabulation are unrelated, is important for continued progress in debates about each.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Mnemonic confabulation},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Topoi},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9613-x},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11245-018-9613-x}
}
Robins, S.K. Confabulation and epistemic authority 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e29.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mahr & Csibra (M&C) claim that episodic remembering's autonoetic character serves as an indicator of epistemic authority. This proposal is difficult to reconcile with the existence of confabulation errors – where participants fabricate memories of experiences that never happened to them. Making confabulation errors damages one's epistemic authority, but these false memories have an autonoetic character.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2018,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Confabulation and epistemic authority},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e29},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001492},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001492/type/journalarticle}
}
Robins, S.K. Memory and optogenetic intervention: Separating the engram from the ecphory 2018 Philosophy of Science
85(5), 1078-1089.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this paper, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon's (1921) distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories of memory error. I focus on a series of experiments where optogenetics is used to study false memory and forgetting. Abstract Optogenetics makes possible the control of neural activity with light. In this paper, I explore how the development of this experimental tool has brought about methodological and theoretical advances in the neurobiological study of memory. I begin with Semon's (1921) distinction between the engram and the ecphory, explaining how these concepts present a methodological challenge to investigating memory. Optogenetics provides a way to intervene into the engram without the ecphory that, in turn, opens up new means for testing theories of memory error. I focus on a series of experiments where optogenetics is used to study false memory and forgetting.
BibTeX:
@article{Robinsa,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Memory and optogenetic intervention: Separating the engram from the ecphory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
  volume = {85},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1078--1089},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/699692},
  url = {http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/699692}
}
Rowlands, M. The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 279-293.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Philosophical thinking about mental content, to a considerable extent, been dominated by a model supplied by the propositional attitudes. The expression ‘propositional attitude' was originally coined by Bertrand Russell (1912) to denote any mental state that is attributed by way of a that-clause. Jones believes that snow is white, that grass is green, or that the cat is on the mat. What follows the ‘that' is a complete sentence (“Snow is white,” “Grass is green, “or “The cat is on the mat”). A complete sentence has a meaning or as philosophers sometimes put it, expresses a proposition. Hence, we arrive at the expression, ‘propositional attitude.' To believe something (or to think it, hope it, fear it, expect it, and so on) is to stand in a certain relation (believing, thinking, etc.) to a proposition—where this is understood as the meaning of the sentence that follows the occurrence of ‘that.' Thus, in the grip of this sort of picture, philosophers came to think of mental content as propositional or at least, proposition-like. The content of mental states has the same sort of structure as a proposition. In the content of the belief that the cat is on the mat there is a component that stands for the (subject) cat, a component that stands for the (object) mat, and a component that stands for the (predicate) relation of being on.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Rowlands2018,
  author = {Rowlands, Mark},
  title = {The remembered: Understanding the content of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {279--293}
}
Salvaggio, M. The justification of reconstructive and reproductive memory beliefs 2018 Philosophical Studies
175(3), 649-663.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Preservationism is a dominant account of the justification of beliefs formed on the basis of memory. According to preservationism, a memory belief is justified only if that belief was justified when it was initially held. However, we now know that much (if not most) of what we remember is not explicitly stored, but instead reconstructed when we attempt to recall it. Since reconstructive memory beliefs may not have been continuously held by the agent, or never held before at all, a purely preservationist account of memory does not allow for justified reconstructed memory beliefs. In this essay, I show how a process reliabilist account can maintain preservationism about reproductive memory beliefs while accommodating the justification of reconstructive memory beliefs. I argue that reconstructive memory is an inferential process, and that therefore the beliefs it produces are justified in the same way that other inferential beliefs are justified. Accordingly, my process reliabilist account combines a preservationist account of reproductive memory with an inferential account of reconstructive memory. I end by defending this view against objections.
BibTeX:
@article{Salvaggio2017,
  author = {Salvaggio, Mary},
  title = {The justification of reconstructive and reproductive memory beliefs},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {175},
  number = {3},
  pages = {649--663},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0886-5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-017-0886-5}
}
Sant'Anna, A. The hybrid contents of memory 2018 Synthese [DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By draw-ing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project.
BibTeX:
@article{SantAnna,
  author = {Sant'Anna, André},
  title = {The hybrid contents of memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Synthese},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1753-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-018-1753-4}
}
Sant'Anna, A. Episodic memory as a propositional attitude: A critical perspective 2018 Frontiers in Psychology
9, 1220.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The questions of whether episodic memory is a propositional attitude, and of whether it has propositional content, are central to discussions about how memory represents the world, what mental states should count as memories, and what kind of beings are capable of remembering. Despite its importance to such topics, these questions have not been addressed explicitly in the recent literature in philosophy of memory. In one of the very few pieces dealing with the topic, Jordi Fernández (2006) provides a positive answer to the initial questions by arguing that the propositional attitude view of memory, as I will call it, provides a simple account of how memory possesses truth-conditions. A similar suggestion is made by Alex Byrne (2010) when he proposes that perception and episodic memory have the same kind of content, differing only in degree. Against the propositional attitude view, I will argue that episodic memory does not have propositional content, and therefore, that it is not a propositional attitude. My project here is, therefore, mainly critical. I will show that, if empirical work is to inform our philosophical theories of memory in any way, we have good reasons to deny, or at least to be skeptical, of the prospects of the propositional attitude view of episodic memory.
BibTeX:
@article{SantAnna2018,
  author = {Sant'Anna, André},
  title = {Episodic memory as a propositional attitude: A critical perspective},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  pages = {1220},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01220},
  url = {https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01220/full}
}
Sant'Anna, A. Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 52-62.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philo- sophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memo- ry and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and re- search on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.
BibTeX:
@article{SantAnna2018a,
  author = {Sant'Anna, André},
  title = {Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {52--62},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.06},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/15579}
}
Sattig, T. The sense and reality of personal identity 2018 Erkenntnis
83(6), 1139-1155.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The vast majority of philosophers of personal identity since John Locke have been convinced that the persistence of persons is not grounded in bodily continuity. Why? As numerous ‘textbooks' on personal identity attest, their con- viction rests, to a large extent, on an objection to the bodily approach, which concerns episodic memory. The objection invites us to a thought experiment in which we meet a person who experientially remembers events from the past of a person with a different body. The nature of such first-personal memory-links is viewed as strongly suggesting that the rememberer is identical with the remem- bered, and hence, given the possibility of such a case, as suggesting that a person can transgress its bodily limits. The memory objection is as influential as it gets in the metaphysics of personal identity. Textbooks often portray it as the starting point of the contemporary debate about personal identity. And it has been widely per- ceived as a success. As everyone who has taught an introductory course on personal identity knows, the recognition of episodic-memory links in body-switching cases has the power to turn any group of novice students against bodily criteria of personal identity. In this essay, I shall specify and undermine the memory objection. I shall attempt to establish two theses. The first thesis (Sects. 1, 2) is that the memory objection is only viable if construed as resting on the view that episodic memory contains a sense of personal identity, which teaches us about the reality of personal identity. The second thesis (Sects. 3, 4) is that there is no such sense of personal identity, that episodic memory teaches us nothing at all about personal identity. &
BibTeX:
@article{Sattig,
  author = {Sattig, Thomas},
  title = {The sense and reality of personal identity},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {83},
  number = {6},
  pages = {1139--1155},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9933-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-017-9933-z}
}
Sattig, T. Memory-based personal identity without circularity 2018 The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity over Time
Editiones Scholasticae
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] What are the criteria of personal identity over time? In other words, what grounds the persistence of persons? The standard psychological approach to personal identity was arguably first proposed by John Locke in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690. According to Lockeanism, as the approach has come to be called, a person's persistence conditions are psychological in nature: a person persists along lines of psychological continuity; its beginning and end are the beginning and end of its psychological life. While there is controversy among Lockeans over exactly which psychological features get to ground personal persistence, Lockeans seem to agree that veridical states of episodic memory play a central role. The core picture seems to be that a present person is that future being that can veridically remember experiences of the present person and that inherits a significant range of psychological features from the latter, such as certain beliefs, desires, and character traits.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Sattig2018,
  author = {Sattig, Thomas},
  title = {Memory-based personal identity without circularity},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Persistence of Persons. Studies in the Metaphysics of Personal Identity over Time},
  editor = {Buonomo, Valerio},
  publisher = {Editiones Scholasticae}
}
Schierbaum, S. Ockham on awareness of one's acts: A way out of the circle 2018 Society and Politics
12, 8-27.
 
Abstract: In this paper, I proceed from the assumption that Ockham"s account of self-awareness can be correctly described as a kind of higher-order approach, because just like modern higher-order theorists, Ockham accounts for a mental act being conscious in terms of a higher-order act that takes the act as its object. I aim to defend Ockham"s approach against the objection that it fails to provide an explanation of how self-awareness comes about because any such explanation would be circular. Part of the critique, in light of recent findings in Ockham scholarship, is that the ontological identity of the subject does not suffice to explain-in a non-circular way-the psychological identity and unity of the subject of awareness. Here, I argue that Ockham can respond to this objection by highlighting the power of will. Roughly speaking, the idea is that he can account for the limits of the psychological subject in terms of what the subject can want or will with respect to her own acts and these acts alone. It is along these lines that Ockham can account for the asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspective in a non-circular way, with reference to the exotic case of angelic mind-reading and the comparatively less exotic case of human memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Schierbaum2018,
  author = {Schierbaum, Sonja},
  title = {Ockham on awareness of one's acts: A way out of the circle},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Society and Politics},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {8--27}
}
Schirmer dos Santos, C. Episodic memory, the cotemporality problem, and common sense 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Direct realists about episodic memory claim that a rememberer has direct contact with a past event. How- ever, how is it possible to be acquainted with an event that ceased to exist? That is the so-called cotemporal- ity problem. The standard solution, proposed by Sven Bernecker, is to distinguish between the occurrence of an event and the existence of an event: an event ceases to occur without ceasing to exist. That is the eternalist solution for the cotemporality problem. Nevertheless, some philosophers of memory claim that the adoption of an eternalist metaphysics of time would be too high a metaphysical price to pay to hold direct realist intuitions about memory. Although I agree with these critics, I will make two claims. First, that this kind of common sense argument is far from decisive. Second, that Bernecker's proposal remains the best solution to the cotemporality problem.
BibTeX:
@article{SchirmerdosSantos2018,
  author = {Schirmer dos Santos, César},
  title = {Episodic memory, the cotemporality problem, and common sense},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1613},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/6}
}
Schmal, D. Intellectual memory and consciousness in Descartes' philosophy of mind 2018 Society and Politics
12, 28-49.
 
Abstract: Although Descartes"s ideas regarding consciousness and memory have been studied extensively, few attempts have been made to address their systemic relations. In order to redress this deficiency, I argue in favor of three interrelated theses. The first is that intellectual memory has a crucial role to play in Descartes"s concept of consciousness, especially when it comes to explaining higher forms of consciousness. Second, the connection between memory and consciousness has been obscured by the fact that intellectual memory, taken as a subject in its own right, was relatively neglected in Descartes"s philosophy: By and large, his views on the matter remained within the limits of late scholastic Scotism. Third, what makes the question of intellectual memory so fascinating in Descartes is not some groundbreaking insight into its nature; rather, it is his gradual recognition of the role that intellectual memory plays in the constitution of higher forms of consciousness. With these arguments, and relying on Descartes"s 1648 correspondence with Antoine Arnauld, where he progressed beyond the substance-based approach to the self, I try to show that he deserves to be credited with a more prominent status in the history of the self and personhood than has previously been the case.
BibTeX:
@article{Schmal2018,
  author = {Schmal, Dániel},
  title = {Intellectual memory and consciousness in Descartes' philosophy of mind},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Society and Politics},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {28--49}
}
Schwartz, A. Memory and disjunctivism 2018 Essays in Philosophy
19
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recent analyses of memory (Robins 2016; Cheng & Werning 2016; Michaelian 2016; Bernecker, 2017) propose necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a memory, which are meant to set memory apart from related mental states like illusory memory and confabulation. Each of the pro- posed taxonomies includes accuracy as one of the necessary conditions such that only accurate represen- tations are memories. I argue that inclusion of an accuracy condition implies a sort of disjunctivism about seeming to remember. The paper distinguishes several types of disjunctivism that these taxonomies could be committed to. If these taxonomies are meant to be empirically informed, however, then plausibly they should be seen to endorse the principle of psychological internalism. The causal argument, a standard objection to disjunctivism (Robinson 1985; Burge 2005, 2011), is then used to show that the sort of dis- junctivism that endorses psychological internalism is mistaken. The ultimate goal is to underscore a lack of clarity in the status of recent accounts of memory as either epistemic, nonreductively ontological, or reductively ontological in approach.
BibTeX:
@article{Schwartz2018,
  author = {Schwartz, Arieh},
  title = {Memory and disjunctivism},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Essays in Philosophy},
  volume = {19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1611},
  url = {http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol19/iss2/3}
}
Sinclair, M. Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson 2018 British Journal for the History of Philosophy
26(1), 131-153.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper shows how reflection on habit leads in nineteenth-century French philosophy to Henri Bergson's idea of duration in 1888 as a non-quantifiable dimension irreducible to time as measured by clocks. Historically, I show how Albert Lemoine's 1875 L'habitude et l'instinct was crucial, since he holds – in a way that is both Ravaissonian and Bergsonian avant la lettre – that for the being capable of habit, the three elements of time are fused together. For that habituated being, Lemoine claims, it is not true to say that the past is no longer, nor even that the future is not yet. This historical link between Ravaisson and Bergson, however, only sharpens the philosophical question of how a dynamic conception of habit involves and requires a conception of real duration, of a temporality more original than clock-time, and, conversely, of how reflection on duration prior to clock-time involves a notion of habit. With reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze, the paper concludes by showing that there is an internal connection between these two grand philosophical themes of nineteenth- and then twentieth-century French thought: habit and time. ARTICLE
BibTeX:
@article{Sinclair2018,
  author = {Sinclair, Mark},
  title = {Habit and time in nineteenth-century French philosophy: Albert Lemoine between Bergson and Ravaisson},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
  volume = {26},
  number = {1},
  pages = {131--153},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1337562},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2017.1337562}
}
Sorrentino Marques, B. Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 89-96.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The debate about moral responsibility for one's actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, how- ever, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent's action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility. Keywords:
BibTeX:
@article{SorrentinoMarques2018,
  author = {Sorrentino Marques, Beatriz},
  title = {Does moral responsibility require mental time travel? Considerations about guidance control},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {89--96},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.10},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/15581}
}
Soteriou, M. The past made present: Mental time travel in episodic recollection 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 294-312.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Some philosophers and psychologists suggest that the episodic recollection of some past event or action that you have witnessed or performed is analogous to traveling back in time. It is a form of ‘mental time travel.' Some also suggest that just as episodic recollection can be regarded as a form of mental time travel, so too can episodes of imagining future events. For example, Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis suggest we have a “general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not only to go back in time, but also to foresee, plan, and shape virtually any specific future event” (2007: 299).1 However, it is not entirely clear how we are to understand and unpack this notion of mentally traveling backward and forward in time.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Soteriou2018,
  author = {Soteriou, Matthew},
  title = {The past made present: Mental time travel in episodic recollection},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {294--312}
}
Sutton, J. Shared remembering and distributed affect: Varieties of psychological interdependence 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 181-199.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] One significant feature of human life is our psychological interdependence. To greater or lesser extents, and across diverse cultural contexts, our cognitive and affective states are related to those of others around us. We act alongside and share experiences with partners, family members, friends, workmates, and other people with whom we are connected in our daily lives. And as a result, what each of us feels and remembers, what matters to each of us about the present and the past, and the way we imagine and plan for the future, can be influenced by what those others feel, remember, and care about. This occurs in the moment, when my emotions or moods, my decisions or thoughts, are modulated by the actions or reactions, judgments, or evaluations of someone close to me. But it also happens over time, and in many cases over years, decades, or lifetimes. Such interdependence does not mean that we think, remember, or feel the same way about things. In many cases, it matters greatly to me when the emotions or memories of someone I care about differ from my own. Our psychological lives can in certain circumstances be interdependent and mutually influencing, to different degrees and in different ways integrated with each other, whether or not the precise content or style of our thoughts, memories, and feelings happens to match.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Sutton2018,
  author = {Sutton, John},
  title = {Shared remembering and distributed affect: Varieties of psychological interdependence},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {181--199}
}
Tanesini, A. Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice 2018 Socially Extended Epistemology
Oxford University Press, 195-219.
 
Abstract: Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness is harmful. Here, the focus is exclusively on the harms caused by its contribution to undermining the intellectual self-trust of some members of the community. Further, since some of these harms are also wrongs, collective amnesia contributes to causing epistemic injustices.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Tanesini2018,
  author = {Tanesini, Alessandra},
  title = {Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Socially Extended Epistemology},
  editor = {Carter, J. Adam and Clark, Andy and Kallestrup, Jesper and Palermos, S. Orestis and Pritchard, Duncan},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {195--219}
}
Teroni, F. On seeming to remember 2018 New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 329-345.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Philosophers and psychologists often distinguish episodic or personal mem- ory from propositional or semantic memory. A vexed issue concerns the role, if any, of memory “impressions” or “seemings” within the latter. According to an important family of approaches, seemings play a fundamental episte- mological role vis-à-vis propositional memory judgments: it is one's memory seeming that Caesar was murdered, say, that justifies one's judgment that he was murdered.1 Yet, it has been convincingly argued that these approaches lead to insurmountable problems and that memory seemings are not well- suited to play this justifying role. As a result, many contemporary accounts of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue, which I will approach as follows.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Teroni2018,
  author = {Teroni, Fabrice},
  title = {On seeming to remember},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Debus, Dorothea and Perrin, Denis},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {329--345}
}
Tewes, C. The habitual body and its role in collective memory formation 2018 Journal of Consciousness Studies
25(7-8), 135-57.
 
Abstract: In recent decades many facets of habitual body memory have been explored in ever greater depth in the field of phenomenol-ogical research. As a result, one can regard this type of memory as an important exemplification of the strong embodiment thesis, i.e. the thesis that the body plays not only a causal but also a constitutive role with regard to (at least some) cognitive processes. However, it is still an open research question how, in particular, to evaluate the significance of the habitual body for the creation of collective memories. Especially when it comes to externalized symbolically-mediated and distributed forms of memory, some theorists think that the habitual body no longer plays a decisive role in scaffolding collective memories. In the present paper, I assess this assumption in more detail. I argue that habitual body memory and skill-based behaviour fulfil indispensable functions in the creation and maintenance of symbolically-based cultural niches and collective memory systems.
BibTeX:
@article{Tewes2018,
  author = {Tewes, Christian},
  title = {The habitual body and its role in collective memory formation},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {7-8},
  pages = {135--57}
}
Theiner, G. Groups as distributed cognitive systems 2018 The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality
Routledge, 233-248.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discus- sions of the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive labor in groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there are diff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what “ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitive systems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debate is taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been devel- oped, since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and David Kirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up the DC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather, it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognition can be analyzed as distributed. As Hutchins (2014: 236) recently put this point,
BibTeX:
@incollection{Theiner2018,
  author = {Theiner, Georg},
  title = {Groups as distributed cognitive systems},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality},
  editor = {Jankovic, Marija and Ludwig, Kirk},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {233--248}
}
Tóth, O.I. Memory, recollection and consciousness in Spinoza's ethics 2018 Society and Politics
12, 50-71.
 
