Kourken Michaelian

photo of MichaelianI work primarily on memory, which I approach from the perspectives of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology. My book, Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past (MIT 2016), argues against the causal theory of memory and develops a simulation theory according to which remembering is a matter of imagining the past.

While my research continues to explore the implications of the simulation theory, I've recently turned my attention towards collective memory, and I'm currently the PI on a project on collective memory funded by a Fast Start grant from the Marsden Fund.

I've also edited several philosophy and interdisciplinary volumes on memory, the most recent of which are The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (Routledge 2017) and Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel (OUP 2016).

I'm currently a senior lecturer in the philosophy department at the University of Otago in New Zealand. Before moving to Otago in 2015, I worked for several years at Bilkent University in Turkey and at the Institut Jean-Nicod in France. My Ph.D. is from the University of Massachusetts in the US, and my M.A. and B.A. are from Carleton University and the University of Alberta, both in Canada.


About
Contact

Email: kourken.michaelian@otago.ac.nz

Phone: +64 (0)3 471 6358

Mailing address:

Department of Philosophy
University of Otago
PO Box 56
Dunedin 9054 New Zealand

Physical address:

Department of Philosophy
University of Otago
Room 108, 117 Union Street East
Dunedin 9016 New Zealand

Positions

2017–20xx. Senior lecturer. Department of Philosophy. University of Otago. Dunedin, New Zealand.

2015–2016. Lecturer. Department of Philosophy. University of Otago. Dunedin, New Zealand.

2011–2014. Assistant professor. Department of Philosophy. Bilkent University. Ankara, Turkey.

2009–2011. Postdoctoral researcher. Institut Jean-Nicod (ENS/EHESS/CNRS). Paris, France.

Degrees

2003–2009. Ph.D. Department of Philosophy. University of Massachusetts. Amherst, USA.

2001–2003. M.A. Department of Philosophy. Carleton University. Ottawa, Canada.

1996–2001. B.A. University of Alberta. Edmonton, Canada.

Books
Authored

cover of Mental Time Travel K. Michaelian 2016. Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past. MIT Press. [BibTeX]

Buy the book:

What is it to remember an episode from one’s past? How does episodic memory give us knowledge of the personal past? What explains the emergence of the apparently uniquely human ability to relive the past? Drawing on current research on mental time travel, this book proposes an integrated set of answers to these questions, arguing that remembering is a matter of simulating past episodes, that we can identify metacognitive mechanisms enabling episodic simulation to meet standards of reliability sufficient for knowledge, and that the subjective experience of reliving the past is a precondition for the reliability of simulational remembering. The resulting account of memory, memory knowledge, and their evolution will be of interest both to philosophers interested in empirically-informed approaches to memory and to psychologists interested in the philosophical implications of empirical memory research.

Contents:

Part I: Epistemology and human memory

  1. Three questions about memory
  2. Situating episodic memory
  3. Memory knowledge

Part II: Episodic memory as mental time travel

  1. The commonsense conception
  2. The causal theory
  3. The simulation theory

Part III: Mental time travel as a source of knowledge

  1. The information effect
  2. Metamemory and the source problem
  3. Metamemory and the process problem

Part IV: The evolution of mental time travel

  1. The puzzle of conscious episodic memory
  2. Consciousness and memory knowledge
  3. Conclusion

Endorsements:

  • Jordi Fernández (Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide): "Kourken Michaelian's book will be a milestone in the study of memory. This systematic investigation covers an impressive span of philosophical and psychological work on memory, and is both well-informed in cognitive science and nuanced in its conceptual treatment of the topic. Michaelian’s treatise provides a framework that will shape the debates on memory and mental time travel in the years to come."
  • Karl Szpunar (Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago): "In Mental Time Travel, Kourken Michaelian calls into question the intuitive assumption that memory is strictly about the past. In so doing, he offers a fresh multidisciplinary perspective into memory’s constructive nature. Psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers who study the concept of memory should consider this volume essential reading."

Reviews:

Blog posts:

Edited
New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory

K. Michaelian, D. Debus, and D. Perrin, eds. Under contract. New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge.

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory will present newly commissioned work from well-established, leading scholars in the philosophy of memory as well as from young scholars who are currently emerging as important contributors to the field. The commissioned contributions to the volume deal with a broad range of issues in the philosophy of memory, from issues in the metaphysics and the phenomenology of memory, through questions about memory and norms, to issues related to memory and affectivity. While the topic of memory has until recently been somewhat neglected in contemporary philosophical debates, a broader interest in relevant themes is currently developing; indeed, the philosophy of memory is emerging as a growing research area and at present it is attracting a substantial amount of attention. In line with this recent development, the volume will provide a timely venue for new and original research in the philosophy of memory.

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory

cover of Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory S. Bernecker and K. Michaelian, eds. 2017. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. [BibTeX]

Buy the book:

Memory occupies a fundamental place in philosophy, playing a central role not only in the history of philosophy but also in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and ethics. Yet the philosophy of memory has only recently emerged as an area of study and research in its own right. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory is an outstanding reference source on the key topics, problems and debates in this exciting area, and is the first philosophical collection of its kind. The forty-eight chapters are written by an international team of contributors, and divided into nine parts: the nature of memory; the metaphysics of memory; memory, mind and meaning; memory and the self; memory and time; the social dimension of memory; the epistemology of memory; memory and morality; history of philosophy of memory. Within these sections, central topics and problems are examined, including: truth, consciousness, imagination, emotion, self-knowledge, narrative, personal identity, time, collective and social memory, internalism and externalism, and the ethics of memory. The final part examines figures in the history of philosophy, including Aristotle, Augustine, Freud, Bergson, Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as well as perspectives on memory in Indian and Chinese philosophy. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind and psychology, the Handbook will also be of interest to those in related fields, such as psychology and anthropology.