Abstract: Spinoza's account of memory has not received enough attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent literature has studied the "pancreas problem." This paper argues that there is an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza's account of memory can be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes's account to show that Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation of memories by holding that they are brain states without corresponding mental states, and that the mind is able to interpret perception either as new experience or as memory. Spinoza has none of these conceptual resources because of his substance monism. Spinoza accounts for memories as the mind's ability to generate ideas according to the order of images. This ability consists in the connection of ideas, which is not an actual property, but only a dispositional one and thus not conscious. It is, however, grounded in the actual property of parts of the body, of which ideas are conscious.
BibTeX:
@article{Toth2018,
  author = {Tóth, Olivér István},
  title = {Memory, recollection and consciousness in Spinoza's ethics},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Society and Politics},
  volume = {12},
  pages = {50--71}
}
Tucker, A. Memory: Irreducible, basic, and primary source of knowledge 2018 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
9(1), 1-16.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I argue against preservationism, the epistemic claim that memories can at most preserve knowledge generated by other basic types of sources. I show how memories can and do generate knowledge that is irreducible to other basic sources of knowledge. In some epistemic contexts, memories are primary basic sources of knowledge; they can generate knowledge by themselves or with trivial assistance from other types of basic sources of knowledge. I outline an ontology of information transmission from events to memory as an alternative to causal theories of memory. I derive from information theory a concept of reliability of memories as the ratio of retrieved information to transmitted information. I distinguish the generation of knowledge from reliable memories from its generation from unreliable memories. Reliable memories can generate new knowledge by forming together narratives and via colligation. Coherent, even unreliable, memories can generate knowledge if they are epistemically independent of each other and the prior probability of the knowledge they generate is sufficiently low or high. Ascertaining the epistemic independence of memories and eliminating possible confounders may be achieved through the generation of knowledge from independent memories in different minds, when memories are primary basic sources of knowledge and the testimonies that report them are trivial.
BibTeX:
@article{Tucker2017,
  author = {Tucker, Aviezer},
  title = {Memory: Irreducible, basic, and primary source of knowledge},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {9},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--16},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0336-5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-017-0336-5}
}
Vicentini De Medeiros, E. The philosophy of episodic memory and moral agency 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 50-51.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The dossier “Mental Time Travel and Moral Agency” was designed to show how philosoph- ical investigation of episodic memory can help to clarify some basic functional presuppositions for moral agency. This sp ecific relationship, strictly sp eaking, is not new at all. For example, if we consider Locke's classical discussion of personal identity, esp ecially focusing on the peculiar set of questions that motivated it, we will realize that the operations of memory were already there. According to the famous chapter XXVII from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, to be a person, in a forensic sense, namely, from the point of view of moral agency, is to be able to con- nect the episodes of a lifetime in an autobiographical fashion. Indeed, we are all on the same page to recognize that piece of Locke's writings as fons et origo for the philosophical problems around personal identity and, of course, moral personhood.
BibTeX:
@article{VicentiniDeMedeiros2018,
  author = {Vicentini De Medeiros, Eduardo},
  title = {The philosophy of episodic memory and moral agency},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {50--51}
}
De Medeiros, E.V. Undoing one's past 2018 Filosofia Unisinos
19(1), 97-102.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In contemporary research on memory, the idea of mental time travel (MTT) has been connected , at the functional level, with planning and imagining what might occur in one's future. Episodic memory impacts on our capacity to move imaginatively towards possible scenarios ahead. Consequently, Gerrans and Kennett (2010, 2016) urge us to agree that MTT is essential to moral agency. In this paper, we suggest that if we conceive the specific varieties of MTT as something more than remembering one's past and imagining one's future , then the capacity of undoing one's past both by episodic counterfactual thinking and the emotion of regret must be considered essential to moral agency on equal terms.
BibTeX:
@article{VicentiniDeMedeiros2018a,
  author = {De Medeiros, Eduardo Vicentini},
  title = {Undoing one's past},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Filosofia Unisinos},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {97--102},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2018.191.11},
  url = {http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/16762}
}
Werning, M. and Cheng, S. Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory 2018 Behavioral and Brain Sciences
41, e34.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic memories are distinct from semantic memories in that they are epistemically generative and privileged. Whereas Mahr & Csibra (M&C) develop a metarepresentational account of epistemic vigilance, we propose an explanation that builds on our notion of scenario construction: The way an event of the past is presented in episodic memory recall explains the epistemic generativity and privilegedness of episodic memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Werning2018,
  author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen},
  title = {Doing without metarepresentation: Scenario construction explains the epistemic generativity and privileged status of episodic memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  volume = {41},
  pages = {e34},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17001534},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0140525X17001534/type/journalarticle}
}
Wilson, R.A. Group-level cognizing, collaborative remembering, and individuals 2018 Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications
Oxford University Press, 248-260.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] From within the disciplinary confines of psychology, collaborative remembering represents a relatively new phenomenon, one both to be incorporated into existing frameworks and that, in turn, holds promise for further interdisciplinary integration, rethinking, and adjustments to our explanatory toolkits. In this chapter I would like to step back from the important, normal science work on collaborative remembering that occupies the core of the present volume to take up some broader questions about the place of memory in Western cultural thought, both historically and in contemporary society, offering the kind of integrative and reflective perspective for which philosophy is often known. In particular, I hope to shed some light on the relationship between collaborative memory and the other two topics in my title: group-level cognizing and individuals.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Wilson2018,
  author = {Wilson, Robert A.},
  title = {Group-level cognizing, collaborative remembering, and individuals},
  year = {2018},
  booktitle = {Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications},
  editor = {Meade, Michelle and Harris, Celia B. and Van Bergen, Penny and Sutton, John and Barnier, Amanda J.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {248--260}
}
Zaborowski, R. Affectivity in its relation to memory 2018 Axiomathes
28(3), 253-267.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: It seems obvious that various feelings (various kinds of affectivity) are memorized, forgotten, and recollected to various degrees. Some of them are forgot- ten. Some of those forgotten can be recollected, while others are lost forever. For example, short and long-lasting feelings and shallow and deep feelings are memo- rized and remembered in different ways. In this paper I analyse from a conceptual point of view several categories of memory-of-feelings and offer a comprehensive map of them. In the end, the richness of categories in the realm of memory is inter- preted as a proof of the intricacy of affectivity.
BibTeX:
@article{Zaborowski2018,
  author = {Zaborowski, Robert},
  title = {Affectivity in its relation to memory},
  year = {2018},
  journal = {Axiomathes},
  volume = {28},
  number = {3},
  pages = {253--267},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9368-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10516-018-9368-4}
}
Baracchi, C. Exile in the flow of time: On memory and immortality in Plato's Republic 2017 Research in Phenomenology
47(2), 204-219.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In its contents as well as discursive strategy, Plato's Republic occasions a few reflections on the phenomenon of memory. The essay situates the philosophical discourse, along with that of divination and poetry, in the context of the practices of memory and, more broadly, within the sphere of Mnemosune. The figure of the philosopher retains traces of archaic humanity, most notably of the Homeric hero. At the same time, in the Platonic Socrates we discern a transfiguration of heroic heritage, in the direction of a thorough ethical recalibration emphasizing the awareness of mortality, the art of finite life (βίος), and the visionary celebration of life (ζωή) in its excessive and indestructible movement. In this way, at the very heart of the Republic we may heed the cipher and resonance of Dionysus.
BibTeX:
@article{Baracchi2017,
  author = {Baracchi, Claudia},
  title = {Exile in the flow of time: On memory and immortality in Plato's Republic},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Research in Phenomenology},
  volume = {47},
  number = {2},
  pages = {204--219},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341366},
  url = {https://brill.com/abstract/journals/rip/47/2/article-p2044.xml}
}
Barash, J.A. Collective memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 255-267.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Over the past decades, the topic of collective memory has become an increasingly central theoretical concern in a wide spectrum of academic disciplines, from the human and social sciences to literature, aesthetics, and the cognitive and natural sciences. It is perhaps due to the breadth of its fields of application that it has often seemed to be a nebulous concept that is in need of philosophical clarification.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Barash2017,
  author = {Barash, Jeffrey Andrew},
  title = {Collective memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {255--267}
}
Bermúdez, J.L. Memory and self-consciousness 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 180-191.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Philosophical questions about memory fall into (at least) three broad categories. Some are fundamentally metaphysical, having to do with the nature of memory. In this category fall ques-tions about how to understand the relation between memory and the past (should memory be understood as a direct relation to the past, for example, or should we think instead in terms of occurrent memory states that are causally derived from past events?). A second set of questions is broadly epistemological. We can ask about how memory judgments are justified, and whether memories create knowledge or simply preserve it. The third set of questions has to do with the functional role of memories. How do memories interact with other mental states? What does the capacity for memory contribute to cognitive and affective life? Issues of functional role can have epistemological and metaphysical ramifications, as well as raising ethical questions (e.g., about the role of shared memories in social life).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bermudez2017,
  author = {Bermúdez, José Luis},
  title = {Memory and self-consciousness},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {180--191}
}
Bernecker, S. A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation 2017 Frontiers in Psychology
8, 1207.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper attempts to answer the question of what defines mnemonic confabulation vis-à-vis genuine memory. The two extant accounts of mnemonic confabulation as “false memory” and as ill-grounded memory are shown to be problematic, for they cannot account for the possibility of veridical confabulation, ill-grounded memory, and well-grounded confabulation. This paper argues that the defining characteristic of mnemonic confabulation is that it lacks the appropriate causal history. In the confabulation case, there is no proper counterfactual dependence of the state of seeming to remember on the corresponding past representation.
BibTeX:
@article{Bernecker2017,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven},
  title = {A causal theory of mnemonic confabulation},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  pages = {1207},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01207},
  url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01207/full}
}
Bernecker, S. and Michaelian, K. Editors' introduction: The philosophy of memory today 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 1-3.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory is a fundamental cognitive capacity and as such interacts with virtually all other basic cognitive capacities. Given its centrality to the mind, it is surprising neither that theorizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself nor that memory continues to be an active area of philosophical research. Important early ideas about memory were developed by Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Chinese and Indian philosophical traditions. In the early modern period, key ideas were developed by figures such as Hume, Reid, and Locke. More recently, continental philosophers have made a number of valuable contributions, sometimes drawing on psychoanalytic insights. In the contemporary analytic tradition, research on memory is the- matically oriented, clustering around a number of topics in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics.
BibTeX:
@book{Bernecker2017a,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Editors' introduction: The philosophy of memory today},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {1--3}
}
Bernecker, S. Memory and truth 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 51-62.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of philosophical theories of memory: traditional archival views and contemporary constructive views. The archival view claims that memory is a purely passive device for registering, storing and reproducing representations of particular past experiences. On this picture, a subject misremembers whenever the content of her state of seeming to remember differs from the content of the corresponding original representation. Given that memory aims at preservation of content, any discrepancy between the encoded and the retrieved content is taken to be a mistake. Hume, for instance, declares that " memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that wherever we depart from it in recollecting anything, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty " (2000: 12). The archival view is still very much with us today; it is a tacit assumption behind the widespread storehouse metaphors of memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bernecker2017c,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven},
  title = {Memory and truth},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {51--62}
}
Bickle, J. Memory and levels of scientific explanation 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 34-47.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] For at least thirty years memory has been a central case study in philosophical disputes about levels of explanation in science. In her groundbreaking work Neurophilosophy, Patricia Churchland provides "a few samples" of memory research "to illustrate the interdisciplinary nature of the research program " (1986: 368–73). Her survey begins at the " cellular and molecular level " with work on invertebrate models (sea slugs, fruit flies) and cumulates eventually in human neuropsychology, neurology, and cognitive psychology. One reason for the popularity of memory as a case study of scientific levels is results: memory has long been the best understood interdisciplinary phenomenon across scientific levels, especially at "lower" ones. The best reason why is probably a serendipitous early guess about brain mechanism: plastic synapses. More than 125 years ago, the great Spanish neuroanatomist Santiago Ramon y Cajal speculated that the small spaces between neurons that his staining and microscopy techniques revealed seemed an intuitively promising basis for memory storage. This hypothesis has paid off handsomely, as we'll see below.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bickle2017,
  author = {Bickle, John},
  title = {Memory and levels of scientific explanation},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {34--47}
}
Black, D.L. Avicenna and Averroes 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 448-460.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Avicenna and Averroes developed their accounts of memory within the broader framework of their theories of the internal senses, a cluster of faculties localized in the brain which were posited to explain a variety of sensory operations. The internal senses originate as an attempt to refine and systematize Aristotle's account of imagination (phantasia) and to harmonize it with later developments in medical theory stemming from the physician Galen. As Avicenna observes, " What [Aristotle] brings together here under the term 'imagination' can be divided into a number of active powers, such as estimation and cogitation, and retentive powers, such as the formative faculty and memory. " Yet the theories developed under the rubric of the " internal senses " also include many new elements not present in Aristotle's psychology. One significant source for many of these developments was the Arabic version of the Parva naturalia, which is not a unadulterated translation of Aristotle, but an adaptation that incorporated mat erials from Neo-Platonic sources. On the basis of these diverse sources, Avicenna and Averroes developed their own competing accounts of the nature of memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Black2017,
  author = {Black, Deborah L.},
  title = {Avicenna and Averroes},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {448--460}
}
Bluemink, M. Socrates, memory and the internet 2017 Philosophy Now
122, 9-11.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It's funny, isn't it, how a text written over two thousand years ago can be so relevant to the problems we face in modern society? In this particular quote from Plato's Phae-
BibTeX:
@article{Bluemink2017,
  author = {Bluemink, M},
  title = {Socrates, memory and the internet},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Philosophy Now},
  volume = {122},
  pages = {9--11}
}
Blustein, J. A duty to remember 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 351-363.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The notion of a " duty to remember " has gained currency in the West in recent decades, a development that can be traced in no small measure to the role it has played in reflections on how to respond to the Nazi extermination of Jews, Gypsies, and other so-called undesirables during World War II. It is to the Holocaust that we must inevitably turn when speaking of such a notion, for it has largely acquired moral and political traction because of it. When a duty to remember with this antecedent is invoked, as has all too frequently been the case since the end of that war, it is characterized by the following features: it is incumbent on humanity collectively; it targets the victims of genocide or other atrocity; and its purpose, to a significant degree, is to put the world on guard against a repetition of crimes of this magnitude.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Blustein2017,
  author = {Blustein, Jeffrey},
  title = {A duty to remember},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {351--363}
}
Brogaard, B. Foundationalism 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 296-309.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory has been a mystery to philosophers for millennia. Part of the reason for this is that they seem to encompass very disparate mental states. You might remember: how to ride a bicycle, that Bill Clinton was impeached by the US House of Representatives but acquitted by the Senate, that 119 is a composite number, that your wife forgot your anniversary two years ago, that you were feeling joyous and elated while dancing salsa at Ball and Chain last Saturday night. These mental states that we refer to as ‘memories' seem to be intrinsically different. Your memory that 119 is a composite number seems more like a belief, whereas your vivid memory of feeling joyous and elated while dancing salsa seems more like an experience or an affective state.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Brogaard2017,
  author = {Brogaard, Berit},
  title = {Foundationalism},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {296--309}
}
Carman, T. Martin Heidegger 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 557-562.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In his 1927 magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger advances a detailed account of the unique temporal structure that, he believes, constitutes what it is for a human being (Dasein) to be. According to Heidegger, being is always intelligible only in terms of time (hence the title of the book), but different kinds of being are defined by different forms of temporality. So, for example, the being of objects with properties consists in their occurring at a now, that is, a single moment in a linear sequence of moments. Human beings, by contrast, exist in a distinctive temporal way by standing in relation to their own existence, by their existence being an “issue” for them.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Carman2017,
  author = {Carman, Taylor},
  title = {Martin Heidegger},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {557--562}
}
Carter, J.A. and Gordon, E.C. Googled assertion 2017 Philosophical Psychology
30(4), 490-501.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can help to explain why certain kinds of assertionsmade on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memoryare properly criticizable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
BibTeX:
@article{Carter2017,
  author = {Carter, J. Adam and Gordon, Emma C.},
  title = {Googled assertion},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {30},
  number = {4},
  pages = {490--501},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395}
}
Chadha, M. Indian Buddhist philosophy 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 416-427.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Buddhist philosophy puts forward a revisionary metaphysics. The central claim is that our ordinary way of thinking and our ordinary conceptual scheme, in which the self (minimally conceived of as the referent of “I”) occupies a prime position is mistaken. Instead the Buddhists propose an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world that lacks such a self. Anātmavāda, or the no-self doctrine, is interpreted in various ways within the classical Indian Buddhist tradition, and among its Hindu critics. As a matter of fact, anātmavāda (insofar as we can speak of it in the singular) is still a matter of debate among contemporary Buddhist philosophers. However, most modern scholars agree that Buddhist doctrine of no-self is not merely aimed at rejecting a given theory of self in the Indian debate—that the self is an immaterial, eternal, and (essentially?) conscious entity and they also agree that the no-self theory minimally dictates that the referent of “I” is not a persisting entity. My discussion in this chapter will focus on the Abhidharma view, since it is generally thought of as the best representative of Indian Buddhist philosophy. Abhidharma tradition arose around the third century BC as a first attempt in classical India to systematize and organize the metaphysical and epistemological theses in Buddha's teachings in the Nikāyas which were in the form of dialogues. The Abhidharma philosophers, I argue, read the no-self view as the no-subject or no-ownership thesis. This raises serious questions about the coherence of the Buddhist view. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall focus on an account of episodic memory and its ownership. I shall begin my discussion with Vasubandhu's “Refutation of a Theory of the Self,” because I take him to be an exemplar of the Buddhist-Abhidharma revisionary metaphysics. Furthermore, in his later writings Vasubandhu has a strategy to sidestep the Strawsonian criticism of the no-ownership view. I will focus on his arguments against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas (Section 4 of the “Refutation of a Theory of the Self”) as that discussion revolves around the self as the subject/owner of experiences and thoughts. The Naiyāyiakas exhort their Buddhist opponents to address questions like: how, although we are not selves, can we apprehend an object, or remember it?; How, without a self, can there be an agent of action or a subject that experiences their results?; How, without a self to possess it, can there be a mind that conceives an “I”?; And, how, without a self, is there an underlying support for desire, cognition, feelings of pleasure and pain, etc.? Vasubandhu defiantly holds ground against his opponents and refuses to posit a self as a subject of experience. Rather, he cleverly shifts the explanatory burden away from the self/person to a mind (or minds) conceived of as a series of causally connected mental states. The task of this chapter is to analyze Vasubandhu's valiant effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. The impetus to develop an accurate descriptive metaphysics of the mind is, I believe, provided by the revisionary Buddhist metaphysics which denies the self as a subject/owner of experiences, memories, and thoughts.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Chadha2017,
  author = {Chadha, Monima},
  title = {Indian Buddhist philosophy},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {416--427}
}
Chadha, M. No-self and episodic memory 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 347-352.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] This issue of Australasian Philosophical Review adopts a cross-cultural perspective across Western Analytic and Phenomenological traditions and Indian Hindu and Bud- dhist traditions to demonstrate how such dialogue deepens our understanding of an important philosophical problem and expands the domain of solution spaces it affords.1 Other philosophical debates, I believe, stand to similarly benefit from such fusion perspectives. The lead article, by Jonardon Ganeri, deals with a problem faced by Buddhist no-self theorists in ancient India: How to account for episodic memories without a self? This problem has become especially pressing in contemporary Western philosophy with the rise of the popularity of no-self views spurred by the growing influ- ence of the cognitive sciences. Ganeri presents three accounts of episodic memory from the Buddhist Abhidharma perspective.
BibTeX:
@article{Chadha2017a,
  author = {Chadha, Monima},
  title = {No-self and episodic memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {347--352},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428878},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428878 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428878}
}
Chappell, S.-G. Aristotle 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 396-407.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] A philosophical theory of memory needs to satisfy a rather long and demanding list of desiderata. Memory is not perception, and memory is not knowledge; but perception can give rise to knowledge and to memory, memory can give rise to knowledge, and knowledge can give rise to memory. So the three seem closely related; our theory needs to capture and explain their relations, and the similarities and differences between them. Also, memory seems to involve a distinction between potentiality and actuality: if you ask me to remember something, I often can remember, but typically I don't actually remember until you prompt me to. (And notice the ambiguities in these bits of ordinary language: “I didn't remember when you first asked me ‘Do you remember?', but now I do remember, so yes, I did remember.”) Our theory should explain these puzzles; not to mention the connected puzzle about what it is for me to store” a memory, and how I recall memories from that “store.” Then there is a puzzle about how the process of recall can go wrong, as it clearly can in at least two ways: I can fail to remember and I can misremember. What do our accounts of these phenomena say about what it takes for the process of remembering to go right? And what exactly, to raise a presumably connected question, is memory's physical basis? Again: if knowledge comes in varieties—maybe (as I have argued elsewhere) the four varieties propositional, practical, phenomenal, objectual—does memory come in the same varieties?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Chappell2017,
  author = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace},
  title = {Aristotle},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {396--407}
}
Chappell, S.-G. Plato 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 385-395.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The first person in the Western canon to do serious philosophy about memory is Plato (427–347 bc). In his works, Plato develops three separate main themes about memory. 1 The first is memory as knowledge-over-time. The second theme starts from the famous discussions of recollection in the Meno and the Phaedo. For the third theme, the locus classicus is Plato's images of the Wax Block and the Aviary in the Theaetetus.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Chappell2017a,
  author = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace},
  title = {Plato},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {385--395}
}
Cheng, T. Iconic memory and attention in the overflow debate 2017 Cogent Psychology
4(1), 1304018.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The overflow debate concerns this following question: does conscious iconic memory have a higher capacity than attention does? In recent years, Ned Block has been invoking empirical works to support the positive answer to this ques- tion. The view is called the “rich view” or the “Overflow view”. One central thread of this discussion concerns the nature of iconic memory: for example how rich they are and whether they are conscious. The first section discusses a potential misun- derstanding of “visible persistence” in this literature. The second section discusses varieties of attention relevant to this debate. The final section discusses the most prominent alternative interpretation of the Sperling paradigm—the postdiction interpretation—and explains how it can be made compatible with a weaker version of the rich or overflow view. Subjects:
BibTeX:
@article{Cheng2017,
  author = {Cheng, Tony},
  title = {Iconic memory and attention in the overflow debate},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Cogent Psychology},
  volume = {4},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1304018},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/23311908.2017.1304018},
  url = {https://www.cogentoa.com/article/10.1080/23311908.2017.1304018}
}
Cheng, C.-Y. Chinese Buddhist philosophy 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 428-438.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory was approached and treated in Indian and Chinese Buddhist traditions in different ways than in the West, and they break new grounds for cognitive research in memory in modern days. Their approaches are both pragmatic in yielding practical norms for life, and at the same time analogical to our common-sense understanding of things in nature. They may not be systematic and have to be seen as phenomenological, but not as analytical.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Cheng2017a,
  author = {Cheng, Chung-Ying},
  title = {Chinese Buddhist philosophy},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {428--438}
}
Clowes, R.W. Extended memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 243-254.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] A new technological ecology of memory? In the early 1990s, Merlin Donald provided an agenda-setting approach to external memory when he distinguished between biological memory that resides within the brain, and external memory that may reside in a number of different external stores, including visual and electronic storage systems, as well as culturally transmitted memories that reside in other individ-uals. The key feature is that it is external to the biological memory of a given person. (Donald 1991: 308) Donald argued that it is external memory, not our biological capacities, that is responsible for all of our complex cultural achievements, and makes us human.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Clowes2017,
  author = {Clowes, Robert W.},
  title = {Extended memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {243--254}
}
Copenhaver, R. John Locke and Thomas Reid 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 470-479.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] As I write this, I remember the first time I saw the statue of David Hume on Edinburgh's Royal Mile. But what exactly am I remembering? We commonly think of such memories as about the past, and in particular, about past experiences. On this view, what I remember now are sensations, feelings, thoughts, and ideas that I had on the day I saw Hume's statue. The objects of memory, on this story, are past experiences. But if we travel three hundred years into the past, we find two philosophers—John Locke and Thomas Reid—whose theories of memory and the role it plays in our lives are very different from these common assumptions about memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Copenhaver2017,
  author = {Copenhaver, Rebecca},
  title = {John Locke and Thomas Reid},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {470--479}
}
De Brigard, F. Memory and imagination 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 127-140.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the history of philosophy, the relationship between memory and imagination has been a matter of debate. This chapter critically surveys the controversy. Section 1 explores some rea-sons that have led philosophers to assume that memory and imagination are distinct. Section 2 offers a historical overview of the main views concerning the distinction between memory and imagination. I suggest that much of the philosophical discussion surrounding the nature of this distinction obfuscates at least three different senses in which memory and imagination could differ. One sense concerns the difference between mental events that should be considered memories versus those that should be considered imaginations. A second sense concerns the nature of the relationship between the mental faculties or systems of memory and imagination. Finally, a third sense concerns the phenomenology of remembering versus that of imagining. Section 3 concludes with a brief overview of some important behavioral and neuroscientific results relevant to this discussion.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeBrigard2017,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Memory and imagination},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {127--140}
}
Debus, D. Memory causation 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 63-75.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The topic of “memory causation” is a core topic in the philosophy of memory and has attracted a good amount of philosophical attention. At its most general, the claim which some philosophers endorse in this context, and which other philosophers very emphatically and passionately think to be false, is the claim that a philosophical account of memory will need to make some causal claims; that is, that in order to offer a complete philosophical account of memory, we will need to refer to causal relations of some kind. Accordingly, the debate on “memory causation” is centered around the following question: (Causal Question) Which role should reference to causation and to causal relations play in an attempt to understand memory from a philosophical perspective?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Debus2017,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {Memory causation},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {63--75}
}
De Sousa, R. Memory and emotion 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 154-165.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] At the highest level of biological generality, we can discern a rough functional analogy between the most primitive tropisms and the most sophisticated human emotions. Both serve to detect and respond differentially to situations that affect the well-being of an organism. Similarly, elementary changes are perpetuated through time in the most primitive organism as well as in explicit individual memory. Thus, in the words of the psychologist Nico Frijda, emotions ‘can . . . be traced back in evolution to elementary principles of being alive', notably autonomy, arising from autopoiesis (Varela et al. 1974), a capacity for detection or perception of relevant cues, guided by a set of concerns (Frijda 2016: 610). While the ‘concerns' of bacteria might seem too remote to mention in the same breath as human emotions, the term draws attention to the parallel between sophisticated emotions and wants on the one side, and the needs served by tropisms towards nutrients or away from threats, on the other. Similarly, a common function is served by memory and by the mere preservation of an acquired change in the simplest organism. Memory and emotion together embody fundamental enabling processes of natural selection: differential success, among a variety of possible processes or behaviours, and the preservation of successful forms or strategies.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeSousa2017,
  author = {De Sousa, Ronald},
  title = {Memory and emotion},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {154--165}
}
Dessingué, A. Paul Ricoeur 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 563-571.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The issue of memory is not addressed in the work of Paul Ricoeur in a continuous way. In the volumes of Time and Narrative, published in French between 1983 and 1985, the question of the narration is mostly seen in relation to temporality and to the writing of history and fiction. The issue of memory can be considered as an underlying theme in the Ricoeurian reflection, which finally leads in 2000 to the publication (in French) of Memory, History and Forgetting (from now on, MHF). In many ways, this publication works as a concluding reflection on the interlaced relationships between narrative, history and imagination, while introducing a new perspective, or at least a more explicit perspective about the relationship between history and memory as well as the notion of forgetting, previously ‘neglected' in the work of Ricoeur. According to the words of Ricoeur in the introduction (Ricoeur 2004: xv), MHF thus functions as a necessary supplement to the three volumes of Time and Narrative (1983–85 in French) and Oneself as Another, edited in French in 1990.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Dessingue2017,
  author = {Dessingué, Alexandre},
  title = {Paul Ricoeur},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {563--571}
}
Deutscher, M. Memory 2017 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Routledge
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory is central to every way in which we deal with things. One might subsume memory under the category of intellect, since it is our capacity to retain what we sense, enjoy and suffer, and thus to become knowing in our perception and other activities. As intelligent retention, memory cannot be distinguished from our acquisition of skills, habits and customs – our capabilities both for prudence and for deliberate risk. As retention, memory is a vital condition of the formation of language.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Deutscher2017,
  author = {Deutscher, Max},
  title = {Memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-V020-2},
  url = {https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/memory/v-2}
}
Droege, P. Memory and consciousness 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 103-112.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The connection between memory and consciousness is so deep that people often assume that ‘memory' means conscious memory. This chapter will discuss the way consciousness figures in relation to one form of memory, episodic memory. To begin, Section 2 proposes a general definition of memory as the present use of past experience, where 'experience' does not imply consciousness. Section 3 considers the role of consciousness in theories of episodic memory. Originally defined by Endel Tulving (1972) as the capacity to remember a specific past event or episode, this form of memory is usually identified with the conscious recollection of past personal experience. The difficulty with this characterization is to account for the peculiar ‘feeling of pastness' in episodic memory and how it relates to present experience. New research on what is lost and what is preserved in the case of episodic amnesia suggests that conscious re-experience is not necessary for the capacity to remember personal past events. Instead, I propose that the conscious feeling of pastness results from embedding the representation of a past experience within a representation of the present. One benefit of this description of episodic memory is the clarity it brings to the debate about whether animals are capable of episodic memory. While animals demonstrate remarkable abilities to remember the past and plan for the future, the role of consciousness in accomplishing these tasks remains unclear. Section 4 will consider why it is difficult to show how consciousness is involved in animal memory and consider what tests might be persuasive. The lesson to be drawn from these considerations is that representational function can account for the conscious aspect of episodic memory and arbitrate between empirical paradigms investigating the role of consciousness in behavior.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Droege2017,
  author = {Droege, Paula},
  title = {Memory and consciousness},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {103--112}
}
Eldridge, P. Regret and the consciousness of the past 2017 International Journal of Philosophical Studies
25(5), 646-663.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of (1) the relationship between regret and episodic memory, (2) the temporal structure of ‘regretful memory', (3) the affective and evaluative dimension of regretful memory and (4) the counterfactual dimension of regretful memory. Based on Husserl's phenomenology, I offer an analysis of regret's complex structures of intentionality and time-consciousness. Husserl held that episodic memory requires two temporal orientations on one's own experience: the past now that one relives and the present now in which one does the reliving. If memory generally entails two temporal perspectives, regretful memory brings in a third point of temporal reference: that now that could have been. Drawing on Hoerl and McCormack, I give an account of regret as a mnemic and counterfactual form of intentional consciousness that confronts an alternative past and attempts to negotiate between two essential yet conflicting features of its actual past: its contingency and its irreversibility. On this basis, I then draw on Bagnoli to offer a phenomenological theory of regretful memory as an emotional mode of valuing possibilities that belong to the past.
BibTeX:
@article{Eldridge2017,
  author = {Eldridge, Patrick},
  title = {Regret and the consciousness of the past},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {International Journal of Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {25},
  number = {5},
  pages = {646--663},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2017.1381413},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09672559.2017.1381413}
}
Fan, W. On recognition and self: A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism 2017 Asian Philosophy
27(4), 292-308.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (ātman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena ofmemories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I arguethatBuddhistexplanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
BibTeX:
@article{Fan2017,
  author = {Fan, Wenli},
  title = {On recognition and self: A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Asian Philosophy},
  volume = {27},
  number = {4},
  pages = {292--308},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388}
}
Faria, P. Bertrand Russell 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 519-527.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Bertrand Russell is widely known for his willingness to change his philosophical mind. He is also now and again saddled with a reputation for carelessness about providing readers with clear and convincing explanations of his turnabouts. More often than not, he would seem to have just come up with a wholly fresh start and go happily on working in the new framework. Russell's ideas about memory are no exception to that perceived pattern of progress. He delivered to the world, in the space of a few years (between 1912 and 1921), two starkly different theories of memory, themselves fragments of much wider and conspicuously contrasting philosophical outlooks, with little explicit argument to account for the change.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Faria2017,
  author = {Faria, Paulo},
  title = {Bertrand Russell},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {519--527}
}
Fernández, J. The intentional objects of memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 88-99.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fernandez2017,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {The intentional objects of memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {88--99}
}
Ferretti, F., Adornetti, I., Chiera, A., Nicchiarelli, S., Magni, R., Valeri, G. and Marini, A. Mental time travel and language evolution: A narrative account of the origins of human communication 2017 Language Sciences
63, 105-118.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper we propose a narrative account for the origin of language. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is conceptual and concerns the idea that the distinctive feature of human language (what sets it apart from other forms of animal communication) has to be traced to its inherently narrative character. The second assumption is methodological and connected to the idea that the study of language origin is closely related to the analysis of the cognitive systems at the base of narrative. Research on narrative abilities of subjects with Autism Spectrum Disorder has shown that storytelling requires the capability to link events causally connected to one another, and especially events which are remote from one another on the temporal axis of a story. Based on this research, we hypothesize that an important cognitive device involved in narrative is Mental Time Travel (MTT), that is, the system that allows humans to project themselves into the past and future. We show that such a system is present (to a greater or lesser extent) even in non-human animals. By virtue of this, we argue that MTT is independent of language and that it may be considered a cognitive precursor for the origin of language. Specifically, we propose that MTT allowed our ancestors to develop a form of pantomimic communication that might be considered as the foundation of the narrative origin of language.
BibTeX:
@article{Ferretti2017,
  author = {Ferretti, F. and Adornetti, I. and Chiera, A. and Nicchiarelli, S. and Magni, R. and Valeri, G. and Marini, A.},
  title = {Mental time travel and language evolution: A narrative account of the origins of human communication},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Language Sciences},
  volume = {63},
  pages = {105--118},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2017.01.002},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0388000116301541}
}
Fivush, R. and Graci, M. Memory and social identity 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 268-280.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] We are the stories we tell about ourselves. Of the many ways to characterize “the self,” we argue that narrative practice is a necessary component. Our identity is critically defined by the narratives we create about ourselves, and this narrative self affords a sense of emotional coherence and continuity in life, that is, a sense that one is the same person with the same inner life, same goals, values, and commitments across time (Barnes 1998; Conway et al. 2004; Fivush 2010; Habermas and Reese 2015; McAdams 2001). In this chapter, we examine psychological theory and empirical evidence demonstrating that a coherent narrative identity is created in everyday social interactions, beginning early in child development, and that individual narrative identity is very much an evolving socially constructed process. We use the term “self” and “identity” interchangeably to refer to the sense of personal continuity and emotional coherence conferred by the narrative life story. We make no claims that this is the only definition or aspect of self; only that this is a critical aspect of self/identity that is created through storying our lived experience.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fivush2017,
  author = {Fivush, Robyn and Graci, Matthew},
  title = {Memory and social identity},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {268--280}
}
Flage, D.E. David Hume 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 480-486.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] David Hume explicitly discusses memory at two places in his Treatise of Human Nature (THN 1.1.3, 8–10; 1.3.5, 84–6). 1 In both cases, he contrasts ideas of the memory with ideas of the imagination. In this chapter, we examine those discussions within the context of the philosophical principles he developed in the Treatise. We show that Hume championed a causal theory of the memory, that an idea of the memory represents the impression that was its original cause, and that Hume argued that one can never be certain that a putative idea of the memory fulfills those conditions.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Flage2017,
  author = {Flage, Daniel E},
  title = {David Hume},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {480--486}
}
Fox, K.C.R., Fitz, N.S. and Reiner, P.B. The multiplicity of memory enhancement: Practical and ethical implications of the diverse neural substrates underlying human memory systems 2017 Neuroethics
10(3), 375-388.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The neural basis of human memory is incredibly complex. We argue that the diversity of neural systems underlying various forms of memory suggests that any discussion of enhancing ‘memory' per se is too broad, thus obfuscating the biopolitical debate about human enhancement. Memory can be differentiated into at least four major (and several minor) subsystems with largely dissociable (i.e., non-overlapping) neural substrates. We outline each subsystem, and discuss both the practical and the ethical implications of these diverse neural substrates. In practice, distinct neural bases imply the possibility, and likely the necessity, of specific approaches for the safe and effective enhancement of various memory subsystems. In the debate over the moral propriety of enhancement, this fine-grained perspective clarifies – and may partially ameliorate – certain concerns, including issues related to safety, fairness, coercion, and authenticity. While many researchers certainly appreciate the neurobiological complexity of memory, the political debate tends to revolve around a monolithic one-size-fits-all conception. The overall project – exploring the societal implications of human enhancement technologies – stands to benefit from a deeper appreciation of the neurobiological diversity of memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Fox2017,
  author = {Fox, Kieran C. R. and Fitz, Nicholas S. and Reiner, Peter B.},
  title = {The multiplicity of memory enhancement: Practical and ethical implications of the diverse neural substrates underlying human memory systems},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Neuroethics},
  volume = {10},
  number = {3},
  pages = {375--388},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-016-9282-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-016-9282-7}
}
Frise, M. Preservationism in the epistemology of memory 2017 The Philosophical Quarterly
67(268), 486-507.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Preservationism states that memory preserves the justification of the beliefs it preserves. More precisely: if S formed a justified belief that p at t 1 and retains in memory a belief that p until t 2 , then S's belief that p is prima facie justified via memory at t 2 . Preservationism is an unchallenged orthodoxy in the epistemology of memory. Advocates include Sven Bernecker, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, Gilbert Harman, Michael Huemer, Matthew McGrath, and Thomas Senor. I develop three dilemmas for it, in part by drawing on research in cognitive psychology. The dilemmas centre on preservationism's implications for certain cases involving either stored beliefs, forgotten evidence, or recollection failure. Each dilemma shows that preservationism either is false or lacks key support.
BibTeX:
@article{Frise,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Preservationism in the epistemology of memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly},
  volume = {67},
  number = {268},
  pages = {486--507},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqw074},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/pq/pqw074}
}
Frise, M. No need to know 2017 Philosophical Studies
174(2), 391-401.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
BibTeX:
@article{Frise2017,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {No need to know},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {174},
  number = {2},
  pages = {391--401},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0688-1}
}
Frise, M. Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs 2017 Erkenntnis
82(2), 285-304.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject's mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one's mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.
BibTeX:
@article{Frise2017a,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {82},
  number = {2},
  pages = {285--304},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7}
}
Frise, M. Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs 2017 Erkenntnis
82(2), 285-304.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject's mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one's mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.
BibTeX:
@article{Frise2018,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Internalism and the problem of stored beliefs},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {82},
  number = {2},
  pages = {285--304},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-016-9817-7}
}
Fuchs, T. Self across time: The diachronic unity of bodily existence 2017 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
16(2), 291-315.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke's tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for someone's persistence over time, is the continuity of his mind on the one hand, and the continuity of his body on the other. In contrast to those views, the paper intends to show that bodily existence represents the basis of selfhood across time, both as the continuity of the experiential self and as the continuity of the autopoietic organism. On the one hand, the lived body conveys a continuity of the self from a first-person perspective, namely a pre-reflective feeling of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity. Moreover, an analysis of awakening and sleep shows that there is a continuous transition from full wakefulness to periods of deep sleep which may thus not be regarded as a complete interruption of subjective experience. On the other hand, this constancy converges with the continuity of the organismic life process as conceived from a third-person perspective. Thus, the experiential self of bodily subjectivity and the autopoietic self of the living organism should be regarded as two aspects of one and the same life process. Finally, the lived body also exhibits a specific form of memory that results from the continual embodiment of existence: it consists of all the affinities, capacities and experiences, which a person has acquired throughout his life. Thus, it provides a continuity of self that must not be actively produced through remembering, but rather integrates the person's entire past in his present being and potentiality.
BibTeX:
@article{Fuchs2017,
  author = {Fuchs, Thomas},
  title = {Self across time: The diachronic unity of bodily existence},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {16},
  number = {2},
  pages = {291--315},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9449-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-015-9449-4}
}
Ganeri, J. Mental time travel and attention 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 353-373.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic memory is the ability to revisit events in one's personal past, to relive them as if one travelled back in mental time. It has widely been assumed that such an ability imposes a metaphysical requirement on selves. Buddhist philosophers, however, deny the requirement and therefore seek to provide accounts of episodic memory that are metaphysically parsimonious. The idea that the memory perspective is a centred field of experience whose phenomenal constituents are simulacra of an earlier field of experience, yet attended to (organised, arranged) in a way that presents them as happening again, is, I suggest, a better one than that the memory perspective consists in taking as object-aspect the subject-aspect of the earlier experience, or the idea that it consists in labelling a representation of the earlier experience with an I-tag. ART
BibTeX:
@article{Ganeri2017,
  author = {Ganeri, Jonardon},
  title = {Mental time travel and attention},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {353--373},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1429794},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1429794}
}
Ganeri, J. Mental time travel and attention: Replies to commentators 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 450-455.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] I am deeply grateful for all the wonderful responses and comments that have been writ- ten with such care and, dare I say it, attention. The editors too were taken by surprise by the range and extensiveness of the responses, and asked me if I would not mind to limit the length of my replies so as to give as much space as possible in the volume for the responses themselves. I shall therefore make a few comments below, mostly indica- tive ofwhat I have learned. With
BibTeX:
@article{Ganeri2017a,
  author = {Ganeri, Jonardon},
  title = {Mental time travel and attention: Replies to commentators},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {450--455},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428880},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1428880}
}
Ganeri, J. Classical Indian philosophy 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 408-415.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] There is a deep conceptual link between time and the self. One venerable articulation of the relation has it that memory provides a criterion of personal identity, to which a standard objection has long been that memory presupposes sameness of self and so cannot be used in a non-circular analysis of it. The force of the objection is acknowledged in the move by those theorists who argue that personal identity is instead to be analyzed in terms, not of memory, but of the artificial notion of quasi-memory (the notion of a state that is like memory in being produced by an earlier experience, but neutral about whose experience it was). Both psychological continuity theorists of personal identity and their opponents agree that there is a more basic tie between time and the self, which I will call the “self-implication requirement on memory”.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Ganeri2017b,
  author = {Ganeri, Jonardon},
  title = {Classical Indian philosophy},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {408--415}
}
Gold, N. and Kyratsous, M. Self and identity in borderline personality disorder: Agency and mental time travel 2017 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
23(5), 1020-1028.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We consider how conceptions of the self and identity from the philosophical literature can help us to understand identity disturbance in borderline personality disorder (BPD). We present 3 philosophical approaches: connectedness, narrative, and agency. We show how these map on to 3 different ways in which the self can be temporally extended. The connectedness approach is dominant in philosophy, and the narrative approach has been used by psychiatry, but we argue that the lesser-known agency approach provides a promising way to theorize some aspects of identity disturbance in BPD. It relates the 2 diagnostic criteria of identity disturbance and disinhibition and is consistent with evidence of memory deficits and altered self-processing in BPD patients.
BibTeX:
@article{Gold,
  author = {Gold, Natalie and Kyratsous, Michalis},
  title = {Self and identity in borderline personality disorder: Agency and mental time travel},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice},
  volume = {23},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1020--1028},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.12769},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/jep.12769}
}
Goldstone, R.L. and Theiner, G. The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) perspective on group cognition 2017 Philosophical Psychology
30(3), 338-372.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We lay out a multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) framework to account for the cognitive capacities of individuals and the groups to which they belong. The goal of MILCS is to explain the kinds of cognitive processes typically studied by cognitive scientists, such as perception, attention, memory, categorization, decision-making, problem solving, judgment, and flexible behavior. Two such systems are considered in some detail—lateral inhibition within a network for selecting the most attractive option from a candidate set and a diffusion process for accumulating evidence to reach a rapid and accurate decision. These system descriptions are aptly applied at multiple levels, including within and across people. These systems provide accounts that unify cognitive processes across multiple levels, can be expressed in a common vocabulary provided by network science, are inductively powerful yet appropriately constrained, and are applicable to a large number of superficially diverse cognitive systems. Given group identification processes, cognitively resourceful people will frequently form groups that effectively employ cognitive systems at higher levels than the individual. The impressive cognitive capacities of individual people do not eliminate the need to talk about group cognition. Instead, smart people can provide the interacting parts for smart groups
BibTeX:
@article{Goldstone2017,
  author = {Goldstone, Robert L. and Theiner, Georg},
  title = {The multiple, interacting levels of cognitive systems (MILCS) perspective on group cognition},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {30},
  number = {3},
  pages = {338--372},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1295635},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2017.1295635}
}
Gross, S. Perception and the origins of temporal representation 2017 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
98(S1), 275-292.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Is temporal representation constitutively necessary for perception? Tyler Burge argues that it is, in part because perception requires a form of memory sufficiently sophisticated as to require temporal representation. I critically discuss Burge's argument, maintaining that it does not succeed. I conclude by reflecting on the consequences for the origins of temporal representation.
BibTeX:
@article{Gross2017,
  author = {Gross, Steven},
  title = {Perception and the origins of temporal representation},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  volume = {98},
  number = {S1},
  pages = {275--292},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12171},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/papq.12171}
}
Hamilton, A. Ludwig Wittgenstein 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 546-556.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Wittgenstein did not work very extensively on memory, but his views on the topic are reasonably defined and important. Moyal-Sharrock's summary is accurate: '[he] discredited the storage and imprint models . . . dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images [and] made room for a family resemblance concept . . . where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something' (Moyal-Sharrock 2009: 'Abstract'). This quotation also summarises the issues addressed in the present chapter. One can treat Wittgenstein's work historically as part of 'Wittgenstein studies'; or ahistorically, relating it to the increasingly technical sub-disciplines of epistemology and philosophy of mind. This chapter tries to bring together historical and ahistorical approaches.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hamilton2017,
  author = {Hamilton, Andy},
  title = {Ludwig Wittgenstein},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {546--556}
}
Heersmink, R. Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems 2017 Synthese
194(8), 3135-3151.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one's autobiographical memory and thus also of one's diachronic self. To develop this claim, I draw on recent empirical work in human-computer interaction, looking at lifelogging technologies in both healthcare and everyday contexts. I argue that personal identity can neither be reduced to psychological structures instantiated by the brain nor by biological structures instantiated by the organism, but should be seen as an environmentally-distributed and relational construct. In other words, the complex web of cognitive relations we develop and maintain with other people and technological artifacts partly determines our self. This view has conceptual, methodological, and normative implications: we should broaden our concepts of the self as to include social and artifactual structures, focus on external memory systems in the (empirical) study of personal identity, and not interfere with people's distributed minds and selves. textcopyright 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
BibTeX:
@article{Heersmink2017a,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {194},
  number = {8},
  pages = {3135--3151},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1102-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-016-1102-4}
}
Heersmink, R. Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts 2017 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
16(1), 17-32.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to personal identity.
BibTeX:
@article{Heersmink2017b,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {17--32},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9448-5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-015-9448-5}
}
Hoerl, C. Memory and the concept of time 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 207-218.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell writes of a form of memory the essence of which is constituted by 'having immediately before the mind an object which is recognized as past' (Russell 1912: 66), and adds the following: But for the fact of memory in this sense, we should not know that there ever was a past at all, nor should we be able to understand the word 'past', any more than a man born blind can understand the word 'light'. (Russell 1912: 66) A similar passage can already be found earlier in the same book: It is obvious that we often remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise present to our senses, and that in such cases we are still immediately aware of what we remember, in spite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present. This immediate knowledge by memory is the source of all our knowledge concerning the past: with-out it, there could be no knowledge of the past by inference, since we should never know that there was anything past to be inferred. (Russell 1912: 26) It is plausible to interpret these remarks as being concerned with the particular type of memory that psychologists, and increasingly also philosophers, refer to as episodic memory – that is, the distinctive capacity we have for recollecting particular past events that we have personally experienced. Thus interpreted, Russell's claim is that the possession of episodic memory is necessary for a grasp of the concept of the past, and, by extension, a full understanding of the concept of time. Understanding what it is for there to have been a past, and for events to have happened in the past, depends on the possession of episodic memory. This is the claim I wish to investigate in this chapter. I refer to it as the Dependency Thesis.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hoerl2017,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {Memory and the concept of time},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {207--218}
}
Hoerl, C. On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke and Reid 2017 Journal of Consciousness Studies
24(3-4), 88-102.
 
Abstract: According to the snapshot view of temporal experience, instances of movement and change cannot, strictly speaking, be objects of sensory perception. Perceptual consciousness instead consists of a succession of individual momentary experiences, none of which is itself an experience of movement or change. The snapshot view is often presented as an intuitively appealing view of the nature of temporal experience, even by philosophers who ultimately reject it. Yet, it is puzzling how this can be so, given that its central claim-that we can never just perceive things moving or changing-clearly flies in the face of our common sense view of the phenomenology of experience. In this paper, I offer a diagnosis of how it is possible that the deep conflict between the snapshot view and our phenomenological intuitions can sometimes go unnoticed. The materials for this diagnosis can, I think, be found in some passages in Thomas Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in which he criticises John Locke's account of the origins of the idea of succession, as presented in chapter 14 of book II of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As I argue, a crucial aspect of Reid's criticisms can be seen to turn on the idea that Locke fails to distinguish between two quite different variants of the snapshot view, which I call the memory theory and the mirroring theory of temporal experience, respectively. It is the failure to distinguish between these two different variants of the snapshot view, I suggest, that can also make the snapshot view appear more compatible with our phenomenological intuitions than it in fact is.
BibTeX:
@article{Hoerl2017a,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {On the view that we cannot perceive movement and change: Lessons from Locke and Reid},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {24},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {88--102}
}
Hutto, D.D. Memory and narrativity 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 192-204.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Although we can potentially narrate any specific event or recurring events in our lives, including acts of remembering themselves, only one special sort of memory – autobiographical reverie – has a strong claim for being indelibly narrative in nature. There is robust empirical and theoretical sup-port for thinking that autobiographical remembering depends upon the mastery of socio-cultural narrative practices and the exercise of narrative skills. In getting clear about why autobiographical memory and narrativity may be inescapably bound together, a preparatory comparison with more purely embodied forms of remembering proves instructive.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hutto2017,
  author = {Hutto, Daniel D.},
  title = {Memory and narrativity},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {192--204}
}
Hutto, D.D. and Myin, E. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content 2017
MIT Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Hutto2017a,
  author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Myin, Erik},
  title = {Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {MIT Press}
}
Irvine, E. Memory images 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 141-153.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The aim of this chapter is to assess arguments, based on research into visual short-term memory, that the contents of consciousness are more rich and detailed than we can evidence in reports. Several authors claim that the rich and possibly non-conceptual contents of iconic memory contribute to the contents of consciousness, but much of this is not processed into working memory so is soon ‘forgotten' (Block 2011, 2007; Dretske 2007, 2006, 2004; Fodor 2008; Tye 2009, 2006). This short-lived, non-attended and unreported conscious content is argued to exist on a ‘phenomenal' (Block) or ‘object' (Dretske) level of awareness. Content that is attended and reported on is cognitively accessed (Block), or experienced on a ‘fact' level (Dretske) as well.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Irvine2017,
  author = {Irvine, Elizabeth},
  title = {Memory images},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {141--153}
}
Ismael, J. Passage, flow, and the logic of temporal perspectives 2017 Time of Nature and Nature of Time
Springer, 23-38.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, an attempt is made to inject a little formal precision into the discussion of passage. Instead of focusing on the quality of temporal experience, we talk about the content, and we argue that a good many of the issues can be resolved with an examination of the logic of temporal perspectives.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Ismael2017,
  author = {Ismael, Jenann},
  title = {Passage, flow, and the logic of temporal perspectives},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {Time of Nature and Nature of Time},
  editor = {Bouton, C. and Huneman, P.},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {23--38},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53725-2_2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-53725-22}
}
Jablonka, E. Collective narratives, false memories, and the origins of autobiographical memory 2017 Biology & Philosophy
32(6), 839-853.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Building on Dor's theory of language as a social technology for the instruction of imagination, I suggest that autobiographical memory evolved cul-turally as a response to the problems of false memory and deliberate deceit that were introduced by that technology. I propose that sapiens' linguistic communication about past and future events initially occurred in small groups, and this helped to correct individual memory defects. However, when human groups grew in size and became more socially differentiated, and movement between groups prevented story-verification, misattributions of events became more common. In such condi-tions individuals with better autobiographical memory had an advantage because they could evaluate their own contents and sources of information, as well as that of others, more accurately; this not only benefitted them directly, but also improved their reliability as social partners. Autobiographical memory thus evolved in the context of human linguistic communication through selection for communicative reliability. However, the advantages of imagination, which enables forward-plan-ning and decision-Making, meant that memory distortions, although controlled and moderated by autobiographical memory, could not be totally eradicated. This may have driven the evolution of additional forms of memory control involving social and linguistic norms. I interpret the language and the social norms of the Pirahã as the outcome of the cultural-evolutionary control of memory distortions. Some ways of testing aspects of this proposal are outlined.
BibTeX:
@article{Jablonka2017,
  author = {Jablonka, Eva},
  title = {Collective narratives, false memories, and the origins of autobiographical memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
  volume = {32},
  number = {6},
  pages = {839--853},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9593-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10539-017-9593-z}
}
James, S. Epistemic and non-epistemic theories of remembering 2017 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
98(S1), 109-127.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Contemporary memory sciences describe processes that are dynamic and constructive. This has led some philosophers to weaken the relationship between memory and epistemology; though remembering can give rise to epistemic success, it is not itself an epistemic success state. I argue that non-epistemic (causal) theories will not do; they provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for remembering that p. I also argue that the shortcomings of the causal theory are epistemic in nature. Consequently, a theory of remembering must account for both its fundamentally epistemic nature and for its constructive and dynamic processes.
BibTeX:
@article{James2017,
  author = {James, Steven},
  title = {Epistemic and non-epistemic theories of remembering},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  volume = {98},
  number = {S1},
  pages = {109--127},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12157},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/papq.12157}
}
Jungert, M. Neurophilosophy or philosophy of neuroscience? What neuroscience and philosophy can and cannot do for each other 2017 The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain
Elsevier, 3-13.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Ever since the rise of modern neuroscience in the 1980s, there has been controversial discussion about its potential influence on topics that have been traditionally seen as part of the domain of social sciences and humanities (see, e.g., Gold & Stoljar, 1999; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013; Tallis, 2014).a The heated public and scientific debate on proposed neuroscientific solutions to the problem of the freedom of the will might be considered as the most prominent example (see, e.g., Mele, 2010, 2015; Schlosser, 2014; Walter, 2001). Moreover, the formation of a large number of neuro-hyphenated disciplines in the field of social sciences and the humanities such as neuro-theology, neuro-psychoanalysis, neuro-education, or neuro-economics, to name just a few, shows the appeal and attraction of applying neuroscientific methods to traditional scientific fields.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Jungert2017,
  author = {Jungert, M.},
  title = {Neurophilosophy or philosophy of neuroscience? What neuroscience and philosophy can and cannot do for each other},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Human Sciences after the Decade of the Brain},
  publisher = {Elsevier},
  pages = {3--13},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804205-2.00001-X},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/B978012804205200001X}
}
Khalidi, M.A. Crosscutting psycho-neural taxonomies: The case of episodic memory 2017 Philosophical Explorations
20(2), 191-208.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I will begin by proposing a taxonomy oftaxonomic positions regarding the mind–brain: localism, globalism, revisionism, and contextualism, and will go on to focus on the last position. Although some versions of contextualism have been defended by various researchers, they largely limit themselves to a version of neural contextualism: different brain regions perform different functions in different neural contexts. I will defend what I call “environmental-etiological contextualism,” according to which the psychological functions carried out by various neural regions can only be identified and individuated against an environmental context or with reference to a causal history. While this idea may seem innocuous enough, it has important implications for a structure-to-function mapping in the mind and brain sciences. It entails that the same neural structures can subserve different psychological functions in different contexts, leading to crosscutting psycho-neural mappings. I will try to illustrate how this can occur with reference to recent research on episodic memory. Keywords:
BibTeX:
@article{Khalidi2017,
  author = {Khalidi, Muhammad Ali},
  title = {Crosscutting psycho-neural taxonomies: The case of episodic memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
  volume = {20},
  number = {2},
  pages = {191--208},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312501},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpex20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2017.1312501}
}
Kuipers, R.A. Turning memory into prophecy: Roberto Unger and Paul Ricoeur on the human condition between past and future 2017 The Heythrop Journal
58(5), 806-815.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] In The SelfAwakened: Pragmatism Unbound, Roberto Unger consistently maintains that, in any democracy worthy of the name, ‘prophecy' ought to speak louder than ‘memory'.4 Precisely what Unger means by these two evocative terms is not immediately or manifestly clear, although one could be forgiven for getting the impression that, in making this claim, Unger is offering his unique expression of pragmatism's uneasy and ambiguous feelings about the past; among other things, this claim constitutes a warning against the temptation of succumbing to an enervating conservatism with which the past always presents us. But beyond offering such a warning, what precisely does Unger mean by ‘memory' and ‘prophecy'? How does he think we ought to understand the relationship between this prophecy that ought to speak louder than memory, and the past from which, he admits, it always emerges? Finally, are there different ways of considering this relationship than the one Unger offers, ways that also resist the temptations of conservatism, yet while in so doing preserve a more edifying role for memory (not to mention tradition or history)? My purpose in this essay is to explore these questions.
BibTeX:
@article{Kuipers2011,
  author = {Kuipers, Ronald A.},
  title = {Turning memory into prophecy: Roberto Unger and Paul Ricoeur on the human condition between past and future},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {The Heythrop Journal},
  volume = {58},
  number = {5},
  pages = {806--815},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00640.x},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00640.x}
}
León, F. Mental time travel and joint reminiscing 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 426-431.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In joint episodic memory-or joint reminiscing-two or more individuals retrieve together an experience that they had previously encoded while socially engaged with one another. In this commentary, I focus on the question of how Ganeri's [2018] analysis of individual episodic memory might be applicable to joint reminiscing. I explore three topics that are of relevance for answering this question: intersubjectivity, attention, and the phenomenology of reminiscing.
BibTeX:
@article{Leon2017,
  author = {León, Felipe},
  title = {Mental time travel and joint reminiscing},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {426--431},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411145},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411145}
}
Le Poidevin, R. Memory and the metaphysics of time 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 219-227.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] To understand the nature of memory is to understand the nature of time itself. That rather bold thesis is the subject of the following discussion. The idea that we can simply read off the mind-independent nature of reality from our mental representations of it does seem rather doubtful, of course. But a rather more promising line of inquiry is to see whether some positions in debates about time's true nature sit rather better than do others with some widespread beliefs about remembering. So that is how this discussion will proceed, by first introducing a metaphysical debate about time, and then exploring the alleged connection with memory. The aspects of memory that we will be particularly concerned with are its role in structuring our perceptual experience, and its role in providing knowledge of our experiential pasts. And the metaphysical views of the nature of time those aspects (arguably) connect with concern the passage of time, the reality of the past, and the basis of time's direction.
BibTeX:
@incollection{LePoidevin2017,
  author = {Le Poidevin, Robin},
  title = {Memory and the metaphysics of time},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {219--227}
}
Liao, S.M. The ethics of memory modification 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 373-382.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Many people would like to have a better memory. It could help them to do better at school, at work, and remember where they put their car keys. Some people hope to stop or slow the loss of their memory. An estimated 5.3 million Americans in 2015 have Alzheimer's disease, a progressive brain disorder that slowly destroys memory and thinking skills, and eventually the ability to carry out the simplest tasks. And some people wish that they could get rid of certain, traumatic memories. A 10-year-old girl, whose rapist was sentenced to 15–18 years in Florida in 2014, told the court: “I wish I could forget and have a new brain, so I don't remember.” A woman who survived a violent sexual assault said: “Days after, my scars were healing on the outside, but the memories hurt just as bad because no matter what I tried, I couldn't get them out of my mind . . . I will always have a constant reminder for the rest of my life of the one night I wish I could forget.” Likewise, the terrible burden of memory weighs heavily on returning soldiers, many of whom suffer flashbacks to those memories as a symptom of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). For instance, Arthur Ricker Sr., a 94-year-old veteran of the D-Day invasion said: “It's still in my memory. Sometimes I wish I could forget but I can't.”
BibTeX:
@incollection{Liao2017,
  author = {Liao, S. Matthew},
  title = {The ethics of memory modification},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {373--382}
}
Madison, B.J.C. Internalism and externalism 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 283-295.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] We have countless beliefs, and many of them are justified. Most of our beliefs, at any given time, are not occurrent, but are stored in memory. In addition, many of our beliefs remain justified while stored in memory. How is this all possible? An epistemology of memory will in part explain the nature of memorial justification, and how it is possible. Epistemic internalists and externalists disagree deeply about the fundamental nature of epistemic properties like epistemic justification. That is, is justification wholly determined by what goes on inside and from the first-person perspective, or does how beliefs are caused, formed, and what relations subjects bear to their environment prove relevant to whether or not justification obtains? This chapter will first survey general issues in the epistemic internalism / externalism debate: what is the distinction, what motivates it, and what arguments can be given on both sides. The second part of the chapter will examine the internalism / externalism debate as regards to the specific case of the epistemology of memory belief.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Madison2017,
  author = {Madison, Brent J C},
  title = {Internalism and externalism},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {283--295}
}
Magrì, E. The problem of habitual body and memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty 2017 Hegel Bulletin
38(01), 24-44.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, I shall focus on the relation between habitual body and memory in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception . Both Hegel and Merleau-Ponty defend a view of the self that is centred on the role of habituality as embodied activity situated in a context. However, both philosophers avoid committing to what Edward Casey has defined habitual body memory, i.e., an active immanence of the past in the body that informs present bodily actions in an efficacious, orienting and regular manner. I shall explore the reasons why neither Hegel nor Merleau-Ponty develops an explicit account of habitual body memory. This will shed light not only on Hegel's account of lived experience, but also on Hegel and Merleau-Ponty's common concern with the habitual body.
BibTeX:
@article{Magri2017,
  author = {Magrì, Elisa},
  title = {The problem of habitual body and memory in Hegel and Merleau-Ponty},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Hegel Bulletin},
  volume = {38},
  number = {01},
  pages = {24--44},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2016.65},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2051536716000652/type/journalarticle}
}
Manning, L. Augustine 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 439-447.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] When Aurelius Augustinus Hipponensis (354–430 CE), referred to as St. Augustine or Augustine, converted to the Christian doctrine, he set himself the aim of understanding God, although, as it is explicit in the quotation above, he did not know where to start. The answer, ten books later in his Confessions (Conf.), is that the only place to search for God is in his own memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Manning2017,
  author = {Manning, Lilianne},
  title = {Augustine},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {439--447}
}
Matheson, D. An obligation to forget 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 364-372.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In this chapter, I argue that as an activity forgetting is susceptible to moral obligation. After responding to a worry about whether the moral obligation to perform this activity ever realistically obtains, I present a tentative account of an important species of the obligation, namely, the moral obligation to forget sensitive information about other agents. I then consider the bearing of these reflections on two broad criticisms of a recently affirmed " right to be forgotten " online.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Matheson2017,
  author = {Matheson, David},
  title = {An obligation to forget},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {364--372}
}
Mccarroll, C.J. Over and beyond our episodic memories 2017 The Journal of Mind and Behaviour
38(3/4), 231-247.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Where do our memories go when we lose them? This question may seem childlike, and indeed it was posed to Mark Rowlands by one of his young sons, but it is a good question, and one that lies at the heart of Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography. In answering this question, Rowlands takes us on a fascinating, insightful, and revisionary journey through episodic memory, its content (and mental content more generally), and the nature of the autobiographical self.
BibTeX:
@article{Mccarroll2017,
  author = {Mccarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {Over and beyond our episodic memories},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {The Journal of Mind and Behaviour},
  volume = {38},
  number = {3/4},
  pages = {231--247}
}
McCarroll, C.J. Looking the past in the eye: Distortion in memory and the costs and benefits of recalling from an observer perspective 2017 Consciousness and Cognition
49, 322-332.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández's claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández's assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one's past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial.
BibTeX:
@article{McCarroll2017,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude},
  title = {Looking the past in the eye: Distortion in memory and the costs and benefits of recalling from an observer perspective},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  volume = {49},
  pages = {322--332},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.01.014},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053810016302148}
}
McCarroll, C.J. and Sutton, J. Memory and perspective 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 113-126.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In an essay in the London Review of Books, the late Jenny Diski describes a remembered scene from her childhood. Aged 6 or so, she is seated on her father's knee. Her father, she tells us, looks just like he does in the pictures she has of him: ‘silvery hair, moustache, brown suede lace-ups'. Diski doesn't have many pictures of her childhood self but she's pretty sure her remembered image of herself at that age is accurate. The layout of the room is also correct: ‘Door in the right place; chair I'm sure accurate, a burgundy moquette; patterned carpet; windows looking out onto the brick wall of the offices opposite'. Indeed, Diski had even gone back to the block of flats and ‘sat in the living-room of the flat next door' just to verify the layout and confirm its accuracy. Nonetheless, for Diski, there is still something rather ‘odd' about this particular memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{McCarroll2017a,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sutton, John},
  title = {Memory and perspective},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {113--126}
}
McCormack, T. and Hoerl, C. The development of temporal concepts: Learning to locate events in time 2017 Timing & Time Perception
5(3-4), 297-327.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A new model of the development of temporal concepts is described that assumes that there are substantial changes in how children think about time in the early years. It is argued that there is a shift from understanding time in an event-dependent way to an event-independent understanding of time. Early in development, very young children are unable to think about locations in time independently of the events that occur at those locations. It is only with development that children begin to have a proper grasp of the distinction between past, present, and future, and represent time as linear and unidirectional. The model assumes that although children aged two to three years may categorize events differently depending on whether they lie in the past or the future, they may not be able to understand that whether an event is in the future or in the past is something that changes as time passes and varies with temporal perspective. Around four to five years, children understand how causality operates in time, and can grasp the systematic relations that obtain between different locations in time, which provides the basis for acquiring the conventional clock and calendar system.
BibTeX:
@article{McCormack2017,
  author = {McCormack, Teresa and Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {The development of temporal concepts: Learning to locate events in time},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Timing & Time Perception},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {297--327},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-00002094},
  url = {https://brill.com/view/journals/time/5/3-4/article-p297297.xml}
}
Michaelian, K., Klein, S.B. and Szpunar, K.K. The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel 2017 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 1-18.
 
Abstract: This introductory chapter reviews research on future-oriented mental time travel to date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2017,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  title = {The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {1--18}
}
Michaelian, K. and Sutton, J. Memory 2017 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Centre for the Study of Language and Information
[URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory plays important roles in many areas of philosophy. It is vital to our knowledge of the world in general and of the personal past in particular. It underwrites our identities as individuals and our ties to other people. Philosophical interest in memory thus dates back to antiquity and has remained prominent throughout the history of philosophy (Aho 2014; Bloch 2014; Burnham 1888; Herrmann & Chaffinn 1988; Nikulin 2015). More recently, memory has come to be recognized as a topic of major philosophical importance in its own right, with the emergence of the philosophy of memory as a distinct field of research (Bernecker & Michaelian 2017).
BibTeX:
@misc{Michaelian2017b,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken and Sutton, John},
  title = {Memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
  publisher = {Centre for the Study of Language and Information},
  url = {https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/memory/}
}
Miyazono, K. Does functionalism entail extended mind? 2017 Synthese
194(9), 3523-3541.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer's disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto's beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it " the systems reply " to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the " the systems reply " to Searle's Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak's claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply.
BibTeX:
@article{Miyazano2017,
  author = {Miyazono, Kengo},
  title = {Does functionalism entail extended mind?},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {194},
  number = {9},
  pages = {3523--3541},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0971-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-015-0971-2}
}
Mole, C. Are there special mechanisms of involuntary memory? 2017 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
8(3), 557-571.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Following the precedent set by Dorthe Berntsen's 2009 book, Involuntary Autobiographical Memory, this paper asks whether the mechanisms responsible for involuntarily recollected memories are distinct from those that are responsible for voluntarily recollected ones. Berntsen conjectures that these mechanisms are largely the same. Recent work has been thought to show that this is mistaken, but the argument from the recent results to the rejection of Berntsen's position is problematic, partly because it depends on a philosophically contentious view of voluntariness. Berntsen herself shares this contentious view, but the defenders of her position can easily give it up. This paper explains how and why they should.
BibTeX:
@article{Mole2017,
  author = {Mole, Christopher},
  title = {Are there special mechanisms of involuntary memory?},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {557--571},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0326-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-016-0326-z}
}
Moon, A. Skepticism and memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 335-347.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Our topic is skepticism and memory. Skepticism is the view that we cannot have knowledge or rational belief in some important area. I mean by “knowledge” and “rational belief” what they mean in ordinary English. I will use “warrant” as a technical term for whatever it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. (I assume, with Plato, that there is a difference between knowing a truth, and merely believing that truth.) Although most of the skeptical arguments discussed in this chapter could be formulated so as to conclude either that we lack rational belief or that we lack knowledge (or warrant), for specificity, I will normally just formulate them so they conclude the latter.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Moon2017,
  author = {Moon, Andrew},
  title = {Skepticism and memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {335--347}
}
Nichols, S. Memory and personal identity 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 169-179.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In modern philosophy, memory plays a central role in discussions of personal identity. On one view, memory plays a role in what makes us the same person across time. On an alternative view, memory instead serves as evidence of identity with a past person.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nichols2017,
  author = {Nichols, Shaun},
  title = {Memory and personal identity},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {169--179}
}
Nikiforov, A.L. Historical memory: The construction of consciousness 2017 Russian Studies in Philosophy
55(1), 49-61.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Historical (national) memory is considered in this article as one of the most important pillars of national identity. In addition to identifying some of the characteristic features of national, historical memory, the author shows that historical memory is influenced by two factorsthe direct experience of the witnesses and participants of past events and official propaganda. As the direct witnesses of events disappear, the possibility of reconstructing and distorting historical memory increases. The ideas put forth in this article are formulated based on the historical memory of World War II in the United States, Russia, Germany, and other European countries.
BibTeX:
@article{Nikiforov2017,
  author = {Nikiforov, Alexander L.},
  title = {Historical memory: The construction of consciousness},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Russian Studies in Philosophy},
  volume = {55},
  number = {1},
  pages = {49--61},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/10611967.2017.1296292},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10611967.2017.1296292}
}
Nikulin, D. Maurice Halbwachs 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 528-536.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Collective memory is at the center of the debate about the relationship between individual memory and the memory as defined by one's participation in a group. The term was introduced by Maurice Halbwachs (Reims, 1877–Buchenwald concentration camp, 1945), who was a prominent French sociologist and wrote on a wide variety of topics, including statistics, Leibniz's philosophy, probability theory, religion, suicide, urbanism, the working class, and social morphology and psychology. Yet Halbwachs became mostly known—more often referred to than read—for his work on memory, to which he returned often. Halbwachs set down the foundations for his work on memory with the groundbreaking study The Social Frameworks of Memory (Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire, 1925), which introduces the notion of collective memory within different social groups. His thinking on memory then continues in numerous works, including a piece on collective memory among musicians, "The Collective Memory of Musicians" ("La mémoire collective chez les musiciens," 1939), which argues that the memory of musicians is social in nature, the book The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land (1941), which traces the changes in the ways the social memory of places is transformed over time due to their new imaginary representation and interpretation, and the posthumously published Collective Memory (1950), which discusses the relationship between collective, individual, and historical memory, and collective memory's temporal and spatial determinations. Throughout these works, providing references to introspection, literary examples, historical observations, and empirical data, Halbwachs touches upon different aspects of memory as related to language, history, and various social groups (family, class, nation, religious, and professional community). Yet the main insight of Halbwachs remains the same: memory is primarily a social collective phenomenon, which means that one can only remember within a group.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nikulin2017,
  author = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  title = {Maurice Halbwachs},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {528--536}
}
O'Callaghan, J. Thomas Aquinas 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 461-469.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter will focus on two aspects of Aquinas' treatment of memory: its sources, primarily in Aristotle and Ibn Sina, and the distinctive position he takes on intellectual memory that he draws in partial opposition to Ibn Sina. Memory in the proper sense involves a corporeal faculty for the retention of temporally indexed sensible forms—temporally indexed particular sense information employed teleologically in the life of perfect animals. Sense memory is memory per se, while intellectual memory, a habitual state of knowledge in the incorporeal faculty of intellect, is only memory per accidens. The chapter will proceed in two stages, considering sense memory first and then intellectual memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{OCallaghan2017,
  author = {O'Callaghan, John},
  title = {Thomas Aquinas},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {461--469}
}
O'Loughlin, I. Learning without storing: Wittgenstein's cognitive science of learning and memory 2017 A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education
Springer, 601-614.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Education has recently been shaped by the cognitive science of memory. In turn, the science of memory has been infused by revolutionary ideas found in Wittgenstein's works. However, the memory science presently applied to education draws mainly on traditional models that are quickly becoming outmoded; Wittgenstein's insights have yet to be fruitfully applied, though they have helped to develop the science of memory. In this chapter, I examine three Wittgensteinian reforms in memory science as they pertain to education. First, Wittgenstein has inspired a particular strain of enactive models of memory and cognition, with important implications for theories of situated learning in education. Second, researchers have begun modeling memory as publicpractice, which deeply informs, inter alia, fraught theoretical discussions of assessment. Third, a number of memory researchers have rejected models based on a stored trace, a fundamental, Wittgensteinian revision with broad implications for characterizations of learning.
BibTeX:
@incollection{OLoughlin2017,
  author = {O'Loughlin, Ian},
  title = {Learning without storing: Wittgenstein's cognitive science of learning and memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {A Companion to Wittgenstein on Education},
  editor = {Peters, Michael A. and Stickney, Jeff},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {601--614},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3136-6_39},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-10-3136-639}
}
Olsson, E.J. Coherentism 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
New York, 310-322.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It is a fact of life that many of the information sources we consult in our daily occupations are not very reliable in themselves. This goes for what we experience through our senses, what other tell us, what we read in the news and, notoriously, on the Internet. In these cases, all we have to go on may be the extent to which the reports that we get from various sources agree or cohere. If they do cohere to a large extent we tend to think that the information is credible and that what is reported is probably true. So, if we read on a webpage of dubious credibility that there has been a robbery outside the Opera House in Stockholm and we overhear someone saying just this on the metro, only to be told so by a distant acquaintance, then we may start to think that there is probably something to it.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Olsson2017,
  author = {Olsson, Erik J.},
  title = {Coherentism},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {New York},
  pages = {310--322}
}
Perri, T. Henri Bergson 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 510-518.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In 1896, at the tail end of what has been referred to as a “golden age” for the study of memory (e.g., Schacter 2001: 88), Henri Bergson published his groundbreaking Matter and Memory: An Essay on the Relation of the Body to the Mind. In this book, Bergson proposes an integrated theory of multiple forms of memory that ultimately entails nothing less than a radical reconception of consciousness, the material world, and the terms of their relation. During Bergson's lifetime, this book was praised by such notable figures as William James (1920: 179), who described it as a work of “exquisite genius” that effects a Copernican revolution in philosophy akin to the critical turn made in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and Walter Benjamin (1969: 157), who described it as a “monumental” work that towers above other efforts that can be classified under the heading of the philosophy of life. In more recent years, the originality and significance of Bergson's philosophy of memory in particular has been recognized in fields as diverse as cognitive neuroscience, psychology, literary studies, and the interdisciplinary field of memory studies.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Perri2017,
  author = {Perri, Trevor},
  title = {Henri Bergson},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {510--518}
}
Perrin, D. and Michaelian, K. Memory as mental time travel 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 228-239.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] When Tulving (1972) first introduced the term, he defined episodic memory essentially as a specialized store devoted to information about the ‘what', ‘when', and ‘where' of experienced past events. Episodic memory thus contrasted both with nondeclarative memory, devoted in part to skills and habits, and, within the category of declarative memory, with semantic memory, devoted to general facts. This definition was broadly compatible with traditional analyses of what philosophers had referred to as recollective, experiential, or personal memory (Brewer 1996), including the popular causal theory (Martin and Deutscher 1966; Bernecker 2010). But semantic memory, too, is capable of storing information about the what, when, and where of events, and accumulating evidence of a tight relationship between the ability to remember the past and the ability to imagine the future subsequently led most psychologists (including Tulving 2002) to redefine episodic memory as a form of mental time travel (MTT) in which the subject imaginatively re-experiences past events, just as, in future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) he imaginatively ‘pre-experiences' future events (Michaelian et al. 2016; De Brigard, Chapter 10, this volume). It is unclear whether this new definition of episodic memory as mental time travel is compatible with traditional philosophical analyses, which assume that there is a deep difference between remembering the past and imagining the future. Empirical research within the MTT framework has revealed a wealth of commonalities between episodic memory and FMTT, leaving no doubt that there is some sort of tight relationship between them. But is it really the case, as the framework suggests, that the only important difference between episodic memory and FMTT is constituted by their distinct temporal orientations?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Perrin2017,
  author = {Perrin, Denis and Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Memory as mental time travel},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {228--239}
}
Le Poidevin, R. The arrow of mind 2017 Journal of Consciousness Studies
24(3-4), 112-126.
[URL
Abstract: Episodic memory provides a peculiarly intimate kind of access to our experiential past. Does this tell us anything about the nature of time, and in particular the basis of time's direction? This paper will argue that the causal theory of temporal direction enables us to unify a number of the key features of episodic memory: its being about particular past experiences, its reliable representation of experiences as past, and the derivative nature of this kind of access to the past: that is, what the memory is about, and how reliable it is, depends on the content and reliability of the original experience on which the memory is based.
BibTeX:
@article{Poidevin2017,
  author = {Le Poidevin, Robin},
  title = {The arrow of mind},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
  volume = {24},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {112--126},
  url = {http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/118421/}
}
Popa, E. Is future-oriented mental time travel inextricably linked to the self? 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4)
Elena Popa, 420-425.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Ganeri's [2018] discussion of mental time travel and the self focuses on remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of Ganeri's interpretation of three Buddhist views-by Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga. Is the scope of Ganeri's discussion confined to the past, or is there a stronger assumption that future thought always entails self-representation? I argue that if mental time travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both past and future thought should be possible independently of self-representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can be further contrasted on the basis of distinct ways of constructing past/future scenarios (field vs. observer perspective), modes of experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time travel (episodic vs. semantic memory). I further assess the compatibility of future-oriented thought with the three Buddhist views on the basis of these coordinates.
BibTeX:
@article{Popa2017,
  author = {Popa, Elena},
  title = {Is future-oriented mental time travel inextricably linked to the self?},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  publisher = {Elena Popa},
  pages = {420--425},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411147},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411147}
}
Ricci, V. G.W.F. Hegel 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 487-495.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Recollection and memory are not among the themes Hegel is mostly famous for. However, this does not mean that his discussion of recollection and memory cannot be of interest for a philosophical reflection on these topics. On the contrary, as I aim to show in this chapter, recollection in particular plays an important role within the system, although its significance has not always been recognized by the scholarship. This might be partially explained by the fact that there is no single systematic locus where Hegel discusses it: rather, recollection appears at several points within the system itself, usually crucial points of transition between different parts of it. A careful examination of such places can illuminate the vital role recollection plays for spirit's freedom and actualization and for the attainment of objective thought. Recollection, as I will show, is a key function in that it allows spirit to internalize the spatio-temporal determinateness of the content of its experience and to attain the stage of thought (in the Psychology) and the stage of the concept in its purity (in the transition between the Phenomenology and the Logic), that is, the content of experience that has been purified by its determinateness. In what follows, I present what I consider the three most important discussions of recollection and memory in Hegel's work, namely those we can find in the Psychology, the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the Logic. My aim is to illuminate the function of these concepts in Hegel's system and to show how this task can both support a better understanding of Hegel's philosophy as a whole and offer some insights to a general philosophical reflection on memory as such.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Ricci2017,
  author = {Ricci, Valentina},
  title = {G.W.F. Hegel},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {487--495}
}
Robbins, S.E. Analogical reminding and the storage of experience: The paradox of Hofstadter-Sander 2017 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
16(3), 355-385.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In their exhaustive study of the cognitive operation of analogy (Surfaces and Essences, 2013), Hofstadter and Sander arrive at a paradox: the creative and inexhaustible production of analogies in our thought must derive from a “reminding” operation based upon the availability of the detailed totality of our experience. Yet the authors see no way that our experience can be stored in the brain in such detail nor do they see how such detail could be accessed or retrieved such that the innumerable analogical remindings we experience can occur. Analogy creation, then, should not be possible. The intent here is to sharpen and deepen our understanding of the paradox, emphasizing its criticality. It will be shown that the retrieval problem has its origins in the failure of memory theory to recognize the actual dynamic structure of events (experience). This structure is comprised of invariance laws as per J. J. Gibson, and this event “invariance structure” is exactly what supports Hofstadter and Sander's missing mechanism for analogical reminding. Yet these structures of invariants, existing only over optical flows, auditory flows, haptic flows, etc., are equally difficult to imagine being stored in a static memory, and thus only exacerbate the problem of the storage of experience in the brain. A possible route to the solution of this dilemma, based in the radical model of Bergson, is also sketched.
BibTeX:
@article{Robbins2017,
  author = {Robbins, Stephen E.},
  title = {Analogical reminding and the storage of experience: The paradox of Hofstadter-Sander},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {16},
  number = {3},
  pages = {355--385},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9456-0},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-016-9456-0}
}
Robins, S.K. In defense of Vasubandhu's approach to episodic phenomenology 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 416-419.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Ganeri [2018] explores three Buddhist approaches to episodic memory and concludes in favor of Buddhaghosa's attentional account. When comparing it to Vasubandhu's, Ganeri argues that Buddhaghosa's is preferable because it does not over- intellectualize episodic memory. In my commentary, I argue that the intellectualism of Vasubandhu's approach (at least as presented by Ganeri) makes it both a more plausible account of episodic memory and a more successful strategy for addressing the precarious role of the self in this form of memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2017,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {In defense of Vasubandhu's approach to episodic phenomenology},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {416--419},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411148},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411148}
}
Robins, S.K. Contiguity and the causal theory of memory 2017 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
47(1), 1-19.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In Memory: A Philosophical Study, Bernecker argues for an account of contiguity. This Contiguity View is meant to solve relearning and prompting, wayward causation problems plaguing the causal theory of memory. I argue that Bernecker's Contiguity View fails in this task. Contiguity is too weak to prevent relearning and too strong to allow prompting. These failures illustrate a problem inherent in accounts of memory causation. Relearning and prompting are both causal relations, wayward only with respect to our interest in specifying remembering's requirements. Solving them requires saying more about remembering, not causation. I conclude by sketching such an account.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2017a,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Contiguity and the causal theory of memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {47},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--19},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1209964},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2016.1209964}
}
Robins, S.K. Memory traces 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 76-87.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory traces feature in nearly every account of memory. They appear as birds in Plato's aviaries and images in Locke's storeroom of ideas, as well as grooves in phonographic records, pictures in a gallery, and textual and digital archives in the vast library of the mind.1 The persistence of such metaphors reveals a long-standing commitment to the existence of memory traces as well as a lack of clarity about their nature. What are memory traces, and why does remembering appear to require them? I use these questions to guide the discussion below. Section 2 provides a survey of views about the nature and features of memory traces. Section 3 introduces four distinct arguments for the necessity of memory traces and the challenges that each account faces.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Robins2017b,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Memory traces},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {76--87}
}
Rowlands, M. Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science, and Autobiography 2017
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Rowlands2017,
  author = {Rowlands, Mark},
  title = {Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science, and Autobiography},
  year = {2017},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Sakuragi, S. On different concepts of experiential memory 2017 Journal of Philosophical Ideas
65s, 35-58.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The topic of this paper is two concepts of experiential memory. Experiential Memory is known to play an essential role in the Lockean memory theory of personal identity. I ague that we can distinguish two different forms of English expressions for experiential memory. The traditional circularity problem is due to its formulation by appeal to one of the two forms, ‘remember V-ing.' In my view, this is a mere linguistic coincidence in English. I show that the theory cannot be formulated in the same way in Japanese because Japanese has no corresponding memory expression. Meanwhile, I argue that the theory formulated by appeal to the other form, ‘remember the feeling,' is likely to remain insufficient, if not facing another circularity charge.
BibTeX:
@article{Sakuragi2017,
  author = {Sakuragi, Shin},
  title = {On different concepts of experiential memory},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of Philosophical Ideas},
  volume = {65s},
  pages = {35--58},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.15750/chss.65s.201708.002},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss.65s.201708.002}
}
Sallis, J. The span of memory: On Plato's Theaetetus 2017 Epoché
21(2), 321-333.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This interpretation directed at certain passages in Plato's Theaetetus explicates the close relation that the dialogue establishes between memory, thought, and speech. It shows that all of these means contribute to the soul's capacity to stretch beyond mere perceptions. The interpretation also shows that comedic elements play a major role in the dialogue, most notably, in the well-known passage that purportedly explains knowledge and memory by means of the image of birds flying about in an aviary. Through close examination of the relevant passages, the interpretation shows that the Theaetetus is not aporetic but rather achieves a positive advance that prepares the way for the Sophist.
BibTeX:
@article{Saliis2017,
  author = {Sallis, John},
  title = {The span of memory: On Plato's Theaetetus},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Epoché},
  volume = {21},
  number = {2},
  pages = {321--333},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche201722778},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=epoche20170021000203210333&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Schuback, M.S.C. Memory in exile 2017 Research in Phenomenology
47(2), 175-189.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this article, a discussion about memory in exile is presented that takes up the thesis that exile is a condition of post-existence and afterness. The main claim is that exile is not only existence after a cut and separation but is an existing as afterness, in a “present tension” of being with the without and without a with. It reveals a sense of the present and of presence as multi-directed movements, as clusters of echoes and delayings. In exile, memories are not the continuous simultaneity of double images but are rather “photisms,” shimmering between images, the coming and going between languages, experiences, a longing back and forth. Exilic memory is the experience that bears wit- ness to the present as the movement of presencing, of appearing while sliding away.
BibTeX:
@article{Schuback2017,
  author = {Schuback, Marcia Sá Cavalcante},
  title = {Memory in exile},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Research in Phenomenology},
  volume = {47},
  number = {2},
  pages = {175--189},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341364},
  url = {https://brill.com/abstract/journals/rip/47/2/article-p1752.xml}
}
Schwab, M. Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 496-509.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In a volume on theories of memory, psychoanalysis is of interest for its idea of unconscious memory. Unconscious memory is different from many other familiar forms in five important respects: (1) A sharp line separates structural or systemic memory from historical memory. (2) What is remembered is inaccessible to ordinary remembering consciousness, accessible only after an unfamiliar reconstruction. (3) Remembrances are unrecognizable as to that they recollect, and what they recollect. (4) Unconscious memory is an agential power of its own, recalling itself to the subject after equally unconscious formative processes (repression, displacement). (5) The psychic forces and agencies participating in remembering articulate the remembrances in figural representation (metaphor, metonymy, staging, iconicity). Psychoanalysis provides the theory and the practice of transforming unconscious memory into conscious memory. The ability to decipher and bring to consciousness what was out of reach for remembrance, and the curative power of this transformation are integral parts in the ascription of unconscious memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Schwab2017,
  author = {Schwab, Martin},
  title = {Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {496--509}
}
Senor, T.D. Preservation and generation 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 323-334.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Preservationism is the thesis that, generally speaking, a memory belief's justification is a function of the epistemic status it had when it was initially formed. Closely related to preservationism is the claim that memory is not an epistemically generative process. In this chapter, I shall argue for preservationism and for the view that memory is not typically epistemically generative. I begin by considering the nature of epistemic generation and its relation to memory, and proceed to argue that preservationism is supported by these theoretical considerations. While our discussion will reveal that memory can be generative both doxastically and epistemically, it is nevertheless primarily best conceived as an epistemically preservative psychological process.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Senor2017,
  author = {Senor, Thomas D.},
  title = {Preservation and generation},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {323--334}
}
Siegel, S. and Silins, N. The structure of episodic memory: Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention' 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 374-394.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts a Buddhist denial of persisting or even momentary selves. Our paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's[2018] ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention', and we focus on his exploration of Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. In particular, we distinguish between memory perspectives on the past and memory relations that may or may not be successfully borne to the past. We also critically examine 3 ways of trying to cash out what is distinctive about episodic memory: (1) episodic memory as mental time travel, (2) episodic memory as reliving of the past, and (3) episodic memory as reflective attention to the past.
BibTeX:
@article{Siegel2017,
  author = {Siegel, Susanna and Silins, Nicholas},
  title = {The structure of episodic memory: Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {374--394},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411153},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411153}
}
Smart, P., Clowes, R.W. and Heersmink, R. Minds online: The interface between web science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind 2017 Foundations and Trends in Web Science
6(1-2), 1-232.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Alongside existing research into the social, political and eco- nomic impacts of the Web, there is a need to study the Web from a cognitive and epistemic perspective. This is particu- larly so as new and emerging technologies alter the nature of our interactive engagements with the Web, transforming the extent to which our thoughts and actions are shaped by the online environment. Situated and ecological approaches to cognition are relevant to understanding the cognitive sig- nificance of the Web because of the emphasis they place on forces and factors that reside at the level of agent–world in- teractions. In particular, by adopting a situated or ecological approach to cognition, we are able to assess the significance of the Web from the perspective of research into embodied, extended, embedded, social and collective cognition. The results of this analysis help to reshape the interdisciplinary configuration of Web Science, expanding its theoretical and empirical remit to include the disciplines of both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.
BibTeX:
@article{Smart2017,
  author = {Smart, Paul and Clowes, Robert W. and Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {Minds online: The interface between web science, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Foundations and Trends in Web Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {1--232},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1561/1800000026},
  url = {http://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/WEB-026}
}
Smart, P., Heersmink, R. and Clowes, R.W. The cognitive ecology of the internet 2017 Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice
Springer, 251-282.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this chapter, we analyze the relationships between the Internet and its users in terms of situated cognitionCognition theory. We first argue that the Internet is a new kind of cognitiveCognitive ecology ecologyEcology , providing almost constant access to a vast amount of digital information that is increasingly more integrated into our cognitive routines. We then briefly introduce situated cognition theory and its species of embedded, embodied, extended, distributed and collective cognition. Having thus set the stage, we begin by taking an embedded cognition view and analyze how the Internet aids certain cognitive tasks. After that, we conceptualize how the Internet enables new kinds of embodied interactionInteraction , extends certain aspects of our embodiment, and examine how wearable technologies that monitor physiological, behavioral and contextual states transform the embodied self. On the basis of the degree of cognitive integrationIntegration between a user and Internet resource, we then look at how and when the Internet extends our cognitive processes. We end this chapter with a discussion of distributed and collective cognition as facilitated by the Internet.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Smart2017a,
  author = {Smart, Paul and Heersmink, Richard and Clowes, Robert W.},
  title = {The cognitive ecology of the internet},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {Cognition Beyond the Brain: Computation, Interactivity and Human Artifice},
  editor = {Cowley, S. J. and Vallée-Tourangeau, F.},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {251--282},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49115-8_13},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-49115-813}
}
Spohn, W. The epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness 2017 Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
4, 359-418.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper deals with the epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness in probabilistic terms. after explicitly stating the underlying algebraic or propositional framework, it proposes two rules of probability change through our inner sense of time and generally describes how conditionaliza-tion works with respect to indexical information. It suggests a rule for rearranging beliefs after forgetting (and other unfavorable epistemic changes). after rehearsing standard auto-epistemology in terms of the reflection principle and its consequences , it moreover studies the auto-epistemology of those non-standard epistemological changes. thus, it generalizes the reflection principle to the indexical case and to an even more general version that is free from the informal restrictions that are commonly assumed. all these principles are illustrated with various examples: the prisoner , the new riddle of induction, Sleeping Beauty, and finally Shangri-La.
BibTeX:
@article{Spohn2017,
  author = {Spohn, Wolfgang},
  title = {The epistemology and auto-epistemology of temporal self-location and forgetfulness},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {4},
  pages = {359--418},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.013},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.013 http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.12405314.0004.013}
}
Taber, J. The self and what lies beyond the self: Remarks on Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention' 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 395-405.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I believe that Jonardon Ganeri, in his essay ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention' together with his book The Self, develops a plausible and attractive account of the self as a mere ‘sense of ownership' that accompanies our experiences or a ‘discrete cognitive system whose function is to implicate the self in the content of memory,' but which needn't refer to anything. Objections that might be raised from a (Galen-) Strawsonian perspective are not, I believe, decisive. Nevertheless, even though Ganeri makes ingenious use of Indian sources in working out this proposal, he chooses not to discuss what I take to be the most intriguing idea of Indian philosophers about the self. Philosophers from various Indian traditions argue that the ‘self' as ordinarily experienced, that is, the finite ‘living' self consisting of the body and cognitive and emotional faculties, is not what one really is. Rather, there is a reality beyond this self, which emerges when one steps away from or ‘abandons' it. I suggest that an experience of this higher or ‘true' Self or (according to those who reject that there is a self in any sense) reality that lies beyond the self (which, however, replaces the finite living self when it is abandoned) could still be accommodated within a naturalistic framework. ART
BibTeX:
@article{Taber2017,
  author = {Taber, John},
  title = {The self and what lies beyond the self: Remarks on Ganeri's 'Mental time travel and attention'},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {395--405},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411149},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411149}
}
Teroni, F. The phenomenology of memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 21-33.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The most salient aspect of memory is its role in preserving previously acquired information so as to make it available for further activities. Anna realizes that something is amiss in a book on Roman history because she learned and remembers that Caesar was murdered. Max returns to the party and remembers where he was seated, allowing him to retrieve his lost cell phone. The fact that information is not gained anew distinguishes memory from perception. The fact that information is preserved distinguishes memory from imagination. But how do acquisition and retrieval of information contribute to the phenomenology of memory?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Teroni2017,
  author = {Teroni, Fabrice},
  title = {The phenomenology of memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {21--33}
}
Thakchoe, S. Candrakīrti on deflated episodic memory: Response to Endel Tulving's challenge 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 432-438.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In my response to Ganeri's [2018] paper, I take Buddhagosha'sdeflationary account of episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakırti (ca. 570-640) who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakırti deflates episodic memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrantika-Yogacara's thesis that episodic memory requires the admission of reflexive awareness. Also unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakırti shows the incoherence of the Mima msaka-Naiyayika's self- implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulving's challenge to the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that Candrakırti may have even greater success in deflating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory. ART
BibTeX:
@article{Thakchoe2017,
  author = {Thakchoe, Sonam},
  title = {Candrakīrti on deflated episodic memory: Response to Endel Tulving's challenge},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {432--438},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411150},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411150}
}
Vallega-Neu, D. Disseminating time: Durations, configurations, and chance 2017 Research in Phenomenology
47, 1-18.
[DOI]  
Abstract: This essay addresses time's dissemination both in the sense of an undoing or fracturing of unifying conceptions of time, as well as in the sense of ‘scattering seeds' by conceiv- ing of manifold temporalizing configurations of living beings, things, and events with- out an overarching sense of time. After a consideration of traditional conceptions of time, this essay explores the notion of duration in Bergson in order to make it fruitful for thinking duration without centering it in human consciousness. The author sug- gests that we can begin to think the temporal happening of things and events in terms of different temporal configurations of various degrees and qualities of complexity that may be occasioned by chance, whereby chance is understood as the freeing of time-spaces of indeterminacy in which temporal configurations take shape or mani- fest themselves.
BibTeX:
@article{Vallega-Neu2017,
  author = {Vallega-Neu, Daniela},
  title = {Disseminating time: Durations, configurations, and chance},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Research in Phenomenology},
  volume = {47},
  pages = {1--18},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341353}
}
von Petersdorff, F. Aspects of mental time travel within historical research 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 444-449.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Although the concept of mental time travel refers to autonoetic consciousness (that is, consciousness of one's own past), I argue that it should prove worthwhile to analyse the apparent similarities between mental time travel and historical operations undertaken by historians in their attempt to understand the autonoetic consciousness of historical agents. I, therefore, analyse arguments presented by R.G. Collingwood as well as by Paul Ricœur, and then reconsider the result hereof within the context of Jonardon Ganeri's [2018] analysis of mental time travel, thereby intending to further outline the scope and the limits of the concept of mental time travel. ART
BibTeX:
@article{VonPetersdorff2017,
  author = {von Petersdorff, Friedrich},
  title = {Aspects of mental time travel within historical research},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {444--449},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411146},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411146}
}
Vukov, J. Enduring questions and the ethics of memory blunting 2017 Journal of the American Philosophical Association
3(02), 227-246.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.
BibTeX:
@article{Vukov2017,
  author = {Vukov, Joseph},
  title = {Enduring questions and the ethics of memory blunting},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
  volume = {3},
  number = {02},
  pages = {227--246},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.23},
  url = {https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2053447717000239/type/journalarticle}
}
Wagoner, B. Frederic Bartlett 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 537-545.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Frederic Bartlett is widely credited with the insight that remembering is a reconstructive process, and that social factors play a principle role in it. These arguments were forcefully advanced in his classic book Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (1932/1995). In this work, he set his approach in contrast to that of Hermann Ebbinghaus's (1885/1913) Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Psychology, the other major classic in the psychology of memory. Whereas Ebbinghaus treated memory as a self-contained faculty for retaining bits of information, Bartlett saw it as a creative and situated activity that was closely tied to imagination (see also De Brigard, Chapter 10, this volume). These differences led Bartlett to adopt an opposing experimental methodology for studying remembering and to emphasize characteristics of it in his theory that Ebbinghaus had ignored, such as meaning, context and social relations. In this chapter, I discuss the key features of Bartlett's approach to remembering and in so doing contextualize them within his time as well as some present-day theorizing. For an extended explication of Bartlett's theory, its development and appropriation by others readers should consult The Constructive Mind: Frederic Bartlett's Psychology in Reconstruction (Wagoner 2017a). The present chapter begins by describing the context and rationale for his seminal 'experiments on remembering' from which he later developed his celebrated theory. It then proceeds to outline Bartlett's reconstructive theory of remembering mainly through an analysis of his well-known concept of schema and how the memory researchers that followed him have transformed it from his time until the present day. Finally, the chapter highlights the often-neglected social aspects of his theory in order to show that Bartlett aimed to develop an integrated sociocultural and psychological approach to remembering.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Wagoner2017,
  author = {Wagoner, Brady},
  title = {Frederic Bartlett},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {537--545}
}
Weir, R. Implying a self and implying my self 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4), 439-443.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Ganeri's [2018] article considers three distinct Buddhist accounts of episodic memory to see whether they are able to give a coherent conception of memory while defusing the weight of the self-implication requirement, which he associates most strongly with Endel Tulving's work on episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness. The aim of this commentary is not to consider whether they are successful in this task, but rather to argue that the task itself is unnecessary. Despite the undeniable strengths of Tulving's position, not only does it appear to offer a far too literal account of episodic memory as a form of mental time travel, but the specific version of the self-implication requirement that Tulving appears to affirm confuses the fact that a self is implicated in episodic memory with the idea that episodic memory always implicates myself, in the sense of the one who is having the memory. ART
BibTeX:
@article{Weir2017,
  author = {Weir, Richard},
  title = {Implying a self and implying my self},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  pages = {439--443},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411151},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411151}
}
Werning, M. and Cheng, S. Taxonomy and unity of memory 2017 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory
Routledge, 7-20.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the most general way of speaking, people use the noun “memory” to refer to instances where information of the past is made available for present purposes. In this minimal sense the rings of trees are memories of the climatic conditions in the seasonal succession of years during certain periods of the past. The characteristic features of tree rings make available this information for the present purposes of dendrologists. Likewise, hieroglyphs inside the Cheops pyramid make information about political events in the lifetime of the pharaoh Cheops available to Egyptologists and can justly be called memories of that time. Making available information of the past for present purposes is also the function of certain psychological states of humans and animals that we refer to by the noun “memory.” For the psychological domain, in English, we also have the verb “remember” along with the verbs “recall” and “recollect” (as well as less frequently used or more remotely related verbs like “reminisce,” “memorize,” “commemorate,” “think of”). The usages of the three verbs differ slightly, but—at least, most of the time—refer to instances of memory. Syntactically speaking, the verb “remember” alone can figure in a great variety of grammatical constructions taking noun phrases and that-clauses or interrogative (wh-)clauses as well as infinitival and gerundival constructions as dependent arguments
BibTeX:
@incollection{Werning2017,
  author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen},
  title = {Taxonomy and unity of memory},
  year = {2017},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory},
  editor = {Bernecker, Sven and Michaelian, Kourken},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {7--20}
}
Zahavi, D. Ownership, memory, attention: Commentary on Ganeri 2017 Australasian Philosophical Review
1(4)
Dan Zahavi, 406-415.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In my discussion of Ganeri's[2018] article, I first examine the sense of ownership: Is it post-hoc, backwards directed, and past-oriented? I then consider whether episodic memory, understood as a form of past-directed attention, has to be supplemented by another cognitive mechanism to allow for a sense of ownership, or whether attention in and of itself exemplifies a type of I-consciousness. In the final and most extensive part of my commentary, I discuss whether Ganeri is right in suggesting that a reflexivist account of the subjectivity of experience commits one to a form of solipsism.
BibTeX:
@article{Zahavi2017,
  author = {Zahavi, Dan},
  title = {Ownership, memory, attention: Commentary on Ganeri},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Australasian Philosophical Review},
  volume = {1},
  number = {4},
  publisher = {Dan Zahavi},
  pages = {406--415},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411152},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rapr20 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24740500.2017.1411152}
}
Aho, T. Descartes's intellectual memory 2016 Rivista di storia della filosofia
71(2), 195-219.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Descartes distinguishes between sensory memory and intellectual memory. The author argues that sensory memory resembles the transmission of information in classical Aristotelian theory, whereas Descartes' intellectual memory, which has often been found puzzling, has analogues in other late scholastic ideas. He seems to use the term 'intellectual memory' in several related senses. It can refer to the recollection of symbolic messages, or it can refer to remembering of meanings, mastery of language. However, the term also has a different use: according to the author, intellectual memory takes care of the remembering subject's own states, in other words, reflective memory. Such a view had its origin in the thought of Scotus, and in Descartes's time it was well-known and popular. It is argued that Descarte's version of the intellectual memory underscores especially the nature of «spiritual memory» as something maintaining the continuous unity of consciousness.
BibTeX:
@article{Aho2016,
  author = {Aho, Tuomo},
  title = {Descartes's intellectual memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Rivista di storia della filosofia},
  volume = {71},
  number = {2},
  pages = {195--219},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3280/SF2016-002002},
  url = {http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/SchedaRiviste.asp?IDArticolo=56872}
}
Brough, J.B. Some reflections on time and the ego in Husserl's late texts on time-consciousness 2016 Quaestiones Disputatae
7(1), 89-108.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Time- consciousness made its appearance in Husserl's thought in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century in analyses that were notably silent on the issue of the ego. The ego itself made its debut in the Ideas in 1913,1 but without an account of its relationship to time. Husserl described timeconsciousness, particularly what he called the absolute time- constituting fl ow of consciousness, as perhaps the most important matter in all of phenomenology. He also came to view phenomenology as centered on the study of the ego understood as transcendental subjectivity. It was not until the last years of his life, however, in his late writings on timeconsciousness collected as the C-manuscripts, that Husserl made a serious effort to work out the connections between these two themes. The point of this essay is to examine how Husserl sought to understand the relation between the ego and temporal awareness in the C-manuscripts. I will argue that in these late texts, Husserl preserves and deepens his early understanding of the absolute fl ow of time- consciousness but that he also attempts to show how the fl ow is interwoven with the ego's constitution of itself and of the world. Time- consciousness plays a role on every level of egological constitution. At the same time, egological constitution contributes to the consciousness of time, and particularly to the constitution of the Husserlian monad, the ego understood not simply as the bare pole from which conscious acts radiate but in its full concreteness as embracing its unique individual history.
BibTeX:
@article{Brough2016,
  author = {Brough, John B.},
  title = {Some reflections on time and the ego in Husserl's late texts on time-consciousness},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {89--108},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167116},
  url = {https://muse.jhu.edu/article/650594 http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=qd20160007000100890108&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Bublitz, J.C., Dresler, M., Kuehn, S. and Repantis, D. Who controls the past controls the future: Reconsolidating concerns over memory manipulations 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 247-249.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The ethical and legal debate about manipulating memories is still in its infancy and has to catch up with advances in mem- ory research. We support the quest by Elsey and Kindt (2016) to ground ethical debates in empirical science rather than “pure intuition or imagination” (228) and commend their insightful empirical work. However, just as ethics has to be cognizant of empirical science, the panoply of ethical con- cerns has to be recognized. The authors seek to dismiss wor- ries about pharmacologically manipulating the emotional valence of memories, but are only partially successful as they brush over important parts too quickly. Ethical problems run deeper, and persuasive refutations require fully appreciating them first. For this, imagination is a valuable tool of the humanities that affords elucidating intuitions and articulating them more precisely. A clearer grasp of problems also allows, as we indicate, generating novel research questions. Imagina- tion is a start, not an endpoint, of bioethical discourse.
BibTeX:
@article{Bublitz2016,
  author = {Bublitz, Jan Christoph and Dresler, Martin and Kuehn, Simone and Repantis, Dimitris},
  title = {Who controls the past controls the future: Reconsolidating concerns over memory manipulations},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {247--249},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251992},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251992}
}
Bugeja, A. Forgetting your scruples 2016 Philosophical Studies
173(11), 2889-2911.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: It can sound absurd to report that you have forgotten a moral truth. Described cases in which people who have lost moral beliefs exhibit the behavioural and phenomenological symptoms of forgetting can seem similarly absurd. I examine these phenomena, and evaluate a range of hypotheses that might be offered to explain them. These include the following proposals: that it is hard to forget moral truths because they are believed on the basis of intuition; that moral forgetting seems puzzling for the same reason that forgetting what you approve or disapprove of seems puzzling; and that moral truths matter too much to us to be easily forgotten. I conclude that the best explanation for the phenomena is a non-cognitivist one: moral forgetting seems puzzling because moral judgements are attitudes of a sort that cannot be lost through forgetting (e.g. desires).
BibTeX:
@article{Bugeja2016,
  author = {Bugeja, Adam},
  title = {Forgetting your scruples},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {173},
  number = {11},
  pages = {2889--2911},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0642-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0642-2}
}
Burkell, J.A. Remembering me: big data, individual identity, and the psychological necessity of forgetting 2016 Ethics and Information Technology
18(1), 17-23.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Each of us has a personal narrative: a story that defines us, and one that we tell about ourselves to our inner and outer worlds. A strong sense of identity is rooted in a personal narrative that has coherence and correspondence (Conway in J Mem Lang 53:594–628, 2005): coherence in the sense that the story we tell is consistent with and supportive of our current version of ‘self'; and correspondence in the sense that the story reflects the contents of autobiographical memory and the meaning of our experiences. These goals are achieved by a reciprocal interaction of autobiographical memory and the self, in which memories consistent with the self-image are reinforced, in turn strengthening the self-image they reflect. Thus, personal narratives depend crucially on the malleable nature of autobiographical memory: a strong sense of self requires that one remember what matters, and forget what does not. Today, anyone who is active online generates a highly detailed, ever—expanding, and permanent digital biographical ‘memory'—memory that identifies where we go, what we say, who we see, and what we do in increasing detail as our physical lives become more and more enmeshed with electronic devices capable of recording our communications, online activities, movements, and even bodily functions. This paper explores the consequences of this digital record for identity, arguing that it presents a challenge to our ability to construct our own personal narratives–narratives that are central to a sense of ‘self'. In the end, the ‘right to be forgotten' may be, above all else, a psychological necessity that is core to identity—and therefore a value that we must ensure is protected. textcopyright 2016, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
BibTeX:
@article{Burkell2016,
  author = {Burkell, Jacquelyn Ann},
  title = {Remembering me: big data, individual identity, and the psychological necessity of forgetting},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Ethics and Information Technology},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {17--23},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9393-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10676-016-9393-1}
}
Cabrera, L.Y. and Elger, B.S. Memory interventions in the criminal justice system: Some practical ethical considerations 2016 Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
13(1), 95-103.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In recent years, discussion around memory modification interventions hasbackslashngained attention. However, discussion around the use of memorybackslashninterventions in the criminal justice system has been mostly absent. Inbackslashnthis paper we start by highlighting the importance memory has for humanbackslashnwell-being and personal identity, as well as its role within thebackslashncriminal forensic setting; in particular, for claiming and acceptingbackslashnlegal responsibility, for moral learning, and for retribution. Webackslashnprovide examples of memory interventions that are currently availablebackslashnfor medical purposes, but that in the future could be used in thebackslashnforensic setting to modify criminal offenders' memories. In this sectionbackslashnwe contrast the cases of (1) dampening and (2) enhancing memories ofbackslashncriminal offenders. We then present from a pragmatic approach somebackslashnpressing ethical issues associated with these types of memorybackslashninterventions. The paper ends up highlighting how these pragmaticbackslashnconsiderations can help establish ethically justified criteria regardingbackslashnthe possibility of interventions aimed at modifying criminal offenders'backslashnmemories.
BibTeX:
@article{Cabrera2016,
  author = {Cabrera, Laura Y. and Elger, Bernice S.},
  title = {Memory interventions in the criminal justice system: Some practical ethical considerations},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Bioethical Inquiry},
  volume = {13},
  number = {1},
  pages = {95--103},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-015-9680-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11673-015-9680-2}
}
Cacciatore, G. Time, narration, memory: Paul Ricoeur's theory of history 2016 The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas
Springer, 167-173.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The theme of the historical experience of the finite man is what allows Paul Ricoeur to complete a long journey that, from the original agreement with a strictly eidetic phenomenology—through the analysis of the will and its sensible and corporeal instincts—leads him to a life's hermeneutics that is firstly the understanding of “ontological deficiency”, as the basic trait of the human will's being, of its passions, of its fallibility and continuous exposure to guilt. But Ricoeurian hermeneutics starts from the refusal of every abstract absolutism of the spirit and of its forms, as well as of a similarly abstract idea of the universal essence of the human. And it's along this process that the further moving of perspective occurs towards the hermeneutics of a text, that becomes objective in the story and in its writing and, even more, in the world and in its stories.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Cacciatore2016,
  author = {Cacciatore, Giuseppe},
  title = {Time, narration, memory: Paul Ricoeur's theory of history},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas},
  editor = {Santoianni, Flavia},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {167--173},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_19},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-019}
}
Carter, J.A. and Kallestrup, J. Extended cognition and propositional memory 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
92(3), 691-714.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to ‘extended-memory cases' (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in backslashS1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call ‘the epistemic parity principle'. In backslashS2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in backslashS3 several lines of response.
BibTeX:
@article{Carter2016,
  author = {Carter, J. Adam and Kallestrup, Jesper},
  title = {Extended cognition and propositional memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  volume = {92},
  number = {3},
  pages = {691--714},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12157},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12157}
}
Chakrabarti, A. Remembering Matilal on remembering 2016 Sophia
55(4), 459-476.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Although memory is pivotal to consciousness and without it no perceptual judgment or thinking is possible, Nyāya epistemology does not accept memory as a knowledge source (pramāņa). Prof Matilal elucidates and defends Udayana's justification for calling into question the knowledgehood or even truth of any recollection. Deepening Matilal's argument, this paper first shows why, if a remembering reproduces exactly the original experience from which it borrows its truth-claim, then there is a mismatch between the time of experience and the time of recall and the remembering ends up being false. To correct that error, if we change the tense in the content of recollection, the added past-ness goes beyond the original experience and violates the purely reproductive nature of memory. The paper ends by responding to this Nyāya position using arguments from Dvaita Vedānta and Jaina epistemology where remembering can be veridical and memory is accepted as an important knowledge source. The additional element of past-ness (a sense of “back-then”) cannot be derived from sense perception. It has to be a spontaneous contribution of the inner sense.
BibTeX:
@article{Chakrabarti2016,
  author = {Chakrabarti, Arindam},
  title = {Remembering Matilal on remembering},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Sophia},
  volume = {55},
  number = {4},
  pages = {459--476},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0559-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11841-016-0559-4}
}
Cheng, S., Werning, M. and Suddendorf, T. Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel 2016 Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
60, 82-89.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.
BibTeX:
@article{Cheng2016,
  author = {Cheng, Sen and Werning, Markus and Suddendorf, Thomas},
  title = {Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews},
  volume = {60},
  pages = {82--89},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.011},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0149763415301603}
}
Cheng, S. and Werning, M. What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind? 2016 Synthese
193(5), 1345-1385.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Colloquially, episodic memory is described as “the memory of personally experienced events”. Even though episodic memory has been studied in psychology and neuroscience for about six decades, there is still great uncertainty as to what episodic memory is. Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode that allows for a mnemonic simulation thereof.We call our analysis the Sequence Analysis of EpisodicMemory since episodes will be analyzed in terms of sequences of events. Our philosophical analysis of episodic memory is driven and supported by experimental results from psychology and neuroscience.We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along three cornerstones: First, psychological evidence suggests that a violation of any of the proposed conditions for episodic memory amounts to a deficiency of episodic memory and no form of memory or cognitive process but episodic memory fulfills them. Second, empirical results support a claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Finally, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Cheng2016a,
  author = {Cheng, Sen and Werning, Markus},
  title = {What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {193},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1345--1385},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0628-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-014-0628-6}
}
Christensen, W., Sutton, J. and McIlwain, D. Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience 2016 Mind & Language
31(1), 37-66.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We present a synthetic theory of skilled action which proposes that cog- nitive processes make an important contribution to almost all skilled action, contrary to influential views that many skills are performed largely automatically. Cognitive control is focused on strategic aspects of performance, and plays a greater role as difficulty increases. We offer an analysis of various forms of skill experience and show that the theory pro- vides a better explanation for the full set of these experiences than automatic theories. We further show that the theory can explain experimental evidence for skill automaticity, including evidence that secondary tasks do not interfere with expert performance, and evidence that experts have reduced memory for performance of sensorimotor skills.
BibTeX:
@article{Christensen2016,
  author = {Christensen, Wayne and Sutton, John and McIlwain, Doris},
  title = {Cognition in skilled action: Meshed control and the varieties of skill experience},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Mind & Language},
  volume = {31},
  number = {1},
  pages = {37--66},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12094},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/mila.12094}
}
Chung, S.H. and Greenbaum, D. Memories: More dangerous than the real thing? 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 251-253.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] James Elsey and Merel Kindt (2016) raise a number of bioethical concerns associated with the manipulation of memories via pharmaceuticals and/or behavioral therapy. However, the authors failed to include a very relevant discussion on the use of emerging virtual reality (VR) technologies in therapy (North and North 2016), particularly their use in manipulating memories (Segovia and Bailenson 2009); early clinical studies have already demonstrated the promise of virtual reality in treating a variety of mental ill- ness ranging fromautismto anxieties (Gorini and Riva 2014).
BibTeX:
@article{Chung2016,
  author = {Chung, Seung Hyun and Greenbaum, Dov},
  title = {Memories: More dangerous than the real thing?},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {251--253},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244219},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244219}
}
Clowes, R.W. and Mendonça, D. Representation redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind? 2016 New Ideas in Psychology
40, 26-47.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The last fifteen years have seen a sea change in cognitive science where issues of embodiment, situatedness and dynamics have become central to the explanatory resources in use. [U+2028]This paper evaluates the suggestion that representation should be eliminated from the explanative vocabulary of cognitive science. We trace the history of the issue by examining the usefulness of action-oriented representation (AOR), and we reassess if there is still a good explanatory role for the notion of representation in contemporary cognitive science by looking at contexts of re-use, contexts of informational fusion and elaboration, contexts of virtualist perception, and contexts of representational extension, restructuring and substitution. We claim that in these contexts the notion of representation continues to fulfill a valuable function in linking the inner informational economy of cognitive systems to how they interact and couple with the world, and that the role of representation in explanation has not been superseded by enactive and radical embodied theories of cognition. The final section of the paper suggests that we might be better off adopting a more pluralist research perspective, accepting that certain branches of cognitive science seem to require the positing of representations in order to develop, whereas others (e.g. research into minimal cognitive systems), do not appear to require it. We conclude that trying to suppress the notion of representation in all areas of cognitive science is seriously misguided.
BibTeX:
@article{Clowes2016,
  author = {Clowes, Robert W. and Mendonça, Dina},
  title = {Representation redux: Is there still a useful role for representation to play in the context of embodied, dynamicist and situated theories of mind?},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {New Ideas in Psychology},
  volume = {40},
  pages = {26--47},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015.03.002},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0732118X15000203}
}
Dalla Barba, G. Temporal consciousness and confabulation: When mental time travel takes the wrong track 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 119-134.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Mental time travel (MTT), including future mental time travel, does not exist stricto sensu. This might appear a provocative statement since “MTT” is largely used in the literature, but the term is actually misused. To travel means to move from one place to another place. Pierre, for example, travels from Paris to Venice. When Pierre arrives in Venice, he is no longer in Paris, but in Venice. He then plans to go to Florence, but he is not in Florence, he is still in Venice. In this example, Paris is Pierre's past and Florence his future. He remembers having been in Paris and he is waiting to go to Florence, but his present consists in being in Venice. When Pierre thinks about having been in Paris, he is not traveling to Paris, as he is not traveling to Florence when he thinks that he will go to Florence in the near future.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DallaBarba2016,
  author = {Dalla Barba, Gianfranco},
  title = {Temporal consciousness and confabulation: When mental time travel takes the wrong track},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {119--134}
}
De Brigard, F. and Gessell, B.S. Time is not of the essence 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 153-179.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The precise relationship between memory and imagination has been a matter of debate for centuries (e.g., Aristotle [Barnes, 1984]; Hobbes, 1668; Hume, 1739; Russell, 1921). But at no time has this debate seen a more remarkable development than in the last two decades, as numerous behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies have consistently shown that our capacity to remember episodes that occurred in the past and our ability to imagine possible events that may occur in the future are profoundly intertwined. Although somewhat cautiously, many of these results have been interpreted as providing evidence in favor of the view that episodic memory (i.e., our capacity to remember past personal events) and episodic future thinking (i.e., our ability to imagine possible future personal events) (Atance & O'Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010) should be seen as two operations of a single cognitive system that enables “mental time travel” (MTT) (Tulving, 1985): the allegedly uniquely human psychological capacity through which we “mentally project ourselves in time” by entertaining mental simulations of events whose contents are either about the past or about the future (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997). According to this perspective, then, the psychological system for MTT operates upon representations with temporal or “tensed” contents. This view naturally leads to the hypothesis that it is the temporal nature of the content of the mental simulations involved in the aforementioned results that accounts for the common engagement of neural mechanisms during episodic memory and future thinking. Time, as it were, is thought to be of the essence.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeBrigard2016,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe and Gessell, Bryce S.},
  title = {Time is not of the essence},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {153--179}
}
Debus, D. Temporal perspectives in imagination 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 217-240.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Contemporary experimental psychologists and neuroscientists have recently set out to organize some of their work around a new experimental paradigm, the paradigm of “mental time travel.” The central idea of this new and important work is the insight that human beings can be aware of, and can direct their attention toward, both the past and the future— in memory and in foresight, respectively— and that there might be important similarities between both those ways of being aware of, and directing our attention toward, events, processes, states of affairs, and objects that are not present at the time of the relevant mental occurrence, but that instead lie in the past or the future.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Debus2016,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {Temporal perspectives in imagination},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {217--240}
}
Debus, D. Imagination and memory 2016 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
Routledge, 135-148.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] All healthy human beings are, from an early age onwards, able to imagine and to remember things. Imaginings and memories occur regularly and frequently, and they play important roles in our daily lives. Imaginings and memories also seem closely related to each other. Indeed, Hobbes claims that “imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations has diverse names” (Hobbes 1991, 16). This seems a fairly radical position, and is not a position that will be defended here. However, the fact that Hobbes is prepared to make such a radical claim indicates that at the very least, there must be some strong and important similarities and links between imagination and memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Debus2016a,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {Imagination and memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination},
  editor = {Kind, Amy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {135--148}
}
de Warren, N. Augustine and Husserl on time and memory 2016 Quaestiones Disputatae
7(1), 7-46.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between Augustine's and Husserl's conceptions of time, consciousness, and memory. Although Husserl claims to provide a phenomenological understanding of the paradox of time so famously formulated by Augustine in his Confessions, this paper explores the apparent similarities between Augustine's concept of distentio animi and the Husserlian concept of inner timeconsciousness against their more profound differences. At stake in this confrontation between Augustine and Husserl is a fundamental divergence in the sense of time as the movement of transcendence in immanence. Within this discussion, the contrast between speaking time (rhetoric) and seeing time (perception), time and eternity, and contrasting notions of the past and future are explored.
BibTeX:
@article{DeWarren2016,
  author = {de Warren, Nicolas},
  title = {Augustine and Husserl on time and memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {7--46},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167113},
  url = {https://muse.jhu.edu/article/650591 http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=qd20160007000100070046&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Dorsch, F. Hume 2016 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
Routledge, 40-54.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter overviews Hume's thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining and how the two are linked to the relevant contemporary discussions, with an almost exclusive focus on the first book of the Treatise ofHuman Nature.1
BibTeX:
@incollection{Dorsch2016,
  author = {Dorsch, Fabian},
  title = {Hume},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination},
  editor = {Kind, Amy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {40--54}
}
Elsey, J. and Kindt, M. Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Ethical implications of a new therapeutic approach 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 225-236.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memories are fundamental to human experience: We are in many ways the products of our pasts, recorded in memory. The influence of memory over current experience is both a blessing and a curse, for just as we find solace in the remembrance of times past, we may also be plagued by pathological memories. Such maladaptive memories are a core feature of several psychiatric conditions, from anxiety disorders to addiction. In this article we present work from our own lab and others that shows the remarkable malleability of human memory, and how the disruption of maladaptive memory reconsolidation is being used for therapeutic purposes. If bioethical concerns about memory modification are to be more than purely hypothetical considerations for the future, they should be grounded in cutting-edge contemporary research. We provide the necessary overview of the field, then raise, challenge, and discuss several old and new ethical concerns. Keywords:
BibTeX:
@article{Elsey2016,
  author = {Elsey, James and Kindt, Merel},
  title = {Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Ethical implications of a new therapeutic approach},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {225--236},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1218377},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1218377}
}
Fernández, J. Epistemic generation in memory 2016 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
92(3), 620-644.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification or belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role.
BibTeX:
@article{Fernandez2016,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {Epistemic generation in memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},
  volume = {92},
  number = {3},
  pages = {620--644},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12189},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12189}
}
Fernández, J. Externalism, self-knowledge and memory 2016 Externalism and Skepticism
Cambridge University Press
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter discusses Paul Boghossian's ‘memory argument' for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. The argument raises the question of whether, assuming externalism, the contents of our past thoughts are accessible to us through memory or not. I concede that there is a sense in which memory does not give us access to the contents of our past thoughts if externalism holds. However, I argue that, in the relevant sense, the view that the contents of our past thoughts are inaccessible to memory cannot be used to establish incompatibilism through the memory argument. Drawing on some tools from two-dimensional semantics, I suggest that one of the premises in the argument trades on an ambiguity between two notions of mental content.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fernandez2016a,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {Externalism, self-knowledge and memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Externalism and Skepticism},
  editor = {Goldberg, Sanford C.},
  publisher = {Cambridge University Press}
}
Fuchs, T. Embodied knowledge - embodied memory 2016 Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium
De Gruyter, 215-229.
 