Contents:

The philosophy of memory today: Editors' introduction. S. Bernecker and K. Michaelian.

Part I: The nature of memory

  1. Taxonomy and unity of memory. S. Cheng and M. Werning.
  2. The phenomenology of memory. F. Teroni.
  3. Memory and levels of scientific explanation. J. Bickle.

Part II: The metaphysics of memory

  1. Memory and truth. S. Bernecker.
  2. Memory causation. D. Debus.
  3. Memory traces. S. Robins.
  4. The intentional objects of memory. J. Fernández.

Part III: Memory, mind, and meaning

  1. Memory and consciousness. P. Droege.
  2. Memory and perspective. C. McCarroll and J. Sutton.
  3. Memory and imagination. F. De Brigard.
  4. Memory images. E. Irvine.
  5. Memory and emotion. R. de Sousa.

Part IV: Memory and the self

  1. Memory and personal identity. S. Nichols.
  2. Memory and self-consciousness. J. L. Bermúdez.
  3. Memory and narrativity. D. D. Hutto.

Part V: Memory and time

  1. Memory and the concept of time. C. Hoerl.
  2. Memory and the metaphysics of time. R. Le Poidevin.
  3. Memory as mental time travel. D. Perrin and K. Michaelian.

Part VI: The social dimension of memory

  1. Extended memory. R. Clowes.
  2. Collective memory. J. A. Barash.
  3. Memory and social identity. R. Fivush and M. Graci.

Part VII: The epistemology of memory

  1. Internalism and externalism. B. J. C. Madison.
  2. Foundationalism. B. Brogaard.
  3. Coherentism. E. J. Olsson.
  4. Preservation and generation. T. D. Senor.
  5. Skepticism and memory. A. Moon.

Part VIII: Memory and morality

  1. A duty to remember. J. Blustein.
  2. An obligation to forget. D. Matheson.
  3. The ethics of memory modification. S. M. Liao.

Part IX: History of philosophy of memory

  1. Plato. S.-G. Chappell.
  2. Aristotle. S.-G. Chappell.
  3. Classical Indian philosophy. J. Ganeri.
  4. Indian Buddhist philosophy. M. Chadha.
  5. Chinese Buddhist philosophy. C.-Y. Cheng.
  6. Augustine. L. Manning.
  7. Avicenna and Averroes. D. L. Black.
  8. Thomas Aquinas. J. O'Callaghan.
  9. John Locke and Thomas Reid. R. Copenhaver.
  10. David Hume. D. E. Flage.
  11. G. W. F. Hegel. V. Ricci.
  12. Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. M. Schwab.
  13. Henri Bergson. T. Perri.
  14. Bertrand Russell. P. Faria.
  15. Maurice Halbwachs. D. Nikulin.
  16. Frederic Bartlett. B. Wagoner.
  17. Ludwig Wittgenstein. A. Hamilton.
  18. Martin Heidegger. T. Carman.
  19. Paul Ricoeur. A. Dessingué.
Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel

cover of Seeing the Future K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar, eds. 2016. Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press. [BibTeX]

Buy the book:

Episodic memory is a major area of research in psychology. Initially viewed as a distinct store of information derived from experienced episodes, episodic memory is understood today as a form of mental "time travel" into the personal past. Recent research has revealed striking similarities between episodic memory - past-oriented mental time travel - and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT). Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel brings together leading contributors in both empirical and theoretical disciplines to present the first interdisciplinary look at the human to imagine future scenarios. Chapters focus on the challenging conceptual and theoretical questions raised by FMTT, covering themes such as: varieties of future-oriented cognition; relationships between FMTT and episodic memory; subjective temporality in FMTT; the self in FMTT; and functional, evolutionary and comparative, developmental, and clinical perspectives on FMTT. With its focus on the conceptual issues at the heart of fast-developing research on FMTT, this edited volume will serve graduate students to senior scholars working on or interested in FMTT and related areas as a synthesis of current theoretical thinking and a source of questions for future FMTT research.

Contents:

  1. The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel: Editors' introduction. K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar.

Part I: Varieties of future-oriented cognition

  1. Toward a taxonomy of future thinking. K. K. Szpunar, R. N. Spreng, and D. L. Schacter.

Part II: Relationships between future-oriented mental time travel and episodic memory

  1. Asymmetries in subjective time. D. Perrin.
  2. Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events. K. Michaelian.
  3. Bidirectional interactions between memory and imagination. A. L. Devitt and D. R. Addis.

Part III: Subjective-temporality in future-oriented mental time travel

  1. Temporal consciousness and confabulation: When mental time travel takes the wrong track. G. Dalla Barba.
  2. The role of subjective temporality in future-oriented mental time travel. S. B. Klein and C. Steindam.
  3. Time is not of the essence: Understanding the neural correlates of mental time travel. F. De Brigard and B. S. Gessell.

Part IV: The self in future-oriented mental time travel

  1. Future mental time travel and the Me-self. L. Manning.
  2. The role of personal goals in future-oriented mental time travel. A. D'Argembeau.

Part V: Functional perspectives

  1. Temporal perspectives in imagination: On the nature and value of imagining the future. D. Debus
  2. Making decisions about the future: Regret and the cognitive function of episodic memory. C. Hoerl and T. McCormack
  3. The mechanisms and benefits of a future-oriented brain. G. Pezzulo.

Part VI: Evolutionary and comparative perspectives

  1. Evolutionary perspectives on prospective cognition. J. M. Thom and N. S. Clayton.
  2. With the future in mind: Towards a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of future-oriented cognition. G. Martin-Ordas
  3. The future of memory, mental time travel, and mind wandering. M. C. Corballis

Part VII: Developmental perspectives

  1. Shaping one’s future self – The development of deliberate practice. T. Suddendorf, M. Brinums, and K. Imuta.
  2. Episodic thinking in children: Methodological and theoretical approaches. C. M. Atance and C. E. V. Mahy.