Abstract: The distinction between representational and embodied knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significancethrough the investigation of implicit memory.This kind of memory is formedi nt he course of the interactiono fo rganism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor,b ut also affect-motor schemes. We mays peako fa ni mplicit "bodym emory" that underlies our habits and skills, connectingb odya nd environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actualizedbysuitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarilyb eing madee xplicit. The paper analyses the structure of embodied knowledge by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in earlyc hildhood. It argues that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basisofintercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others ("theory of mind")are derivedfrom later steps of development ;t hey are not sufficient for explaining the interactive and empathic human capacities.This will finally be illustrated by the example of autism.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Fuchs2016,
  author = {Fuchs, Thomas},
  title = {Embodied knowledge - embodied memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
  editor = {Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja and Wiltsche, Harald A},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  pages = {215--229}
}
Gerrans, P. and Kennett, J. Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency 2016 Mind
126(501), 259-268.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot “feel the future” they cannot imaginatively inhabit it and hence their agency is compromised. The extent of such losses and consequent impairments to moral agency can be matters of degree.
BibTeX:
@article{Gerrans2017,
  author = {Gerrans, Philip and Kennett, Jeanette},
  title = {Mental time travel, dynamic evaluation, and moral agency},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Mind},
  volume = {126},
  number = {501},
  pages = {259--268},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv206},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/mind/fzv206}
}
Harrelson, K.J. Narrative identity and diachronic self-knowledge 2016 Journal of the American Philosophical Association
2(01), 164-179.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Our ability to tell stories about ourselves has captivated many theorists, and some have taken these developments for an opportunity to answer long-standing questions about the nature of personhood. In this essay I employ two skeptical arguments to show that this move was a mistake. The first argument rests on the observation that storytelling is revisionary. The second implies that our stories about ourselves are biased in regard to our existing self-image. These arguments undercut narrative theories of identity, but they leave room for a theory of narrative self-knowledge. The theory accommodates the first skeptical argument because there are event descriptions with retrospective assertibility conditions, and it accommodates the second argument by denying us epistemic privilege in regard to our own past. The result is that we do know our past through storytelling, but that it is a contingent feature of some of our stories that they are about ourselves.
BibTeX:
@article{Harrelson2016,
  author = {Harrelson, Keven J.},
  title = {Narrative identity and diachronic self-knowledge},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of the American Philosophical Association},
  volume = {2},
  number = {01},
  pages = {164--179},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2015.30},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstractS2053447715000305}
}
Heersmink, R. The internet, cognitive enhancement, and the values of cognition 2016 Minds and Machines
26(4), 389-407.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper has two distinct but related goals: (1) to identify some of the potential consequences of the Internet for our cognitive abilities and (2) to suggest an approach to evaluate these consequences. I begin by outlining the Google effect, which (allegedly) shows that when we know information is available online, we put less effort into storing that information in the brain. Some argue that this strategy is adaptive because it frees up internal resources which can then be used for other cognitive tasks, whereas others argue that this is maladaptive because it makes us less knowledgeable. I argue that the currently available empirical evidence in cognitive psychology does not support strong conclusions about the negative effects of the Internet on memory. Before we can make value-judgements about the cognitive effects of the Internet, we need more robust and ecologically-valid evidence. Having sketched a more nuanced picture of the Google effect, I then argue that the value of our cognitive abilities is in part intrinsic and in part instrumental, that is, they are both valuable in themselves and determined by the socio-cultural context in which these cognitive abilities are utilised. Focussing on instrumental value, I argue that, in an information society such as ours, having the skills to efficiently navigate, evaluate, compare, and synthesize online information are (under most circumstances) more valuable than having a lot of facts stored in biological memory. This is so, partly because using the Internet as an external memory system has overall benefits for education, navigation, journalism, and academic scholarship.
BibTeX:
@article{Heersmink,
  author = {Heersmink, Richard},
  title = {The internet, cognitive enhancement, and the values of cognition},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Minds and Machines},
  volume = {26},
  number = {4},
  pages = {389--407},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9404-3},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11023-016-9404-3}
}
Hoerl, C. and McCormack, T. Making decisions about the future: Regret and the cognitive function of episodic memory 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 241-266.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Episodic memory is the capacity to consciously recollect particular events from one's own past (Hoerl, 2007; Tulving, 1985). Empirical work in psychology suggests that it is a fairly sophisticated memory capacity that may develop later than other memory and learning abilities (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999) and that can be selectively impaired in amnesia (Squire & Zola, 1998). It is also often held to be unique to humans (Hoerl, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Tulving, 2002)— echoing the long- standing philosophical trope that animals' lives are in some sense confined to the present (Aristotle, 1930; Bennett, 1964; Bergson, 1991; Nietzsche, 1983; Schopenhauer, 1999)— although there is considerable debate about this in comparative psychology. Existing discussions of episodic memory in philosophy are typically concerned with the idea that episodic recollection involves being in a distinct kind of epistemic state (Martin, 2001; Soteriou, 2008) and a state with a distinct kind of phenomenology (Hoerl, 2001; Hopkins, forthcoming). In both disciplines, the question as to what episodic memory is for— what distinctive evolutionary function it might serve— has, until relatively recently, rarely been asked (Baddeley, 1988), but is now becoming a very lively area of debate (Boyer, 2008; Klein, 2013; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). In fact, this question has arguably emerged as one of the most significant challenges for memory research. While learning about the general characteristics of the world (and retaining such information for future use) is clearly beneficial, of what benefit is it to the individual to be able to remember particular past events as such, given that those particular events will never come again?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hoerl2016,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph and McCormack, Teresa},
  title = {Making decisions about the future: Regret and the cognitive function of episodic memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {241--266}
}
Hopkins, R. Memento and the double life of memory 2016 Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie
Oxford University Press, 89-99.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] As the title suggests, Christopher Nolan's startling Memento (2000) is about memory. Its protagonist Leonard Shelby has lost some of his ability to remember. As he tells any- one who will listen, while he doesn't have amnesia (since he can remember who he is and what happened to him up to ‘the Incident', an attack that left him with brain dam- age), he ‘can't make new memories'. The people he now meets, what he learns from and about them, and his own reasons for being somewhere all slip from his grasp over the course of a few minutes. His situation is, as he puts it, like that of someone constantly waking up, unsure where he is, and why. The movie's structure gives the viewer some sense of what life for Leonard might be like. Just as he is thrown into the midst of situa- tions as his memory of them lapses, so we are thrown into the middle of them as the story unfurls. For half the tale is told in leaps backwards, each scene in colour revealing the events leading up to the colour scene that preceded it. Indeed, this is the film's most striking feature—a tour de force of cinematic storytelling that rightly made Nolan's name as a director. However, I am not going to concentrate on this display of technique or the insight it gives us into what it might be like to be Leonard.1 Instead I want to explore a related aspect of the movie. We have what Leonard lacks—the ability to make new memories. But what difference does it make to us that we can do this? Comparing our position with Leonard's is one way to investigate this question.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hopkins2016,
  author = {Hopkins, Robert},
  title = {Memento and the double life of memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie},
  editor = {Dodd, Julian},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {89--99}
}
Huebner, B. Transactive memory reconstructed: rethinking Wegner's research program 2016 The Southern Journal of Philosophy
54(1), 48-69.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that recent research on episodic memory supports a limited defense of the phenomena that Daniel Wegner has termed transactive memory. Building on psychological and neurological research, targeting both individual and shared memory, I argue that individuals can collaboratively work to construct shared episodic memories. In some cases, this yields memories that are distributed across multiple individuals instead of being housed in individual brains.
BibTeX:
@article{Huebner2016,
  author = {Huebner, Bryce},
  title = {Transactive memory reconstructed: rethinking Wegner's research program},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {54},
  number = {1},
  pages = {48--69},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12160},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/sjp.12160}
}
Hui, K. and Fisher, C.E. The imperative for conceptual accuracy in memory modification 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 237-238.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] We agree that ethical discussions surrounding memory modification ought to be grounded in empirical research. Indeed, we have also argued that the bioethical debate on memory is too often speculative and insufficiently rooted in the actual scientific mechanisms that could be used to alter memory (Hui and Fisher 2015). Elsey and Kindt's (2016) discussion of reconsolidation-based approaches is an important step in this direction. They call attention to the differences between pathologic and normal emotional memories and explain why the former are more vulnerable to the emotional dampening of maladaptive memories in phobias and posttraumatic stress disorder attributed to propranolol. Furthermore, by drawing upon data from the broader scientific literature outlining the specific processes by which propranolol appears to capitalize on the lability of memory through reconsolidation, they appropriately address a multitude of commonly raised but ill-informed ethical concerns in the memory debate, such as fears about indiscriminate memory erasure. As they note, reconsolida- tion-based interventions invoke their own scope of appli- cations and ethical implications.
BibTeX:
@article{Hui2016,
  author = {Hui, Katrina and Fisher, Carl E.},
  title = {The imperative for conceptual accuracy in memory modification},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {237--238},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244224},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1244224}
}
Hutto, D.D. Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory 2016 Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences
Palgrave Macmillan, 229-236.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memories have long been compared with archived items that can be faithfully retrieved by minds, as if they were the sorts of thing that exist in a kind of inter-nal mental storehouse. Down the ages memories have often been conceived of as images – proxies of items encountered by the senses – which are received, some-times suitably augmented, retained and later retrieved by minds. This familiar picture of memories has a long and influential history, finding perhaps its earliest and most eloquent expression in St. Augustine's Confessions.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hutto2016,
  author = {Hutto, Daniel D.},
  title = {Remembering without stored contents: A philosophical reflection on memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences},
  editor = {Groes, Sebastian},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {229--236}
}
Julião, R., Lo Presti, R., Perler, D. and van der Eijk, P. Mapping memory. Theories in ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy and medicine 2016 eTopoi: Journal for Ancient Studies
special vo, 678-702.
 
Abstract: This paper discusses theories ofmemory as developed by philosophers and medical writers from Graeco-Roman antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. While philosophers had much to say on the nature ofmemory and recollection, their epistemo- logical role and their relationship to other functions of the soul, medical writers concen- trated on the anatomy, physiology, pathology and indeed the therapeutics ofmemory and recollection.Yet the close relationship between philosophical and medical approaches was most clearly visible in discussions about the bodily location ofmemory,where theoretical concepts ofthe hierarchy offaculties ofthe soul were connected with clinical observations ofmemory failure as a result of injury or disease.
BibTeX:
@article{Juliao2016,
  author = {Julião, Ricardo and Lo Presti, Roberto and Perler, Dominik and van der Eijk, Philip},
  title = {Mapping memory. Theories in ancient, medieval and early modern philosophy and medicine},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {eTopoi: Journal for Ancient Studies},
  volume = {special vo},
  pages = {678--702}
}
Kebede, M. Action and forgetting 2016 Philosophy Today
60(2), 347-370.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper is about the Bergsonian synchronization of the perpetual present or memory with the passing present or the body. It shows how forgetting narrows and focuses consciousness on the needs of action and how motor memory allows the imagining of the useful side of memory. The paper highlights the strength of Bergson's analysis by respectively confronting classical theories of memory, the highly regarded perspective of the phenomenological school, Deleuze's interpretation of Bergsonism, and Sartre's theory of mental imagery.
BibTeX:
@article{Kebede2016,
  author = {Kebede, Messay},
  title = {Action and forgetting},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophy Today},
  volume = {60},
  number = {2},
  pages = {347--370},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201647116},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=philtoday20160060000203470370&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Kelly, M.R. Grief: Putting the past before us 2016 Quaestiones Disputatae
7(1), 156-177.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Grief research in philosophy agrees that one who grieves grieves over the irreversible loss of someone whom the griever loved deeply, and that someone thus factored centrally into the griever's sense of purpose and meaning in the world. The analytic literature in general tends to focus its treatments on the paradigm case of grief as the death of a loved one. I want to restrict my account to the paradigm case because the paradigm case most persuades the mind that grief is a past- directed emotion. The phenomenological move I propose will enable us to (1) respect the paradigm case of grief and a broader but still legitimate set of grief- generating states of affairs, (2) liberate grief from the view that grief is past directed or about the past, and thus (3) account for grief in a way that separates it from its closest emotion- neighbor, sorrow, without having to rely on the affective quality of those two emotions.
BibTeX:
@article{Kelly2016,
  author = {Kelly, Michael R.},
  title = {Grief: Putting the past before us},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {156--177},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167120},
  url = {https://muse.jhu.edu/article/650598 http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=qd20160007000101560177&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Keven, N. Events, narratives and memory 2016 Synthese
193(8), 2497-2517.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Whether non-human animals can have episodic memories remains the subject of extensive debate. A number of prominent memory researchers defend the view that animals do not have the same kind of episodic memory as humans do, whereas others argue that some animals have episodic-like memory—i.e., they can remember what, where and when an event happened. Defining what constitutes episodic memory has proven to be difficult. In this paper, I propose a dual systems account and provide evidence for a distinction between event memory and episodic memory. Event memory is a perceptual system that evolved to support adaptive short-term goal processing, whereas episodic memory is based on narratives, which bind event memories into a retrievable whole that is temporally and causally organized around subject's goals. I argue that carefully distinguishing event memory from episodic memory can help resolve the debate.
BibTeX:
@article{Keven2016,
  author = {Keven, Nazim},
  title = {Events, narratives and memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {193},
  number = {8},
  pages = {2497--2517},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0862-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-015-0862-6}
}
Kirchhoff, M.D. Composition and transactive memory systems 2016 Philosophical Explorations
19(1), 59-77.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A recurrent theme in research on socially distributed cognition is to establish the claim that the cognitive phenomenon of transactive memory is grounded in a specific mode of organization: mechanistic compositional organization. My topic is the confluence of transactive remembering or transactive memory systems (TMSs) and mechanistic compositional organization. In relation to this confluence, the paper scrutinizes the claim that the kind of organization grounding TMSs and/or tokens of transactive remembering takes the specific form of mechanistic compositional organization – at least as the latter is usually construed. It is argued (i) that the usual account of mechanistic compositional organization is based on a synchronic composition function, and (ii) that the organization of TMSs and/or transactive remembering is not well understood by way of synchronic composition. The positive account pursued is that TMSs and/or transactive remembering are better understood as grounded in a diachronic composition function.
BibTeX:
@article{Kirchhoff2017,
  author = {Kirchhoff, Michael D},
  title = {Composition and transactive memory systems},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Explorations},
  volume = {19},
  number = {1},
  pages = {59--77},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1085593},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpex20 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13869795.2016.1085593}
}
Klein, S.B. Lost feeling of ownership of one's mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.'s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism 2016 Philosophical Psychology
29(4), 490-493.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In her paper “Memory and Mineness in Personal Identity,” Rebecca Roache (this issue) makes a number of claims about the nature of memory, the nature of self, and the relation between the two. In particular, she argues that Klein and Nichols's (2012) treatment of Locke's connectivity account of self and memory rests on an “implausible,” “unsupported,” and “untenable” interpretation of patient R.B.'s memory problems. I have no interest in debating Roache's views on the relation between self and memory. Serious treatment of what currently is known about that relation easily would exceed the space provided for commentary. Suffice it to say that psychological discoveries over the past 60 years reveal that no simple account is capable of being fitted to Locke's thesis: the relation, as now understood, consists in a complex interplay between different aspects of the self (for a review, see Klein, 2012; Klein & Gangi, 2010) and different types of memory (e.g., Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; Tulving 1985). These issues are discussed in Klein (2014a). In what follows, I focus on Roache's claim that patient R.B.'s report of losing possessory custody of mental content is not sanctioned by the language he uses to relate his phenomenology. I present evidence (some new) supporting Klein and Nichols's interpretation of patient R.B.'s ownership pathology and, in the process, argue that Roache's re-analysis is unsupported by theory and evidence.
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2016a,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {Lost feeling of ownership of one's mental states: the importance of situating patient R.B.'s pathology in the context of contemporary theory and empiricism},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {490--493},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126815},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cphp20 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126815}
}
Klein, S.B. and Steindam, C. The role of subjective temporality in future-oriented mental time travel 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 135-152.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) consists in a set of neurocognitive functions that enable one to break free of the grasp of the perpetual “now” and consider how things might be in the “next.” The adaptive functionality of such a mental competence is immense: to be capable of anticipating, imagining, and responding to contingencies that cannot be known with certainty— but whose consequences have fundamental significance for survival— provides an enormous selective advantage. While organisms vary greatly in the complexity and temporal reach of their ability to consider the future (e.g., Cheke & Clayton, 2010; Klein, 2013a; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), all living things possessed of motility and reasonably sophisticated neural function must, of adaptive necessity, be able to orient toward and react to personally relevant possibilities (Klein, 2013a). Indeed, several investigators have proposed that an organism's ability to anticipate and plan for the future is a major driving force of cortical evolution (e.g., Bar, 2011; Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002; Pezzulo, 2008; Tulving, 2005).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Klein2016b,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B. and Steindam, Chloe},
  title = {The role of subjective temporality in future-oriented mental time travel},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {135--152}
}
Kreitmair, K. Memory manipulation in the context of punishment and atonement 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 238-240.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Elsey and Kindt (2016) provide evidence to suggest that by disrupting the process of reconsolidation, traumatic mem- ories can be dissociated from their affective components long after they are formed. They acknowledge that this reignites questions over whether the dampening of dis- tasteful yet character-enhancing memories results in a pro- liferation of irresponsible and ethically challenged individuals (Henry, Fishman, and Youngner 2007), but dis- miss this concern as implausible, largely due to the com- plexity of the reconsolidation-based intervention process. In this commentary, I argue that the concern is not thereby adequately addressed.
BibTeX:
@article{Kreitmair2016,
  author = {Kreitmair, Karola},
  title = {Memory manipulation in the context of punishment and atonement},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {238--240},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251993},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251993}
}
Lavazza, A. What we may forget when discussing human memory manipulation 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 249-251.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation is an important new frontier of research in the therapeutic field (Soeter and Kindt 2011). The ethical implications of these techniques to treat traumatic and disruptive memories have been appropriately analyzed by Elsey and Kindt (2016). The authors point out that when discussing the moral consequences of such techniques, hypothetical sce- narios should be realistic and speculations about the future cannot ignore the data and restrictions provided by the research. However, there do seem to be real ethical concerns in relation to both clinical and nonclinical memory manipu- lations through propranolol administration (Kindt, Soeter, and Vervliet 2009; Brunet et al. 2011). I therefore illustrate three possible scenarios that I think are worthy of consider- ation, regarding respectively the authenticity of the subject's choices, the situations involving the risk of losing touch with reality, and the so-called social composition effects.
BibTeX:
@article{Lavazza2016,
  author = {Lavazza, Andrea},
  title = {What we may forget when discussing human memory manipulation},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {249--251},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251988},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251988}
}
Lázaro-Muñoz, G. and Diaz-Mataix, L. Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Stones left unturned 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 244-247.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory reconsolidation is the process by which a previ- ously stored memory, when recalled, becomes unstable and susceptible to modification before being re-stored. Reconsolidation disruption protocols (RDPs) may prove to be powerful therapeutic tools for psychiatric disorders that involve maladaptive learning and memory. However, Elsey and Kindt (2016) present an overly optimistic and incomplete portrayal of the state of reconsolidation research, which leads them to minimize scientific and ethi- cal apprehensions about manipulating human memory through reconsolidation. This is problematic because their depiction of reconsolidation research could mislead stake- holders—such as clinicians, patients, and health policy- makers—when evaluating the potential harms and benefits of translating RDPs to the clinical context. We address three pressing concerns about the authors' depic- tion of reconsolidation research: (1) insufficient and contra- dictory evidence about the effectiveness or clinical utility of propranolol RDPs; (2) risk for extemporaneous transla- tion of propranolol RDP research to clinical practice; and (3) lack of discussion of other kinds of RDPs that generate significant ethical challenges—it is necessary to consider different kinds of RDPs when drawing conclusions about the ethics of a topic as broad as “manipulating human memory through reconsolidation.”
BibTeX:
@article{Lazaro-Munoz2016,
  author = {Lázaro-Muñoz, Gabriel and Diaz-Mataix, Lorenzo},
  title = {Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Stones left unturned},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {244--247},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251989},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251989}
}
Malanowski, S. Is episodic memory uniquely human? Evaluating the episodic-like memory research program 2016 Synthese
193(5), 1433-1455.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recently, a research program has emerged that aims to show that animals have a memory capacity that is similar to the human episodic memory capacity. Researchers within this program argue that nonhuman animals have episodic-like memory of personally experienced past events. In this paper, I specify and evaluate the goals of this research program and the progress it has made in achieving them. I will examine some of the data that the research program has produced, as well as the operational definitions and assumptions that have gone into producing that data, in order to call into question the ultimate value of the episodic-like memory research program. I argue that there is a gap between the claims that the research program makes and the data it uses to support these claims, and that bridging this gap is essential if we want to claim that human episodic memory has a meaningful analog in animals. I end with some suggestions of how to potentially fix these problems.
BibTeX:
@article{Malanowski2016,
  author = {Malanowski, Sarah},
  title = {Is episodic memory uniquely human? Evaluating the episodic-like memory research program},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {193},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1433--1455},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0966-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-015-0966-z}
}
Manning, L. Future mental time travel and the me-self 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 183-198.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] One of the most frequently cited contributions from James's Principles of Psychology (1890) to the current study of the self is the division of the self into the " I-self, " the self as a knower, and the " Me-self, " the self as known. In general terms, James's I-self and Me-self distinction has been elaborated on and updated to produce present-day theoretical models, but independently of the existing expanded versions, the foundations remain in the groundwork that James laid out. A recent example of updated work based on the division of I-self and Me-self is the sense of self and memory model put forward by Prebble et al. (2013). Within the concept of the Me-self (i.e., the content of self), some of whose characteristics are tackled in the present chapter in relation to episodic future thought, Prebble et al.'s (2013) model includes two functions according to the temporal dimension: the present moment or across time. The self-concept based on Conway's theory (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004b) is the content of the self in the present moment. Its normal functioning allows us to experience a sense of unity in our mental representations of who we are. The content of self across time, on the other hand, allows us to experience semantic continuity. Regarding the relationships between the sense of self and the memory systems, in contrast with the I-self (see section 1) that is exclusively based on episodic autobiographical memory, the Me-self is associated with both semantiticized and episodic autobiographical memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Manning2016,
  author = {Manning, Lilianne},
  title = {Future mental time travel and the me-self},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {183--198}
}
McCarroll, C.J. and Sutton, J. Multiperspectival imagery: Sartre and cognitive theory on point of view in remembering and imagining 2016 Phenomenology and Science: Confrontations and Convergences
Palgrave Macmillan, 181-204.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] When remembering events from one's life, one often visualises the remem- bered scene as one originally experienced it: from an ‘internal', ‘own-eyes', ‘fi rst-person', or ‘fi eld' perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an ‘external', ‘third-person', or ‘observer' perspective (Nigro and Neisser 1983 ).
BibTeX:
@incollection{McCarroll2016,
  author = {McCarroll, Christopher Jude and Sutton, John},
  title = {Multiperspectival imagery: Sartre and cognitive theory on point of view in remembering and imagining},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Phenomenology and Science: Confrontations and Convergences},
  editor = {Reynolds, J. and Sebold, R.},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {181--204},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-51605-3_10},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1057/978-1-137-51605-310}
}
Michaelian, K. Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering 2016 Frontiers in Psychology
7, 1857.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This articles develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelian2016,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {7},
  pages = {1857},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01857},
  url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01857/full}
}
Michaelian, K. Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past 2016
MIT Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Michaelian2016a,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {MIT Press}
}
Michaelian, K. Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 63-92.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Over the last several decades, the psychology of memory has undergone a major reorientation away from earlier conceptions of episodic memory as a specialized system dedicated to the storage and retrieval of information about the “what, when, and where” of past events and toward a conception of episodic remembering as a form of constructive mental time travel (MTT). Reinforced by impressive brain imaging evidence and extensive research on representational and phenomenological overlap between remembering the past and imagining the future (for recent reviews, see Klein, 2013; Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010), this new conception emphasizes the deep similarities between episodic memory, future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT), and, increasingly, processes such as episodic counterfactual thinking (De Brigard, 2014; De Brigard & Gessell, Chapter 8 of this volume; Pezzulo, Chapter 13 of this volume), in which the subject imagines alternatives to past events. Taking the new conception to its logical conclusion, many have argued that, rather than distinct faculties of episodic remembering and imagining, what we in fact have is “a single general faculty of mental time travel” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). On this view, remembering the past and imagining the future are strictly continuous.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2016b,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {63--92}
}
Michaelian, K. Memory 2016 Philosophy: Mind (Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks)
Macmillan, 227-243.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory is one ofour most fundamental cognitive capacities. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that it is also one of the oldest topics in philosophy. Linked to the metaphysical doctrine of the forms, it figured centrally in Plato's(427–347 BCE) theory of knowledge. And Plato's student, Aristotle (384–322 BCE), sought to distinguish memory from sensation and expectation by arguing that memory—and only memory—is about the past.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Michaelian2016c,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Philosophy: Mind (Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks)},
  editor = {McLaughlin, Brian},
  publisher = {Macmillan},
  pages = {227--243}
}
Modrak, D.K.W. Aristotle on phantasia 2016 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
Routledge, 15-26.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The breadth of Aristotle's conception of imagination (phantasia) is extraordinary and sets the stage for the discussion of imagination in subsequent literature.1 Aristotle appeals to phantasia to explain behavior of all sorts, especially to explain behavior that seems to be guided by reason, but is not, in cases where the agent (a child, a drunken adult or a nonrational animal) lacks the capacity for rational judgment. He also appeals to phantasia to explain the human mind's ability to transition seamlessly between perception and thought. In this capacity, phantasia is required for thinking. In addition, he assigns nonveridical perceptual experiences to phantasia, including cases of illusion, delusion and dreaming.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Modrak2016,
  author = {Modrak, Deborah K W},
  title = {Aristotle on phantasia},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination},
  editor = {Kind, Amy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {15--26}
}
Mole, C. A methodological flaw in 'The neural basis of flashback formation: The impact of viewing trauma' 2016 Psychological Medicine
46(08), 1785-1786.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Discussions of post-traumatic stress have often emphasized the disordered ways in which intrusively remembered episodes are interpreted, recollected and re-experienced, during the months after those episodes take place. Relatively little emphasis has been placed on the way in which such episodes are processed at the time of their initial occurrence. This is reflected in our diagnostic practice, and in our psychological theor- izing. An important series of recent papers (Bourne et al. 2013; Clark et al. 2014, 2016) suggests that this is a mis- take. These papers establish that intrusively remem- bered episodes are processed in a distinctive way at the time when they are first experienced. They thereby raise the question of how the initial processing of intru- sively remembered episodes differs from the initial processing of normally remembered episodes. That question has received less attention than it deserves.
BibTeX:
@article{Mole2016,
  author = {Mole, Christopher},
  title = {A methodological flaw in 'The neural basis of flashback formation: The impact of viewing trauma'},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Psychological Medicine},
  volume = {46},
  number = {08},
  pages = {1785--1786},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716000040},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstractS0033291716000040}
}
Mole, C. Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: A response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne 2016 Psychological Medicine
46(15), 3255-3258.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] No reader of Psychological Medicine needs to be reminded that correlation does not imply causation, but there are two attitudes that might be taken to that fact, and between them a spectrum of positions. I suspect that those holding positions towards either end of this spectrum overestimate their view's preponderance, and that this explains some of the mutual misunderstandings in our debates concerning psychological disorder. An example may be found in a recent exchange between me, on one hand, and Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne, on the other (Clark et al. 2016b; Mole, 2016). Before considering that exchange, we should consider the two contrasting attitudes to correlation and causation. Most feasible positions lie somewhere between these extremes, but opinions differ as to whether the most sensible lie nearer the first or second.
BibTeX:
@article{Mole2016a,
  author = {Mole, Christopher},
  title = {Causes and correlates of intrusive memory: A response to Clark, MacKay, Holmes and Bourne},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Psychological Medicine},
  volume = {46},
  number = {15},
  pages = {3255--3258},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716001793},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstractS0033291716001793}
}
Mole, C. The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought 2016
Routledge
 
BibTeX:
@book{Mole2016b,
  author = {Mole, Christopher},
  title = {The Unexplained Intellect: Complexity, Time, and the Metaphysics of Embodied Thought},
  year = {2016},
  publisher = {Routledge}
}
Naylor, A. Psychological deprogramming–reprogramming and the right kind of cause 2016 Philosophical Papers
45(1-2), 267-288.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper makes use of an example of Williams's (1970), an example involving so-called psychological deprogramming–reprogramming, in arguing that procedures such as Teletransportation would not provide what matters to us in our self-interested concern for the future. This is so because the beliefs and other psychological states of a resultant person would not be appropriately causally dependent on any beliefs or other psychological states of the original person.
BibTeX:
@article{Naylor2016,
  author = {Naylor, Andrew},
  title = {Psychological deprogramming–reprogramming and the right kind of cause},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Papers},
  volume = {45},
  number = {1-2},
  pages = {267--288},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2016.1187485},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/05568641.2016.1187485}
}
Obsieger, B. Phenomenological temporality 2016 Quaestiones Disputatae
7(1), 141-155.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper aims to clarify the structure of temporality as it is originally experienced in time-consciousness. At a pre-refl ective level, time-consciousness presents us with changing or unchanging worldly objects as persisting through time. However, time-consciousness is not simply a consciousness of worldly temporal events but, rather, a consciousness of these events as they appear in our experience. Accordingly, the phenomenal time that is experienced in time-consciousness consists in a correlative unity between two different temporal series: that of the appearing objects and that of their modes of appearance. This article concludes with an analysis of the "immanent" side of phenomenal temporality. Following Husserl, I argue that appearances or experiences have the same temporal structure as worldly events, and that this iso-morphism makes it possible for worldly processes of change and persistence to present themselves to us as perceptual phenomena.
BibTeX:
@article{Obsieger2016,
  author = {Obsieger, Bernhard},
  title = {Phenomenological temporality},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Quaestiones Disputatae},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {141--155},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/qd20167119},
  url = {https://muse.jhu.edu/article/650597 http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=qd20160007000101410155&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Occhionero, M. and Cicogna, P. Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering 2016 Philosophical Psychology
29(7), 958-966.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Dreaming can be explained as the product of an interaction among memory processes, elaborative processes, and phenomenal awareness. A feedback circuit is activated by this interaction according to the associative links and the requirements of the dream scene. Recently, it has been hypothesized that a partial similarity exists between dreaming and mind wandering and that these two processes may involve the same neural default network. This commentary discusses the differences and similarities between phenomenal consciousness during dreaming and phenomenal consciousness during mind wandering from the perspective of the “continuity” of engagement of cognitive systems. The greatest difference consists in the lack of reality testing during dreaming. Dream imagery is hallucinatory by nature. Consequently, the simulated world in dreams makes dream imagery more akin to perception. In contrast, the imagery of mind wandering is more similar to imagination. The level of meta-awareness is preserved more frequently and to a greater degree in mind wandering.
BibTeX:
@article{Occhionero2016,
  author = {Occhionero, Miranda and Cicogna, Piercarla},
  title = {Phenomenal consciousness in dreams and in mind wandering},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {7},
  pages = {958--966},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1213800},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2016.1213800}
}
Perrin, D. Asymmetries in subjective time 2016 Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel
Oxford University Press, 39-61.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This chapter tackles the issue of the relationship between backward and forward mental time travel (MTT). It makes a case for a moderate version of discontinuism with regard to the question of the processes involved in both forms of MTT. To do so, it provides a philosophical argument against the continuist position on episodic thought that is widely held by psychologists. More specifically, it points out and elaborates on the asymmetries in the epistemological and causal process that are intrinsic to the subjectivity feature— or so-called autonoeticity— of episodic thought.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Perrin2016,
  author = {Perrin, Denis},
  title = {Asymmetries in subjective time},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Seeing The Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel},
  editor = {Michaelian, Kourken and Klein, Stanley B. and Szpunar, Karl K.},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {39--61}
}
Rizzo, G. Wittgenstein on time: From the living present to the clock time 2016 The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas
Springer, 137-148.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Augustine's analysis of time in Book XI of Confessions represents for Ludwig Wittgenstein a good example of a philosophical question. In dealing with such theme, his thought undergoes relevant changes. In the Philosophical Remarks, written more than 10 years after the drafting of the Tractatus, the Austrian philosopher holds that the essence of the world can be expressed in the grammar of language. Philosophy as “custodian” of grammar can grasp the essence of the world by excluding nonsensical combinations of signs. Philosopher, however, are often “tempted” to straightly describe the nature of the world, producing logical-grammatical paradoxes. An example of such a temptation is offered by the attempt to take hold of the essence of time using propositions like “only the present experience has reality.” The logical mistake hidden in this proposition lies in the bad use of the adjectival word “present” that would lose its everyday use and functional role in the language. Only comparing the term “present” with the background of other words referring to time experiences like “past,”“future,” and so on, we are able to understand the true sense of it. Engaging in a grammatical investigation into the notion of time helps us to dispel the different uses of it staving off logical muddles. Wittgenstein makes, in his lecture held at Cambridge in 1932–1933, a relevant distinction between what he calls “memory-time” and “information-time.” If the first can be understood as a now-centered system mostly expressed by indexical sentences or as an arrangement relied on memory, and therefore inadequate to give any external physical criteria for time measurements, the second clearly refers to a public chronology, implemented by clocks, calendars, diaries, and so on. Grammatical misconceptions, however occur when we are “tyrannized” by a metaphor and not able to “move outside of” it. The Austrian philosopher makes no secret of preferring a characterization of time that rejects a truth-functional interpretation. As for the notion of “game” in the Philosophical Investigations, it is impossible to have something like a common denominator shared by every sentence involving time.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Rizzo2016,
  author = {Rizzo, Giorgio},
  title = {Wittgenstein on time: From the living present to the clock time},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas},
  editor = {Santoianni, Flavia},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {137--148},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-0_16},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-24895-016}
}
Roache, R. Memory and mineness in personal identity 2016 Philosophical Psychology
29(4), 479-489.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols (2012) describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.'s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols' characterization of R.B.'s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.
BibTeX:
@article{Roache2016,
  author = {Roache, Rebecca},
  title = {Memory and mineness in personal identity},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {4},
  pages = {479--489},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216}
}
Robins, S.K. Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory 2016 Synthese
193(5), 1561-1583.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Constructivists about memory argue that memory is a capacity for building representations of past events from a generalized information store (e.g., De Brigard, in Synthese 191:155–185, 2014a; Michaelian, in Philos Psychol 24:323–342, 2012). The view is motivated by the memory errors discovered in cognitive psychology. Little has been known about the neural mechanisms by which false memories are produced. Recently, using a method I call the Optogenetic False Memory Technique (O-FaMe), neuroscientists have created false memories in mice (e.g., Ramirez et al., in Science 341:388–391, 2013). In this paper, I examine how Constructivism fares in light of O-FaMe results. My aims are two-fold. First, I argue that errors found in O-FaMe and cognitive psychology are similar behaviorally. Second, Constructivists should be able to explain the former since they purport to explain the latter, but they cannot. I conclude that O-FaMe studies reveal details about the mechanism by which false memories are produced that are incompatible with the explanatory approach to false memories favored by Constructivism.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2016a,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Optogenetics and the mechanism of false memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {193},
  number = {5},
  pages = {1561--1583},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1045-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-016-1045-9}
}
Robins, S.K. Misremembering 2016 Philosophical Psychology
29(3), 432-447.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The Archival and Constructive views of memory offer contrasting characterizations of remembering and its relation to memory errors. I evaluate the descriptive adequacy of each by offering a close analysis of one of the most prominent experimental techniques by which memory errors are elicited—the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Explaining the DRM effect requires appreciating it as a distinct form of memory error, which I refer to as misremembering. Misremembering is a memory error that relies on successful retention of the targeted event. It differs from both successful remembering and from confabulation errors, where the representation produced is wholly inaccurate. As I show, neither the Archival nor the Constructive View can account for the DRM effect because they are insensitive to misremembering's unique explanatory demands. Fortunately, the explanatory limitations of the Archival and Constructive Views are complementary. This suggests a way forward. Explaining misremembering—including how it differs from both successful remembering and confabulation—requires a hybrid theory of memory, combining the Archival commitment to discrete retention with the Constructive approach to retrieval. I conclude the paper with the beginning sketches of such an account.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2016b,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Misremembering},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  pages = {432--447},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245},
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1113245}
}
Robins, S.K. Representing the past: Memory traces and the causal theory of memory 2016 Philosophical Studies
173(11), 2993-3013.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: According to the Causal Theory of Memory (CTM), remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher (Philos Rev 75:161–196, 1966) argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker (Memory: A philosophical study. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) and Michaelian (Philos Psychol 24:323–342, 2011), contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural analogues in favor of memory traces as distributed patterns of event features. The proposals are understood as distinct accounts of how memory traces represent past events. But there are two distinct questions one could ask about a trace's representational features. One might ask how memory traces, qua mental representations, have their semantic properties. Or, what makes memory traces, qua mental representations of memories, distinct from other mental representations. Proponents of the CTM, both past and present, have failed to keep these two questions distinct. The result is a serious but unnoticed problem for the CTM in its current form. Distributed memory traces are incompatible with the CTM. Such traces do not provide a way to track the causal history of individual memories, as the CTM requires. If memory traces are distributed patterns of event features, as Bernecker and Michaelian each claim, then the CTM cannot be right.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2016c,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Representing the past: Memory traces and the causal theory of memory},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {173},
  number = {11},
  pages = {2993--3013},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0647-x},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-016-0647-x}
}
Ruin, H. Memory 2016 The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics
John Wiley and Sons, 114-121.
 