Part VIII: Clinical perspectives

  1. Semantic memory as the essential scaffold for future-oriented mental time travel. M. Irish.
  2. The impact of multiple sclerosis in future-oriented mental time travel: Neuropsychological and neuroimagining approaches. A. Ernst and L. Manning.

Endorsements:

  • Shayna Rosenbaum (PhD, CPsych, Coordinator, Neuropsychology Stream, Clinical Area, Department of Psychology, York University): "Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel captures the recent surge of interest in our ability to engage in future thinking and what it tells us about mental representations of time, space, the self, and the reconstructive nature of memory. The editors and contributors successfully assemble diverse theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to the study of mental time travel, a feast for the minds of graduate students and seasoned professionals alike. The result is an in-depth, incisive treatment of the cognitive and neural bases of temporal thought from leaders in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience that is sure to influence the direction of future research on mental time travel."
  • Sven Bernecker (Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine): "This volume is an excellent collection of new essays on the theoretical presuppositions and implications of the research on future-oriented mental time travel. It is a must-read for anyone interested in memory studies and philosophical psychology."

Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions

cover of Philosophical Issues K. Michaelian and S. Arango-Muñoz, eds. 2014. Epistemic Feelings and Epistemic Emotions. Focus section. Philosophical Inquiries 2(1). [BibTeX]

Read the focus section: Philosophical Inquiries.

Contents:

  1. Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section. S. Arango-Muñoz and K. Michaelian.
  2. Feelings of (un)certainty and margins for error. J. Dokic.
  3. Metacognitive feelings, self-ascriptions and mental actions. S. Arango-Muñoz.
  4. Shared knowledge from individual vice: The role of unworthy epistemic emotions. A. Morton.
  5. Epistemic emotions: A natural kind? A. Meylan.


Distributed Cognition and Memory Research

cover of Review of Philosophy and Psychology K. Michaelian and J. Sutton, eds. 2013. Distributed Cognition and Memory Research. Special issue. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1). [BibTeX]

Read the special issue: Springer.

Contents:

  1. Distributed cognition and memory research: History and current directions. K. Michaelian and J. Sutton.
  2. Memory, natural kinds, and cognitive extension; or, Martians don't remember, and cognitive science is not about cognition. R. D. Rupert.
  3. Alignment, transactive memory, and collective cognitive systems. D. P. Tollefsen, R. Dale, and A. Paxton.
  4. Transactive memory systems: A mechanistic analysis of emergent group memory. G. Theiner.
  5. The adaptive function of distributed remembering: Contributions to the formation of collective memory. M. M. Fagin, J. K. Yamashiro, and W. C. Hirst.
  6. The cognitive integration of e-memory. R. W. Clowes.
  7. Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings. S. Arango-Muñoz.
  8. Distributed remembering through active structuring of activities and environments. N. Dahlbäck, M. Kristiansson, and F. Stjernberg.
  9. Is my memory an extended notebook? P. Loader.
Articles
In progress
  • K. Michaelian. Title TBD. Chapter on memory and testimony. Invited for book edited by S. Goldberg and S. Wright.
  • E. Cosentino and K. Michaelian. Title TBD. Article on mental time travel and self-control.
  • M. Werning, S. Cheng, and K. Michaelian. Title TBD. Article on simulation and memory traces in episodic memory and mental time travel.
  • S. Arango-Muñoz and K. Michaelian. Group metamemory: Does collaborative remembering imply group metacognition? Chapter invited for Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Ed. A. Fiebich.
  • K. Michaelian. How generative can you get? Reconstruction and autonoesis in episodic memory knowledge. Article invited for a special issue of Mind & Language.
  • S. Robins and K. Michaelian. The causal theory of memory at 50. Chapter for New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory.
  • A. Sant'Anna and K. Michaelian. Thinking about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought. Article for submission.
  • K. Michaelian. Review of S. Prosser. Experiencing Time (Oxford University Press 2016). For Philosophical Quarterly.
Forthcoming

click for pdf

K. Michaelian and J. Sutton. 201x. Collective mental time travel: Remembering the past and imagining the future together. Synthese. [BibTeX]

Abstract: Bringing research on collective memory together with research on episodic future thought, Szpunar and Szpunar (2016) have recently developed the concept of collective future thought. Individual memory and individual future thought are increasingly seen as two forms of individual mental time travel, and it is natural to see collective memory and collective future thought as forms of collective mental time travel. But how seriously should the notion of collective mental time travel be taken? This article argues that, while collective mental time travel is disanalogous in important respects to individual mental time travel, the concept of collective mental time travel nevertheless provides a useful means both of organizing existing findings, while also suggesting promising directions for future research.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 201x. Autonoesis and reconstruction in episodic memory: Is remembering systematically misleading? (Commentary.) Behavioral and Brain Sciences. [BibTeX]

Abstract: Mahr and Csibra view autonoesis as being essential to episodic memories and construction as being essential to the process of episodic remembering. These views imply that episodic memory is systematically misleading, not because it often misinforms us about the past, but rather because it often misinforms us about how it informs us about the past.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian and J. Sutton. 201x. Collective memory. Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. Ed. M. Jankovic and K. Ludwig. Routledge. [BibTeX]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian and S. Arango-Muñoz. 201x. Collaborative memory knowlege: A distributed reliabilist perspective. Collaborative Remembering: Theories, Research, Applications. Eds. M. Meade, C. B. Harris, P. van Bergen, J. Sutton, and A. J. Barnier. Oxford University Press. [BibTeX]


click for pdf

D. Perrin and K. Michaelian. 201x. Memory as mental time travel. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Eds. S. Bernecker and K. Michaelian. Routledge. [BibTeX]


click for pdf

S. Bernecker and K. Michaelian. 201x. The philosophy of memory today: Editors’ introduction. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. [BibTeX]


email for pdf

K. Michaelian. Forthcoming. Naturalistic descriptions of knowledge. Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. Volume IV of Philosophy of Knowledge: A History. Ed. S. Hetherington and M. Valaris. Bloomsbury. [BibTeX]


email for pdf

K. Michaelian. Forthcoming. Naturalism and scientific methods–A brief introduction. Analytic Philosophy: A Contemporary Reader. Ed. J. Horvath. Bloomsbury. [BibTeX]