Abstract: What is memory? For modern psychological-neurological science, the question has a straightforward response. Yet, in its extension, it points toward the deepest aporias of a philosophy of subjectivity and of time. As a first step in a discussion of memory and philosophical hermeneutics, we need to briefly survey the ambiguity of the concept of memory itself. For it resonates also in the ambiguity of its position within hermeneutic thinking, where it has vacillated between a marginal and a fundamental position over the years. According to the standard definition, repeated in numerous handbooks, memory is "the processes by which information is encoded, stored, and retrieved, " ultimately in and through neurological brain mechanisms. It ranges from immediate sensory memory, over short-term, to so-called long-term memory. Other important distinctions concern the difference between procedural memory (attained nonconscious capacities) and working memory (what is actively kept in mind at a certain moment), and between semantic and episodic memory. The distinctions can be multiplied. Memory can become the object of training and enhancement, through various mnemonic techniques and educational practices, and it is a persistent concern for medicine and psychology where it surfaces as illness-and age-related deficiencies. Over the course of the last half century, memory has also become a central task of technology, through the invention of machines that seek to reproduce precisely the capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information. The philosophically more difficult and evasive dimension of memory is opened up once we begin to probe the conceptual presupposition of this scientific and technological definition. The key issue here is time. When we say that a biological creature, or a technical artifact, has the ability to retain and recover information over the course of time, time itself is taken for granted as the general, existing framework within which all things exist and occur. As a posited framework for organizing, controlling, and explaining life, this objectified temporal "time-space" is indispensable. With the help of chronom-eters and calendars, it is mastered so that all that happens can be given a distinct location within it, in time as it were, in a before and after. It is when we begin to think philosophically about the nature of this framework that we are led toward the deeper aporias of time and temporality. Time itself does not "exist" in any place. Instead, time somehow "holds" things together, giving them continuity. But this holding together does not take place in any exterior space. Rather, the "holding" is somehow constantly happening in and through Memory Hans Ruin 12
BibTeX:
@incollection{Ruin2016,
  author = {Ruin, Hans},
  title = {Memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics},
  editor = {Keane, Niall and Lawn, Chris},
  publisher = {John Wiley and Sons},
  pages = {114--121}
}
Schechtman, M. A mess indeed: Empathic access, narrative, and identity 2016 Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie
Oxford University Press, 17-34.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Over the last several decades narrative accounts of personal identity have become increasingly popular (see, e.g. Davenport 2012; MacIntyre 1984; Ricoeur 1994; Rudd 2012; Schechtman 1996; Taylor 1989). As the narrative approach has gained more adherents it has also, not surprisingly, gained more detractors (see, e.g. Christman 2004; Lamarque 2007; Strawson 2004; Vice 2003). Critics of this approach argue that understanding identity in narrative terms is both harmful and misleading. Peter Goldie has made important contributions to this discussion in many ways, not the least of which is staking out a sensible middle ground between those he calls ‘nar- rativists' and those he calls ‘narrative sceptics.' This position is given its most developed and mature expression in The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind (2012). There Goldie argues that although our lives are not constituted by narratives (as narrativ- ists claim it is) it can nonetheless be extremely valuable to think of our lives in narrative terms (as narrative sceptics deny it can be).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Schechtman2016,
  author = {Schechtman, Marya},
  title = {A mess indeed: Empathic access, narrative, and identity},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes from the Work of Peter Goldie},
  editor = {Dodd, Julian},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {17--34}
}
Sepper, D.L. Descartes 2016 The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination
Routledge, 27-39.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] René Descartes (1596–1650) has rarely been regarded as a major philosopher of imagination. One reason is that the writings in which imagination featured most centrally were published either just before his death or posthumously; they had little effect on how Descartes was interpreted. Other reasons have more to do with us than with him: it seems improbable to us that imagination can figure large in modern rationalism, and the now century old tradition of antipsychologism in professional philosophy and psychology makes it seem unlikely we can learn much from old fashioned philosophical psychology.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Sepper2016,
  author = {Sepper, Dennis L},
  title = {Descartes},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination},
  editor = {Kind, Amy},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {27--39}
}
Setiya, K. Retrospection 2016 Philosophers' Imprint
16(15)
[URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The third volume of Simone de Beauvoir's autobiography ends with a passage some have found mystifying:
BibTeX:
@article{Setiya2016,
  author = {Setiya, Kieran},
  title = {Retrospection},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
  volume = {16},
  number = {15},
  url = {www.philosophersimprint.org/016015/}
}
Smith, B.C. Proust, the madeleine and memory 2016 Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences
Palgrave Macmillan, 38-41.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] When Proust's narrator, Marcel, eats the crumbs of a madeleine dipped in lime blossom tea it triggers a process of remembering that brings his past to life. At first the narrator describes himself as being struck in a way that captures his attention. He is not sure what this sudden awareness means, but he con- jectures that it was his tasting the madeleine soaked in tea that brought about this startling feeling. He tastes it again. The same feeling occurs. But when he tries a third time the feeling is diminished. After much effortful concentration, Marcel finally comes to realize why the tasting experience is so potent: it is anchored by a long-buried memory that is gradually brought to the surface of consciousness. At this point the narrator recalls his aunt Léonie bedroom, where on Sundays she would soak pieces of madeleine in her lime blossom tea. He remembers the old grey house in Combray, the gardens, the streets and the square of the small town. From this beginning comes the vast outpourings of Marcel's memories of his past life.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Smith2016,
  author = {Smith, Barry C},
  title = {Proust, the madeleine and memory},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Memory in the Twenty-First Century: New Critical Perspectives from the Arts, Humanities, and Sciences},
  editor = {Groes, Sebastian},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {38--41}
}
Stout, N. Autism, episodic memory, and moral exemplars 2016 Philosophical Psychology
29(6), 858-870.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper presents a challenge for exemplar theories of moral concepts. Some have proposed that we acquire moral concepts by way of exemplars of actions that are prohibited as well as of actions that are required, and we classify newly encountered actions based on their similarity to these exemplars. Judgments of (im)permissibility then follow from these exemplar-based classifications. However, if this were true, then we would expect that individuals who lacked, or were deficient in, the capacity to form or access exemplars of this kind would be similarly deficient in the ability to classify new actions according to them, and this relative inability would be manifested in the moral judgments made by such individuals. However, there is reason to suspect, I think, that a number of individuals who have been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) actually have the deficiencies I have described here but are nevertheless fully able to make sound moral judgments. If this is so, then it must be the case that classifying actions as instances of a given moral concept and making judgments based on said classification does not rely solely on exemplars.
BibTeX:
@article{Stout2016,
  author = {Stout, Nathan},
  title = {Autism, episodic memory, and moral exemplars},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {29},
  number = {6},
  pages = {858--870},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1164305},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2016.1164305}
}
Tillman, J. Eternal sunshine on the collective mind 2016 AJOB Neuroscience
7(4), 242-243.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the target article “Manipulating Human Memory Through Reconciliation: Ethical Implications of a New Therapeutic Approach,” James Elsey and Merel Kindt (2016) identify the ethical benefits of a medical interven- tion that involves the “disruption of maladaptive memory reconsolidation” (225) for therapeutic purposes. Treat- ments may include reducing the association of debilitating fears, such as in the case of certain phobias and posttrau- matic stress disorder (PTSD), with certain memories. The ethical concerns raised by the authors are limited to the possible negative effects regarding individuals, but the authors do not yet consider the possibility of ethical con- cerns regarding certain populations. The question I would like to raise is whether or not this type of pharmacological and therapeutic intervention ought to be used in the case of collective traumas. Further, I consider whether or not collective traumas are important for the formation of col- lective or group identities. Consideration of group identi- ties leads to the following questions: (1) If this intervention were successful at a large scale in human subjects, would there be an ethical responsibility to remove collective trauma? (2) If this trauma is removed, would this inextrica- bly alter the shared and collective identity of many minor- ity groups? (3) If it would alter this shared identity, is this a major ethical concern in terms of justice?
BibTeX:
@article{Tillman2016,
  author = {Tillman, Jennifer},
  title = {Eternal sunshine on the collective mind},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {AJOB Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  number = {4},
  pages = {242--243},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251991},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251991}
}
Vierra, A. Psychopathy, mental time travel, and legal responsibility 2016 Neuroethics
9(2), 129-136.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel—episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy's view. Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them. I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument by using an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.
BibTeX:
@article{Vierra2016,
  author = {Vierra, Andrew},
  title = {Psychopathy, mental time travel, and legal responsibility},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Neuroethics},
  volume = {9},
  number = {2},
  pages = {129--136},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6}
}
White, C., Kelly, R. and Nichols, S. Remembering past lives 2016 Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy
Bloomsbury, 169-195.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In contemporary western contexts, and beyond, many adults have deep-seated convictions that they have lived before (e.g., Gallup 2005; Haraldsson 2006; Bender 2007).1 If people really do have previous lives, that is astonishing; but even if they do not, the belief in past lives is still a striking phenomenon. What leads people to think that they existed before their birth? The
BibTeX:
@incollection{White2016,
  author = {White, Claire and Kelly, Robert and Nichols, Shaun},
  title = {Remembering past lives},
  year = {2016},
  booktitle = {Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental Philosophy},
  editor = {De Cruz, Helen and Nichols, Ryan},
  publisher = {Bloomsbury},
  pages = {169--195}
}
Zarpentine, C. Moral judgement, agency and affect: A response to Gerrans and Kennett 2016 Mind
126(501), 233-257.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recently, a number of philosophers and psychologists have drawn on neuroscientific and psychological research on the role of affective processes in moral thinking to provide support for moral sentimentalism. Philip Gerrans and Jeanette Kennett (2010) criticize such 'neurosentimentalist' accounts on the grounds that they focus only on synchronic processes occurring at the time of moral judgement. As a result, these accounts face a dilemma: either they fail to accommodate the connection between moral judgement and agency or they are committed to implausible claims about the moral agency of individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). I respond to this criticism, arguing that Gerrans and Kennett fail to appreciate the diachronic aspects of affective mechanisms and that they misinterpret the empirical literature on the vmPFC. I argue that neurosentimentalism does have the resources to explain the connection between moral judgement and agency.
BibTeX:
@article{Zarpentine2017,
  author = {Zarpentine, Chris},
  title = {Moral judgement, agency and affect: A response to Gerrans and Kennett},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Mind},
  volume = {126},
  number = {501},
  pages = {233--257},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv202},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/mind/fzv202}
}
Andriopoulos, D.Z. Can we identify an empiricist theory of memory in Plato's dialogues? 2015 Philosophical Inquiry
39(3), 124-138.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Can an empirisist theory of memory be identifi ed in Plato's dialogues? Research in the dialogues and reconstructing the pertinent references convinced me that- along with the multi-discussed and generally accepted concept of memory within Plato's metaphysical framework of the theory of knowledge- an empirisist version of memory is utilized by the Athenian philosopher in his argumentations, concerning mainly epistemological issues and problems; in fact, given the republished metaphysical concept of memory, one cannot fi nd (or fi nd only), beyond the orthodox, old interpretation related to metempsychosis, ies attributing to Plato such, perhaps heretic, parallel use of sensorymaterial and empiricist structures. Moreover, I contend that the empiricist version of memory is related, or, can be considered, as a precursor, to a great extent, to the so called empirical theory of memory; the theory where memory is a necessary and decsively functioning constituent to the new and modern theory of knowledge.
BibTeX:
@article{Andriopolous2015,
  author = {Andriopoulos, D. Z.},
  title = {Can we identify an empiricist theory of memory in Plato's dialogues?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophical Inquiry},
  volume = {39},
  number = {3},
  pages = {124--138},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/philinquiry2015393/439},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=philinquiry200300254060600570071&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=philinquiry201500}
}
Barnett, D.J. Is memory merely testimony from one's former self? 2015 The Philosophical Review
124(3), 353-392.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: An important philosophical tradition treats the deliverances of one's own internal faculties as analogous to the deliverances of external sources of testimony. Pushing back against this tradition in the special case of the deliverances of one's own memory, I aim to highlight the broader interaction between an internal (or first-person) and an external (or third-person) perspective that one might adopt towards one's own states of mind. According to what I call the ‘diary model' of memory, one's memory ordinarily serves as a means for one's present self to gain evidence about one's past states of mind, much as testimony from another person can provide one with evidence about that person's states of mind. I reject the diary model's analogy between memory and testimony from one's former self, arguing first that memory and a diary differ with respect to their psychological roles, and second that this psychological difference underwrites important downstream epistemic differences.
BibTeX:
@article{Barnett2015,
  author = {Barnett, David James},
  title = {Is memory merely testimony from one's former self?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {The Philosophical Review},
  volume = {124},
  number = {3},
  pages = {353--392},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895337},
  url = {https://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article/124/3/353-392/81046}
}
Behnke, E.A. Null-body, protean body, potent body, neutral body, wild body 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 69-90.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the opening paragraph of the summary of his January–May 1960 course on “Husserl at the Limits of Philosophy,” Merleau-Ponty reminds us that what we might think of as the “complete” works of an individual are—from the point of view of the person concerned—precisely his or her incomplete works, presenting “merely the overall direction of a search which was trans- formed into a ‘work' [oeuvre] by the ever premature interruption of a life's work” (TL, 113–14/159–60). The work itself “is never completed; it is always in progress,” and returning to the work each day “is always only a question of advancing the line of the already opened furrow,” of prolonging this arc while going beyond it, until one day the body fails, is “written off” (PW, 67/94–95; cf. S, 58/73). But with this, more is lost than the brute fact of an individual life; as Claude Lefort says of Merleau-Ponty himself, “The writer disappears just when he was preparing for new beginnings, and the creation is interrupted” (VI, xiv/341; my emphasis). The “living historicity” of the effort whereby the artist or writer carries on the tradition that he or she has founded (PW, 73/103; cf. S, 63/79) is robbed of its future, stranded, with the “outline of what is to come (Urstiftung)” (TL, 115/161) left unfinished.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Behnke2015,
  author = {Behnke, Elizabeth A.},
  title = {Null-body, protean body, potent body, neutral body, wild body},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {69--90}
}
Belshaw, C. Immortality, memory and imagination 2015 The Journal of Ethics
19(3-4), 323-348.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Immortality-living forever and avoiding death-seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has been argued (notably by Williams, recently by Scheffler) that an immortal life would fairly soon become boring, trivial, and meaningless, and is not at all the sort of thing that any of us should want. Yet boredom and triviality presuppose our having powerful memories and imaginations, and an inability either to shake off the past or to free ourselves of weighty visions of the future. Suppose, though, that our capacities here are limited, so that our temporal reach is fairly significantly constrained. Then, I argue, these alleged problems with immortality will recede. Moreover, similar limitations might help us in the actual world, where life is short. If we cannot see clearly to its end points, both ahead and behind, life will seem longer. Keywords Immortality Á Memory Á Imagination Á Boredom Á Triviality Á Meaning Many people believe they will live forever. Many more, while lacking this belief, nevertheless hope, or would like, to live forever. But there is a difference. Although the boundaries here are not sharp, belief in immortality is, typically, belief in some sort of endless life, often of a not altogether familiar kind, that comes to us after death. The hope, where there is not the belief, is often for an avoidance of death, and a continuation of the life we already enjoy. It is this second form of immortality-let us just say secular rather than religious-that I am concerned with here. Though many think that a life without end is desirable, and would like it to be offered them, there are well-known objections. How powerful are these? Several writers have
BibTeX:
@article{Belshaw2015,
  author = {Belshaw, Christopher},
  title = {Immortality, memory and imagination},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {The Journal of Ethics},
  volume = {19},
  number = {3-4},
  pages = {323--348},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10892-015-9203-8}
}
Bernecker, S. Memory in analytic philosophy 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 298-315.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Remembering is a fundamental cognitive process that is involved in virtually all other important cognitive functions such as reasoning, perception, problem solving, and speech. Since memory is a central component of the mind, it is not surprising that theorizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself. Contemporary philosophers are primarily interested in the role of memory in various metaphysical and epistemological debates. Memory is frequently discussed in relation to epistemic justification, personal identity, externalism about mental content, and the experience of time—and, to a lesser extent, collective and cultural identity, nonconceptual mental content, the hypotheses of situated, embedded, or extended cognition, as well as the ethics of memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bernecker2015,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven},
  title = {Memory in analytic philosophy},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {298--315}
}
Bernecker, S. Visual memory and the bounds of authenticity 2015 Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium
De Gruyter, 445-464.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It has long been known that memory need not be a literal reproduction of the past but may be a constructive process. To say that memory is a constructive process is to say that the encoded content may differ from the retrieved content. At the same time, memory is bound by the authenticity constraint which states that the memory content must be true to the subject's original perception of reality. This paper addresses the question of how the constructive nature of visual memory can be reconciled with the authenticity constraint. In what re- spect and to what extent may the content of a visual memory differ from the original perceptual state while still adequately reflecting the subject's original perception?
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bernecker2015b,
  author = {Bernecker, Sven},
  title = {Visual memory and the bounds of authenticity},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
  editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  pages = {445--464}
}
Bernier, P. Dignāga on reflexive awareness 2015 Philosophy East and West
65(1), 125-156.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The nature of consciousness and the epistemology of self-knowledge, or how we know our own minds, have prompted many discussions in Western philosophy, par- ticularly in recent analytic philosophy. Classical Indian philosophy has also made noteworthy contributions to the development of original theories and arguments concerning these issues. Unfortunately, these contributions are little known in con- temporary philosophy. This article proposes and defends an interpretation of some central views of Dignāga on reflexive awareness (svasamvedana), or RA, which throw light on these philosophical questions. The Dignāgian account of RA rests crucially on the so-called memory argument, which has remained relatively unknown in con- temporary discussions. The main purpose of this article is to defend an interpretation of the memory argument and thus to contribute to contemporary discussions about the nature of consciousness and the epistemology of self-knowledge.
BibTeX:
@article{Bernier2015,
  author = {Bernier, Paul},
  title = {Dignāga on reflexive awareness},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophy East and West},
  volume = {65},
  number = {1},
  pages = {125--156},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2015.0015},
  url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/philosophyeastandwest/v065/65.1.bernier.html}
}
Bietti, L.M. and Sutton, J. Interacting to remember at multiple timescales: Coordination, collaboration, cooperation and culture in joint remembering 2015 Interaction Studies
16(3), 419-450.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Everyday joint remembering, from family remembering around the dinner table to team remembering in the operating theatre, relies on the successful interweaving of multiple cognitive, bodily, social and material resources, anchored in specific cultural ecosystems. Such systems for joint remembering in social interactions are composed of processes unfolding over multiple but complementary timescales, which we distinguish for analytic purposes so as better to study their interanimation in practice: (i) faster, lower-level coordination processes of behavioral matching and interactional synchrony occurring at timescale t1; (ii) mid-range collaborative processes which re-evoke past experiences in groups, unfolding at timescale t2; (iii) cooperative processes involved in the transmission of memories over longer periods occurring at timescale t3; and (iv) cultural processes and practices operating within distributed socio-cognitive networks over evolutionary and historical timeframes, unfolding at timescale t4 . In this paper we survey studies of how the processes operating across these overlapping and complementary timescales constitute joint remembering in social interactions. We describe coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and culture as complementary aspects of interacting to remember, which we consider as a complex phenomenon unfolding over multiple timescales (t1, t2, t3, t4) .
BibTeX:
@article{Bietti2015,
  author = {Bietti, Lucas M. and Sutton, John},
  title = {Interacting to remember at multiple timescales: Coordination, collaboration, cooperation and culture in joint remembering},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Interaction Studies},
  volume = {16},
  number = {3},
  pages = {419--450},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1075/is.16.3.04bie},
  url = {http://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/is.16.3.04bie}
}
Bogdan, R.J. Memory as window on the mind 2015 Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science
Springer, 45-53.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] This paper argues for two propositions. The first is that memory is not only indispensable to a mind but also constitutionally implicated in shaping its operation. As a result, a study of memory systems that dominate a kind of mind opens a unique explanatory window on what that kind of mind can and cannot do. This angle on the memory-mind relation has not been widely adopted in cognitive science so far; it should be.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bogdan2015a,
  author = {Bogdan, Radu J.},
  title = {Memory as window on the mind},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science},
  editor = {Pârvu, Ilie and Sandu, Gabriel and Toader, Iulian D.},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {45--53},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16655-1_3},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-16655-13}
}
Bublitz, C. and Dresler, M. A duty to remember, a right to forget? Memory manipulations and the law 2015 Handbook of Neuroethics
Springer, 1279-1307.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Neuroscience might develop interventions that afford editing or erasing memo- ries, changing their content or attenuating accompanying emotions. This section provides an introduction to the intriguing ethical and legal questions raised by such alterations, with a special focus on the report of the President's Council “Beyond Therapy” and the proposal of a right to freedom of memory advanced by Adam Kolber.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bublitz2015,
  author = {Bublitz, Christoph and Dresler, Martin},
  title = {A duty to remember, a right to forget? Memory manipulations and the law},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Neuroethics},
  editor = {Clausen, Jens and Levy, Neil},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {1279--1307},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_167},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4167}
}
Carruthers, P. The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought 2015
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Carruthers2015,
  author = {Carruthers, Peter},
  title = {The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought},
  year = {2015},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Casey, E.S. Edges of time, edges of memory 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 254-274.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Merleau-Ponty's thought was guided by three closely related philosophical passions: continuism, plenarism, and wholism. I will come to wholism, but will focus first on continuism and plenarism. By “continuism” I mean an aversion to lacunary phenomena such as gaps and holes and vacua along with a corresponding commitment to seeking continuities wherever they can be found—connections at the least, though not necessarily samenesses. Where Sartre, his lifelong philosophical foil, was fascinated with holes and the nothing—with the “not”—Merleau-Ponty was on the side of those who, from Parmenides to Descartes, Leibniz to Darwin, held that “Nature knows no gaps” and that it likewise “abhors a vacuum.” If one had to choose, Merleau- Ponty preferred Being to Nothingness. By the same token, he opted for full- ness rather than emptiness—for the plenary, the complete if not the total. His philosophical cup was always at least half-full. Or more likely fully full, chock-full of things and people and sensuous displays. An axiomatic utter- ance from the Phenomenology of Perception is this: “The problem of the world and, to begin with, that of one's own body, consists in the fact that it is all there [tout y demeure]” (230/230; his italics).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Casey2015,
  author = {Casey, Edward S.},
  title = {Edges of time, edges of memory},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {254--274}
}
Chen, X. Reflection: Memory and forgetfulness in daoism 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 176-183.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Daoism is among the most influential philosophies native to the Chinese, second only to Confucianism, which enjoyed the status of state-supported orthodoxy in China beginning around 135 BCE. The philosophy of Daoism offers a rich source for inspiration and imagination, for spiritual freedom, and for escape from misfortune and social pressure. Most important, however, its significance lays in its divergence from Confucianism: Daoism offers a unique presentation of values, containing its own ways of thinking and living. While Confucianism has traditionally embraced a conservative attitude, Daoism stresses a break from the tradition. Confucians who take interest in the Dao within the human world highlight its so-called manifestation in right relationships and in social harmony. However, they take themselves to be the guardians and transmitters of the old literature. And yet, Daoism itself is antitraditional, transcending common values; historically, it criticized Confucian rulers and Confucian political and moral theory. While Confucianism emphasized social interests, duty, and responsibility, Daoism prized the values of individual life. And, interesting, while Confucianism has emphasized memory, Daoism, especially Zhuangzi, has focused its attention on forgetting (wang, 忘). For the Daoist, forgetting is all-important, even more so than memory, in spiritual life and even in creative activity.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Chen2015,
  author = {Chen, Xia},
  title = {Reflection: Memory and forgetfulness in daoism},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {176--183}
}
Clowes, R.W. Thinking in the cloud: The cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology 2015 Philosophy & Technology
28(2), 261-296.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Technologies and artefacts have long played a role in the structure of human memory and our cognitive lives more generally. Recent years have seen an explosion in the production and use of a new regime of information technologies that might have powerful implications for our minds. Electronic-Memory (E-Memory), powerful, portable and wearable digital gadgetry and ``the cloud'' of ever-present data services allow us to record, store and access an ever-expanding range of information both about and of relevance to our lives. Already, for a decade we have been carrying around expansive gadgetry which allows us to collect, store and use what would have been almost unimaginable amounts of digital information only a short time ago. Now, thanks to the wireless internet adding vast processing and storage potential to the powerful portable devices which many of us carry constantly or wear, this information can be accessed and customised in an ever-greater variety of ways. How should we assess the implications of the new portable and pervasive cognitive technologies on offer? Does E-Memory and the wider panoply of cloud-enabled cognitive technologies really promise (as some see it), or threaten (as others do), a radical change to the human cognitive abilities and perhaps the very nature of our minds? If so, how are we to assess the possibilities and attempt to understand whether they offer a hopeful or dangerous turn in the human condition? This investigation is structured around four related factors of the new technology: Totality, Practical Incorporability, Autonomy and Entanglement. We use these factors to inquire into the implications of this cloud-based memory technology for our minds and our sense of self.
BibTeX:
@article{Clowes2015,
  author = {Clowes, Robert W.},
  title = {Thinking in the cloud: The cognitive incorporation of cloud-based technology},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophy & Technology},
  volume = {28},
  number = {2},
  pages = {261--296},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0153-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13347-014-0153-z}
}
Clucas, S. Memory in the renaissance and early modern period 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 131-175.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] During the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was an important shift in the concept of memory. Memory changed from being regarded as a distinct part of the sensitive faculties within an essentially Aristotelian psychology to being regarded as one intellective function among others in a unified intellect. There is a corresponding shift between memory construed primarily as an aid to the practical realms governed by rhetoric and dialectic (its usefulness to the orator or to the preacher) and memory as the principle upon which a “total science,” or encyclopedic knowledge could be elaborated. While Mary Carruthers has suggested that the culture of medieval Europe was “memorial,” while the early modern period ushered in a shift toward the “documentary,” the advent of print in some ways intensified this “memorial culture,” or at least led to a deepening of the thematic of memory in philosophy, and saw a rich development of memory in a variety of non-philosophical domains.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Clucas2015,
  author = {Clucas, Stephen},
  title = {Memory in the renaissance and early modern period},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {131--175}
}
Cosentino, E. and Ferretti, F. Cognitive foundations of the narrative self 2015 Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
6(2), 311-324.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper we tackle the issue of the role of narrative language in the constitution of human subjectivity. There are at least two different approaches to this issue. The first one is consistent with the view that language has a unique constitutive role in cognition. According to this account, human subjec- tivity is a by-product of the advent of language. We will refer to it as linguistic idealism and will argue that, in spite of its popularity in the philosophy and social sciences, this view is completely unfounded. We will defend a second approach, which acknowledges the relevant role of language in human subjectivity but interprets this role in the light of a relation of coevolution between language and cognition. We will sug- gest that this relation is asymmetric and the priority is given to the cognitive foundations of human sense of the self. The influence of language on human subjectivity is then analyzed in terms of a retroactive ef- fect. We will argue that the relation of coevolution between language and cognition provides an interpre- tative tool that allows us to account for human subjectivity in accordance with darwinian naturalism.
BibTeX:
@article{Cosentino2015,
  author = {Cosentino, Erica and Ferretti, Francesco},
  title = {Cognitive foundations of the narrative self},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {311--324},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2015.0029},
  url = {https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281373605}
}
de Freitas, E. and Ferrara, F. Movement, memory and mathematics: Henri Bergson and the ontology of learning 2015 Studies in Philosophy and Education
34(6), 565-585.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Using the work of philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) to examine the nature of movement and memory, this article contributes to recent research on the role of the body in learning mathematics. Our aim in this paper is to introduce the ideas of Bergson and to show how these ideas shed light on mathematics classroom activity. Bergson's monist philosophy provides a framework for understanding the materiality of both bodies and mathematical concepts. We discuss two case studies of classrooms to show how the mathematical concepts of number and function are themselves mobile and full of potentiality, open to deformation and the remapping of the (im)possible. Bergson helps us look differently at mathematical activity in the classroom, not as a closed set of distinct interacting bodies groping after abstract concepts, but as a dynamic relational assemblage.
BibTeX:
@article{DeFreitas2015,
  author = {de Freitas, Elizabeth and Ferrara, Francesca},
  title = {Movement, memory and mathematics: Henri Bergson and the ontology of learning},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Studies in Philosophy and Education},
  volume = {34},
  number = {6},
  pages = {565--585},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9455-y},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11217-014-9455-y}
}
de Warren, N. Memory in continental philosophy: Metaphor, concept, thinking 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 228-274.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The publication of Friedrich Nietzsche's Unfashionable Observations (1873–1876) and Henri Bergson's Matter and Memory (1896) marks a set of inflection points in the western history of memory that heralded a vibrant engagement with the sense of the past across a broad range of philosophical discourse. In the writings of Nietzsche, Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida—the principal figures discussed in this chapter—memory is addressed in many ways, yet an essential characteristic within this constellation is an acute sensitivity to the shifting meanings and varied manifestations of memory. Any essay on philosophical conceptions of memory, such as the one presently hazarded, must begin with this mindfulness, and thus avoid the temptation of proposing a single problem or perspective that would be said to embrace what is philosophically captivating about memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{DeWarren2015,
  author = {de Warren, Nicolas},
  title = {Memory in continental philosophy: Metaphor, concept, thinking},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {228--274}
}
Dogramaci, S. Forget and forgive: A practical approach to forgotten evidence 2015 Ergo
2, 645-677.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem of forgotten evidence.
BibTeX:
@article{Dogramaci2015,
  author = {Dogramaci, Sinan},
  title = {Forget and forgive: A practical approach to forgotten evidence},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Ergo},
  volume = {2},
  pages = {645--677},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0002.026},
  url = {http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.12405314.0002.026}
}
Droege, P. From Darwin to Freud: Confabulation as an adaptive response to dysfunctions of consciousness 2015 Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness
MIT Press, 141-165.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] I began this project by reading the excellent anthology Delusion and Self-Deception (Bayne and Fernandez 2009), and before long I was wondering if I had been deceiving myself into thinking I had anything original to add to the realms of recent publication on confabulation. My error does not count as delusional, thank goodness, because I am reconsidering the mistake. My ability to reevaluate my beliefs in light of counterevidence is a good way to distinguish nonpathological forms of error such as self-deception from pathological delusions.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Droege2015,
  author = {Droege, Paula},
  title = {From Darwin to Freud: Confabulation as an adaptive response to dysfunctions of consciousness},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness},
  editor = {Gennaro, Rocco J.},
  publisher = {MIT Press},
  pages = {141--165}
}
Fernández, J. What are the benefits of memory distortion? 2015 Consciousness and Cognition
33, 536-547.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The purpose of this paper is to determine whether memories can have any benefit for their subjects while being dis- torted.1 There are a number of things that one may have in mind by ‘benefit' while referring to memory. For that reason, the formulation of the issue that will occupy us here admits several possible readings. It will therefore make for clarity if we begin our discussion by specifying, in Section 1, the types of benefits with which we will be concerned in this discussion. One may also have different things in mind by ‘distortion,' depending on one's views about the function of memory. Thus, in order to formulate the topic of our discussion precisely, I will distinguish, in Section 2, two pictures ofwhat memory is supposed to do, and two associated notions of distortion. Next, I will put forward two types of memories that, I will argue, can qualify as cases of beneficial distortion under very specific circumstances. In Section 3, I will discuss the case of so-called ‘observer mem- ories' and, in Section 4, I will discuss the case of so-called ‘fabricated memories.' My contention will be that, in both cases, some of those memories can, on the one hand, be advantageous for the subject to have while, on the other hand, her faculty of mem- ory has failed to perform its proper function by producing them. The significance of this claim for the two pictures of what memory is supposed to do will be explored in Section 5.
BibTeX:
@article{Fernandez2015,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {What are the benefits of memory distortion?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  volume = {33},
  pages = {536--547},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.09.019},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053810014001974}
}
Frise, M. Epistemology of memory 2015 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] We learn a lot. Friends tell us about their lives. Books tell us about the past. We see the world. We reason and we reflect on our mental lives. As a result we come to know and to form justified beliefs about a range of topics. We also seem to keep these beliefs. How? The natural answer is: by memory. It is not too hard to understand that memory allows us to retain information. It is harder to understand exactly how memory allows us to retain knowledge and reasons for our beliefs. Learning is largely a matter of acquiring reasons for changing views. But how do we keep reasons for the views we keep? The epistemology of memory concerns memory's role in our having knowledge and justification. This branch of epistemology, unlike nearly all other branches, addresses our having knowledge and justification over time. This article reviews the major epistemic roles that philosophers have assigned to memory. Section 1 surveys the nature of memory and the various memory systems. Some philosophers think the relation knowledge bears to at least one memory system is maximally strong: remembering just is a way of knowing. Section 2 covers this strong relation. Section 3 canvases the main problems that data on human memory pose to theories of justification and the central attempts to solve these problems. Section 4 discusses the historical and contemporary responses to two main skeptical challenges about memory.
BibTeX:
@misc{Frise2015,
  author = {Frise, Matthew},
  title = {Epistemology of memory},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy},
  url = {http://www.iep.utm.edu/epis-mem/}
}
Gordon, B.R. and Theiner, G. Scaffolded joint action as a micro-foundation of organizational learning 2015 Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past
Routledge, 154-186.
[DOI]  
Abstract: [first paragraph] Organizational learning, at the broadest levels, as it has come to be understood within the organization theory and management literatures, concerns the expe- rientially driven changes in knowledge processes, structures, and resources that enable organizations to perform skillfully in their task environments (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011). Understood this way, organizational learning encompasses organizational knowledge and organizational knowledge creation processes (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nonaka 1994; Spender 1996; Grant 1996; Cook and Brown 1999; Nonaka et al. 2006; Nonaka and von Krogh 2009); absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002; Volberda et al. 2010), organizational memory and cognition (Walsh and Ungson 1991; Walsh 1995; Kaplan 2011; Ren and Argote 2011), sensemaking (Weick 1995; Weick et al. 2005), and related areas. Making sense of what this actually means, and explicating how it works, has been an important mandate in the field for several decades now; a quest chronicled, in part, by several influential reviews, including Fiol and Lyles (1985), Levitt and March (1988), Huber (1991), Crossan et al. (1999); Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011), and March (2011).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Gordon2015,
  author = {Gordon, Brian R. and Theiner, Georg},
  title = {Scaffolded joint action as a micro-foundation of organizational learning},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past},
  editor = {Stone, Charles and Bietti, Lucas M.},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {154--186},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315815398}
}
Gordon, M. Between remembering and forgetting 2015 Studies in Philosophy and Education
34(5), 489-503.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This essay seeks to add to a growing body of literature in philosophy of education that focuses on issues of historical consciousness and remembrance and their connections to moral education. In particular, I wish to explore the following questions: What does it mean to maintain a tension between remembering and forgetting tragic historical events? And what does an ethical stance that seeks to maintain this tension provide us? In what follows, I first describe two contemporary approaches to cultivating historical consciousness and advocate for the need to integrate the insights from both these strands rather than choosing between them. Based on some of the insights of Nietzsche, Arendt and other thinkers, I then explore the notion of forgetting while highlighting its educational and moral significance. In order to further explore the moral significance of forgetting, I highlight some of the similarities and differences between forgetting and the virtue of forgiving. Next, I consider the case of The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa as a contemporary example of an attempt to strike a balance between remembering and forgetting. I conclude this essay by briefly outlining some of the advantages of an ethic of remembering and forgetting
BibTeX:
@article{Gordon2015a,
  author = {Gordon, Mordechai},
  title = {Between remembering and forgetting},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Studies in Philosophy and Education},
  volume = {34},
  number = {5},
  pages = {489--503},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-014-9451-2},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11217-014-9451-2}
}
Hamilton, C. Body, memory, and irrelevancies in Hiroshima mon amour 2015 The Philosophy of Autobiography
University of Chicago Press, 72-95.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the last volume of her autobiography the British writer Kathleen Raine remarks: Too much happens to us in the present world for it to be possible to preserve a sense of what is really ours. We think we ‘know' what we possess merely by hearsay, or from books, or on the word of other people. Our lives are encum- bered with irrelevancies which we mistake for living experience, and which in the end come more and more to usurp it. (1991, 263) In this chapter, I wish to suggest that this knowledge, this acknowledgment, underlies Alain Resnais's fi lm Hiroshima mon amour. In arguing for this claim, I aim to explore Raine's comment in the context of the fi lm, provid- ing thereby an illustration of what she means in a particular context, which will, among other things, help make clearer what she means by the some- what obscure notion of “irrelevancies”; a philosophical perspective on self- understanding that we often miss; and also a fresh perspective on the fi lm itself. And this is part of a larger enterprise, namely, an attempt to explore philosophically a specifi c example in order to contribute to our understand- ing of how it is that human beings tell the story of their lives in a bid to make sense of themselves and what they experience. What I wish to suggest is that, in a particular way that I shall seek to explain clearly, reference to our corporeal vulnerability is of crucial importance in an adequate philosophical understanding of how it is that we struggle to make sense of our lives.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Hamilton2015,
  author = {Hamilton, Christopher},
  title = {Body, memory, and irrelevancies in Hiroshima mon amour},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography},
  editor = {Cowley, Christopher},
  publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
  pages = {72--95}
}
Harman, G. Thought 2015
Princeton University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Harman2015,
  author = {Harman, Gilbert},
  title = {Thought},
  year = {2015},
  publisher = {Princeton University Press}
}
Hasselmo, M.E. Remembering by index and content: Response to Sarah Robins 2015 Philosophical Psychology
28(6), 916-919.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In her review of my book How we remember: Brain mechanisms of episodic memory, Sarah Robins highlights my example of the problem of interference between memories accessed by content-addressable memory. However, she points out the difficulty of solving this problem with index-addressable representations such as time cells or arc length cells. Namely, the index-addressable memory requires knowing the unique index in advance in order to perform effective retrieval. This is a difficult problem, but should be solvable by forming bi-directional associations between an index-addressable sequence of time cells and an array of content-addressable features in the environment.
BibTeX:
@article{Hasselmo2015,
  author = {Hasselmo, Michael E.},
  title = {Remembering by index and content: Response to Sarah Robins},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {28},
  number = {6},
  pages = {916--919},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2014.895315},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2014.895315}
}
Hui, K. and Fisher, C.E. The ethics of molecular memory modification 2015 Journal of Medical Ethics
41(7), 515-520.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Novel molecular interventions have recently shown the potential to erase, enhance and alter specific long-term memories. Unique features of this form of memory modification call for a close examination of its possible applications. While there have been discussions of the ethics of memory modification in the literature, molecular memory modification (MMM) can provide special insights. Previously raised ethical concerns regarding memory enhancement, such as safety issues, the 'duty to remember', selfhood and personal identity, require re-evaluation in light of MMM. As a technology that exploits the brain's updating processes, MMM helps correct the common misconception that memory is a static entity by demonstrating how memory is plastic and subject to revision even in the absence of external manipulation. Furthermore, while putatively safer than other speculative technologies because of its high specificity, MMM raises notable safety issues, including potential insidious effects on the agent's emotions and personal identity. Nonetheless, MMM possesses characteristics of a more permissible form of modification, not only because it is theoretically safer, but because its unique mechanism of action requires a heightened level of cooperation from the agent. Discussions of memory modification must consider the specific mechanisms of action, which can alter the weight and relevance of various ethical concerns. MMM also highlights the need for conceptual accuracy regarding the term 'enhancement'; this umbrella term will have to be differentiated as new technologies are applied to a widening array of purposes.
BibTeX:
@article{Hui2015,
  author = {Hui, Katrina and Fisher, Carl E.},
  title = {The ethics of molecular memory modification},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
  volume = {41},
  number = {7},
  pages = {515--520},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101891},
  url = {http://jme.bmj.com/lookup/doi/10.1136/medethics-2013-101891}
}
Hutto, D.D. and Sánchez-García, R. Choking RECtified: Embodied expertise beyond Dreyfus 2015 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
14(2), 309-331.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: On a Dreyfusian account performers choke when they reflect upon and interfere with established routines of purely embodied expertise. This basic explanation of choking remains popular even today and apparently enjoys empirical support. Its driving insight can be understood through the lens of diverse philosophical visions of the embodied basis of expertise. These range from accounts of embodied cognition that are ultra conservative with respect to representational theories of cognition to those that are more radically embodied. This paper provides an account of the acquisition of embodied expertise, and explanation of the choking effect, from the most radically enactive, embodied perspective, spelling out some of its practical implications and addressing some possible philosophical challenges. Specifically, we propose: (i) an explanation of how skills can be acquired on the basis of ecological dynamics; and (ii) a non-linear pedagogy that takes into account how contentful representations might scaffold skill acquisition from a radically enactive perspective.
BibTeX:
@article{Hutto2015,
  author = {Hutto, Daniel D. and Sánchez-García, Raúl},
  title = {Choking RECtified: Embodied expertise beyond Dreyfus},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {14},
  number = {2},
  pages = {309--331},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-014-9380-0},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-014-9380-0}
}
Ismael, J. On whether the atemporal conception of the world is also amodal 2015 Analytic Philosophy
56(2), 142-157.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The world as we encounter it is full of contingency, and rife with danger and opportunity. Surrounding everything that does happen is a halo of unrealized possibilities. There is not only what does happen, but what could, would, or might have happened if things had been otherwise. The serenity prayer popu- larized in Alcoholics Anonymous meetings tells us that practical wisdom is at least in part a matter of knowing how to recognize the difference between necessity and contingency.1 And it is not just common sense that is steeped in modality. A good part of our scientific knowledge is explicitly modal knowl- edge. Our physical theories are not just interested in what actually happens. They mine the pattern of actual events for clues about their modal substruc- ture, i.e., the laws and causes whose implications describe a wide array of purely hypothetical situations.
BibTeX:
@article{Ismael2015,
  author = {Ismael, Jenann},
  title = {On whether the atemporal conception of the world is also amodal},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
  volume = {56},
  number = {2},
  pages = {142--157},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12062},
  url = {http://web.mit.edu/holton/www/pubs/determinism&fatalism.pdf http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phib.12062}
}
Jackson, A. How you know you are not a brain in a vat 2015 Philosophical Studies
172(10), 2799-2822.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A sensible epistemologist may not see how she could know that she is not a brain in a vat (BIV); but she doesn't panic. She sticks with her empirical beliefs, and as that requires, believes that she is not a BIV. (She does not infer entially base her belief that she is not a BIV on her empirical knowledge—she rejects that 'Moorean' response to skepticism.) Drawing on the psychological lit erature on metacognition, I describe a mechanism that's plausibly responsible for a sensible epistemologist coming to believe she is not a BIV. I propose she thereby knows that she is not a BIV. The particular belief-forming mechanism employed explains why she overlooks this account of how she knows she is not a BIV, making it seem that there is no way for her to know it. I argue this proposal satisfactorily resolves the skeptical puzzle.
BibTeX:
@article{Jackson2015,
  author = {Jackson, Alexander},
  title = {How you know you are not a brain in a vat},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {172},
  number = {10},
  pages = {2799--2822},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-015-0445-x}
}
Jacobson, K. The gift of memory: Sheltering the I 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 29-42.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] It is easy to think of myself as the direct possessor of my identity, as holding within myself the person that I am. Yet experience tells me otherwise: I find myself in and through the things, the people, and places of my unfolding life. My identity is sheltered in the world around me; as Bachelard writes, it is “the non-I that protects the I.”1 Building on Merleau-Ponty's notion of the dilated character of our way of being-in-the-world, I explore this idea and specifically argue that it is through memory, and its gift-like character, that we are returned to ourselves by what lies beyond us, that we maintain and develop an identity across time. I argue that memory, like a home, provides us with a dynamic pivot for our past and future; it is the living, breathing landscape of identity.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Jacobson2015,
  author = {Jacobson, Kirsten},
  title = {The gift of memory: Sheltering the I},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {29--42}
}
Jungert, M. Memory, personal identity, and memory modification 2015 Selbstgestaltung des Menschen durch Biotechnologien
Francke, 129-140.
 
Abstract: Memory certainly is one of the most significant characteristics of human beings. It is connected with anthropologically essential capabilities like strategic planning, self-reflection, and the development of a unique life story. Although the importance of memory seems to be evident, there is a strong negligence of the role of memory and remembering in theories on personal identity. In this chapter, I will demonstrate that this is mainly due to three factors: 1.) the missing differentiation between various kinds of memory; 2.) the one-sided focus on diachronic identity in the philosophical debate on personal identity; and 3.) the lack of integration of psychological research on memory into philosophical theory. I will discuss how to approach each of these problems and outline possible implications for the debate on memory modification and enhancement.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Jungert2015,
  author = {Jungert, M.},
  title = {Memory, personal identity, and memory modification},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Selbstgestaltung des Menschen durch Biotechnologien},
  publisher = {Francke},
  pages = {129--140}
}
Klein, S.B. A defense of experiential realism: The need to take phenomenological reality on its own terms in the study of the mind 2015 Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice
2(1), 41-56.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this article I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its own terms. In defense of " experiential realism, " I offer a critique of modern psychology's all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is " What can we learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into quantitative proxies? " I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory)—that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A " science of mind " that approaches its subject matter from a third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed skepticism.
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2015,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {A defense of experiential realism: The need to take phenomenological reality on its own terms in the study of the mind},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {41--56},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000036},
  url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/cns0000036}
}
Klein, S.B. What memory is 2015 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
6(1), 1-38.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term ‘memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the ‘received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2015a,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {What memory is},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--38},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1333},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/wcs.1333}
}
Kriegel, U. Experiencing the present 2015 Analysis
75(3), 407-413.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] There are several differences between (i) seeing rain outside one's window and (ii) episodically remembering seeing rain outside one's window. One difference appears to pertain to felt temporal orientation: in episodically remembering seeing the rain, we experience the rain, and/or the seeing of it, as (having occurred in the) past; in perceiving the rain, we experience the rain as (in the) present.1
BibTeX:
@article{Kriegel2015,
  author = {Kriegel, Uriah},
  title = {Experiencing the present},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Analysis},
  volume = {75},
  number = {3},
  pages = {407--413},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv039},
  url = {https://academic.oup.com/analysis/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/analys/anv039}
}
Landes, D.A. Memory, sedimentation, self: The weight of the ideal in Bergson and Merleau-Ponty 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 131-145.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] As has often been noted, the pathway to thinking Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Henri Bergson together is as oblique as the resonances are clear. Beyond their shared style of seeking a middle position between opposed philosophi- cal traditions, and in addition to their similar respect for contemporane- ous empirical research, they both attempt to reconceive the body through an exploration of habit, temporality, and a prereflective level of experience. Yet Merleau-Ponty, whose approach to these themes proceeds under the influence of Husserlian phenomenology, leaves an extended engagement with Bergson's concepts for the most part to the side. When he does offer a reading of Bergson, it is primarily critical.2 Nevertheless, as Alia Al-Saji notes, there is a certain “unthought” Bergson haunting the pages of Merleau- Ponty's texts.3
BibTeX:
@incollection{Landes2015,
  author = {Landes, Donald A.},
  title = {Memory, sedimentation, self: The weight of the ideal in Bergson and Merleau-Ponty},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {131--145}
}
Lin, Y.-T. Memory for prediction error minimization: From depersonalization to the delusion of non-existence: A commentary on Philip Gerrans 2015 Open MIND
MIND Group, 15(C).
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Depersonalization is an essential step in the development of the Cotard delusion. Based on Philip Gerrans' account (this collection), which is an integration of the appraisal theory, the simulation theory, and the predictive coding framework, this commentary aims to argue that the role of memory systems is to update the knowledge of prior probability required for successful predictions. This view of memory systems under the predictive coding framework provides an explanation of how experience is related to the construction of mental autobiographies, how anomalous experience can lead to delusions, and thus how the Cotard delusion arises from depersonalization.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Lin2015,
  author = {Lin, Ying-Tung},
  title = {Memory for prediction error minimization: From depersonalization to the delusion of non-existence: A commentary on Philip Gerrans},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Open MIND},
  editor = {Metzinger, Thomas and Windt, Jennifer M},
  publisher = {MIND Group},
  pages = {15(C)},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570719},
  url = {www.open-mind.net}
}
Ludwig, K. Is distributed cognition group level cognition? 2015 Journal of Social Ontology
1(2), 189-224.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper shows that recent arguments from group problem solving and task performance to emergent group level cognition that rest on the social parity and related principles are invalid or question begging. The paper shows that standard attributions of problem solving or task performance to groups require only multiple agents of the outcome, not a group agent over and above its members, whether or not any individual member of the group could have accomplished the task independently.
BibTeX:
@article{Ludwig2015,
  author = {Ludwig, Kirk},
  title = {Is distributed cognition group level cognition?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Journal of Social Ontology},
  volume = {1},
  number = {2},
  pages = {189--224},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0001},
  url = {https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jso.2015.1.issue-2/jso-2015-0001/jso-2015-0001.xml}
}
Martin, M.G.F. Old acquaintance: Russell, memory and problems with acquaintance 2015 Analytic Philosophy
56(1), 1-44.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] While still in prison for breaching the Defence of Realm Act, Bertrand Russell filled up his time in the summer of 1918 drafting material that would eventually form the basis ofThe Analysis ofMind (hereafter, AM) (Russell, 1921). In those notes, Russell repudiates the notion of ego or the subject and with it the relation of acquaintance that he had employed in earlier work. In its place he embraces the Neutral Monism that he had hitherto resisted in, for example, The Theory of Knowledge manuscript (hereafter, TK) (Russell, 1992) and the lectures Philosophy of Logical Atomism (hereafter, PLA) (Russell, 1986). Among those manuscript pages are three notes bundled together on the topic of memory. In the first of these he proclaims:
BibTeX:
@article{Martin2015,
  author = {Martin, M. G. F.},
  title = {Old acquaintance: Russell, memory and problems with acquaintance},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Analytic Philosophy},
  volume = {56},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--44},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12059},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phib.12059}
}
Mazis, G.A. The depths of time in the world's memory of self 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 43-68.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The sense we have of who we are, for Merleau-Ponty, emerges from juxtaposi- tions of differing temporalities within the depths of perception, those fissures first described in the Phenomenology of Perception, yet not as prominently as they will be in his later writings. Prereflective experience as it unfolds within perception is not a matter of simple presentations, but rather is the coming forth of things, beings, events, and ultimately one's emerging sense of self as perceived in a complex present that not only has the progressively unfolding past and future within its depths, but also transgressive eruptions of varied temporal moments that flash forth— especially of the past—that are the un- noticed depths of perception and memory. In the introductory sections of the Phenomenology of Perception, in an opening sketch of perception, we are told that in my perceiving the table, I “resolutely contract the thickness of duration which has elapsed while I have been looking at it,” or, in other words, al- though I am not consciously displaced from my present attention in the regard
BibTeX:
@incollection{Mazis2015,
  author = {Mazis, Glen A.},
  title = {The depths of time in the world's memory of self},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {43--68}
}
McCain, K. Is forgotten evidence a problem for evidentialism? 2015 The Southern Journal of Philosophy
53(4), 471-480.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The “problem of forgotten evidence” is a common objection to evidentialist theories of epistemic justification. This objection is motivated by cases where someone forms a belief on the basis of supporting evidence and then later forgets this evidence while retaining the belief. Critics of evidentialist theories argue that in some of these cases the person's belief remains justified. So, these critics claim that one can have a justified belief that is not supported by any evidence the subject possesses. I argue that these critics are mistaken.
BibTeX:
@article{McCain2015,
  author = {McCain, Kevin},
  title = {Is forgotten evidence a problem for evidentialism?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {53},
  number = {4},
  pages = {471--480},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12152},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/sjp.12152}
}
McGrath, S. Forgetting the difference between right and wrong 2015 Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory
Oxford University Press
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In this paper, I explore a neglected puzzle due to Gilbert Ryle. 1 Section 1 presents Ryle's puzzle and discusses its potential significance for metaethics. In Sections 2 and 3, I examine and criticize a number of proposed solutions to the puzzle, including Ryle's own. In Section 4, I develop and defend a novel solution.
BibTeX:
@incollection{McGrath2015,
  author = {McGrath, Sarah},
  title = {Forgetting the difference between right and wrong},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory},
  editor = {Chappell, Sophie-Grace},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Michaelian, K. Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind? 2015 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science
6(6), 475-482.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the ‘ doors of memory' too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It maybe preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage,and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not.
BibTeX:
@article{Michaelian2015,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science},
  volume = {6},
  number = {6},
  pages = {475--482},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1364},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/wcs.1364}
}
Morris, D. and Maclaren, K. Introduction 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 1-25.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] This collection of essays elucidates Merleau-Ponty's accounts of time, memory, and the institution of meaning, and develops their implications for understanding the self and its ontology.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Morris2015,
  author = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  title = {Introduction},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {1--25}
}
Müller, J. Memory in medieval philosophy 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 92-124.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The concept of memory is of the utmost importance for an understanding of the Middle Ages as a historic period. In a seminal study on this subject, medieval culture is aptly described as “fundamentally memorial, to the same profound degree that modern culture in the West is documentary.” Memory is for medieval thought what imagination is for the Renaissance and the Enlightenment: the central human capability that sets in motion the flow of intellectual ideas and thoroughly keeps this flow going.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Muller2015,
  author = {Müller, Jörn},
  title = {Memory in medieval philosophy},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {92--124}
}
Myin, E. and Zahidi, K. The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mind 2015 Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium
De Gruyter, 391-408.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In contemporary philosophy of mind, internalism – the view that mental phe- nomena are confined to the brain, or at least the body of subjects – is a widely held position. In their (in)famous paper “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) have challenged inte rnalism about the mind, proposing instead the Extended Mind thesis. According to that view, someone's beliefs or memories can be “constituted partly by fea- tures of the environment” (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 12). In other words, Clark and Chalmers hold that parts of the environment can be part of the mental. This position is also known under the name of “active externalism” (to distinguish it from the passive externalism with respect to content as developed by Putnam and Burge) (Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 12).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Myin2015,
  author = {Myin, Erik and Zahidi, Karim},
  title = {The extent of memory. From extended to extensive mind},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
  editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  pages = {391--408}
}
Naylor, A. Justification and forgetting 2015 Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
96(3), 372-391.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article sets forth a view about how epistemic justification figures in the ongoing justification of memory belief, a view that I call moderate justificational preservationism (MJP). MJP presupposes a nontraditional notion of memorial justification according to which what makes one's present belief that p prima facie justified is that which provided one with prima facie justification to believe that p originally (or some portion thereof). The article offers support for MJP by examining a series of cases that involve forgetting, and in doing so, criticizes views of Jennifer Lackey, David Owens, Michael Huemer, and George Pappas.
BibTeX:
@article{Naylor2015,
  author = {Naylor, Andrew},
  title = {Justification and forgetting},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  volume = {96},
  number = {3},
  pages = {372--391},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12076},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/papq.12076}
}
Naylor, A. On inferentially remembering that P 2015 Logos & Episteme
6(2), 225-230.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference from one's memory that q and a true thought one has that r, its analysis presupposes an adequate account of the (presumably non-inferential) memory that q. Bernecker's account of non-inferentially remembering-that is shown to be inadequate. A remedy lies in strengthening the account by requiring the rememberer to have had prima facie justification to believe that q, any defeaters of which were misleading.
BibTeX:
@article{Naylor2015a,
  author = {Naylor, Andrew},
  title = {On inferentially remembering that P},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Logos & Episteme},
  volume = {6},
  number = {2},
  pages = {225--230},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20156214},
  url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/memory/: http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=logos-episteme20150006000202250230&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Nikulin, D. Introduction: Memory in recollection of itself 2015
1Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 3-34.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory belongs to our most common and everyday, and yet most intimate and significant, experiences. Following Augustine's famous observation about time, one might say that memory seems to be self-evident in its immediacy, yet, when asked what it is, memory appears to evade definition and requires much effort for its understanding.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nikulin2015a,
  author = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  title = {Introduction: Memory in recollection of itself},
  year = {2015},
  volume = {1},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {3--34}
}
Nikulin, D. Memory in ancient philosophy 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 35-84.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Ancient philosophy has long become our philosophical other in which we can almost always discover, or rediscover, a theme or an insight that we now deem modern and new. Memory's philosophical recollection of itself can therefore become reflective once it looks into the mirror of its ancient understanding and recognizes itself in images and narratives that appear both familiar and strange.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nikulin2015b,
  author = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  title = {Memory in ancient philosophy},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {35--84}
}
Nuzzo, A. Forms of memory in classical German philosophy 2015 Memory: A History
Oxford University Press, 184-219.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The terminology of memory in the German language is as extensive and differentiated as the philosophical reflection that is informed by such terminology in the period of its classical development in Kant and his aftermath up to Hegel. Erinnerung, Gedächtnis, Andacht, their uses and associations (sich erinnern, Innerlichkeit, Denken) punctuate a problematic constellation that is coextensive with the entire disciplinary field of philosophy—from metaphysics to epistemology and logic to psychology and anthropology, to the spheres of ethics, politics and the social, to the philosophy of history and the reflection on art. Those concepts also connect the philosophical discussion of the time with extra-philosophical fields such as religion, literature, and the arts more broadly. Eventually, they testify of the varied reception of the history of the concept of memory in German philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century and in the first decades of the nineteenth century: Aristotle's influence intersects with or is alternatively opposed by a renewal of Plato's theory of anamnēsis; the modern discussion between Locke and Leibniz and the latter's influence on scholastic psychology loom large in the background but are eventually rendered unrecognizable in the developments initiated by Kant's criticism. To put it very generally, in the philosophical reflection on the theme of memory during this period, traditional strata of meaning coexist with brilliant innovations and uses.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nuzzo2015,
  author = {Nuzzo, Angelica},
  title = {Forms of memory in classical German philosophy},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Memory: A History},
  editor = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {184--219}
}
O'Loughlin, I. Neither noise nor signal: The role of context in memory models 2015
9405Modeling and Using Context: 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2015 Lanarca, Cyprus, November 2-6, 2015 Proceedings
Springer, 398-409.
 