2017

click for html version

K. Michaelian and J. Sutton. 2017. Memory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. E. N. Zalta. [BibTeX] [link]


2016

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering. Frontiers in Psychology 7: 1857. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This articles develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Against discontinuism: Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events. Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Eds. K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar. Oxford University Press. Pp. 62–92. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Continuists maintain that, aside from their distinct temporal orientations, episodic memory and future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) are qualitatively continuous. Discontinuists deny this, arguing that, in addition to their distinct temporal orientations, there are qualitative metaphysical or epistemological differences between episodic memory and FMTT. This chapter defends continuism by responding both to arguments for metaphysical discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities between episodic memory and FMTT at the causal, intentional, and phenomenological levels, and to arguments for epistemological discontinuism, based on alleged discontinuities with respect to the epistemic openness of the past and future, the directness or indirectness of our knowledge of past and future, and immunity to error through misidentification. The chapter concludes by sketching a positive argument for continuism.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, and K. K. Szpunar. 2016. The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel. Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press. Pp. 1–18. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This introductory chapter reviews research on future-oriented mental time travel to date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future).


click for pdf

J. Davies and K. Michaelian. 2016. Identifying and individuating cognitive systems: A task-based distributed cognition alternative to agent-based extended cognition. Cognitive Processing 17(3): 307–319. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This article argues for a task-based approach to identifying and individuating cognitive systems. The agent-based extended cognition approach faces a problem of cognitive bloat and has difficulty accommodating both sub-individual cognitive systems ("scaling down") and some supra-individual cognitive systems ("scaling up"). The standard distributed cognition approach can accommodate a wider variety of supra-individual systems but likewise has difficulties with sub-individual systems and faces the problem of cognitive bloat. We develop a task-based variant of distributed cognition designed to scale up and down smoothly while providing a principled means of avoiding cognitive bloat. The advantages of the task-based approach are illustrated by means of two parallel case studies: re-representation in the human visual system and in a biomedical engineering laboratory.

email for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Memory. Philosophy: Mind. Ed. B. McLaughlin. Series: Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy. Macmillan Reference. Pp. 227–243. [BibTeX] [link]


2015

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2015. Opening the doors of memory: Is declarative memory a natural kind? Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 6(6): 475–482. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) memory and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the ``doors of memory'' too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It may be preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage, and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not.

2014

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2014. JFGI: From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism. Philosophical Issues 24: 314–346. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard (2010) has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of a true belief. But the significance of the role played by the subject's cognitive agency in distributed cognitive systems is in fact highly variable: at one extreme, formation of a true belief seems clearly to be significantly creditable to the subject's agency; at the other extreme, however, the subject's agency plays such a peripheral role that it is at best unclear whether it should receive significant credit for formation of a true belief. The compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology thus turns on what it takes for a contribution to the formation of true belief to count as significant. This article argues that the inevitable vagueness of this notion suggests retreating from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism and explores the prospects for a distributed reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly with distributed cognition. In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Goldberg's recent extended reliabilist view (Goldberg 2010) by allowing the process the reliability of which determines the epistemic status of a subject's belief to extend to include not only processing performed by other subjects but also processing performed by non-human technological resources.

click for pdf

S. Arango-Muñoz and K. Michaelian. 2014. Epistemic feelings, epistemic emotions: Review and introduction to the focus section. Philosophical Inquiries 2(1): 97–122. [BibTeX] [link]

Abstract: Philosophers of mind and epistemologists are increasingly making room in their theories for epistemic emotions (E-emotions) and, drawing on metacognition research in psychology, epistemic --- or noetic or metacognitive --- feelings (E-feelings). Since philosophers have only recently begun to draw on empirical research on E-feelings, in particular, we begin by providing a general characterization of E-feelings (section 1) and reviewing some highlights of relevant research (section 2). We then turn to philosophical work on E-feelings and E-emotions, situating the contributions to the focus section (two articles devoted to E-feelings and two devoted to E-emotions) with respect to both the existing literature and each other (section 3). We conclude by briefly describing some promising avenues for further philosophical research on E-feelings and E-emotions (section 4).

email for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2014. La mémoire comme source de connaissances. In Connaître. Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine. Eds. J.-M. Chevalier and B. Gaultier. Editions d’Ithaque. Pp. 119–148. [BibTeX] [link]


2013

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2013. The evolution of testimony: Receiver vigilance, speaker honesty, and the reliability of communication. Episteme 10(1): 37–59. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Drawing on both empirical evidence and evolutionary considerations, Sperber et al. (2010) argue that humans have a suite of evolved mechanisms for "epistemic vigilance". On their view, vigilance plays a crucial role in ensuring the reliability and hence the evolutionary stability of communication. This article responds to their argument for vigilance, drawing on additional empirical evidence (from deception detection research) and evolutionary considerations (from animal signalling research) to defend a more optimistic, quasi-Reidian view of communication. On this alternative view, the lion's share of the responsibility for explaining the reliability of testimony falls not to the vigilance of receivers but rather to the honesty of communicators, implying that vigilance does not play a major role in explaining the evolutionary stability of communication.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2013. The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck. Synthese 190(12): 2429–2456. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader "information effect".