Abstract: Context plays a crucial role in learning and memory, but a satisfactory characterization of this role in models of memory remains elusive. Classical and recent studies show that context cannot be mean- ingfully treated as either the figure or the ground, the noise or the signal, in memory models. This impasse belies certain cognitivist assumptions common to traditional cognitive science. A number of postcognitivist movements in philosophy and cognitive science have offered effective cri- tiques of the basic framework, often borrowed in memory science, that depicts the human cognitive system as a dimensionless executive control unit receiving and transforming signals as input from the environment. These revisionary movements have also offered up alternative dynamic approaches to cognitive modeling and explanation, which can and should be deployed in memory science in order to resolve the impasse surround- ing the modeling of context and memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{OLoughlin2015,
  author = {O'Loughlin, Ian},
  title = {Neither noise nor signal: The role of context in memory models},
  year = {2015},
  volume = {9405},
  booktitle = {Modeling and Using Context: 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2015 Lanarca, Cyprus, November 2-6, 2015 Proceedings},
  editor = {Christiansen, Henning and Stojanovic, Isidora and Papadopoulos, George A.},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {398--409}
}
Oshana, M. Memory, self-understanding, and agency 2015 The Philosophy of Autobiography
University of Chicago Press, 96-121.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The task of this chapter is to determine what aspects of a person's identity or “selfhood” must be available to the person, and the manner in which they must be available, in order for the person to function as a self- governing agent. For the purposes of this discussion I shall understand agency as a fairly robust state. So understood, an agent is a being who deliberates, refl ects, de- cides, intends, and brings about states of affairs. An agent (ideally) estab- lishes standards of behavior for himself and is in control of himself, unlike a patient, or a being that is acted upon, managed, or caused to assume various states. A patient may well have desires and goals, and a distinctive conception of the good he wishes to realize. He might have the good fortune to see these realized, perhaps on his behalf, by others. But only qua agent is a person in a position to realize these goals by his own effort. To be a self- governing agent calls for a further characteristic.1 This characteristic is the ability to anticipate one's intentions as leading to action by way of self- monitoring behavior. In what follows I will suggest that this robust form of agency is missing from the lives of persons beset by a spectrum of disorders of memory and of senility. I shall argue that memory, and principally autobiographical episodic memory of past experiences, is a central element in our standing as self- governing agents.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Oshana2015,
  author = {Oshana, Marina},
  title = {Memory, self-understanding, and agency},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography},
  editor = {Cowley, Christopher},
  publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
  pages = {96--121}
}
Otgaar, H., Howe, M.L., Clark, A., Wang, J. and Merckelbach, H. What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015) 2015 Consciousness and Cognition
33, 286-290.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area.
BibTeX:
@article{Otgaar2015,
  author = {Otgaar, Henry and Howe, Mark L. and Clark, Andrew and Wang, Jianqin and Merckelbach, Harald},
  title = {What if you went to the police and accused your uncle of abuse? Misunderstandings concerning the benefits of memory distortion: A commentary on Fernández (2015)},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  volume = {33},
  pages = {286--290},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2015.01.015},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053810015000173}
}
Parker, D. Was there an ice cube there or am I just remembering it? Does the reversibility argument really imply scepticism about records? 2015 Erkenntnis
80(S3), 587-603.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: It is commonly thought that the statistical mechanical reversibility objection implies that our putative records of the past are more likely to have arisen as spontaneous fluctuations from equilibrium states than through causal processes that correctly indicate past states of affairs. Hence, so the story goes, without some further assumption that solves the reversibility objection, such as the past hypoth- esis, all our beliefs about the past would almost surely be false. This claim is disputed and it is argued that at least some of our records of the past can and should be thought to be veridical because the intentional contents of records are not included as part of their statistical mechanical description. The fact that the present state of the world around us coheres so well with the way we would expect it to be if our records were veridical provides good evidence for the claim that they are produced via a common causal structure.
BibTeX:
@article{Parker2015,
  author = {Parker, Daniel},
  title = {Was there an ice cube there or am I just remembering it? Does the reversibility argument really imply scepticism about records?},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Erkenntnis},
  volume = {80},
  number = {S3},
  pages = {587--603},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9768-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10670-015-9768-4}
}
Proust, J. Time and action: Impulsivity, habit, strategy 2015 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
6(4), 717-743.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed to satisfy the trade-off above when achieving goals of each type. While actions of the first two types depend on non-conceptual appraisals of a given intensity and valence, strategic intentions have a propositional format and guide action within longer-term executive frameworks involving prospective memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Proust2015,
  author = {Proust, Joëlle},
  title = {Time and action: Impulsivity, habit, strategy},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {6},
  number = {4},
  pages = {717--743},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0224-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0224-1}
}
Robins, S.K. A mechanism for mental time travel? A critical review of Hasselmo's How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory 2015 Philosophical Psychology
28(6), 903-915.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Episodic memories are memories for particular past experiences, from walking down the aisle to parking the car outside a store. Recalling these episodes can feel like reliving them: they are accompanied by a level of phenomenological detail that memories for facts, phone numbers, and faces are not. Episodic memory is thus often considered the most important, and yet most difficult, form of memory to explain. Tulving (2002) has described it as “mental time travel,” a characterization as apt as it is unilluminating. An explanation of episodic remembering requires us to say more.
BibTeX:
@article{Robins2015,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {A mechanism for mental time travel? A critical review of Hasselmo's How We Remember: Brain Mechanisms of Episodic Memory},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {28},
  number = {6},
  pages = {903--915},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.877243},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2013.877243}
}
Rowlands, M. Rilkean memory 2015 The Southern Journal of Philosophy
53, 141-154.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper identifies a form of remembering sufficiently overlooked that it has not yet been dignified with a name. I shall christen it Rilkean Memory. This form of memory is, typically, embodied and embedded. It is a form of involuntary, autobiographical memory that is neither implicit nor explicit, neither declarative nor procedural, neither episodic nor semantic, and not Freudian. While a discussion of the importance of Rilkean memory lies beyond the scope of this paper, I shall try to show that admitting Rilkean memory into our ontology does point us in the direction of a very different conception of the mind and mental processes.
BibTeX:
@article{Rowlands2015,
  author = {Rowlands, Mark},
  title = {Rilkean memory},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {53},
  pages = {141--154},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12118},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/sjp.12118}
}
Ruin, H. Anamnemic subjectivity: New steps toward a hermeneutics of memory 2015 Continental Philosophy Review
48(2), 197-216.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The topic and theme of memory has occupied an ambiguous position in phenomenological and hermeneutic thinking from the start, at once central and marginalized. Parallel to and partly following upon the general turn toward collective and cultural memory in the human and social sciences over the last decades, the importance of memory in and for phenomenological and hermeneutic theory has begun to emerge more clearly. The article seeks to untangle the reasons for the ambiguous position of this theme. It describes how and why the question of what memory is can provide a unique entrance to thinking the temporality and historicity of human existence, while at the same time it can also block the access to precisely these most fundamental levels of subjectivity. The text argues for a deeper mutual theoretical engagement between phenomenological-hermeneutical thinking and contemporary cultural memory studies, on the basis of an understanding of memory as finite and ec-static temporality, and as the enigma of so-called anamnetic subjectivity.
BibTeX:
@article{Ruin2015,
  author = {Ruin, Hans},
  title = {Anamnemic subjectivity: New steps toward a hermeneutics of memory},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Continental Philosophy Review},
  volume = {48},
  number = {2},
  pages = {197--216},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-015-9323-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11007-015-9323-7}
}
Russon, J. The impossibilities of the I: Self, memory, and language in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 92-105.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] “I nearly forgot myself, so persuasively did they speak.” So says Socrates as he begins his defense speech in Plato's Apologia Socratous.1 Three themes are linked here: self, memory, and speech. I will not in fact engage with the richness of this Platonic text, but I will take it as a provocation to explore the intertwining of the sense of “self”—the I am I—with matters of memory and language. Through investigating the essential roles of memory and ex- pression within the experience of I am I, we will find first that the I's very possibility rests upon two impossibilities of the I meeting up with itself.2 This analysis will reveal three temporalities: the impersonal, melodic temporality that integrates the present with the past that is a former present; the reitera- tive temporality of the past that remains my true present; and the discontinu- ous temporality of the past that was never present. To these temporalities correspond three senses of self: the transparent self that answers to the im- perative of objectivity, the personal self that is character and complex, and the as-yet-unknown self of transformation.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Russon2015,
  author = {Russon, John},
  title = {The impossibilities of the I: Self, memory, and language in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {92--105}
}
Schwarz, W. Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver 2015 Synthese
192(9), 3011-3036.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The puzzle of the absentminded driver combines an unstable decision prob- lem with a version of the Sleeping Beauty problem. Its analysis depends on the choice between “halfing” and “thirding” as well as that between “evidential” and “causal” decision theory. I show that all four combinations lead to interestingly different solu- tions, and draw some general lessons about the formulation of causal decision theory, the interpretation of mixed strategies and the connection between rational credence and objective chance.
BibTeX:
@article{Schwarz2015,
  author = {Schwarz, Wolfgang},
  title = {Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {192},
  number = {9},
  pages = {3011--3036},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0699-z},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-015-0699-z}
}
Shapiro, L. Memory in the Meditations 2015 Res Philosophica
92(1), 41-60.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper considers just how memory works throughout the Meditations to adduce Descartes's conception of memory. Examining the meditator's memory at work raises some questions about the nature of Cartesian memory and its epistemic role. What is the distinction between remembering and repeating a thought? If remembering is not simply repeating a thought, then what is involved in properly remembering? Can we remember properly while adding or shifting content, say, in virtue of articulating relations between ideas? If so, what is the relation between remembering and reasoning, since both would then involve relations of ideas? These questions become salient in considering the meditator's creative recollections in the Third and especially the Sixth Meditations. After briefly considering what Descartes does say about memory, I consider two other strategies for addressing those questions: an analogy with innate ideas, and attending to the role that other thinkers play in one's own recollections.
BibTeX:
@article{Shapiro2015,
  author = {Shapiro, Lisa},
  title = {Memory in the Meditations},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Res Philosophica},
  volume = {92},
  number = {1},
  pages = {41--60},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2015.92.1.3},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imusesynonym=resphilosophica&rft.DOI=10.11612/resphil.2015.92.1.3&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Sridharan, V. Conscious belief as constructed memory: An empirical challenge to dispositionalism 2015 Mind & Society
14(1), 21-33.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: There is an emerging consensus that human behavior is governed by two types of processes: System 1 processes, which are quicker, automatic, and run in parallel, and System 2 (S2) processes, which are slower, more conscious, and run in serial. Among such ‘‘dual-process'' theorists, however, there is disagreement about whether the premises we use in our conscious, S2 reasoning should be considered as beliefs. In this exchange, one facet that has been largely overlooked is how con- scious beliefs are structurally and functionally similar to episodic memories. This article will argue that the similarities between beliefs and episodic memories, specifically in light of Daniel Schacter's widely influential constructive memory framework, highlight a heretofore unexamined empirical weakness of dispositional accounts of S2 beliefs. In addition, this perspective helps situate beliefs within our broader understanding of how information is encoded and retrieved in the brain.
BibTeX:
@article{Sridharan2015,
  author = {Sridharan, Vishnu},
  title = {Conscious belief as constructed memory: An empirical challenge to dispositionalism},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Mind & Society},
  volume = {14},
  number = {1},
  pages = {21--33},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11299-014-0156-6}
}
Strawson, G. 'The secrets of all hearts': Locke on personal identity 2015 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
76(S), 111-141.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Many think John Locke's account of personal identity is inconsistent and circular. It's neither of these things. The root causes of the misreading are [i] the mistake of thinking that Locke uses ‘consciousness' to mean memory, [ii] failure to appreciate the importance of the ‘concernment' that always accompanies ‘consciousness', on Locke's view, [iii] a tendency to take the term person , in Locke's text, as if it were (only) some kind of fundamental sortal term like ‘human being' or ‘thinking thing', and to fail to take proper account of Locke's use of it as a ‘forensic' term (§26). It's well known that Locke uses person as a forensic term, but the consequences of this have still not been fully worked out.
BibTeX:
@article{Strawson2015,
  author = {Strawson, Galen},
  title = {'The secrets of all hearts': Locke on personal identity},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement},
  volume = {76},
  number = {S},
  pages = {111--141},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246115000144},
  url = {http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstractS1358246115000144}
}
Sullivan-Bissett, E. Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence 2015 Consciousness and Cognition
33, 548-560.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.
BibTeX:
@article{Sullivan-Bissett2015,
  author = {Sullivan-Bissett, Ema},
  title = {Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
  volume = {33},
  pages = {548--560},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.006},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1053810014001986}
}
Sutton, J. Remembering as public practice: Wittgenstein, memory, and distributed cognitive ecologies 2015 Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium
De Gruyter, 409-444.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] A woman is listening to Sinatra before work. As she later describes it, ‘suddenly from nowhere I could hear my mother singing along to it … I was there again home again, hearing my mother … God knows why I should choose to remember that … then, to actually hear her and I had this image in my head … of being at home … with her singing away … like being transported back you know I got one of those … like shivery feelings really suddenly' (Anderson 2004, 9-10). An older couple, discussing their honeymoon forty years ago, each say that they can't remember the show they saw, until through iterative, puzzled cross-cuing they finally get there – ‘Desert Song, that's it' (Harris et al 2011, 292). An elderly English veteran of a prisoner of war camp in Japan, finishing up morning tea with a young Japanese social scientist interested in reconciliation, suddenly calls out loudly – in Japanese – ‘stand to attention'. He stands to attention in front of her: like many of the men she interviews, he physically re-enacts frag- ments of that long-past world of the camp, bringing that absent past into this new present context with a visceral shock (Murakami 2001, 2012; Middleton & Brown 2005, 133-136).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Sutton2015,
  author = {Sutton, John},
  title = {Remembering as public practice: Wittgenstein, memory, and distributed cognitive ecologies},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium},
  editor = {Moyal-Sharrock, D and Munz, V and Coliva, A},
  publisher = {De Gruyter},
  pages = {409--444}
}
Sutton, J. Scaffolding memory: Themes, taxonomies, puzzles 2015 Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past
Routledge, 187-205.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] We must learn to remember the particular events and experiences in our past. Infants have capacities to imitate and repeat, to know what to expect and what usually happens in specific contexts, and to remember isolated episodes (Bauer 2007). Building on these capacities, young children gradually gain the ability to locate specific past actions and experiences in time, and to understand them in terms of their causal, emotional, or narrative relations to other events (Nelson and Fivush 2004). Typically, autobiographical remembering of this more sophis- ticated form does not emerge until the child is 4 or 5 years old, and richer forms continue to develop throughout childhood, to such an extent that it can be seen as a social-cultural skill (Fivush 2011). Longitudinal studies increasingly reveal a range of individual and cultural differences and trajectories through adoles- cence and early adulthood in the forms and contents of the personal narratives that people spontaneously recall when remembering their past (Markowitsch and Welzer 2009; Reese 2009; Fivush et al. 2011; Reese et al. 2011).
BibTeX:
@book{Sutton2015a,
  author = {Sutton, John},
  title = {Scaffolding memory: Themes, taxonomies, puzzles},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Contextualizing Human Memory: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding How Individuals and Groups Remember the Past},
  editor = {Stone, Charles and Bietti, Lucas M.},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {187--205}
}
Tan, E.J. Forgetting and forgiving: A Nietzschean perspective 2015 Prajna Vihara
16(1), 20-50.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] What is the relation between forgiveness and forgetting? While it is true that one cannot be said to have forgiven another an offense simply because one has forgotten the offense if only because it is nec- essary that one know the offense for which one is granting forgiveness - nevertheless, common ways of speaking attest to an intuition that there is an important relation between forgiveness and forgetting. For instance, one might respond to a friend's apology by saying, “Forget about it”, or simply, “It is forgotten”. It may be argued that in such instances, the alternative or accompanying expression “there is nothing to forgive”, should perhaps be taken quite literally since the offense in question may be too minor, thus rendering these expressions at best merely incidental and certainly non-paradigmatic cases of forgiveness. Nevertheless, no matter how trivial the offense might be, it is clear that in such exchanges the disavowal of the need for forgiveness is not to be taken literally. There is indeed something to forgive and be forgiven for; in the injunc- tion to the offending party to “forget about it” (speaking of a forgetting that has yet to occur and a deed that is still to be forgotten) and in the injured party's claim that “there is nothing to forgive” (attesting to a forgiving that need no longer occur since it already has), forgetting serves as the token of forgiveness.
BibTeX:
@article{Tan2015,
  author = {Tan, Emily Jean},
  title = {Forgetting and forgiving: A Nietzschean perspective},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Prajna Vihara},
  volume = {16},
  number = {1},
  pages = {20--50}
}
Tang, M.-t. False memories and reproductive imagination: Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory 2015 Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy
7(1), 29-51.
 
Abstract: In cognitive psychology, a false memory refers to a fabricated or distorted recollection of an event that did not actually happen. Both 'memory-distortion' and 'false memory creation' refer to the processes of recollection in which the recollected events are not actually happened. This paper has three aims: (1) to examine Ricoeur's analysis of memory and imagination; (2) to explain and reinforce the constructive role of memory; (3) to show in what manner the first two aims lead to the conclusion that the phenomena of 'distorted or false memory creation' are reproductive because the nature of recollection is constructive in the sense of representation of past. In this regard, Ricoeur's trajectory not only displaces the essential structure of memory and imagination behind the curtain of their distinction and connection, but also contributes to the debates in cognitive psychology.
BibTeX:
@article{Tang2015,
  author = {Tang, Man-to},
  title = {False memories and reproductive imagination: Ricoeur's phenomenology of memory},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy},
  volume = {7},
  number = {1},
  pages = {29--51}
}
Thomas, E. Hilda Oakeley on idealism, history and the real past 2015 British Journal for the History of Philosophy
23(5), 933-953.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In the early twentieth century, Hilda Diana Oakeley (1867–1950) set out a new kind of British idealism. Oakeley is an idealist in the sense that she holds mind to actively contribute to the features of experience, but she also accepts that there is a world independent of mind. One of her central contributions to the idealist tradition is her thesis that minds construct our experiences using memory. This paper explores the theses underlying her idealism, and shows how they are intricately connected to the wider debates of her period. I go on to explain how the parts of Oakeley's idealism are connected to further areas of her thought – specifically, her views on history and her growing block theory of time – to provide a sense of Oakeley's philosophy as a system. As there is no existing literature on Oakeley, this paper aims to open a path for further scholarship.
BibTeX:
@article{Thomas2015,
  author = {Thomas, Emily},
  title = {Hilda Oakeley on idealism, history and the real past},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {British Journal for the History of Philosophy},
  volume = {23},
  number = {5},
  pages = {933--953},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2015.1055232},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09608788.2015.1055232}
}
Tsompanidis, V. Mental files and times 2015 Topoi
34(1), 233-240.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper argues that applying a mental files framework for singular thought to thoughts about specific times could produce an account of tensed thought with sig- nificant advantages over competing theories. After describing the framework (1), I argue for the conceivability of treating particular times as res of singular thoughts (2), and the pos- sibility that humans open ‘object files' for them during per- ception (3). Then I discuss the possible make-up and function of a NOW indexical mental file (4). The last section argues that, if our ‘now' thoughts can be coherently analysed as thinking ofatime under theNOWmental file, onewould have a plausible explanation of the following issues: how tensed thought can refer to extended temporal intervals of various length; why reference to times is not destroyed by thought delays; and how a ‘now' thought results in timely actions and, sometimes, relief. Keywords
BibTeX:
@article{Tsompanidis2015,
  author = {Tsompanidis, Vasilis},
  title = {Mental files and times},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Topoi},
  volume = {34},
  number = {1},
  pages = {233--240},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9247-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11245-014-9247-6}
}
Vallier, R. Memory-of the future: Institutions and memory in the later Merleau-Ponty 2015 Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self
Ohio University Press, 109-129.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In the intellectually productive years of the 1950s, during the period when he holds the Chair of Philosophy at the Collège de France and until his death in 1961, Merleau-Ponty is engaged in a critical self-reflection leading to a deep- ening of the problematic at the center of his philosophical project. Through- out the decade, Merleau-Ponty draws from multiple “nonphilosophical” dis- courses—painting, the life sciences, psychology, psychoanalysis, and politics, to name but a few—in order to better understand the fundamentally new pattern of relations between the human and Being that has emerged through these nonphilosophical discourses during the twentieth century. This domain of nonphilosophy may be diverse, but all the investigations of it, he says, tend in “convergent directions” and point to a new “fundamental thought,” that is, a new way of thinking these ontological relations (NC, 163).1 As such, the discourse of philosophy itself must also change, because philoso- phy as it has traditionally been understood is no longer capable of expressing these ontological relations, perpetuating a distorted image of human being, an image that would be just as inadequate as any offered by the idealism or materialism against which the young Merleau-Ponty and his colleagues had argued by embracing phenomenology. To understand human being more adequately in light of nonphilosophy, then, is not only why Merleau- Ponty looks to nonphilosophy for resources, but also why we might be able to characterize Merleau-Ponty's project as an ontological refoundation of philosophy (and he himself characterizes it as an “a-philosophy,” which is not an “anti-philosophy,” not “without-philosophy,” but rather a “post- philosophy,” which appropriates the insights of nonphilosophy [NC, 164ff.]). His commitment to this project of refoundation will lead him also to refor- mulate—and indeed is partially motivated by the reaction to—the findings
BibTeX:
@incollection{Vallier2015,
  author = {Vallier, Robert},
  title = {Memory-of the future: Institutions and memory in the later Merleau-Ponty},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Time, Memory, Institution: Merleau-Ponty's New Ontology of Self},
  editor = {Morris, David and Maclaren, Kym},
  publisher = {Ohio University Press},
  pages = {109--129}
}
Van Cleve, J. Problems from Reid 2015
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{VanCleve2015,
  author = {Van Cleve, James},
  title = {Problems from Reid},
  year = {2015},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Varga, S. Self-deception, self-knowledge, and autobiography 2015 The Philosophy of Autobiography
University of Chicago Press, 141-155.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] In a sense, literary works always to some degree entail an autobiographical dimension: they inevitably capture and reveal something about the author's imagination, creativity, and interests. Nevertheless, when we speak about auto biography we designate a distinct literary genre. This genre is particularly intriguing, and it puts to the test our more or less commonsense beliefs about authorship as well as about the nature of the relation between fact and fi ction (Anderson 2001; Lejeune 1982).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Varga2015,
  author = {Varga, Somogy},
  title = {Self-deception, self-knowledge, and autobiography},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {The Philosophy of Autobiography},
  editor = {Cowley, Christopher},
  publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
  pages = {141--155}
}
Weatherson, B. Memory, belief and time 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
45(5-6), 692-715.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius's Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
BibTeX:
@article{Weatherson2015,
  author = {Weatherson, Brian},
  title = {Memory, belief and time},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  volume = {45},
  number = {5-6},
  pages = {692--715},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250}
}
Wilson, R.A. and Lenart, B.A. Extended mind and identity 2015 Handbook of Neuroethics
Springer, 423-439.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psycho- logical continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative or autobiographical memory of some kind, and special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person's psychological states can physically extend beyond that person's body. Since “person” is a term of both metaphysical and moral significance, and discussions of both extended minds and personal identity have often focused on memory, this article explores the relevance of extended cognition for the identity of persons with special attention to neuroethics and memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Wilson2015,
  author = {Wilson, Robert A. and Lenart, Bartlomiej A.},
  title = {Extended mind and identity},
  year = {2015},
  booktitle = {Handbook of Neuroethics},
  editor = {Clausen, Jens and Levy, Neil},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {423--439},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_14},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-414}
}
Zohny, H. The myth of cognitive enhancement drugs 2015 Neuroethics
8(3), 257-269.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: There are a number of premises underlying much of the vigorous debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. Among these are claims in the enhancement literature that such drugs exist and are effective among the cognitively normal. These drugs are deemed to enhance cognition specifically, as opposed to other non-cognitive facets of our psychology, such as mood and motivation. The focus on these drugs as cognitive enhancers also suggests that they raise particular ethical questions, or perhaps more pressing ones, compared to those raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement. Finally, the use of these drugs is often claimed to be significant and increasing. Taken together, these premises are at the heart of the flurry of debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. In this article, it is argued that these are presumptions for which the evidence does not hold up. Respectively, the evidence for the efficacy of these drugs is inconsistent; neurologically it makes little sense to distinguish the cognitive from non-cognitive as separate targets of pharmacological intervention; ethically, the questions raised by cognitive enhancement are in fact no different from those raised by other kinds of neuroenhancement; and finally the prevalence rates of these drugs are far from clear, with the bulk of the claims resting on poor or misrepresented data. Greater conceptual clarity along with a more tempered appreciation of the evidence can serve to deflate some of the hype in the associated literature, leading to a more realistic and sober assessment of these prospective technologies.
BibTeX:
@article{Zohny2015,
  author = {Zohny, Hazem},
  title = {The myth of cognitive enhancement drugs},
  year = {2015},
  journal = {Neuroethics},
  volume = {8},
  number = {3},
  pages = {257--269},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-015-9232-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12152-015-9232-9}
}
Aho, T. Early modern theories 2014 Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind
Springer, 223-238.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] The investigation of memory in sixteenth-century philosophy was dominated by the traditional idea of memory as an inner sense which is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain and which is capable of retaining sensory species as well as recalling them when the perceived objects are no longer present. The theory of memory was hence closely connected to the theory of perception. The old distinction of memory and recollection was often mentioned, though some authors gave the name ‘memory' to both functions (1) . In early modern philosophy, much attention was paid to questions of the effi ciency of memory, such as which physical conditions are favourable to memory and how the capacity of memory can be strengthened and developed by various mnemonic methods. These items have also an obvious connection to learning and pedagogy (2) .
BibTeX:
@incollection{Aho2014,
  author = {Aho, Tuomo},
  title = {Early modern theories},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind},
  editor = {Knuuttila, Simo and Sihvola, Juha},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {223--238},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_15},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-015}
}
Michaelian, K. Review essay: Individual and collective memory consolidation: Analogous processes on different levels 2014 Memory Studies
7(2)
MIT Press, 254-264.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Anastasio et al. have produced a book which is unusual both in the scope of its interdisciplinary aspirations and in the boldness of its thesis. The authors hail from an exceptionally broad range of fields: Anastasio is a neurobiologist, while his three coauthors are in history/medicine, cognitive neuroscience, and anthropology, respectively. Such truly interdisciplinary collaborations are, unfortunately, rare, and the authors deserve praise for undertaking this contribution to the field of memory studies. And the book does indeed belong to memory studies, for Anastasio et al. aim to make a contribution not only to research on individual memory but also, simultaneously, to research on collective memory. This contribution is, moreover, meant to go beyond the simple borrowing of concepts from one field (almost always individual memory) and application of them in the other, which is more common: the authors develop an original model of memory consolidation which, they hope, will provide “a new conceptual framework that can organize findings, facilitate reason- ing, stimulate new insights, and propose testable hypotheses about individual and collective mem- ory” (p. 245).
BibTeX:
@article{Anastasio2014,
  author = {Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Review essay: Individual and collective memory consolidation: Analogous processes on different levels},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Memory Studies},
  volume = {7},
  number = {2},
  publisher = {MIT Press},
  pages = {254--264},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698013515365},
  url = {http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1750698013515365}
}
Arango-Muñoz, S. and Michaelian, K. Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section 2014 Philosophical Inquiries
2(1), 97-122.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic – or noetic or metacognitive – feelings (E-feelings). Since philoso-phers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by briefly describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4).
BibTeX:
@article{Arango-Munoz2014,
  author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago and Michaelian, Kourken},
  title = {Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Inquiries},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {97--122},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4454/philinq.v2i1.79},
  url = {https://philpapers.org/archive/ARAEFE.pdf}
}
Arango-Muñoz, S. The nature of epistemic feelings 2014 Philosophical Psychology
27(2), 193-211.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called epistemic feelings. This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and mechanisms of epistemic feelings: the doxastic account; the mental scanner account; and the heuristic mechanism account. The paper will argue in favor of the heuristic mechanism account.
BibTeX:
@article{Arango-Munoz2014a,
  author = {Arango-Muñoz, Santiago},
  title = {The nature of epistemic feelings},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {27},
  number = {2},
  pages = {193--211},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.732002},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2012.732002}
}
Behrendt, K. Hirsch, Sebald, and the uses and limits of postmemory 2014 The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film
Wilfird Laurier University Press, 51-67.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Marianne Hirsch coined the term "postrnemory" to encompass a subject of enduring interest-namely, the fraught position of the generation that follows a period of collective trauma. Her specific focus in her initial work on postmemory was on the relationships that children have with parents who were victims or witnesses of such trauma. Hirsch is explicit about her personal connection to the subject: she is a child of parents who escaped the Holocaust, and she grew up in a climate in which the after-effects of trauma and victimization manifested themselves in countless ways.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Behrendt2014,
  author = {Behrendt, K.},
  title = {Hirsch, Sebald, and the uses and limits of postmemory},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Memory Effect: The Remediation of Memory in Literature and Film},
  editor = {Kilbourn, Russell J. A.; and Ty, Eleanor Rose},
  publisher = {Wilfird Laurier University Press},
  pages = {51--67}
}
Bloch, D. Ancient and medieval theories 2014
78(253)Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind
Springer, 205-221.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Memory and recollection have always been important in very different areas of human experience, and this has profoundly influenced the history of these concepts. Because of this, different traditions of memory and recollection have existed throughout the history of ideas, sometimes taking parallel courses, at other times intersecting with and influencing each other. A purely philosophical tradition was shaped in particular by, and with constant reference to, Plato and Aristotle, and this tradition created different concepts to be used in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science. A rhetorical conception of memory was shaped in a second tradition by ideas like the ones that we find in Cicero's works and in the Rhetoric to Herennius, but, in contrast with the other views on memory, this was not a dynamic conception, and it remained basically unaltered throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Finally, an ethical tradition that treated memory as part of human prudence had many different sources of inspiration, but perhaps the most important were Plato, Cicero, Neoplatonic authors and Augustine.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Bloch2014,
  author = {Bloch, David},
  title = {Ancient and medieval theories},
  year = {2014},
  volume = {78},
  number = {253},
  booktitle = {Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind},
  editor = {Knuuttila, S. and Sihvola, J.},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {205--221},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-0_14},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1468-229X.1993.tb01582.x http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-007-6967-014}
}
Blustein, J. Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and Public Life 2014
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Blustein2014,
  author = {Blustein, Jeffrey},
  title = {Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and Public Life},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Brogaard, B. A partial defense of extended knowledge 2014 Philosophical Issues
24(1), 39-62.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended-mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a ‘situationist-friendly virtue epistemology'.
BibTeX:
@article{Brogaard2014,
  author = {Brogaard, Berit},
  title = {A partial defense of extended knowledge},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  pages = {39--62},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12025},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phis.12025}
}
Burgess, A. What Is It Like To Be Asleep? 2014 The Harvard Review of Philosophy
21(1), 18-22.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Reconsider the Cartesian skeptical hypothesis that you are currently dreaming. Traditional efforts to rule it out can be divided, very roughly, between those targeting content and those targeting form. A generic content-centric approach might maintain that dream narratives are
BibTeX:
@article{Burgess2014,
  author = {Burgess, Alexis},
  title = {What Is It Like To Be Asleep?},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {The Harvard Review of Philosophy},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {18--22},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview2014212},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=harvardreview20140021000000180022&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
Campbell, S. Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory 2014
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Campbell2014,
  author = {Campbell, Sue},
  title = {Our Faithfulness to the Past: The Ethics and Politics of Memory},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
Carbonell, V. Amnesia, anesthesia, and warranted fear 2014 Bioethics
28(5), 245-254.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Is a painful experience less bad for you if you will not remember it? Do you have less reason to fear it? These questions bear on how we think about medical procedures and surgeries that use an anesthesia regimen that leaves patients conscious – and potentially in pain – but results in complete ‘drug‐induced amnesia' after the fact. I argue that drug‐induced amnesia does not render a painful medical procedure a less fitting object of fear, and thus the prospect of amnesia does not give patients a reason not to fear it. I expose three mistakes in reasoning that might explain our tendency to view pain or discomfort as less fearful in virtue of expected amnesia: a mistaken view of personal identity; a mistaken view of the target of anticipation; and a mistaken method of incorporating past evidence into calculations about future experiences. Ultimately my argument has implications for whether particular procedures are justified and how medical professionals should speak with anxious patients about the prospect of drug‐induced amnesia.
BibTeX:
@article{Carbonell2014,
  author = {Carbonell, Vanessa},
  title = {Amnesia, anesthesia, and warranted fear},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Bioethics},
  volume = {28},
  number = {5},
  pages = {245--254},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01995.x},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01995.x}
}
Carruthers, P. On central cognition 2014 Philosophical Studies
170(1), 143-162.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This article examines what is known about the cognitive science of working memory, and brings the findings to bear in evaluating philosophical accounts of central cognitive processes of thinking and reasoning. It is argued that central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts. Contrary to a broad spectrum of philosophical opinion, the central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active.
BibTeX:
@article{Carruthers2014,
  author = {Carruthers, Peter},
  title = {On central cognition},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {170},
  number = {1},
  pages = {143--162},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0171-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-013-0171-1}
}
Chadha, M. A buddhist explanation of episodic memory: From self to mind 2014 Asian Philosophy
24(1)
Monima Chadha, 14-27.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that some ofthe work to be done by the concept of self is done by the concept ofmind in Buddhist philosophy. For the purposes ofthis paper, I shall focus on an account of memory and its ownership. The task of this paper is to analyse Vasubandhu's heroic effort to defend the no-self doctrine against the Nyāya-Vaiśes:ikas in order to bring to the fore the Buddhist model of mind. For this, I will discuss Vasubandhu's theory of mind in the early Abhidharma as well as post-Abhidharma period to show the continuity in his work.
BibTeX:
@article{Chadha2014,
  author = {Chadha, Monima},
  title = {A buddhist explanation of episodic memory: From self to mind},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Asian Philosophy},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  publisher = {Monima Chadha},
  pages = {14--27},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2014.869093},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/casp20 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09552367.2014.869093}
}
De Brigard, F. The nature of memory traces 2014 Philosophy Compass
9(6), 402-414.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memory trace was originally a philosophical termused to explain the phenomenon ofremembering. Once debated by Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more recently to have become the exclusive province ofcognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the contrary, scientific research on the nature ofmemory traces can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With that general aim inmind, the present paper has three specific goals.First,itattemptstochart the most relevant philosophical views on the nature ofmemory traces from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it reviews critical findings in the psychology and the neuroscience ofmemory traces. Finally, it explains how such results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical positions on the nature ofmemory traces. This paper also touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research that theories ofmemory traces need to accommodate in order to succeed.
BibTeX:
@article{DeBrigard2014,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {The nature of memory traces},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
  volume = {9},
  number = {6},
  pages = {402--414},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12133},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phc3.12133}
}
De Brigard, F. Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking 2014 Synthese
191(2), 155-185.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory's malfunction, but rather as the normal result of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events.
BibTeX:
@article{DeBrigard2014a,
  author = {De Brigard, Felipe},
  title = {Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {191},
  number = {2},
  pages = {155--185},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-013-0247-7}
}
Debus, D. ‘Mental time travel': Remembering the past, imagining the future, and the particularity of events 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 333-350.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The present paper offers a philosophical discussion of phenomena which in the empirical literature have recently been subsumed under the concept of ‘mental time travel'. More precisely, the paper considers differences and similarities between two cases of ‘mental time travel', recollective memories (‘R-memories') of past events on the one hand, and sensory imaginations (‘S-imaginations') of future events on the other. It develops and defends the claim that, because a subject who R-remembers a past event is experientially aware of a past particular event, while a subject who S-imagines a future event could not possibly be experientially aware of a future particular event, R-memories of past events and S-imaginations of future events are ultimately mental occurrences of two different kinds.
BibTeX:
@article{Debus2014,
  author = {Debus, Dorothea},
  title = {‘Mental time travel': Remembering the past, imagining the future, and the particularity of events},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {333--350},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0182-7},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0182-7}
}
Dijkstra, K. and Zwaan, R.A. Memory and action 2014 The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
Routledge, 296-305.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Traditional theories viewed memory as the “great storehouse of information.” Since the late 1960s, researchers have begun thinking of information as stored in the form of semantic net- works. The general idea was that concepts were stored in nodes and that the links between nodes indicated an association between the concepts. Several decades later, it became clear that there is a fundamental problem with this view. The problem is that the concepts are merely labels in the network, for example the label “whale” or “tree.” The network is merely a connection oflinked labels. The labels have no meaning to the network; they only have meaning to the user. As Harnad (1990) put it, the network is parasitic on us. He dubbed this the grounding problem. The grounding problem suggests that semantic networks as just described cannot be a model of human memory.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Dijkstra2014,
  author = {Dijkstra, Katinka and Zwaan, Rolf A.},
  title = {Memory and action},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition},
  editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {296--305}
}
Dokic, J. Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 413-426.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one's own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted with other, reductionist two-tiered accounts as well as with reflexive accounts of episodic memory to be found in the literature.
BibTeX:
@article{Dokic2014,
  author = {Dokic, Jérôme},
  title = {Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {413--426},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0183-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0183-6}
}
Dokic, J. Feelings of (un)certainty and margins for error 2014 Philosophical Inquiries
2(1), 123-144.
 
Abstract: So-called epistemic or noetic feelings are often recruited in one's reasoning, and we may wonder how this recruitment is realized at the psychological level, and whether it is epistemologically warranted. I tackle these issues by focusing on feelings of subjective certainty and uncertainty in the context of ordinary perceptual categorizations. I first locate epistemic feelings within our cognitive architecture, by reference to the influential two-system framework of reasoning and decision-making as well as recent empirical models of our metacognitive abilities. I then put forward the thesis that in a normal context, feelings of perceptual certainty track the safety of our perceptual beliefs, whereas feelings of perceptual uncertainty track the fact that these beliefs are not safe. In other words, our felt certainty or uncertainty about the category of what we perceive is an indication of the fact that a margin for error has or has not been provided. I conclude by discussing two distinctions relevant to the account presented here, namely the distinction between perceptual and conceptual certainty (or uncertainty), and the distinction between objective and subjective certainty (or uncertainty).
BibTeX:
@article{Dokic2014a,
  author = {Dokic, Jérôme},
  title = {Feelings of (un)certainty and margins for error},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Inquiries},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {123--144}
}
Donohoe, J. Remembering Places: A Phenomenological Study of the Relationship between Memory and Place 2014
Lexington Books
 
BibTeX:
@book{Donohoe2014,
  author = {Donohoe, Janet},
  title = {Remembering Places: A Phenomenological Study of the Relationship between Memory and Place},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {Lexington Books}
}
Dupont, J.-C. Memory Traces between brain theory and philosophy 2014 Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy
Palgrave Macmillan, 17-33.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The theory of memory traces and its critics have a long history. From the beginning, long before the first actual characterization of memory traces, memory acquired an ontological status, whether the latter chal- lenged the relevance of traces a priori, or on the contrary legitimized it. Today, the search for memory traces has become a fundamental part of neuroscience. In this context, their significance and their contribution to brain theory is actively debated. The philosophical discussions on the pertinence of research on brain traces continue. For philosophers like David Krell, such debates are like an illusory quest for the Holy Grail (Krell 1990). For others, like John Sutton, there is a healthy continuity between old ideas and contemporary connectionism (Sutton 1998).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Dupont2014,
  author = {Dupont, Jean-Claude},
  title = {Memory Traces between brain theory and philosophy},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy},
  editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {17--33}
}
Eldridge, P. Observer memories and phenomenology 2014 Phenomenology and Mind
7, 160-167.
 