click for pdf

K. Michaelian and J. Sutton. 2013. Distributed cognition and memory research: History and current directions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4(1): 1–24. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: According to the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the brain but is often distributed across heterogeneous systems combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. These ideas have been intensely debated in philosophy, but the philosophical debate has often remained at some distance from relevant empirical research, while empirical memory research, in particular, has been somewhat slow to incorporate distributed/extended ideas. This situation, however, appears to be changing, as we witness an increasing level of interaction between the philosophy and the empirical research. In this editorial, we provide a high-level historical overview of the development of the debates around the hypotheses of distributed and extended cognition, as well as relevant theory and empirical research on memory, considering both the role of memory in theoretical debates around distributed/extended ideas and strands of memory research that resonate with those ideas; we emphasize recent trends towards increased interaction, including new empirical paradigms for investigating distributed memory systems. We then provide an overview of the special issue itself, drawing out a number of general implications from the contributions, and conclude by sketching promising directions for future research on distributed memory.

2012

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2012. Metacognition and endorsement. Mind & Language 27(3): 284–307. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the "endorsement problem": how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this paper argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement problem.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2012. Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind. Consciousness and Cognition 21(3): 1154–1165. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: In the context of their argument for the extended mind hypothesis, Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggest four criteria for when a resource counts as a memory for an agent: (1) the agent has constant access to the resource; (2) the information in the resource is directly available to the agent without difficulty; (3) the agent automatically endorses information retrieved from the resource; (4) information is stored in the resource as a consequence of past endorsement. The suggestion is that external resources which satisfy these criteria count as memories on a par with internal, biological memory. As research on forgetting and metamemory shows, however, criteria 2-4 are not satisfied by biological memory itself (and criterion 1 by itself is obviously insufficient), so the criteria cannot be used to establish the existence of external memory. A revised, more psychologically realistic version of the criteria results in a classification of standard cases of putative external memory similar to that generated by the original criteria. But the classification should ultimately be based directly on a description of the function of memory, and merely revising the criteria does not capture this function. An acceptable account of the function of memory will be compatible with plausible accounts of its evolution and with its role in mental time travel and other forms of imagination and will thus suggest that we rely on external memory to serve a function not performed by biological memory systems. External memory thus turns out not to be a type of memory. This conclusion has implications for cognitive science theorizing in the extended mind framework, questions around the ecological validity of laboratory studies of memory, and the causal theory of memory in philosophy.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2012. (Social) metacognition and (self-)trust. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3(4): 481–514. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.


2011

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2011. The epistemology of forgetting. Erkenntnis 74(3): 399–424. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that human memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible to forgetting -- that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the opposed view: normal human forgetting -- the pattern of forgetting characteristic of cognitively normal adult human beings -- approximates a virtue located at the mean between the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering too much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer, a certain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, by eliminating "clutter" from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall shape of the subject's total doxastic state. I conclude by reviewing work in psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtuous pattern of forgetting.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2011. Generative memory. Philosophical Psychology 24(3): 323–342. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This paper explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for philosophical theories of the metaphysics of memory and for a central question in the epistemology of memory. I first develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. I then argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of Martin and Deutscher's influential causal theory of memory. I conclude by sketching the implications of this updated theory for the question of memory's status as a generative epistemic source.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2011. Is memory a natural kind? Memory Studies 4(2): 170–189. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Though researchers often refer to memory as if it were a unitary phenomenon, a natural kind, the apparent heterogeneity of the various "kinds" of memory casts doubt on this default view. This paper argues, first, that kinds of memory are individuated by memory systems. It argues, second, for a view of the nature of kinds of memory informed by the tri-level hypothesis. If this approach to kinds of memory is right, then memory is not in fact a natural kind.


2010

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2010. In defence of gullibility: The epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection. Synthese 176(3): 399–427. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Research in the psychology of deception detection implies that Fricker, in making her case for reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, overestimates both the epistemic demerits of the antireductionist policy of trusting speakers blindly and the epistemic merits of the reductionist policy of monitoring speakers for trustworthiness: folk psychological prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding, it turns out that monitoring is on a par (in terms both of the reliability of the process and of the sensitivity of the beliefs that it produces) with blind trust. The consequence is that while (a version of) Fricker's argument for the necessity of a reduction succeeds, her argument for the availability of reductions fails. This does not, however, condemn us to endorse standard pessimistic reductionism, according to which there is no testimonial knowledge, for recent research concerning the methods used by subjects to discover deception in non-laboratory settings suggests that only a more moderate form of pessimism is in order.

2009

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2009. Reliabilism and privileged access. Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 69–109. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: Reliabilism is invoked by a standard causal response to the slow switching argument for incompatibilism about mental content externalism and privileged access. Though the response in question is negative, in that it only establishes that, given such an epistemology, externalism does not rule privileged access out, the appeal to reliabilism involves an assumption about the reliability of introspection, an assumption which in turn grounds a simple argument for the positive conclusion that reliabilism itself implies privileged access. This paper offers a two-part defence of that conclusion: the reliabilist account of privileged access is defended both against arguments in favour of the rival content inheritance strategy and against an argument turning on empirical considerations concerning the individuation of the belief-producing process of introspection.

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2009. Margaret Cavendish's epistemology. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17(1): 31–53. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This paper provides a systematic reconstruction of Cavendish's general epistemology and a characterization of the fundamental role of that theory in her natural philosophy. After reviewing the outlines of her natural philosophy, I describe her treatment of "exterior knowledge", i.e., of perception in general and of sense perception in particular. I then describe her treatment of "interior knowledge", i.e., of self-knowledge and "conception". I conclude by drawing out some implications of this reconstruction for our developing understanding of Cavendish's natural philosophy.

Awarded the British Society for the History of Philosophy's 2007 Graduate Student Essay Prize.


2008

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2008. Testimony as a natural kind. Episteme 5(2): 180–202. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: I argue, first, that testimony is likely a natural kind (where natural kinds are accurately described by the homoeostatic property cluster theory) and that if it is indeed a natural kind, it is likely necessarily reliable. I argue, second, that the view of testimony as a natural kind and as necessarily reliable grounds a novel, naturalist global reductionism about testimonial justification and that this new reductionism is immune to a powerful objection to orthodox Humean global reductionism, the objection from the too-narrow induction base.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2008. Privileged standpoints/reliable processes. Hypatia 23(1): 65–98. [BibTeX] [DOI]

Abstract: This paper attempts to reconcile Harding's postmodernist standpoint theory with process reliabilism in first-order epistemology and naturalism in metaepistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory is best understood as consisting of an applied epistemological component and a metaepistemological component. Naturalist metaepistemology and the metaepistemological component of postmodernist standpoint theory have produced complementary views of knowledge as a socially and naturally located phenomenon and have converged on a common concept of objectivity. The applied epistemological claims of postmodernist standpoint theory usefully can be construed as applications of process reliabilist first-order epistemology. Postmodernist standpoint theory, reliabilism, and naturalism thus form a coherent package of views in metaepistemology, first-order epistemology, and applied epistemology.

Review essays

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 201x. Episodic and semantic memory and imagination: The need for definitions. Review essay on M. S. Humphreys and K. A. Chalmers. Thinking about Human Memory (Cambridge University Press 2016). American Journal of Psychology.


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2014. Review essay on Thomas J. Anastasio, Kristen Ann Ehrenberger, Patrick Watson, and Wenyi Jiang, Individual and Collective Memory Consolidation: Analogous Processes on Different Levels (MIT Press 2012). Memory Studies 7(2): 254–264. [DOI]


Reviews

click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Review of D. Nikulin (ed.), Memory: A History (Oxford 2015). Frontiers in Psychology 6: 2047. [DOI]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Review of J. Brockmeier, Beyond the Archive: Memory, Narrative, and the Autobiographical Process (Oxford 2015). Memory Studies 9(3): 363–365. [DOI]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2016. Review of A. Gelfert, A Critical Introduction to Testimony (Bloomsbury 2014). Philosophical Quarterly 67(266): 198-200. [DOI]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2015. Review of Stanley B. Klein, The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence (Oxford 2014). Minds and Machines 25(1): 119–122. [DOI]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2015. Review of Joëlle Proust, The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-awareness (Oxford 2014). Analysis 75(2): 349–351. [DOI]


click for pdf

K. Michaelian. 2010. Review of Sven Bernecker, The Metaphysics of Memory (Springer 2008). European Journal of Philosophy 18(4): 623–626. [DOI]


Talks
2017

08-09/2017. Collective memory: Metaphor or reality? Refereed conference talk. European Network on Social Ontology V. Lund University.

08/2017. Title TBD. Seminar talk. University of Otago.

07/2017. Title TBD. Seminar talk. Otago Memory Group.

07/2017. Imagining the past: The simulation theory of episodic memory. Invited conference talk. Issues in Philosophy of Memory. University of Cologne.

06/2017. Title TBD. Invited workshop talk. Distributed Agents. King's College London.

06/2017. How generative can you get? Reconstruction and autonoesis in episodic memory knowledge. Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

05/2017. Collective memory: Metaphor or reality? Invited workshop talk. Cognition in Groups. Centre for the Study of Social Action, Università degli Studi di Milano.

05/2017. Collective memory: Metaphor or reality? Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

05/2017. Imagining the past: The simulation theory of episodic memory. Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

05/2017. How generative can you get? Reconstruction and autonoesis in episodic memory knowledge. Invited workshop talk. PERFECT 2017 Memory Workshop. Cambridge.

02/2017. The epistemology of generative memory. Invited seminar talk. Tokyo Forum for Analytic Philosophy.

02/2017. The epistemology of generative memory. Invited seminar talk. Università degli Studi Roma Tre.

01/2017. Mental time travel: The continuism-discontinuism debate. Talk in refereed conference symposium. Society for Applied Research on Memory and Cognition. University of Sydney.

2016

11/2016. What is it to (successfully) remember an episode? Invited symposium talk. What is Episodic Memory? Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychology, & Neuroscience. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

11/2016. Episodicity and generativity: Is episodic memory systematically misleading? Invited seminar talk. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

11/2016. Beyond the causal theory: Memory without memory traces. Invited seminar talk. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

11/2016. Memorial justification: Between reductionism and antireductionism. Invited workshop talk. 3rd Cologne/Leuven Epistemology Workshop. University of Cologne.

10/2016. Confabulating, misremembering, relearning: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering. Workshop talk. New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. University of Otago.

07/2016. Against the causal theory. Talk in referred conference symposium. International Conference on Memory 6. Budapest.

06/2016. Metacognition and metarepresentation in communication and memory. Invited summer school talk. Understanding Communication and Understanding Minds: The Role of Metarepresentations. Central European University.

06/2016. Individual and collective mental time travel: Epistemology and ethics. Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

06/2016. Collective mental time travel: Ontology. Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

06/2016. Individual mental time travel: Ontology. Invited seminar talk. Université Grenoble Alpes.

06/2016. Collective mental time travel: Ontology and epistemology. Invited seminar talk. York University.

05/2016. Collective mental time travel: Ontology and epistemology. Seminar talk. University of Otago.

05/2016. Towards a dual process model of mental time travel. Postgraduate seminar talk. University of Otago.

02/2016. Mental time travel and episodic memory in humans and animals: Continuities and discontinuities. Refereed workshop talk. Philosophy of Mental Time IV. Osaka.