Abstract: This paper explores the challenge that the experience of third-person perspective recall (i.e. observer memories) presents to a phenomenological theory of memory. Specifically this paper outlines what husserl describes as the necessary features of recollection, among which he includes the givenness of objects in the first person perspective. The paper notes that, on first sight, these necessary features cannot account for the experience of observer memories as described by Neisser & Nigro (1983). This paper proposes that observer memories do not so much entail a shift of perspective as they do a process of self-objectification and as such do not break with the phenomenological emphasis on the first person perspective.
BibTeX:
@article{Eldridge2014,
  author = {Eldridge, Patrick},
  title = {Observer memories and phenomenology},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Phenomenology and Mind},
  volume = {7},
  pages = {160--167}
}
Fernández, J. Memory and immunity to error through misidentification 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 373-390.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the two views will yield the outcome that the subject is always an intentional object of her own memories: In episodic memory, one remembers being the subject whose extrinsic properties were experienced in some past perception. For that reason, one cannot misidentify oneself in memory unless one is having an inaccurate memory. Thus, the source of immunity to error through misidentification in memory lies in the nature of mnemonic content.
BibTeX:
@article{Fernandez2014,
  author = {Fernández, Jordi},
  title = {Memory and immunity to error through misidentification},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {373--390},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0193-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0193-4}
}
Gerrans, P. and Sander, D. Feeling the future: Prospects for a theory of implicit prospection 2014 Biology & Philosophy
29(5), 699-710.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of gaining information about the future to shape preferences and guide behaviour.
BibTeX:
@article{Gerrans2014,
  author = {Gerrans, Philip and Sander, David},
  title = {Feeling the future: Prospects for a theory of implicit prospection},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Biology & Philosophy},
  volume = {29},
  number = {5},
  pages = {699--710},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9408-9},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10539-013-9408-9}
}
Ghezzi, A., Guimarães Pereira, Â. and Vesnić-Alujević, L. The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten 2014
Palgrave Macmillan
 
BibTeX:
@book{Ghezzi,
  author = {Ghezzi, Alessia and Guimarães Pereira, Ângela and Vesnić-Alujević, Lucia},
  title = {The Ethics of Memory in a Digital Age: Interrogating the Right to be Forgotten},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}
}
Godfrey-Smith, P. Sender-receiver systems within and between organisms 2014 Philosophy of Science
81(5), 866-878.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Drawing on models of communication due to Lewis and Skyrms, I contrast sender- receiver systems as they appear within and between organisms, and as they function in the bridging of space and time.Within the organism, memory can be seen as the sending of messages over time, communication between stages as opposed to spatial parts. Psychological memory and genetic memory are compared with respect to their relations to a sender-receiver model. Some puzzles about “genetic information” can be resolved by seeing the genome as a cell-level memory with no sender
BibTeX:
@article{Godfrey-Smith2014,
  author = {Godfrey-Smith, Peter},
  title = {Sender-receiver systems within and between organisms},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophy of Science},
  volume = {81},
  number = {5},
  pages = {866--878},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1086/677686},
  url = {https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/677686}
}
Goldberg, S.C. Interpersonal epistemic entitlements 2014 Philosophical Issues
24(1), 159-183.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others' processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, and a more “extended” epistemology—one that calls into question the epistemic significance that has traditionally been ascribed to the boundaries separating individual subjects.
BibTeX:
@article{Goldberg2014,
  author = {Goldberg, Sanford C.},
  title = {Interpersonal epistemic entitlements},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Issues},
  volume = {24},
  number = {1},
  pages = {159--183},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12029},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phis.12029}
}
Halpin, H., Clark, A. and Wheeler, M. Philosophy of the web: Representation, enaction, collective intelligence 2014 Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web
Blackwell, 21-30.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] There is an emerging vision of the human mind as essentially a social organ apt to make extensive and transformative use of whatever forms of local and global scaffolding other agents and technologies provide. In an increasingly wired and networked world, our very nature as cognitive beings is gradually changing.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Halpin2014,
  author = {Halpin, Harry and Clark, Andy and Wheeler, Michael},
  title = {Philosophy of the web: Representation, enaction, collective intelligence},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Philosophical Engineering: Toward a Philosophy of the Web},
  editor = {Halpin, Harry and Monnin, Alexandre},
  publisher = {Blackwell},
  pages = {21--30}
}
Hempinstall, S. Heads in the cloud: Human memory and external storage implications 2014 American Philosophical Association Newsletters: Philosophy and Computers
13(2), 12-17.
 
Abstract: Extended mind theory holds that human memories can be stored outside the head. Computational theories allow for mechanisms that model the mind. Combining the two with respect to human memory yields a Computational Model of Memory (CMM), a processing schema of the architecture and mechanisms in the head which serves to cross-reference, categorize, and sort memories into, at the very minimum, short and long term. I argue that at memory creation, there is no difference in kind; what differs is the storage medium—whether it is internal or external. Furthermore, the location of the memory is not a limiting factor in either storage or subsequent retrieval since both rely on the same conceptual mechanisms. This model is particularly useful for modeling the memory transactions in and between minds. The CMM illustrates distributive, transactive, and collective memory in action. In Part I of this article, I provide the details of the CMM. In Part II, I cover the philosophical basis for moving from Extended Mind to Extended Memory, as well as responses to philosophical objections to Extended Memory. Part II discusses the cross-disciplinary compatibility of the CMM with the psychological properties of memory recall and integration, and computer information processing architectures. In Part III, the model illustrates the implications and entailments of extended memory, especially insofar as increased dependency may affect the mind, both substantially and functionally. Finally, Part IV suggests future work, particularly the philosophical relevance to the field of artificial intelligence.
BibTeX:
@article{Hempinstall2014,
  author = {Hempinstall, Susan},
  title = {Heads in the cloud: Human memory and external storage implications},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {American Philosophical Association Newsletters: Philosophy and Computers},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {12--17}
}
Hibbert, R. How should we study concepts in the cognitive sciences? The example of memory 2014 Logique & Analyse
228, 683-699.
[DOI]  
Abstract: There is considerable variation in the concept of memory employed in different branches of the cognitive and social sciences. This paper is about how a philosopher of science can make sense of this divergence. First I consider the reasons for focussing on concepts specifically. Then I pose a question about the classifying practices of scientists, and consider various methods for investigating the answer. I defend a historically situated case study method as the best option, and suggest some appropriate case studies for the example of the concept of memory.
BibTeX:
@article{Hibbert2014,
  author = {Hibbert, Ruth},
  title = {How should we study concepts in the cognitive sciences? The example of memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Logique & Analyse},
  volume = {228},
  pages = {683--699},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.2143/LEA.228.0.3078179}
}
Hoerl, C. Remembering events and remembering looks 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 351-372.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the former contains an additional ingredient not present in the latter, but otherwise treating them as the same thing. I also show that a recent ‘minimalist' approach to episodic memory (Clayton & Russell in Neuropsychologia 47 (11): 2,330–2,340, 2009; Russell & Hanna in Mind & Language 27 (1): 29–54, 2012) fails to give a satisfactory explanatory account of the difference between the two types of remembering. I finish by sketching an alternative approach to episodic memory, which turns on the idea that episodic recollection recruits a specific form of causal reasoning that provides for a concrete sense in which remembered events are remembered as belonging to the past.
BibTeX:
@article{Hoerl2014,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {Remembering events and remembering looks},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {351--372},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0191-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0191-6}
}
Hoerl, C. Time and the domain of consciousness 2014 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
1326(1), 90-96.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a perceptual illusion fail, and that it is, in fact, the nature of memory, rather than perception, that explains why we are inclined to think of time as passing. I also offer a diagnosis as to why philosophers have sometimes been tempted to think that an objective passage of time seems to figure directly in perceptual experience, even though it does not.
BibTeX:
@article{Hoerl2014a,
  author = {Hoerl, Christoph},
  title = {Time and the domain of consciousness},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {1326},
  number = {1},
  pages = {90--96},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12471},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/nyas.12471}
}
Hopkins, R. Episodic memory as representing the past to oneself 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 313-331.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the remembered episode to be. I argue that episodic memory is active, in the way this view suggests. I clarify the idea that it is, as the view also implies, not a source of knowledge but an expression of knowledge the subject already has. And I suggest the view need not limit memories to states that are in any way experience-like. This position offers a way to articulate the relations between episodic memory and related phenomena: factual memory, generic memory, remembering-how and anticipation. And it allows us to explain how we know which aspects of our episodic memory states to take seriously and which (such as the shift to an observer perspective on the remembered events) to treat as merely incidental. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract)
BibTeX:
@article{Hopkins2014,
  author = {Hopkins, Robert},
  title = {Episodic memory as representing the past to oneself},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {313--331},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0184-5},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0184-5}
}
Howarth, E. and Paris, J.B. Principles of remembering and forgetting 2014 Logique et Analyse
228, 489-511.
 
Abstract: We propose two principles of inductive reasoning related to how observed information is handled by conditioning, and justify why they may be said to represent aspects of rational reasoning. A partial classification is given of the probability functions which satisfy these principles.
BibTeX:
@article{Howarth2014,
  author = {Howarth, E and Paris, J B},
  title = {Principles of remembering and forgetting},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Logique et Analyse},
  volume = {228},
  pages = {489--511}
}
Huebner, B. Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality 2014
Oxford University Press
 
BibTeX:
@book{Huebner2014,
  author = {Huebner, Bryce},
  title = {Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality},
  year = {2014},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press}
}
James, S. Hallucinating real things 2014 Synthese
191(15), 3711-3732.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: No particular dagger was the object of Macbeth's hallucination of a dagger. In contrast, when he hallucinated his former comrade Banquo, Banquo himself was the object of the hallucination. Although philosophers have had much to say about the nature and philosophical import of hallucinations (e.g. Macpherson and Platchias, Hal-lucination, 2013) and object-involving attitudes (e.g. Jeshion, New essays on singular thought, 2010), their intersection has largely been neglected. Yet, object-involving hallucinations raise interesting questions about memory, perception, and the ways in which we have knowledge of the world around us. In this paper, I offer an account of object-involving hallucinations. Specifically, I argue that they are an unusual species of perceptual remembering. In Act II, Scene I of Shakespeare's Macbeth, the titular character has a visual experi-ence as of a dagger floating before him. To Macbeth it was as though his experience was of a particular worldly object. It was not, and much has been done to make sense of this kind of phenomenon. 1 This paper focuses on another kind of hallucination. As Mac-beth descends deeper into madness, he has a visual experience as of his former comrade Banquo, whom he had recently betrayed. Unlike the dagger-hallucination, this visual 1 See e.g. Crane (2011a), Johnston (2004), Smith (2002), Smith (1983), and especially Macpherson (2013) for discussion of the role this kind of hallucination has had in shaping much of contemporary philosophy of perception over the last hundred or so years.
BibTeX:
@article{James2014,
  author = {James, Steven},
  title = {Hallucinating real things},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {191},
  number = {15},
  pages = {3711--3732},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-014-0492-4}
}
Klein, S.B. Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations 2014 Frontiers in Psychology
5, 29.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2014,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  pages = {29},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029},
  url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00029/abstract}
}
Klein, S.B. Autonoesis and belief in a personal past: An evolutionary theory of episodic memory indices 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 427-447.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to show, when such an approach is adopted, not only does a new, functionally-grounded answer emerge; we also gain insight into the adaptive significance of the process proposed to underwrite our belief in the memorial status of a mental state (i.e., autonoetic awareness). What justifies our feeling that the content of awareness refers to the past? How do we determine that our phenomenology is a veridical (or even partly compromised) repre-sentation of our past and not, say, a thought or act of imagination? Such questions have vexed philosophers and psychologists for almost as long as attention has been directed toward the (uniquely human; e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Tulving 2005) act of recollection.
BibTeX:
@article{Klein2014a,
  author = {Klein, Stanley B.},
  title = {Autonoesis and belief in a personal past: An evolutionary theory of episodic memory indices},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {427--447},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0181-8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0181-8}
}
Knez, I. Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis 2014 Philosophical Psychology
27(2), 164-192.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: In this article, I argue that the relationship between place and self can be accounted for by recent theoretical work on autobiographical memory. The link between place and self is conceptualized as a transitory mental representation that emerges as a “place of mine” (personal autobiographical experience) from a “place” (declarative knowledge). The function of “place of mine” is to guide personal memory and self-knowing consciousness of periods of our lives. I combine inquiries of memory, self, and place in a triadic relationship, a synthesis, suggesting a conceptual model for the phenomenon of place-related self as a sub-system of the self. This is formed by a causal progression from a physical place across time via emotional and cognitive bonds, components of the autobiographical information grounding the self, apportioned across declarative memory. Finally, using the methods of factor analysis and structural equation modeling, I show that the proposed model accounts for previous and new data on place-related identity.
BibTeX:
@article{Knez2014,
  author = {Knez, Igor},
  title = {Place and the self: An autobiographical memory synthesis},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {27},
  number = {2},
  pages = {164--192},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.728124},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2012.728124}
}
Koggel, C.M. Relational remembering and oppression 2014 Hypatia
29(2), 493-508.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper begins by discussing Sue Campbell's account of memory as she first developed it in Relational Remembering: Rethinking the Memory Wars and applied it to the context of the false memory debates. In more recent work, Campbell was working on expanding her account of relational remembering from an analysis of personal rememberings to activities of public rememberings in contexts of historic harms and, specifically, harms to Aboriginals and their communities in Canada. The goal of this paper is to draw out the moral and political implications of Campbell's account of relational remembering and thereby to extend its reach and application. As applied to Aboriginal communities, Campbell's account of relational remembering confirms but also explains the important role that Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission (IRS TRC) is poised to play. It holds this promise and potential, however, only if all Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, engage in a process of remembering that is relational and has the goal of building and rebuilding relationships. The paper ends by drawing attention to what relational remembering can teach us about oppression more generally. textcopyright by Hypatia, Inc.
BibTeX:
@article{Koggel2014,
  author = {Koggel, Christine M.},
  title = {Relational remembering and oppression},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Hypatia},
  volume = {29},
  number = {2},
  pages = {493--508},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12079},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/hypa.12079}
}
Kolber, A.J. The limited right to alter memory 2014 Journal of Medical Ethics
40(10), 658-659.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] We like to think we own our memories. If we could ever dampen or erase a memory, the decision to do so, it may seem, should be ours and ours alone. On occasion, for example, patients unexpectedly regain consciousness while undergoing major surgery. Many are horrified by the experi- ence and subsequently develop post- traumatic stress disorder. If there were a way to avoid such trauma by blocking or erasing the memory of one's own surgery, surely patients should ordinarily be given the opportunity to do so. Indeed, intrao- perative awareness presents a rare oppor- tunity to erase a memory with limited downside.
BibTeX:
@article{Kolber2014,
  author = {Kolber, Adam J.},
  title = {The limited right to alter memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics},
  volume = {40},
  number = {10},
  pages = {658--659},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101972},
  url = {http://jme.bmj.com/lookup/doi/10.1136/medethics-2013-101972}
}
Lavazza, A. Documentality, emotions, and motivations. Why we need a kind of internal memory 2014 Rivista di estetica
57(57), 51-66.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Memory, as is well known, makes up a large part of our identity (even though the criterion of this “identity” is controversial). Documents – understood as inscriptions – make up our external memory in a peculiar way: they constitute both a stable anchor and a reference-point for our personal transformations over time. There is, however, also an internal memory, residing in our brain. This is based in part on external documentation; but it is of course not exclusively tied thereto. Rather it evolves dynamically over time, in part reflecting ethical debates which we carry on within ourselves and which is influenced also by emotional factors, for example as we try to erase memories that are unpleasant. If, for example, the internal memory of some offense against our person is erased, then the motivation to testify against those who offended against us no longer exists or is greatly reduced, and this is so even though the documents that record the offense remain. Our motivations here depend on the emotional factor in our memories; once this has been lost, even though the autobiographical, episodic memory still remains, then the value- significance of the event fades from our view, and with it the impulse to act. Emotions are in large part responsible for creating a bond with documents; they make it possible for our internal and external memories to have significance. There must be some degree of emotional resonance in inscriptions relating to events in the past, which arises out of our own experience of these events and from our memory of these experiences, for these inscriptions to have significance in our lives. Documents are thus fundamental. But for ourselves and for our social lives, they must be supplemented by internal memories.
BibTeX:
@article{Lavazza2014,
  author = {Lavazza, Andrea},
  title = {Documentality, emotions, and motivations. Why we need a kind of internal memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Rivista di estetica},
  volume = {57},
  number = {57},
  pages = {51--66},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.685},
  url = {http://journals.openedition.org/estetica/685}
}
Levy, N. Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content 2014 Philosophical Psychology
27(3), 351-367.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person-that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person-it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.
BibTeX:
@article{Levy2014,
  author = {Levy, Neil},
  title = {Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {27},
  number = {3},
  pages = {351--367},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.729485},
  url = {http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cphp20http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.729485 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09515089.2012.729485}
}
Lindemann, H. Second nature and the tragedy of Alzheimer's 2014 Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood
Oxford University Press, 11-23.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] An insistent sound somewhere. She swam up out of a deep warm sleep and fum- bled on the nightstand for the telephone. What time was it, anyway? The phone display read a little after three in the morning.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Lindemann2014,
  author = {Lindemann, Hilde},
  title = {Second nature and the tragedy of Alzheimer's},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood},
  editor = {Hydén, Lars-Christer and Lindemann, Hilde and Brockmeier, Jens},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {11--23}
}
Madison, B.J.C. Epistemic internalism, justification, and memory 2014 Logos & Episteme
5(1), 33-62.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject's perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.
BibTeX:
@article{Madison2014,
  author = {Madison, Brent J C},
  title = {Epistemic internalism, justification, and memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Logos & Episteme},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {33--62},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme20145122},
  url = {http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?urlver=Z39.88-2004&rftvalfmt=&rft.imuseid=logos-episteme20140005000100330062&svcid=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection}
}
McCormack, T. Three types of temporal perspective: Characterizing developmental changes in temporal thought 2014 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
1326(1), 82-89.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: This paper provides an outline of the development of temporal thinking that is underpinned by the idea that temporal cognition shifts from being event dependent to event independent over the preschool period. I distinguish between three different ways in which it may be possible to have a perspective on time: (1) a perspective that is grounded in script-like representations of repeated events; (2) a more sophisticated perspective that brings in an fundamental categorical distinction between events that have already happened and events that are yet to come; and (3) a mature temporal perspective that involves orienting oneself in time using a linear temporal framework, with a grasp of the distinctions between past, present, and future. I propose that, with development, children possess each of these types of perspective in turn, and that only the last of these involves being able to represent time in an event-independent way.
BibTeX:
@article{Mccormack2014,
  author = {McCormack, Teresa},
  title = {Three types of temporal perspective: Characterizing developmental changes in temporal thought},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences},
  volume = {1326},
  number = {1},
  pages = {82--89},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12504},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/nyas.12504}
}
Nikulin, D. Memory and recollection in Plotinus 2014 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
96(2), 183-201.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Beginning with an outline of memory and recollection in Plato and Aristotle, this paper argues that establishing the role of memory and recollection in their mutual relation in Plotinus requires a careful reconstruction. Whereas memory for Plotinus is not a storage of images or imprints that come either from the sensible or the intelligible but rather is a power capable of producing memories, recollection takes the form of a discursive rational rethinking and reproduction of the soul's experience of the noetic objects. Recollection, then, is a triple motion of the descent, stay, and return of the soul to the intelligible.
BibTeX:
@article{Nikulin2014,
  author = {Nikulin, Dmitri},
  title = {Memory and recollection in Plotinus},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie},
  volume = {96},
  number = {2},
  pages = {183--201},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2014-0009},
  url = {https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/agph.2014.96.issue-2/agph-2014-0009/agph-2014-0009.xml}
}
Nordenfelt, L. Dignity and dementia: A conceptual exploration 2014 Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood
Oxford University Press, 39-52.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] My purpose in this chapter is to explore the concept of dignity and its place in the care of the elderly and, in particular, in the care of persons with dementia. My presentation has a very specific point of departure. I was for four years involved in two projects, one of which was international, studying the dignity of older persons. The international project was supported by the European Commission and was called Dignity and Older Europeans (DOE) (the quality of life program QLG6-CT-2001-00888).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Nordenfelt2014,
  author = {Nordenfelt, Lennart},
  title = {Dignity and dementia: A conceptual exploration},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Beyond Loss: Dementia, Identity, Personhood},
  editor = {Hydén, Lars-Christer and Lindemann, Hilde and Brockmeier, Jens},
  publisher = {Oxford University Press},
  pages = {39--52}
}
Nunan, R. Film as philosophy in Memento: Reforming Wartenberg's imposition objection 2014 Film and Philosophy
18(1), 1-18.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] For more than a decade Film and Philosophy and the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism have published a running debate as to whether commercial narrative fiction films are capable of doing philosophy, perhaps even original
BibTeX:
@article{Nunan2014,
  author = {Nunan, Richard},
  title = {Film as philosophy in Memento: Reforming Wartenberg's imposition objection},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Film and Philosophy},
  volume = {18},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--18}
}
Palermos, S.O. Knowledge and cognitive integration 2014 Synthese
191(8), 1931-1951.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Cognitive integration is a defining yet overlooked feature ofour intellect that may nevertheless have substantial effects on the process of knowledge-acquisition. To bring those effects to the fore, I explore the topic of cognitive integration both from the perspective of virtue reliabilism within externalist epistemology and the perspective of extended cognition within externalist philosophy ofmind and cognitive science. On the basis of this interdisciplinary focus, I argue that cognitive integration can provide a minimalist yet adequate epistemic norm of subjective justification: so long as the agent's belief-forming process has been integrated in his cognitive character, the agent can be justified in holding the resulting beliefs merely by lacking any doubts there was something wrong in the way he arrived at them. Moreover, since both externalist philosophy of mind and externalist epistemology treat the process of cognitive inte- gration in the same way, we can claim that epistemic cognitive characters may extend beyond our organismic cognitive capacities to the artifacts we employ or even to other agents we interact with. This move is not only necessary for accounting for advanced cases of knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts or the interactive activity of research teams, but it can further lead to interesting ramifications both for social epistemology and philosophy of science.
BibTeX:
@article{Palermos2014,
  author = {Palermos, Spyridon Orestis},
  title = {Knowledge and cognitive integration},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Synthese},
  volume = {191},
  number = {8},
  pages = {1931--1951},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-013-0383-0}
}
Perri, T. Bergson's philosophy of memory 2014 Philosophy Compass
9(12), 837-847.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Bergson identifies multiple forms of memory throughout his work. In Matter and Memory,Bergson considers memory from the perspectives of both psychology and metaphysics, and he describes what we might refer to as contraction memory, perception memory, habit memory, recollection memory, and pure memory. Further, in subsequent works, Bergson discusses at least two additional forms ofmem- ory – namely, a memory ofthe present and a non-intellectual memory ofthe will. However, it is often not clear how these different forms ofmemory relate to one another. With the aim ofproviding an over- view ofBergson's philosophy ofmemory that can also serve as a point of entry to his philosophy as a whole, this article explores the different senses and forms ofmemory that Bergson describes, paying special attention to how they are distinct from one another and how they are unified. It is my intention to show that, although these various senses and forms of memory are different from one another (sometimes essentially so), they are also continuous and unified insofar as they are equivalent to different tones ofone's mental life and to different tensions ofone duration.
BibTeX:
@article{Perri2014,
  author = {Perri, Trevor},
  title = {Bergson's philosophy of memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophy Compass},
  volume = {9},
  number = {12},
  pages = {837--847},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12179},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phc3.12179}
}
Perrin, D. and Rousset, S. The episodicity of memory 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 291-312.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating Tulving's chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion.
BibTeX:
@article{Perrin2014,
  author = {Perrin, Denis and Rousset, Stéphane},
  title = {The episodicity of memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {291--312},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0196-1},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0196-1}
}
Pöyhönen, S. Explanatory power of extended cognition 2014 Philosophical Psychology
27(5), 735-759.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: I argue that examining the explanatory power of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) offers a fruitful approach to the problem of cognitive system demarcation. Although in the discussions on HEC it has become common to refer to considerations of explanatory power as a means for assessing the plausibility of the extended cognition approach, to date no satisfying account of explanatory power has been presented in the literature. I suggest that the currently most prominent theory ofexplanation in the special sciences, James Woodward's contrastive-counterfactual theory, and an account of explanatory virtues building on that theory can be used to develop a systematic picture of cognitive system demarcation in the psychological sciences. A major difference between my differential influence (DI) account and most other theories of cognitive extension is the cognitive systems pluralism implied by my approach. By examining the explanatory power ofcompeting traditions in psychological memory research, I conclude that internalist and externalist classificatory strategies are characterized by different profiles of explanatory virtues and should often be considered as complementary rather than competing approaches. This suggests a deflationary interpretation ofHEC.
BibTeX:
@article{Poyhonen2014,
  author = {Pöyhönen, Samuli},
  title = {Explanatory power of extended cognition},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Psychology},
  volume = {27},
  number = {5},
  pages = {735--759},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.766789},
  url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2013.766789}
}
Radzik, L. Historical memory as forward- and backward-looking collective responsibility 2014 Midwest Studies In Philosophy
38(1), 26-39.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] Visitors to Berlin, if they spend enough time walking through the various neigh- borhoods, will eventually have their eyes caught by a glimmer in the pavement. Every so often, one of the cobblestones is made of brass. Sometimes one sees a cluster of brass stones. Eventually, the visitor will stop for a closer look and see that that the stone is engraved. It will say something like this:
BibTeX:
@article{Radzik2014,
  author = {Radzik, Linda},
  title = {Historical memory as forward- and backward-looking collective responsibility},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Midwest Studies In Philosophy},
  volume = {38},
  number = {1},
  pages = {26--39},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/misp.12014},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/misp.12014}
}
Robins, S.K. Memory traces, memory errors, and the possibility of neural lie detection 2014 Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy
Palgrave Macmillan, 171-191.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The civic response to crime is forever challenged by the human inclina- tion to lie, deceive, mislead, and distort. There is thus perennial interest in creating lie detectors, which can distinguish between honest and deceptive reports during interrogation. Most lie detectors work by iden- tifying behavioral or physiological correlates of deception. The tradi- tional polygraph test, for example, measures a person's heart rate, skin conductance, and blood pressure (amongst other physiological markers) while he or she answers questions, detecting the elevated arousal that often accompanies deception. The problems with such measures are well known: the connection between arousal and deception is imperfect, and respondents can develop tactics by which the connection is further weakened or suppressed. Many are excited by advances in neuroscience, which suggest the possibility of neural lie detection (e.g., Spence et al. 2001), as these are thought to provide more direct and reliable measures of guilt and deception.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Robins2014,
  author = {Robins, Sarah K.},
  title = {Memory traces, memory errors, and the possibility of neural lie detection},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy},
  editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {171--191}
}
Russell, J. Episodic memory as re-experiential memory: Kantian, developmental, and neuroscientific currents 2014 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
5(3), 391-411.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant's analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna ( Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) that the temporal element of re-experiencing involves order/simultaneity. The first of these assumptions is immediately problematic for two reasons. In the first place, if we assume that early episodic recall mediated by processing in the hippocampus, then (a) is clearly in tension with the fact that spatial coding in the hippocampus is allocentric/environment-centred. Second, two of our own recent experiments (described here) show that when only egocentric cues are available in a What/When/Where episodic memory task it is not possible to distinguish young children's performance from semantic memory. I argue that this tension should be resolved by recognising that the egocentric coding of the original experience as being of an objective scene relies upon allocentric representations and these are preserved in re-experiential memory, allowing a recollection of the objective nature of the scene on which one takes a subjective view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) (Source: journal abstract)
BibTeX:
@article{Russell2014,
  author = {Russell, James},
  title = {Episodic memory as re-experiential memory: Kantian, developmental, and neuroscientific currents},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {391--411},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0194-3},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13164-014-0194-3}
}
Smart, P. Embodiment, cognition and the world wide web 2014 The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
Routledge, 326-334.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Embodied cognition forms part of an increasingly popular trend in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science which emphasizes the role played by extraneural and extracorporeal factors in human cognitive processing (Clark, 2008; Shapiro, 2011). It sits alongside a number ofother areas of research, which we can collectively refer to as embodied, embedded, enactive and extended (4E) approaches to cognition. Although subtle differences exist between these approaches, what they have in common is a commitment to the idea that issues of material embodiment and environmental embedding play explanatorily significant roles in our understanding of human cognitive success.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Smart2014,
  author = {Smart, Paul},
  title = {Embodiment, cognition and the world wide web},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition},
  editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {326--334}
}
Stokes, P. Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time 2014 Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
13(2), 295-312.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Personal identity theory has become increasingly sensitive to the im- portance of the first-person perspective. However, certain ways of speaking about that perspective do not allow the full temporal aspects of first-person perspec- tives on the self to come into view. In this paper I consider two recent phenom- enologically-informed discussions of personal identity that end up yielding metaphysically divergent views of the self: those of Barry Dainton and Galen Strawson. I argue that when we take a properly temporally indexical view of the first-person perspective, and thereby resist the assumption that phenomenally- figured and theoretically-figured identity claims must have a common object, the metaphysically awkward accommodations each of these authors is compelled to make cease to be necessary. Keywords
BibTeX:
@article{Stokes2014,
  author = {Stokes, Patrick},
  title = {Crossing the bridge: The first-person and time},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume = {13},
  number = {2},
  pages = {295--312},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11097-013-9302-6}
}
Strohminger, N. and Nichols, S. The essential moral self 2014 Cognition
131(1), 159-171.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits-more than any other mental faculty-are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits. textcopyright 2013 Elsevier B.V.
BibTeX:
@article{Strohminger2014,
  author = {Strohminger, Nina and Nichols, Shaun},
  title = {The essential moral self},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Cognition},
  volume = {131},
  number = {1},
  pages = {159--171},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005},
  url = {https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0010027713002497}
}
Sutton, J. and Williamson, K. Embodied remembering 2014 The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
Routledge, 315-325.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Experiences of embodied remembering are familiar and diverse. We settle bodily into familiar chairs or find our way easily round familiar rooms. We inhabit our own kitchens or cars or workspaces effectively and comfortably, and feel disrupted when our habitual and accustomed objects or technologies change or break or are not available. Hearing a particular song can viscerally bring back either one conversation long ago, or just the urge to dance. Some people explicitly use their bodies to record, store, or cue memories. Others can move skilfully, without stopping to think, in complex and changing environments thanks to the cumulative expertise accrued in their history of fighting fires, or dancing, or playing hockey. The forms of memory involved in these cases may be distinct, operating at different timescales and levels, and by way of different mechanisms and media, but they often cooperate in the many contexts of our practices of remembering.
BibTeX:
@book{Sutton2014,
  author = {Sutton, John and Williamson, Kellie},
  title = {Embodied remembering},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition},
  editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {315--325}
}
Teroni, F. The epistemological disunity of memory 2014 Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan
Springer, 183-202.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: A long-standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory (PastRT), these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this chapter, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. The PastRT offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argument in favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Teroni2014a,
  author = {Teroni, Fabrice},
  title = {The epistemological disunity of memory},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Mind, Values, and Metaphysics: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan},
  editor = {Reboul, Anne},
  publisher = {Springer},
  pages = {183--202},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_12},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-812}
}
Theiner, G. A beginner's guide to group minds 2014 New Waves in Philosophy of Mind
Palgrave Macmillan, 301-322.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds (1) that minds are exclusively possessed by individuals and (2) that no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms and associated closely with the brain; no parts of the brain that are constitu- tive of a human mind are considered capable of having a mind. 1 Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) and (2) as standard individualism about minds (SIAM). Put succinctly, SIAM says that all minds are singular minds. This conflicts with the group mind thesis (GMT), understood as the claim that there are collective types of minds that comprise two or more singular minds among their constitutive parts. The related concept of group cognition refers to psychological states, processes or capacities that are attributes of such collective minds.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Theiner2014,
  author = {Theiner, Georg},
  title = {A beginner's guide to group minds},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {New Waves in Philosophy of Mind},
  editor = {Sprevak, Mark and Kallestrup, Jesper},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {301--322}
}
Theiner, G. Varieties of group cognition 2014 The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
Routledge, 347-357.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson, 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one ofthe greatest assets ofour species. In the history ofhumankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem solvers, and decision makers. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many social scientists employed the notorious “group mind” idiom to express the sensible idea that groups can function as the seats of cognition, intelligence, and agency in their own right (Allport, 1968; Wilson, 2004). In their quest to stress (rightly) that group phenomena are something “over and above” the sum of individual contributions, a fondness for vitalist metaphors led them to believe (wrongly) that genuine group cognition must be the result of tapping into individualistically inaccessible, “holistic” forces. Today, inspired in part by his- torically unparalleled forms of mass collaboration enabled by the Internet, it has once again become popular to speak of collective intelligence, group agency, or even the emergence of a “global brain” (cf. the wiki-edited MIT Handbook of Collective Intelligence [MIT Center for Collective Intelligence, n.d.]).
BibTeX:
@incollection{Theiner2014a,
  author = {Theiner, Georg},
  title = {Varieties of group cognition},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition},
  editor = {Shapiro, Lawrence},
  publisher = {Routledge},
  pages = {347--357}
}
Vandekerckhove, M., Bulnes, L.C. and Panksepp, J. The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory 2014 Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
7, 210.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person "self-experience," a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of "awareness" or "knowing consciousness" that permits "time-travel" in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one's life and its possibilities within the "mind's eye."
BibTeX:
@article{Vandekerckhove2014,
  author = {Vandekerckhove, Marie and Bulnes, Luis Carlo and Panksepp, Jaak},
  title = {The emergence of primary anoetic consciousness in episodic memory},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience},
  volume = {7},
  pages = {210},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00210},
  url = {http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00210/abstract}
}
Walter, S. and Eronen, M. Reduction, multiple realizability, and levels of reality 2014 The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science
Bloomsbury
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] The goals of reduction have been numerous: revealing unity behind the appearance of plurality, showing that some phenomena are resultants of more fundamental phenomena, looking “downwards” into the composition of things in order to explain wholes in terms of their parts, or explicating one theory in terms of a more fundamental one.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Walter2014,
  author = {Walter, Sven and Eronen, Markus},
  title = {Reduction, multiple realizability, and levels of reality},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Science},
  editor = {French, Steven and Saatsi, Juha},
  publisher = {Bloomsbury}
}
Werning, M. and Cheng, S. Is episodic memory a natural kind? A defense of the sequence analysis 2014 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society  
Abstract: Colloquially, episodic memory is described as "the memory of personally experienced events". Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode. We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along two cornerstones: First, empirical results support the claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Second, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.
BibTeX:
@inproceedings{Werning2014,
  author = {Werning, Markus and Cheng, Sen},
  title = {Is episodic memory a natural kind? A defense of the sequence analysis},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society}
}
Williamson, K. and Sutton, J. Embodied collaboration in small groups 2014 Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy
Palgrave Macmillan, 107-133.
 
Abstract: [first paragraph] Being social creatures in a complex world, we do things together. We act jointly. While cooperation, in its broadest sense, can involve merely getting out of each other's way, or refusing to deceive other people, it is also essential to human nature that it involves more active forms of collaboration and coordination (Tomasello 2009; Sterelny 2012). We collaborate with others in many ordinary activities which, though at times similar to those of other animals, take unique and diverse cultural and psychological forms in human beings. But we also work closely and interactively with each other in more peculiar and flexible prac- tices which are in distinctive ways both species-specific and culturally and historically contingent: from team sports to shared labor, from committee work to mass demonstrations, from dancing to reminiscing together about old times.
BibTeX:
@incollection{Williamson2014,
  author = {Williamson, Kellie and Sutton, John},
  title = {Embodied collaboration in small groups},
  year = {2014},
  booktitle = {Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy},
  editor = {Wolfe, Charles T.},
  publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan},
  pages = {107--133}
}
Wu, W. Being in the workspace, from a neural point of view: Comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On central cognition' 2014 Philosophical Studies
170(1), 163-174.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] In his rich and provocative paper, Peter Carruthers announces two related theses: (a) a positive thesis that ‘‘central cognition is sensory based, depending on the activation and deployment of sensory images of various sorts'' (Carruthers 2013) and (b) a negative thesis that the ‘‘central mind does not contain any workspace within which goals, decisions, intentions, or non-sensory judgments can be active'' (Carruthers 2013). These are striking claims suggesting that a natural view about cognition, namely that explicit theoretical reasoning involves direct operations over beliefs, is wrong. Our beliefs, on this natural view, interact with each other to yield new beliefs. If Carruthers is right, beliefs have only an indirect or mediated influence in cognition with sensory states playing the direct role. I think it an important feature of Carruthers' discussion that he draws support from work on the neural circuits and mechanisms that subserve these processes. In what follows, I want to register a few worries about the theses and the empirical evidence adduced to support them.1
BibTeX:
@article{Wu2014,
  author = {Wu, Wayne},
  title = {Being in the workspace, from a neural point of view: Comments on Peter Carruthers, 'On central cognition'},
  year = {2014},
  journal = {Philosophical Studies},
  volume = {170},
  number = {1},
  pages = {163--174},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0169-8},
  url = {http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11098-013-0169-8}
}
Abbott, B. Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how 2013 Philosophical Perspectives
27(1), 1-21.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: [first paragraph] This paper will focus on a particular attempt to apply linguistic evidence to the solution of a philosophical problem. The problem is whether or not there is a distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that.i Ryle (1949) argued that there is, and indeed there is a lot of intuitive support for that position. To someone who knows how to play tennis, or how to play the violin, this kind of knowledge just does not feel propositional. As many people have noted, knowledge of how to do things requiring skill takes a lot of time and practice, while even complex propositional knowledge can be attained almost instantly. And Ryle himself pointed out that "though it is proper to ask for the grounds or reasons for someone's acceptance of a proposition, this question cannot be asked of someone's skill at cards—" (1949, 28). Nevertheless, despite this kind of evidence, Jason Stanley has argued at length, based on linguistic analysis, that knowledge how is not different from knowledge that, but is instead just a subcategory of propositional knowledge (Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Stanley 2012; Stanley and Williamson 2001 (hereinafter SW)), a position he calls (following Ryle) "intellectualism". At least two issues can be distinguished here. One is, what exactly is the linguistic evidence telling us about knowledge how vs. knowledge that? Another is, should we believe what linguistic evidence tells us? We will take up those issues in that order.
BibTeX:
@article{Abbott2013,
  author = {Abbott, Barbara},
  title = {Linguistic solutions to philosophical problems: The case of knowing how},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Philosophical Perspectives},
  volume = {27},
  number = {1},
  pages = {1--21},
  doi = {https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12019},
  url = {http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpe.12019}
}
Arango-Muñoz, S. Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings 2013 Review of Philosophy and Psychology
4(1), 135-152.
[DOI] [URL
Abstract: Recent debates on mental extension and distributed cognition have taught us that environmental resources play an important and often indispensable role in support-ing cognitive capacities. In order to clarify how interactions between the mind – particularly memory– and the world take place, this paper presents the " selection problem " and the " endorsement problem " as structural problems arising from such interactions in cases of mental scaffolding. On the one hand, the selection problem arises each time an agent is confronted with a cognitive problem, since she has to choose whether to solve it internally or externally. How does she choose? On the other hand, when confronted with the internally or externally retrieved solution to a cognitive task, the subject has to decide whether to endorse the information. How does the subject decide whether to endorse it or not? The last section proposes a solution to each problem in terms of metamemory and metacognitive feelings. Metamemory evaluates memory each time the subject is confronted with a memory task and elicits either a positive or negative metacognitive feeling that guides the decision. 1 Scaffolded Memory I have a terrible memory. I often forget having an appointment, as well as important dates, such as my girlfr