2015

12/2015. The scope of memory: Is autonoetic consciousness essential to remembering? Workshop talk. Memory Day. University of Otago.

08/2015. Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events. Invited seminar talk. University of Auckland.

08/2015. Mental time travel and our knowledge of past and future events. Invited seminar talk. University of Waikato.

07/2015. Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective. Refereed conference talk. Australasian Association of Philosophy 2015. Macquarie University.

06/2015. Collaborative memory knowledge: A distributed reliabilist perspective. Invited workshop talk. Memory and Knowledge. Université Pierre-Mendès-France Grenoble.

05/2015. Remembering together: Collaborative memory and distributed reliabilism. Seminar talk. University of Otago.

2014

09/2014. Mental time travel: The metaphysics and the epistemology of episodic memory. Invited seminar talk. University of Otago.

04/2014. Episodic memory in evolutionary perspective. Invited conference talk. International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science 2014. Boğaziçi University.

03/2014. Explaining the evolution of conscious mental time travel: Metacognitive functions of autonoesis and chronesthesia. Invited seminar talk. Carleton University.

2013

11/2013. From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism. Invited seminar talk. University of Cape Town.

09/2013. From distributed cognition to distributed reliabilism. Invited seminar talk. University of Western Australia.

09/2013. How do you know whether you’re remembering or imagining? Towards a process monitoring framework. Invited seminar talk. University College Dublin.

09/2013. Is collective memory memory? Talk in refereed conference symposium. Cognitive Science Society 2013. Humboldt University Berlin.

06/2013. Memories of tomorrow. Invited seminar talk. Cardiff University.

06/2013. How do you know whether you’re remembering or imagining? Metacognition in episodic construction. Invited seminar talk. Queen’s University Belfast.

05/2013. Metacognition and episodic construction: Towards a process monitoring framework. Invited seminar talk. Middle East Technical University.

05/2013. Relying on oneself and others: Trust and vigilance in memory and testimony. Invited seminar talk. University of Cologne.

05/2013. Episodic construction as a source of knowledge: The role of metacognition. Invited seminar talk. University of Cologne.

05/2013. Remembering: Empirical themes in philosophical memory research, philosophical themes in empirical memory research. Invited seminar talk. University of Cologne.

2012

06/2012. Knowing whether one is remembering or imagining: Towards a process monitoring framework. Refereed conference talk. European Epistemology Network 2012. Bologna/Modena.

05/2012. Epistemology and metacognition. Invited workshop talk. Brains, Minds, and Language 1. Boğaziçi University.

01/2012. The evolution of testimony: Receiver vigilance, speaker honesty, and the reliability of communication. Invited seminar talk. Lund University.

01/2012. The limits of vigilance. Invited seminar talk. Lund University.

2011

11/2011. Is external memory memory? Biological memory and extended mind. Invited workshop talk. Things and Thoughts 4. Boğaziçi University.

11/2011. Cyborg memories. Public talk. Bilkent University.

09/2011. (Social) metacognition and (self-)trust. Invited conference talk. 3rd Copenhagen Conference in Epistemology. Copenhagen University.

09/2011. Is external memory memory? Talk in refereed conference symposium. International Conference on Memory 5. University of York.

02/2011. The information effect. Invited seminar talk. University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign).

01/2011. The information effect. Refereed conference talk. Communication and Cognition 2011. Université de Neuchâtel.

2010

11/2010. The information effect: Social influences on memory and anti-luck epistemology. Invited seminar talk. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

11/2010. The information effect. Seminar talk. KnowJust seminar. Institut Jean-Nicod.

09/2010. Métamémoire et confiance en soi. Talk in invited conference symposium. Société Française de Psychologie 2010. Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3.

09/2010. The information effect: Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck. Refereed conference talk. Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy 2011. Università degli Studi di Padova.

09/2010. Constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck. Talk in refereed conference symposium. European Society for Philosophy and Psychology 2010. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

07/2010. Metacognition and endorsement. Invited seminar talk. University of Edinburgh.

06/2010. Metacognition and endorsement. Refereed conference talk. Aristotelian Society/Mind Association Joint Session 2010. University College Dublin.

03/2010. Metacognition and justification. Refereed conference talk. Justification Revisited. Université de Genève.

01/2010. The epistemology of forgetting. Refereed conference talk. Vereniging voor Analytische Filosofie IV. Catholic University of Leuven.

2009

11/2009. The epistemology of forgetting. Invited seminar talk. APIC seminar. Institut Jean-Nicod.

Funding
Major

Marsden logoRemembering together: Collective memory and collective intentionality

Funded by a 300 000 NZD Fast Start grant from the Marsden Fund (administered by the Royal Society of New Zealand), this project will systematically investigate the concept of collective memory over the course of three years (2017-2019).

Collective memory has been investigated in two distinct research traditions. Psychologists have investigated remembering in small-scale groups; social scientists and humanists have investigated remembering in large-scale groups. Humanists in other disciplines have made key contributions to our understanding of collective memory, and it is imperative that philosophers, too, begin to engage with this dynamic interdisciplinary field. Philosophical theories of collective intentionality have the potential to provide key theoretical underpinnings to collective memory research. At the same time, collective memory provides an invaluable opportunity to test and refine those accounts. This project will carry out a sustained philosophical investigation of collective memory, producing a unified account of the nature of remembering at multiple scales. The account will have benefits both for empirical collective memory research and for philosophy. It will contribute to the theoretical sophistication of collective memory research by providing a framework capable of integrating existing findings and suggesting new lines of inquiry. It will contribute to the empirical sophistication of philosophical accounts of collective intentionality by bringing these into contact with rich bodies of empirical knowledge on the workings of collective memory.

Minor

2016. Humanities Research Grant. University of Otago.

2015. Humanities Research Grant. University of Otago.

2014. Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey. TÜBİTAK-ULAKBİM-UBYT publication award.

2013. Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey. TÜBİTAK-ULAKBİM-UBYT publication award.

2012 (x2). Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey. TÜBİTAK-ULAKBİM-UBYT publication award.

Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Doctoral fellowship. 2003-2007.

Events
Issues in Philosophy of Memory 2

Issues in Philosophy of Memory 2. 2019. Università degli Studi Roma Tre. Organizers: K. Michaelian, F. Ferretti, E. Cosentino.

New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory

poster for New Directions in the Philosophy of MemoryNew Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. 25-26 October 2016. University of Otago. Organizer: Kourken Michaelian. [program]

Talks:

  • Dorothea Debus. Handle with care: On the fragility of recollective memories, and some ethical implications.
  • Jordi Fernández. Functionalism and the nature of episodic memory.
  • Philip Gerrans. Subjective presence in mental time travel.
  • Kourken Michaelian. Confabulating, misremembering, relearn- ing: The simulation theory of memory and unsuccessful remembering.
  • Denis Perrin. The procedural nature of episodic memory.
  • André Sant'Anna. Thinking about events: A pragmatic account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought.
  • John Sutton. Shared remembering and distributed affectivity: In- timacy, memory, and emotion-regulation.
  • Chloe Wall. Are memory and testimony analogous?


Memory Day 2015

poster for Memory Day 2015Memory Day 2015. 6-9 December 2015. University of Otago. Organizing committee: Evelyn Tribble, Amanda Barnier, Kourken Michaelian, Elaine Reese. [program]


Epistemic Norms from a Naturalistic Viewpoint: Interdisciplinary Perspectives

poster for Epistemic Norms from a Naturalistic Viewpoint: Interdisciplinary PerspectivesEpistemic Norms from a Naturalistic Viewpoint: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. 7-8 October 2010. Institut Jean-Nicod. Organizers: Joëlle Proust and Kourken Michaelian. [program]

Talks:

  • Fabian Dorsch. Reasons and requirements.
  • Pascal Engel. Cognitivism about epistemic norms.
  • Georgy Gergely. Psychological Essentialism: The origins of representing artifact kinds.
  • Christopher Hookway. Some norms of perception.
  • Asher Koriat. Subjective convictions and social consensus: Evidence from research on social attitudes and social beliefs.
  • Jennifer Nagel. Epistemic anxiety.
  • David Over and Angelo Gilio. Inferring conditionals from disjunctions: A psychological and probabilistic study.
  • Joëlle Proust. On the nature of epistemic norms.
  • Beate Sodian. Development of epistemic norm sensitivity in children.
  • Dan Sperber. Epistemic vigilance and epistemic norms.
  • Jonathan Weinberg. What good are disagreements?

Supervision
Current students
Completed students
  • Özge Dural Özer. M.A. thesis. 2012-2013. Middle East Technical University. Co-supervisor.
Teaching

poster for PHIL458PHIL458: Themes in the philosophy of memory (semester 2 2017)

This paper provides an advanced introduction to the philosophy of memory. The paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach and can be taken by nonphilosophy students. Undergraduates are welcome. Email me for permission to enrol.

Topics will be determined as we go, on the basis of student interest. Potential topics include:

Readings will be assigned as we go and distributed electronically. The emphasis will be on cutting-edge work in the area, and we’re likely to read chapters from the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, in addition to recent articles.

Assessment: In-class presentations and research essays.

Other
Editorial roles

2017-present. Editorial board member. Memory Studies.

2016-present. Associate editor. Frontiers in Psychology, Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology specialty section.

2015-2017. Book reviews co-editor. Memory Studies.

Referee work

Journals:

  • Abstracta
  • American Philosophical Quarterly
  • Analysis
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  • British Journal for the History of Philosophy
  • Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • Cognitive Systems Research
  • Consciousness and Cognition
  • Dialectica
  • Ergo
  • Erkenntnis
  • Episteme
  • European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
  • Frontiers in Psychology
  • History of Philosophy Quarterly
  • Journal of Applied Philosophy
  • Language & Communication
  • Memory Studies
  • Mind
  • Mind & Language
  • Minds and Machines
  • Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
  • Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
  • Philosophia
  • Philosophical Explorations
  • Philosophical Papers
  • Philosophical Psychology
  • Philosophical Quarterly
  • Philosophical Studies
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
  • Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage
  • Synthese
  • Theoria
  • Topoi
  • Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science

Publishers:

  • Bloomsbury
  • Routledge
  • Springer

Funding agencies:

  • Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (France)
  • Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (Flanders)
  • Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Conferences:

  • Society for Philosophy and Psychology. 2016.
  • Canadian Philosophical Association. 2009, 2010.
  • Minds, Bodies, and Problems. Bilkent, 2012.

Interdisciplinary structures

2017-present. Otago Memory Group. Organizers: K. Michaelian, E. Reese, L. Tribble.

International cooperation

10–12/2018 (TBC). Visiting researcher. Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

07–09/2018 (TBC). Visiting researcher. University of Cologne.

04-05/2017. Visiting researcher. Université Grenoble Alpes.

02/2017. Visiting researcher. Università degli Studi Roma Tre.

11/2016. Visiting researcher. Ruhr-Universität Bochum.

06-07/2016. Faculty member. Understanding Communication and Understanding Minds: The Role of Metarepresentations (summer school). Central European University.

06/2016. Visiting researcher. Université Grenoble Alpes.

2016-present. Member. Imperfect Cognitions Research Network.

2015-present. Member. European Network for Practical Reason and Normative Psychology. Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature. University of Oslo.

2013-2015. Member. Extended Knowledge project. Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind, and Normativity. University of Edinburgh.

05/2013. Erasmus faculty exchange. University of Cologne.